a plan as Taylor seems actually to have formed, intended to charge both
flanks of the advancing Americans with cavalry supported by infantry;
but the American artillery surprised him almost as much as if Taylor
had used shooting stars. Probably the right course for him would have
been to attack anyhow, for his men were still eager to fight, a cannon
could be discharged only about once a minute, and our batteries would
not have done much more harm at 70 than at 700 yards. But apparently it
seemed impracticable to wallow slowly for such a distance through the
grass, the sharp edges of which would have cut the legs of his poorly
dressed soldiers badly, under so withering a fire. Something had to be
done, however, for the troops grew impatient. He therefore directed his
right wing to prepare for a charge, and ordered Torrejón and his two
small guns to attack the American right, rear and wagons. Reluctantly
Torrejón obeyed. Passing to the left, his "red lancers"--probably a
thousand strong and "portentous" with trumpets, banners and lance
points--advanced through the scattered chaparral and across a slough,
becoming somewhat broken on the way, and found themselves at another
small morass. Evidently the nature of the ground on which he was likely
to operate had not interested Torrejón.[8.14]
Taylor, sitting unconcernedly with one leg over the pommel of his
saddle, writing, was notified of this movement and simply replied, "Keep
a bright lookout for them." But some one--probably Twiggs, who commanded
the right wing--had the Fifth Infantry march rapidly more than a quarter
of a mile to the right and rear, and throw itself into a square.
Torrejón awkwardly approached this body in column instead of line with
some of the worthless Presidials in the lead, fired ineffectively, was
answered with a disconcerting though not very injurious volley, and
recoiled some 300 yards. He then sent word to Arista that a morass
rendered his movement impracticable; but on receiving instructions to
persevere, he made a circuit, advanced upon the second front of the
square, and once more exchanged a volley. Now, however, he found our
Third Infantry moving to defend the wagons, and saw two of Ringgold's
cannon hurrying to the scene at a gallop, while his own pieces had
not come up. As rapidly as possible, therefore, and quite willingly,
he retreated, but not without a salute from our two cannon, which he
was unable to return. This unsuccessful manoeuvre exhausted Arista's
ingenuity, and he only waited now for darkness, hoping to get away and
find a better position.[8.14]
During these operations a wad from Duncan's battery had fired the grass.
The wind from the Gulf, nearly parallel to the American front, drove a
wall of roaring, crackling flame and a cloud of thick smoke across the
plain; and, as the armies could see each other only now and then and
in spots, firing had to be suspended for nearly an hour. Meanwhile,
believing the Mexican left had given way, Taylor shifted his position
behind the screen with a view to advancing. Churchill pushed on by the
road nearly to where Torrejón had been; the Fourth Infantry moved up to
support him; the Fifth went ahead on the extreme right; the rest of the
army made corresponding changes; and as a whole the line diverged now
thirty or forty degrees from its original direction, while the wagons
came nearly up to it.[8.14]
But the Mexican left had not yielded, and so Taylor found when he sent
a squadron of dragoons to open the way. To avoid being enfiladed,
Arista swung his line forward in excellent order, using the Fourth
Infantry as a pivot, and again it stood firm under an artillery fire
more destructive than at first. Indeed our Fourth Infantry began to
suffer a galling cannonade, and Torrejón again assumed the offensive.
Canister from the 18-pounders checked him, however, and after sharp
musketry exchanges between the Mexican line and our Artillery Battalion,
which had advanced and formed a square, serious infantry operations
in this quarter came to an end. As for the artillery, Arista had now
used up his 650 cannon balls; but the Americans kept at work until
nightfall.[8.14]
On our left, however, important events occurred. From the first Captain
Duncan's battery, which made two fire-units because handled in sections,
played a brilliant and effective rôle, supported by the Eighth Infantry
and either Kerr's or May's dragoons, and advancing or retiring as the
course of the battle dictated. When Arista's change of front threw his
right forward nearly 700 yards and seemed to threaten a flank attack,
these pieces became more active and more daring than ever, and under
their blasting discharges, aided more or less at this time by the
18-pounders, the Mexicans fell rapidly. Again they grew impatient--not
principally because they were suffering so terribly, but because they
were inactive, and because hints that Arista had sold them began to
arrive from Ampudia's quarter; and finally the extreme right wing
broke.[8.14]
After a time some of the officers and Arista, who exposed himself
bravely throughout the battle, induced these troops to go back, and as
they were still in much confusion, the remnants of Noriega's corps,
reinforced with 200 men from Torrejón, were ordered to support them.
