body of troops on the Rio Grande and cross it with a considerable
force, such a movement must be regarded as an invasion of the United
States and the commencement of hostilities." This declaration called
forth protests, but was quite fair. By stationing troops peaceably in
the "intermediate region" between the Nueces and the Rio Grande we
only placed ourselves on an equality with Mexico; and, as we ordered
Taylor to leave her posts undisturbed, we showed a friendly recognition
of the principle of pacific joint-occupation during negotiations. Our
forces, to be sure, outnumbered hers, but her attitude made it unsafe to
despatch a smaller representation. Unlike us, Mexico had no occasion to
send an army into that region for defensive purposes. The United States
had shown every sign of desiring peace and none of desiring war, and at
this time was endeavoring to bring about a friendly settlement. Such an
army could not have prevented us from entering the intermediate region,
for at Corpus Christi Taylor was already there; and it could not have
saved the Mexican posts and citizens, for they were not menaced. Mexico,
on the other hand, had threatened us and made open preparations to
strike; it was now understood at Washington that no declaration of war
should be expected to precede a blow; her generals had proclaimed that
hostilities were on the point of beginning; and it was only common sense
to assume that, should a Mexican army cross the Rio Grande, it would
come to execute the announced intention of those who sent it.[7.15]
During the evening of January 12, 1846, despatches from Slidell and
Black arrived at Washington, and made the rejection of our pacific
overture look almost certain. This unexpected turn of affairs gave
new seriousness and fresh urgency to the Mexican issue; and the next
day Taylor was ordered to encamp on the Rio Grande at whatever point
he should consider most advantageous. He was cautioned, however,
against regarding Mexico as an enemy, unless war should be declared
or hostilities be undertaken by her, and against provoking a conflict
by insistence upon the joint navigation of the river, which our claim
implied.[7.16]
February 3 the General received these instructions, and replied that he
should lose no time. Three days later the army was formally ordered to
"be prepared for a field movement at short notice." But, although Taylor
had been on the ground for six months, he was "utterly ignorant"--said
Hitchcock--of the way to Matamoros, and had now to investigate the
matter. By February 24 he possessed the necessary data, and ordered the
troops to be in readiness to set out "at forty-eight hours notice";
yet it was not until the eighth of March that his cavalry, led by
the impetuous Twiggs and accompanied by Ringgold's handsome battery,
actually moved off. The infantry brigades followed at intervals of a
day with Duncan's and Bragg's field artillery; and transports prepared
to remove the convalescents, extra baggage and Major Munroe's artillery
company to Point Isabel, near the mouth of the Rio Grande.[7.17]
[THE ADVANCE TO THE RIO GRANDE]
Soon after receiving the instructions to advance, Taylor had given
notice of his orders to influential citizens of Matamoros then at Corpus
Christi, explaining that his march would be entirely pacific, and that
he expected the pending questions to be settled by negotiation; and
similar assurances were conveyed to the Mexican customhouse office at
"Brazos Santiago," near Point Isabel. March 8 a more formal announcement
appeared in General Orders No. 30. Taylor here expressed the hope
that his movement would be "beneficial to all concerned," insisted
upon a scrupulous regard for the civil and religious rights of the
people, and commanded that everything required for the use of the army
should be paid for "at the highest market price." These orders, which
merely anticipated instructions then on their way from Washington,
were translated into Spanish, and placed in circulation along the
border.[7.18]
To the troops the march proved a refreshing and beneficial change. The
weather was now fine, the road almost free from mud, and the breeze
balmy. Frequently the blue lupine, the gay verbena, the saucy marigold
and countless other bright flowers carpeted the ground. The cactus and
