He undertook to prove by elaborate calculations that the greater part
of the volunteers could not at the best arrive on the Rio Grande before
the first week in August; and, since that would be the rainy season,
when the hoofs of mules and horses would be unfit for hard use, and
various other difficulties would arise, he recommended that most of the
new troops, after remaining under instruction at salubrious points in
the United States during the summer, should be placed upon that river by
September 25, so as to make, with the volunteers and regulars already
there, 25,000 or possibly 30,000 healthy, properly equipped and more or
less trained soldiers, ready to invade Mexico in a decisive manner. In
the execution of this plan he did not intend to shirk or dally.[9.28]
May 15 he gave the chiefs of the general staff directions about throwing
supplies of all kinds upon the various rendezvous in advance of the
volunteers, prompted the quartermaster general to obtain wagons, and
even called attention to the necessity of seasonably obtaining light
boats for the navigation of the Rio Grande.[9.30]
His feeling was, however, particularly after news of what he called
Taylor's "great and brilliant victories" arrived, that it would not seem
proper--especially to military men--for him to supersede that officer
except with heavy reinforcements; and no doubt he saw it would scarcely
enhance a prestige that was dear to him personally and invaluable to him
as the commander-in-chief, to lie idle in hot mud for several months. He
therefore proposed to leave Washington about May 30, give his personal
attention to the troops and supplies _en route_ and at the rendezvous,
and reach the scene of action a little before them.[9.30]
Such procrastination disgusted Polk, and such "schemes" annoyed
Marcy, both of whom doubtless had an eye on political considerations.
Democratic members of Congress protested that Scott was slow, and
also that, if successful in Mexico, he would be the ruin of their
party. In short, it seemed necessary to get rid of him.[9.29] May
19, therefore, without saying a word to Scott, the secretary of war
had a provision attached to the bill which finally became the law of
June 18, enabling the Executive to appoint an officer new to the army
as commander-in-chief of the volunteers, and at the end of the war
eliminate Scott entirely. This led to sharp language between Marcy and
Scott.[9.30]
Marcy, the politician, intimated that the militia, who had gone to
Taylor's assistance and were to serve only three months, must have a
chance to do something, and Scott, the soldier, declined to take the
field if liable to be fired on from the rear. In one of his notes the
General remarked that he had taken for lunch merely "a hasty plate of
soup"--a fact that really proved his extreme devotion to the business in
hand; and in another he specified a number of the reasons why a summer
campaign was not feasible. At this juncture, too, a private note of his,
to the effect that no eastern man, Whig or West Pointer was likely to
be given a commission, turned up at the White House. Polk regarded the
note as disrespectful, and also thought the expression "fire upon my
rear" was a reflection on the Executive. Scott protested that his words
referred to Marcy and the members of Congress, and apparently did all he
could, without sacrificing his professional convictions, to satisfy the
President; but his efforts were in vain.[9.30]
The army on the Rio Grande was now out of danger; Taylor seemed not
so extremely incompetent after all; and Scott was still a scientific,
visionary schemer and a promising candidate for the chair of state, whom
it was more politic to disgrace than to honor. Polk decided therefore
that he was meddlesome, insubordinate, hostile, foolish, vindictive
and untrustworthy, a procrastinating obstructionist, and above all
a "violent partisan"; and on May 25 he received orders to stay at
Washington and hasten the preparations. His correspondence with Marcy
was published. The big dogs and little--Blanche, Tray and all--began
to bark. He was called a farrier general for speaking of hoofs, and
"Marshal Tureen" for admitting that he took soup. His off-hand remarks
were termed flippant, his close calculations fussy, and his deliberate
plans dilatory. His allusion to the "rear," fully justified by what had
occurred and what was to follow, seemed even to some friendly critics
disrespectful and uncalled for. Political intrigue, not war, was said to
occupy his mind. The General has "committed suicide with a goose-quill,"
announced the Boston _Courier_; Marcy himself confided to a friend that
Scott had lost a position he would never be able to regain; and Taylor,
assigned to duty with his new brevet rank,[9.31] was continued in the
chief command.[9.30]
[THE OREGON ISSUE SETTLED]
All this while the administration felt extremely anxious, on both
domestic and international grounds, regarding the Oregon issue. The
West, which Representative Graham called "the ruling star" in Congress,
clamored for "fifty-four forty or fight." Cass admitted that he found
it necessary to sacrifice to its demand his preference for a boundary
at the forty-ninth degree, and Polk's yielding to the same pressure
is readily understood.[9.32] It was believed that England's interest
in peace would forbid her fighting the United States for a small area
of unrecognized value, and the Democratic leaders probably had no
expectation of getting into a war. The British Cabinet, however, had
its public to deal with, and felt that it could not live a day should
it appear submissive to American "bullying." Hence on February 4, 1846,
when the United States finally rejected arbitration, the two nations
were almost at the grips.[9.33]
Yet each contained powerful elements favorable to accommodation. The
strong tone of the American government impressed England, and Polk
realized that while compromising on the lower line would anger the
Northwest, an opposite course might throw upon him the responsibility
of disrupting his party, ruining his administration, and plunging the
country into an abyss. The American Congress, like the people, took
a more and more serious view of the situation; and the roar of the
"fifty-four forty" men subsided into a growl. On a hint from the United
States Great Britain presented in May a compromise practically similar
to that which her minister at Washington had rejected the previous year.
