precipitated by the will and act of Mexico. The circumstances proved
this and testimony illuminates them. In October, 1847, a pamphlet
written by Mariano Otero, editor of _El Siglo XIX_ and Senator from the
state of Jalisco, appeared. His object was by no means to defend the
United States, but he said: "The American forces did not advance to
the Rio Grande until after the war became inevitable, and then only as
an army of observation.... The military rebellion of San Luis [Potosí]
gave rise to a government [that of Paredes] pledged to resist all
accommodation [with the United States] ... which government ... began
hostilities." Arista declared in December, 1847, "I had the pleasure of
being the first to begin the war." In short, Polk told only the truth
when he said the conflict was forced upon us. Mexico wanted it; Mexico
threatened it; Mexico issued orders to wage it; and on April 18 her
President, no doubt in view of his political difficulties, insisted upon
those orders. "It is indispensable," he wrote urgently to Arista, "that
hostilities begin, yourself taking the initiative."[7.35]
"If in a litigious affair," declared Vattel, "our adversary refuses
the means of bringing the right to proof, or artfully eludes it; if he
does not, with good faith, apply to pacific measures for terminating
the difference, and above all, if he is the first who begins acts of
hostility, he renders just [even] the cause which was before doubtful."
Every condition of this judgment fitted the course of Mexico.[7.36]
VIII
PALO ALTO, RESACA DE LA PALMA
May, 1846
[THE MEXICAN ARMY]
The Mexico of 1845 had an elaborate military organization. In addition
to the comandantes general--regularly one in each department or
state--there were six generals at the head of the six military Divisions
in which the political divisions of the country had been grouped.
The college at Chapultepec provided a full course of instruction for
officers; and though it seemed hardly worth while to spend three
years there in order to become a second lieutenant, when one could
leap at once into a captaincy or something better by acting as the
tool of a revolting general, there were never less than one hundred
students.[8.1]
At the head of the army stood a sort of general staff called the
plana mayor; but the duties of this inefficient body fell mostly to
the engineers, some of whom possessed excellent qualifications, while
others--admitted to the corps for political or personal reasons--did
not. The artillery, which included nominally four brigades with fourteen
batteries, suffered from this all-pervading evil and also from defects
of its own. Many of the guns had come down from olden times, though
a large number of the field pieces equalled any the United States
possessed; not a few were honeycombed; and the carriages were mostly
of the old Gribeauval pattern. To convey ammunition, carts had to be
obtained when needed. For the transportation of ordnance, mules or oxen
were usually hired by contract; and, as the drivers had no acquaintance
with artillery drill and tactics, battery evolutions were out of the
question, and guns could be moved but slowly, if at all, during an
engagement.[8.1]
The so-called Permanent infantry consisted substantially of three Light
(_Ligero_) and twelve Line regiments, and there were also twenty-five
Active (_Activo_) corps, large or small, which, though originally
designed as a sort of reserve to be called out in emergencies, were now
constantly under arms. Owing to the great extent of the country the
regiments were broken into sections, which assumed to be independent;
and for this reason drill, discipline and _esprit de corps_ suffered
greatly. Training and equipment left much to be desired. When four
simple manoeuvres were understood, soldiers were pronounced perfect. For
arms almost all the infantry had flint-lock muskets, many of which had
been discarded by the British army. Firing from the hip to avoid the
recoil marred their aim; and, partly in consequence of using too much
powder, they generally fired high. Of horse there were ten Permanent
and five Activo regiments besides numerous minor units. The cavalry
included also nearly fifty Presidial companies, originally designed to
guard the frontier against Indian raids; but these had almost vanished
except in name, and the remnants were extremely inefficient. The mounted
men carried in general a sword and a sort of blunderbuss called the
_escopeta_, but many used lances instead of swords. About 3000 Coast
Guards are also to be mentioned, but as a rule they were expected merely
to defend the ports where they lived and the immediate vicinity. In all
