we should now observe, was in our case more than a prejudice. Even in
the eyes of the intelligent _El Siglo XIX_, an American was "a being
detestable to the nation on account of the little accord between [him
and] the religion, the language, and the gentle, affable, frank, and
generous character of the Mexican." Our directness of thought, speech
and action, and the brusqueness of manner that naturally accompanied it
appeared inconsiderate and haughty; and no doubt, in dealing with people
who seemed to us deceitful, unreliable and unfriendly, our citizens
often emphasized these characteristics. In habits and customs there was
indeed a profound unlikeness, and below this lay a still more profound
racial antagonism. Finally the politicians of all parties, fearing to
be outdone in the display of patriotism, encouraged the anti-American
feeling. The sharp and rancorous Tornel used every opportunity to speak
against us; and Santa Anna, whose prestige was immense--it must not be
forgotten--as late as 1844, both fearing the influence of our freedom
and wishing his fellow-citizens to consider him essential, represented
the United States as a Minotaur eager to devour them. Few were
enlightened enough to correct the misconceptions regarding us; no one
had the power, courage or wish to do so; and in the end, very naturally,
these dominated the public mind--or, to be more precise, created and
kept alive a general impression. Americans "scarcely have the look of
men," it was gravely asserted.[5.1]
In regard to an immediate conflict in arms with us, Mexico by no means
felt like the dove threatened by a hawk, as people in this country have
generally supposed. To be sure, the national existence was often said to
be in danger, but such talk was largely for effect. Castillo asserted
that Slidell had been sent in order to obtain a pretext for war; but
this was in all probability a bid for Mexican and European support,
since he knew that we already had grounds enough, and the council of
state evidently believed we did not seek a conflict. Paredes whispered
to the British minister at a banquet, "I hope your government does not
mean to let us be eaten up;" but this was a plea for English assistance.
As we have just said, not American arms but American settlers were the
chief danger, in the opinion of Mexico. The very men who clamored that
the national existence was threatened by the United States were the ones
who called most loudly for war. A circular to the local authorities
issued by the central government in December, 1845, invited attention
to the prevailing opinion that armed resistance could prevent further
usurpations like that of Texas; and another such paper, issued in
November of the following year, dwelt strongly upon this point. From
military force also there was danger, to be sure. Our superiority in
numbers and resources was admitted. But there were many offsets to that
superiority, and the Mexicans closely studied and shrewdly counted upon
them.[5.2]
[THE UNITED STATES DEEMED FEEBLE]
Let us review those offsets. In the first place, while the government
of the United States deemed its course honorable and considerate, in
the eyes of many, if not all, Mexicans we had been abject as well as
knavish, stealing her territory and then trying to buy off her anger,
submitting to be gulled, flouted and lashed, and each time going back
for more of the same treatment; and it seemed hardly possible that we
should suddenly adopt a bold, positive, unflinching course. It was even
believed that we dreaded to enter the lists. Almonte, for example, in
reporting that his protest against annexation had caused a heavy fall
on the stock exchange, observed, "The fears of a war with Mexico are
great;" and it was notorious that his departure from the United States
created almost a panic in our money market.[5.3]
Besides, it was assumed that party feeling would go to about the same
lengths here as in Mexico, and that our differences over the slavery
question and the tariff would probably make it impossible for us to
conduct a war vigorously--perhaps, impossible to wage it at all. "The
northern states, I again repeat to you, will not aid those of the south
in case of war with Mexico," wrote Almonte while minister at Washington
in June, 1844. European journals like _Le Constitutionnel_ of Paris
confirmed this opinion;[5.4] and the London _Times_ remarked, It would
be a war, not of the United States, but of a party that has only a bare
majority, and "odious" to a "large and enlightened minority in the best
States." Moreover, argued the official journal of Mexico, the injustice
of the war would of itself excite American opposition.[5.5]
From a military as well as a political point of view this country
seemed feeble. Our regular army was understood to be numerically
insignificant and fully occupied with frontier and garrison duties;
our artillery appeared weak in quality as well as in numbers; and our
cavalry was deemed little more than a cipher. As for volunteers, our
citizen-soldiers were represented in Mexico not merely as unwarlike,
but as "totally unfit to operate beyond their frontiers." Indeed, as
competent a judge as Captain Elliot, British minister in Texas--who
knew the United States well, and in the spring of 1845 was in close
touch with Mexican leaders at their capital--said that the greater their
number, the greater would be the difficulty of invading Mexico. "They
could not resist artillery and cavalry in a Country suited to those
arms," he believed; "they are not amenable to discipline, they plunder
the peasantry, they are without steadiness under reverses, they cannot
march on foot." Nor did there exist in this country, added Elliot,
either aptitude or adequate means for a regular military invasion.[5.6]
"America as an aggressive power is one of the weakest in the world
... fit for nothing but to fight Indians," declared _Britannia_, an
important English weekly; and apparently the war of 1812, to which the
Mexicans referred with peculiar satisfaction, had proved even more than
this. The military operations in a war between Mexico and the United
States would be "contemptible and indecisive," said the London _Times_.
