would be the mines of Mexico, and asked the nations of Europe how
they would like to find their monetary circulation "dependent on the
caprice of the President of the United States." In September, 1845,
it printed the assertion of its Mexican correspondent, that England
must interfere or be prepared to see not only those mines but also
California in American hands. There is a general feeling, announced the
London _Standard_, that only the interposition of England and France
can check the United States. The United States will absorb Mexico
unless foreign powers avert this, preached the London _Journal of
Commerce_. "The conquest of Mexico would create perils for the political
balance of the world," said the _Journal des Débats_; and hence "the
immense aggrandizements" contemplated by the United States "could not
take place without giving umbrage to several nations." Europe would
certainly forbid a conquest of Mexico, threatened _Le Constitutionnel_.
The Mexicans were fully capable of seeing all this for themselves.
The _Monitor Constitutional_, for example, gave currency to the idea
that certain powers would prevent the invasion of their country.
Indeed they could see even more. "Enlightened nations of Europe,"
exclaimed _La Aurora de la Libertad_, "a people consumed with ambition
and covetousness is already taking up arms to conquer the American
continent, lay down the law to your interests and possessions, and some
day disturb your peace at home."[5.23]
Another source of possible trouble for the United States abroad was
the idea that any territory obtained from Mexico would be given up to
slavery. This point came out strongly in the _Journal des Débats_, for
example. Considerably more serious was the danger that in coping with
Mexican privateers we should offend other nations. In this way, so the
British minister warned our secretary of state, the Americans were
likely to become involved in "complications of the gravest character";
and it was believed by the Mexicans that a blockade of their coast, in
addition to being extremely difficult, was almost or quite certain to
have that effect.[5.24]
To these points they added characteristically that fear of their power,
as well as antipathy to us, might lead foreign nations to espouse their
side; and all the supporters of the monarchical plans now entertained
by the government and the upper classes, felt that if carried out
these would pave the way for European assistance. In fact the British
minister himself believed that such a change of regime would guarantee
Mexico against the United States, and it is reasonable to suppose that
in talking with her public men he disclosed this conviction. Being a
jealous nation, thoroughly given up to politics, and not industrial or
commercial, Mexico could not fail to exaggerate the probable effect of
all these influences upon England and France, and to underestimate the
factors that were tending to keep them at peace with us.[5.25]
[WAR DESIRED BY MEXICO]
The strongest basis of hope for effective aid from abroad was, however,
none of these considerations, but our dispute with England over
Oregon. In January, 1846, Bankhead and Slidell agreed that Mexico's
policy toward the United States would depend mainly or wholly upon the
outcome of that issue, and to the Mexican eye the outcome was already
clear. Each country had rejected the proposition of the other, and
Polk's Message of December 2, 1845, committed him afresh to an extreme
position. The course of England tended to confirm the natural inference.
Her perfectly excusable intention was to hold the Mexicans ready to
coöperate with her, should war become her programme, while restraining
them from engaging us alone. Bankhead replied with an encouraging
vagueness to Mexican hints that British assistance was desired, and Lord
Aberdeen talked with the Mexican agent at London of a possible alliance
against us. Indeed that agent reported that he believed Aberdeen would
like to see Mexico fight the United States and win.[5.26]
For superficial, touch-and-go people here was enough to build upon, and
the long entertained hopes of British aid struck root anew. January
14, 1846, our minister Slidell stated that the idea of an approaching
conflict over the Oregon question was assiduously nursed, and seventeen
days later the correspondent of the London _Times_ reported, that it
had become a general conviction. Aberdeen's possible alliance seemed
therefore like a certainty, and he himself admitted to our minister at
London that Mexico had counted upon a war over Oregon. With France, as
we know, Mexico did not stand on the best of terms at this juncture; but
in addition to the other reasons for looking to her, Guizot and Louis
Philippe were strongly pro-English, and in fact, so Bankhead reported,
Paredes hoped for assistance from that country also.[5.27]
From high to low, as we have learned, the Mexicans were inveterate
gamblers, passionately fond of calculating probabilities and accepting
chances, and a situation like this appealed most fascinatingly to their
instincts and their habits. But in the eyes of many--indeed most, it is
likely--the outlook seemed more than promising. Vain and superficial,
they did not realize their weaknesses. "We could not be in a better
state for war," the _Diario_ announced in March, 1845. If any one
thought of the empty treasury, he assured himself that patriotism and
the boundless natural wealth of the country would afford resources.
