THE BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
_1st October to 16th December 1917_
The Battle of Cambrai and the German counter attack.
(_Vide_ Map III.)
After three days in the Bapaume area the Division moved east to face
the Hindenburg Line south-west of Cambrai. By the 10th of October, when
this sector had been taken over from the 40th Division, headquarters
was at Sorel, about 1000 yards south of Fins. All three brigades were
in the line, the 61st on the right, east of Villers Guislains and
Gonnelieu, the 59th in the centre from the outskirts of Gonnelieu to a
line passing through Villers Plouich, and the 60th on the left, with
its left flank between Beaucamp and Bilhem. Except for ten days towards
the end of the month the Division was in the IIIrd Corps of the Third
Army.
October passed quietly. By the 25th the Divisional Artillery had
returned from the Ypres Salient and was in action, covering the
Divisional front; the battery positions of the 91st Field Artillery
Brigade lay in the area Villers Guislain-Gonnelieu-Gouzeaucourt, those
of the 92nd Brigade about Gouzeaucourt and in the country to the north.
On the 27th Brig.-General Butler left to command an infantry brigade
in the Guards Division and handed over command of the 60th Brigade to
Brig.-General F. J. Duncan, C.M.G., D.S.O.
On the 29th the 55th Division took over from the 61st Brigade the
ground up to Villers Guislains inclusive. The front occupied by the
20th Division was even then a long one, but the formation of the
ground made it possible to defend it without holding a continuous
system of trenches. It will be seen from Map III that the line crossed
several spurs and valleys. The spurs were held as defended localities,
fortified for all-round defence and each occupied by one battalion;
places of tactical importance in the position were held by a number of
small strong points. At the heads of the valleys machine guns were so
placed as to cover both the low ground and the slopes of the spurs on
each side.
Preparations for an attack to be launched on the 20th of November
were then begun, but with the greatest secrecy, as the success of the
operation depended on the Germans being surprised. The scheme was
revealed to brigade commanders and their staffs early in the month,
but no other officers in the brigades were told until a week before
the battle, and then only under a strict pledge of silence, which was
faithfully kept. Not until the day before the attack were the details
generally disclosed. It was, of course, impossible in the later stages
to conceal these preparations from the troops. When battalions were
withdrawn to the rear to train with tanks, gun positions reconnoitered
close to the German line, new ammunition dumps formed in forward
positions and all the familiar measures carried out, it became clear
that an operation of some magnitude was at hand. Among the many
arrangements made to facilitate the advance of the artillery, bridges
were constructed and carried forward to enable the guns to cross the
trenches. During the four nights before the attack the guns were moved
up to positions in the open close behind the front line, camouflaged
and left there. By the night of the 19th/20th only two guns remained in
the original line to cover the front of the Division.
The task of providing signal communication for the three attacking
divisions on the Divisional front fell almost entirely on the 20th
Divisional Signal Company. 137 miles of armoured cable were laid out to
the front line and to the various battle headquarters of all arms. As
the day of attack drew nearer the normal five to seven hundred messages
per day received at the Divisional Headquarter office at Sorel grew
to two thousand a day, which severely taxed the powers of the Signal
Company.
A thick mist which hung over the position for several days before the
attack assisted the preparations incalculably, as it prevented the
enemy’s aeroplanes from obtaining any information. On the 17th and
18th of November the 61st and 60th Brigades, which were to deliver the
assault on the Divisional front, were relieved by troops of the 12th
and 6th Divisions; outposts belonging to the 20th Division were left,
however, covering the original front. On the 19th the 61st on the right
and the 60th on the left took over the new Divisional line, which then
extended only from a thousand yards north-west of Gonnelieu to the
north-east of Villers Plouich. At the same time the 59th Brigade, to
which a special rôle had been assigned, moved back to Gouzeaucourt in
reserve. The concentration was a very complicated and difficult one,
especially for the 20th Division, which was manning the trenches up to
the last moment. Concentration camps for the 20th and for three other
divisions had been made and completely camouflaged by the 83rd, 84th
and 96th Field Companies R.E. and the 11th D.L.I. under the orders of
Lieut.-Colonel Newell, the C.R.E.
The essence of the plan was to surprise the enemy, overwhelm him with
a sudden rush of tanks followed by infantry, and break his line before
he had time to realise the nature or the locality of the attack. There
was therefore no preliminary bombardment, nor even was any registration
of the guns allowed. The infantry lines were to be preceded by waves of
tanks and the attack covered by standing barrages, which were to lift
from objective to objective as the assaulting troops advanced. Of the
60 tanks at the disposal of the Division 36 were allotted to the 61st
Brigade and 24 to the 60th.
The general direction of the attack was north-east, across the
Hindenburg and Hindenburg Support Lines on the front of La Vacquerie
and Welsh Ridge. The left boundary was the Villers Plouich--Marcoing
railway; the right boundary an approximately parallel line about 2500
yards to the south-east. The first objective followed the general
line of a track from Banteux to Ribécourt, between the road from La
Vacquerie to Bonavis and the railway. La Vacquerie, a particularly
strong point, was the key position of the enemy’s first line of defence
on the right. This village and the trenches north-west of it formed an
initial objective in the area of the 61st Brigade. The second and final
objective included the whole of Welsh Ridge, from a point in the sunken
road nearly 3000 yards north-east of La Vacquerie to the railway 1200
yards south-west of the railway junction at Marcoing.
The 12th Division on the right and the 6th Division on the left were to
attack objectives prolonging those of the 61st and 60th Brigades.
After this line had been taken the 29th Division was to pass through
the 20th to a line north of Masnières and Marcoing. To prepare the way
for this advance and to secure the right flank of the 29th Division the
59th Brigade was to move forward as soon as the second objective had
been occupied in order both to seize the crossings of the canal between
Masnières and Marcoing and to form a defensive flank by holding a line
from Les Rues Vertes to the south for a distance of 2000 yards. For
this purpose sixteen tanks from those allotted to the 61st Brigade were
to be placed at the disposal of the 59th. Defensive flanks were to be
formed by the 12th Division from the right of the 59th Brigade as far
as Lateau Wood (inclusive) and by the 6th Division from the left flank
of the 29th towards the south-west. During the night of the 19th/20th
the infantry and tanks formed up about 1000 yards from the enemy’s
wire. To help to drown the noise of the advancing tanks intermittent
bursts of machine-gun fire were kept up throughout the night.