As for our navy, it was undoubtedly small; the Mexican consul at New
Orleans reported that it lacked the discipline commonly attributed to
it; and, however efficient it might really be, Mexico had no commerce to
attack.[5.7]
The Mexicans, on the other hand, were deemed by many observers decidedly
formidable. "There are no better troops in the world, nor better drilled
and armed, than the Mexicans," asserted Calderón de la Barca, the
Spanish minister at Washington; and some of the generals were thought,
even by foreigners, equal to the most renowned in Europe. The Americans
would be at a vast disadvantage, was Captain Elliot's opinion, "in
rapidity of movement" and ability to endure "continued fatigue on the
hardest food." The soldiers of the tri-color "are superior to those of
the United States," declared the Mexico correspondent of the London
_Times_ flatly in 1845.[5.8]
[MEXICAN CALCULATIONS OF THE CHANCES]
If the military power of Mexico was rated in this way by outside
observers of such competence, one can imagine how it was rated at
home. The Mexicans regarded themselves as martial by instinct, and
viewed their troops, inured to war by an almost unceasing course of
revolutions, as remarkably good. Santa Anna once boasted that, if
necessary, he would plant his flag upon the capitol at Washington; and
the results of the wars with Spain and France had tended powerfully to
encourage the self-confidence of his fellow-citizens. "We have numerous
and veteran forces burning with a desire to gain immortal renown," said
the _Boletín Oficial_ of San Luis Potosí. "Not to speak of our approved
infantry," it was argued, "our artillery is excellent, and our cavalry
so superior in men and horses that it would be an injustice not to
recognize the fact;" besides which "our army can be rapidly augmented."
Indeed an officer of reputation told Waddy Thompson that the cavalry
could break infantry squares with the lasso. In November, 1845, the
Mexican minister of war solemnly predicted that his countrymen would
gain the victory, even if one third less numerous than their American
adversaries. To clinch this matter, the feeling of superior power,
which it was known that we entertained, was regarded as an ignorant
over-confidence that would ensure our defeat. In short, "We have
more than enough strength to make war," cried the editors of _La Voz
del Pueblo_; "Let us make it, then, and victory will perch upon our
banners."[5.9]
The clash, it seemed probable, would come first in Texas, far from our
centres of strength. On that field Tornel, the keenest public man in
the country, insisted that Mexico could triumph over any force we could
bring to bear, and Almonte offered some reasons for entertaining such
an opinion. The Texan troops, he said, would exhaust their supplies
before the campaign would really begin; and consequently, since there
would be no way to subsist a large American force in that extensive,
poor and sparsely settled region, the greater the number coming, the
greater would be their sufferings. Even the cultivated districts, wrote
Elliot, could support only a trifling addition, if any, to the resident
population. Moreover, even should an American army be able to exist
there, a few light troops placed along the frontier would keep it busy
on the defensive, said Pakenham; while it was urged by Mexicans that,
should our line break, their invading host would soon find itself among
the opulent cities of the southern states, where perhaps it could not
only exact money, but free two million slaves, obtain their grateful
and enthusiastic assistance, enroll the Indians of the southwest, who
detested the United States, and draw aid as well as encouragement from
the abolitionists of the north. Almonte himself assured his government
that the blacks, the savages and the anti-slavery extremists could be
reckoned on.[5.10]
Possibly, of course, their line instead of ours might be the one to give
way; but in that case the Americans, instead of meeting with conditions
like these, would be confronted by immense distances, great deserts,
furious rains, long droughts, and barren, easily defended mountains.
