THE SOMME
_24th of July to 7th of September 1916_
The line between Beaumont Hamel and Hebuterne--Move to the Somme
area--Battle of Guillemont.
(_Vide_ Map II. and Sketch B.)
As soon as all units were concentrated in the district round Doullens,
the 20th Division was ordered to relieve the 38th in the hilly country
between Beaumont Hamel and Hebuterne. Accordingly the 29th of July
found the Division once more in the line, though not yet in the area of
the great offensive which had been progressing since the first of the
month between the Ancre and the Somme.
Brig.-General W. E. Banbury, C.M.G., took over command of the 61st
Brigade on the 28th of July from Brig.-General Sweny, who had returned
to the Brigade a few days earlier, but was still suffering from the
effect of his wounds.
The right of the new line rested about half a mile north-west of
Beaumont Hamel on the south side of a spur known as Redan Ridge,
overlooking the village, which lay in a narrow valley some hundred
feet below. From the crest of Redan ridge the line ran rather east of
north into somewhat lower ground, facing Serre and extending to a point
1200 yards north-west of it. Here it formed a salient and turned back,
rising to the Divisional left flank at a place known as Sixteen Poplars
on the Hebuterne-Puisieux road about 1000 yards from Hebuterne. The
61st Brigade held the right of this line, the 60th the centre opposite
Serre and the 59th the left, with Divisional Headquarters at Couin.
The 38th Divisional Artillery remained in the line to support the
20th Division, whose own artillery was still at Ypres. The Division
was now once more in the XIVth Corps, which had taken over that day
from the VIIIth, and which consisted of the Guards, 6th, 20th and 25th
Divisions; on the right of the 20th was the 25th Division and on the
left the 56th.
Although this country was now outside the main battle area, attacks
had been made on the 1st of July between the Ancre and Serre and north
of Hebuterne, with a view to holding the enemy reserves and occupying
his artillery. To meet these attacks the enemy had concentrated a
large force of artillery, with the result that when the 20th Division
took over the line the trenches were in an appalling state and the
ground still covered with dead. The front line could be held only by
advanced parties, and it had to be reclaimed; in places where it was
too much damaged and full of dead bodies it had to be filled in and a
new line dug in front of it. Communication trenches had to be put in
good order for 500 yards behind the front line, deep dug-outs made, the
battlefield cleared and a new line built within 200 yards of the enemy,
wherever there was a greater distance than this between the opposing
trenches. To assist in this task the 3rd Battalion Grenadier Guards was
attached to the 20th Division from the 1st to the 7th of August; on the
departure of this battalion, a field company of the Guards Division
came to help. The field companies of the Division were employed in
the areas of their respective brigades, and the 11th D.L.I. and large
parties from the battalions in reserve were constantly at work.
[Illustration:
GUILLEMONT, 3^{RD}-4^{TH} Sep^t 1916. Sketch B.]
During the fortnight which the Division spent in this sector the time
was chiefly spent in improving the line and in making preparations for
a coming attack. Accordingly the artillery and the troops in the front
trenches were kept fairly busy, while the enemy trench mortars caused
a good deal of fresh damage and hindered the parties working at night.
The Divisional Signal Company was largely occupied in an attempt to
sort out a complex system of buried cables left by the VIIIth Corps
after the unsuccessful attack at the beginning of the month. Wire
cutting by shell-fire was carried out daily for the first four days
of August. On the 4th our trench mortars and Stokes guns and the 59th
Brigade machine guns co-operated with the artillery in a bombardment to
silence the enemy’s trench mortars. That evening, between 7 and 9.15
P.M., another bombardment was carried out in order to assist
the operations of the Ist Anzac Corps at Pozières. It had been intended
to make a smoke and gas attack on the front of the 61st Brigade, but
the wind was unfavourable, so all that could be done was to bring the
enemy’s trenches under rifle and machine-gun fire. The 61st Machine Gun
Company fired 14,000 rounds, forming a barrage behind the enemy’s line
between Beaumont Hamel and Serre. The enemy’s retaliation was slight at
the time, but at 11 P.M. he opened a heavy trench mortar fire.
On the 7th the 61st Brigade was relieved by the 74th Brigade of the
25th Division, and went into Divisional reserve about Coigneux. On the
same day the 38th Divisional Artillery was relieved by that of the
Guards, whose left group fired 1000 rounds on the German front line on
the 8th to assist the operations of the Fourth Army.
A good deal of preparation was made on the 13th to meet an expected
attack. The army operators at the listening sets overheard a
conversation between two German officers, which seemed to indicate that
a bombardment our lines, to be followed by a raid, had been arranged
to take place that night. The Germans actually shot tracing tapes
by rocket across “No man’s land,” exactly bounding the front of the
expected attack. Neither the bombardment nor the raid, however, came
off, the night as a matter of fact being particularly quiet.