Enthusiasm would supply everything, it was believed. Equally unable were
the Mexicans to perceive the frailty of their hopes for European aid.
With few exceptions they saw through a veil, darkly. Even Almonte, a
military man and better acquainted with the United States than any other
prominent citizen, assured his government that in such a conflict the
triumph of Mexico would be "certain."[5.28]
Here and there one doubted. Some drew back. But the nation as a
whole--if Mexico really was a nation--felt convinced that pride and
passion could safely be indulged. We shall dictate our own terms,
thought many. At any rate, argued others, our honor will be vindicated
by a brilliant stroke beyond the Rio Grande; European intervention will
then occur; the United States will have to pay a round sum for Texas;
and we shall obtain a fixed boundary, guaranteed by the leading powers
of Europe, that will serve as an everlasting dike against American
aggression. The press clamored for war; the government was deeply
committed to that policy; and the great majority of those who counted
for anything, panting feverishly, though with occasional shivers, to
fight the United States, were passionately determined that no amicable
and fair adjustment of the pending difficulties should be made.[5.28]
"For us [Mexicans]," Roa Bárcena admitted, "the war was a fact after
Shannon's declarations of October, 1844, and the fact was confirmed
by the admission of Texas to the North-American Union." "Since the
usurpation of Texas no arrangement, no friendly settlement has
been possible," said _La Reforma_. Besides, a faith in eventual
triumph, strong enough to survive a series of disasters, burned in
the heart of the nation. The Mexican correspondent of the Prussian
minister at Washington--regarded by our secretary of war as entirely
trustworthy--reported that the people were bent upon war. But for the
procrastination and vanity of Mexico, no conflict would have occurred,
said J. F. Ramírez, who stood high among the best public men of that
country. "The idea of peace was not popular," states one Mexican
historian; the nation was responsible for the war, confess others.
_Mexico desired it_, admitted Santa Anna in 1847 and the minister of
relations in 1849, both speaking officially.[5.28]
VI
THE AMERICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR
1845
In the United States a strong feeling against the dominant elements in
Mexico had been created by events that did not directly concern us.
The atrocious massacres perpetrated at Goliad and the Alamo during the
Texan struggle for independence made an indelible impression on the
public mind. Said Buchanan on the floor of the American Senate: "I
shall never forget the deep, the heart-rending sensations of sorrow and
of indignation" which pervaded this body when we first heard of Santa
Anna's "inhuman butcheries." The decimating of Texan prisoners for
trying to escape from their guards, as they had a perfect right to do,
and the cruelties, or at least excessive hardships, which they were made
to suffer in confinement, deepened the feeling. The official threats
of ruthless war and even extermination against the Texans, and the
belief that Indians were incited to fall upon their women and children,
sharpened it still more. In 1844 one Sentmanat went from New Orleans to
Tabasco on a revolutionary mission but was unsuccessful; and his party
surrendered to the Mexican leader, General Ampudia, on the promise of
good treatment. Most of the men, however, were shot; the rest of them
disappeared in prison; Sentmanat was summarily executed; and his head,
fried in oil to make it last longer, became the chief decoration of the
public square at San Juan Bautista.[6.1]
Such acts--naturally though incorrectly supposed to represent the
character of the Mexican, and linked with the apparent cowardice of
Santa Anna and his army in the Texan war of independence--caused the
nation in whose name they were perpetrated to be looked upon by not a
few Americans as a nest of poisonous reptiles, fit only to be stamped
upon. Referring to one of the Texan outrages, the Indiana _State
Sentinel_ exclaimed: "Should that blustering, cowardly nation ever
have the temerity to declare war against the United States, think you
not that the remembrance of such scenes will make every soldier feel
himself 'thrice armed'?" When people of our own became the victims,
when they were robbed and deported without cause on the shores of
