THE THIRD BATTLE OF YPRES
_2nd July to 18th October 1917_
The third battle of Ypres--Divisional Artillery in the attack
of 31st July--The crossing of the Steenbeek--The capture of
Langemarck--Capture of Eagle Trench--The 20th Division (less
Artillery) moved south--Artillery in support of attacks towards
Poelcappele and Houthoulst Forest.
(_Vide_ Map I.)
During the first fortnight of July 1917 the Divisional Artillery
marched north into the Ypres Salient. Headquarters was opened at
Elverdinghe on the 15th and batteries moved at once into position
between 1500 and 3000 yards further east. The C.R.A. (Brig.-General
Browell) took over command of the Left Group of the Right Artillery,
XIVth Corps, consisting of the 91st and 92nd Brigades and the 93rd
(Army) Brigade, which again fought under its old Divisional Artillery.
Immediately after coming into the line preparations were begun for an
attack which was to be made on the Allied front between the river Lys,
south-east of Messines, and Bixschoete.
The plan underlying the operations of 1917 consisted in striking a
series of blows in different parts of the front, so that each of the
succeeding attacks might fall on the enemy before he had recovered
from the last. After the German retirement to the Hindenburg Line,
operations were begun on the 9th of April at Arras. At the end of the
first six days’ fighting our lines had been pushed forward four miles
on this front, and included the important Vimy Ridge, which gave to
us and denied to the enemy most valuable observation. The 93rd (Army)
Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel W. D. Stillwell) took part in
this battle.
As the French were preparing to launch an attack on the Aisne, the
Arras operations were continued in order to hold as many as possible
of the German reserves from moving south. The French opened their
offensive on the 16th of April, and on the 5th of May carried the
Chemin des Dames. The fighting on the Arras front had then fulfilled
its rôle, but activity in this area was still maintained until
preparations for an offensive in the Ypres Salient were complete.[7]
The whole of the country round Ypres is overlooked by the ridge which
runs up from Messines and Wytschaete, passing east of Hooge and
Zonnebeke to Passchendaele. The British line until the 7th of June lay
in a semicircle round Ypres at a general distance of 4000 yards from
the town, following the foot of the high ground as far as Sanctuary
Wood south of Hooge. From this point, while the main ridge continues
north-east, the line curved in a general north-westerly direction past
Wieltje to Boesinghe, but was still overlooked by the German positions
on the long spur which extends as far as Pilckem.
On the 7th of June the very successful battle of Messines gained the
whole of the southern part of the ridge as far as a point about a mile
south of Hooge. The object of the operations which began at the end of
July was to extend this success and to push forward our lines east and
north of Ypres so as to embrace the whole of the high ground which at
present dominated our position in the salient. On the front of the
XIVth Corps this meant an advance north-east, of which the first stage
was to be the capture of Pilckem Ridge and the ground as far as the
Steenbeek.
The Divisional Artillery covered the right sector of the XIVth Corps
front, occupied till the beginning of July by the 29th Division, and
after that by the 38th. The line, which extended from a point opposite
Krupp Farm to the canal bank just short of the railway, was little
changed since the 20th Division had held it in the spring of 1916. It
had been pushed forward and straightened at certain points, and to the
left of this sector the British had taken over a further stretch of
1500 yards along the canal, but the general situation of the trenches
remained the same.
The conditions, on the other hand, had been very greatly improved. Many
miles of new tram lines had been laid, so that nearly every battery had
a line running to within a hundred yards of the gun positions, and a
large number of ammunition dumps had been formed. The flatness of the
country made it impossible to get complete flash cover for all guns.
Camouflage screens, however, had been erected all along the front, and
with the natural cover afforded by numerous small copses and farms,
most batteries were able to obtain fair flash cover.
The Divisional Artillery had to occupy entirely new positions; these
were reconnoitred on the 13th; work was begun on them that night, and
on the 14th, 15th and 16th the batteries came into action and took
their part in the preliminary bombardment.
The divisions detailed to carry out the attack in the XIVth Corps were
the 38th on the right and the Guards on the left; the 29th Division was
in reserve behind the Guards, and the 20th was to arrive in this area
in time to come into reserve behind the 38th.
The bombardment continued throughout the rest of July, for the
operations originally planned to begin on the 25th were put off till
the 31st. A marked feature of this period was the silence of the German
guns by day, a great contrast to the continual shelling of 1916. This
was the result of the very thorough counter-battery work which had been
carried out in the salient by the heavy artillery, assisted by our
aeroplanes. It is known that the Germans withdrew their guns by day and
brought them up each night, when they shelled the whole area heavily,
especially with gas. They had been engaged, when the 20th Divisional
Artillery came into the line, in moving back their battery positions
across the Steenbeek, and the increased activity which they showed
after the 21st of July pointed to the completion of this manœuvre.
The enemy’s night firing, by killing and wounding many of the drivers
and horses as well as by continually breaking the Decauville railway,
made the supply of ammunition exceedingly difficult, especially for
the Divisional Ammunition Column, which was working day and night
forming dumps in the forward area for future operations. There were
considerable losses, too, among the gunners; B/92 Battery had 24
casualties in two nights, and on the 22nd had to be withdrawn from the
line for a short rest. The 93rd (Army) Brigade was in the most forward
position, and it had been decided to keep this as a silent brigade.
Owing to the casualties incurred in the Divisional Artillery, this plan
had to be abandoned on the 22nd in order to keep up the programme of
night firing that had been laid down.
With the exception of a few raids on the enemy’s lines, the only
operation carried out before the battle began took place on the 27th,
when information was received that the enemy had retired from his
front line. Strong patrols sent out to verify this report crossed No
Man’s Land unopposed, entered the enemy’s front line, and even pushed
on beyond it. Later they met with strong resistance from numbers of the
enemy concealed in large concrete dug-outs, and when reinforcements
came up from the direction of Pilckem, the patrols were forced back
to the original line. Prisoners stated that the enemy was much shaken
by our bombardment, but had no intention of retiring on this front.
Opposite Boesinghe, however, the enemy did retire, leaving in our hands
both banks of the Yser Canal, which had formed till then a serious
obstacle to the advance of the Allied left flank.
During this time the Divisional Ammunition Column worked very hard
and earned the congratulations of the C.R.A. Between the 19th and the
26th the column delivered over 35,000 rounds to the batteries, besides
sending out rations, water, and large quantities of camouflage and
material. In the latter half of July the casualties in the column were
3 officers, 37 other ranks, and 113 animals.
