the interest of the peculiar institution in connection with our Mexican
problem. The debates of Congress are equally barren. Soon after the
war opened, as we shall discover, northeastern Mexico seemed ready
to join the United States or accept our protection, and there is no
sign that the slavocracy attempted to improve the opportunity. The
politicians most eager to acquire Mexican territory were Dickinson
of New York, Hannegan of Indiana and Walker, an anti-slavery man. A
northern correspondent of Calhoun wrote that many in New York insisted
on extending that way "to augment the strength of the non-slaveholding
states," while a Mobile correspondent said, "I would let the war
continue forever before I would take 697,000 [square miles] of
territory, which must be free territory." A meeting in Ohio declared
for taking all of that country, and this does not seem to have been
paralleled in the South. South Carolina was preëminently the champion
of slavery, yet Governor Aiken publicly opposed making acquisitions in
that quarter. Calhoun, the leader of the southern ultras there and
elsewhere, did the same. So did Waddy Thompson, Botts, Toombs, Lumpkin,
Campbell and many other southerners. W. R. King said that while the
South would insist--as a point of pride and right--upon sharing the
benefit of any territory gained from Mexico, it was a gross libel to
represent her as desiring to increase in that way the strength of
slavery.[9.14]
King deplored the war. One of the South Carolina Senators wrote
that it was detested nowhere more than in his state. In Georgia,
too, the conflict was bitterly opposed. The people did not desire
the war, said Toombs. Half of the slaveholders oppose it, admitted
Ritchie, a Virginian, editor of the administration organ. Besides
all other objections, it was pointed out that the southern policy of
conservatism and her stand for a strict construction of the Constitution
would be endangered by absorbing a large area mainly populated by
extremely inferior aliens. To combat all this evidence, we find hardly
anything[9.11] except the characteristic hints, imaginings and
assertions of certain abolitionists.[9.14]
On the other hand, the evidence that the annexation of Texas was
essentially the cause[9.12] of the war is impressive both in quantity
and in quality.[9.13] Benton, Clay, Robert C. Winthrop, Stephen A.
Douglas, Andrew Johnson and many other public men agreed on this point.
As Van Buren and substantially all the Whig organs had predicted
that immediate annexation would entail war with Mexico, they must
be counted in the same class. Charles Sumner drew up a resolution
declaring that such was the primary cause, and it passed the legislature
of Massachusetts, where the subject was rather closely studied, by
overwhelming majorities. The House committee on foreign affairs took
that ground in its report of February 24, 1847. All agree upon this,
was Winthrop's declaration. Paredes expressed the same view in the most
formal manner. The Mexican minister of war under the government that
overthrew Paredes publicly endorsed it; and at least two well-qualified
foreign observers, Duflot de Mofras and the biographer of Lord Aberdeen,
took the same view. Indeed, the proposition seems demonstrated by the
plain course of events.[9.14]
The mere annexation of Texas cannot, however, be regarded as the sole
cause of the war. But for the loudly expressed wrath of the Americans,
due mainly to Mexican barbarities in Texas and outrages upon the persons
and property of American citizens, Mexico would have been far less
irritable, and the annexation difficulty, which came so near to being
patched up, might have been adjusted; while, as Polk maintained, if
the policy of the United States regarding our claims had been firm,
consistent and strong from the first, Mexico would not have dared to
risk so much in dealing with us later.[9.14]
The general cause of hostilities was, therefore, the series of
unpleasant incidents occurring in the mutual relations of the two
countries from the scandalous treatment of Poinsett down to the
scandalous treatment of Slidell, from the first mutterings of discontent
in Texas down to the setting of her one fair star in the broad sea of
the American Union; and in this long series the annexation of Texas was
the chief event.[9.14]
But one can speak much more definitely. For a term of years, mainly
in consequence of the use made of these affairs by self-seeking
politicians, the people of Mexico had fed on the ideas of despising,
fearing, hating and fighting the United States; Paredes had gained
supreme authority on this basis; public sentiment demanded that he
should pursue the route marked out by his professions; to beat the small
and apparently demoralized American army, led by a backwoods general,
seemed quite feasible; it appeared likely that a victory would confirm
the dictator's power, while a failure to strike would ensure his doom;
and hence an attack upon our army was ordered. This was the precise
cause of the war.[9.14]
[THE WAR MEASURES]
Let us now return to Congress. The war bill of May 13 gave the President
authority to use the army, the navy, the militia and not more than
