had been laboring for more than a month to focus Taylor's mind upon
the subject, "the old gentleman," wrote Meade, "would never listen or
give it a moment's attention," Flat-boats and scows, towed by the light
steamers belonging to the army, might have been sent from Point Isabel
into the river, and the troops, reinforcements and light batteries,
crossing at the much-used ferry of Burrita, less than twenty miles from
Matamoras, and by land appearing at the town, say, in early morning,
could probably have taken army, cannon and ammunition substantially
complete. Instead of doing anything of this description, Taylor now sent
down to Point Isabel for mortars and for plank to make into boats, and
went there himself. A slight illness delayed him further; and in eight
days nothing was accomplished in the direction suggested beyond placing
at Burrita a battalion of the First Infantry and some 200 volunteers
just landed at Point Isabel.[8.19]
Still, though let alone, Arista occupied no enviable position. He
was commonly charged with incompetence, treason or both. Many of the
officers had forsaken their troops in the hour of danger, and were now
viewed with distrust and contempt. The men felt exhausted and profoundly
disheartened. Even the dogs kept still. Provisions, ammunition and funds
were scant. Fierce complaints and recriminations became rife. Panic
brooded over all. Taylor's inaction seemed an encouraging sign, however,
and on the 17th a request for a suspension of hostilities, accompanied
with hints of a peaceful settlement, was made by Arista. This petition
Taylor rejected. But, not aware that a general's first duty in war is to
eliminate the fighting strength of the enemy, he said that Arista might
retire with his army, the sick and the wounded, if he would give up all
public property. In fact, as if anxious to fight these men again after
letting them get nicely rested, he threatened to bring Matamoros down
about their ears, unless they would move to a safer place.[8.20]
Arista had been ordered to hold the city as long as possible, but a
council of officers pronounced it indefensible; and, besides feeling no
violent wish to sacrifice himself, he doubtless realized that nobody was
ready to stand by him. He therefore ordered now an immediate retreat,
and a wild scramble ensued. The transportation facilities were entirely
inadequate. Some of the guns and ammunition had to be thrown into the
river. The troops of Canales were dismissed. A large number of men
deserted; and the rest, leaving four or five hundred sick and wounded in
the town, hurried away. Fatigues and miseries almost unspeakable were
their lot, and also for some time a terrible fear of pursuit. Heat,
cold, thirst, famine, tempest, sickness, desertion, a route lined with
dead animals, sleep in the mud as profound as the sleep of the grave,
troopers carrying their horse furniture, deaths from exhaustion or
broken hearts, and even suicides--these made up the record. Finally,
almost at the end of the month 2638 men, according to an officer,
crawled painfully into Linares, and a week later Arista received orders
to place Mejía in command.[8.21]
Taylor, all this while, had been proceeding in his deliberate way.
Boats were made and put on the river two or three miles above the town,
and early on the eighteenth troops began to cross; but when the first
of them were over, a report that Arista had retreated was confirmed,
and the greater part of the army, retracing their steps, used the
regular Anacuitas ferry. As they approached Fort Paredes the city
officials--dressed all in white, bearing white flags and riding white
horses--came forth to surrender Matamoros. No terms of capitulation were
granted, but the General said he would protect persons and property, and
allow the civil laws to continue in force; and already he had promised
to respect the religion of the people. To their surprise the Americans
appeared to find themselves among friends, for the lately implacable
but seldom tactless Mexicans came up smiling, cried "_Amigo, amigo!_"
and with sunny enthusiasm offered their hands; and although a feeble
pursuit of Arista produced only insignificant results, the victors felt
well content. Their superiority as fighting men had been demonstrated.