By zero, 6.20 A.M. on the 20th, the dispositions were as
follows:
The 61st Brigade, under Brig.-General Banbury, held the right of the
line, with the 7th Somerset L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Troyte-Bullock) on
the right and the 7th D.C.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Burges Short) on the
left. The 12th King’s (Lieut.-Colonel Vince) on the right and the 7th
K.O.Y.L.I. (Major Storr) on the left were in support.
The 60th Brigade, under Brig.-General Duncan, held the left of the
line with the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Boyle), in
touch with the D.C.L.I. and the 12th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Moore),
with their left on the railway just north-east of Villers Plouich. In
support were the 6th K.S.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel Welch) and the 12th R.B.
(Lieut.-Colonel Riley).
The 59th Brigade, under Brig.-General Hyslop, was concentrated in and
about Gouzeaucourt.
The Division was covered by two artillery groups. The Right Group,
under Lieut.-Colonel Ricardo, consisted of the 92nd Brigade, the
232nd Brigade, and the 3rd Brigade R.H.A. The Left Group, under
Lieut.-Colonel Erskine, consisted of the 91st Brigade, the 178th
Brigade, and the 15th Brigade R.H.A.
The first wave of tanks moved forward at 6.10 A.M., and at
6.20 the barrage opened along the whole front.
The attack went exactly as planned from beginning to end. The Somersets
and two companies of the D.C.L.I. advanced on La Vacquerie and the
trenches north-west of it. The garrison at these places offered little
opposition and, apparently demoralised by the tanks, ran towards the
Hindenburg Line. La Vacquerie was taken by the Somersets about 7.30
A.M., and had been mopped up by 9 o’clock, when 80 prisoners,
6 machine guns and 2 trench mortars had been taken. Two companies of
the King’s, with the two remaining companies of the D.C.L.I., carried
on the advance to the first objective. The enemy offered a certain
amount of opposition in the Hindenburg Line and the King’s on the right
suffered rather heavily, but before 10 A.M. this line was
taken, with 200 prisoners and many machine guns.
On the front of the 60th Brigade the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. and the
12th K.R.R.C. carried the defences of Welsh Ridge. The reserve company
of the 12th K.R.R.C.--“B” Company, under Captain Hoare--lost heavily in
attacking a strong point which held up the advance, for when this point
had been taken, out of 3 officers and 96 men in the company only 34 men
remained. That this company reached its objective was largely due to
Rfm. A. E. Shepherd, K.R.R.C., whose gallantry was rewarded with the
Victoria Cross. The following is the official account of his action:
“For most conspicuous bravery as a company runner. When his company
was held up by a machine gun at point blank range he volunteered to
rush the gun, and, though ordered not to, rushed forward and threw a
Mills bomb, killing two gunners and capturing the gun. The company, on
continuing its advance, came under heavy enfilade machine-gun fire.
When the last officer and the last N.C.O. had become casualties he took
command of the company, ordered the men to lie down, and himself went
back some seventy yards under severe fire to obtain the help of a tank.
He then returned to his company and finally led them to their last
objective. He showed throughout conspicuous determination and resource.”
On the whole, however, the casualties of the 60th Brigade were few, and
the first objective was occupied at 9.25 A.M.
The advance to the final objective was more vigorously opposed. The
remaining two companies of the King’s and the K.O.Y.L.I., attacking
on the 61st Brigade front, encountered a good deal of resistance in
the Hindenburg Support Line, a good natural position, well fortified
and strongly held. Behind the line there were many gun-pits, some
of which the enemy defended to the last. The K.O.Y.L.I. on the left
fought with great dash, and in spite of severe losses carried all
before them. Second-Lieut. Joffe, Sgt. Roberts and about a dozen men of
this battalion distinguished themselves by rushing a 77 mm. gun which
continued to fire point-blank till they were within fifty yards of it.
The King’s also forced their way forward by hard fighting and took a
number of prisoners.
The 60th Brigade attacked the second objective with the 6th K.S.L.I.
and the 12th R.B. The enemy gave little trouble except on the right
of the R.B., where “A” Company found him defending his positions
throughout with determination. A particularly difficult point to carry
was a nest of five machine guns and a trench mortar in the Hindenburg
Support Line. Capt. Fraser, commanding “A” Company, obtained the
assistance of a tank, which advanced straight on the post while a party
of the R.B. worked round it. When the tank came within fifty yards of
the enemy a direct hit from the trench mortar killed two of the crew
and severely wounded the rest. The tank section commander, Capt. R. W.
L. Wain, got out and rushed at the enemy with a Lewis gun, while “B”
Company on the left turned the flank. In the fighting that ensued Capt.
Wain was killed, but the post was taken, and the only gun of the five
which could be used was turned on to those of the enemy who were able
to get away. “A” Company took over 130 prisoners, a trench mortar, and
6 machine guns during the day.
About eleven o’clock the final objective was taken, and the 59th
Brigade and the 29th Division were passing through the lines.
Arrangements had been carefully made by the Divisional Signal Company
to establish signal communication as the attack progressed. The tanks,
however, made small work of the ground lines as they were laid, and
recourse had to be made to a poled cable route on each brigade front,
which was successfully established in due course.
Meanwhile at 10.30 A.M. the 91st Field Artillery Brigade was
ordered forward to the north-east of La Vacquerie. Good positions were
found along the track from Banteux to Ribécourt between the roads
leading from La Vacquerie to Bonavis and Masnières. Batteries were
held up by tanks which had stuck in the sunken road, but managed to
come into action during the afternoon.
