administration found itself confronted by a crisis. The dignity of the
United States had certainly been outraged in a defiant and contemptuous
manner. By the acts of Mexico, diplomatic relations had been completely
severed, and she would not renew them on any terms which the United
States could think of accepting. Commercial intercourse was practically
at an end, and the interests of our citizens were so gravely prejudiced,
that from this point of view even a London paper, the _Examiner_,
admitted reluctantly that the situation was becoming "intolerable to
the United States." Our claims and our awards were still facts. "The
honor of this government is pledged to our own people for the diligent
and proper prosecution of these claims," our secretary of state had
said in 1843, and it was perfectly true. To let them go unpaid, in
addition to being internationally immoral, would have wronged our
aggrieved citizens; and to pay them from our own revenues, besides being
immoral, pusillanimous and ridiculous, would have been unfair to all
of our tax-payers. We had observed no more willingness, although the
Mexican government had nearly always been sufficiently strong, to do us
justice before annexation became an issue than afterwards; and in fact
Ashburnham, a British representative at Mexico, did not exaggerate when
he wrote, "They _will_ not pay but on compulsion." There was therefore
no way to collect our due except by force.[6.30]
If our long forbearance appeared to American editors a mistake, much
more reason had the administration to entertain that opinion, for
our ministers and consuls in Mexico had repeatedly urged it, and
Slidell had summed up his experience there in the following words,
amply justified by the sequel: "We shall never be able to treat with
her on fair terms until she has been taught to respect us ... here
all amicable advances are considered as indicative either of weakness
or treachery." "Be assured," he added privately to Buchanan, "that
nothing is to be done with these people, until they shall have been
chastised." The solemn declarations of a succession of trusted agents
that our forbearance was a tactical error were facts that our government
was bound to consider; and by way of confirmation it had not only our
complete failure to get on with Mexico, but the success of a power which
seemed to have pursued a very different course, for in October, 1845,
our consul at Vera Cruz had given the state department a specimen of
England's tone. Mexico, said she to the minister of relations, must
fulfil to the letter every contract with a British subject.[6.31]
Furthermore our government felt seriously concerned about the European
monarchical schemes. Early in January, 1846, the London _Times_ printed
a letter from its correspondent at Mexico in which the opinion was
expressed that a foreign prince, if "seconded by any leading European
power," could gain a Mexican throne. A week later the same journal,
recommending a Spanish king as the only possible cure for the ills
of Mexico, had remarked that the United States could not oppose the
"united policy of the European Powers"; and at about the same time
the _Picayune_ had announced, that it was proposed to give Cuba to
England for her coöperation in the monarchical plan. Our government
had, and could have, no intention of submitting to such European
manoeuvres. Any attempt of England and France to place a king on the
throne of Mexico, wrote Buchanan, "would be resisted by all the power
of the United States;" and the best way to oppose it was to effect a
definitive settlement of our difficulties with Mexico at once--first,
because this of itself would very likely make the development of the
rather complicated scheme appear, in view of the "Monroe Doctrine,"
impracticable, and, secondly, because no European power could, with any
show of decency, interfere in the domestic affairs of that country,
while she was actually at war.[6.32]
Chivalry does not govern international relations even at the present
day, and in 1845 sentiment was perhaps less tender on the subject than
it now is. Vattel, the recognized authority on the law of nations,
wrote thus: "Every nation ... has, therefore, a right ... to preserve
herself from all injuries.... When the evil is done, the same right to
security authorizes the offended party to endeavour to obtain a complete
reparation, and to employ force for that purpose, if necessary."[6.33]
Moreover, the United States could appeal, not only to strict law,
but still more forcibly to broad equity. To sum up the case in one
sentence, Mexico, our next neighbor, on no grounds that could be
recognized by the United States, repudiated her treaties with us, ended
official relations, aimed to prevent commercial intercourse, planned to
deprive us of all influence on certain issues vitally connected with
our declared foreign policy, seemed likely to sell California to some
European rival of ours, made it impossible for us to urge long-standing
claims or watch over citizens dwelling within her borders, refused to
pay even her admitted debts to us, claimed the privilege of applying to
our government publicly the most opprobrious epithets in the vocabulary
of nations, designed to keep our people in a constant state of
uncertainty and alarm, intended to cause us the expense of maintaining
for defensive purposes a large army and a large navy, planned to destroy
our commerce by commissioning privateers, claimed the right to harry
Texas, a part of the Union, at will, threatened and prepared for war,
and proposed to assume such an attitude that, whenever encouraged by
foreign support or any other circumstances, she could open fire upon
us without even giving notice. She had informed the world that it was
her privilege to keep on harrying Texas from generation to generation;
and on a broader scale, but in a manner precisely analogous, it was now