Their artillery had evidently surpassed the Mexican artillery in both
mechanical and personal qualities. The officers had exhibited the finest
courage, _esprit de corps_ and skill. An army supposed to outnumber ours
three to one had been scattered, and a prestige of the utmost value at
home, in Mexico and in Europe, had been gained.[8.22]
[EFFECTS OF THE BATTLES]
Regarding Taylor, thoughtful officers did not feel enthusiastic,
however. The General had shown himself slow, unskilful, wanting in
penetration and foresight, and poorly grounded professionally. Nine
tenths of the regular officers felt that no talents had been displayed
by him, even in the battles. He had shown, said Meade, "perfect
inability to make any use of the information" given him. In the opinion
of another excellent officer he seemed "_utterly, absurdly_ incompetent
to wield a large army." He had failed to realize the difficulties of his
position; had undervalued the enemy; and, as Bliss admitted, had had
"no conception" of the Mexican preparations. This last fact dimmed his
credit, even for courage, in the minds of discerning critics. But, after
all, his resolution had been superb and inspiring. He had succeeded;
and among us Americans "Nothing succeeds like success." The reports
written for him read admirably. Terse remarks of his, often tinged with
soldierly humor, delighted the general taste at home, and mere questions
of tactics or strategy signified in comparison rather less than zero.
Besides, he was so democratic--no military stiffness, no West Point
"aristocracy" about him. A tidal wave of popularity rose in his favor,
and soon Thurlow Weed of New York, the Warwick of the Whig party, came
out for him as Presidential candidate. A commission as brevet major
general and other official honors did not fail to arrive.[8.23]
At Mexico the news of these events produced utter amazement and
consternation. The public, reported the British minister, had been
assured "in the most inflated Tone that Victory would follow the
steps of the Mexican Army and that annihilation and dishonour would
be the portion of their enemies." Even General Vega, a man of sense,
had predicted a victory that would end the war. Now, alas, the cards
had fallen badly. "Profound and bitter sorrow," as it privately
admitted, was the feeling of the government. Down like a plummet went
expectations, confidence and courage; down went the plausible hope of
Paredes that all the nation, glowing with pride and enthusiasm over a
victory, would rally about him; and down also, reported Bankhead, went
his monarchical scheme, which four out of five on the Congressional
committee appointed to draft a new constitution had favored.[8.24]
IX
THE UNITED STATES MEETS THE CRISIS
May-July, 1846
Polk believed in pursuing "a bold and firm course" toward Mexico. In
this policy--as her character and methods, the comparative success of
England in dealing with her, and the many humiliating failures of the
United States indicated--he was right.[9.1] More and more positive,
during his examination of the case before and after the end of April,
1846, became his intention to place the subject before Congress in a
strong Message; and when he found that Slidell, who called at the White
House on Friday, May 8, held the same opinion, he decided to send that
Message "very soon." The next day he and the Cabinet discussed the
question at length once more. George Bancroft, secretary of the navy,
was not ready to advise the employment of force, unless Mexico should
commit a hostile act; but when, at about six o'clock, Taylor's report
of the Thornton affair presented itself, this difficulty vanished. In
the evening, at the President's request, the Cabinet reassembled, and
after another full discussion all agreed that a war Message should
be delivered to Congress on Monday. Sunday Polk worked on the paper
both before and after going to church, and conferred with leading
Congressmen. The military committee of the House, meeting in haste,
agreed unanimously to recommend 50,000 men and ten million dollars for
the prosecution of hostilities; and the Senators and Representatives
gathering in excited and quickly changing groups, anxiously discussed
and planned.[9.4]
About noon on Monday the expected Message arrived at the capitol, and
was read to thronged and agitated Houses. Our forbearance has been
misconstrued, said the President. "After reiterated menaces, Mexico has
passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and
shed American blood upon the American soil.[9.2] She has proclaimed
that hostilities have commenced, and that the two nations are now at war
... war exists, and, notwithstanding all our efforts to avoid it, exists
by the act of Mexico herself." "The most energetic and prompt measures
and the immediate appearance in arms of a large and overpowering
force are recommended to Congress as the most certain and efficient
means of bringing the existing collision with Mexico to a speedy and
successful termination." Volunteers to serve not less than six or twelve
months, with liberal financial provision for the war, were therefore
suggested; but at the same time a desire for an "amicable" as well