Starting from Gouzeaucourt at zero the 59th Brigade moved forward, and
led by the 10th and 11th R.B., with a troop of the 1/1st Northumberland
Yeomanry under Captain the Hon. C. F. M. Ramsay, left the old front
line at 9.10 A.M. to follow the assaulting battalions.
By 11 A.M. this advanced guard was passing through the second
objective. The 11th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Cotton) advanced in open order
along the north-west slope of the La Vacquerie valley to seize the
crossings over the canal; the 10th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Troughton),
to whom the two troops of yeomanry were attached, deployed on the
south-east slope before moving on to form the defensive flank. In rear
of these two battalions the 10th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Sheepshanks)
formed up in the valley on either side of the sunken road and the 11th
K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Priaulx) took up a position about the crossing
of the sunken road and the track from Banteux to Ribécourt.
The 11th R.B. advanced on a two company front. They came under a
certain amount of shelling, but parties of the enemy who tried to hold
them back by long-range fire, seeing the tanks and infantry coming
on, either withdrew or gave themselves up. “B” Company on the left,
moving towards a bridge east of Marcoing, encountered an enemy strong
point about 800 yards south of the canal, but an outflanking movement
by Lewis guns and bombers soon brought about the surrender of the
garrison, which was estimated at 150 men. The bridge-head was then
occupied and troops of the 29th Division crossed unopposed. “C”
Company on the right had little difficulty, except from a machine gun
which for a time delayed its progress; the gun was silenced by a tank,
and the company then entered Les Rues Vertes. Here between 12 and 1
o’clock a certain amount of street fighting took place, but the village
was cleared as far as the canal.
[Illustration: THE BROKEN BRIDGE, MASNIÈRES]
About 12.40 P.M., when the 11th R.B. were held up at the main
bridge in Masnières, a tank arrived on the scene and prepared to move
across, carrying a small party of the 11th R.B. to bomb the houses
on the opposite side. Owing to a mechanical breakdown the tank was
unable to move for an hour, by which time two more tanks had arrived
and began to fire their 6-prs. into the houses across the canal. It is
probable that the bridge, though apparently intact, had been partially
destroyed, for when the tank eventually moved across, the centre of
the bridge collapsed and the tank became wedged between the two ends,
effectually blocking the crossing at this point. The Canadian Cavalry
Brigade arrived in Les Rues Vertes about 2 P.M., but finding
the bridge broken retired, although Lieut.-Colonel Cotton pointed out
several other bridges close by, one of which was not marked on the map.
Lieut.-Colonel Troughton, 10th R.B., who was holding two bridges intact
to the south of Masnières, gave the same information. Only one squadron
passed over, and in a brilliant engagement captured a battery of the
enemy’s guns.
The town of Masnières, where the arrival of British troops was
naturally most unexpected, was full of civilians, mostly women and
children. It was an amazing and a most pathetic sight to see women with
babies in perambulators in the streets under the fire of the enemy.
Many of them were evacuated at once, and good work was done by Lieut.
Duval, the interpreter of the brigade. The civilians showed great
courage under shell-fire.
By 4.30 the 11th R.B. had handed over the canal crossings to the 29th
Division and were established in the northern part of the defensive
flank.
Meanwhile the 10th R.B. on the right had deployed on the line south of
Les Rues Vertes; their right flank was exposed, as the 12th Division
was still behind the Bonavis-Masnières road and the two troops of the
Northumberland Yeomanry filled up this gap. Later, touch was gained
with the 12th Division.
The 10th K.R.R.C. moved forward along the La Vacquerie valley, with two
companies on each side of the road. All went well on the right, but
the left companies were troubled by machine-gun fire from the north.
A patrol sent out in this direction discovered the enemy holding a
strong point, which was vigorously attacked and captured with some
200 prisoners. The battalion then took up a position in a sunken road
1500 yards south-west of Les Rues Vertes, sending one company in the
afternoon to relieve the yeomanry on the right of the 10th R.B.
The 11th K.R.R.C. in reserve moved forward to a position close in rear
of the 10th K.R.R.C.
The 61st and 60th Brigades were consolidating their objective across
the north-eastern end of Welsh Ridge, and the 59th Brigade occupied
the line running south from Les Rues Vertes. The 12th Division held
the second objective from the right of the 61st Brigade to Lateau Wood
inclusive, with a line running forward from there to the right of the
59th Brigade. The 6th Division, on the left of the 60th Brigade, had
pushed through Ribécourt and thrown out a defensive flank along the
high ground north and north-west of Marcoing, where it was in touch
with the left of the 29th Division. The right flank of the 29th was
then working through Masnières. The 51st Division was on the outskirts
of Flesquières and the 62nd and 36th Divisions were advancing further
to the north and north-west. Divisional Headquarters moved forward at
this time to Villers Plouich.
By 9 P.M. the 10th R.B. on the right and the 11th R.B. on the
left had pushed forward along the spur and were established between Les
Rues des Vignes and the canal south of Mon Plaisir Farm. One company,
under Capt. Ashwell, occupied part of the village of Les Rues des
Vignes after severe opposition.
During the afternoon considerable advance was made on the left, where
the 52nd Division penetrated as far as Anneux, over two miles north of
Flesquières, although the latter still remained in the hands of the
enemy. The British line, therefore, formed a salient between Lateau
Wood and Marcoing, divided from the very sharp salient at Anneux by
the re-entrant at Flesquières. It had been impossible to get the guns
forward along the sunken roads quickly enough to support the infantry
fighting at Masnières and Marcoing, but the two factors which most
limited the results of the battle as a whole on this day were the
check at Flesquières and the absence of a large force of cavalry on
the far side of the canal. These factors, and the consequent inability
of the 29th Division to push forward north and east of Masnières,
allowed the Germans to occupy the Beaurevoir-Masnières line which ran
in front of Rumilly and Crèvecœur. From this position the Germans were
able to command the line of the 59th Brigade. On the 21st Flesquières
was captured and the line straightened, and further advance was made
towards the north.