The Senate, whose advice Polk asked in order to escape from his radical
declarations, recommended the acceptance of it on June 12, and the
crisis ended.[9.33]
During the same anxious period a less public negotiation also was on
foot. There were signs of a revolution in Mexico, and it behooved Polk
to consider who might come to the front. Farías and Almonte had many
partisans, and both were hostile to the United States; but Santa Anna,
now living in exile near Havana and spending his time on gamecocks,
monte and a huge mail from Mexico, seemed quite likely to regain the
power; and it was believed that his intelligence, ambition and knowledge
of his country's weakness, combining in favor of peace, were more than
enough to offset any stirrings of patriotic enthusiasm in his breast.
Reports from trustworthy sources--particularly from Slidell, Consul
Dimond at Vera Cruz, and Consul Black at Mexico--tended to support this
belief;[9.34] and it was understood also that past actions and present
circumstances bound Santa Anna to oppose all European and monarchical
designs upon Mexico. Not having begun the conflict with the United
States, he could pronounce peace a necessity, it was thought, and throw
upon Paredes all the odium of the abortive war. Moreover A. J. Atocha,
a naturalized American citizen, who had been a confidant and tool of
Santa Anna, had assured Polk in February that the General, should he
regain power, would be ready to treat.[9.35] From the despatches of
the Spanish minister at Mexico we know that it was impossible, as Polk
asserted, to prevent a man possessing large resources from landing on
the Mexican coast; and it seemed evident that Santa Anna's presence in
the country, should he fail to regain power and make a treaty, would in
all probability lead to a distracting civil war. On the day Polk signed
the war bill, an order[9.36] to let him pass through our blockading
squadron off Vera Cruz was, therefore, issued to Commodore Conner.[9.38]
[NEGOTIATIONS WITH SANTA ANNA]
And this was not all. Though deeply distrustful of Atocha, Polk seems
to have derived from a conversation with him the idea of despatching a
secret emissary to Santa Anna, and on the evening of July 5 Commander
Mackenzie of the United States navy arrived at Havana.[9.37] Two days
later he passed three hours with the ex-dictator, informing him of the
order to let him pass, and giving him the substance of a conversation
with Polk, in which the President had expressed these interesting
sentiments: first, a hope of seeing the General once more in authority;
secondly a desire for peace--on the basis of a boundary _via_ the
Rio Grande and thence west, ample payment in cash for the territory
thus transferred, and permanent friendly relations with Mexico; and,
thirdly, a willingness to stop military operations and send a minister,
should Santa Anna, on regaining his former position, be willing to
negotiate.[9.38]
In reply the General drew up a note, which was copied by Mackenzie
and then destroyed. In this he professed liberal intentions regarding
commerce and politics, anti-monarchical and anti-European principles,
and a disposition--in case the United States would promote his
"patriotic desires"--to respond with a treaty of the desired sort.
