annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral and
political grounds entirely legitimate. That republic had defied the
arms of the mother-country for nine years. It was recognized as an
independent nation by the leading commercial powers of the world; and
no well-informed person, even in Mexico, dreamed that it would return
to its former connection. To be sure, her pretensions were asserted in
1845 as loudly as ever; but she made them ridiculous by declaring that
never, under any circumstances, would the independence of her rebellious
daughter be conceded. Besides, Mexico had practically acquiesced in the
recognition of Texas by our own and other governments; and, in view of
this fact, as good a lawyer and statesman as Daniel Webster, though
opposed to incorporating that country in the Union, held that our doing
it gave Mexico no ground of complaint.[4.1]
[TEXAS ANNEXED JUSTLY]
Annexation was therefore permissible, and grave national interests of
the United States appeared to demand the step. All northern Mexico,
including California, seemed liable to secede, for the people of that
whole region felt profoundly dissatisfied with the administration of
their national affairs, and realized the urgent need of a strong and
orderly government; there was reason to believe that Sam Houston, the
President of Texas, thought of organizing under European auspices a
southwestern empire, absorbing Oregon, and thus offsetting the United
States; as A. J. Donelson, our minister in Texas at that period, wrote
in 1848, "He was not mistaken. This he could have done"; and in that
event we should have had a bold, ambitious rival in the rear. The
anti-slavery agitation in the United States led many of our southern
citizens to long for separation and a union with slaveholding Texas. The
possibilities of Texan cotton production, stimulated by the English,
who were eager to be independent of the American fields, were keenly
dreaded. The logic of the situation seemed likely to render Texas not
only a commercial and industrial competitor and a rancorous political
enemy, but a source of dangerous complications with Mexico, England and
France. Finally, the British, who possessed a powerful influence in
her councils and in those of Mexico, were deliberately endeavoring to
shape matters in such a way as to do very serious harm, it was believed,
to the interests of the United States. Under such conditions no one
could reasonably complain because we undertook, employing as means
only argument and persuasion, to acquire that important and valuable
territory, and ward off these apparently imminent dangers. Albert
Gallatin, who opposed our taking the step, wrote later that it was "both
expedient and natural, indeed ultimately unavoidable."[4.1]
No doubt it was quite natural that Mexico should take offence. To see
a handful of poor farmers, nearly all of them foreigners by birth,
rebel against their national government, appropriate a large portion
of the nation's territory, rout its army, capture its President,
establish a working political system, and gain recognition abroad, had
been fearfully trying. To believe, not only on the authority of every
Mexican leader but on that of many Europeans and some eminent Americans,
that all this loss and chagrin were largely, if not wholly, due to the
machinations of a neighbor, allied to Mexico by a treaty of amity and
constantly professing friendship, was harder yet. And now to find those
Texans, recently so eager to escape from all outside control, preparing
as if by a preconcerted understanding to join that seemingly perfidious
and aggressive nation, carrying their invaluable territories with them,
and bringing its frontier to the very bank of the Rio Grande--this was
certainly enough to make any citizen, ignorant of the natural steps by
which it had really come about and quite unable to understand American
ways, boil with rage. But the United States had labored to explain the
affair to Mexico, and was not responsible for her blindness.
For a number of reasons Mexico had anticipated the final outcome of the
Texan difficulties, and on August 23, 1843, Bocanegra, her secretary
of relations, addressed our minister on the subject. The conduct of
the United States regarding that province, he wrote, has "appeared to
afford grounds for doubting the sincerity and frankness" of the American
authorities, and therefore, while hoping that the republic founded by
Washington may be saved "from stain and dishonor," we announce hereby,
"that the Mexican Government will consider equivalent to a declaration
of war against the Mexican Republic the passage of an act [by the
American Congress] for the incorporation of Texas with the territory
of the United States; the certainty of the fact being sufficient for
the immediate proclamation of war." Such a note was of course decidedly
offensive to the honor of this nation. Even Thompson felt compelled to
be indignant.[4.2]
The following November Almonte, who then represented Mexico at
Washington, informed our secretary of state that should Congress and
the Executive decide upon annexation, he should consider his mission at
an end. "My country," he stated, "is resolved to declare war as soon
as it receives information of such an act." In reply, Upshur asserted
rather sharply the right of the United States to regard Texas as an
independent nation; but early in 1844 he talked the matter over with
Almonte in a very frank and amicable way, and the Mexican minister
concurred substantially in the annexation policy of our government. The
next spring, however, he formally repeated the protests of August and
