THE SOMME (_Continued_)
_29th July to 13th October 1916_
Divisional Artillery in the Salient--Reorganisation into
six-gun Batteries--Move of Artillery to the Somme--Attack of
Division on “Blue Line” facing Morval and Lesbœufs, 16th to 18th
of September--Line near Gueudecourt--Attack on “Brown Line”
overlooking Le Transloy, 7th October.
(_Vide_ Map II.)
When the 20th Division moved out of the Ypres Salient in July 1916,
the artillery remained in the line covering the infantry of the 6th
Division. Soon afterwards the XIVth Corps went south, exchanging with
the VIIIth, and the remaining divisions which had composed the XIVth
Corps in the salient went with it, to reappear in the Hebuterne area on
their way to the Somme. Thus on the 24th the Guards handed over to the
4th Division, and on the 31st the infantry of the 6th was relieved by
the infantry of the 29th, on the front covered by the 20th Divisional
Artillery.
All through August the guns on both sides were very active. Almost
daily some part of our position in this sector was heavily shelled, and
our batteries were occupied in retaliation, and in bringing under fire
various points in and behind the German lines. On the 8th the enemy was
particularly aggressive, and shelled nearly all the battery positions.
That night, between 11 P.M. and midnight, he discharged gas
on the front of the 29th Division, which was unfortunate in having a
large number of casualties, though the 20th Divisional Artillery had
none.
On the 1st of September the Divisional Artillery, while still in the
line, was reorganised on the basis of six guns to each 18-pr. battery.
The three howitzer batteries (the fourth, it will be remembered,
had left the Division in August 1915) remained unaltered, with four
guns each. This involved many changes; one battery in each brigade
was broken up to provide the extra guns for those that remained;
several others were re-numbered, and the 90th Brigade, which had no
howitzer battery, disappeared. When the reorganisation was complete
the Divisional Artillery, under Brig.-General Hotham, was composed as
follows:--
91st Brigade
(Lt.-Col. F. A. Wilson D.S.O.).
A/91.
B/91.
C/91.
D/91.
92nd Brigade
(Lt.-Col. H. G. Ricardo).
A/92.
B/92.
C/92.
D/92.
93rd Brigade
(Lt-Col. A. H. D. West).
A/93.
B/93.
..
D/93.
On the 8th of September the 20th Divisional Artillery was relieved by
that of the 4th Division, and started on a six days’ march southwards
to the Somme. On the 13th it came again under the XIVth Corps, but it
was not to cover the front of its own infantry until the end of the
month.
After the operations at Guillemont the 20th Division went back for a
short period of rest, during which time our hold on the main ridge was
completed by the capture of Ginchy. We now enter upon the third phase
of the battle, in which the British troops pushed down the far side of
the ridge and also gained ground on the flanks of the attack. On the
15th of September and the following days an advance on the whole front
of the Fourth Army brought the line on the right to within assaulting
distance of Morval, Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt--the last of the enemy’s
original defensive systems--and on the left as far as High Wood,
Martinpuich and Courcelette. The attack was made by the XIVth Corps on
the right, the XVth in the centre and the IIIrd on the left, and was
the first occasion on which tanks came into action. In the XIVth Corps
the 56th Division was on the right, the 6th in the centre, the Guards
on the left, and the 20th in reserve.
The only unit of the 20th Division which fought on the first day of
the battle was the 91st Field Artillery Brigade. On the 13th, as
soon as the Divisional Artillery had come into the XIVth Corps area,
Brig.-General Hotham was ordered to send one brigade to reinforce
the 56th Divisional Artillery on the extreme right of the British
line. Next day, accordingly, while the 92nd and 93rd Brigades went
into camp in the Bois des Tailles, two miles south of Meaulte, the
91st Brigade, having marched already 35 miles, moved up ten miles
further to positions between Bois Favière and Trônes Wood, where by
3 A.M. on the 15th all batteries were dug in and ready to
open fire. By the time the teams had withdrawn to their wagon lines
they had covered well over 50 miles. This was a very fine performance,
reflecting the highest credit on the spirit of the men and the fitness
of the horses. During the battle that day the brigade put down a
defensive flank barrage on Combles to assist the attack of the 56th
Division west of the village.