as early settlement of the pending difficulties was expressed, and a
pledge was given to negotiate whenever Mexico would either make or hear
proposals.[9.4]
Objections greeted the Message at once. Calhoun in particular strongly
opposed the President's fundamental idea. Hostilities have occurred,
he said; but as Congress has not acted, there is no war "according
to the sense of our Constitution." Archer, a leading Whig Senator,
concurred in this view, adding that perhaps the Mexican proceedings
had been justifiable, and that first of all a careful investigation of
the facts was requisite. Clayton, another Whig, went farther, and said
that by having Taylor advance to the Rio Grande Polk had made himself
the aggressor. There is no evidence, it was urged, that Mexico has
declared war or sanctioned hostilities. Recognition of a state of war
would extinguish all treaties with that country, jeopardize the persons
and property of our citizens on sea and land, wipe out our claims upon
Mexico, expose the nation to untold evils, and perhaps give offence in
Europe, objected others; hence let us merely authorize the President
to repel invasion. On Benton's motion the Senate divided the subject
of the Message, referring the matter of invasion to the committee on
military affairs and the broad question of waging war to that on foreign
relations.[9.3] Excellent possibilities of delay seemed to lurk in this
decision. Calhoun favored it.[9.4]
[THE ACTION OF CONGRESS]
But the House was prompt and positive. Conveniently reposing on the
table there was a bill, presumably growing out of the Oregon issue,
which proposed that Polk should be authorized to accept volunteers
and repel invasion; and this was now modified to fit the President's
recommendations. It was also given a preamble, which stated that "by
the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that
Government and the United States." This phraseology displeased most of
the Whigs; but they were powerless to change it. In the committee of
the whole about an hour and a half were allowed for a partial reading
of the Message and the accompanying documents, and thirty minutes for
debate. Amidst a great uproar the bill was then reported, ordered
without discussion to its third reading, and under the spur of the
"previous question" passed. One hundred and seventy-four supported it
and fourteen--five from Massachusetts, five from Ohio, and one each from
Maine, Rhode Island, New York and Pennsylvania--voted in the negative.
The next morning this bill was reported in the Senate.[9.4]
Calhoun pleaded now for at least a pause of twenty-four hours, and
this appeared not unreasonable, since the documents that supported the
Message had not yet come from the printer; but the party caucus had
resolved upon a course of action, and Benton and Allen, chairmen of the
committees on military affairs and foreign relations, announcing that
consideration had already been given to both aspects of the war measure,
favored immediate action. Cass made an effective speech in the same
sense; and, although a test showed that eighteen Senators objected to
the preamble, the bill, somewhat amended, was passed finally by a strong
majority--forty against only two. Calhoun, Berrien of Georgia and Evans
of Maine did not vote. Crittenden and Upham answered to their names,
"Aye, except the preamble." Webster and a few others were absent. In the
evening the House accepted the amendments, and the next day at about
one o'clock Polk received and signed the bill. Later some of the Whig
Congressmen pretended that all they had voted for was to save Taylor's
army; but the 50,000 soldiers and ten millions of money were not asked
for a mere rescue party, and it was pointed out in the discussion that
the General's fate would be decided long before the bill would give him
troops. By an overwhelming majority in both houses, then, voting in
full accord with the President and his Cabinet, war on a large scale
was provided for. "The gates of Janus are open," wrote Alexander H.
Stephens.[9.4]
[THE MOTIVES OF CONGRESS]
At every stage of these proceedings flowed a tide of real national
feeling, but there were also devious currents that need to be mentioned.
Probably few, if any, of the chief actors expected very serious trouble
with Mexico. Polk for his part assured Benton that if Congress would
recognize the war and provide large forces, he believed the affair
could speedily be terminated; and he promised to use no more funds and
men than should prove "absolutely necessary to bring the present state
of hostilities to an end." Many Congressmen, who talked with members
of the Cabinet, were told that without firing another gun the United
States would have a satisfactory treaty within four months.[9.5] The
Washington correspondent of the New York _Tribune_, an anti-slavery Whig
journal, reported that on learning of the action taken by the House
Polk said, "I shall now give you peace--I have the power." "The war was
declared as the means of peace"--as a part of the President's policy of
intimidating Mexico into making a settlement, wrote the correspondent of
the New York _Journal of Commerce_. So thought the New York _Herald_.