November, 1843.[4.3]
[THE UNITED STATES CONCILIATORY]
Probably to gain time and if possible lead us on to acknowledge in some
way the claim of Mexico, Almonte encouraged Calhoun, who had succeeded
Upshur as the secretary of state, to believe that his government,
looking upon Texas as lost, would accept a pecuniary consideration
in order to minimize the misfortune; and about the middle of April,
1844, a "bearer of despatches" named Thompson left Washington with
certain instructions from the secretary of state to B. E. Green, our
chargé at Mexico. These directed him to inform the Mexican government
that, while intending no disrespect and feeling an "anxious desire"
to maintain friendly relations, the United States had been compelled
by a regard for our own security to negotiate a treaty for the
annexation of Texas without reaching a previous understanding with it,
but had borne its attitude in mind, and was now ready to adjust all
difficulties--particularly that of the boundary, which had purposely
been left an open question--"on the most liberal and satisfactory
terms."[4.4]
Thompson landed at Vera Cruz on May 14, and proceeded at once to call on
President Santa Anna, then at one of his estates near the coast. He next
went on to the capital, and in company with Green had a conference with
the acting President, who was, of course, entirely under Santa Anna's
control. No good results followed, however, and Calhoun's overture for
an amicable adjustment of the Texan difficulty, which Green presented
officially in a note, was rejected by the Cabinet. The United States,
Bocanegra pretended in his reply, though it had injured and outraged
Mexico by taking steps toward annexation, had now recognized her claim
to the territory; and he not only refused to make any concession, but
formally repeated the declaration of August 23. He then placed the Texas
affair before the diplomatic corps at Mexico; an unsuccessful attempt
was made to obtain from Bankhead, the British minister, some hint of
aid against the United States; Almonte received orders to persist in
his protests; the newspapers, taking their cue from a journal under the
President's direct control, broke out into what Bankhead characterized
as "the most violent strain of invective against the proposed
annexation"; and Santa Anna himself, assuming the reins of government,
called for 30,000 men and a large sum of money.[4.5]
It is thus clear that while our government positively and rightfully
denied the claims of Mexico to any legal ownership of Texas, it
showed--even to the extent of imprudence--a kindly regard for her
feelings and a willingness to make her, under cover of adjusting the
boundary, a substantial present; and it is equally clear that our
overture, instead of being received in a friendly or even a candid
manner, was twisted and misrepresented, and was used by Santa Anna not
only to advance his personal interests, but even to feed the prevalent
hostility against the United States and increase the danger of war.
Of course Mexico had a perfect right to repulse our advances, but her
method of procedure in the case was unjustifiable.
Meanwhile, from a variety of causes, among which the merits of the
question had but a small place, the treaty of annexation failed in our
Senate, and the Texans, who had given offence to England, France and
especially Mexico by accepting the overture of our Executive, found
themselves not only slighted by the United States but ferociously
menaced by Santa Anna, and seemed likely, in their resentment and
peril, to swing quite beyond our reach--presumably under the shield of
England. To counteract this tendency somewhat and in a measure safeguard
Texas against the dangers we had brought upon her, Calhoun sent a bold
and even audacious despatch to the American representative at Mexico.
The United States, he said, is responsible for the annexation treaty,
and upon us, not upon Texas, the wrath of Mexico should be visited;
moreover the matter of acquiring that territory, which it has long
been our policy to do, is pending still, and for that reason, as well
as on the score of humanity, we could not allow the question to be
decided by fierce Mexican threats of brutal hostilities; Texas is to be
treated as an independent power; but should annexation be consummated,
the United States will be ready to settle most liberally all resulting
difficulties.[4.6]
In October, 1844, our minister gave the substance of this despatch to
the Mexican government; and soon the talented, energetic and audacious
Rejón, the successor of Bocanegra, sent him in reply a long but not
wearisome review of the Texas affair, that was absolutely a masterpiece
in its class. Truths, managed so as to give a wrong impression, clever
half-truths and flat falsehoods were skilfully combined, and at last the
United States appeared to stand in the dock as a confessed perjurer and
thief awaiting sentence. As for Calhoun's intervening now between Mexico
and a handful of rebels, protested Rejón, that could not be tolerated,
unless every nation that so chose might fill neighboring territory with
its people, incite them to revolt, aid them to resist, and finally offer
them annexation. Our minister, Shannon, who had been a useful Democratic
stump-speaker in Ohio, blustered, blundered, threatened and undertook to
argue, but only drew from Rejón a still more insulting letter, and still
more embittered the feeling in both countries.[4.7]
At the beginning of March, 1845, our President signed the joint
resolution of Congress which provided for the annexation of Texas.
