THE MENIN ROAD SECTOR
_12th December 1917 to 20th February 1918_
Relief of 30th Division by 20th Division in the Menin Road
Sector--Importance of this Line--Reorganisation of the
Division--Move of the Division to the Fifth Army area south of
the Somme.
(_Vide_ Map I.)
After the battle of Cambrai the Division went back into Corps reserve
for a few days, and then moved north again into the area of the Fourth
Army (General Sir H. S. Rawlinson). By the 12th of December units were
concentrated some twenty to twenty-five miles south-west of Ypres,
with Divisional Headquarters at Blaringhem. The Divisional Artillery,
after a most trying march over roads coated with ice, arrived in this
area on the 24th, when the Divisional Artillery Headquarters was opened
at Robecq and the batteries went into billets in the neighbourhood of
Haverskerque. On the 7th of January 1918 the 20th Division, less the
artillery, relieved the 30th Division in the left sector of the IXth
Corps front (Lieut.-General Sir A. Hamilton Gordon).
The front line, 2700 yards in length, ran north-east and south-west
for about an equal distance on either side of the Menin road, which it
crossed north-west of Gheluvelt. The position lay on the forward slopes
of the long ridge which overlooks Ypres from the south and east. From
the high ground about Clapham Junction several marshy streams flow
south and east, cutting the slopes of the ridge into a succession of
spurs, on one of which the village of Gheluvelt stands.
The defensive system included a series of lines which at this time were
still in course of construction. Behind an outpost line lightly held
ran the main defensive position in which the reserves of battalions
were generally posted. Behind this again ran an Intermediate Line just
below the crest of the ridge, a Corps Line, and an Army Line which
extended from the ramparts of Ypres to the south.
The ground along which the front trenches ran had been won as a result
of the hard fighting in September and October 1917, since when British
troops had twice attacked in the northern part of the sector with a
view to improving their position. In the second attempt, on the 3rd of
December, some progress was made in the face of heavy machine-gun fire,
but only a temporary advantage was gained, as the Germans, attacking on
the 14th under cover of a trench mortar barrage, recovered the greater
part of their original line. In so doing they curtailed our observation
and to a certain extent improved their own.
It was this problem of observation that made it essential for us to
yield no further ground, for should the enemy capture the front line
here his view of our position would be improved very greatly. An
official memorandum issued by the Fourth Army at this time states: “The
area of the Army Battle Zone about the Menin road is probably the most
important on the whole Army front, and it rests with the IXth Corps to
make it as nearly impregnable as possible.” This, then, was one of the
tasks which the Division had to undertake.
A boundary line running east and west cut the front trenches about
three hundred yards south of the Menin road, dividing the front into
two sub-sectors, the right held by one battalion in the front line,
the left by two battalions. On the night of the 6th/7th of January the
61st Brigade took over the right sub-sector and the 60th Brigade took
over the left. The 59th Brigade was in reserve in the area between
Dickebusch and La Clytte, three to five miles south-west of Ypres.
Divisional Headquarters was nearly seven miles south-west of Ypres at
Westoutre. The 37th Division was on the right of the 20th, and the New
Zealand Division on the left.
The front was covered by three brigades of artillery formed into two
groups, one to support each of the infantry brigades in the line. The
Southern Group consisted of the 242nd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade;
the Northern Group, when the 20th Division first took over this sector,
consisted of the 37th Divisional Artillery. The whole was under the
command of the C.R.A. 20th Division.
In spite of the advantages which the Germans would have obtained by
penetrating the front line in the Menin road sector, the six weeks
which the Division spent there were extremely quiet. The great trouble
was the weather. The first half of January was cold, with hard frosts
and heavy falls of snow; occasionally there were warmer days when it
poured with rain. About the middle of the month the thaw began with
torrents of rain and a gale of wind. The trenches soon became feet deep
in mud and water. Part of the front line was so deeply flooded that
certain trenches had to be evacuated. Posts were established behind
them, and the line was constantly patrolled at night to prevent the
enemy from occupying these positions.
[Illustration: THE MENIN ROAD, YPRES]
Being on the forward slope of the ridge, a great deal of the position
was in full view of the enemy. The whole of the ground was a mass of
shell-holes, and the only approaches to the front line lay along a few
duckboard tracks, which the Germans regularly shelled. The journey
to the front line and back along these slippery tracks was a very
unpleasant and dangerous business, and as a brigade relief took place
every six days and battalions remained in the front trenches only
forty-eight hours, and sometimes only twenty-four, it had to be made
very often.
Along the top of the ridge were several “tunnels,” which gave cover
to a large number of troops. Just south of Sanctuary Wood, Tor Top
Tunnels, a huge underground cavern lit by electric light, held the
whole of the battalion in reserve to the left brigade. As there were
only four exits from this place, so that very few men might have
escaped if a fire had broken out, great precautions were taken, and
nobody was allowed even to strike a match. These orders were the
outcome of a disastrous fire which had occurred in Hedge Street Tunnels
the night before the 61st Brigade went into the line, when several
officers and men were burnt to death, including some of the advanced
party of the 61st Brigade.
The swampy ground along the banks of the various streams which crossed
the line was generally impassable, so that it was sufficient to
organise the spurs for defence, and to wire the gaps in the line where
the streams flowed through. For the first half of January, however, the
hard frost made it possible to move across these marshes, and constant
patrolling was necessary to ensure the safety of the line.