The headquarters of the 20th Division was at Forked Tree Camp, two
miles south of Fricourt, and the 92nd and 93rd Field Artillery Brigades
remained in the Bois des Tailles.
The infantry of the 20th Division came into the fighting in the early
hours of the 16th, when the 60th and 61st Brigades, having been placed
under the orders of the G.O.C. Guards Division, moved forward, the
61st to the right of the Guards’ line opposite Lesbœufs, the 60th into
reserve at Waterlot Farm.
The three infantry brigades of the 20th Division had not yet received
reinforcements to replace the great losses of the Guillemont fight and
were in consequence very weak; the 59th Brigade could put only 900
rifles in the line, and the other two brigades only 1100 and 1200, but
they were still full of fight and confidence.
The first objective on this day was a “Blue Line” facing Morval
and Lesbœufs and about 1200 yards west of these places. The second
objective skirted Morval on the west and Lesbœufs on the east, ending
at the cross-roads half way between Lesbœufs and Gueudecourt.
The 61st Brigade, under Brig.-General Banbury, was to attack on the
right, the 3rd Guards Brigade on the left. On the left of the Guards
was the XVth Corps.
The 61st Brigade was not in touch with any attacking troops on its
right, as the 6th Division was still held up by the Quadrilateral--a
well-sited and stubbornly defended fortification three-quarters of a
mile east of Ginchy.
The 7th D.C.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel J. G. T. Simcox, D.S.O.) were detailed
to attack on the right of the line and the 7th Somerset L.I. (Major E.
L. Lyon) on the left.
In support were the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. (Lieut.-Colonel B. B. Robinson),
who had orders to watch particularly the exposed right flank. The 12th
King’s (Lieut.-Colonel Vince) formed the reserve.
Owing to the late hour at which orders were received on the 15th the
battalions of the 61st Brigade had not time to complete their assembly
before dawn on the 16th. As a result they had to face heavy and very
accurate machine-gun and minenwerfer fire, which caused many casualties
before the advance began.
The 7th Somerset L.I. lost Major Lyon and all senior officers at this
time. Second-Lieut T. G. Jenne commanded the battalion throughout the
operation and was awarded the M.C.
Zero was at 9.25 A.M., when the assaulting troops advanced to
within 70 yards of the barrage. As soon as the barrage lifted, they
attacked the position. The D.C.L.I., under Captain Macmillan, the
second in command, established themselves in the first objective, where
they captured 100 prisoners and 2 minenwerfer. They found, however,
that they were not in touch with the Somersets, though they met an
isolated company of this battalion. Due largely to the splendid efforts
of Lance-Cpl. R. V. E. Hill and Pte. C. Barrow, who both received the
M.M. for their gallant action on this day, the Somersets gained the
German line on a front of 150 yards, taking 50 prisoners and 2 machine
guns. They held their position while they dug another trench just to
the west of it; then having used all their own bombs and all that they
had captured from the enemy, they had to fall back to the new trench.
The time laid down for the advance to the second objective was 10
A.M., but Captain Macmillan, 7th D.C.L.I., seeing that the
attack on the left was not progressing, decided not to attempt any
further advance. It appears that, owing to the late hour at which the
orders were received and to the difficulty of effecting the necessary
reliefs, the Guards were late in launching their attack, and then
meeting with strong opposition were unable to make much progress.
The Somersets came under very heavy machine-gun fire, from which they
suffered severely. As early as half-past ten they were reported to
have only two junior officers left. In spite of running short of bombs
and ammunition, they held on in the trench they had dug until they
were relieved at night. The D.C.L.I., meanwhile, with a gap between
them and the Somersets, were left with both flanks in the air. They
too had lost heavily, and all battalion bombers had been wiped out by
minenwerfer. The K.O.Y.L.I. came up and made their right flank secure,
and when a counter attack developed on their left they borrowed two
bombing sections from this battalion, and with their help drove the
enemy back. At 10.45 A.M. the 12th King’s went up to reinforce
the line under very heavy machine-gun fire from the front, right, and
right rear. About 6 P.M. the 84th Field Company R.E. came up
and constructed strong points on the flanks, and at dusk a platoon
of the K.O.Y.L.I. with a Lewis gun and a bombing section dug in,
with the assistance of a party of R.E. on the left of the D.C.L.I.