On the 14th the 61st Brigade relieved the 60th, and that night made
a smoke barrage in conjunction with operations further south, while
artillery, machine-gun and rifle fire was opened along the whole
Divisional front, a barrage behind the enemy’s support line being made
by the 61st Machine Gun Company.
Two days later, on relief by the Guards, the Division went out of the
line, and after a few days in the district known as “A” area, with
headquarters at Beauval, moved towards the scene of the battle in which
it was to make its name. On the 22nd of August the 20th relieved the
24th Division in the sector north of the Guillemont-Montauban road. The
6th Divisional Artillery, which had been attached to the 20th Division
since the 17th, when it had replaced that of the Guards, moved also to
the new area. Divisional Headquarters was opened on the 23rd at Minden
Post, near Carnoy.
The 59th Brigade held with one battalion in the front line the right
sector from the Guillemont-Montauban road just west of Guillemont
village to the station, with Brigade Headquarters at the Briqueterie,
about half a mile south-east of Montauban. The 61st Brigade had a
battalion and a half in the front trenches, continuing the line to a
point just south of the south-east corner of Delville Wood. Brigade
Headquarters was north-east of Bernafay Wood. The 60th Brigade was in
reserve at the Craters, close to the Carnoy-Montauban road, about 1000
yards from Carnoy.
In order to appreciate the important part which the capture of
Guillemont played in the general scheme, we will review briefly the
course of the fighting up to this date. The original British line
enclosed Maricourt on the east and north, running thence westward as
far as Fricourt, which was in the hands of the enemy. It then turned
rather west of north, past La Boisselle, Thiepval and Beaumont Hamel,
all of which formed part of the German front line defences. Between the
British right flank and the Somme the fighting was carried on by the
French. The attack of the 1st of July gave us Montauban, Mametz, and
a sharp salient each side of La Boisselle. These gains were increased
in the fighting of the next fortnight to include Fricourt, Mametz
Wood, Contalmaison, Ovillers-la-Boisselle and all ground between these
places. On the left flank the German defences on the high ground south
of Thiepval held out for many weeks. A second attack just before dawn
on the 14th of July yielded very important results; a footing was
gained on the great ridge which extends between Combles and Thiepval,
and part of the enemy’s second defensive system was broken.
Sir Douglas Haig in his despatch[2] divides the battle of the Somme
into three phases. In the first, which ended with this advance on
the 14th-18th of July, the success of the attacks evidently came
as a surprise to the enemy, who must have considered his defences
practically impregnable. The second phase was a severe struggle for the
possession of the main ridge, ending with the capture of Guillemont
and Ginchy on the 3rd and 9th of September respectively. By this time
the enemy had begun to bring strong reinforcements on to the scene,
so that on the 18th of July, at the close of the first phase, his 62
battalions had been increased to 138, and by the end of August, when
the 20th Division came into the fighting, his original 6 divisions on
the front of attack had been reinforced by 30 divisions more.[3] The
third phase was the exploitation of the success.
The line gained by the 18th of July, at the close of the first
phase, included Trônes Wood, Delville Wood, and Longueval; it then
turned to the west, passing on the north side of Bazentin-le-Grand
and Bazentin-le-Petit to join our original trenches near
Ovillers-le-Boisselle. This left a dangerously sharp salient about
Longueval and Delville Wood, overlooked by the enemy all round from
the south-east to the north-west. Behind this salient ran the French
communications as well as our own, and many guns and much ammunition
had here to be crowded into a confined space. It was evident that the
enemy might well cause us heavy loss by bringing concentrated artillery
fire to bear on this area, while if he could drive in the salient he
would get direct observation over the ground behind. Indeed, in a heavy
counter attack on the 18th he succeeded in regaining part of Delville
Wood and penetrated into the northern half of Longueval, maintaining
these gains until on the 27th and 29th he was once more driven back.
It became particularly important, therefore, in this struggle for the
ridge, to straighten out the line by the capture of Guillemont and
Leuze Wood, so bringing the right flank of the attack into line with
the centre.
With this end in view, while a further advance was being made in the
north towards High Wood and Pozières, several attacks were made on
Guillemont. The first, on the 23rd of July, failed. On the 30th of
July, and again on the 8th of August, our troops entered the village
but were unable to hold it. Lastly, on the 16th and 18th of August,
attacks planned on a more comprehensive scale advanced the line to
Guillemont station and to within a few hundred yards of the outskirts
of the village, which, however, still remained in German hands.[4]
From this it will be seen that the capture of Guillemont--the task
which the Division had been ordered to carry out--was no easy matter.
The attack was to form part of a larger operation carried out by the
whole Fourth Army, in conjunction with the French on the right. It
was originally intended that the attack should be made on the 24th
of August. Before it could be launched a good deal of work had to
be done. The trenches, which had been much damaged in the recent
fighting, had to be repaired, and a new line had to be dug to serve
as departure trenches for the assaulting troops. The night of the
23rd/24th was spent in digging this new line; the work, however, was
so much interrupted by the enemy that not much progress could be made.