there may have been 32,000 men under arms in 1845.[8.1]
The medical corps suffered at all times from the low quality of its
personnel and from its defective equipment; and the accommodations
for surgeons in a campaign were so poor that many found pretexts for
remaining behind when their corps took the field. The commissaries
had peculiar difficulties to meet. A Mexican army drew supplies from
places near it and not from government dépôts; and when money failed,
as it often did, payments had to be made with drafts on the treasury,
which possessed an uncertain value. Hence people often would not part
with supplies, the troops went hungry, and the natural tendency toward
inefficiency and desertion was accentuated. In order to release the
army from service in the interior, when hostilities became imminent in
1845, it was decided to organize volunteer corps; but almost every one,
however anxious to see the United States chastised, preferred to let
somebody else do the work.[8.1]
Mexico, then, did not exactly rise _en masse_ to sweep Taylor
away,[8.2] yet the forces gathered at Matamoros could be termed
respectable. Arista seems to have had about 175 artillerymen, 3500
infantry, 1100 cavalry, 425 irregular horse under General Antonio
Canales and some 500 Matamoros volunteers--in all, say, 5700 men
including officers and ineffectives. His first brigade consisted of
infantry led by García, a fine man and officer; the second, also
infantry, had Vega, a brave and patriotic soldier, for commander; and
the third brigade, cavalry, was under Torrejón, who possessed one
excellent quality--the instinct of self-preservation. Canales could be
described succinctly as a border ruffian and conspirator; and Ampudia,
second in general command, was about the same thing plus a cosmopolitan
varnish.[8.3]
[MEXICAN PREPARATIONS AT MATAMOROS]
After news of Taylor's intention to advance reached Matamoros, the
Mexicans worked most zealously in constructing fortifications there,
and by the end of April had a series of earthworks. Just above the city
was erected Fort Paredes, laid out in regular style for 800 men, which
guarded the ferry of Las Anacuitas. Two redoubts, crossing their fires,
were planted opposite Fort Brown at a distance of seven or eight hundred
yards; and two or three minor forts commanded approaches. Gabions or
wicker-work strengthened the embrasures, and fascines and sand-bags were
freely used. No guns heavier than 12-pounders defended the works, and
no platforms were laid; but in general the ordnance was of brass, well
cared for though somewhat honeycombed.[8.4]
For a number of reasons the garrison felt confident. Through deserters
and spies they knew as much as they were capable of understanding about
the American army. To Mejía our general seemed "more contemptible than
the lowest of Mexican tailors," and to Ampudia "an absolute nullity."
The martial Worth, who did impress them, left the front at the beginning
of April because Polk decided against him on the question of brevet
rank. Hitchcock had been compelled to go north on sick leave. For some
good reason every infantry colonel and many others in high positions
were absent. One regiment had not a field officer, and in another only a
single company could boast a captain. Personally the officers in general
were believed to lack harmony and zeal, and the men to be discontented,
hopeless, unwilling to fight, and enfeebled by their hardships and
misbehavior at Corpus Christi. According to Mexican reports our
cavalry could neither shoot nor control their hard-bitted horses,
and our infantry, chiefly composed--except the officers--of needy
foreigners, came short in discipline, training and every other soldierly
qualification save appetite. "Those adventurers cannot withstand the
bayonet charge of our foot," said Mejía, "nor a cavalry charge with the
lance."[8.5]
[Illustration: MATAMOROS AND FORT BROWN SKETCH MAP
A Fort Brown B 44-pounders C Traverse D American Infantry E American
Dragoons F American Cannon G Artillery Battalion H Mexican Mortars I
Mexican Batteries J Mexican Infantry K Mexican Cavalry ]
No very alarming degree of intelligence had appeared to direct the
American operations. Our troops were on a point exposed to a convergent
fire; Fort Brown enfiladed none of the hostile batteries, though it
might have been planned to do this; near the cavalry camp stood thick
groves offering shelter to assailants; behind our main position was a
lagoon forming--with a bend of the river--almost a circle; and the
enemy, once in possession of the single road, which ran for seven or
eight miles through rough country, would have had the army in a bottle.