During the operations Lieut.-Colonel B. B. Robinson, commanding
the 7th K.O.Y.L.I., was wounded by a shell which hit the battalion
headquarters, killing or wounding all officers there. At night all
units of the brigade were relieved.
The casualties were heavy, but the brigade gained and held its
objective. It was a particularly fine performance, and Brig.-General
Banbury received high praise from the G.O.C. Guards Division for the
success of the attack. With both flanks exposed the 61st Brigade had
successfully stormed, under heavy artillery, rifle and machine-gun
fire, a strong German position, and in spite of numerous counter
attacks had succeeded in holding it until relieved.
Captain Macmillan, D.C.L.I., was awarded the D.S.O. for his gallant
leadership on this occasion.
On the night of the 16th/17th the 20th Division, less the 61st
Brigade, relieved the Guards in the left sector of the XIVth Corps
front, with the headquarters at Bernafay Wood. The 60th Brigade, under
Brig.-General Butler, took over the right of the line from the 61st,
which moved back into Corps reserve at Carnoy, leaving the 84th Field
Company at the disposal of the C.R.E.; the 59th, under Brig.-General
Shute, took over the left of the line from the 3rd Guards Brigade.
The Divisional reserve was formed by a brigade of the 5th Division at
Waterlot Farm. On the right of the 20th was the 6th Division, and on
the left the 21st Division of the XVth Corps. The front was covered by
the Guards and two brigades of the 6th Divisional Artillery.
The relief of the Guards by the 59th Brigade was most arduous. The
situation here was very obscure; the guides had great difficulty in
finding their way, and the enemy was shelling the area with gas. The
11th R.B., for example, had to march for a considerable distance in gas
masks, and took about five hours to get from Trônes Wood to the line.
The headquarters of these four battalions were in a ditch which the
enemy shelled continuously on the 17th, and on which he obtained many
direct hits.
During the day the enemy made several attempts to enter the trenches
of the 60th Brigade. A determined bombing attack launched at 1.30
P.M. against the 12th K.R.R.C. was driven back with great
loss after fighting lasting for an hour and a half. At the same time
an attack was made against the 6th K.S.L.I. A party rushed the bombing
post on the left of this battalion, while large numbers of men in
small groups tried to come across the open from Lesbœufs. The latter
were repulsed, and the N.C.O. in charge of the bombing post collected
his men, who by out-throwing the Germans drove them back. Several
other attempts were similarly defeated by the superior throwing of
our bombers. The artillery opened fire, and accounted for many of
the enemy. The casualties--due partly to these attacks and partly to
hostile shelling--amounted to 3 officers and 35 other ranks in the 12th
K.R.R.C., and 62 other ranks in the K.S.L.I.
On the same day three battalions of the 59th Brigade--the 11th R.B.,
the 10th R.B. and the 11th K.R.R.C.--were called upon to carry out
a most difficult operation. The objective was some 800 yards of the
Blue Line which still remained in the enemy’s hands. The battalions
from the first were placed at a serious disadvantage, as the trenches
they had taken over the night before ran almost at right angles to
the enemy’s line; they were, in fact, old communication trenches.
British troops were reported to be holding the Blue Line on each flank
of the objective, but it was not discovered until too late that this
information was incorrect. The brigade on the left of the 59th was
therefore unable to give the expected assistance by bombing down the
flank of the enemy’s line. Owing to the uncertainty of the situation
and the difficulty of communicating with the front line, the companies
did not receive their orders until a short time before the attack; one
company of the 11th R.B. did not take part in the operation, as all
runners sent to this company were hit before they could reach it.
Moreover, owing to the little time available for the preparation of
barrage tables and to the uncertainty of the ammunition supply, the
artillery could not give the necessary support.
These three battalions, then, on leaving their trenches had to swing
round on a forward slope. As soon as they showed themselves, the
enemy, obviously ready for the attack, put down an extremely quick and
accurate barrage, and met the assaulting line with a hail of bullets.
Although nearly all the most advanced troops became casualties, some
of the 11th K.R.R.C. fought their way forward to the objective, and
Captain O. R. Ord, with a few riflemen of the 10th R.B., reached the
enemy wire, where they were all killed in making a gallant attempt to
get through. Most of the troops, coming under overwhelming machine-gun
fire from the front and flanks, were unable to make much progress. In
the end all three battalions had to retire to their original line with
very heavy losses.