"If the war should be protracted and carried beyond the Rio Grande,"
said Captain Elliot, "I believe that it would require very little skill
and scarcely any exposure of the defending force to draw the invading
columns well forward beyond all means of support from their own bases
and depots into situations of almost inextricable difficulty;" and a
correspondent of Calhoun, referring to such natural obstacles, wrote,
"nothing is more certain than your statement that [the] war will have
to become defensive [on our part]."[5.11]
Moreover it was argued, said the Mexican minister of relations in 1849,
that the invaders would be unable to obtain resources of any description
from the country about them, would be masters of nothing but the
ground actually occupied, and would find the difficulty of maintaining
themselves, at such a distance from their base, "invincible." On the
other hand should invasion by sea be attempted, the Americans would
have to struggle with tempestuous waters, a coast guarded by reefs and
currents, lowlands protected by "a terrible and faithful ally"--as
Cuevas described the yellow fever, more than one tremendous wall of
mountains, and bad roads that could easily be closed; and they would
find no vital point of attack within practicable reach. The United
States cannot hope to conquer Mexico, was the conclusion of the London
_Morning Herald_, commonly regarded as a ministerial organ; while the
Paris _Globe_, reputed to be Guizot's personal voice, went farther,
and predicted that undertaking to do it would be "ruinous, fatal" to
us.[5.12]
Should we, however, care to make the attempt, Mexico--it was pointed
out--would not only fight on the defensive, and enjoy all the advantages
of knowing the ground, moving on inside lines, and using fortifications,
but would also be able to strike. Nothing would be paid on our claims,
either principal or interest. There was considerable American property
in the country; and while the means of her citizens were being spent in
righteous self-defence, that property could hardly expect exemption.
Above all, one "terrible weapon," as the Mexican consul at New Orleans
termed it, could be wielded night and day, near and far, without expense
and without risk. This was the issuance of commissions to privateers,
for the "nefarious" conduct of the United States in using this weapon,
said the London _Times_, authorized Mexico to do the same. The pursuit
of slavers had been so close of late that many fine Baltimore clippers,
able to outsail anything but a steamer and to go where a steamer could
not, were lying idle in Cuban ports, ready to scour the Gulf and the
Atlantic.[5.13]
No less vulnerable seemed the United States in the Pacific Ocean,
where--according to the New York _Herald_--American property worth
fifteen or twenty millions was afloat. Should letters of marque be
"actively and prudently distributed on the coasts of the Pacific," wrote
consul Arrangóiz to his government, "the Americans would receive a fatal
blow in the captures [of whalers and merchantmen] that would immediately
be made in the seas of Asia, where the naval forces of the United States
are insignificant and could not promptly be increased"; and he reported
in July, 1845, that owing to the prospect of hostilities the insurance
companies at New Orleans were refusing to take war risks. Tornel and
the other Mexican leaders counted heavily on the value of this weapon.
Our own journals were full of the subject, and could find no remedy.
American commerce was defenceless against such an attack, the London
_Times_ cheerfully admitted.[5.14]
Under these conditions it was most natural to believe that Mexico
could make the war "obstinate and tedious," as the London _Standard_
said, and therefore extremely expensive for the United States. She
could "with trifling inconvenience to Herself," Pakenham told Calhoun,
"impose upon this Country the necessity of employing as large a Naval
and Military force as if the War was with a far more powerful enemy."