Meanwhile the Division had entrained at Domart on the 20th of July and
concentrated in the XIVth Corps area, with headquarters at Proven. For
the rest of the month it remained in Corps reserve behind the 38th
Division.
As the day of the attack drew near various units of the Division were
attached for special work in connection with the operations. The 10th
K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. went to the 38th Division on the 25th to
provide carrying parties to the front line. They came under severe
shelling, meeting for the first time the new German gas, in which it
was possible to work for some hours before the effects of the gas were
felt. This gas, which could not be seen and could be detected only by
the faint smell of sour apples, was very deadly, but few casualties
were caused to these two battalions from this source owing to the
efficiency of the gas helmet and the special rattles which had been
provided to give warning. The 10th R.B. suffered heavy casualties from
shell-fire.
During the operations both battalions were employed on reclaiming
roads under the C.R.E., and the 11th K.R.R.C. did the same work under
the 38th Division. The 59th and 217th Machine Gun Companies moved to
forward positions on the 22nd to assist in the barrage on the 31st,
when the 59th Machine Gun Company fired over 20,000 rounds on the
S.O.S. lines, The 59th Brigade, the 83rd Field Company R.E., and the
11th D.L.I. moved to positions south and west of Elverdinghe on the
30th and 31st. During the operation the 83rd and 96th Field Companies
and the D.L.I. constructed artillery tracks under the C.R.E.
The attack was launched at 3.50 A.M. on the 31st of July and
went well. The infantry quickly gained the Pilckem Ridge, and by 11.35
A.M. both the 38th and the Guards Divisions were reported to
be holding their final objective, the line of the Steenbeek. At 3.30
P.M. the S.O.S. went up from this line and the 92nd and 93rd
Field Artillery Brigades opened fire; the barrage came down right on
the attacking wave, which broke and ran.
[Illustration: THE STEENBEEK]
During the advance the barrage, which had been practised daily during
the preceding week, moved forward at the rate of 100 yards every four
minutes, remaining stationary 200 yards beyond each objective. Whilst
stationary on these “protectors” some batteries fired smoke shells to
form a screen another 200 yards further on. In the 91st Brigade 2nd
Lieut. G. C. Glossop, C/91 Battery, and Lieut. H. P. W. Humphreys,
D/91, acted as F.O.O.’s, accompanied by twelve N.C.O.’s and men. A
buried cable had been dug in up to the front line trenches. As the
infantry advanced, a telephone line was run out from the cable head,
one officer being responsible for the line and the other for obtaining
information. Excellent reports were sent back, and 2nd Lieut. Glossop
and Lieut. Humphreys were awarded the M.C. and four men the M.M. for
their conspicuous success in maintaining communication to the foremost
infantry positions for two days under heavy shell-fire. Lieut. A.
Currie of the same brigade won the M.C. for carrying out under heavy
shelling a most useful reconnaissance. In the 92nd Brigade Lieut.
Pickard, D/92, and 2nd Lieut. Harrison, A/92, acted as F.O.O.’s, and
advanced with the infantry. 2nd Lieut. Harrison and many of his party
were killed during the action.
As the advance progressed the guns were moved forward. At 10
A.M., when the infantry had taken a line between Pilckem and
the Steenbeek, the 92nd Brigade moved forward to positions already
chosen just west of the canal. As soon as this brigade was reported in
action, about 1.45 P.M., the 91st was ordered to the western
slope of Pilckem Ridge. At this time it began to rain. The tracks
forward were not yet completed; one road was passable, but only as
far as the old German front line. As a result of our bombardment the
ground was a mass of shell-holes, with pill-boxes blown upside down
and débris scattered everywhere, difficult enough for infantry to move
over and almost impossible for guns. As the planked track could not be
finished till nearly dark, only one battery, C/91, was able to get to
the forward position that day, with eight horses per gun team and all
ammunition by pack. The remaining batteries got to the position by dawn
the next day. The ground, however, was so swampy that the guns could
not open fire until platforms had been made. During the 1st of August,
in the efforts to get the guns into some sort of line, one or two were
completely bogged and could not be got out for some days. There was
great difficulty in getting up ammunition; all had to come by pack
along a plank road, at the end of which it was dumped and then brought
up some distance to the gun positions by hand. It was hard work for
the men, who had no cover of any kind, and who, when there was time to
rest, simply slept in the mud.
The rain continued for the next three days, making any movement most
difficult. On the 4th the weather cleared and aeroplanes could go up,
an opportunity of which the Germans took full advantage, for they
shelled the wagon lines heavily that night, causing many casualties
among the men and horses.
The C.R.A. took over command of the Right Artillery on the 5th, and the
Left Group (91st, 92nd and 93rd Brigades) came under Lieut.-Colonel
Ricardo. The next day the 20th Division relieved the 38th, with
headquarters at Dragon Camp, about three miles east of Elverdinghe, the
61st Brigade taking over the outpost line.
On the 7th of August Major-General Matheson went to hospital, suffering
from gas poisoning. Two days later Major-General Douglas Smith returned
to the Division and took command. At the same time Brig.-General
Browell, the C.R.A., was invalided home. He was succeeded on the 10th
by Brig.-General H. W. A. Christie, C.M.G.
The 61st Brigade was relieved that night by the 59th.
The task before the Division was to capture Langemarck. The line held,
on taking over the right sector of the XIVth Corps front, extended for
1000 yards along the west bank of the Steenbeek, with the left flank
resting on the Ypres-Staden railway. As a preliminary operation it was
necessary to gain command of the Steenbeek valley in order to obtain
ground on the far side of the stream, where the leading waves might
form up for the attack.
It was originally intended to do this by peaceful penetration. This was
a very difficult matter, not only because the stream and the marshy
ground on each side of it formed a serious obstacle, but also because
the enemy, profiting by a week of bad weather which had prevented any
advance on our part, had thoroughly organised his defences on the east
bank.
Major J. W. Massie, 83rd Field Company R.E., made a remarkably fine
reconnaissance of the Steenbeek along the whole Divisional front--work
which was particularly valuable, as previous reports had been
misleading.
The 29th Division on the left and the 11th Division on the right had
already established a line of posts on the far side. On the front
of the 20th Division there was a very strong work at Au Bon Gite,
300 yards beyond the east bank on the Langemarck road. This was an
extremely well fortified place, containing many concrete shelters.