About 9.15 P.M. a heavy bombardment was opened all along the
front and support lines, followed at 10.30 by an advance against the
11th K.R.R.C., who were holding the front line of the 59th Brigade. The
enemy was easily driven back by rifle and machine-gun fire, but the
trenches were rather badly damaged by the bombardment, which caused
about 150 casualties in the battalion attacked. By 11.30 all was
quiet, and work was continued. At 12.30 A.M., however, the
shelling broke out again, effectually stopping all further work for
the night. XIVth Corps therefore ordered the attack to be postponed,
confining the activities on the Divisional front to a modified
artillery programme in support of operations which were carried out by
the divisions on the right and left. On the evening of the 24th, after
another heavy bombardment, the enemy attacked between the Quarries, on
the west edge of the village, and the railway, but was again driven
off, chiefly by machine-gun fire.
On the 25th and 26th the Division side-slipped to the right, the new
front extending from 500 yards south of the Montauban-Guillemont road
to 450 yards north-west of the village. On the 27th the 60th Brigade
relieved the 61st in the left sub-sector. On the eve of this relief a
direct hit on the headquarters of the 12th R.B., when a conference was
taking place, unfortunately wounded five officers.
Meanwhile preparations for the attack were being pushed forward.
Unfortunately, just at this time bad weather set in, and this, with
the continued and heavy hostile shelling, in which gas shells were
largely used, made the work extremely difficult. The trenches were
deep in mud and water, and were constantly being blown in; some of
the communication trenches were impassable, and all were in a very
bad condition, so that it became a most difficult matter to bring
up rations and ammunition and to effect reliefs in the front line.
The state of the Carnoy-Montauban road was such that at one time,
on the 29th, thirty-seven vehicles broke down and stuck in the mud.
In addition to this, on the 25th the 11th R.B. lost about fifty men
including their commanding officer, Lieut.-Colonel Harington, when the
enemy attempted, without success, to enter their trenches, and the 12th
K.R.R.C. had to repulse an attack which was made during a thunderstorm
on the evening of the 29th against the right of the 60th Brigade line.
After the thunderstorm, during which two of our observation balloons
were struck by lightning and brought down, the trenches were in a worse
state than ever. Moreover both No Man’s Land and the ground behind the
trenches were covered with dead bodies which had been lying out for
weeks, and the state of the whole line was foul. The men, too, were
given little rest; on the night of the 28th/29th all available men of
all three brigades were working in the forward area.
These very severe conditions told on the health of the troops, who were
becoming so exhausted that it seemed doubtful whether they would be fit
for the severe fighting which the capture of Guillemont would probably
involve. Brig.-General Shute was asked whether, in view of the weakness
of his units and the great strain to which the men had been put, he
thought his brigade could take part in the attack. All ranks were keen
to go through with the job which they had been sent to do, and it was
decided that the operations could be carried out if the whole brigade
might first go for a day or two right out of the line to rest. This was
granted. The attack, after being postponed to the 29th, and again to
the 30th, owing to the weather and the state of the ground, had been
finally put off to the 3rd of September. The 10th R.B. and the 10th
K.R.R.C. had been relieved on the 29th by the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and the
7th D.C.L.I., and on the 31st the rest of the 59th Brigade was relieved
by the rest of the 61st in daylight and under a heavy gas bombardment.
The 59th marched back tired out, having lost just 600 casualties, not
counting sick, in the nine days it had held this line.
The 60th Brigade had suffered so severely, and the strength of the
units had been so seriously reduced, that on the 1st of September the
Corps Commander decided that the 47th Brigade of the 16th Division
should be used in the attack on Guillemont and that the 60th Brigade
should be withdrawn into reserve. The relief was accordingly carried
out that night. Passing through Montauban battalions again came under
heavy shelling. Brig.-General Butler handed over his complete plans
for the battle to the Brigadier-General commanding the 47th Brigade,
and sent up his staff captain and signal officer to assist him. It
was a great disappointment to Brig.-General Butler and the 60th
Brigade to be taken out of the attack after all the work done and the
hardships suffered in preparation for it, but the strongest battalion,
the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I., did not number more than 550 rifles,
and the remaining three battalions together totalled only 1000. The
6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. were then attached as a fifth battalion to
the 59th Brigade. All this involved a modification of the original
operation orders, though the main features of the scheme remained the
same, and new orders were issued on the 2nd of September. In spite of
these changes such a short time before the attack, all the necessary
arrangements were made and worked well during the battle.