On the night of the 20th/21st the 11th R.B. were ordered to seize the
crossings at Crèvecœur to allow French cavalry to pass through at
dawn. The night was pitch dark, the men were exhausted, and Crèvecœur
was found by then to have been occupied by the enemy. The battalion
captured an enemy machine gun complete with team, but was unable to
take the bridges. That night IIIrd Corps issued orders that every
effort must be made to gain possession of the Beaurevoir-Masnières
line and to capture Crèvecœur. The rôle of the Division was to push
on to Crèvecœur in conjunction with the 29th Division on the left.
The 59th Brigade was detailed to carry out this operation, with the
assistance of twelve tanks, and zero was fixed at 11 A.M. on
the 21st. Later, the attack of the 29th Division was cancelled. The
tanks ran out of petrol, and eventually at 2 P.M. the 11th
K.R.R.C., the assaulting battalion of the 59th Brigade, had to attack
alone. The battalion came under enfilade fire from Rumilly and the
high ground north of the canal, so that in spite of several efforts to
force a passage during the day, little progress was made. That night
the 11th K.R.R.C. consolidated a position on the spur north-west of
Les Rues Vignes, while a company of the 11th R.B. held the bridge-head
below the village. This company, owing to heavy casualties and to the
impossibility of obtaining reinforcements, was ordered to withdraw
during the night. Before doing so, the remains of the company, assisted
by the R.E., made four gallant but unsuccessful attempts to destroy the
bridge.
The 11th R.B. formed a defensive left flank, covering the crossings
south and south-east of Mon Plaisir Farm.
Two batteries of the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade moved forward at
daybreak to positions north-west of Lateau Wood and supported this
attack under considerable shell-fire. In the evening they withdrew to
a small re-entrant between Lateau Wood and the La Vacquerie--Masnières
road, where they were joined by the rest of the brigade.
The medical arrangements for the battle included an A.D.S. and a
walking wounded collecting post at Gouzeaucourt, and advanced posts
near Villers Plouich and on the Gouzeaucourt--Bonavis road just behind
the front fine. After the attack other posts were pushed forward to the
La Vacquerie valley, towards Marcoing and later to Les Rues Vertes.
Wounded from many different divisions passed through the A.D.S. at
Gouzeaucourt. Excellent work was done by the bearers of the Division
under Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Osburn, commanding the 60th Field Ambulance.
During the following days, while fierce fighting continued for the
possession of an important ridge at Bourlon Wood, three miles north
of Flesquières, the 20th Division was occupied in consolidating the
position it had won. The main line ran from the left flank of the 12th
Division, which was holding Lateau Wood, along the top of the spur and
then north to the canal. In front of this an outpost line was held
joining the main line on the right flank, passing forward on the spur
about 500 yards north-west of Les Rues des Vignes, and turning back to
the left flank south-east of Mon Plaisir Farm.
The position held by the Division at this time was most important. The
line formed a deep salient, overlooked by the high ground which the
enemy occupied. Not only did the enemy hold the bridges across the
canal, but on the south-east face of this salient the steep convex
slope of the ridge left a strip of dead ground along the front, so
that even from the outpost line the bottom of the valley and the
village of Les Rues des Vignes were out of sight. The two artillery
brigades west and north-west of Lateau Wood covered an extent of front
out of all proportion to the number of guns, and while they fired at
ranges between 3000 and 6000 yards, the enemy had to advance only a
few hundred yards into Lateau Wood to look straight down on their
positions. A successful attack by the enemy on Bonavis Ridge would then
completely cut off the whole of the infantry holding the Les Rues des
Vignes salient and take the artillery positions in flank.
Between the 21st and the 24th the 7th Somerset L.I. moved to Masnières
in support of the 88th Brigade of the 29th Division. The following
is an extract from a letter sent by the Brigade Commander of the
88th Brigade to Brig.-General Banbury: “I wish to tell you how much
I appreciate the excellent work done by the 7th Somerset L.I. in
Masnières, in clearing the houses of snipers and exploring the many
underground passages. The place is quite quiet now, with a Somerset on
guard at each hole.”
By the morning of the 30th the Divisional front was held by two
brigades, the 59th, which after seven days in reserve had just
relieved the 60th, on the right, and the 61st on the left. None of
the battalions had a fighting strength of over 400, and some of them
well under 300. The front line from right to left was held by the 10th
K.R.R.C., the 11th K.R.R.C., the 12th King’s and the 7th Somerset
L.I. In support were the 10th R.B. in a ravine about 1500 yards south
of Les Rues Vertes and the 7th D.C.L.I. at the northern end of the
La Vacquerie valley, 1500 yards south of the canal. The 11th R.B.,
800 yards north-east of La Vacquerie, and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I., were in
reserve. The commanding officers of some battalions were sent back for
a rest, as it was considered a good opportunity for their seconds in
command to get some useful experience. On the 29th the 61st Brigade was
ordered to take over next day another 1000 yards of front on the right.
This all points to the fact that no counter attack was expected at this
time.
The relief of the 60th by the 59th Brigade Headquarters was not
complete when the Germans launched their great counter attack.
Brig.-General Duncan therefore commanded the 59th Brigade throughout
the operation, and the 60th Brigade fought under the orders of
Lieut.-Colonel Troyte Bullock (7th Somerset L.I.), who was temporarily
filling the place of Brig.-General Hyslop. The latter brigade was in
reserve at Villers Plouich.
At 7 A.M. on the 30th the enemy opened a bombardment on the
front of the 55th and 12th Divisions on the right. This spread to the
20th Division about 7.30, when three barrages, which included smoke
and mustard-gas shells, fell simultaneously between the outpost line
and the sunken road from La Vacquerie to Masnières. The infantry
attack in the same manner developed from the south, the 55th and the
12th Divisions having been heavily engaged for some time, when at 8
A.M. the Germans advanced on the whole of the 20th Divisional
front.