Taylor, he said, must promote the scheme by marching to Saltillo,
forcing Paredes to fight, defeating him, and then advancing perhaps
to San Luis Potosí, so as to constrain the Mexicans of all parties
to recall the Hero of Tampico; and he offered valuable hints about
attacking Tampico and Vera Cruz, which seemed to attest his sincerity.
Mackenzie then took his leave, and, impressed by Santa Anna's military
suggestions, transcended his instructions by visiting Taylor on the way
home--thus rendering himself and his mission unduly conspicuous.[9.38]
In these ways, combining diplomacy and force as he loved to do, Polk
imagined that our Mexican crisis had been fully met.
X
THE LEADERS ADVANCE
May-September, 1846
On taking possession of Matamoros Taylor pitched his tent in the shade
of a small tree about half a mile from town, and there he remained.
Dressed in attakapas pantaloons and a linen roundabout he sat enthroned
on a box cushioned with an Arkansas blanket, and for dinner-table had a
couple of rough blue chests. The slight pursuit of Arista and the search
for concealed ordnance, arms and munitions did not require his personal
attention. June 6 Lieutenant Colonel Wilson with his four companies of
the First Infantry, Price's company of rangers and two of Bragg's guns
under Lieutenant Thomas, the future "Rock of Chickamauga," marched for
Reynosa, about sixty miles distant by the road, which had asked for
the protection of American troops,[10.1] and on the fifteenth Captain
McCulloch and his company were sent off on a scouting expedition; but
the General had ample time for reflection, and his thoughts were not
entirely agreeable.[10.2]
Despite newspaper glorification, the low opinion of his abilities that
was entertained by the officers must have impinged somewhat upon his
consciousness. Captain Larnard, in fact, believed that he not only
realized his inadequacy, but longed to retire; and certainly Taylor's
private letters exhibited the profoundest mental discomfort. Scott
should come, he insisted over and over again; the campaign would be a
failure, and the officer conducting it would be ruined. He distrusted
the intentions of the administration, and he condemned its policy. As
early as May 9 he feared too many volunteers--whom he disliked--were
coming; by May 20 he knew what Gaines had done; and Scott's letter of
May 18 informed him that about 20,000 such troops were "to march upon
Mexico."[10.2]
[THE TROOPS ON THE RIO GRANDE]
Under this head all his fears were realized. First, three-months
men (militia) sent for by himself in April, then six-months men
called out by Gaines, and then twelve-months men raised under the
war bill poured in. By June 3 his army had risen to nearly 8000.
Three weeks later the First Tennessee Infantry--advance guard of
the Congressional troops--appeared, and it found on the scene six
regiments from Louisiana, one from St. Louis, one from Kentucky, seven
companies from Alabama and twelve or fifteen from Texas. All of these
had come in response to the calls of Taylor or Gaines; and some had
been on the ground more than a month. In all about 8000 of these two
classes arrived, and in accordance with Taylor's desire nearly all of
them--except a very few, who agreed to serve twelve months--were sent
home about the first of August.[10.3] Before they took their leave,
at least 20,000 American soldiers were on the Rio Grande, besides an
inevitable number of American civilians more or less directly connected
with the army or not connected at all; and by far the greater part of
their subsistence had to come, of course, from the United States.[10.4]
The men were stationed in a series of camps. The best of all these was
probably at Point Isabel, where the dry, undulating ground and fresh
breezes made for health and comfort. Fort Polk, as the station was
now called, included about fifty acres. The shallowness of the harbor
impaired the convenience of the Point somewhat, however; and the primary
camp lay three or four miles away at the north end of Brazos Island,
which consisted of low hills on the side toward the mainland, a swamp in
the centre, a wreck-strewn beach on the outer side, and in general three
blades of grass to fifty square feet of sand, as Lieutenant George B.