[Illustration: GUILLEMONT STATION]
Before describing the course of the battle it may be well to notice
the lie of the ground and certain points that had an important effect
on the operations. The enemy’s line ran a little to the west and
north-west of Guillemont, which being part of his original second line
of defence, though by this time reduced to a mass of ruins, was very
strongly fortified. The village lay on high ground, but in a slight
depression which is really the head of a long valley running up from
the west. To the north, high ground extends for 3000 yards, with the
village of Ginchy at the highest point; to the south, after forming
a ridge from 400 to 1000 yards across, the ground fulls sharply in a
series of irregular spurs and re-entrants towards the Somme. The most
important of these re-entrants is a narrow valley which runs from
Wedge Wood towards the north-east, merging just west of Leuze Wood
into the high ground which extends east of Ginchy, and, except for the
depression made by the upper end of this valley, east of Guillemont.
Further east again the ground falls to the valley north of Combles.
About 600 yards south-east of Wedge Wood is Falfemont Farm; 400
yards south-west of Guillemont are the remains of a small triangular
plantation known as Arrow Head Copse, situated on the top of the ridge
and overlooking the village. Running more or less south from the
south-west corner of Guillemont are two sunken roads, which gave more
trouble and cost more casualties than any other obstacle encountered
both in this battle and in the previous attempts to take the village.
The Quarries, on the west edge of the village, had been well fortified
and formed a very strong point. It only remains to take note of two
roads, one leading from Wedge Wood to Ginchy, and the other, known as
Mount Street, running east and west through Guillemont to the north
corner of Leuze Wood.
The Divisional boundaries and the front line are shown in Sketch “B.”
The boundary between the brigades was Mount Street.
The essence of Major-General Douglas Smith’s plan was to attack
Guillemont from the north side as well as from the west and on the
south.
To carry out this plan it was essential to dig assembly trenches north
of Guillemont station. These were completed in time, thanks mainly to
the untiring efforts of the 11th D.L.I. and the R.E.
Acting on the plan designed by Major-General Douglas Smith,
Brig.-General Shute decided to put only a weak force on his left, and
to dispose his greatest strength on the right flank, so as to encircle
the village. His operation orders were a model of lucidity.
The first objective may be taken as the west and north sides of
Guillemont; it included the eastern sunken road, the Quarries, and a
road bounding the north of the village. The advance to this objective
was to be made at noon.
The second objective, to be attacked at 12.50, was formed by a road
passing through the eastern outskirts of the village and branching off
from the north-east corner of it towards Ginchy.
The third objective was the Ginchy--Wedge Wood road, the attack on
which was to be made at 2 P.M.
The fourth and final objective was a line running from the western
corner of Leuze Wood, north-west towards Ginchy, as far as the railway.
On the right of the 20th the 5th Division was to advance against
Falfemont Farm and Leuze Wood; on the left the 7th Division was to
capture Ginchy.
During the night of the 2nd/3rd of September the 59th Brigade, with
the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I., returned to its position in the
line, and the troops of both the attacking brigades took up their
battle positions. There was luckily very little shelling during this
night--none with gas shells--and units were able to complete their
assembly before dawn. The enemy seemed unaware of the concentration
that was being carried out against him. This was largely due to the
splendid work of our aeroplanes. The last two days had been warm and
sunny, and a complete rest and plenty of good food had restored the men
wonderfully. They showed remarkable keenness as they went back to the
line.
The following was the disposition of the troops on the morning of the
3rd of September:
_Right Attack._
59th Brigade (Brig.-General C. D. Shute), with headquarters at the
Briqueterie, south of Bernafay Wood.
Front line, from right to left, 11th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel A. E.
Cotton), 10th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel W. V. L. Prescott-Westcar), 10th
K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel C. A. Blacklock), plus one company of the 11th
K.R.R.C.
In support, 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel E. D. White).
In reserve, 11th K.R.R.C. (Major F. L. V. Swaine) (less one company),
in trenches just south-east of Trônes Wood.
The 96th Field Company R.E. (Major P. F. Storey) was divided, one
section being placed at each end of the front line, and the remaining
half company, with a company of the 11th D.L.I., being south of Trônes
Wood.
_Left Attack._
47th Brigade (Brig.-General C. E. Pereira), with headquarters near the
north-east corner of Bernafay Wood.
Front line, from right to left, 6th Connaught Rangers, facing east
opposite the Quarries; 7th Leinsters, facing south-east.
In support, 8th Munster Fusiliers.
In reserve, 6th Royal Irish, just east of the northern half of Trônes
Wood.
The 83rd Field Company R.E. (Captain J. A. C. Pennycuick) and one
company of the 11th D.L.I., attached to the 47th Brigade, were west of
Trônes Wood.
_Supports to Right and Left Attacks._
Two battalions of the 61st Brigade were placed at the disposal
of the attacking brigades, the 7th Somerset L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel
C. J. Troyte-Bullock) supporting the 59th, and the 12th King’s
(Lieut.-Colonel A. N. Vince) supporting the 47th.