There were many other concrete blockhouses at intervals on both sides
of the stream, commanding all approaches, but Au Bon Gite was the key
to the enemy’s defences in this sector.
On the 8th, the 11th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel Cotton), who held the whole
of the front line, were ordered to send over three patrols to establish
themselves by peaceful penetration. As one of these patrols went
forward to the stream the road was blown up; a bridge was blown up in
front of another patrol; the third got across and established a post on
the right flank in prolongation of the line of posts thrown out by the
11th Division. This patrol remained in its position until the night of
the 10th/11th, when the 11th R.B. were relieved by the 10th K.R.R.C.
(Lieut.-Colonel Lee), and the post was withdrawn.
During this week the Divisional Signal Company made great improvements
in the signal communication with the front. The buried cable head
was still in the original front line just east of the canal. It was
impossible with the labour available to continue the bury to the two
infantry brigade battle headquarters, so arrangements were made to
establish a route from the cable head to each brigade and to bury each
of these lines for a short distance over the worst shelled area on the
Pilckem Ridge. This exceedingly unpleasant task was accomplished before
the coming operation, thanks to the untiring energies of the infantry
working parties and signal personnel. Forward of brigade headquarters
one main route on each brigade front was laid. These were supplemented
by visual wireless and amplifiers, so arranged as to form alternate
routes as necessity arose. Breakdown parties were placed at intervals
along all routes.
On the 11th of August the 59th Brigade was ordered to force the
Steenbeek with artillery support. Two companies of the 10th K.R.R.C.
were detailed to make the assault. Unfortunately a patrol of the enemy
crossed the stream shortly before operations began, and fired on the
troops as soon as they advanced. This disorganised the attack. The two
companies, however, got across, but were overwhelmed by the enemy on
the east bank.
Another attempt was made on the 14th, this time with six companies,
two of the 11th R.B. on the right of the Langemarck road and the whole
of the 10th R.B. on the left of it, all under Lieut.-Colonel L. H. W.
Troughton, commanding the 10th R.B. The objective was a line about 300
yards east of the Steenbeek and included Au Bon Gite.
The joint headquarters of these two battalions was at this time at
Stray Farm, an old farmhouse reinforced with concrete and in full view
of the enemy. Here, under the filthiest and most unsanitary conditions,
the staffs of both battalions and the signallers were crowded together.
The Germans had the range exactly, and hit the place repeatedly.
Although they came under a good deal of shelling the assaulting
companies were assembled by 3 A.M. on the 14th, under cover
of detachments thrown forward to guard the line of the stream. At
4 A.M., under an artillery barrage which was described by
Lieut.-Colonel Troughton as the best he had ever seen, the troops
crossed, some by wading through the stream and others by light bridges
which they themselves carried down. The 10th R.B. suffered heavily
from machine-gun and rifle fire from Au Bon Gite and other pill-boxes,
but after severe hand-to-hand fighting round the pill-boxes they
established themselves 250 yards beyond the stream and consolidated
the position. Lieut. Martin and Sgt.-Major Salter, D.C.M., were killed
gallantly capturing a pill-box which was holding up the advance.
Immediately afterwards, while attacking another pill-box Capt. Edwards
and Capt. Irvine were killed. When information was urgently needed
as to the situation, Lieut. E. Chapman, intelligence officer to this
battalion, went forward with Rfm. Moore to the front line in full
view of the enemy under a hail of bullets and made a most valuable
reconnaissance of the position. Lieut. Chapman was killed but Rfm.
Moore succeeded in bringing back the information which Lieut. Chapman
had written.
The left company of the 11th R.B., after crossing with some difficulty
the Steenbeek and the swampy ground on each side of it, had a
hand-to-hand fight with the enemy on the east bank, and then carried
straight on under heavy machine-gun fire to Au Bon Gite. The mill at
this place and several smaller dug-outs were taken, but the main work,
a solid structure scarcely damaged by the bombardment of our heavy
guns, held out. Men were all round it and even on top of it, but the
Germans inside had closed a strong iron door and could not be captured.
At this point a counter attack developed, and the company of the 11th
R.B., now short of ammunition and without bombs, had to fall back to a
position some 200 yards west of Au Bon Gite and partially surrounding
it. The company commander, Capt. H. A. Slade, greatly distinguished
himself and was awarded the D.S.O.
The right company gained its objective, but then became involved in the
counter attack on Au Bon Gite and had to withdraw, forming a defensive
flank with one post practically in the objective.
In the early morning of the 15th a party of the enemy tried to work
round the flank of the left company of the 11th R.B., but under the
steady fire of this company the attack melted away. The two remaining
companies were then sent up to reinforce the front line. They suffered
heavily on the way, but succeeded in reaching the forward troops.
The casualties, especially in officers, were very heavy. By 6
A.M. on the 14th the only two officers remaining in the 10th
R.B. were Capt. S. J. Pegler and Lieut. Bidwell; they were awarded the
D.S.O. and the M.C. respectively for their gallant actions on this day.
The battalion lost altogether 11 officers killed, 4 officers wounded,
and over 200 men.
Preparations were made for a company of the 10th K.R.R.C. and a company
of the 11th K.R.R.C. to capture Au Bon Gite at 2 A.M. on the
15th, with the assistance of trench mortars, machine-gun fire from
the 217th Machine Gun Company, and six R.E. detachments from the 83rd
Field Company to blow in the doors. The artillery put down a barrage
according to orders, but owing to the darkness of the night, the
difficulties of communication, and the continuous shell and machine-gun
fire, the troops could not reach their jumping-off ground in time. The
attack was therefore cancelled by the senior officer on the spot.
Although the strong point at Au Bon Gite had not been reduced, the
Steenbeek had been crossed and sufficient ground gained to enable the
assaulting waves for the main attack to be formed up on the far side.
The way was now clear for the larger operation, which included the
capture of Langemarck. This was fixed for the 16th of August, and was
part of an attack carried out by the Allied armies on the east and
north of Ypres.
The attack on the 20th Division front was made by the 60th Brigade on
the right and the 61st on the left. These two brigades on the night of
the 14th/15th relieved the 59th, which went back into reserve on the
canal bank, leaving, however, the 10th and the 11th R.B. as covering
troops on the east side of the Steenbeek. After the losses incurred in
the operations of the last week this brigade was very weak, and two
battalions of the 38th Division were attached to the 20th as Divisional
reserve.