The cavalry, however, badly demoralized themselves, dashed blindly at
a trot against the infantry; the resulting disorder extended even to
the Tampico men; and these desperate corps, ordered to charge as the
only possible way to prevent them from bolting, moved forward aimlessly
in succession. Duncan, when he saw this large force advance, withdrew
a little, still firing; but soon under cover of the smoke he came up
again, and gained an enfilading position. Suddenly with a sharp crack
his guns opened, and against the fading horizon his shells and shrapnel
could be seen bursting, with almost the regularity of signal rockets,
over those dark masses. Driven like sheep by this fire, the Mexican
right wing turned toward the left and hurried across the entire field,
presenting their flank and to some extent their rear to the Americans at
a distance of 200 paces or even less, while, in a somewhat more orderly
manner, the First Infantry, which stood next in line, followed them.
Now was the time to decide the battle; but, though Taylor had come to
this part of the field, nothing could be done, for it was feared that
should a charge be made, the enemy's cavalry might reach the wagons, and
cripple our army by destroying the provisions. Indeed, the Americans
appear to have drawn back a little toward the train; and the disordered
Mexicans, having reached the extreme left and finally the rear of their
line, were re-formed.[8.14]
It was now about seven o'clock. The Americans had lost five killed and
forty-three wounded, and the Mexicans probably seven times as many. The
afterglow of sunset lighted up the dun clouds of smoke. Darkness was
close at hand. Necessarily, therefore, the struggle ended; and while
the Mexicans retired through the chaparral to the low eminence behind
the original position of their right wing, and there camped in order
of battle, the Americans bivouacked where they stood, or in the fitful
glare of the still burning grass gave attention to such of both armies
as could be discovered lying on the field. At last the prairie fire
burned out; the smoke of battle drifted away; the full moon appeared;
and the tired troops, watched over by pacing guards, slept between the
stacks of arms like images.[8.14]
Important moral results had been gained by the Americans, but they
were not aware of the fact, and expected the battle to be resumed. At
about seven o'clock the next morning, however, as the light mist slowly
dissolved, their astonished eyes beheld the Mexican line gliding off
into the road; and presently, like the tail of a huge serpent, its rear
wound away into the chaparral, and vanished. Taylor gazed and reflected,
moved a short distance, waited to ascertain through a party of dragoons
that it was a genuine retreat, consulted with some of his principal
officers, and then decided on pursuit; but the forenoon had to be
spent in erecting breastworks and planting four heavy cannon to defend
the train, which he now saw should be left behind; and he merely sent
forward a composite force of 220 men, under Captain McCall of the Fourth
Infantry, to harass the Mexican rear.[8.15]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA]
[ARISTA IN A NEW POSITION]
Arista turned this delay to good account. The chaparral and woods that
his troops had been seen to enter extended with some interruptions to
the Rio Grande, a distance of approximately seven miles; and two hours
before noon, after marching about halfway through it, he stopped at the
Resaca de Guerrero. The Resaca was an ancient channel of the river,
but it now consisted merely of a shallow, muddy ravine somewhat in
the shape of a bow, several hundred feet wide and three or four feet
deep at the banks, lying substantially east and west across the route,
with its concave side toward Palo Alto. At the bottom of it, both to
the right and to the left of the road, lay narrow ponds, and the space
between the water and the banks was rather closely filled with bushes
and small trees. Facing round here, Arista planted three or four guns
at the right, or east, of the road from Palo Alto where it approached
the Resaca, two at least--hidden with branches of trees--on the southern
bank of the Resaca, and other pieces at suitable points toward his left.