McClellan wrote home. Here, too, the air was excellent; but the brackish
water caused many complaints, and the sand blew into everything--hair,
nose, eyes and food. Marching the entire length of the island the
soldiers found themselves, at its southern end, about eighty yards from
the mainland, waded across the bayou or strait known as Boca Chica, and
after going about seven miles farther came to another camp and group of
storehouses, ten miles or so from their point of departure, called Mouth
of the Rio Grande, where the river steamers tied up or anchored.[10.5]
Here, as at Camp Brazos, the ground was "working A live with magotes and
land crabs," as a soldier put it; but the same breezes usually tempered
the heat. Eight miles from the Gulf by land--twenty-five or thirty by
water--one came to Burrita, a cluster of huts on a ridge close to the
stream, and this high ground was made the site of a roomy camp. On the
opposite side of the river and separated from it by a mile of swamp lay
Camp Belknap, a spot fit only for the snakes, tarantulas, centipedes,
fleas, scorpions and ants that infested it. Above this point lay several
more camps,[10.6] and still others enveloped Matamoros.[10.7]
Except Belknap all of these places were fairly salubrious for men of
reasonable prudence, and several of them distinctly healthful; yet
considerable sickness prevailed. At Brazos Island a sort of dysentery
made trouble, and by some the water of the Rio Grande itself was thought
injurious. Until May 13 no funds available for tents had been within
the reach of Quartermaster General Jesup; and after this difficulty
was removed, feeling that he could not wait for duck, he used, common
muslin, which let the rain through; and many of the troops, even
regulars, had no protection against the weather except a screen of brush
or a blanket thrown over a bush. Measles invaded the camps, and lying
on the damp ground made the disease fatal in many instances. What was
worse, the heedlessness and homesickness of the volunteers caused much
sickness even at Point Isabel. The regulars, however, were comparatively
healthy and contented.[10.7]
The heat, softened by constant breezes, was thought by many less
oppressive than in Tennessee and Kentucky, though sometimes men fainted
at the drills. Bathing proved a valuable resource; and on the seashore
there were oysters, crabs and a large variety of beautiful fish to catch
and eat. Stately processions of herons and scarlet-winged flamingos
and the chatter of jackdaws and many other birds amused the soldiers;
and some of those addicted to sport discussed the project of crossing
the mosquitos with gamecocks, we are told. The roar of the sea and
the mirages along the river, innumerable flowers, the solemn _burros_
(donkeys) almost buried by their loads, the Mexicans vending eatables at
exorbitant prices, the long lines of tents where such a luxury as tents
existed, target shooting, and now and then the muffled drum helped
occupy one's attention. On July 5 occurred a Sunday and a sermon--the
last of the campaign. At sunset a tremulous orange haze in the west
was due, followed by the twinkling lights of the camp, that were so
agreeable to view from a distance, and then by the howling of wolves,
the tenor chorus of the swamps, and the agonized baritone fugues of
the donkeys. It was now time for singing, story-telling and, above
all, gambling--perhaps Old Sledge on a blanket, perhaps Chuckle-luck,
perhaps monte, perhaps faro; and now and then came a fandango (dance)
on the hard ground with such American and Mexican women as there were.
The camp life was "a rough furnace and a hot fire," wrote Sergeant
Miller; but the novelty of it soon wore off, and the volunteers grew
discontented.[10.7]
[THE MORALE OF THE ARMY]
They had come for glory and a good time, and were having neither. They
wanted to do something, and to do it at once or go home. One at least of
them believed that assignment to garrison duty would have led to general
desertion. Wherever they were, they panted to be somewhere else. Having
come to gamble, with their lives for a stake, they clamored to have the
game begin. If there was no enemy to fight, they were ready to fight
friends; and in one of the many brawls and riots Colonel Baker was shot
in the neck. Four or five months of training under expert officers and
strict discipline were necessary to prepare regulars for the field;[10.8]
and naturally these volunteers, almost wholly alien to the habits,
feelings and efficiency of the real soldier, often felt at liberty to
thwart and even defy their commander, and were unable to coöperate with
him intelligently when really disposed to do so. In spite of positive
orders they wasted ammunition recklessly, and Lieutenant Meade thought a
day passed in his tent no less perilous than a stiff battle.[10.11]
The officers were very similar. One brigadier general came with a light
buggy, in which he proposed to make the campaign. Another had enlisted
as a private, and, not being deemed worthy to command the company, had
been elected a lieutenant; but the executive fiat provided him with
qualifications. "In the name of God," wrote a soldier to Senator Allen,
don't let Hamer be a brigadier general; he is talented, but doesn't
dare undertake to drill a squad; yet the commission was issued.[10.9]
Pillow, another of the same rank, ambitious to figure but not acquainted
with his proper work, did what was not proper. Some of the volunteer
generals on horseback reminded Lieutenant Jamieson of the line,
"Woe to the mullein-stalk that came in our way."