The first objective followed the road bounding the west edge of
Langemarck; the second was clear of the village on the east side of it;
the third and final objective ran east of Schreiboom, and was part of
the German Gheluvelt-Langemarck line.
The direction of the attack was north-east, with the left resting on
the Ypres-Staden railway. The extent of the front increased from 1000
yards on the Steenbeek to 1400 on the final objective. The boundary
between brigades as far as the first objective was the Langemarck road;
it then skirted the south of Langemarck and of Schreiboom. It will be
seen that this gave a wider front to the 61st Brigade than to the 60th
until the final objective was reached. The reasons for this were as
follows:
(1) The 61st Brigade was thus made responsible for the whole
village of Langemarck.
(2) The 60th Brigade on a narrower front would be able to keep
one battalion in reserve; this brigade was more liable to be
attacked from the direction of Poelcapelle, where the enemy was
known to keep his reserves.
(3) If the 61st Brigade were held up at Langemarck, the 60th, by
working round to the south-east, could partially surround the
village.
The 60th Brigade was to attack the first and second objectives on a one
battalion front with the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I.; the 6th K.S.L.I.
and the 12th K.R.R.C. were then to advance to the final objective. If
all went well this would leave one battalion (the 12th R.B.) still in
reserve.
The 61st Brigade was to advance throughout on a two battalion front,
two half battalions of the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and the 7th Somerset L.I.
being allotted to each of the first and second objectives; the 12th
King’s and the 7th D.C.L.I. being detailed to attack the third.
Special arrangements were made to deal with Au Bon Gite. The company
of the 11th R.B. which had made the original assault on the 14th, and
a party of the 83rd Field Company R.E., were to advance with the first
wave of the Oxfords and reduce this place while the main attack pressed
forward on either side.
The 11th Division was on the right of the 20th and the 29th Division on
the left, and at certain fixed points during the advance touch was to
be gained with these divisions.
The Right Artillery of the XIVth Corps (the 20th and 38th Divisional
Artilleries) covered the attack with standing and creeping barrages,
pausing on the first objective for twenty minutes and on the second for
an hour, so that under cover of smoke shells the infantry might have
time to re-form or to come up to the objective should the attack have
been delayed. The Corps heavy guns co-operated in the barrage on areas
further behind the enemy’s lines. A machine-gun barrage was provided by
the four machine gun companies with the exception of half of the 60th
and half of the 61st, which accompanied their brigades.
The attacking troops formed up during the night of the 15th/16th. It
was, of course, of the utmost importance that they should take up their
position east of the Steenbeek without the knowledge of the enemy. As
the enemy’s posts opposite the 60th Brigade were at an average distance
of 150 yards from the stream and only 80 yards opposite Au Bon Gite
on the front of the 61st Brigade, this was an extremely difficult
manœuvre. During the night the 83rd and 84th Field Companies R.E.
placed bridges, covered with canvas, across the Steenbeek, Lieut. E.
C. Delamain of the 84th Field Company being awarded the M.C. for his
work during the night. Further, Major P. G. Norman, commanding 84th
Field Company, carried out the very hazardous task of laying tapes
under severe fire to mark the forming-up places on the cast bank of the
stream. It reflects great credit on all who directed the operation and
on the troops who earned it out that in spite of the enemy’s shelling,
which was at times severe, and of machine-gun fire from Au Bon Gite,
the leading battalions formed up in their positions apparently without
the enemy being aware of their presence.
The disposition of the troops, when the assembly was completed, was as
follows:
On the right was the 60th Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General Butler), with
headquarters at Stray Farm. The 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. were formed
up with the first wave east of the Steenbeek, and the second wave west
of it. The 6th K.S.L.I. on the right and the 12th K.R.R.C. on the left
were a short distance in rear of the Oxfords. The 12th R.B. were 800
yards south-east of Pilckem.
On the left was the 61st Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General Banbury),
with headquarters on the railway north of Pilckem. The 7th Somerset
L.I. on the right and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. on the left were east of the
Steenbeek; behind these battalions the 12th King’s on the right had
crossed the stream, and the 7th D.C.L.I. were crossing it at the time
when the attack began.
The 60th and 61st Trench Mortar Batteries and half of the 60th and 61st
Machine Gun Companies were close to the infantry of their brigades.
The guns of the 91st Field Artillery Brigade were in action on the west
slope of Pilckem Ridge, those of the 92nd Brigade on the canal bank.
[Illustration: AU BON GITE]
At 4.45 A.M. the artillery barrage, accurate and beautifully
timed, fell like a curtain, and close behind it the leading waves of
the infantry moved forward to the attack. It was then just light enough
to see the country for about 300 yards ahead. Bombers of the 11th R.B.
had crawled up during the night to within a few yards of Au Bon Gite,
where they lay concealed in shell-holes. At zero these men threw smoke
bombs on to the enemy, making a screen under cover of which the rest
of “B” Company attacked. After a short fight the position was captured
with its garrison of an officer and 50 men.
The first wave of the Oxfords had meanwhile passed Au Bon Gite, and the
second wave had crossed the Steenbeek. This battalion met a certain
amount of opposition from parties of the enemy in blockhouses, but by
5.20 A.M. had reached the first objective with trifling loss.
All movement, however, was very difficult. On the whole Divisional
front the ground was nothing but a swampy crater field as far as the
final objective. Up to the first objective it was particularly bad, and
in many places the only possible formation for the troops was a series
of small columns which wound their way in single file between the pools
of mud and water.
The 61st Brigade came under enfilade fire from Au Bon Gite until that
place was taken, but otherwise, although under fairly heavy rifle
and machine-gun fire, met no serious opposition until the K.O.Y.L.I.
on the left were held up by concrete blockhouses west of Langemarck
and later at Langemarck station. At these two places great dash and
initiative were shown by individual men, who, when practically all
their officers had been lost, carried on, and with Lewis guns and bombs
fought splendidly together. Here Pte. W. Edwards of the 7th K.O.Y.L.I.
won the Victoria Cross. The following is the official account of his
valiant action:
“For most conspicuous bravery when under heavy machine-gun and rifle
fire from a strong concrete fort. Having lost all his company officers,
without hesitation he dashed forward at great personal risk, bombed
through the loopholes, surmounted the fort, and waved to his company
to advance. By his splendid example he saved a most critical situation
at a time when the whole battalion was held up and a leader urgently
needed. Three officers and thirty other ranks were taken prisoner
by him in the fort. Later Pte. Edwards did most valuable work as a
runner, and he eventually guided most of the battalion out through very
difficult ground. Throughout he set a splendid personal example to all,
and was utterly regardless of danger.”