Captain Johnson, medical officer to the 10th R.B., was awarded the M.C.
for attending the wounded for many hours after he had been severely
wounded himself.
This attack resulted in the only failure sustained by the Division
during the battle of the Somme.
On the 18th the 6th Division made another attack on the Quadrilateral
and succeeded in breaking down the very determined resistance of the
defenders and in capturing the position. A patrol of the 12th R.B.
under Lieut. Breckon and 2nd Lieut. Ruddle was sent out to assist on
the left flank of the attack, and was most successful. About 300 yards
from the 12th R.B. trenches was the head of the valley which runs north
from Combles. Here the patrol cut off several parties of the enemy
as they retired from their trenches, and captured a machine gun and
26 prisoners (one party alone, under Cpl. Chitty, took 14 of them),
besides accounting for some 50 more who tried to get away down the
valley. One of the 12th R.B. bombing sections, which had been lent to
the 12th K.R.R.C., was at this time holding an advanced bombing post.
A man of this section, Rifleman Yates, went out by himself against a
party of Germans who had been seen collecting for a counter attack
behind a barricade in their trench. Bombing the Germans as he went he
inflicted considerable loss upon them and broke up the attack. In the
meantime a bombing attack had been made against the 6th K.S.L.I., and
had been defeated.
The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. were moved up in the early hours of the 19th to
the support of the 59th Brigade. They arrived at their position forty
minutes after dawn, having suffered 60 casualties in passing through a
very heavy barrage and in advancing across ground swept by machine-gun
fire. Here they remained till they were relieved on the 21st, having
lost 30 more men on the 20th from enemy shelling. The 12th King’s also
came up on the 19th to reinforce the 59th Brigade, and the 10th and
11th R.B. were withdrawn from the line.
Between the 17th and the 21st, when the Division was relieved, the
nights were largely spent in digging a new line of trenches. The
battalions of both brigades, the 84th Field Company R.E. and the 11th
D.L.I., were employed on this work, which was carried through in spite
of bad weather and a good deal of hostile fire.
Meanwhile the 92nd and 93rd Field Artillery Brigades had taken their
part in the operations. The 93rd moved to Guillemont on the 19th,
coming under the Guards Divisional Artillery, and the 92nd came into
action on the 20th in support of the 18th Infantry Brigade of the 6th
Division. The 91st Field Artillery Brigade remained with the 56th
Division, which was working towards Combles. All three brigades were
engaged in a general attack which was made on the 25th of September.
In this action Morval and Lesbœufs were taken; Combles was practically
surrounded, and was entered by British and French troops simultaneously
on the 26th, when Gueudecourt also fell. This success was then extended
to the left flank by the capture on the 27th of Thiepval.
After a few days’ rest in the neighbourhood of Treux the Division
again moved forward on the 26th into the line near Morval, only to be
relieved next day by the 2nd French Division, which took over that
part of the line in preparation for an attack on Sailly-Saillisel.
The 20th then took over from the 21st Division of the XVth Corps a
line extending from the cross-roads half-way between Gueudecourt and
Lesbœufs to a point 250 yards east of Gueudecourt.
All these constant changes of headquarters meant necessarily very
hard work for all the personnel of the Signal Service, made more
difficult by the continual rain and appalling mud. In spite of these
difficulties, communications were most successfully maintained
throughout this period.
The new sector was held for the first week by one brigade--the
61st--which went in on the night of the 29th/30th. The 60th Brigade was
in support near Trônes Wood, the 59th remaining at Carnoy in reserve,
and Divisional Headquarters returned to Bernafay Wood. Here also the
headquarters of the Divisional Artillery was established on the 29th,
when Brig.-General Hotham look command of the artillery covering
the 20th Division, composed of his own three brigades and certain
others which varied for the first few days, but which after the 4th of
October consisted of the Guards Divisional Artillery and the 24th Field
Artillery Brigade of the 6th Division.