Covered by a thick mist the enemy moved forward with extraordinary
rapidity. Although they put up an extremely good fight the outpost
companies were soon overwhelmed; the majority were entirely cut off and
were never heard of again. The right flank, which owing to the convex
slope of the ground and the consequent difficulty of observation was
the most vulnerable point, had already been turned by the successful
attack on the 55th and 12th Divisions. The companies in the main line,
therefore, at the moment when they had to face an attack in great
strength on their front, found that the enemy had broken through to
their right rear. The German infantry advanced in a succession of
from eight to twelve waves, preceded by a great number of low-flying
aeroplanes which rained machine-gun fire on the troops and dropped
smoke bombs to screen the assaulting lines. The front line battalions
met the enemy with heavy rifle and Lewis gun fire, but when the right
companies had been taken in front and rear and all had lost a large
proportion of their strength, the whole line was eventually overcome.
All communications had been cut, and battalion headquarters and the
supporting battalions had no sooner become aware of the German advance
than they found the enemy upon them. The headquarters of the 10th
R.B. with two companies put up a gallant fight in a vain effort to
stem the enemy’s onslaught on their flank and front. The few officers
and men of the battalion headquarters who survived were eventually
captured. Capt. T. H. Henderson, M.C., the adjutant, was killed while
bravely attempting with a few riflemen to hold up the masses of the
enemy. Capt. S. J. Pegler, D.S.O., took command of the battalion,
of which he could find at that time only a party of 4 officers and
20 men. The remnants of these two brigades then fell back fighting
to the north-eastern and south-eastern slopes of Welsh Ridge, where
the reserve battalions had taken up their position. Major Macmillan,
commanding the 7th D.C.L.I., lost his life while gallantly leading a
party of men against the enemy, and many other attempts were made to
check the advance, but wherever a stand was made the position was at
once outflanked.
The machine gun companies fought valiantly but suffered great loss. Of
the 217th, in the area north of Lateau Wood, only a few men got back.
The 59th Machine Gun Company was on the ridge a little further east. As
soon as the German aeroplanes came over, the twelve guns in the front
line were mounted for anti-aircraft work and so had to be immediately
remounted to engage the infantry attack. These guns then continued to
fire, helping to cover the retirement of their own infantry, but the
company was overcome, and such guns as still remained in action were
destroyed before falling into the enemy’s hands. The officer commanding
the company took the headquarter party forward to a trench which except
for one machine gun was empty; he then went to look for a better
position and was not seen again. The sergeant-major took command,
fired the gun until it was put out of action, and then held the
trench with bombs for an hour. After that the party moved to another
trench occupied by one man with two guns, and remained there till at
4 P.M. the sergeant-major reported to an officer of the 61st
Machine Gun Company, under whom he worked for the next three days.
The second in command at the transport lines brought his men forward
with two guns and joined the 11th R.B., with whom he served until the
following afternoon.
Twelve guns of the 61st Machine Gun Company near Les Rues Vertes were
quickly overwhelmed. All the teams disappeared, but from the accounts
of eyewitnesses it seems clear that they fought bravely to the last.
Meanwhile, Lieut. J. Neil had got No. 2 Section into action about 2000
yards south-west of the village, and opened fire directly on to the
enemy, who was then on the spur east of his position. When he had only
two guns left, the pressure of the enemy, and the fact that he was well
in front of the infantry, forced him to withdraw. Pte. Drummond showed
great courage at this time by firing his gun till the last possible
moment although surrounded by the enemy. These two guns fired till 3 or
4 o’clock in the afternoon, when they were moved to form a defensive
flank to the right.
Two sections of the 83rd Field Company R.E. were resting after night
work north of Lateau Wood when the attack began, and became involved in
the fighting between Lateau Wood and La Vacquerie. Their bivouacs were
completely outflanked and they lost 2 officers and 22 men. The rest of
the company manned a trench in front of Villers Plouich.
The 84th Field Company, under Major P. G. Norman, was south of
Marcoing, and under orders of the 61st Brigade took up a position on
Welsh Ridge, 2000 yards south of the village. As he could see parties
of the enemy to the east and large numbers advancing down the slope of
Bonavis Ridge, Major Norman sent reinforcements to the D.C.L.I. and to
an important trench on the right, where they met the two sections of
the 83rd Field Company. Then, as both the brigade major and the staff
captain of the 61st Brigade had become casualties, Major Norman took
over the duties of brigade major. Two sections of the company were sent
later to reinforce the K.O.Y.L.I., under whose orders they remained
until the brigade was relieved.
Two companies of the 11th D.L.I. took part in the fighting on this
flank. “D” Company was on Welsh Ridge. On seeing the troops retiring
Capt. Pemberton in command took up a position facing north-east and
later advanced to reinforce the front line. At 5.30 P.M. this
company was ordered to gain touch with the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. “B” Company,
under Capt. Jee, returning from work near Les Rues des Vignes, occupied
a line on the north end of Welsh Ridge to bar the Marcoing valley, and
during the afternoon joined “D” company further to the right.
The A.D.S. near Les Rues Vertes was kept open until the enemy came
within a few hundred yards. Capt. Edmond, 60th Field Ambulance, who
was in charge of the dressing station, then withdrew his bearers, but
finding a man dangerously wounded he ran back under heavy fire to get
a stretcher, and with the help of Private Barker, carried back the
wounded man for 6000 yards. Later he went forward again under severe
shell fire to attend to other casualties and then was unfortunately
killed by a fragment of shell.
A bearer party of the 61st Field Ambulance with a party of infantry
fell into the enemy’s hands near Masnières. An officer broke away,
collected some 20 men and fought for two days while the bearers, often
at great risk, collected and treated the wounded. On the second night
the few remaining men of the infantry party and the bearers returned to
their own lines, bringing the wounded with them. The M.C. was awarded
to Captain Rogerson, temporarily commanding the 61st Field Ambulance,
for his excellent organisation, and to the bearer officer, Captain
Jones.