Lance-Cpl. Powel fired a Lewis gun through the enemy’s loophole and so
cleared a point which had held up the line. Altogether at this stage
the battalion captured 5 officers, 70 other ranks and 12 machine guns,
in addition to 3 guns, with a quantity of ammunition.
By 5.40 A.M. the whole of the first objective was in our hands.
At 5.45 A.M. the advance was continued. The original second
wave of the Oxfords attacked and reached the second objective with
little loss. In the meantime the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. had
crossed the Steenbeek. The former reached the line of the first
objective without incident, but the latter came under machine-gun fire
from a blockhouse near Langemarck and lost a good many men, including
the commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Prioleau, who was wounded.
The situation was retrieved by Sgt. E. Cooper of the 12th K.R.R.C. The
gallant action, for which he was awarded the Victoria Cross, is given
as follows in the _London Gazette_:
“For most conspicuous bravery and initiative in attack. Enemy machine
guns from a concrete blockhouse, 250 yards away, were holding up
the advance of the battalion on his left, and were also causing
heavy casualties to his own battalion. Sgt. Cooper, with four men,
immediately rushed towards the blockhouse although heavily fired on.
About a hundred yards distant he ordered his men to lie down and fire
at the blockhouse. Finding this did not silence the machine guns, he
immediately rushed forward straight at them and fired his revolver
into an opening in the blockhouse. The machine guns ceased firing and
the garrison surrendered. Seven machine guns and forty-six prisoners
were captured in the blockhouse. By this magnificent act of courage he
undoubtedly saved what might have been a serious check to the whole
advance, at the same time saving a great number of lives.”
After this the 6th K.S.L.I. and the 12th K.R.R.C. continued to advance;
they mopped up all shelters and dug-outs which they passed, and in this
way killed many of the enemy and took a further 46 prisoners. They then
formed up east of the second objective, ready to move forward to the
attack.
On the left, once the station and the railway trucks had been cleared,
comparatively little opposition was met. The losses, however, in the
first stages of the battle had been heavy. Second-Lieut. Robinson was
the only company officer of the K.O.Y.L.I. left after reaching the
first objective; he had a very trying time and set a splendid example
throughout. Sgt. S. Goodman and Sgt. G. H. Jackson deserve great credit
for the way in which they took their companies to the second objective
when all their officers had been hit.
The right of the 61st Brigade had some trouble with machine guns and
snipers in the outskirts of Langemarck, but the mopping-up parties
did their work thoroughly and accounted for any of the enemy who were
left behind the leading wave. On this front, too, there had been heavy
losses. One company of the Somersets had no officers left and lost
touch with the rest of the battalion. Second-Lieut. J. R. Hill, M.C.,
of “D” Company, got these men together and then took his own company
on to the objective. Although wounded in the face and leg, he remained
in command until he was satisfied that the position was assured. He
was awarded a bar to his M.C. The mopping-up parties for the village
were twice the strength of the assaulting troops; they worked from
shell-hole to shell-hole under cover of Lewis gun fire and then bombed
the enemy out of each concrete dug-out in turn. In one blockhouse the
Somersets took 1 officer and 30 men; in another 40 men and 4 machine
guns.
The 12th King’s and the 7th D.C.L.I., who had sustained a good many
casualties in following close behind the leading battalions, formed up
on the second objective.
Up to this time the enemy’s barrage, which came down on the Steenbeek
four minutes after zero, had been ineffective, and though he now began
to shell the south-west of Langemarck, little damage was done.
At 7.20 A.M. the whole line advanced to the final objective,
the 6th K.S.L.I. and 12th K.R.R.C. on the right, the 12th King’s and
the 7th D.C.L.I. on the left. The battalions of the 60th Brigade met
with strong opposition from parties of the enemy concealed in hedges,
ditches, concrete dug-outs and fortified houses, and came under intense
machine-gun fire from the right flank. Many of the enemy were killed
and 135 prisoners taken. By 7.45 A.M. the 60th Brigade held
the final objective. The 61st Brigade had little difficulty except on
the extreme left. Here it was possible to advance only in single file
along the railway line. The left company of the D.C.L.I. had a certain
number of casualties, chiefly from machine-gun fire from the left
front, but cleared the line and took 60 prisoners. This brigade had
gained the final objective by 8 A.M.
No sooner had this line been occupied than enemy aeroplanes appeared
flying low, about 50 feet above the ground, firing machine guns on the
infantry and apparently taking photographs.
The divisions on the flanks had meanwhile advanced. On the left the
61st Brigade was throughout in touch with the 29th Division. The
co-operation of the 29th Division on the left of the 61st Brigade could
not have been better. On the right of the 20th Division the situation
was not so good. The divisions further south had not made much
progress; the 11th Division therefore had to form a defensive flank.
Its left was in touch with the 60th Brigade on the third objective, but
Rat House, south-east of Langemarck, remained in the possession of the
enemy.
About 400 prisoners had been taken by the Division, including the
officer commanding the battalion which had held Langemarck. A section
of 4·2 howitzers, one 77 mm. field gun, and 20 or 30 machine guns had
also fallen into our hands.
The artillery F.O.O.’s were excellent; their reports were generally
the first to be received and were accurate. The liaison, too, between
the artillery and the infantry was all that could be desired. In this
battle 2nd Lieut. Potter and Lieut. Green, of B/92 Battery, won the M.C.
The R.E. field companies did most valuable work, both in preparing for
the crossing of the Steenbeek and in making strong points during the
advance.
The bearers of the Division worked under the 61st Field Ambulance,
commanded by Lieut.-Colonel W. J. S. Harvey, who also devised a most
successful scheme for the organisation of the medical officers of
battalions.
Walking wounded collecting posts had been established by the 60th Field
Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Osburn) at Cheapside, and by the 62nd
Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel E. F. L’Estrange) at Mouton Farm near
Elverdinghe.
