not in the course of numerous conversations take up its most obvious and
most important aspects would be absurd. These must have been considered,
and Bankhead reported that not only the annexation of Texas but "the
other points of difference, such as Limits and Indemnity," were to come
up, and in particular he understood that whatever sum the United States
might agree to pay would be "much reduced by claims arising out of the
Convention [of 1839] ... and by others since created." Such was Polk's
view. The questions of boundary compensation and claims compensation,
he said, "naturally and inseparably blended"; and the former existed
only as a consequence of annexation. To suppose after the United States
and Mexico had so long and beautifully illustrated the scene on Keats's
Greek vase--we forever pursuing and she forever eluding us--that we
should hand over to her a large sum without first ascertaining and
subtracting the just value of our claims, would have been ridiculous.
Moreover our claims counted prominently among the "differences" existing
between the two governments, and without a definite adjustment of them a
complete settlement and restoration of harmony, such as this plan aimed
expressly to accomplish, was impossible.[4.19]
At this point, however, Bankhead's agency ended, for another superseded
it. On October 13, after having gone over the matter informally with
Peña, Consul Black at the minister's request wrote a confidential letter
to him, in which he quoted the following language from his instructions:
Ascertain from the Mexican government whether it will receive "an envoy
from the United States, intrusted with full power to adjust all the
questions in dispute between the two governments"; if so, he will be
"immediately" despatched. The secretary of relations now, if he had
not already done so, laid this matter before the President, and on the
fifteenth he replied thus: My government is "disposed to receive the
representative [_comisionado_] of the United States who may come to
this capital with full powers from his government to settle the present
dispute [_contienda_] in a peaceful, reasonable and honorable manner";
but, in order to eliminate every sign of coercion, the American fleet
must retire from Vera Cruz. This proposal was sanctioned by the Mexican
Congress in a secret session.[4.20]
Now the American proposition contemplated "all the questions in
dispute," while Peña said in reply, "the present dispute." But this
was apparently an immaterial variation in phraseology, such as is
customary with men of independent minds. In the first place, it is an
axiom that a whole includes all of its parts, and the American claims
were, as we have just observed, an essential feature of the dispute
between the two countries. In the second place we know that Bankhead
so understood the matter. In the third place this mere difference in
phraseology certainly did not indicate with any clearness a rejection
of the American proposal and the substitution of an essentially
different one, and, if so intended, it involved an ambiguity for which
Mexico was bound to pay the penalty. Fourthly, Black's note was the
sequel to a confidential interview with Peña held expressly for a free
comparison of ideas. Now the consul must have understood the unvarying
refusal of the United States to recognize any Mexican claim to Texas,
and therefore he could see that no envoy would be appointed by us
to treat directly and exclusively regarding the annexation of that
republic. His instructions, moreover, were perfectly distinct; and his
understanding of these matters would have been corrected, had correction
been required, by Parrott, with whom he was ordered to confer. If,
then, it had appeared in his preliminary conversation with Peña that
Mexico insisted upon rejecting the American overture and substituting
an essentially different and essentially unacceptable proposition, he
would have stopped at that point, and reported in substance that Polk's
offer was declined. There would have been no occasion to address the
note of October 13 to Peña. In other words the American offer was
understood, and it was fairly and squarely met. Herrera's government
desired earnestly, as Peña showed Bankhead, to bring about such a
complete settlement as Polk had in mind, and to that end it accepted our
overture.[4.21]
But there is another point worthy of notice. The word _comisionado_
used by Peña--the past participle, employed here as a noun, of the verb
"to commission"--has usually been translated "commissioner," and hence
it has often been urged by American writers, that he did not agree to
receive a minister. But by good fortune we have a definition of that
word from a Mexican secretary of relations. "A _comisionado_," wrote
Bocanegra, "is a person charged by any community, or private citizen
to conduct any business," and this definition obviously included
ministers. On comparing the documents we find _minister_, _envoy_,
_plenipotentiary_ and _comisionado_ used as equivalents; and Peña called
Slidell a _comisionado_ after learning that he came as a resident
minister. Besides, the title signified nothing substantial, for the
parties agreed that our agent should have full powers to discuss the
whole business in hand, and so it follows again that, for the purpose of
settling all the points of difference existing between the two nations,
Mexico agreed to receive an American minister. November 6 Polk heard
as much through Commodore Conner, then off Vera Cruz; and three days
later Parrott arrived with Peña's autograph note, which was similarly
understood at the White House.[4.22]
For good reasons the President felt that no time could be wasted. It was
a critical juncture. The controversy with England over the possession
of Oregon had reached an acute stage, and our minister at London
expressed the opinion that she was trying to make use of Mexico in
connection with it. Our relations with Mexico had dragged long enough.