proposed to hang upon the flank of the United States. Foreign mediation
could not be invoked, for all the American states were naturally
supposed to be prejudiced, and it was contrary to our interest and
avowed policy to allow European intervention in the affairs of this
continent; and no end of what had become truly an intolerable state of
affairs could be seen, for Mexico declared she would never give up her
pretensions until she had recovered Texas, which it was now beyond her
power to do.[6.34]
[THE CASE URGENT]
It rested with our government, therefore, as the agent of national
defence and the representative of national dignity and interests, to
apply a remedy. Of course, too, all the pressure of warlike sentiment
among our people, especially in the President's party, and even the
pressure of motives distinctly selfish, had to be recognized more or
less, for such is the nature of popular government. Very likely Polk's
abandoning a part of our Oregon claim rendered it the more necessary
to avoid flinching in the Mexican affair; and accordingly on April 21,
1846, after long consideration of the matter, he informed the Cabinet
that our relations with Mexico "could not be permitted to remain" as
they were, and that he thought he should recommend to Congress the
adoption of energetic measures for the redress of our grievances,
which meant also of course a full settlement of our differences with
that power. In truth no other course would have been patriotic or even
rational.[6.35]
VII
THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CONFLICT
April, 1845-April, 1846
Strangely enough, although our diplomatic troubles with Mexico would
almost certainly have led to hostilities, the war actually came about in
a totally different way.[7.1]
During the spring and early summer of 1845, in view of Mexican threats
and of reports from trustworthy sources that an invasion of Texas might
be expected,[7.2] it was decided by our government that when her
people should have accepted our annexation proposal, as they were almost
sure to do, it would become the duty of the United States to defend
her;[7.3] and this decision made the question where her southern
boundary lay a practical matter. It was a thorny subject. In 1834
Mexico herself did not feel sure about the line; and according to the
chief technical officer in our state department, sole commissioner to
negotiate the treaty of peace with Mexico, if an official demarcation
had existed, the war between Texas and the mother-country had rubbed
it out. The former now claimed the territory as far as the Rio Grande,
but she did not establish her title by occupying completely and
effectively the region south of the Nueces. Only by an agreement with
Mexico, indeed, could limits have been fixed. So far as it concerned the
republic of Texas, this was in effect the situation.[7.4]
For the United States, however, this was not the whole story. Down
to 1819 our government had insisted that Louisiana extended to the
Rio Grande. In other language, since the southern part of Louisiana
was called Texas, the official view was that Texas bordered on that
stream. Such, then, was in effect the contention of Jefferson,
Madison, Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Pinckney, Livingston and Clay,
who represented three administrations in upholding the claim. By the
treaty of 1819 we did not withdraw from our position, but merely
arranged to "cede" whatever possessions we had west of the Sabine for
certain valuable considerations. From 1819 to 1845, Texas, considered
under its geographical and historical aspects as a district of old
Louisiana, appeared to border on the Rio Grande not less truly than
before, for no other line became established. Hence it seemed evident
from this point of view, that by annexing Texas we revived our old
claim, our old official view, and the testimony of all those eminent
statesmen. Our government so held. November 10, 1845, in explaining to
Slidell the extent of Texas, Buchanan went back to Jefferson, Madison,
Monroe, Pinckney and the discussion of the Louisiana boundary. Polk,
as the head of our government, could not well repudiate, simply on his
own authority, the solemn declarations of Presidents and other high
officials, in which through a term of years the nation had acquiesced.
The fact that for a considerable time the Texans, asserting the Rio
Grande line, had maintained themselves against Mexico perhaps had
some confirmatory value; and Polk was further bound, not only by his
apparently sincere belief in our old claim, but by the pledge he had
given to Texas and the pledge our official representative had given her,
expressly to promote the cause of annexation, that he would maintain the
claim as President. These were grips of steel.[7.5]
[THE UNITED STATES ARMY]
To meet the responsibility thus incurred, we had eight regiments of
infantry, four of "artillery" and two of dragoons, including about
7200 men. The "artillery" regiments, which were theoretically expected
to serve in fortifications with heavy guns, were armed, equipped and
drilled as infantry; but one company of each had a field battery,
and under the instruction of excellent officers had reached a high
state of skill in using it. The infantry and cavalry, drilled on the
French system, were in a good condition generally, though division
among coast and frontier stations, besides impairing discipline and
efficiency, had prevented manoeuvring in large bodies; and the infantry
soldiers in particular, inured on the border to hard service, felt now
a reasonable confidence in themselves and their immediate superiors.
The forty-five capable engineer officers understood their duties fairly
well, except that a lack of men to execute operations had left them,
as the head of the corps admitted, too much like theoretical mariners.