Although the Decauville railway line was broken early in the day,
the evacuation of wounded by hand, by wheeled stretcher, and by hand
trolley went on smoothly and without congestion, but the long carry
from the R.A.P.’s in the front line to the forward A.D.S. at Gallwitz
Farm threw very heavy work on the bearers.
Gallwitz Farm was heavily shelled and had to be abandoned. Here Capt.
G. Adam, 62nd Field Ambulance, won the M.C.--one of many honours
awarded to the R.A.M.C. for this battle. Capt. Adam attended the
wounded in the open under heavy shell fire until the dressing station
was destroyed. He then got his cases safely away and went on with his
work at another point until he was utterly exhausted.
Two hundred stretcher bearers, detailed by the Division for clearing
the battlefield, were given a short training and organised as the
Divisional Stretcher Company. They were an unqualified success and did
valuable work on the afternoon of the 16th and that night.
After the capture of the second objective the rest of the morning
was spent in consolidating the position, involving on the part of
the 60th Brigade preparations to deal with a counter attack on the
dangerous right flank. The line was held from right to left by the 6th
K.S.L.I., the 12th K.R.R.C., the 12th King’s, and the 7th D.C.L.I.
The Oxfords were on the first and second objectives, and the 12th
R.B., who had been employed during most of the fighting in carrying
bombs and ammunition to the front line, occupied a position east of
the Steenbeek. The Somersets and the K.O.Y.L.I. were on the second
objective.
From mid-day onwards various reports were received stating that the
enemy appeared to be crawling up along hedges in front of the position.
At 4 P.M. he attacked the junction of the two brigades about
Schreiboom and drove back the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 12th King’s for
a distance of 200 yards. The left company of the 12th K.R.R.C. was
practically wiped out, and a company of the Oxfords was sent up as
reinforcements. Nearly all the ammunition had been spent in fighting
this attack, and a further supply was sent up by parties of the 12th
R.B., two companies of which battalion moved forward to ensure the
safety of the second objective.
At 7 P.M. the two battalions of the 38th Division were placed
at the disposal of brigade commanders, the 10th Welch coming under the
60th Brigade and the 15th Welch under the 61st. They did invaluable
work in bringing up water, rations, and ammunition, besides helping in
the work of consolidation.
On the 17th an attempt was made to regain that part of the line which
had been lost. In the 60th Brigade the attack was made by two and
a half companies of the 12th R.B.; in the 61st by the 12th King’s,
supported by the remaining three companies of the Somersets and one
company of the D.C.L.I. On the left the objective was occupied without
much trouble, but the right of the 61st Brigade and the 12th R.B. were
enfiladed by heavy rifle and machine-gun fire from Rat House, and
suffered severely. It was therefore decided to dig in on the original
line.
That night, on relief by the 38th Division, infantry units began to
move back to Proven, where Divisional Headquarters was opened on
the morning of the 19th. During the following three weeks the field
companies and some of the battalions were at intervals employed in the
forward area, but the time was devoted principally to rest and training.
The headquarters of the Divisional Artillery went back to rest, but the
91st and 92nd Field Artillery Brigades remained in action under the
C.R.A. of the 38th Division, the 92nd Brigade moving up on the 26th to
the west slope of Pilckem Ridge.
During the following three weeks the general situation was little
changed. The weather until the end of August was wet and windy, and
time was needed to prepare for the next advance. Minor operations were
carried out against Eagle Trench, a part of the enemy’s line east of
Schreiboom, but without much result. The French had not lately been
heavily engaged, and in consequence the Germans turned most of their
guns in this area on to the British lines. The battery positions of the
91st Brigade were heavily shelled on the 2nd of September, and again on
the 4th, when two howitzers of D/91 were hit.
At this time the enemy, finding that his strongest defences were unable
to hold out against our attacks, adopted a new system of defence by
which he held his front line only lightly, relying on large reserves
kept close at hand to regain any ground that might be lost.[8] He
devoted his time in this part of the battlefield principally to
organising shell-holes as posts and strong points. In order that our
guns might bring all these posts under fire, the front was divided
into a number of areas, some of which were shelled each day; barrages
were frequently carried out, not creeping regularly, but lifting
backwards and forwards at odd intervals, so as to harass the enemy.
These continual bombardments entailed very heavy work not only on the
batteries, but also on the Divisional Ammunition Column. In September
the weather improved, and, except for occasional heavy bombardments,
the German artillery became less active; aeroplanes, however, flew
frequently over our lines, particularly between the 11th and the 16th,
when they bombed the camps and wagon lines and killed a large number of
horses.
The 93rd (Army) Field Artillery Brigade pulled out of action at this
time and moved to another area.
On the 5th the headquarters of the Divisional Artillery returned to
the line, and on the 11th the 20th Division again relieved the 38th,
and prepared to launch an attack on the 20th of the month, when the
British offensive was being resumed on a front of eight miles, from the
Ypres-Staden railway to the south. By the day of the attack the front
line, which ran from a point on the road 1000 yards east of Langemarck
in a north-westerly direction to the railway, was held by the 60th
Brigade on the right and the 59th on the left; the 61st was in reserve.
Divisional Headquarters was near Elverdinghe. All units had been very
weak since the fighting at Langemarck, and even after they had had
three weeks out of the line to refit, the average fighting strength of
the battalions was only 350. The 51st Division of the XVIIIth Corps was
on the right of the 20th, and the Guards on the left.
The signal communications taken over from the 38th Division included
a new buried cable in the much-shelled area between Langemarck and Au
Bon Gite, but there was no buried line back to Stray Farm. The task of
completing this bury across a mile of sodden and difficult ground was
at once undertaken by the Signal Company, and successfully accomplished
in time. The value of this work was proved in the course of the day’s
fighting, when not only was signal communication maintained, but in
addition to continual telephone calls, one thousand and ten telegrams
were dealt with at the Divisional Signal Office.
The objective in the forthcoming attack included ’t Goed ter Vesten
Farm and the enemy trenches south-east of it; from the farm it ran west
to the railway, involving on this flank only a short advance. On the
right the attack was to be made in two bounds, but on the left there
was an intricate network of trenches, which it was considered better to
capture without any pause.
The attack was preceded by a twenty-four hours’ hurricane bombardment,
which started about 4 A.M. on the 19th, and during the action the usual
creeping, standing, and smoke barrages were carried out, covering
altogether a depth of 2500 yards. Half of the machine gun companies of
the 60th and 59th Brigades were under their brigade commanders, the
remaining two half companies being kept back as a reserve until the
objective had been taken. The 61st and 217th Machine Gun Companies
worked under the orders of the Divisional Machine Gun Officer.