If it is intended to do anything, a New York merchant had written some
time since to the secretary of the navy, "no time should be lost in
sending a person to Mexico, as you can scarcely conceive the feverish
excitement in our mercantile community," due to the dread of privateers.
Herrera's pacific administration was tottering; and our consul at Vera
Cruz warned the state department to act promptly, since it might go
down at any time. Paredes, the monarchist, was known to be plotting a
revolution; and the London _Times_, then a journal of great importance,
had pronounced emphatically for a Spanish throne in Mexico as a bulwark
against the United States, and had said that it believed no European
power would object. We had promised through Black that a minister would
be despatched "immediately," if he would be received; and Peña not
only had made no objection to this, but had shown impatience for his
arrival. In anticipation of satisfactory news from our consul, Slidell
had been ordered to Pensacola, and instructions for him drafted. By ten
o'clock in the evening of November 10 these were ready; Polk signed
his commission; and Lieutenant Lanier of the navy set out at once for
Pensacola with the documents.[4.23]
[SLIDELL'S INSTRUCTIONS]
"To counteract the influence of foreign Powers, exerted against the
United States in Mexico, and to restore those ancient relations of peace
and good will which formerly existed between the Governments and the
citizens of the sister Republics, will be the principal objects of your
mission," read Slidell's instructions; take up the subject of our claims
"in a prudent and friendly spirit," and arrange through an adjustment of
the Texas boundary to cast upon the United States the burden of paying
them; "exert all your energies" to prevent the cession of California to
England or France if it be contemplated, and, if you can do so without
endangering the restoration of amicable relations with Mexico and the
adjustment of the Texas boundary, endeavor to purchase at least the
northern part of California, including San Francisco Bay, but at all
events conciliate the good-will of the Mexicans, even should their
vanity and resentment prove trying. Fully in sympathy with Buchanan's
instructions, the minister proceeded to Vera Cruz as quickly as possible
on a vessel of war, landed there by November 30, and, noting that his
way had already been paved by the retirement of our fleet, set out at
once for the capital.[4.24]
Unfortunately, though as prompt as possible, Polk had not been prompt
enough. Herrera's administration, as we have learned, had now sunk
to the lowest point in courage, efficiency, prestige and sense of
responsibility. Every morning it looked for a revolution, and every
night for a mutiny. Its one idea was to hold on until the assembling of
Congress on the first of January, in the hope that something favorable
might then occur; and it found this last resource threatened by its
reasonable and pacific policy in regard to the United States. Earlier in
the year it had been denounced for agreeing to recognize Texas on the
condition of her abandoning all thoughts of joining the American Union,
and now it was menaced for listening to Black and Buchanan. A call for
war in the name of honor, territory and independence appeared to be a
serviceable oriflamme for its political enemies. Fierce, unsparing cries
of treason, ignominy and national ruin therefore assailed Herrera; and
under these onslaughts the weak, timid, irresolute administration lost
heart.[4.25]
On December 3 Peña saw Black at the palace and exclaimed, We hear an
envoy has arrived from the United States; who can he be, and what has
he come for? The consul replied that he supposed he must be the envoy
that Mexico had agreed to receive. This ought not to be, answered Peña
hastily; no envoy was expected before January; we are not prepared to
receive him; the government desires he should not come to the capital or
even disembark; "you know the opposition are calling us traitors, for
entering into this arrangement with you;" his coming now might produce a
fatal revolution. This interview showed that before anything was known
regarding Slidell's quality, credentials or instructions, and purely on