The infantry were placed in two wings divided by the road, with much the
greater weight on the right hand, some of the troops taking position
just in the rear of the ravine, some behind its northern bank, and
some in the chaparral still farther forward. The headquarters tent was
pitched in a small clear space or _placeta_ about 500 paces back on the
left of the road, and Torrejón's cavalry halted in the same road still
farther away; while Canales with two guns, placing himself on the left a
considerable distance back from the Resaca, guarded a cross-road leading
to Arista's rear.[8.16]
The Mexican position, besides covering every line to Fort Brown, offered
a number of other advantages. It did not call for much use of artillery,
and therefore neutralized Arista's deficiency in cannon ammunition. The
woods made it impossible for the Americans to employ that dreaded arm
effectively. The bank of the Resaca formed a natural breastwork, and
it seemed likely that the troops, protected in this manner, would be
confident and firm. But evidently a bold and enterprising enemy could
take advantage of the woods to conceal his movements; and evidently,
too, Arista's main batteries could fire only in the direction of the
road, since there were Mexicans in advance of the Resaca both to right
and to left. Another handicap lay in the impossibility of surveying the
field and manoeuvring troops--particularly the cavalry; the soldiers,
unable to see far, lacked that sense of union and support which Mexicans
peculiarly needed; and the want of reserves, though to a certain extent
a part of the Fourth Infantry stationed on the right behind the Resaca
could act as such, was an additional source of weakness.[8.16]
A still more serious feature of Arista's situation was the condition
of his troops. Many, and probably most of them, had not eaten for more
than twenty-four hours. The sufferings they had witnessed and the
neglect of their fallen comrades had worked upon their feelings. The
dreadful effectiveness of the American artillery had been profoundly
discouraging; many of their officers had proved unworthy of confidence;
and above all, accustomed to the duplicity of Mexican leaders and
unable to understand their general's inactivity the day before, many
concluded that Arista, who was accused of seeking American support for
his alleged revolutionary scheme, had betrayed them. This idea, if we
may trust common sense and Mexican intimations, was suggested or at
least encouraged by Ampudia himself; and the coöperation of all these
depressing influences had spread a general conviction through the army
by the forenoon of May 9 that a great disaster would befall it that
day. A few, it was said, broke their weapons in despair; and utter
dejection could be read in the faces of every corps. Some reinforcements
were drawn from the city, but they did not materially improve the
situation.[8.16]
[BATTLE OF RESACA DE LA PALMA]
Taylor, then, advancing at about two o'clock, after detaching most
of the Artillery Battalion and perhaps Kerr's dragoons to guard the
train, moved forward to the edge of the woods, and halted at what was
called the Resaca de la Palma to await information. The advance corps
under McCall, which consisted principally of the light companies of
the first brigade under Captain C. F. Smith, was now feeling its way
toward the enemy. At a little after two o'clock, turning a bend in the
road, it found cannon in front. Instantly they fired. About half a
dozen Americans fell, and the rest quickly withdrew. At three o'clock
McCall's report arrived at headquarters. Taylor pushed on immediately,
and in about an hour came up with the advance party. Ringgold's battery,
now commanded by Lieutenant Ridgely, was sent forward on the road, and
McCall's command, thrown into the chaparral on both sides, began a slow
and painful advance through the bushes. Almost immediately it found
itself in contact with the enemy.[8.16]
Under such circumstances McCall could give the battery no support, of
course, and the only reasonable expectation was that Ridgely's men and
horses would be shot from the woods, and his guns be taken. That,
however, made no difference to him. His orders were to advance, and
advance he would. Once a body of lancers charged his guns, but by a
combination of courage, skill and good luck he routed it. Some of the
Mexican artillery seems to have moved up the road a little way after
McCall retired; but Ridgely, pushing on even into the very smoke of the
enemy's cannon, drove them in spite of stubborn resistance beyond the
edge of the Resaca, and then sent back for troops to help him capture
them. When the battle became more general he continued to fire upon
the Mexican batteries; and, as far as he could without endangering