All the ammunition and provisions were brought by wagon from the coast,
exposed to attack at every step. The imperfectly fortified base at Point
Isabel, stored with indispensable supplies, had a garrison of only two
companies aside from two or three hundred sutlers, clerks, teamsters
and the like; and vessels could approach the landing only by a narrow
passage between two islands, which could have been closed by a few
6-pounders. Yet we should have encouraged Mexico beyond calculation,
and might have been injured greatly in Europe, had we now given up Fort
Brown.[8.6]
A number of small disasters overtook the Americans. Colonel Cross,
chief of the quartermaster's department, went out and never came
back. April 22 Lieutenant Porter and ten men, operating against the
banditti, allowed their arms to get wet, and were scattered with loss
by a party of Mexicans. Twenty of the Texas rangers commanded by
Captain Walker permitted themselves to be surprised, and half of them
were either killed or driven beyond recall. Taylor attributed these
mishaps to a lack of experience, but the enemy regarded them as proofs
of inferiority; and when Thornton's party succumbed, the enthusiasm
burst all bounds. "Honor and glory a thousand and one times" to the
"brave men" of the army, cried a Tampico leaflet, and a triumph in the
anticipated battle appeared certain.[8.7]
[MEXICAN CONFIDENCE]
From another source also the Mexicans drew encouragement. While Taylor's
officers were nearly all West Pointers and perhaps quite all native
Americans, many of the privates were in fact of European birth and a
large percentage Roman Catholics. To these Mejía, Ampudia and Arista
issued moving appeals based upon religious prejudice and alleged
foreign condemnation of our course toward Mexico, gilded with generous
promises of rewards for deserting, supported by the luring voices of
gayly dressed sirens who lined the opposite bank of the river all day,
and reinforced by two captured American dragoons, who were given back,
and reported that deserters received handsome treatment. A considerable
number of men, largely veteran offenders from the British army, stole
across; most of the Seventh Infantry were believed ready to change
sides; and the Mexicans boasted exultingly that "Old Taylor" himself
would soon be over.[8.8]
Arista, who had spent several years in the United States, did not feel
very sanguine. Ampudia's predictions of glory he regarded as "castles in
the air," or as perhaps intended to raise expectations that Ampudia's
successor would be unable to satisfy. But the officers and the troops
felt impatient for combat. So loudly and so long had the charges of
haughtiness, perfidy, aggressiveness and greed been reiterated against
us, that all believed them true. The Americans were in their eyes
accursed heretics, eager to trample under foot their holy religion:
and they were also barbarians, capable of everything rough and cruel.
In the event of their success the family hearth was to be polluted,
the glorious, dearly-bought independence of the nation crushed, and
the adored accents of the mother-tongue stifled. To the Indian rank
and file the word "patriotism," indeed, meant little; but they loved
their villages, and could imagine even worse tyrants than Mexicans.
The name "foreigner" had a terrible sound in their ears, and fanatical
devotion to the Roman church set their passionate natures aflame. At
the first sight of the "detestable" Stars and Stripes fluttering in
the breeze, they had loudly demanded battle, and later the confident
hope of triumph gave a still keener edge to their enthusiasm. Taylor
evidently despised the enemy, believing there was no fight in them;
but those tawny fellows, though miserably clothed and apparently
spiritless, were trained to "blind obedience," could fight like devils
while their strength and fury lasted, and had now reached a good state
of discipline. Even Captain Hardee of Thornton's command, a prisoner
at large in Matamoros, believed the Mexicans would gain the coming
battle.[8.9]
One of Taylor's most obvious needs in taking post on the Rio Grande was
a light corps available for scouting, and in ordering him to advance,
Marcy had expressly authorized him to call upon the Texans--by whom legs
were valued chiefly as the means of sticking to a horse--for assistance;
but nothing was done about the matter. On April 11 a friend in Matamoros
warned him that an attempt might be made to cut his line to Point
Isabel, but he did not seem to feel concerned. His troops were merely
drawn beyond the effective range of Ampudia's artillery; the work of
fortifying was quickened; on the 23d he described the fort complacently
as "in a condition of defence"; and a week later he contented himself
with having the road inspected for seven miles. Point Isabel, he said as
early as April 12, could withstand attack.[8.10]
[Illustration: Fort Brown to Brazos Island]
Arista, for his part, decided quite naturally, while on his way
to Matamoros, that he would plant himself on the American line of
communication, and prevent our army from receiving ammunition,
provisions and reinforcements. Accordingly the 1600 men under Torrejón,
after disposing of Thornton's command, passed Fort Brown, held the road
for some days without the knowledge of Taylor, and then by a grave
blunder were drawn away, and concentrated on the Rio Grande opposite