Almost the only events which involved any fighting occurred on the
night of the 9th/10th of January. In order to assist some operations
of the 37th Division, the 20th carried out a demonstration in which
artillery, Stokes mortars, machine guns, Lewis guns and rifle grenades
all played a part. The 37th Division raided the enemy’s trenches twice
during the night, and on both occasions the enemy put down a heavy
barrage for an hour on the front and support lines of the 20th Division.
At 4.45 A.M. on 10th of January a party of the enemy, estimated at 30
to 50 strong, attempted to raid the left company of the 6th K.S.L.I. in
the left sub-sector. The forward posts were temporarily driven in, but
the positions were quickly retaken, and though the Germans failed to
capture any of the K.S.L.I., they left two of their own party prisoners
in our hands. About this time the 37th Division on the right was
relieved by the 4th Australian Division.
On the 22nd of January the artillery of the 37th Division was relieved
by that of the 20th, which from that date formed the Northern Group,
under Major H. Price Williams, M.C. The battery positions extended
between Zillebeke and Hooge. It was laid down that the policy of the
artillery in this sector should be defensive and not aggressive, as it
was not desired to stir the enemy into activity without good cause.
Accordingly, while no favourable opportunity of inflicting loss on the
enemy was missed, no harassing fire or fire without a definite object
was carried out.
Throughout this period our patrols were active, as it was considered
important that we should keep command of “No Man’s Land.” This was
successfully done. A number of patrols went out from each brigade every
night, and although they kept the enemy’s trenches and posts constantly
under observation, as a rule no parties of the enemy were met. One
patrol of the 7th D.C.L.I. had an unpleasant experience and was forced
to spend a considerably longer time in front of the line than was
expected. A liaison patrol of one N.C.O. and one man of this battalion
had been sent out on the night of the 24th/25th to the battalion on the
left. The patrol had encountered an enemy machine gun and the N.C.O.
had been killed. An officer and one man of the D.C.L.I. went out at 4
A.M. on the 25th to investigate. They also found the machine
gun, which opened fire on them at fifteen yards’ range. Fortunately
they escaped, and they crawled away eastwards. At daybreak they found
themselves between the enemy’s posts, and there they had to remain
concealed in a shell-hole all day. As soon as it became dark they moved
towards their own trenches, coming across a post of the enemy on the
way, and then being driven back by Lewis gun fire from our line. Having
thus had to spend another night out, they eventually rejoined their
battalion at daybreak on the 26th.
Good work was done also by the machine gun companies. Between the
23rd and the 29th the 59th Machine Gun Company fired 36,000 rounds in
indirect fire, and in conjunction with trench mortars silenced all the
enemy’s forward machine guns near the Menin road, making the reliefs
much easier to carry out.
On the 31st the Division was transferred from the IXth to the XXIInd
Corps, under Lieut.-General Sir A. Godley, but as the XXIInd Corps
took over the Menin road sector, this involved no change in the
dispositions. On the night of the 7th/8th February the Divisional
line was extended to the left as far as a point 600 yards east of the
south-east corner of Polygon Wood. A readjustment of the inter-brigade
boundary then became necessary, so that after this time each brigade
had two battalions in the front line.
Meanwhile, the organisation of the Division had been changed. It had
been decided to reduce all infantry brigades to three battalions each.
On the 3rd of February three battalions--the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I.
(Lieut.-Colonel Boyle), the 10th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel Sheepshanks),
and the 10th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Morgan-Owen)--were told that they
were to be broken up at once. The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel
Janson) were to leave the Division. The preparation of rolls and the
many details which had to be settled in a short time involved a great
deal of work, but it was quickly carried out. A certain number of the
10th K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. joined the 11th K.R.R.C. and the 11th
R.B. and so remained in the Division, and in all units officers were
given, as far as possible, their choice of various battalions to which
they might go. In general, complete companies were posted to other
battalions of their own regiments.
The order came as a great shock to battalions all of which had a
fine record and in which _esprit de corps_ stood high, and both
officers and men felt the disbandment keenly.
By the 8th of February only a few headquarter details were left.
Lieut.-Colonel Morgan Owen, commanding the 10th R.B., returned on the
12th from a conference to find that his battalion no longer existed.
About the middle of the month the last few details went to the
Divisional Wing of the Corps Reinforcement Camp.
The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. remained with the Division until the 15th, when
they came under the O.C. Reinforcements XXIInd Corps; on the 20th they
became the 14th Entrenching Battalion.
The 2nd Scottish Rifles, a very fine battalion over 1000 strong, under
Lieut.-Col. H. C. H. Smith, D.S.O., came from the 8th Division to the
20th on the 3rd of February, and from that time formed part of the 59th
Brigade.
In the Trench Mortar Batteries the personnel of V/20 Battery was
transferred to the XXIInd Corps (H) T.M.B.; X, Y, and Z/20 were then
reorganised to form the new X and Y/20 Batteries. At the same time,
twelve mortars were handed over in exchange for ten six-inch Newtons.
After this the 20th Division was relieved by the 37th. All units were
out of the line by the 19th, and on the following day began to entrain
for the area of the Fifth Army south of the Somme.