_Divisional Reserve._
The 61st Brigade (Brig.-General W. E. Banbury), less the two battalions
supporting the attack, was in Divisional reserve, with headquarters in
Bernafay Wood close to the west edge. The two remaining battalions of
the brigade--the 7th D.C.L.I. (Major R. Mander) and the 7th K.O.Y.L.I.
(Lieut.-Colonel B. B. Robinson)--were moving forward from the craters
near Carnoy with a view to occupying the trenches vacated by the 7th
Somersets and 12th King’s as soon as these units should advance.
Near the 61st Brigade headquarters, but outside the wood, were the 84th
Field Company R.E. (Major M. A. H. Scott) and the 11th D.L.I. (Major G.
Hayes), less the two companies attached to the 59th and 47th Brigades.
The 60th Brigade (Brig.-General the Hon. L. Butler), less the 6th
Oxford and Bucks L.I., was at the craters.
_Artillery._
The attack was covered by the fire of the artillery of the 6th and
24th Divisions, under Brig.-General L. M. Philpotts, C.R.A., 24th
Division, and of the Corps heavy artillery allotted for the purpose.
Brig.-General Philpotts and his brigade-major were both unfortunately
killed on the following day whilst visiting Guillemont.
The strength of the brigades in actual number of rifles at the
beginning of the day was as follows:
47th Infantry Brigade 2400
59th „ „ plus 6th Oxford and
Bucks L.I. 2300
60th „ „ less 6th Oxford and
Bucks L.I. 1000
61st „ „ 2253
----
Total 7953
The operations began at 6 A.M. on the 3rd with a deliberate
bombardment of certain selected areas. A “Chinese attack” was made at
8.15 A.M., when all batteries delivered a burst of rapid fire
on the enemy’s lines. At 8.30 the whole of the 6th and 24th Divisional
Artilleries concentrated an intense fire on an area on the north-east
of Guillemont known as the “trap” area, which had purposely not been
shelled before, while the howitzers opened with gas shell.
At 9 A.M. the 5th Division began to advance towards Falfemont
Farm. This attack was at first only partially successful, but
indirectly it was very useful in diverting the enemy’s attention from
Guillemont.
Zero hour for the 20th Division was noon. Just before this, liquid fire
was projected and a “push pipe” mine was exploded with the object of
destroying a German machine-gun emplacement in the line of the first
sunken road opposite Arrow Head Copse--a formidable obstacle which had
held up former attacks on this flank. The mine had evidently struck
a stone in being run out and had turned back. The explosion made a
shallow trench about 120 feet long, leaving intact the machine-gun
emplacement, which was, however, destroyed by the guns and which gave
no trouble in the advance.
At zero the artillery fire became intense. Half the field artillery
guns were used for stationary barrages and half for creeping barrages.
At the beginning of the advance towards each objective the procedure
was the same; a stationary barrage was put down and a creeping barrage
moved forward in front of the assaulting infantry at the rate of fifty
yards per minute. The stationary barrage lifted at certain stated
times, or whenever the creeping barrage came up to it.
At zero, too, the infantry advanced close under the creeping barrage.
The first objective was quickly reached. On the right strong opposition
was met at the first sunken road by the 11th and 10th R.B., who lost
a good many men at this point. The 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. now came
up, and passing through the two Rifle Brigade battalions carried on
the assault to the second sunken road, which was the first objective
on this flank. They, too, suffered a good many casualties, the
three leading companies losing all their officers and their company
sergeant-majors before the second road was reached. On the left the
47th Brigade moved forward rapidly, reaching the German lines at one
point just as the enemy was manning his parapet and mounting a machine
gun. Here the enemy was completely surprised and surrendered freely.
In their impetuous advance the Connaught Rangers on the right passed
the Quarries without completely clearing them, and the left flank of
the 10th K.R.R.C., attacking on the left of the 59th Brigade, was
placed for a time in a difficult position. Lieut.-Colonel Blacklock,
commanding this battalion, at once grasped the situation, and by
detaching his reserve company and a platoon from one of the companies
in the line to clean up the Quarries averted what might have been a
very awkward state of affairs. Later he was awarded a bar to his D.S.O.
for this action.
Both brigades had occupied the first objective by 12.30 P.M.,
at which time the situation was as follows. On the right the 6th Oxford
and Bucks L.I. and the 10th K.R.R.C. held the second sunken road and
the west side of the village as far as Mount Street, with the 10th and
11th R.B. in rear. On the left the 6th Counnaughts and 7th Leinsters
held the rest of the western and the northern sides of the village,
supported by the 8th Munsters, while the 6th Royal Irish were moving up
from Trônes Wood. The 7th Somerset L.I. had reached the first sunken
road after losing a good many men in passing through the enemy barrage
at Arrow Head Copse; the 12th King’s, moving forward under severe shell
fire, had entered the northern part of Trônes Wood; the 7th K.O.Y.L.I.
and the 7th D.C.L.I. were marching up from their billets, the leading
companies of the former being east of Bernafay Wood. An officer who saw
the battalions of the 61st Brigade stated that they advanced through a
very heavy barrage in perfect order as if on parade.