Almonte, the Mexican minister, at once protested, giving notice that his
country would maintain the claim to her ancient province "at all times,
by every means ... in her power"; and although James Buchanan, who now
became secretary of state under Polk, replied in a conciliatory manner,
Almonte broke off diplomatic relations and left our shores. At Mexico
the news produced a tremendous commotion, heightened by the report from
California that a revolution, decided by the American settlers, had
occurred in that department. War at once and war to the knife! cried the
press in concert; while the administration, in a note moderated by the
British and French ministers yet sufficiently positive, severed official
relations with Shannon, and insisted upon this policy even after
receiving a conciliatory reply from him. By the action of Mexico there
was, therefore, a complete rupture between the two countries.[4.8]
[MEXICO PREPARES FOR WAR]
When it was learned, about the middle of July, that our terms of
annexation had been accepted by Texas, passion burst forth again. The
leash of Mexican eloquence and fury broke. "August Houses! President of
the Republic!" cried _El Amigo del Pueblo_, "The hour of danger for the
country has sounded and she has a right to look to you for salvation.
Union and war!" Not merely Texas but all Mexico, the people were
told, had been marked as its prey by American greed. In order to save
itself before the public the administration, though at heart averse to
hostilities, proposed to Congress a declaration of war. Money was asked
from the Chambers, and full quotas of troops were summoned from the
departments; and by the end of the month, as the agent of our government
duly reported, the course of things pointed strongly toward hostilities.
The archives of Vera Cruz were carried to the interior; new guns were
mounted in the fortress there; steps were taken to raise a loan of
fifteen millions; munitions and provisions were said to be going as
rapidly as possible to Matamoros; and much was heard about the movements
of troops. At the end of July the ministers of Mexico at London and
Paris were notified that an appeal to arms would be made. August 8 the
Mexican consulate at New Orleans closed; and a few days later our consul
at Havana reported that his Mexican colleague had received an official
notification of the existence of war.[4.9]
To be sure, no public declaration to that effect appeared, but
there were good reasons for considering this fact unimportant. With
Spanish-American subtlety the Mexicans discovered that the threat of
August 23, 1843, repeated later, had rendered such an announcement
unnecessary, and that it would be shrewder to hold that by annexing
Texas we had declared war upon them, since they would then be free to
attack or defer attacking us, as might seem expedient. Besides, it
was argued, Texas was merely a rebellious province, and hence Mexico
could make war there at will, without giving us an excuse for opening
hostilities against her seaboard, and without enabling us to seize
territory by the right of belligerency. Consequently, as large forces
had been ordered to the north, a move across the Rio Grande at any
hour seemed more than possible; and the official journal urged, that
it should be effected at the earliest practicable moment, in order to
prevent the United States from occupying the territory, and making ready
there for hostilities.[4.10]
[OUR EFFORTS TO RESTORE INTERCOURSE]
The American government, on the other hand, undertook to restore
friendly relations. The official assurances of good-will given Almonte
were supplemented by private representations conveyed to him through
a mutual friend by a member of our Cabinet; and Polk took also a step
of much greater importance. Before the end of March W. S. Parrott was
appointed a confidential agent of our state department, and ordered
to reach Mexico, which had long been his place of residence, by the
quickest route. Try to convince the Mexican government, ran his
instructions, that it is truly for the interest of that country, "to
restore friendly relations between the two republics." If it is found
willing, you may reveal your official character, and say that the
United States will send a "Minister" on learning that he will be kindly
received. The annexation of Texas cannot be undone; but "you are at
liberty to state your confident belief that in regard to all unsettled
questions, we are prepared to meet Mexico in a most liberal and friendly
spirit."[4.11]
Thus commissioned, Parrott sought his post without delay, renewed
his acquaintance with members of the Mexican Congress, invited them
frequently to lunch or dinner, and talked, no doubt in the spirit of
his instructions, with all such influential persons as he could reach.