Obviously a great number of warships would be needed to blockade seven
hundred leagues of coast and patrol two oceans, and the cost of soldiers
could be figured thus, it was thought: During the war of independence
in Mexico eighty thousand royal troops and sixty thousand insurgents
were supported by that country; its population and resources had since
increased; the United States would therefore have to send probably
two hundred and fifty thousand men; and the American soldier was very
expensive.[5.15]
The people of this nation were looked upon as worshippers of the
dollar, and it was believed that war taxes would not be endured here
long. Consequently, since the United States had no credit--said
European journals--the conflict would soon have to end. "The invasion
and conquest of a vast region by a state which is without an army and
without credit is a novelty in the history of nations," remarked the
London _Times_ in 1845. The war losses were expected to reinforce the
effect of war taxes. "War with the United States would not last long,"
wrote Arrangóiz, "because the [American] commerce finding itself
attacked on all seas would beg for peace." When the Mexican corsairs
have captured a few American ships and the Americans have thrown a
few bombs into Vera Cruz, matters will be arranged, predicted _Le
Constitutionnel_ of Paris.[5.16]
[MEXICO RECKONS ON BENEFITS]
Evidently, then, Mexico was not likely to suffer disastrously, and
certain benefits of great value could be anticipated. The act of
crossing swords with us would fulfil a patriotic duty and vindicate the
national honor. Glory and the satisfaction of injuring a perfidious
and grasping enemy would more than compensate for the cost. A conflict
would prevent this greedy neighbor, as the London _Times_ argued,
from imagining that Mexico dared not resist spoliation. The American
settlers, whom every effort had been made for many years to keep out
of the country, would be driven away, and the danger of American ideas
averted. Even if the frontier could not be forced back to the Sabine, a
long period of hostilities would render it impossible to practice near
the border our arts of political seduction, and merely a short contest
would tend to re-Mexicanize thoroughly the northern departments. Indeed
the whole country would be re-Mexicanized, for the first effect of the
war would be to cure disunion and baptize the nation anew in the fires
of patriotism. The necessity of meeting a foreign foe would vitalize
the courage of the army, which had grown somewhat lax in battling with
fellow-citizens, restore discipline, and perfect the officers in their
difficult but noble profession. A blockade, many believed with Almonte
and Santa Anna, preventing the exportation of silver and the squandering
of good money on foreign luxuries, would be "the best possible
thing" for the country. Stimulated by exemption from ruinous foreign
competition, the industries would at length flourish, and the boundless
natural resources of the country become fountains of wealth.[5.17]
War is no doubt a great evil, argued the editors of _La Voz del Pueblo_,
"but we recall what Polybius said, to wit: 'If many empires have been
destroyed by war, by war also have many risen from nothing.'" Prussia
owes her greatness to the Seven Years War, pointed out _El Siglo XIX_.
The conquest of the Moors cost Spain a struggle of centuries, but
what Spaniard would undo it? asked others. "Nations determine their
history only in the most dangerous crises," urged an anonymous but able
pamphlet; "and such a crisis, in which posterity will admire us, has
arrived."[5.17]
So the matter presented itself to many when studied as an exclusively
Mexican affair. But could it be regarded as exclusively Mexican?
In Central and South America there were countries that naturally
entertained a racial prejudice against the "Anglo-Saxon." They were
fully capable of discovering the claim to monopoly suggested by the name
United States of "America," by our considering none except ourselves
"Americans," and by our "Monroe Doctrine"; and moreover our press
clamored for the entire continent. Mexico had her eye upon them, and she
counted on drawing support from that quarter.[5.18]
As early as 1836 Cuevas, then minister at Paris, after pointing out to
his government how strongly the country was protected by nature against
the United States, remarked: "Add to this the interest of the republics
of the South to defend Mexico against an always threatening enemy,
which with its ever monstrous greed seems a volcano ready to burst upon
them." The next year a Mexican agent at Lima reported that the alleged
unlawful interference of this country in Texas was the subject of
general conversation and of just alarm in the Spanish-American states.