The attack on the second objective in the 59th Brigade sector was
carried out by the 11th R.B., the 10th R.B., and one company of the
10th K.R.R.C., supported by the Oxfords and the 10th K.R.R.C., with the
11th K.R.R.C. in reserve. On the left the Munster Fusiliers moved to
the assault, leaving the Leinsters and Connaughts to consolidate the
positions won. The advance was timed to begin at 12.50 P.M.,
and very soon afterwards reports that the troops had reached their
allotted positions began to come in. It seems clear that the whole of
the second objective had been captured by 1.30 P.M. There was
a good deal of hand-to-hand fighting in Guillemont itself and in the
orchards on the south side of it, where the supporting battalions were
engaged in clearing up and consolidating the village.
At 2 P.M. the whole line went forward up to the Ginchy--Wedge
Wood road, which the 59th Brigade reached without heavy casualties in
spite of many small parties of the enemy who were found in dug-outs
along the road and at the cemetery east of the village and were made
prisoners. On the left the Royal Irish passed to the attack through the
other battalions of the brigade. They were joined by the Munsters, and
these two battalions having got forward under a hot fire to within 70
yards of the road, rushed the position, where they captured a machine
gun and more than 100 prisoners.
As soon as this line had been reached it became clear to the commanders
in the front line of the 59th Brigade that for the time being no
further advance could be made. The 5th Division should by this time
have got forward to the line of Leuze Wood, and was reported to have
done so. Many of the enemy could, however, be seen both in the wood
itself and on the spur south-west of it on the right of the 20th
Divisional line. Lieut. H. R. Hill, 7th Somerset L.I., received the
M.C. for a valuable reconnaisance he made at this time into Leuze
Wood, which he found strongly held. Lieut.-Colonel White, Oxford and
Bucks L.I., who had been placed in command of the front line troops
of the 59th Brigade, decided not to attack the fourth objective, but
only to send forward patrols towards it until the right flank was more
secure. About 2.20 P.M. XIVth Corps reported that Ginchy
had been occupied by the 7th Division, and at the same time ordered
Major-General Douglas Smith to co-operate with the 5th Division in
clearing the trench running from the south-east corner of Guillemont to
Falfemont Farm by bombing down it from the north, For this purpose an
additional battalion of the 61st Brigade--the 7th D.C.L.I.--was put at
Brig.-General Shute’s disposal, to be used in case of necessity. At 3
P.M. the left brigade of the 5th Division was reported in the
trench running north-west from Wedge Wood, while the right brigade was
about to attack the line Wedge Wood-Falfemont Farm. Brig.-General Shute
had not by 3.45 P.M. gained touch with the 5th Division, so
he prolonged his line to the right for some 300 yards with the Oxford
and Bucks L.I., and brought up the 7th D.C.L.I. to form a defensive
flank to the south-east. To the left of the Oxfords the line was held
by the 11th R.B., one company of the 10th K.R.R.C., the 10th R.B.,
and a portion of the 96th Field Company R.E., while the 10th and 11th
K.R.R.C. were consolidating the position in Guillemont.
On the front of the 47th Brigade the Royal Irish held the Ginchy--Wedge
Wood road to the north of Mount Street, with the Munsters on their
left, forming a defensive flank towards Ginchy, The sharp fighting
among the ruins of Guillemont had caused a certain amount of confusion.
“B” Company of the 7th Somerset L.I., under Capt. Mitchell, M.C.,
was therefore detached to reinforce the right of the 47th Brigade,
and arrived just in time to beat off a counter attack with rifle and
bayonet. Two companies of the King’s who had reached Guillemont station
were ordered up to support the Connaught Rangers on the north of the
village, but by 3.45 P.M., although they had arrived at this
position, they had not got into touch with the Connaughts.
The rest of the 96th Field Company and the company of the 11th D.L.I.
with the right attack had reached Arrow Head Copse. Of the 83rd Field
Company and the company of 11th D.L.I. with the left attack, half were
assisting the Connaughts to consolidate the position in Guillemont,
while half were still west of Trônes Wood.
By 3.50 P.M. the 47th Brigade reported that the Munsters had
been ordered to advance and take the fourth objective. Guillemont was
being heavily shelled at this time, but the Connaughts and Leinsters
were in the village, and the 12th King’s, who had reached our original
front line, had sent two companies forward to support the Connaughts.
The left flank, therefore, seemed fairly secure. Casualties in the 59th
Brigade had latterly been heavy, but touch had been gained with the 5th
Division, and orders had been sent out for the final advance. Meanwhile
the Ginchy--Wedge Wood road was being consolidated. Major-General
Douglas Smith had therefore every hope that the fourth objective would
be taken.