the cochineal excited and gratified curiosity. Ducks and geese often
flew up from the line of advance. Many rabbits and many deer scampered
across the plain; and occasionally wolves, catamounts and panthers
were frightened from cover. Wild horses would gaze for an instant at
their cousins in bondage, and then gallop off, tossing their manes
disdainfully; and once a herd of them, spaced as if to allow room
for cannon, were taken for Mexican cavalry. Innumerable centipedes,
tarantulas and rattlesnakes furnished a good deal of interest, if
not of charm. The boundless prairie had somewhat the fascination of
the sea; and occasionally, when a mirage conjured up a range of
blue mountains--clothed with forests and reflected in lakes--that
melted presently into the air, one had a sense of moving on enchanted
ground.[7.19]
To be sure, the march was not entirely agreeable. For about 196 miles
it stretched on and on, and most of the way it lay through deep, sandy
plains, here glistening with salt, and there varied with briny marshes
or sticky black dirt. In some places Mexicans had burned the herbage;
and the light ashes, raised by the tramp of many feet, settled on the
soldiers' faces till they could scarcely recognize one another. Tortured
with thirst, they would occasionally break ranks pell-mell at the sight
of water; but as a rule they found it brackish. All suffered alike; and
we have a picture of Taylor himself breakfasting at the door of his
tent with a mess-chest for table, his rugged countenance flaming with
sunburn, his long lips cracked and raw, and his long nose white with
peeling skin. But the experience, even at its worst, proved a wholesome
tonic after the degeneration of Corpus Christi.[7.19]
March 20 the army came to the Arroyo Colorado, a salt lagoon about a
hundred yards wide and three or four feet deep. Here General Mejía,
the commander at Matamoros, who knew all about our troops and their
movements, had intended to win a sheaf of laurels; but orders from
his government, not quite ready for action, arrived in time to curb
this ambition. He concluded then to try the effect of a ruse, and his
officer convinced the Americans, with solemn warnings, bugle-calls here
and there, and a clever showing of heads among the bushes and trees on
the southern side of the lagoon, that a hard fight would result from
attempting to cross it. But without the least hesitation Taylor prepared
for battle. Ringgold's pieces were made ready. Worth dashed into the
stream at the head of an advance party; and on gaining, unopposed,
the opposite bank, he saw--dust in the atmosphere, and far away a
dozen small black specks rapidly growing smaller. But morally it was a
victory; and the troops, though cheated, felt encouraged.[7.20]
March 23, after making fifteen miles across a clear, dry prairie, the
army came to a road that led to Matamoros, about eighteen miles away
on the right, and to Point Isabel, distant nine or ten on the other
side; and Taylor, ordering Worth and the infantry to camp and watch
for the enemy at a suitable place in the former direction, proceeded
to the coast with his cavalry. There he found the transports in sight
and the wind favorable. Defences were planned at once; and on the 27th,
leaving an engineer, supported by a guard under Munroe, to superintend
the construction of them, the General returned to the army, then some
ten miles from Matamoros. The next morning all advanced, and soon came
to rough defiles. On each side bristled what a soldier described as an
irregular, impenetrable mass of "scraggly, scrubby, crooked, infernally
illegitimate and sin-begotten bushy trees loaded with millions of
thornpins"--that is to say, _chaparral_. Passing this and a few cabins
in the midst of corn, cotton and pomegranates, the troops found
themselves at the end of their march, Río Bravo, the "Bold river of the
North," brown with mud, rolled swift and boiling at their feet; and in
plain view about half a mile distant--black with crowded house-tops, gay
with flags, and noisy with bugles and barking dogs--lay Matamoros. A
rude pole was soon raised; to the music of our national airs the colors
went up; and a small masked battery of field guns was planted near
them.[7.21]
A singular political game then took place between Taylor and Mejía.