Merely passing the war bill will be enough, it said; and, especially
since Polk's Message exhibited the same combination of sword and olive
branch as his employing Slidell and Taylor jointly, so to speak, one
cannot well reject this view, which is supported also by evidence
previously offered.[9.10]
The Democrats, being the administration party, naturally stood by the
President,[9.6] and a wish to make the attitude of the United States
impressive and effective was an additional reason for their urgency and
haste. But probably these were not the only inducements. The party was
falling into dissensions. The Van Buren group felt indignant that New
York should occupy a secondary place in the Cabinet, and be represented
there by the Old Hunker, Marcy, while the rest of the Democrats
complained that Van Buren's faction, the Barnburners, were dictating
everything. A short, inexpensive and successful war--especially one
without gunpowder--seemed likely to please the country, provide offices,
consolidate the party, and compel the Whigs to lose prestige by
endorsing the policy of their opponents, or else to sacrifice popularity
by antagonizing it. Moreover it looked as if a discussion of Polk's
course in sending Taylor to the Rio Grande, however correct that course
had been, might prove at such a juncture dampening and vexatious; and
for all of these reasons it seemed expedient that a war bill, with
exactly the preamble already quoted, should be rushed through Congress
at the quickest pace.[9.10]
The Whigs were no less perspicacious, and they especially hated to lose
the partisan advantage of charging that Polk had been the aggressor.
Mexico has not declared war, they insisted; and with more or less
honesty they complained that a regard for sacred truth forbade them to
endorse the preamble. But their position was exceedingly delicate. Not
only had Mexico long threatened hostilities, prepared openly for them,
and severed her diplomatic relations with us at both capitals, but
she had in effect made a declaration of war. Her only official voice
at this time was that of Paredes; and his agent, Arista, an officer
of the highest rank, had given Taylor formal notice of hostilities.
Arista had been sent but recently to command against the Americans,
and nobody could reasonably suppose that he had proceeded at once to
transgress or ignore deliberately the wishes of his master in so grave
an affair.[9.10]
Taylor on the other hand had shown the most pacific disposition both in
word and in deed. Nothing serious could be alleged against us except
the peaceable joint-occupation of territory long claimed by the United
States; and in short, unless Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Pinckney and
John Quincy Adams were to be disavowed, it seemed legitimate for Polk
and for Congress to hold now that Arista's attack upon Thornton had been
the first hostile act.[9.7] The preamble, therefore, could not well be
rejected; and nearly all of the Whigs, having before their eyes the doom
of those who opposed the war of 1812, choked down some honest though
mistaken compunctions and in most cases a probably more troublesome lump
of partisan regret, and voted for the bill.[9.10]
As already has been suggested, however, there was in Congress a third
party--John C. Calhoun, and for later as well as for present reasons
it is desirable to understand his opinions. To him it seemed highly
advisable to forestall European interference, and quite possible to
avoid a conflict with Mexico, by adjusting the Oregon question before
coming decisively to an issue in the Mexican difficulty, and therefore
he thought the United States ought by all means to limit itself now
to repelling invasion. Personal reasons also led him to deplore the
prospect of a conflict in arms. The culmination of his fiery life, the
fulfilment of his brilliant dream, had seemed in April to be drawing
near. By his convenient method of bending facts and principles to his
purpose, as the sparrow makes a nest for herself, he had found it
possible to coöperate with the West in spending great sums on internal
improvements, and expected in this way to make the Northeast a helpless
minority; but he could easily see that war might empty the treasury and
bring about new political alignments. For the same reason it looked as
if his project of a low tariff also would vanish; and, as we have seen,
contemplating the possibility of secession, he did not wish[9.8] the
youth of the southern states to expend their blood in Mexico.[9.10]
Before the news of Thornton's encounter arrived he argued with Polk
against sending to Congress the proposed Message on our relations with
Mexico. During the excitement on that eventful Sunday he not only
planned with his partisans in Senate and House to oppose war, but worked