Then the outlook was completely changed by two events, reports of
which reached Divisional Headquarters within a quarter of an hour of
each other. At 5.15 P.M. the 47th Brigade stated that the 7th
Division had been driven out of Ginchy. This was confirmed at 5.30
P.M., when the further news arrived that the 5th Division had
not succeeded in advancing to its objective--the edge of Leuze Wood;
in fact, parties of the enemy could be seen on the spur south-west
of the wood and on the right of the 59th Brigade, where, moving on
the exposed slope, they formed excellent targets to our troops across
the valley. The enemy also had machine guns on this spur, but their
fire was kept down most successfully by a section of the 61st M.G.
Company, under Lieut. Pavier. Immediately on hearing of the repulse
of the 7th Division, Major-General Douglas Smith asked for a barrage
on the left flank; the prompt response of the artillery prevented any
counter attack developing before a proper defence could be organised.
He also ordered the 60th Brigade to move up to the west of Trônes Wood.
When he learned of the situation on the right, he saw that with both
flanks in the air the position was too precarious to admit of a further
advance. He ordered the B.G.C. 59th Brigade, who had already cancelled
the orders for the attack, to consolidate the Ginchy--Wedge Wood road,
pushing out patrols towards the fourth objective, and requested the
Corps heavy artillery to fire on the Ginchy-Leuze Wood road. The 7th
D.C.L.I. having been drawn into the battle with the 59th Brigade, he
placed at Brig.-General Pereira’s disposal the last battalion of the
61st Brigade, the 7th K.O.Y.L.I.
The situation on the left flank was, as a matter of fact, critical,
and was saved by the prompt action of an officer of the 12th King’s,
Captain C. D. R. Cleminson, who had been sent up with the two companies
of his battalion to reinforce the Connaught Rangers. When he had
reached the north of Guillemont he was joined by about sixty men of
the 7th Division, who stated that they had been driven out of Ginchy.
Realising the danger to the left flank, Captain Cleminson on his own
initiative advanced towards Ginchy and dug in on a defensive line
facing the village. In response to a message purporting to come from
the Royal Irish he sent forward a platoon to Ginchy Wood, on the
south-west side of Ginchy. During the advance to his point the platoon
commander and many men were killed. Sgt. Jones, the platoon sergeant,
took command, got his platoon and the Lewis gun into position, and
reported to Captain Cleminson that no trace of the Royal Irish could be
found. He then returned to the platoon, and held out in this isolated
position, without food or water, for two days and two nights. On the
second day, owing to his coolness and resource, his platoon drove back
three counter attacks with heavy loss. On the morning of the 5th he was
relieved. For this magnificent deed he was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Captain Cleminson was reinforced by another company of his battalion,
and collected parties of stragglers from the 7th Division. With these
troops he organised a strong defensive flank. He gained touch at
9 P.M. with a party of the Royal Irish on his right, and
maintained this position until, on the 5th, he too was relieved. For
his gallant action he was awarded the D.S.O.
From 5.30 P.M. onwards the Germans made repeated counter
attacks against the left of the line; all failed. Their efforts
gradually became less vigorous, until they were finally driven off
about 8.30 P.M. During these attacks two companies of the
Somerset L.I. were sent to the assistance of the 47th Brigade, making
the left flank practically secure.
When, at 8.10 P.M., the Divisional Commander learned that the
7th Division troops were back in their trenches, he decided to use
the 60th Brigade to relieve the 47th, which had suffered very heavy
casualties. During the night the 12th R.B. (Lieut.-Colonel H. L. Riley)
and the 12th K.R.R.C. (Lieut.-Colonel A. I. Paine) took over the right
of the 47th Brigade line, relieving the Royal Irish and the Munsters,
who went back to their original positions in Bernafay Wood and at
Carnoy. He also ordered the 48th Brigade, which had been put at his
disposal some two hours earlier, to move to the Craters; later, in view
of possible counter attacks, he ordered this brigade further forward,
the two leading battalions to be about Bernafay Wood by 6 A.M.
on the 4th.
During the night the 96th and 83rd Field Companies R.E., the two
companies of the 11th D.L.I. with them, and the 7th D.C.L.I., were
employed in Guillemont consolidating the village. The 84th Field
Company and the 11th D.L.I. (less two companies) were wiring the front
line and improving the communications back to Guillemont.
The 6th K.S.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Wood)--the last battalion of the
60th Brigade--were approaching the village at 2 A.M.
Orders for the operations to be carried out on the 4th arrived early
that morning. The 20th was to co-operate with the 5th and 7th Divisions
in the afternoon, by sending out strong patrols to establish themselves
on the line of the fourth objective. The troops of the 59th Brigade
were by this time becoming very exhausted. As it was evident that
the brigade could not be relieved by fresh troops for some time,
Major-General Douglas Smith sent up the remainder of the 11th D.L.I.
at 10.50 A.M. to take the place of the units which were most
tired out. By 11 A.M. the K.O.Y.L.I. had reached the front
line of the 47th Brigade. At this time troops of the 7th Division were
reported to have entered Ginchy, but an hour and a half later they were
driven out once more. An attempt by the enemy to work round the left
flank was defeated by the 12th King’s.