The former did everything possible to convince the Mexican general
that his movement was entirely pacific, and offered to "enter into any
arrangements to secure the peace and harmony of the frontier" during
negotiations between the two governments; but the latter insisted
over and over again that a state of war had been created by the
American advance. In spite of this Taylor reminded his officers of the
"essentially pacific" and "conciliatory" intentions of the army; yet at
the same time he reported the Mexican attitude as distinctly hostile,
asked for reinforcements, mounted four 18-pounders to command the city,
and about April 7 began what came to be known as Fort Brown, a large,
bastioned "field-work" opposite the lower end of the city.[7.22]
[THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE]
On April 11 General Ampudia, the assassin of Sentmanat, arrived at
Matamoros to assume the chief command, accompanied by cavalry and
followed, as the Americans understood, by two or three thousand more
troops. The next day he signalized his advent by ordering Taylor to
decamp at once for the other side of the Nueces--a proposal to which
a courteous negative was returned--and by compelling all the Americans
in the city, "under open threats of violence," to leave town within
twenty-four hours. Taylor retaliated by requesting our naval commander
off the Rio Grande to stop the use of that stream. As the Mexican
attitude made it impossible for us to have the joint navigation implied
by our claim, this appeared reasonable; but essentially the measure was
defensive, since without supplies coming by water a large force could
not remain long at Matamoros. When Ampudia complained, the General
pointed out that sealing up the river was only the "natural result of
the state of war so much insisted on by the Mexican authorities as
actually existing," and offered to reopen it if Ampudia would join
him in maintaining an armistice during the negotiations of the two
governments; but this led to no result.[7.23]
Ampudia's orders and intention had been to attack the Americans as
soon as possible, but his glorious prospects darkened immediately.
Though given the place of Major General Arista, long at the head of
military affairs in this quarter, because he supported the revolution
of Paredes while Arista not only frowned upon it, but seemed to aim
at making northeastern Mexico independent, Ampudia was detested and
thought incompetent--an opinion he did not share--by not a few in the
northern army, whereas Arista stood high in his caste, and, as a person
of wealth and position, had strong friends well able to make trouble
for the central government. Consequently an order dated April 4 made
Arista commander-in-chief with Ampudia as lieutenant. The latter was
immediately forbidden to shine on the field of glory, and, finding his
officers would not support him in disobedience, he submitted.[7.24]
Arista, however, bearing instructions dated April 4 to attack the
Americans, reached the scene on the 24th, and ordered his cavalry
general, Torrejón, to cross above Matamoros with about 1600 men. Hearing
a rumor of this movement, Taylor sent Captain Thornton and about sixty
dragoons late that afternoon to reconnoitre; and the next morning, some
twenty-eight miles from camp, finding himself completely shut in by
overwhelming forces, the Captain tried to break through, lost several
men killed and wounded, and then with all the rest surrendered. This
was war. "Hostilities have begun," announced Arista on the day of his
arrival. "Hostilities may now be considered as commenced," reported
Taylor on the 26th; and--besides advising Polk to organize twelve-months
volunteers--he at once called upon Texas and Louisiana for about 5000
men.[7.25]
[REASONS FOR POLK'S COURSE]
It was a tragic and most regrettable dénouement; yet, on a close review
of all the data now accessible, one does not find it easy to censure
Polk. If he had wished and meditated war from the first, why did he work
for an amicable settlement through Parrott, Black and Slidell? For the
sake of appearances, many said. But in the first place we have found
that Polk was honest in those negotiations; and, in the second, had
war been his aim and appearances his care, he would not have permitted
the order of January 13 to be issued that day. On January 12 it looked
at Washington as if the question of receiving Slidell would soon be
decided. The President could afford to wait a little, and he would have
done this, for it was clear that an unnecessary military step, taken
while he was extending the olive branch, would needlessly make him
appear either treacherous or ridiculous. Moreover if he sought a war, he
knew on January 12 that matters were shaping themselves to his taste;
that Mexico was almost sure to close the door of negotiation soon;
and consequently that he would soon be able to demand of Congress the
forcible redress of our grievances.[7.26]
Here lay a _casus belli_ amply endorsed by international law, the
practice of civilized powers, and the general opinion of the world. It
was a ground, too, that Polk himself, as we have seen, felt entirely
satisfied to stand upon, and one that our people, feeling as they did,
would almost certainly have accepted. Having, then, apparently within
his reach a pretext for war that almost everybody thought good, he would
not have exerted himself to obtain one that almost everybody thought
bad; and in fact--evidently expecting no event of decisive importance
to occur near the Rio Grande--he went on day after day with his plan
to lay our grievances before Congress, until news of the attack on
Thornton burst upon Washington like a rocket. On the hypothesis that
he had wished and meditated war from the first and merely stuck at
appearances, his conduct was therefore irrational; and, besides, we have
seen adequate reasons for believing that he desired peace.[7.26]
Discarding that hypothesis, however, leaves us the important question,
How did the idea of sending Taylor forward present itself to Polk?