At an early stage in the battle the situation of the artillery in the
La Vacquerie valley became critical. The 92nd Brigade, in a fold of
the ground on the slope of Bonavis Ridge, remained in action after the
infantry had retired through the guns and drove back four attacks,
firing at a range of 200 yards. Finally, with the enemy close in front
and on both flanks, the gunners were overcome and the survivors were
compelled to remove the sights and as many of the breech-blocks as
possible and to withdraw. Part of the waggon lines of this Brigade,
2000 yards east of Fins, had been captured, but the rest got away with
some loss, and the brigade collected at Metz-en-Couture.
The 91st Brigade was about a thousand yards in rear of the 92nd. When
information was received that the enemy was advancing and had taken the
valley in which the 92nd had been in action, Lieut.-Colonel Erskine
turned all guns on to the spur just beyond this valley in order to
prevent reinforcements coming up and to give room for a counter attack,
sending officers forward to the crest just in front of the batteries.
No counter attack, however, was possible with the few troops who were
left. The trench which had formed the headquarters of the 61st Brigade
and 91st Field Artillery Brigade was a short distance to the left front
of the 91st battery positions. When the enemy had captured the 92nd
Field Artillery Brigade and had advanced to a few hundred yards of
Brigade Headquarters, Brig.-General Duncan moved his headquarters to
a ravine north-east of Villers Plouich, the headquarters of the 91st
Field Artillery Brigade joining the batteries in action.
Throughout the rest of the day the men continued to serve the guns with
great coolness and gallantry under heavy fire and repeated aeroplane
attacks, although the Germans were only a few hundred yards in front
and completely overlooked the flank from the Bonavis Ridge. The steady
fire of this brigade played no small part in checking the advance and
in enabling the infantry to hold on.
The 11th R.B., the reserve battalion of the 59th Brigade, moved forward
at 8.50 A.M. with the object of occupying a line below the
north-east slope of Welsh Ridge. It soon became evident, however, that
the enemy had broken through on the front of the 20th Division. Major
Morgan Owen, who was in command of the battalion on this day, therefore
decided that the two most pressing duties were to endeavour to save the
guns and to take up a defensive position and gain touch with the troops
on each flank. A position in front of the guns of the 92nd Brigade was
then impossible. The line chosen crossed the La Vacquerie valley about
1500 yards from the village, and followed the south-east slope of Welsh
Ridge. A platoon of “C” Company, under 2nd Lieut. Crawford, drove the
enemy back from a wireless station on the lower slopes of the ridge so
that some secret papers might be removed and the destruction of the
apparatus completed. This platoon, with some forty artillerymen, then
took up a position commanding the dismantled guns of the 92nd Brigade.
Half “B” Company was sent up as a reinforcement and the guns were
temporarily retaken, enabling the artillery to remove the remaining
breech-blocks, but heavy shelling and an encircling movement of the
enemy afterwards compelled this party to withdraw. 2nd Lieut. Crawford
was awarded the D.S.O. The battalion, with both flanks in the air,
repulsed four attacks before the remains of the other three battalions
of the brigade fell back on to this line.
At 6 P.M. Lieut.-Col. Priaulx, commanding the 11th K.R.R.C.,
was placed in command of the battalions of the 59th Brigade.
The 7th K.O.Y.L.I., in reserve to the 61st Brigade, manned the
Hindenburg Support Line on Welsh Ridge and formed a valuable
rallying-point.
While the remnants of the 59th and 60th Brigades had been fighting
desperately to stem the enemy’s advance and had finally established a
line on the north-eastern and south-eastern slopes of Welsh Ridge, the
60th Brigade also had been hotly engaged.
The enemy’s most dangerous advance developed on the right flank, where
by 9.30 A.M. he had taken Bonavis, Villers-Guislain, Gonnelieu
and Gouzeaucourt, and was on the southern outskirts of La Vacquerie. On
the left the 29th Division was gallantly holding out in Masnières.
Communications with flank divisions having been broken and the wireless
station put out of action by a hostile shell, Divisional Headquarters
knew that the Germans had broken through on the south only when parties
of men were seen retiring over the high ground at Gonnelieu. A staff
officer who was sent out to ascertain the situation ordered these men
to hold the bank of the Gouzeaucourt--Villers Plouich road.
At 9 A.M. the 60th Brigade at Villers Plouich was ordered
forward, the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. to the
ridge running south-west from Gonnelieu, the 12th R.B. to the village
itself, and the 12th K.R.R.C. to La Vacquerie. Shortly after these
orders had been issued it was reported that the front of the 20th
Division had been broken; they were immediately cancelled as far as
they concerned the K.S.L.I. and the Oxford and Bucks L.I., who were
then directed to take up a position in the Hindenburg Line north-east
of La Vacquerie. But by the time these two battalions had received the
new orders, the K.S.L.I. were engaged with the enemy south-west of
Gonnelieu and could not be withdrawn. The Oxford and Bucks L.I. stood
fast, reported the situation, and later were ordered to attack the
ridge. Both battalions made some progress but were unable to gain the
crest, and eventually dug in on the north-west slope. The 60th Machine
Gun Company reinforced the line near Gouzeaucourt.
The 12th R.B. advanced at 9.30 A.M. on Gonnelieu, which was
already in the enemy’s hands. The leading companies worked up the
valley north-west of the village, and by 10.30 were deployed south of
the main road. For some time both flanks were exposed, but later the
Oxford and Bucks L.I. moved forward on the right, and touch was gained
in the afternoon with the 12th K.R.R.C. about 400 yards to the left.
About 6 P.M. a patrol entered Gonnelieu and captured two
German N.C.O.’s but found the village held in strength. Later patrols
could get no further than the outlying buildings.
The 12th K.R.R.C. took up a position east and north-east of La
Vacquerie, wisely putting no troops in the village, which during the
day was heavily shelled. Some men of other divisions were collected
about 10.30 A.M., and posted on the south-west side, and one
company moved to the right to a position on the high ground to gain
touch with the 12th R.B. and to watch the village of Gonnelieu.