50,000 volunteers--to serve twelve months after reaching the rendezvous
"or to the end of the war, unless sooner discharged"--to expend not more
than $10,000,000, to complete the vessels of war already authorized,
and to purchase additional vessels. By other Acts he was authorized
(May 13) to increase by enlistment the number of privates in the
regular army from sixty-four to not over one hundred per company, thus
bringing the rank and file up to 15,540; a company of sappers, miners
and pontoniers and a regiment of mounted riflemen, originally intended
to protect emigrants and traders on the Oregon route, were created
(May 15 and 19); and numerous details concerning organization were
either prescribed or entrusted to the Executive (June 18 and 26).[9.15]
Under the last head authority was given to appoint all the necessary
general officers.[9.16] Meantime (May 13) the President issued a war
proclamation, modelled upon that of 1812, in which he announced that an
appeal had been made to "the last resort of injured nations"; and the
state department (May 14) sent a confidential circular to our agents
abroad, explaining that we had taken up arms reluctantly, and "solely
for the purpose of conquering an honorable and permanent peace."[9.17]
"The war sense of the United States," it has been remarked, "seems to
be in inverse ratio to its war spirit;" and in general the military
measures of the government exhibited more zeal than discretion. In
particular they put into action the very system that had proved
disastrous a generation before. For this Taylor was primarily
responsible, for after having seen the war of 1812 and that of Florida
languish and crawl, he strongly urged that volunteers be called out for
one year of service. Polk's Message deepened the mischief by expressing
confidence in raw troops, although in 1838 the secretary of war had
assured him that the difference in expense between volunteers and
regulars was "at least as four to one," besides the waste resulting
from their total ignorance of administration, the cost of marching
to and from distant points for short periods of service, and the
disproportionate growth of the pension list.[9.18] The President was
indeed authorized to increase the number of privates in a regular
company, but the roll of officers remained as before; and enlistment
was not stimulated, as it might have been, by adding something to the
pay.[9.19]
Having a choice between a definite and an indefinite period, the
volunteers were sure, as Marcy foresaw, to elect the former,
although--as the sequel appeared to show--a sufficient number
would almost certainly have engaged for the war, had that been the
only proposal. The Mexicans were commonly regarded as cowardly and
inefficient. Very few Americans expected them to hold out as long
as they did; and intending volunteers would naturally have counted,
therefore, upon returning soon. There were also the enthusiastic
feelings natural at the opening of a war, and a deep interest resulting
from the supposed peril of Taylor's army. Yet the government chose to
accept gratuitously the risk, which in due time became a certainty, of
embarrassing itself, disappointing the country and encouraging the enemy
by offering a brief term of service.[9.19]
Instead of retaining control of the organization and officering of the
regiments, it entrusted this work to the states, and as a rule the men
chose their own officers;[9.20] but in these features of the system, as
in our governmental methods generally, there was some advantage as well
as much loss. Webster, for example, held that volunteers ought to have
the right of electing for leaders men whom they knew and could trust;
and if they preferred, to sicken and bleed under captains as ignorant as
themselves, whom they knew and could trust, rather than fare otherwise
under trained officers whom they would have had to obey without fully
understanding them, they were perhaps entitled to the privilege, and no
doubt they learned something from exercising it. Anyhow, said Webster,
the other method would have been degrading; and American citizens must
not be degraded. As for generals, the law of June 18 compelled the
Executive to take them from the militia, although they would be under
no obligation to serve more than three months, and might withdraw in
the midst of a campaign. There was no provision for filling vacancies
resulting from death or discharge; and finally the appropriations were
so poorly arranged that the quartermaster's office had to juggle with
funds as even Polk himself could not lawfully have done.[9.19]
Such as it was, however, the system went promptly into effect. Beginning
on May 15, the secretary of war sent requisitions for volunteers to the
governors of the states, deeming this method of application advantageous
as well as due to their official position, since they were supposed
to know the troops of their jurisdictions and the best places from
which to draw them. In general the plan was to summon about 25,000
from the northeastern states, to be enrolled and await orders, and to
call out nearly as many from the other states for immediate service.