Owing to the state of the trenches and to casualties among the runners,
the orders for the operation did not reach battalions until after
6.30 P.M.--the hour at which it was due to begin. At 7.30,
however, the patrols went forward under an intense creeping barrage
and established themselves along the whole of the fourth objective. At
the same time the 5th Division captured Falfemont Farm and pushed out
strong patrols to Leuze Wood. The task assigned to the 20th Division
was now accomplished, and with the 5th Division in line along the edge
of Leuze Wood its right flank was safe. To complete the operations, it
remained to capture Ginchy. This was carried out by the 16th Division
on the 9th, when the crest of the whole ridge, from a thousand yards
west of Combles to a thousand yards south of Thiepval, passed into
British hands.
During the 4th of September the Divisional Commander had ordered the
47th and 60th Brigades to be relieved by the 48th, and the 59th by the
last brigade of the 16th Division, the 49th, which had been placed at
his disposal that afternoon. These changes were to be effected during
the night of the 4th/5th, but owing to messengers being killed and
guides losing their way, they could not be completed that night. The
remaining units of the 47th Brigade were out of the line by 2 A.M. on
the 5th. At 9.30 A.M., as soon as the 59th Brigade had been relieved,
Major-General Douglas Smith handed over the sector to the G.O.C. 16th
Division, and moved his headquarters to Forked Tree Camp. He left in
the line, under the 16th Division, the 60th Brigade, the 7th Somerset
L.I. and the 11th D.L.I. These troops rejoined their division on the
7th.
The casualties in the 20th Division during the battle were as follows:--
_Officers._ _Other Ranks._
59th Infantry Brigade 30 935 = 965
60th „ „ 20 402 = 422
61st „ „ 16 418 = 434
R.E. 2 50 = 52
D.L.I. 4 87 = 91
R.A.M.C. 1 8 = 9
-- ---- ----
73 1900 = 1973
These casualties, of course, threw a great deal of work on to the
R.A.M.C., who carried out their duties very gallantly in spite of
great difficulties. The conditions of this battle necessitated certain
changes in the normal arrangements. The casualties in the Somme area
were far greater than any with which the field ambulances had hitherto
had to deal. The roads were so bad that cars could not get anywhere
near the line, and wounded had to be carried a long distance over most
difficult country, while the concentration of troops left few dug-outs
for wounded or for R.A.M.C. personnel. The arrangements made were
these. The personnel of all three field ambulances was pooled. Thus all
the bearers were concentrated under one command at the bearer camp at
Bronfay Farm, about a mile south-west of Carnoy. Advanced bearer posts
were established at the Briqueterie near Montauban and at Bernafay
Wood; further forward still were posts at Waterlot Farm and in a trench
east of Trônes Wood, and between these were relay posts. The medical
officers of units had squads for the carrying of wounded at their
regimental aid posts. There was a loading post at Montauban, which was
as far forward as the wagons could go, so that all stretcher cases had
to be carried back to there--sometimes as much as 5000 yards. The task
of the stretcher-bearers was indeed an appalling one. The magnificent
way in which they carried out their duties will always be remembered.
From horsed ambulance wagons all cases had to be changed into light
motor ambulances before they could reach a road on which the large
motor ambulances could travel.
Signal communication throughout the battle was good, due to the
excellent system devised by Major F. J. M. Stratton, commanding the
20th Divisional Signal Company R.E.
Division was in touch with brigades by telephone practically without
a break. Forward of brigades, lines were laid as far as the original
front line, with runner posts and linesmen stationed at intervals along
them. The line to the left was broken only once; that to the right
was broken several times, but was never out of action for more than
ten minutes. Forward of the old front line most messages came back by
runners; some were brought by pigeons, and a few were signalled to
aeroplanes. Arrangements were made for visual signalling, and both
brigades had wireless stations in touch with the Corps wireless at
Divisional headquarters.
The capture of Guillemont was a fine achievement, for which the
Commander-in-Chief, the Commanders of the Fourth Army and of the XIVth
Corps sent messages of congratulation to the Division.
The importance of this battle is well shown by the following extract
from a leading article in one of the London daily papers: “Guillemont
is a strongly fortified village near the end of the British line. It
was the most powerful of the German positions in the neighbourhood
of the Somme.... Two or three weeks ago the pessimists were wondering
whether Guillemont would be taken this year. It has passed into the
possession of Sir Douglas Haig so unobtrusively that few appear to
understand that the fall of Guillemont is the most important event
which has happened on the Somme for the last six weeks. Certainly the
Germans are under no delusions about this conspicuous success.”