the Pacific, when they were shot without trial at Tampico, when they
were threatened with the death of pirates for joining the Texans, and
especially when the newspapers told how Americans among the Santa Fe
prisoners were insulted, abused and forced to work in chains on the road
to Santa Anna's palace, so that he might feast his cruel, cowardly eyes
upon their sufferings, fury burned like a flame in many a heart. Time
appeased the fire, but in 1846 the embers were still red.[6.1]
[AMERICAN FEELING ABOUT MEXICAN OUTRAGES]
With less poignant but no less real indignation the American public
noted in a general way the entire long series of our grievances: our
flag insulted, our minister traduced and threatened, our consuls
maltreated, our government officially maligned, agreements broken,
treaties ignored or violated, citizens persecuted and imprisoned,
property confiscated, trade hampered and ruined, complaints more or
less politely mocked, positive demands adroitly evaded, valid claims
fraudulently defeated; and heard that such offences were not merely
committed now and then, but repeated over and over again with apparent
deliberation and malice. The highest Mexican authorities were found
encouraging prejudice and ill-will against our citizens, exerting
themselves to make foreign nations distrust and hate us, misrepresenting
our efforts to conciliate them, and describing our honest wish to be on
friendly terms as hypocrisy and craft. Our people saw the legitimate
results of Mexican misgovernment charged against this country;
proceedings of our authorities, fully warranted by the facts, protested
against; threats of war freely made to influence our national conduct;
and measures looking toward hostilities openly advocated and adopted in
the most offensive manner. Just how fully the details were noted by the
public, and how long the incidents were remembered, it would obviously
be impossible to say; but in all probability they sank into the general
consciousness, and produced a certain state of mind.
In February, 1847, the Virginia House of Delegates declared that the war
had been "most unrighteously provoked ... by a long series of acts of
injustice and outrage towards the United States," and this is only one
of almost countless equivalent expressions, which no doubt were fairly
sincere.[6.2]
On the other hand certain factors tended to neutralize our indignation.
There was a disposition, traceable to natural good-heartedness,
political expediency and commercial interests, to maintain friendly
relations with our neighbor. Much of what seemed like misconduct was
attributed to circumstances. We had a rather conceited notion that
Mexicans could not be expected to know very much or do very well. More
or less faintly the idea glimmered, that perhaps it was easy for them
to misunderstand the Texas affair, and natural for them to be angry
about it. Many felt inclined on general principles to suspect that our
aggrieved citizens were not entirely exempt from blame. Money was used
by the agents of Mexico to influence our press. Domestic politics warped
public opinion in her favor sometimes; and finally the anti-slavery
people went great lengths in championing her government and accusing
their own, for every suggestion of war upon Mexico was suspected of
aiming at the acquisition of territory and the reinforcement of a hated
institution.[6.3]
The northeastern states, on account of the strong anti-slavery sentiment
existing there, were not a little disposed to heed these influences, but
elsewhere they signified much less, and were quite unable to offset the
prevalent feeling that Mexico had insulted, outraged and cheated us, and
the growing conviction that, in dealing with her, forbearance had proved
to be a mistake. As early as 1830 Count Lillers wrote from New Orleans:
It would be "impossible" to speak of Mexico with "more bitterness and
desire of vengeance than is done by certain persons whose words must not
be neglected," and by 1837 many agreed with Jackson that satisfaction
ought to be required; yet nothing positive was done, and the impatience
grew. The lenity of our authorities began to be denounced, and the New
Orleans _Picayune_ in particular attacked what it called "the known
imbecility which has for years marked our government at home as regards
its external relations with Mexico."[6.4]
The proceedings of her claims commissioners had a signally bad effect.