The former were all to be infantry; the latter, horse and foot in the
ratio of about one to three. It was expected that existing militia
organizations--regiments or parts of regiments--would offer their
services, and that new men would fill the ranks as they felt moved
to come forward. Not only privates but officers were to approach the
national service by that portal, and then be mustered into the army at
the appointed state rendezvous by a United States officer detailed for
the purpose.[9.21] In four days the calls were nearly all on their
way.[9.24]
The purpose of distributing requisitions over the whole country was to
interest every state, Polk explained; and to stimulate the executive
officials he urged upon the secretary of war the most prompt and
energetic action and personal attention to each detail, insisting for
his own part upon being kept "constantly advised of every important
step that was taken."[9.22] This charge Marcy accepted with all
seriousness.[9.23] Whether bowing his massive head ponderously over a
big desk, sifting callers with keen glances through shaggy brows, or
giving instructions to subordinates in a voice roughened with snuff, he
devoted his faculties to his task with a rare power of concentration.
But he preferred the quiet of his home; and there, comfortably wrapped
in his dressing gown with a box of the brown powder and an old red
handkerchief on the table, he did his best work.[9.24]
Polk believed, or tried to believe, that "multitudes" were eager to
volunteer, but others feared it would not be easy to raise troops
after so long a peace. Strong influences were at work, however. Though
evidently the fireside was not in danger, patriotism urged men to take
the field, for did not the nation call?
"Arm! arm! your country bids you arm!
Fling out your banners free--
Let drum and trumpet sound alarm,
O'er mountain, plain and sea;"
thus wrote Park Benjamin the day Polk signed the war bill. A longing to
escape from the dulness of bare existence, ambition to see the world
and test one's powers, a passion for adventure and frolic in a far
clime believed to be all glitter, beauty and romance, the prospect of
revelling in the Halls of Montezuma, a feeling that one who was not
"in it" would have to spend the rest of his days explaining why, the
expectation of honors and popularity that would make success easy in any
pursuit, quarrels with sweethearts or hopes of becoming irresistible
to the "girls," were among the motives. For the high officers it was a
"political tour," said one of them; and with everybody the barbarities
perpetrated by the Mexicans in Texas counted for much. The hardships of
campaigning were unknown. While every one understood that some would
fall, it was practically impossible for an ardent young fellow, well
and strong, to imagine his particular person stretched lifeless on
the ground; or, if such an end was ever contemplated, it appeared as
something quick, unfelt amidst the excitement, and sweetened by the
greatness of one's cause.[9.24]
Behind all of this lay certain facts too deep for the soldiers
themselves to perceive, but not too deep for them to feel. One
instinctively shunned that "misery of cowardice," which--as Pericles
told the Athenians--is more dreadful to men of spirit than death in
battle. As the ages have demonstrated, man is naturally a fighting
animal, and therefore he finds in war the keenest sense of his vital
selfhood. It is our chief glory to will and to do; and in mortal
combat this glory is more intense, if not more real, than in peaceful
occupations. Besides, if a man comes to his end in being supremely
himself, he triumphs over death, and indeed he wins another victory,
too, for life--so rich in menaces--can threaten him no longer. The
validity of nearly all these motives was more or less transitory. When,
for example, a man had proved that he could face a cannon, it seemed
unnecessary to keep on facing it. But while they lasted, they were
strong.[9.24]
In almost every section, therefore, except New England, where the
annexation of Texas could not yet be forgiven, the war spirit rose high,
astonishing even the most sanguine. At New York the walls were covered
with placards headed, "Mexico or Death," or "Ho, for the halls of the
Montezumas!" and the streets echoed to the song:
"Come all ye gallant volunteers
Who fear not life to lose,
The martial drum invites ye come
And join the Hickory Blues:
The gallant Hickory Blues,
The daring Hickory Blues--
To Mexico they proudly go,
The gallant Hickory Blues."