Americans, he also swept the woods with canister, frightening the
enemy with a terrible noise in the tree-tops that reminded them of the
slaughter at Palo Alto.[8.16]
To right and to left the battle soon raged. All the Americans on the
ground, numbering about 1700, were put in. No general guidance could
be exercised. "Chance was the lord of all save the good right arms" of
the troops, wrote an officer. In such woods and thickets lines could
not be formed. Even companies found it impossible to remain intact. A
field officer was no more than a captain, and a captain no more than a
subaltern. All got into the work promptly, and all did their best when
there. As fast as they could, singly or in little squads, they pushed
on, cheering and shouting. Often it required one's utmost exertions to
squeeze through or hack through the dense and thorny chaparral under
pelting showers of bullets. Now there was shooting, and now the cold
steel struck fire. "My orders was to make free use of the bayonet,"
said the General afterwards, and the orders were borne in mind. Here
Lieutenant Meade, the future victor of Gettysburg, had a chance to win
his spurs; and he was but one of many heroes, though perhaps the most
conspicuous in his quarter.[8.16]
Nor did the Americans have it all their own way. Those Mexicans who
fought at all this day, fought like tigers. On the right near the
road the Second Light Infantry, which had been placed there in ambush
just before the real battle opened, stood firm; but most of its field
officers were struck down, and it had to give way. A company of Uraga's
regiment did nobly close by, and every man of it, we are told, was
either killed or wounded.[8.16]
Farther toward Arista's left, however, our men pushed forward rather
easily, though it seemed evident from the firing that Mexicans were in
front. Gaining ground in this direction some Americans probably came
upon a path which led round the western end of the pond, and gave access
to the Mexican flank. Just before the battle began Ampudia learned of
the path, and stationed a company of the Sappers and a company of the
Fourth Infantry in this quarter; and later he sent another detachment
from the Fourth with a gun. Besides these meagre forces probably no
corps guarded the left except a few Tampico troops. These also fought
well; but the splendid silk banner of the Veterans, the bravest corps
in the army, was captured, and only at heavy cost could they fight
their way back. Meantime the rest of Uraga's regiment came over from
beyond the road, but it could not stop the Americans; and brave Captain
Barbour, followed by a small party, soon approached the placeta. The
effect was electrical. Nobody knew how many troops were following him.
Canales took flight. The sense of defeat, already imparted by hurrying
soldiers of the Second Light, spread across the road from the broken
left, and at about half-past five o'clock Arista's right wing, the
strength of the army, crumbled like a sand fort struck by a wave. Except
perhaps one, all the corps dissolved; and in a moment, as it seemed,
nothing was left but a mob of fugitives.[8.16]
During all this, Taylor, exposing himself as much as any one, had been
fighting at the centre. The proper course to adopt there was to charge
the Mexican guns on the road with infantry, but for some reason he sent
May's dragoons against them. In a way the effort succeeded. Slashing as
they galloped, the horsemen quickly ran over the batteries--more than
a quarter of a mile beyond them, in fact; and then, coming back in a
scattered condition, had a chance to slash again, for the batteries had
been reoccupied. But the thickets on both sides were full of Mexican
infantry. Against their muskets the dragoons were mere targets--broad
ones, too; and before long the squadron, much the worse for its charge,
recrossed the Resaca. Taylor was disgusted. Turning to Belknap and the
Eighth Infantry he exclaimed, "Take those guns, and by ---- keep them!"
A part of the Fifth joined Belknap; and these men, rushing in furiously
all together, yelling like fiends, after a brief though sharp struggle
with the artillerymen--for the supporting infantry had now abandoned
their position--captured the pieces. But the battle had already been
won.[8.16]
Before McCall had shown himself Arista, dazed perhaps by his reverse
at Palo Alto, valuing too highly his new position, and probably
overestimating the injury inflicted on Taylor the day before, had made
up his mind that no immediate attack was to be expected, and after
placing the army had withdrawn to his tent, and busied himself in
writing. Even when firing began, he said it was only a skirmish; and
after our troops reached his left flank, he merely ordered Ampudia and
the rest of the Fourth Infantry to go and settle things in that quarter.