At mid-day a very fine attack by the Guards drove the enemy out of
Gouzeaucourt. At the same time the K.S.L.I. made a second attempt
to clear the high ground south-west of Gonnelieu. Owing to heavy
machine-gun fire and to the obscure situation on the right one company
had to be sent towards Gouzeaucourt; the rest of the battalion was
unable to gain the crest, but the right company fired into the flank of
the Germans, mowing them down as they retired before the Guards.
Another attempt to seize Gonnelieu and the ridge was made that
night. The K.S.L.I. were to work down the railway to a point east of
Gouzeaucourt and then turn left-handed, while the Oxford and Bucks L.I.
attacked in conjunction with the 12th R.B. The battalions were met by
very heavy machine-gun fire, and although the right pushed forward the
left encountered a hostile attack launched simultaneously with our own
and was unable to gain ground.
A party of the 11th D.L.I. had meanwhile fought a spirited action on
the extreme right. “A” Company of this battalion near Villers Plouich
took up a position to cover the approaches from the south and was not
engaged, but the headquarters and “C” Company were in Gouzeaucourt at
the time when the German attack was developing against the village.
Except for heavy gun-fire nothing very unusual was apparent until 9.15
A.M., when Lieut.-Colonel G. Hayes, commanding the battalion,
noticed men coming back and horses galloping towards Fins. At that
moment heavy machine-gun fire was heard close to the village and an
artillery sergeant-major stated that the enemy was coming over in
masses from the direction of Villers Guislain. Lieut.-Colonel Hayes
immediately led the party out towards a small hill, known as Hill 135,
some 700 yards south-west of the village. There he saw the Germans
advancing in the most perfect order, entirely unopposed. The leading
waves were by that time across the railway and the others were in
force on the ridge behind, from which they swept the crest of Hill 135
with machine-gun fire. He ordered one platoon to defend the houses in
the southern end of Gouzeaucourt, in order to cover the left flank,
placed two along the road between Hill 135 and the village to check
the advance from the ridge in front, and sent one to the southern end
of the hill to protect the exposed right flank. The men were well led
by the company commander, Lieut. Bushell, who showed great coolness
and courage throughout the day. Three sections of R.E. of another
division then came up; two were sent to reinforce the left flank and
one to fill the gap between the top of the hill and the right platoon.
The machine-gun fire was by this time extremely heavy; the Germans had
broken through Gouzeaucourt, where the left platoon had found them
already in possession. Lieut.-Colonel Hayes, therefore sent Sgt.-Major
M’Evoy and twenty men to a position a little south of the main road
1500 yards west of Gouzeaucourt, with orders to hold on to the last man
and cover the retirement of the others. The rest of the company and the
R.E. withdrew to this line under heavy machine-gun fire both from the
town and from Hill 135, but with comparatively little loss. Later the
20th Hussars reinforced the party and prolonged the line to the right,
and at noon the counter attack of the Guards on Gouzeaucourt relieved
the situation. The adjutant of the 11th D.L.I., Captain Tollit, had
meanwhile returned to the old battalion headquarters and succeeded in
getting away with the confidential papers; he was sent to Sorel for
machine guns and reinforcements, and then returned to the line. On the
following day “C” Company moved back to a position near Villers Plouich.
In the A.D.S. at Gouzeaucourt between thirty and forty wounded were
lying when shell and machine-gun fire gave the first warning of the
enemy’s approach.
A shell hit the dressing station, bringing down the wall of the room
in which the wounded were being dressed, and soon afterwards the enemy
appeared on the ridge between Gouzeaucourt and Villers Guislain. The
wounded were immediately placed in the Decauville train and got away
and the A.D.S. was abandoned just before the enemy surrounded the
village. Lieut.-Colonel Osburn, commanding the 60th Field Ambulance,
went back to his rear headquarters at Fins and ordered all available
bearers to march towards Gouzeaucourt. Captain R. V. C. Ash had
meanwhile withdrawn the unit. A provisional A.D.S. was formed half way
between Fins and Gouzeaucourt, and there three or four hundred wounded
were dressed. In the evening, when Gouzeaucourt had been retaken, most
of the stores were rescued from the original dressing station.
When the enemy’s attack was launched on the morning of the 30th,
Brig.-General Hyslop was at rear Divisional Headquarters at Sorel on
his way home on sick leave, and he took command of the headquarter
details of the 20th and 29th Divisions, and also of the details of the
20th Division at Nurlu. Part of this force was rushed forward towards
Gouzeaucourt and part took up a position near Revelon and helped to
repel an attack. All transport except the mobile ammunition echelon was
sent back to Moislains. A line of straggler posts was formed, and all
labour units in the neighbourhood, as fast as they could be collected,
were employed either in digging or in carrying forward ammunition and
R.E. material. Towards evening it was ascertained that the situation
was in hand.
Thanks to an alternative emergency ground line which the 20th
Divisional Signal Company had laid to Corps through the outskirts of
Gouzeaucourt, to supplement the poled cable route erected by Corps,
signal communication between Divisional Headquarters and Corps was
successfully maintained throughout the day, in spite of the fact that
at one time a portion of the line passed into German hands and out
again. This line also proved of inestimable value to the 6th, 12th and
29th Divisions, whose communications with Corps had broken.
Constant and most strenuous efforts were made to maintain signal
communication forward of Division. Cpl. Thompson gained the M.M. for
conspicuous bravery in mending lines time after time under heavy
shell-fire.
By the end of the day the line ran from Gouzeaucourt, past the
north-west outskirts of Gonnelieu to La Vacquerie; it then turned
east round the cross-roads between La Vacquerie and Bonavis, thence
north-west to the ravine, and along the eastern and north-eastern
slopes of Welsh Ridge. There were gaps in the line, in particular·
north-east of La Vacquerie. As no troops were available to fill them,
IIIrd Corps was asked for reinforcements and sent two battalions of the
6th Division--the 2/6th Sherwood Foresters, who were placed under the
59th Brigade, and the 1st Buffs, who went to the 60th. Between the 59th
and 60th Brigades were elements of the 12th Division.