for the same purpose with leading Whigs, urging--for example--that
Mexico should be given more time to consider the risk of a conflict, as
if she had not already been speculating upon it for several years. Then
in the Senate he gravely proclaimed the truism that border hostilities
do not necessarily constitute war, and turned it into a sophism by
applying it in the present case. To compare Arista's attack upon
Thornton to an unmeaning border squabble was truly, in view of the long
series of preliminaries, ridiculous; and equally ridiculous was the
endeavor to support this fallacy with another: that since Congress had
not declared war, a state of war with Mexico could not lawfully exist at
this time.[9.9] "Is not Calhoun deranged?" exclaimed our minister at
Paris on hearing of this.[9.10]
To be sure, Congress is the only branch of our central government that
can legally declare war; but, for instance, other nations are not
hampered by our Constitution, and might attack us in such a manner as
to prevent Congress--for a time, at least--from acting. None the less
we should fight, and it would be nonsense to describe our resistance
as unconstitutional. As a matter of fact Congress did not declare war
against Mexico, and on Calhoun's theory we had no lawful war with that
country. On that theory, not only our military men, Congress and the
President, but our Supreme Court, which fully recognized the war, acted
unconstitutionally. Indeed, he himself illustrated the untenability of
his idea. In order to avoid the weakness of advocating purely defensive
operations a Whig leader, Senator Crittenden, said that by repelling
invasion he meant pursuing the enemy until we could be sure that no
repetition of the outrage would occur. This programme would have
involved substantially all that we did against Mexico. It would have
meant a war without a declaration; yet Calhoun endorsed it. In short,
even one so acute and so deeply interested as he could not find a real
argument against the war bill, and his "friends" abandoned him on this
issue. By an overwhelming majority Congress rejected his interpretation
of the organic law. War existed. No American who recognized our claim to
the intermediate region, formally made by national authorities and never
withdrawn, and especially none who recognized the claim of Texas, could
logically deny that it existed by the act of Mexico; and in the light
of its antecedents, including Arista's declaration of war and attack
upon Thornton, the war bill committed the nation properly as well as
completely.[9.10]
[THE CAUSE OF THE WAR]
We were, then, under arms; but, after all, why? What was the cause of
the war? It was not--as will plainly appear in another chapter, it is
believed--an unholy determination to obtain California at the cost, if
necessary, of fifty thousand lives. It cannot have been a difficulty as
to the boundary of Texas, for two nations do not fight over an issue
that exists for only one of them--and that one not the aggressor; and
for Mexico the question between the Nueces and the Rio Grande had
no international significance except when it could be used, as an
_argumentum ad hominem_, to embarrass Americans.[9.14]
Nor was it a scheme to extend the field of negro servitude. Even a
cormorant requires time for digestion, and in 1845 the acquisition of
Texas appeared so powerful a bulwark for the peculiar institution, that
no strong and widespread craving for additional areas can be supposed to
have existed at the beginning of 1846. Besides, as pro-slavery Taylor,
Calhoun and Polk, anti-slavery Webster and time-serving Buchanan
agreed, free labor was practically sure to dominate California; and
hence, in view of the slight probability that much cultivable territory
could be obtained in the south against the stubborn opposition of the
free states, the war seemed more likely to diminish than to increase
the relative strength of slavery. Moreover, the soil south and west
of the Rio Grande was unsuitable for cotton, sugar, rice or tobacco.
Rich proprietors already owned the land, and had no thought of parting
with it. The system of peonage was extremely economical, and it held
the ground so firmly that negro slavery, though tried, had been unable
to make headway against it. The free laborers of northeastern Mexico
would have been, admitted the _North American_, particularly hostile to
our southerners and their methods; and the colored population, it was
pointed out, could have escaped gradually from its bonds by amalgamating
with the natives. Now the leaders of the "slavocracy" doubtless inquired
into the conditions; and, as most of our ministers and probably most of
our consuls in Mexico were from their section, they could easily obtain
information. Waddy Thompson and A. J. Donelson, for example, believed
and said, that slavery would not thrive in northern Mexico.[9.14]