account of domestic politics, the government was anxious to break its
agreement. So Peña admitted later, for he privately sent word to Slidell
that under the circumstances it feared to compromise itself, and would
have acted otherwise had it been free. So the matter was understood
by Bankhead; and so it has been understood by fair-minded Mexican
historians. It only remained to contrive a method of evasion.[4.26]
The method adopted was to ask the council of state--a quite unnecessary
proceeding--whether it would be proper to receive Slidell. In so doing
Peña expressed a decided opinion in the negative, advancing, besides
arguments of no moment, the more serious objection that receiving a
resident minister would imply the existence of friendly relations
between the two countries, and would thus condone the annexation of
Texas. Even this argument, however, possessed no real value, for,
as Peña recognized, Slidell was explicitly commissioned to "restore"
friendly relations, which indicated that such relations could not
exist until after he should be received and after he should act; and,
besides, Mexico could have received him with a declaration of reserve,
safeguarding all her claims. Moreover this was evidently a point, if of
any importance, which the secretary should have considered before making
the agreement.[4.27]
To avoid this last difficulty, he alleged in his desperation that
Black had proposed, and he accepted, the plan of sending merely an
envoy _ad hoc_, a special envoy commissioned to settle with Mexico for
the annexation of Texas. His assertion, however, is disproved by the
circumstances and correspondence leading to Slidell's appointment; and
a simple argument reinforces the facts. For the United States to offer
amends for annexation would have been to deny its repeated protestations
that annexation was perfectly proper; would have been to brand upon
its own forehead the heinous charges drawn in vitriol by Rejón. Peña
could see that no country possessing the eyesight of a mole and the
courage of a mouse would so degrade itself. He knew, October 11, that
on such a demand the negotiations would end before beginning; would end
at once in his study with Black's bidding him a respectful good-night;
and since Herrera desired the negotiations, he could not make such a
proposition.[4.28]
[SLIDELL REJECTED]
Moreover the council of state, which was a permanent body of notables,
brushed aside this contention of Peña's, and fell back "on the very
nature of the affair and on the state of our relations (_en la
natureleza misma del negocio y en el estado de nuestras relaciones_)."
Assuming plainly that the United States desired to avoid war and restore
friendly diplomatic and commercial intercourse, it declared that we had
set a trap [_lazo_] for Mexico, and undertaken to introduce a regular
minister under false pretences, as it were, in order to compel her to
be amicable against her will. In furtherance of this design the promise
of the Mexican administration cannot be urged, it protested, for the
intention must have been merely to let the Texas affair be settled, as
a preliminary to the restoration of cordial relations, and it would be
an "unexampled humiliation" were Mexico to receive a regular American
minister before being satisfied for the outrage and injury inflicted
upon her. In other words, Mexico had promised to receive Slidell, but
it did not comport with her interest and her dignity to fulfil the
agreement. This decision ensured his rejection. December 20 he was
officially notified of it, and in reply he wrote what seemed to him a
spiritless note, explaining to Buchanan that under his instructions
he did not wish to make war inevitable by closing the door finally to
negotiations. This done, he withdrew as soon as an escort could be
obtained to the city of Jalapa, situated not far from the coast on the
Vera Cruz road, to await instructions.[4.29]
Daniel Webster, a lawyer of no mean abilities, formerly our secretary
of state, and at the time when he spoke a resolute opponent of Polk,
said, after mature consideration of the matter, that Mexico was "highly
unjustifiable" in thus refusing to hear our minister; and the demand
upon this nation to repudiate its protestations of honesty, and become