[TROOPS COME FORWARD]
At Philadelphia 20,000 citizens of all parties gathered "to sustain the
country." In the central states banks advanced money without security,
farmers' wives issued free rations, ladies made clothing and flags by
the wholesale, roads turned black with men. Ohio looked with disfavor
on the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico, regarding them as
measures favorable to slavery; yet in less than two weeks after the
requisition for volunteers arrived, three thousand of her sons were
marching to the rendezvous. At Indianapolis Lew Wallace hung out a flag
and a four-sided transparency inscribed, "For Mexico; fall in"; and
in three days his company was full. "Illinois must rally now and win
a character," James Shields wrote to Koerner; and fourteen regiments
volunteered instead of the four that could be taken.[9.24]
In Kentucky, said reports, the quota of the state was complete by May
26, and the governor had to stop the volunteering by proclamation.
Tennessee was called upon for about 3000 men, and nearly 30,000 came
forward. None would retire, and the selection was made by lot or ballot.
At Memphis troops organized before the call arrived. "May glory and
honor await them!" cried the _Daily Eagle_. St. Louis began to drill on
May 12, and in a few days the excitement was so deep and universal that
the courts adjourned. North Carolina offered more than three times her
quota.[9.24]
In the Gulf states many feared that not enough citizens would remain at
home to police the negroes. "Governor, do--if possible--get them into
the service," was the tune in Alabama. Mississippi complained bitterly
that so few of her sons had a chance. At New Orleans the roar of
business was almost drowned by a still more clamorous roar:
"The drums, the drums, the busy, busy drums,
The drums, the drums, the rattling, battling drums,
The drums, the drums, the merry, merry drums!"
As rapidly as possible Brigadier General Wool and other officers
mustered the regiments into service; and, leaving the rendezvous and the
crowds of praying, cheering people amidst the saddest good-bys and the
warmest good wishes, the volunteers bravely set out for the war.[9.24]
Before very long new views of military life began to dawn upon the
soldiers. At the old battlefield below New Orleans, where many of the
troops camped, mud and water covered what was below their boot-tops
while mosquitos covered what was above. Going down the river they
brightened at the sight of sycamores and live-oaks, draped with Spanish
moss, and of the ducks, jays, mocking-birds and Virginia nightingales,
that seemed to find life so merry. But soon the lighthouse of the
Southwest Pass was gleaming astern, the muddy water became blue, and
these landsmen were on the deep. Sharks, diving porpoises, squadrons of
nautili and shoals of little flying-fish gave them some pleasure; but
the motion, especially to men packed like sardines in the dirty holds
of schooners and small brigs or lying spoon-fashion--if there was even
room to do that--on deck, seemed horrible. On the slow voyage the water,
which was often impure, fermented sometimes, and ten cents was the price
of a wholesome drink.[9.25]
And then the Gulf storms! The wind howled; the sea opened its jaws;
the heavens were now like ink, and now one burst of flame; thunders
rolled; ropes hissed and shrieked; spars cracked, snapped and were swept
away; the vessel tossed from beam-end to beam-end; the maddened horses
almost kicked the planking from the ribs, and the men cursed, prayed
or stolidly awaited their fate. But sooner or later nearly all of them
perceived on the horizon a line of sandy beach spotted with tents.