Longoreño, eight or ten miles below the city, to protect the crossing
of the other troops, who proceeded to that point by several routes in
order to deceive the Americans. The last day of the month Ampudia with
his brigade and four guns went over; and on May 1 Arista--leaving Mejía
with about 1400 men to hold Matamoros--followed with his other brigade
and eight pieces. Unfortunately for him three scows of little capacity
were the only boats available; and as these had been taken to Longoreño
in carts by a circuitous route nearly fifteen miles in length, so as to
avoid exciting our suspicions, they were not in good order. One or two,
in fact, seem to have been almost useless, and hence many precious hours
were lost; but at any rate the army succeeded in crossing a swift river
without injury almost under the eyes of the Americans.[8.11]
[TAYLOR ALARMED]
By about one o'clock in the afternoon on the first of May Taylor heard
that Mexicans were below him, and awoke. He saw now that Fort Brown
required munitions and food, and that Point Isabel could not, even yet,
resist a serious attack. Tents came down in haste; the wagon train was
made ready; and at about half-past three--leaving behind the Seventh
Infantry commanded by Major Brown, with Captain Lowd's four 18-pounders,
Lieutenant Bragg's field battery and the sick, under orders to hold
out as long as possible--Taylor marched for the coast. No time was
lost in getting there. The troops bivouacked that night on the damp,
chilly plain without fires, and early the next morning set out again.
The shallow, greenish-brown lagoons rimmed with broad, flat, oozing
banks of mud, the marshes full of tawny grass, and the low ridges
mottled with patches of herbage and bald surfaces of gleaming dry dirt,
seemed interminable; but as hours passed the now sultry air began to
be streaked with salt odors, and by noon the panting troops caught the
sparkle of blue waves. Fortunately they could not hear the shouts of joy
in Matamoros over what was called their precipitate flight.[8.12]
As it was necessary to strengthen the defences, all the troops now
exchanged their muskets for picks and shovels. May 6 the engineer in
charge was authorized to continue the work by employing a hundred
laborers; and at about three o'clock the next day, escorting more than
200 loaded wagons, the little army, preceded by a body of dragoons,
moved out on the return march. As the small garrison of Fort Brown had
provisions for at least three weeks, and the Mexicans could not be
expected to attack it seriously with Taylor approaching their rear,
whereas they were practically sure to be met on the road, Taylor's best
officers entreated him to gain freedom of action by leaving the train
behind, which at most would have delayed it only a day or so; but he
would not. No fears disturbed his mind. Reinforced with perhaps 200
men just landed at the Point, the army now with him numbered 2228,
all told. Recent exercise and drill had left it in a splendid physical
condition. Recollecting how long popular orators had been mocking at the
"regulars," it longed to do something. The attacks upon Cross, Walker,
Porter and Thornton had exasperated its temper; nothing could have
pleased the great majority of the soldiers better than a fight; and the
General felt very much the same way.[8.13]
When it had made about seven miles the army bivouacked, and early the
next day it resumed the march. Soon after noon, when some ten or twelve
miles more had been covered, a low, dark line could be seen across the
plain in front, some two or three miles away. It was the Mexican army.
As the pond or water-hole of Palo Alto lay near, the tired and thirsty
troops were permitted to halt, rest a little, drink and fill their
canteens; and then Taylor had them posted in order of battle. At the
extreme right the Fifth Infantry led by Lieutenant Colonel McIntosh was
placed, and on its left in succession came Major Ringgold's battery,
the Third Infantry (Captain Morris), two 18-pounders on siege carriages
under Lieutenant Churchill, and the Fourth Infantry (Major Allen). The
Third and Fourth made up a brigade, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel
Garland; and all the troops just mentioned, together with Twiggs's
dragoons, some 250 strong, in two squadrons led by Captains Kerr and
May, formed the right wing. The other wing, known as the first brigade
and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Belknap, consisted of the Artillery
Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Childs, Captain Duncan's battery, and
the Eighth Infantry, posted in this order from right to left. The wagons
were then assembled near the pond at the side of some woods, and Kerr
was detached with his squadron to guard them.[8.14]
[Illustration: BATTLE OF PALO ALTO
May 8, 1846
American Forces Black
Mexican Forces Red
Regmental numeral III
Artillery battalion A
Kerr's squadron K
May's squadron M
Ringold's battery R
Duncan's battery D
Churchill's battery C
Tampico Corps T
Zapadores (Sappers) Z
Presidiales P Light Cavalry L
Infantry-First position
Intermediate position
Final position
Cavalry-First position
Intermediate position
Final position
Artillery-First position
Intermediate position
Final position
Wagon Train-First position
(The positions of the troops can be indicated only
approximately.)