Persons of a mature age, who had bulked large at home, would not stoop
to plod through the rudiments of a new profession. Even good officers
were in fear of the letters written by their men and the revenge that
might be taken later, should real discipline be enforced; while those
less conscientious threatened to resign if kept in the background, stood
in the way of superiors belonging to the opposite political party, in
order to prevent them from making a reputation, or even took part with
the men in the hope of getting into Congress by and by.[10.11]
In short, the volunteers were all one costly mass of ignorance,
confusion and insubordination, said Meade; while the regular officers
felt discouraged, not merely by discovering that civilians were
preferred to educated soldiers for high appointments, but by finding
themselves in the shadow and even under the command of men who had
been discharged from West Point for incapacity or from the army for
gross misconduct.[10.10] At the height of this, General Taylor, who was
disqualified by lack of experience and mental discipline for organizing
an efficient staff, and therefore needed to use his own eyes and his
own voice, held aloof. "I very seldom leave my tent," he wrote on July
25, adding helplessly, "How it will all end time alone must tell."
Besides, every mail brought letters about the Presidency to distract his
attention.[10.11]
Probably he saw he had blundered. On April 26 he knew that war had
begun, and called upon Louisiana and Texas for soldiers with a view
to the invasion of Mexico, which he must have believed, under the
circumstances, that his government wished. By the rules of the service
it was then his duty, as he well knew, to make requisitions for
everything the campaign would require,[10.12] and a zealous commander,
gathering--as Taylor had been instructed to do--all the information he
could find regarding the local conditions, might reasonably have sent on
to Washington with it an able officer to assist the department. With a
scorn, however, for science and vision that should have delighted Polk,
Taylor did neither; but, assuming that the Mexicans would not fight--if
at all--north of the mountains beyond Monterey, he determined to advance
with about 6000 men. Unfortunately he neglected to have his engineers
inspect the three steamboats on which his plan depended, and these
proved to be worm-eaten and practically useless.[10.13]
[TROOPS ADVANCE]
About the middle of June, boats for the Rio Grande began to be
despatched from New Orleans, but--in addition to mishaps at the coast
resulting from gales and the freaks of the shifting bars--a serious
embarrassment soon occurred above. A direct advance against Monterey by
land was deemed impracticable, because the route lacked water. Taylor
had therefore planned to have his troops march to Camargo, the head of
navigation toward that city, and send their supplies to that point by
the river; but during the first eleven days of July rain fell heavily
and flooded the country. The freshet, however, ensured a sufficient
depth in the Rio Grande, and on July 6 the Seventh Infantry set out
for Camargo. The distance, called about 120 miles by land, was more
than twice as long by water; and the river wandered about so much that
according to humorous natives a bird could never get across--always
alighting on some projection of the bank from which it had risen. It
proved a hard task for the light and feeble steamboats, with only
green wood for the boilers, to stem the fierce current; the pilots
were unacquainted with the difficulties of such navigation;[10.14] and
in making one of the sharp turns a boat was frequently caught by the
current, and swept downstream or against the bank--breaking the rudder
perhaps.[10.16]
But in one way or another the steamers puffed ahead past great
cornfields, and occasionally there was a small village, where the people
stared in wonder at the strange craft, and the girls laughed and shouted
to see the soldiers throw kisses to them. After some 200 miles of this
came Reynosa on a high limestone point, dominated by a heavy, stunted
church tower like an ancient castle; and, farther along, the mouth of
the Alcantro was passed. The country became still better now, with
fertile valleys running back to the tablelands; and not only corn but
potatoes, wheat, beans, and cotton could be seen. Forty miles of such a
landscape, and the steamboats entered the San Juan; and after struggling
on for three or four more they stopped early on July 14 at Camargo,
where Captain Miles, who commanded the regiment, sent at once for the
alcalde, an official who acted as mayor, judge and _pater familias_ in
a Mexican town, and formally took possession. The rest of the regular
infantry pursued the same route as fast as possible, and on July 30 most
of the volunteers were ordered to do so.[10.16]
[Illustration: FROM MATAMORE TO MONTEREY]