"The conduct of the Mexican government towards the American claimants
under the treaty between the two countries," declared the _Picayune_,
"has been the most infamously perfidious ever practised by one
country and submitted to by another." "Many earnest remonstrances and
complaints," wrote Webster, our secretary of state, officially to the
Mexican commissioners, have been made to me against your proceedings and
those of your government in this affair; and though he refrained from
expressing any opinion as to the justice of them, such a declaration
was evidence of an indignation both deep and general. At the same time
fresh grievances accumulated; and the Mexicans, instead of showing
any appreciation of what our people regarded as kindness toward them,
appeared even less willing to grant effectual redress than ten or
fifteen years before. "Forbearance and lenity toward such creatures,"
protested the _Jeffersonian Republican_ of New Orleans in August, 1845,
"are all lost and worse than lost," for they are thought signs of
weakness, and lead to greater atrocities.[6.5]
The decision of Herrera's administration to reject Slidell, our minister
of peace, was generally regarded--except by the partisan opponents of
our government--as a crowning proof of the vanity of forbearance and
a loud call for action. This nation, said the St. Louis _Republican_,
"owes it to herself and her character, and the just appreciation of her
ministers and her standing in all foreign countries not to suffer so
open an insult to her representative to pass unnoticed." "The indignity
to our Minister requires atonement," was the crisper utterance of the
_Picayune_, which was widely recognized as the best informed authority
on Mexican affairs among our newspapers. The revolution of Paredes
appeared to be a further evidence of hostility. The government of
Mexico, observed the _Delta_ of New Orleans, has been overthrown with no
pretext except the necessity of active war against the United States;
so let war be waged. Finally, the definitive rejection of our peace
overture, announced in Castillo's defiant and offensive note, supplied a
conclusive argument in the opinion of many against further hesitation.
"We have borne and forborne long enough, and a resolute stand should be
taken at once," was the comment of the _Missouri Reporter_. "The United
States," declared the New Orleans _Commercial Bulletin_, "have borne
more insult, abuse, insolence and injury, from Mexico, than one nation
ever before endured from another ... they are now left no alternative
but to extort by arms the respect and justice which Mexico refuses to
any treatment less harsh."[6.6]
[BELIEF THAT EUROPE WAS BEHIND MEXICO]
Another consideration that intensified public sentiment was the
suspicion, which in many cases deepened into something more, that
she was to be used against us by the monarchies of Europe, and in
particular by Great Britain. In 1842, when she made forays into Texas
and threatened a serious invasion, it became a very prevalent opinion
in the United States, reported the Mexican consul at New Orleans, that
England stood behind these movements; and later that country was justly
believed to be working in Texas to defeat and injure us. Her influence
at Mexico was understood to be powerful; and the Americans, not aware
what elements of strength Mexico felt able to count upon, thought she
certainly would not defy us unless assured of foreign support. "Our
people are prone to the opinion, whether well or ill-founded," said the
_Commonwealth_ of Lexington, Kentucky, in February, 1846, "that that
ambitious and mischievous government [of Great Britain] is at the bottom
of Mexican hostility towards us." This was provocation enough. "To fight
the Britishers, all the States are one," complained the London _Times_,
and on this point it was doubtless much closer to the fact than in most
of its deliverances on American affairs.[6.7]
England was not supposed to be alone, however. Our people understood
that France had coöperated with her against the annexation of Texas,
and not a few suspected her of pursuing the same course to bring about
the rejection of Slidell and the anti-American revolution of Paredes.