First, then, from his point of view it seemed entirely permissible.
A proprietor is not debarred from going where a squatter has built a
cabin; and in the light of our official claim and arguments Mexican
occupation above the Rio Grande was merely by sufferance. The so-called
"provocative act" of pointing guns at Matamoros could not be charged
against the government, for Marcy had suggested other points also for
Taylor's camp, leaving the choice to him. It was a defensive measure
adopted by the General for military reasons in conjunction with pacific
assurances and proposals; and we learn from Arista and others that it
had a sedative effect on the property owners of that flimsily built city
and on the army authorities.[7.27]
No encroachment upon the powers of Congress appeared to be involved.
Had Polk's aim been, as Calhoun alleged, to establish a boundary, he
could not have tolerated Mexican posts, for the troops of foreign
states cannot be permitted to sojourn within our officially defined
limits. Besides, Polk had sent Slidell to treat on this very question,
and Slidell had not given up the task. Though it rested with Congress
to declare war, a President could legally, in the exercise of his
discretion, take steps liable to bring about hostilities. Moreover
Congress appeared to have authorized Taylor's movement. Corpus Christi,
claimed by Tamaulipas, had been made an American port of delivery. A
collection district had been established in the intermediate region. The
declaration of Polk's Message, December, 1845, that our jurisdiction
had been extended to the Rio Grande, and Marcy's appended report, which
announced that Taylor's instructions were to regard that stream as our
boundary, had raised no storm. For six months, admitted the chief Whig
organ, our doings in this field not only had appeared to be endorsed
by the people, but had gone on openly without calling forth "a single
question from any public authority." Officially notified of the military
occupation of Corpus Christi, Congress, instead of protesting, had
voted supplies for the troops. Finally, Congress had instructed the
Executive, in the resolutions for annexing Texas, to reach an agreement
with Mexico regarding the boundary; it was his duty to persevere in the
attempt until convinced he could not succeed; and Taylor's advance, as
will presently be seen, appeared to him a proper step in the discharge
of this obligation.[7.28]
Familiar precedents and principles were believed to sanction the
movement of our troops. In 1794 Washington had ordered Wayne to conduct
hostilities in disputed territory, and had threatened to destroy a
British fort there. In accordance with a resolution of Congress, Madison
had seized the "Florida parishes" claimed by Spain. Just before Taylor
was ordered to move, Hilliard informed the House of Representatives that
England had magistrates in the southern part of Oregon; and John Quincy
Adams proposed to take military possession of that disputed territory
before concluding negotiations. If such a method could be employed in
dealing with countries willing to treat, very naturally--in the case
of one that had pronounced for war--pacific occupation, leaving the
competing jurisdiction undisturbed, seemed fully justifiable.[7.29]
Taylor's advance appeared also to be highly expedient. For one thing,
our claim upon the intermediate region would have been weakened, had
we refrained from sharing with Mexico in the occupation of it. For
another, it seemed wise to place ourselves in a strategic position that
would be of great value, should Mexico's threat of war be carried into
effect. And for a third it was believed that a bold military attitude,
indicating that at last the United States had made up its mind, would
count with Mexico as a strong argument for negotiation. Such was the
opinion of Parrott, Slidell, Worth, Taylor, Scott, Archer, now chairman
of the Senate committee on foreign relations, Brantz Mayer, formerly
secretary of legation at Mexico, Polk himself, the administration
circle in general, and well-informed persons outside it. January 17
Conner was ordered to assemble all his vessels and exhibit them off
Vera Cruz--evidently in pursuance of this design. The government organ
stated, and opposition writers conceded, that such a purpose was in
view.[7.30]
But essentially, as already has been suggested, Taylor's advance
rested on the necessity of military defence; and indeed there is reason
to consider Scott the prime factor in the business, for the order of
January 13 was based upon, and in part verbally reproduced, a "projet"
submitted by him, whereas Polk's diary for January 12 and 13 does not
even allude to the subject. Now not only were defensive measures called
for on general principles, as we have just been informed by the London
_Times_, but the Texans actually and urgently needed a sheltering arm.