In particular, as he reported, he was "very precise in stating, that
the Government of the United States could never recognize in Mexico the
right to claim an indemnity for the annexation of Texas to the American
Union; but that, in a treaty of _limits_, for the sake of peace and
good neighborhood, the United States would, no doubt, be disposed, as
had been officially stated, to meet Mexico, in a negotiation, upon the
most friendly and _liberal_ terms." No explanation could have been
clearer.[4.12]
There were good reasons for anticipating a favorable result from this
overture. President Herrera, connected by marriage with a leading
American merchant at the capital, was an honest, reasonable and
patriotic citizen; and, knowing that hostilities with the United States
would at best involve many costly sacrifices, and would very likely
throw California into our hands, he desired to escape by some method
from his public action in favor of war. It was altogether possible, too,
that a reverse on the field might upset his administration and injure
his friends; and, since the movement that had placed him in power had
cost money, his backers, in order to be repaid, felt anxious to curtail
instead of increasing the military expenses. Moreover there was trouble
with both England and France at this time; the more intelligent part of
the nation, cooling a little, were beginning to perceive the advantages
of a peaceful settlement with us; a chance could be seen that in the end
such a policy, reducing the cost of government, would become popular;
and finally it was realized that unless money to pay the troops were
obtained from the United States, their fickle allegiance probably could
not be retained. Accordingly on August 29, 1845, Parrott reported that
in his opinion an envoy from this country would be heartily welcomed;
almost at the same time Black, our consul at Mexico, and Dimond, our
consul at Vera Cruz, expressed the same view; and private advices tended
to confirm these opinions.[4.13]
Our own reasons for wishing to have diplomatic intercourse restored
were almost equal in strength to Herrera's. Aside from the political
and commercial interests that had always led us to seek the friendship
of Mexico, we desired to collect the unpaid instalments of our awards,
prosecute our claims, guard our citizens residing in that country,
adjust the Texan difficulty, counteract prejudicial movements on the
part of European states, and cultivate the good-will of the Central and
South American peoples, who were sure to be influenced by the sentiments
of their kindred next us. In particular, only two or three months later
Guizot's idea of establishing a balance of power in this hemisphere
was exciting alarm in Congress; and there is reason to believe that
our Executive, already aware of it, desired the support of Mexico in
opposing a design so un-American. Besides, Polk felt sure that European
governments had an eye upon California, and a minister was needed at
the Mexican capital to prevent, if possible, any bargaining on the
subject.[4.14]
Even more important, there were signs that a monarchy headed by
a European prince might be set up in Mexico, involving dangerous
interference in our commercial and political relations with that
country, sure to increase the gravity of a military contest, should one
arise, and seriously attacking the "Monroe Doctrine." As early as 1838
our consul at Mexico reported that Alamán and the conservatives were
laboring to establish a monarchy. In 1840 Estrada, one of the ablest and
best of their statesmen, was denounced for openly advocating the change.
Paredes, now at the head of the army, had favored it for years, and in
1841 had initiated a movement in that direction. In January, 1845, two
agents of the Spanish government were said to be laboring in Mexico
for the same cause, and the _Memorial Histórico_ announced that Spain,
France and England had formed an alliance to set up a new government
there. At about the same time the _Picayune_ stated that official
documents relating to the monarchical scheme had been received at New
Orleans; and early in March our diplomatic representative at London
sounded a strong note of warning.[4.15]
To reinforce all these considerations, England and France felt deeply
offended at our absorption of Texas; Polk, who believed "that no
compromise [in the Oregon affair] to which Great Britain would accede,
could pass the Senate," now regarded a peaceful adjustment of that
controversy as impossible; and Mexico, though as a rule profoundly
influenced by the policy of England, might any day take offence at
some British move, and wish to approach the United States. For these
reasons it was of great importance to have a diplomatic agent near her
government ready to take advantage of any promising turn; and, finally,
one can easily imagine that in Polk's opinion the reception of a United
States minister would of itself, aside from what he might do, render it
more difficult for Mexico to maintain her unfriendly attitude.[4.16]
[SLIDELL DESPATCHED AS MINISTER]
Accordingly the letters of Parrott, Black and Dimond were promptly
taken up by the American Cabinet, and after a thorough discussion
of the subject it was unanimously agreed, although the rupture had
been caused by Mexico, to reopen diplomatic relations with her; to
keep this intention profoundly secret, lest European ministers at
Washington should thwart our aims; to despatch as minister John
Slidell of Louisiana, an agreeable man, able lawyer and excellent
Spanish scholar--just the sort of person most likely to gain the ear
of Mexico--and to pay as much as forty millions, if necessary, for
a satisfactory boundary. The next day, however, Polk learned that
Mexico had been taking warlike steps as late as August 21. It was
therefore concluded, in order to make sure that our envoy would not
be rejected, to wait a little for news, and meantime instruct Black
to ascertain "officially" whether a "Minister" would be received. No
further action on the part of the Mexican government appeared necessary
to restore friendly intercourse, for previously, after the withdrawal
of a legation, the broken thread had been mended by sending a new
representative. Nothing less than such action would have answered
our purpose, for only a diplomatic agent of the usual kind, residing
near that government, could have handled the existing problems. In
consequence exactly this, without qualification or ambiguity, was
proposed.[4.17]
Just at this point a new factor appeared. The British, holding a great
amount of Mexican bonds, enjoying a very profitable trade in that
quarter, and not at all anxious to see us extend our territory by
conquest, did not wish Mexico to challenge the United States; and early
in October Bankhead expressed a desire to confer with Peña y Peña,
her secretary of relations, concerning the situation. This offer was
cordially accepted; and, at an interview between these gentlemen and
the President, Herrera said that the "subjects" which an American envoy
might bring up would be discussed "with every disposition to terminate
them amicably." Moreover, after frequent conversations and a second
formal interview, Peña thanked Bankhead most gratefully in writing for
offering to use his influence with Pakenham, now the British minister
at Washington, "for the purpose of amicably arranging the differences
[_las diferencias_]" existing between the United States and Mexico, and
intimated plainly that Herrera would listen to any "proposals" coming
from the American government.[4.18]
[SLIDELL'S MISSION UNDERSTOOD BY MEXICO]