In February, 1846, the _Courrier des Etats Unis_ of New York, which
could be regarded as of considerable importance, made this rather
startling announcement: "The latest intelligence from Mexico leaves no
doubt that the new Government of that country is resolved to reject all
peaceful overtures from the United States and solicit the intervention
of European powers to obtain from the Union indemnification for the loss
of Texas and a boundary line under the protecting guaranty of France and
Great Britain. We know personally that this was an idea entertained by
General Almonte when he left New York, on his return to Mexico, where
he now occupies an influential place in the government." The statement
that Almonte expressed such a view early in 1845 must have become known
somewhat widely, for apparently it signified much; and the scheme could
not fail to give offence to as many of our people as heard of it. Even
more disagreeable were the plans for a European monarchy now looming
up so boldly south of the Rio Grande, for they defied the "Monroe
Doctrine," and threatened to bring some great power--perhaps more than
one--directly into the lists against us. During February, 1846, the New
Orleans papers, especially the _Picayune_, invited the attention of the
country vigorously to this phase of the situation.[6.8]
All things considered, it seemed imperative to stop drifting, and to
settle our affairs with Mexico before the monarchs of Europe could
mature plans to injure us; and evidently, from that point of view, no
further delay could be afforded. At this time, therefore, the people
of the southwest, the region most deeply interested in the situation
and consequently best entitled to speak, demanded very seriously and
very positively a definitive adjustment of our relations with Mexico.
As matters were, the thought of armies and privateers appearing on
the horizon as the first announcement of war hardly allowed nervous
people to sleep. Actual fighting, it was often argued, would be less
injurious than passive hostility with its threats and possibilities.
The desirability of Mexican friendship on the score of commercial and
political interests was not forgotten, but many believed that good
relations could not be had without first giving her a lesson. Finally,
urged the _Picayune_ with reference to the monarchical designs of
Paredes, it was now the most critical time since the Spanish colonies
had revolted; the future of republicanism and the independence of
America were at stake; and as matters stood, European powers had the
battlefield, Mexico, wholly to themselves.[6.9]
These broad views were strongly supported by more limited and often by
less justifiable ones. The trade interests of the entire Mississippi
valley required not only to be freed from danger, but also to have the
plan of non-intercourse, which Mexico had practically put into force,
given up. A Mexican army would march into Texas, it was remarked, "as
avowed abolitionists," and slaveholders may naturally have preferred
to meet this peril in the enemy's territory. Political considerations
of a personal sort, and one especially, doubtless had an influence.
Calhoun, the dominant figure of the South, contemplating a possible
withdrawal from the Union, desired the people of that section to husband
their strength. "We need our young men for other troubles," he said
with reference to their fighting Mexico. Besides, he naturally could
not welcome a great disturbance that would interfere necessarily with
his plans, and lead to political results of an unpredictable sort. Now
there were men, particularly in Mississippi, by no means unwilling to
embarrass and possibly unhorse that overshadowing leader by forcing him
to antagonize a popular movement; and a war with Mexico seemed obviously
well-suited for such a purpose.[6.10]
[AMERICAN DESIRE FOR TERRITORY]
A wish to extend the Union was undoubtedly a factor.[6.11] As the
_American Review_ said, Burr had planted in the lower Mississippi
valley the seeds of ambition for southern conquest, and the soil proved
very fit for their germination and growth.[6.12] As early as 1830 the
British consul at New Orleans believed the people would support an
attack upon the territory of Mexico. In 1835 a French visitor of some
prominence concluded that every American held two ideas firmly: that
our prosperity resulted from our republican institutions, and that
Providence intended the new world for the Anglo-Saxon. In 1843 Captain
Elliot, mistaking an instinct for a determination, felt satisfied that
the United States had resolved to push south. By 1845 the appetite for
more territory was pronounced. "There appears to be no limit to the
insatiable lust of territorial acquisition which pervades the minds
of many of our citizens," lamented the New Orleans _Tropic_. When the
annexation of Texas appeared to be certain, the New York _Morning News_
exclaimed, "Who's the next customer, California or Canada?" To this
question the _Tribune_ replied, that its neighbor had tasted blood and
growled for more. No, we don't growl, retorted the _News_; more "will
come soon enough--come of its own accord," for our destiny is to possess
the whole continent. Believers in this convenient theory felt bound to
go forward, and should Mexico oppose the decree of Heaven, so much the
worse for her.[6.13]