A few well-trained topographical engineers, a small medical staff, and
a quartermaster's department rounded out this miniature army. Nearly
all the infantry carried flint-lock muskets, and numerous defects and
deficiencies existed; but probably the forces were better equipped
for service than has generally been supposed. In view of possible
difficulties with Mexico, a disproportionate share of the troops were
placed at or near Fort Jesup on the western border of Louisiana; and in
June, 1845, these included the Third Infantry, eight companies of the
Fourth Infantry, and seven companies of the Second Dragoons.[7.6]
[GENERAL ZACHARY TAYLOR]
Their commander was Brevet Brigadier General Zachary Taylor. This child
of destiny, born in 1784, had grown up and gained some rudiments of an
education amidst the Indian troubles of the Kentucky border. At the age
of twenty-three he had been commissioned first lieutenant in the Seventh
Infantry, and after showing remarkable coolness and intrepidity in two
small affairs during our second war with England and the Black Hawk War,
he had won a stubborn fight in 1837 against the Seminoles at the head of
some 1100 soldiers. Three years later he was assigned to a supervising
command in the southwest, and this included Fort Jesup.[7.7]
Personally Taylor possessed a strong character, a very strong character,
neither exhausted by self-indulgence nor weakened by refinement and
study. He was every inch a man, with a great heart, a mighty will, a
profound belief in himself, and a profound belief in human nature.
The makings of a hero lay in him, and to a large extent the making
had been done. He was gifted, too, with solid common sense, not a
little shrewdness and ambition, a thorough knowledge of men--the sort
of men that he knew at all--a military eye, and a cool, resourceful
intelligence that was always at work in its own rather ponderous
fashion. The sharp gray eyes and the contraction of his brows that made
the upper part of his face look severe were tempered by the benignity
of the lower part; and the occasional glimmer of a twinkle betokened
humor.[7.7]
On the other hand, everything about him suggested the backwoodsman. His
thick-set and rather corpulent body, mounted on remarkably short legs,
typified barbaric strength. In speech he was rough and ungrammatical, in
dress unkempt and even dirty, and in every external of his profession
unmilitary. He never had seen a real battle nor even a real army.
Ignorance and lack of mental discipline made him proud of his natural
powers and self-mastered attainments, and he saw very distinctly the
weaknesses of school-taught and book-taught men. West Pointers, trim in
person and in mind but inferior to him in strength, practical sense and
familiarity with men and things, he felt strongly inclined to belittle;
and this feeling went so far that he despised, or at any rate frequently
seemed to despise, knowledge itself. He could not, however, fail to
recognize on occasions the professional superiority of his trained
officers, and no doubt found himself unable now and then to defend
his opinions. In such cases, being by temperament extremely firm, he
naturally took refuge in obstinacy; and sometimes he appears to have
been positively mulish, holding to his own view after he must have seen
its incorrectness.[7.7]
From various logical results of these limitations Taylor was happily
saved by Major General Winfield Scott, the head of the army, who
purposely gave him Captain W. W. S. Bliss as adjutant general. Bliss was
described by a good authority as the peer of any man alive in learning,
statesmanship and military capacity; and he felt willing to give the
General--later his father-in-law--the unstinted benefit of all his
talents and attainments. With him at his elbow Taylor could be sure of
trustworthy information, honest and competent advice, a friendly hand
to supplement or subtract, and a skilful pen to report, explain and,
if necessary, discreetly color the facts. Captain Williams, an able
officer, wrote in 1848 that he could not imagine one man's being more
indebted to another than Taylor was to his assistant. In other words,
"Taylor" in the history of the Mexican War is the name of a double star,
one partner in which was the dominating personality of the General, and
the other a fine, trained intelligence known as Bliss.[7.8]
Taylor, then, having been warned by a despatch of May 28, 1845, to hold
the troops in readiness, was confidentially ordered on the fifteenth
of June to place them at some port where they could readily embark for
the Texas frontier, and, after learning that our annexation overture
had been accepted, to occupy "on or near the Rio Grande del Norte"
such a position, favorable to the health of the men, as would be "best
adapted to repel invasion." Accordingly he concentrated his infantry at
New Orleans, where official notice that annexation had been accepted by
Texas reached him. Further orders from William L. Marcy, the secretary
of war, enjoined upon him to "avoid any Acts of aggression," and in
particular to refrain from disturbing any Mexican posts on the left
bank of the river "unless an actual state of war should exist"; and
under these instructions the forces left New Orleans toward the end of
July for Aransas Bay, Texas. His troops--counting the dragoons, who set
out by land for San Antonio, about 120 miles from the coast, a little
later--numbered some 1500.[7.9]
Taylor himself with a part of the command reached his destination on the
twenty-fifth; landed his men, with such rapidity as meagre facilities
and heavy surf would permit, on St. Joseph's Island; and then, with row
boats and small sailing-craft, conveyed them some twenty-five miles
farther to Corpus Christi, a hamlet on the south side of the Nueces
River at its mouth. News that Mexico was on the point of beginning
hostilities caused great alarm presently; but no enemy came, and by the
end of August the General felt secure. The rest of the troops from Fort
Jesup were then on the ground. Seven companies of the Seventh Infantry,
collected laboriously from a number of points, had arrived. Two
volunteer artillery companies from New Orleans had come to the rescue;
and a party of Texan rangers were near him. The Mexicans, on the other
hand, showed no signs of concentrating.[7.10]
[CONDITIONS AT CORPUS CHRISTI]
Naturally the public inquired whether the occupation of Corpus Christi,
and especially the words "on or near" the Rio Grande, could be
justified. But, as the London _Times_--a witness by no means prejudiced
in our favor--observed, "When the United States Government, with the
full sanction of the American people, consummated the annexation of
Texas, ... they should, according to all the usages of civilized
Governments, have proceeded to take military means for the protection of
their new frontier." The performance of this duty involved giving the
commander a somewhat liberal discretion, for southern Texas was a region
of which the Washington authorities knew very little, and what steps it
would be proper for the General to take, should the Mexicans launch a
raid at San Antonio, was known there even less. It would have required
about a month to send information and receive orders based upon it.