During the latter part of 1845 the chief Mexican engineers drew detailed
plans for crossing, not only the Rio Grande, but the Sabine. Merely
the refusal of Paredes, growing out of his revolutionary designs, to
reinforce the troops on the frontier with 2400 men prevented an attack
at this time. Almonte, who had particularly recommended incursions into
Texas, held the post of war minister in January, 1846. The Mexican
troops were extremely mobile. Ampudia's main force, at the end of a long
march, did 180 miles in four days. Screened by rancheros and living on
a little corn and jerked beef carried in their pouches, a body of light
cavalry could have reached San Antonio by way of Laredo, ruined the
town, and been well on their way toward home before their movement would
have been suspected at Corpus Christi. The government received warnings
of this danger from Dimond and from Parrott in 1845; Marcy and Polk
feared it; and the probable rejection of Slidell--which meant a triumph
of the war party--seemed likely to accentuate the peril. In fact Mejía
ordered irregulars into Texas on February 16 and March 17, though, as
their commander aspired to execute a revolution with American aid, he
did us no harm.[7.31]
Nor were only such formal incursions to be guarded against. The war
of 1836 in Texas had shown what outrages Mexicans were capable of
committing, and similar affairs had now begun to occur. In one instance
a party of fifteen, including women, after having been induced to
surrender, were all butchered except a single person, who survived
though seriously wounded. In April, 1846, the Mexicans opposite
Matamoros confessed that bloodthirsty guerillas were abroad. Ampudia,
whose murderous record had been his chief distinction, commanded there.
May 13 the British consul in that city reported that licensed bands of
assassins, "caressed, rewarded, and encouraged" by the authorities,
were committing atrocities near the Rio Grande; and, had the way been
open, such gangs might have robbed and murdered in the settlements of
Texas.[7.32]
The position selected by Taylor was admirably suited to this emergency.
Scott, though a Whig, wrote out a long explanation, showing that on
the Rio Grande the army had a more healthful camp than before, better
drinking water, more abundant fuel, better grazing and a better port.
Information could be obtained more quickly; the border watched more
closely; an invading force pursued more promptly; and its line of
retreat cut more certainly. Besides, the river amounted to a great
breastwork, for this part of it could be crossed with safety at only
certain points, and a body of men, even though comparatively small,
could not cross anywhere on its lower course without peril. It was
not, however, simply that the Rio Grande position seemed far the best.
The nature of the region made it essential. Taylor had to be in that
vicinity or else near Corpus Christi, and for purposes of defence the
latter point could not be deemed satisfactory. Now the necessity of
defence was entirely due to the threatening conduct of Mexico. Therefore
she could not reasonably complain of our precautions; and if she could
not complain, then no one could do so in her name.[7.33]
But the challenge was triumphantly thrown out: Can it be denied that
our taking a position on the river did in fact cause the war? In view
of the data it can and should be denied. First, joint occupation of the
disputed region might have gone on peaceably, as occupation of that
character has continued elsewhere, but for a distinctly aggressive step
on the part of Mexico; and, secondly, for her the Rio Grande had no
particular significance. She claimed all of Texas, and intended to drive
us from it, if she could. Furthermore, the crass vanity and ambition of
Mexican generals and the exigencies of domestic politics would probably
have led to an attack upon us, had Taylor remained at Corpus Christi,
or even pitched his camp at San Antonio. In spite of express orders,
Mejía actually attempted an offensive in the intermediate region. When
the Mexican government gave formal notice to England and France in the
summer of 1845 that war had become inevitable, our army lay far from the
Rio Grande. Taylor's advance to the Bold River no more produced the war
than Pitcairn's march to Lexington produced the American revolution. It
was an effect and an occasion, but not a cause.[7.34]
[MEXICO THE AGGRESSOR]