The 91st Field Artillery Brigade in action in the valley received
orders from the C.R.A. during the afternoon to withdraw the batteries
to Beaucamp that night. The limbers had been ordered up by the C.R.A.,
and they made their way by Metz and Beaucamp to Villers Plouich.
It was out of the question to withdraw the guns until after dark, as
the enemy lay close up to the south-east edge of La Vacquerie, and
through this village passed the only route to the battery positions.
This was a deep sunken road, only wide enough for one team, and it had
to be used to bring up the teams as well as to withdraw the guns. To
ensure that no block should take place, arrangements had to be made for
each battery to complete its withdrawal through the sunken road in turn.
Thanks to the thorough grasp of the situation and to the greatest
coolness shown by all ranks the guns were successfully withdrawn with
extraordinarily few casualties, in spite of the darkness of the night.
By 3 A.M. on the 1st of December the brigade was again in
action just north of Beaucamp.
Among the many decorations awarded to the 91st Brigade for its
successful action this day was the M.C. to Lieut. Ardagh, who was the
sole remaining officer of C/91 Battery.
The same night Divisional Headquarters moved from Villers Plouich to a
point half-way between Gouzeaucourt and Gouzeaucourt Wood.
Meanwhile the main German attack had been delivered with great
determination on the north face of the salient. The divisions on this
front inflicted enormous losses on the enemy, and against greatly
superior numbers held their general line unbroken.
During the two following days the enemy’s attacks on the Divisional
front were directed against the centre and the right of the line; the
61st Brigade on the left was not seriously threatened. Capt. Pegler,
commanding the 10th R.B., who with a small party of his battalion had
been fighting during the 30th under the 61st Brigade, reported at
2 A.M. on the 1st to Lieut.-Colonel Priaulx and took up a
position on either side of the La Vacquerie--Masnières road. The enemy
delivered two assaults against the 10th R.B. and the 11th R.B. at this
point during the morning, but both were driven back, and the line was
held under severe shelling throughout that day.
On the right the 60th Brigade was engaged more heavily. At dawn the
Guards attacked along the ridge and entered Gonnelieu from the west,
but at 8.30 A.M. the enemy put down a heavy barrage, followed
by an attack on Gonnelieu and on the front of the 12th R.B. and the
12th K.R.R.C. to the north. The Guards were forced out of the village,
and a wedge was driven between the centre and left companies of the
12th R.B. The three front line companies of this battalion (“D,” “A,”
and “B”) had then only one unwounded officer among them. The company
sergeant-major of “D” Company organised a counter attack with some
of his men and a handful of “A” Company, and was last seen advancing
against vastly superior numbers of the enemy near Gonnelieu. The right
company of the 12th K.R.R.C. (“D” Company, under Capt. G. B. Loyd)
meanwhile fired into the flank of the attack. At a critical moment
Capt. Loyd was mortally wounded while directing the fire of his men,
and this company, with twenty remaining men of “B” Company of the 12th
R.B., fell back.
The situation at this point was saved by the right company of the 12th
R.B. (“D” Company, under Capt. Williams, M.C.), which stood firm in the
face of repeated attacks. Although wounded in the leg Capt. Williams
remained in command and drove back the Germans on his front when they
had broken through the gap on the left and were 200 yards to his rear.
The men on the left used nearly all their ammunition, and three Lewis
guns fired about twelve drums each into the enemy at ranges under 100
yards. The company suffered severely, only five men remaining unwounded
in the left platoon, but the enemy was held and abandoned his efforts
to break through.
At 10 A.M. the Guards delivered a counter attack with great
steadiness under machine-gun fire and again entered Gonnelieu.
Meanwhile the 12th K.R.R.C. had been engaged at La Vacquerie. After
very fierce fighting most of the day, they gallantly drove the enemy
back and held the line unchanged. The battalion held a long line with
no reserves, and the men were very exhausted. That night the 60th
Brigade was relieved by the 183rd Brigade of the 61st Division.
The 29th Division at Masnières still held its ground, and during the
day beat off a succession of determined attacks, withdrawing under
orders during the night to the west bank of the canal. The gallant
action of this division and of the 12th R.B. and 12th K.R.R.C. on each
side of La Vacquerie went far to check the German advance.
During the 2nd of December the enemy confined his attacks to the
La Vacquerie front, where he was repulsed three times by the 183rd
Brigade. North-east of the village, after heavy shelling, he launched
a bombing attack on the 10th and 11th R.B. under cover of heavy
machine-gun fire, and gained a footing in the trench. Counter attacks
were organised at once. Twice the trench was almost cleared, but
eventually the supply of bombs gave out and a part of the line had to
be withdrawn to the sunken road. “B” and “D” Companies of the 11th
D.L.I. were sent from the 61st Brigade to reinforce the 11th R.B., and
a new line on the slope just north-west of the road was established and
held.
On the night of the 2nd/3rd the 59th and 61st Brigades were relieved,
and on the morning of the 3rd the front was handed over to the 61st
Division. Divisional Headquarters moved to Sorel, with the three
brigades about Villers Plouich, Sorel and Fins.
The relief of the Divisional Artillery was out of the question, and
the 91st Brigade remained for another fortnight in action north of
Beaucamp. On the 3rd of December the enemy renewed his attack and
succeeded in entering La Vacquerie and completed his capture of
Gonnelieu. At Masnières and Marcoing he was again repulsed, but the
line there was very exposed, and at night all troops who remained east
of the canal were moved back to positions west of it.
Local attacks during the next few days gained little ground, and it was
evident that the enemy was becoming exhausted. His success along the
Bonavis Ridge, however, had left the divisions further north holding a
dangerous salient, and made it necessary to withdraw that flank to the
high ground at Flesquieres.[12] This was completed by the 7th, when our
positions were finally established along the line shown in Map III.
The Headquarters of the Divisional Artillery was relieved on the 14th,
and two days later the 91st Brigade pulled out of action.