[BATTLE OF PALO ALTO]
During these days Arista had waited for Taylor's return; but, in order
to hasten that and perhaps accomplish direct results, he had ordered
the guns of Matamoros to begin cannonading Fort Brown on the morning of
May 3, and two days later, believing the garrison were near starvation,
sent Ampudia to invest it. For the sake of water and to cover all of
the roads that might be taken by the American army, he placed himself
at Los Tanques del Ramireño; and about noon on the eighth, learning
of Taylor's approach, he set out for Palo Alto, some five miles
away. Shortly before gaining that point he saw through his glass blue
American dragoons in the far distance, and, as quickly as he could,
put his troops in position. At the extreme right were placed about 150
horse under Noriega, and then came a 4-pounder, a corps of Sappers, the
Second Light Infantry, the Tampico Veteran Company and Coast Guards,
five 4-pounders, the First, the Sixth and the Tenth Infantry, and
finally, beyond an interval of about 400 yards and somewhat in advance,
Torrejón and the rest of the cavalry--their front extended, their right
strengthened with two small guns, and their left reaching beyond the
Point Isabel road to a piece of chaparral on a slight elevation beside a
swamp. In the rear of the line were some thickets; just behind the right
wing an eminence eighteen or twenty feet high rose above chaparral;
protected by this lay a watering-place; and in front there were some
boggy pools and wide fields of stiff grass almost shoulder-high.[8.14]
As soon as formed, the Americans advanced in silence--the 18-pounders,
drawn by oxen, following the road--while Lieutenant Blake reconnoitred
the Mexican line within musket range to look for artillery. At about
two o'clock Ampudia came in sight with the Fourth Infantry, commanded
by Colonel Uraga, a company of Sappers, two 8-pounders, and about
400 irregular horse under Canales. Upon this Arista and his staff, a
blaze of gold lace, passed rapidly down the line. It seemed strange
to find in his position a tall, raw-boned man with red hair and sandy
whiskers; but he showed the martial bearing of his nation, and harangued
the troops with genuine Mexican eloquence. They were found ready for
battle. Answering him with loud vivas they made ready their arms. The
silken banners fluttered; the bands played; and at about half-past
two or three o'clock, by the General's order, his artillery opened.
The hostile armies were then approximately half a mile apart; and the
Mexicans--drawn out, except the cavalry, only two deep on a front
about a mile in length without reserves--seemed to number 6000, though
probably not more than two thirds as many.[8.14]
Apparently Taylor's plan had been to force a passage by charging, for
his aim was to reach Fort Brown, and his infantry had been instructed,
the day before, to rely mainly on the bayonet; but he now halted. All
his infantry except the Eighth regiment deployed into line. At strange
words of command--"Haw, Brindle!" "Whoa, Brandy!"--ten yoke of oxen
wheeled each ammunition wagon into its place; and the cannon advanced.
At this juncture Ampudia's column approached the field. Canales led his
men a considerable distance forward into the scattered chaparral on the
Mexican left, probably with a view to cutting off Taylor's retreat, and
thus put himself entirely out of the battlefield; but the rest of the
command proceeded toward their appointed place between Torrejón and the
infantry, and as this movement appeared to mean a charge, the American
fire was turned in that direction. Without faltering, however, they
moved up to the line and deployed, but their route was marked with the
fallen.[8.14]
Now ensued about an hour of cannonading, supported by our troops with
shouts that often drowned the roar of the guns, and endured by the
Mexicans with unfailing constancy. Arista's pieces, though bravely and
skilfully served, were mostly too light. The balls generally fell short,
and as they ricocheted, our men stepped aside. But the American practice
met every hope. Sometimes a single shot appeared to mow down a whole
platoon of mounted men; and here, there, everywhere gaps opened in the
infantry. With vivas the gaps instantly closed, but they would not stay
closed.[8.14]