the football of Mexican party politics, did seem a bit unreasonable. As
for Polk, it was hard indeed to be charged with ruining by his awkward
statesmanship the pacific administration of Herrera, when in fact the
inherent weakness of that administration ruined his own hopes, and to be
denounced in the United States for trying to force war upon Mexico, when
the Mexicans denounced him for trying to force peace upon them.[4.30]
But Herrera's amiable inefficiency was near its doom. The aristocratic
elements--Church, army and monarchists--drew together, and this action
forced the Santannistas and the Federalists to overlook their own
differences. Paredes, natural leader of the former combination, hated
and feared the latter, for Santa Anna had worsted him in more than one
clash, and the Federalists aimed not only to reform the Church and
support republican institutions, but also to destroy the military order
by establishing an effective militia system. Professing allegiance to
the administration and extorting from its hopes and fears of him all
the money that could be obtained, he disobeyed the orders to divide his
army or march to the Texas frontier; and about the middle of December,
seeing that the Federalists were likely to control the new Congress,
he revolted. The relations of Mexico to the United States afforded a
battle-cry helpful to the army and hurtful to Herrera's administration;
and hence the President was accused of "seeking to avoid a necessary
and glorious war" and of stooping to negotiate "the ignominious loss of
national integrity" with an American envoy.[4.31]
[HERRERA OVERTHROWN BY PAREDES]
Herrera fulminated against the traitorous general who was attacking his
own country. Both houses of Congress fulminated. The city of Mexico
and every department fulminated. But all this was merely eloquence.
The officer despatched to require the immediate surrender of Paredes
accepted a seat in his carriage. Most of the commanders appointed to
defend the capital took their stations under pledges to the enemy.
December 29, when Paredes arrived within about a dozen miles of Mexico,
the garrison of the citadel, instigated by their chief officer, General
Valencia, rose; nearly all the rest of the forces at the capital soon
followed that example; and Herrera, giving up the Presidency without
firing a gun, left the palace with the entire body of his loyal officers
and officials, his mild face and his respectable side-whiskers--in one
hired cab.[4.31]
The only danger of the revolutionary cause had been from treachery.
Tornel and many of the officers were at work for Santa Anna, and
Valencia, whom nobody would trust, was at work for himself. Paredes,
resembling the one-eyed man among the blind, had a certain reputation
for honesty; and these plotters, misled by his reiterated declarations
that he would accept no office in the new government, thought him simple
enough to be used and then thrown over. Valencia in particular, who was
president of the council of state and therefore legally the successor of
Herrera, felt already triumphant, put on regal style, and helped himself
liberally to the public funds. But he and Tornel had enabled Paredes to
make himself independent of them, and now found themselves dealing with
a master instead of a dupe. The troops at Mexico sided with the majority
of the army, and Paredes notified Valencia that he would shoot every
one opposing him--"archbishop, general, magistrate, or anybody else."
Then with military pomp, accompanied by officials whose signatures
adorned the placards denouncing him, he took possession of Mexico, while
the public, long since weary of the incidental music of revolutionary
professions, looked on in silence.[4.31]
The classical farce of an electoral junta appointed by the victorious
general was now enacted, and Paredes became temporary President.
Apparently, however, he intended to use this ill-gotten power with
integrity and force. He drew no salary except that of a general,
avoided all display, and surrounded himself with men of the better
class; and when a broker, who had fattened on corrupt dealings with the
government, offered him a loan, he replied with blazing eyes, "I do
not wish money, but I wish to prosecute the robbers of the Treasury."