It was Brazos Island off Point Isabel, and they anchored about four
miles from it in the open sea. Meanwhile Brevet Major General Gaines,
commanding the military department of the West, had begun on May 3 at
his own instance to requisition troops for the relief of Taylor, and a
considerable number of these men also set out for the Point.[9.25]
[THE CHOICE OF A COMMANDER]
The question of a commander now had to be decided. Polk felt little
confidence in Taylor. The General's separating his army so far from
his base and exposing both to imminent peril seemed inexcusable; and
furthermore General Scott, not only the head of the army but the famous
hero of Lundy's Lane, was the natural chief of the large forces now
called out. Certain facts, however, injured Scott's chances. He was now
almost exactly sixty years old, and many thought him, as did Senator
Fairfield, "too much of an old granny." In 1839 he had been given 57
votes at the Whig Presidential convention, and of late the brilliancy
of his political anticipations had made him look "ten feet high," said
Corwin. His want of reverence for the President's decision respecting
brevet rank had led Polk and Benton to think of banishing him to a post
on the northern frontier. General Gaines and his many friends had long
hated him; and Mrs. Gaines insisted that no one was "much," whose lips
could be covered with a button. Finally, he was called vain, and so he
appeared to be.[9.30]
But the ostentation that won him the nickname "Old Fuss and Feathers,"
in addition to being much exaggerated by report, was doubtless
attributable in large measure to military policy and respect for his
rank. No one ever saw it interfere with serious affairs, and one who
could remark on the weak point of his own personal appearance, the point
ridiculed by Mrs. Gaines, was not so extremely vain after all. The
right word for Scott was egotism. Now egotism--in others--is doubtless
a shocking trait; yet merely to seem aware of what everybody knows,
does not, as many think it does, convert merits into demerits. General
Scott had a magnificent presence--fully six feet and four inches of
height and a corresponding weight--the brightest fame as an intrepid
soldier, the honor of a long and eminent career, the first place in our
army, a high social position, superior talents and attainments, unusual
knowledge of the world, charming personal graces, and a character of
rare quality--powerful, gentle and true. That he did not dissemble nor
cloak his value was a fault; but those who felt entitled to censure him,
merely because they had no such merits to be aware of, were somewhat in
error.[9.30]
Besides, almost every great artist is egotistical, and Scott was a great
artist. In more ways than one this was true. He could instruct the baker
in the mysteries of making bread, and superintend ably the roasting
of a ham; damn his delighted black body-servant for hiding everything
and then hiding himself; rave at an admiring guest for cutting lettuce
instead of rolling it round his fork, or lament in tragic tones at whist
that he had to play against three; and the next moment he would be
analyzing a campaign of Turenne, monologuing inimitably about the great
men he had met in Europe, or criticizing and comparing the best authors
of French prose. His foibles--particularly a sensitiveness of temper, an
ambition for the Presidency and a fondness for relieving heavy thought
with light words, as Marcy did with light snuff--were numerous; the
openness of his large and generous nature, superior to the prudence of
smaller minds, prevented his concealing them; certain peculiarities of
language and manner, from a delicacy about commas to a fondness for
literary effects, were easily ridiculed; and in non-military affairs
his indiscretion was now and then glaring; but he must be described
emphatically as a soldier, a gentleman, a "character," a great general
and a great man.[9.30]
Distrusting Taylor, and profoundly alarmed about the situation on the
frontier,[9.26] Polk sent for Scott on May 13, and conferred upon him
verbally the chief command in Mexico; yet, while admitting that he saw
proofs of experience in the General's remarks, he pronounced him too
"scientific and visionary," as the master of a difficult business must
always appear to the tyro.[9.27] Probably he knew that a man could not
become a soldier overnight, as he could become a militia colonel or a
"statesman," or--in Santa Anna's opinion--a professor of jurisprudence;
but he believed that, should fighting really need to be done, even an
improvised army would make "a brisk and a short war of it," as the
administration paper neatly said, and, if necessary, dictate a peace "in
the Halls of the Montezumas." Under circumstances like these prevision
and science appeared rather superfluous. The only things needful were to
march now and triumph to-morrow.[9.30]