The night before the attack a direct hit on the headquarters of the
10th K.R.R.C. killed Lieut-Colonel Rixon, Capt. Wallington, and several
others. Major Cockbum took over the command of the battalion.
The operations began at 5.40 A.M. on the 20th of September.
East of Schreiboom the enemy held a defensive position known as Eagle
Trench. It was a curiously constructed work, in which the actual trench
ran between two solid embankments about 8 feet high. These details were
not known at the time of the attack, as owing to the formation of the
ground it was an extremely difficult place to see. As, however, it was
known to be strongly held, 290 oil drums were fired on to it at zero;
they seem to have fallen beyond the trench, and to have done little
more than light up the surroundings and show the enemy our advancing
lines.
On the left flank all went well; the enemy’s trench system was
carried and the line pushed forward to ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm, but
in the centre the right of the 59th Brigade and the left of the 60th,
owing to the enemy’s excellent field of fire, could make no headway
against Eagle Trench. The right gained some ground, but, coming under
machine-gun fire from houses and strong points on its right, was unable
to advance very far. This was the situation at 8 A.M. Owing to
this delay the infantry ceased to gain any immediate advantage from the
pre-arranged artillery barrage, which, after a short pause on the first
objective, continued to sweep forward. During the next hour the left
flank reached the objective and the right moved forward some distance,
but the centre remained held up. The 51st Division on the right had
advanced successfully, and was in touch with the 60th Brigade.
Orders were then issued for the attack to be continued at 6.30
P.M., when the situation had been cleared up. The artillery
barrage, which was reported from all sides to be perfect, was in the
main a repetition of that of the morning, but smoke shells were fired
at Eagle Trench to mask the machine guns there while the infantry
moved into position. This proved to be a wise precaution, in view of
the high command which this trench was afterwards found to possess.
On the front of the 11th R.B. the smoke screen was ineffective. The
companies of this battalion, having been widely separated to support
other battalions in the morning, had to form up in daylight in view
of the enemy. This daylight assembly was the signal for a tremendous
barrage on Langemarck, while machine guns in Eagle Trench simply raked
the plain.
The 60th Brigade advanced on the right, and by 9.15 P.M. had
taken between 60 and 70 prisoners, but the north part of Eagle Trench,
immediately east of Schreiboom, resisted all efforts to take it. The
59th Brigade, while holding the objective on the left, had its right
thrown back to pass a little east of the Schreiboom cross-roads.
The 11th R.B. in gaining a footing in Eagle Trench, just north of
the cross-roads, had lost 66 per cent. casualties and 11 out of 16
officers. The result of the day’s fighting left the enemy holding a
salient in the centre of the Divisional line. On the general front the
advance had been successful, and had gained ground to an average depth
of 500 yards.
The remaining part of Eagle Trench had still to be captured. With
this object an attack, in which two tanks were to precede a party of
infantry, was ordered to be carried out on the 22nd. The tanks stuck
in Langemarck, so the operation was postponed till the morning of the
23rd. At the same time an alternative plan was prepared to be carried
out in the event of the tanks remaining derelict. As the tanks were
unable to move forward in time to take part in the attack at 5.30
A.M., the alternative plan was put into operation at the last
moment, and zero put forward to 7 A.M. These orders provided
for a three-minute bombardment by Stokes guns and a smoke barrage,
followed by a bombing attack up the trenches from the south and north
covered by a barrage of rifle grenades, and an assault above ground
from the west. Detachments of the 12th K.R.R.C. and the 10th R.B. were
to carry out this operation.
The Stokes bombardment was timed to begin at 7 A.M. At 6.25
the enemy attacked the 60th Brigade, but was driven off by rifle
and machine-gun fire, leaving 23 prisoners behind. This in no way
disorganised the preparations for the attack, which started punctually
at 7 o’clock. After a very effective bombardment by the Stokes mortars,
the bombing parties worked their way inwards from the flanks, the 12th
K.R.R.C. from the south, the 10th R.B. from the north, covered by a
rifle grenade barrage. While the enemy was engaged with these parties,
one company of the 10th R.B. assaulted Eagle Trench from the west,
and after a short and sharp fight, carried it. The attack took place
practically in broad daylight, and came as a complete surprise to the
enemy, who had just “stood down.” The bombers did their work well,
and the frontal attack was splendidly carried out by Capt. T. G. L.
Ashwell, who won the M.C. Our casualties were not heavy, but the enemy
left 94 prisoners and 10 machine guns in our hands.
In the fighting for Eagle Trench 2nd Lieut. Allan, A/91 Battery, gained
a bar to his M.C., and 2nd Lieut. Robinson, C/91, won the M.C. The
latter was very badly wounded, and completely lost his sight.
The stretcher bearers, working under the 60th Field Ambulance, had
more casualties in this action than in the battle of Langemarck. Again,
their task was a severe one, as the Decauville line was broken too
often to be of much use, but by their untiring efforts all the wounded
were cleared without a hitch. As an example of what was done, 24
bearers at Gallwitz Farm carried back 142 stretcher cases in 24 hours.
Prisoners stated that a concerted attack against the Divisional front
had been arranged, and it is evident that our success here completely
upset the enemy’s plans. By the evening the total number of prisoners
had risen to 1 officer and 102 other ranks. The successful issue of
this fighting is all the more creditable since between the 18th and the
23rd the troops had little or no cover and during the whole time were
exposed to heavy shelling day and night. From prisoners’ statements it
appears that since the 11th of September the regiments opposed to the
20th Division had lost over 60 per cent. of their strength, largely
from artillery fire, and that their morale had been much shaken.
By the evening of the 23rd the 60th and 59th Brigades were well
established east of Eagle Trench. They were relieved that night by the
61st Brigade, which during the next few days straightened the line
to give a good jumping-off place for the relieving division in the
subsequent operations. The total number of prisoners was brought up to
2 officers and 156 other ranks.
So gallant had been the fighting and so important had been the result
of the capture of Eagle Trench that the following message was sent by
the Army Commander, General Sir Hubert Gough:
“The tenacity, gallantry and skill which your Division showed over
the operations round Eagle Trench are very fine. Please accept my
congratulations and expressions of admiration to you and all ranks of
your gallant Division.”