When Americans appeared at the _placeta_, however, he awoke. Pouring
curses on the cowards of his army, he hurried to the cavalry, and
taking the place of Torrejón, who had refused to charge, dashed up the
road. His men lanced a few lingering American dragoons and helped a few
comrades to escape, but the battle could not be saved. On one side of
the road at least, Americans already held the chaparral, and like May he
could not stand against protected infantry.[8.16]
At the head of the cavalry he retreated, therefore, and turning to
the left crossed the Rio Grande by one of the lower passages. Other
fugitives got over at various points; and a great number, passing Fort
Brown, which was about three miles from the battlefield, crowded to the
Anacuitas ferry. Here they found a couple of scows; and some troops,
that had been engaged all this time in annoying Fort Brown, stood on
guard. But the fleeing soldiers were panic-stricken, the boats moved
slowly, and the Americans were looked for at every moment. Men fought
for places. Clothing and arms were thrown away. Many tried to swim or
fell accidentally into the water, and an unknown number perished in the
swift current.[8.16]
"Rio Bravo! Rio Bravo!
Saw men ever such a sight
Since the field of Roncesvalles
Sealed the fate of many a knight?"
But the Americans did not come. Taylor had scarcely any fresh troops
except those guarding the wagons nearly or quite five miles in the
rear. May's dragoons had been used up. Apparently no effort had been
made to communicate with Fort Brown, and have its defenders--now tired
but not exhausted--sally forth to help reap the fruits of the expected
victory. Taylor only claimed to have captured "a number" of this utterly
broken army facing a difficult river. Even badly wounded men got safely
across, it would seem; and very soon, in spite of everything, nearly
four fifths--that is to say, about 4000 besides those under Canales--of
the troops commanded by Arista on the first of the month appear to
have been in safety on the south shore. He lost on May 9, according to
his official report, 160 killed, 228 wounded and 159 missing, but the
accuracy of the figures may be doubted. Fourteen officers, eight guns
and a large amount of property were captured by the Americans, while
their casualties were only 33 killed and 89 wounded.[8.16]
During the whole week so dramatically concluded, Fort Brown had been
under attack.[8.17] On May 3 it replied vigorously, though with
trifling results, to the guns of Matamoros; but as Taylor, with more
than a month of good weather and about 300 wagons at his disposal, had
neglected to bring up a stock of ammunition, it fired only occasionally
after that in order to notify both friend and foe that its courage
still held good. On the 4th Canales occupied the road, and on the next
day Ampudia arrived with four guns and nearly a thousand men. Arista,
however, believing his cannon were not heavy enough to breach the wall
and confident that hunger would soon reduce the garrison, forbade
assault. The besiegers made themselves extremely disagreeable; but by
this time the Americans had bomb-proofs and "gopher holes," and, aside
from the death of Major Brown, met with no serious losses. Taylor's
profound silence, after as well as before the battle of Palo Alto,
caused intense anxiety; but when the cannon began to "bark" again on
the 9th, and especially when a throng of panic-stricken fugitives could
be seen rushing past, haggard faces put on smiles. Finally a solitary
messenger approached at a gallop with his reins on the horse's neck,
waving cap and sword, and shouting "Victory!" and the long strain ended
in exultation.[8.18]
[SITUATION OF THE MEXICANS]
The Mexican army was now hanging like a plum, overripe, shaken by
the wind and ready to fall. To the British consul it seemed utterly
demoralized, and beyond the possibility of reorganization. Yet there
it was permitted to rest and recuperate undisturbed. The official
explanation said that although a pontoon train had been proposed a long
time before, the dim prospect of hostilities had not seemed to warrant
that expense; but like numerous other official statements put out in the
course of the war, this explanation hid more than it told.[8.19]