In 1842 Dorsey, bearer of despatches from our legation at Mexico, stated
at Savannah that Santa Anna had sent envoys to all the South American
republics with this message: "Unless you enable us to resist such
aggression as will be perpetrated by the United States, she will proceed
to embrace in her mighty grasp the whole of the southern continent;"
and Dorsey added that Colombia had already promised financial aid and
two thousand men. At the close of that year, as a letter from Caracas
mentioned, steps were said to have been taken toward forming a league to
support Mexico against American encroachments. In 1843 Almonte made up a
pamphlet of extracts from John Quincy Adams's brilliant though unfounded
speech at Braintree, in which he accused our government of greed and
unrighteousness in the Texas business; and this telling document was
distributed in the principal cities of South America. During the
following years the menace of our ambition to all of the Spanish race
in this hemisphere continued to be discussed in the Mexican press.
"Republics of South America," cried _La Aurora de la Libertad_, for
example, "your existence also is in danger; prepare for the combat;"
and it was easy to believe that official appeals for assistance, in the
event of actual invasion, would not fall upon deaf ears.[5.18]
[EUROPEAN AID EXPECTED]
And there were still better grounds, it was reckoned, for expecting aid
from abroad. In the first place, holding more or less honestly that we
had trampled on the law of nations, the Mexicans persuaded themselves
that every civilized country would feel an interest in their cause. The
justice of our case against the United States, declared the official
_Diario_, will be recognized at once by all governments to which "public
faith and honor are not an empty name." This view was encouraged in
Europe. The cause of Mexico, said the Liverpool _Mail_, is that of all
just and honest governments. The Mexicans have good ground to complain,
proclaimed the sympathetic _Journal des Débats_, for "they have been
tricked and robbed."[5.19]
Covered with so noble a sentiment as devotion to the cause of justice,
more practical considerations could be expected to exert their full
influence. In Mexico as well as in the United States, the monarchies of
Europe were believed to view with jealousy the success of our republican
institutions. Our policy of "America for the Americans," which the
British minister, Ward, had turned against Poinsett at Mexico, was
contrary to the interest of every commercial nation beyond the Atlantic.
The United States, exclaimed _Le Correspondant_ of Paris, assumes to
exclude Europe from the affairs of that continent--as if Europe had not
had rights and possessions there before the United States began to be!
as if the United States did not owe its existence to Europe! as if the
ocean could change the law of nations; and leading journals in London
expressed similar indignation.[5.20]
As the whole world understood, great Britain had not yet forgiven us for
becoming independent, and viewed with great repugnance our extensions
of territory, our commercial development and our control over raw
cotton; and it was obvious that she would be glad to stop our growth.
Sooner or later, warned the British press, the course of this monster
will have to be checked. Guizot, the premier of France, regarded the
United States as a "young Colossus," and earnestly desired to apply in
this hemisphere the principle of the balance of power. Polk was by no
means popular at the Tuilleries, and the _Journal des Débats_, commonly
regarded as the mouthpiece of the government, courteously described his
Message of December, 1845, as bellicose, passionate, full of vain and
ludicrous bravado, arrogant, detestably hypocritical, brutally selfish
and brutally dishonest.[5.21]
The plan to annex Texas had greatly disturbed these two governments,
and they had not only exerted to the utmost against it their diplomatic
strength, both separately and in concert, but, as Mexico knew, had
been disposed to take up arms in that cause. Aided by circumstances,
the courage and skill of the United States had completely foiled them,
but they could not be supposed to view the result with satisfaction;
and there was good reason to believe that they contemplated a possible
further extension of this country, not only with alarm, but with a
strong desire to prevent it. Said the London _Morning Herald_ in March,
1845: Mexico will turn to good account the support of her powerful
protectors and their intense repugnance to the annexation of Texas; and
the London _Times_ predicted that our greed in the Texas affair would be
punished.[5.22]