With equal firmness he took his promised attitude of hostility toward
the United States. On the fourth of January he swore publicly to defend
the integrity of the national territory; and this had reference to
Texas--every foot of Texas to the Sabine--for such was the unqualified
claim of Mexico.[4.31]
With a government based upon a pledge of war against us and swearing to
carry out that pledge, it seemed as if the United States could have no
amicable dealings; but our authorities were now accustomed to forbear,
and all the reasons for desiring a restoration of diplomatic intercourse
were still in force. Indeed, one of them had become pressingly urgent,
for the European monarchical scheme appeared now to be unmistakable.
Remain in Mexico, Buchanan therefore instructed Slidell, so as to take
advantage of any opening for negotiations; if you deem it wise to do so,
let Paredes know that his financial straits can be relieved by arranging
matters with us; present another formal request for a hearing, and make
"every honorable effort" in your power to avoid a rupture.[4.32]
[SLIDELL MAKES ANOTHER EFFORT]
Accordingly, on the first day of March, 1846, our minister addressed
a letter to Castillo, the new minister of relations, summarizing the
negotiations with Peña, placing clearly in view the alternatives
of diplomacy or war as they had now been defined, and asking to be
received. Again the council of state was consulted, and again this
oracle pronounced for rejection. Castillo then tried to frame a reply to
Slidell; but his note, drafted in opposition to his own ideas, proved
so weak and halting that he laid it before the Spanish minister. In
the view of this diplomat the best solution of the imbroglio seemed to
be European arbitration, and therefore he probably thought it well to
show the United States that we could reach no understanding with Mexico
ourselves. It was also desirable to rally the nation round Paredes by
assuming a bold, aggressive tone. And a fiery, offensive note, suited to
these conditions, rejected the second American overture.[4.33]
Here stands an American minister, answered Slidell, "clothed with full
power to settle all the questions in dispute between the two nations."
Begone, said Mexico once more.[4.34]
V
THE MEXICAN ATTITUDE ON THE EVE OF WAR
In tracing the mutual relations of the United States and Mexico, we have
often had occasion to note how each nation felt about the other and
about a possible conflict; but it is very desirable now to understand as
completely as possible what those feelings were at about the beginning
of 1846, and this will require the consideration of many additional
facts.
Already there were influential and wealthy Mexicans, particularly in
the north, who wished or half-wished that the United States would
subjugate their country, so that order and prosperity might come; and
others reflected that at least our assistance might be desired, should
Paredes undertake to set up a European monarchy. But these were selfish
calculations. They seldom implied good-will. Friends we have none at
the capital, Slidell reported; and our consul at the northern city of
Tampico, even though but a faint loyalty to the central government
prevailed in that section, wrote in September, 1845: "The most stubborn
and malignant feeling seems to exist in the mind of every Mexican
against the United States."[5.1]
[WHY MEXICO DISLIKED THE UNITED STATES]
The principal cause of this feeling--the supposed misconduct of our
government in the settlement, revolution and successful resistance of
Texas, and in the recognition and annexation of that republic--has
already been explained; but other strong reasons coöperated. All
understood that intense dissatisfaction existed in the northern
departments. Now that our frontier had been advanced so far south,
further peaceful aggression seemed easy; and it was believed that we
intended to pursue the Texas method progressively, until all of Mexico
should little by little become ours. "This first invasion is the threat
of many more," said the official journal. It was alleged that we,
fearing the competition of that country in the markets of the world,
did all we could to hinder its agricultural, industrial and commercial
development, and excited the revolutions that paralyzed it; and it
was even believed that we incited the Indians to ravage the northern
frontiers, and so create discontent against the central government. The
privileged classes dreaded the influence of our democratic ideas. The
clergy were afraid that Protestantism, or at least free thought, might
cross the border, and that so far as Mexican territory should fall under
our sway, secular education, the confiscation of their property, and the
other anti-clerical plans of the Federalists, who appeared to draw their
inspiration and their arguments largely from this country, might be put
into force. The numerous misunderstandings and clashes with the United
States that we have noted had produced an enduring resentment, and in
particular our claims and our efforts to have them settled were commonly
deemed artificial and unjust.[5.1]