Throughout the period spent in this sector the 11th D.L.I. (Major G.
Hayes) were constantly at work; they carried up material, dug and wired
new lines of trenches, repaired tramways and constructed a duckboard
track from Langemarck to the front line. On the 20th of September the
Lewis gunners of the battalion were employed on anti-aircraft work and
assisted the attack on Eagle Trench. That night two companies working
with the R.E. constructed strong points in the captured area. For
his work at this time Capt. W. G. L. Sear was awarded the M.C. The
continual shelling, particularly on the line of the Steenbeek, made the
journey to and from work always difficult.
In the last days of September the 20th Division was relieved by the
14th, and on the 1st of October entrained for Bapaume.
Before leaving, another congratulatory message was received from
General Sir Hubert Gough:
“The Army Commander wishes to thank all ranks 20th Division for the
part they have played in the third battle of Ypres. The Division may
well be proud of the capture of Langemarck on August 16th and the
taking of Eagle Trench on September the 23rd. While holding the line
of the Steenbeek during a prolonged spell of bad weather the Division
showed a good soldierly spirit under difficult conditions. The Army
Commander is sorry to lose such a good fighting Division.”
Once more the Divisional Artillery was left in action, although all
ranks were well-nigh exhausted after two and a half months’ continuous
fighting in the battle.
The C.R.A. and headquarters moved out of the line on the 28th, when
the artillery brigades came under the 4th Division, commanded by
Major-General T. G. Matheson. The gunners of both brigades were
immediately employed in preparing gun positions on the Steenbeek. The
line of the Steenbeek was continually being shelled, especially at
night, when all ammunition had to be carried down to the positions; and
as the usual artillery programme had to be carried out in addition to
this work, the strain was very great.
Since the capture of Langemarck the German possession of Poelcapelle
had prevented the advance on this part of the battle front from being
pushed to any great depth. A successful advance further to the south
gained Polygon Wood and Zonnebeke on the 26th of September, thus
establishing a footing on the main ridge at these places, and the
line was advanced to within striking distance of the high ground as
far north as a point east of St Julien.[9] In the XIVth Corps area
there was no infantry action, though both the 91st and 92nd Field
Artillery Brigades took part in an artillery bombardment. On the 4th of
October an attack between the Menin road and the Ypres-Staden railway
included Poelcapelle as an objective of the 11th Division, which was
at this time on the right of the 4th. The 4th Division advanced at 6
A.M. parallel to the railway, with its left flank some 600
yards south-east of it, and by 10 o’clock, when the protective barrage
was reported to be most effective, had gained the final objective, the
right of which touched the northern outskirts of Poelcapelle. The town
itself was entered by the 11th Division.
The fighting on the general battle front since the 20th of September
had been remarkable for the many heavy counter attacks launched
against our troops when the objectives had been taken. These attacks
were repulsed with great loss to the enemy, and Sir Douglas Haig states
in his despatch[10] that documents captured on the 4th of October
showed that the Germans, recognising the failure of these methods, were
endeavouring to return to their old practice of holding their forward
position in strength.
After this attack the 92nd Field Artillery Brigade moved to positions
on the eastern slope of Pilckem Ridge completely open to the enemy’s
view. The 91st Brigade was transferred to the sector north of the
railway, to cover the Guards Division, and was ordered to take up a
position on the Steenbeek (Hannebeek) during the night of the 6/7th.
Batteries worked all through the 6th, trying to make a track round the
shell-holes towards the positions, which were in a swamp on both banks
of the stream. They began to move forward at 7 P.M. along the
road which follows the crest of the ridge as far as the cross-roads at
Pilckem, then down the Langemarck road for a mile, after which they
branched off to the north.
This was the only available road in the neighbourhood for all traffic.
It was constantly shelled, and on the evening of the 6th it was crowded
with infantry units, ration parties and troops of all kinds when the
German guns opened fire. In the confusion that ensued the batteries
were a good deal delayed, but in spite of the awful state of the ground
they reached a road close to the position during the night and actually
got four guns and two howitzers into action. All the next day they
struggled to get ammunition down to the position by pack, skirting the
northern edge of the Pilckem Ridge. It rained heavily, and the mud was
so deep that it was found to be impossible to get the remaining guns
into action that night.
On the 8th, at dawn, Lieut.-Colonel Erskine, commanding the brigade,
borrowed a hundred men under Lieut. Hoare from the 4th Battalion of the
Grenadier Guards to assist in moving the remaining guns. This battalion
was at the time in reserve, and the men showed extraordinary goodwill
and keenness to do all they could, and worked with the greatest
determination. Each man carried down with him two rounds of ammunition
besides his own rifle and equipment. Then, with fifty men on each gun
besides the men of the batteries and one team of horses, the whole
brigade was got into action by mid-day, with the exception of one gun
which was badly stuck upside down in a shell-hole. It was a fine piece
of work, which earned the congratulations of the XIVth Corps and of
Brig.-General F. A. Wilson, the C.R.A., Guards Division. Major Balfour,
commanding C/91, a first-rate battery commander, was killed while
actually man-handling one of the guns.
The last two actions in this battle in which the Divisional Artillery
took part were fought on the 9th and 12th October, when attacks were
launched on the British front from Zonnebeke to the left flank, and on
part of the French front further north. The Guards on the extreme left
of the British line attacked at 5.20 A.M. on the 9th. They
made a brilliant advance in cold, wet weather and over sodden ground to
a line close to the south-east end of Houthulst Forest. Further south
the eastern outskirts of Poelcapelle were cleared and progress was made
up the main ridge towards Passchendaele.[11] On the 12th, attacking
again in rain and a high wind, the Guards reached the edge of the
forest.
Forward positions for one brigade of the 20th Divisional Artillery
were reconnoitered on the 14th, but the continued bad weather made the
movement of guns impossible. Four days later the batteries were at last
relieved.
For three whole months the 20th Divisional Artillery had been in the
battle without any relief. Throughout this time, over ground sodden
with rain, the men had fought continuously, practically without
protection of any sort and under a continuous bombardment of gas and
high-explosive shell. Casualties had been exceptionally heavy and
the strain abnormal. It was the hardest time in the line that the
Divisional Artillery ever spent, and the men were absolutely played out
when on the 18th of October they moved out of action to entrain two
days later for Peronne.