Authority to occupy such a post as might seem necessary, in view of the
ground, the vicinity and the news, had to be given. Taylor understood
that Corpus Christi, which belonged to Texas by the same right of
effective occupation as Nacogdoches or Galveston, satisfied the terms of
the order; the government accepted that interpretation; and the country
acquiesced.[7.11]
Gradually his forces assumed rather formidable proportions. Some of
the troops had to come from Detroit, and some from Florida; but it
was feared in all quarters that a heavy Mexican body might cross the
Rio Grande any day, and the reinforcements made quick time. October
13 the army included General W. J. Worth's command, called the first
brigade, which comprised the Eighth Infantry and twelve companies of the
so-called artillery consolidated as a battalion; the second brigade,
consisting of the Fifth and the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant
Colonel J. S. McIntosh; the third brigade under Colonel William
Whistler, which included the Third and the Fourth Infantry; the Second
Dragoons, commanded by Colonel D. E. Twiggs; some United States and New
Orleans field artillery, and the Texas rangers. In all, officers and
men, there were about 3900.[7.12]
Taylor, accustomed to frontier conditions, described his troops as
healthy, remarkably well-behaved and very comfortable. But in reality
the tents could scarcely keep out a heavy dew; for weeks together every
article in many of them was thoroughly soaked; and much of the time
water stood three or four feet deep in some. The weather oscillated
sharply between sultry heat and piercing northers, so that one lay down
gasping for breath and woke up freezing. As hardly enough wood could be
obtained for the cooks, camp-fires were usually out of the question; and
only brackish drinking water could be had. At one time nearly twenty
per cent of the men were on the sick list, and half of the others more
or less ill. Taylor knew so little of military evolutions that he could
not get his men properly into line, and few of his chief officers
excelled him very much. Despite orders from the President, military
exercises were given up after a time; a sullen torpor and silence
reigned in the camp, and many deserted. Meanwhile a horde of gamblers
and liquor-sellers opened booths near by; and the soldiers, driven
to desperation, paid what little money they had to be drugged into
insensibility or crazed into brawls and orgies. Some, if not many, of
the officers gave up acting like gentlemen, and one at least even forgot
how to be honest.[7.13]
Then a dispute regarding precedence brought the camp to the verge of
battle. Twiggs had the honor of seniority as colonel; but Worth, as a
brevet brigadier general, insisted that should Taylor cease to hold the
command, it would fall to him. The question was referred to Washington;
and Scott, directed by Marcy to settle it, gave a ruling in favor of
brevet rank. This decision did not, however, end the controversy. More
than a hundred officers joined in an appeal to Congress, while Worth
declared he would maintain his rights "to any extreme." Taylor, instead
of using his personal and official strength to enforce a _modus vivendi_
until the issue could be properly decided, or at least refraining from
all accentuation of it, ordered a general review, and in spite of the
ruling announced by his superior officer, assigned Twiggs to command
on that occasion; and then, finding that serious trouble would ensue,
proved himself, by countermanding the review, unable to maintain even
his own authority. After all this, discipline could hardly be said
to exist. Moreover, a general want of confidence in the commander
prevailed. "Whether an idea, strategic or of any other description, has
had the rudeness to invade the mind or imagination of our chief is a
matter of doubt," said Worth; "We are literally a huge body without a
head." If Taylor succeeds, it will be by accident, concluded Lieutenant
Colonel Hitchcock, now commanding the Third Infantry, who had studied
and taught at West Point.[7.14]
[THE QUESTION OF RIGHT]