The batteries were in a valley about 800 yards north-east of Delville
Wood, known from its map reference as Toc 7 Valley. It was a most
unpleasant place. Within a length of a mile all the guns of the whole
of the artillery covering the 20th Division were crowded together,
being in many places only ten yards apart. The gun-pits were very
rough at first, consisting of a sandbag parapet with a tarpaulin or
matting over the gun. The men lived in slits in the ground, with a
sheet of corrugated iron over the top and a great deal of water at the
bottom. The Germans knew well enough that our guns were concentrated
in this valley--the only place in the neighbourhood that gave any
flash cover--and shelled the positions continually. There was great
difficulty at this time in getting up ammunition, all of which had
to come by night over the exposed ridge east of Delville Wood. Owing
to wet weather and the many shell craters the ground was so bad that
it was impossible to get wagons up to the gun positions. After a few
days it was arranged that all ammunition should be brought up by pack;
and this became the regular way of supplying the guns as long as they
remained in this valley.
It will be seen from the map that the line which the Division held ran
north-west and south-east. It lay in low ground, facing a ridge beyond
which were the villages of Le Transloy and Beaulencourt. The object of
the operations which followed--the last fighting to be demanded of the
Division for some time--was to gain possession of the crest of this
ridge and bring under observation the country on its north-east side.
As a preparatory measure, advantage was taken of operations which were
being carried out on the left on the 1st of October to advance the line
of the 61st Brigade. It was desired to get a good jumping-off place
from which to assault the enemy’s position on the crest of the ridge,
and also to observe where his barrages were placed and where they might
be expected in the course of the attack. At 3.15 P.M. on the
1st of October the 7th Somerset L.I. on the right and the 7th D.C.L.I.
on the left pushed forward small parties at an interval of 150 yards
under an intense artillery barrage. They gained ground to an average
depth of 400 yards and established strong points within 200 yards of
the German trenches. While they were digging in on what was dead ground
from the enemy’s trench the Germans made several counter attacks. As
soon as they appeared over the top our men downed tools and drove them
back with rifle fire, “standing in the open.” After dark, and during
the next night, these strong points were connected by the 84th Field
Company R.E. and the 11th D.L.I. into a continuous line. The position
of the enemy’s barrage was observed, and this was of great assistance
in the attack on the 7th of October, when troops were kept away from
the dangerous areas and many casualties thereby saved. The whole
operation was carried out well and in a very determined manner, but not
without considerable loss.
On the night of the 3rd/4th the 60th Brigade came up into the line
and took over the right sub-sector from the 61st Brigade; the latter
continued to hold the left sub-sector, so that there were then two
brigades holding the Divisional front.
The attack was put off for two days--that is, until the 7th--owing to
a break in the weather. Between the 3rd and 6th the preparations were
completed. Further supplies of bombs and ammunition were brought up,
communications were improved, and assembly trenches dug with the help
of the R.E. field companies and the 11th D.L.I. Most of the troops
detailed to make the assault moved back for two days’ rest, but by the
7th all had taken up their places in readiness for the attack. The
60th Brigade was on the right, with the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. and
the 12th R.B. in the front line, the 12th K.R.R.C. in support, and
the 6th K.S.L.I. in reserve. The 61st Brigade was on the left, with
the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. (in touch with the 12th R.B.) and the 12th King’s
in front, each supported by two companies of the 7th Somerset L.I.
The 7th D.C.L.I. were in reserve. The 59th Brigade was in Divisional
reserve west of Trônes Wood. On the right of the 20th Division the 56th
Division, also belonging to the XIVth Corps, carried on the line, and
on the left the 12th Division of the XVth Corps. The strength of the
brigades was as follows:--
59th Brigade 2075
60th Brigade 2087
61st Brigade 2317
----
6479
The object of the operation was to establish a position on the top of
the ridge overlooking Le Transloy and Beaulencourt, which might serve
as a line of departure for a further advance against these places.
With this end in view the attack was made along the whole front of the
Fourth Army, the objective being a “Brown Line” which was taken to be
the crest of the ridge. For the 20th Division the first objective was
Rainbow Trench, on the near side of the crest; the second objective,
which included Cloudy Trench, was about 1200 yards of the Brown Line
facing the original Divisional front. The direction of the advance,
therefore, was north-east.
At 11.30 on the morning of the 7th a German aeroplane flew low over
the lines. In spite of the men lying quite still the observer probably
noticed the concentration of the troops, for the German guns, which had
been quiet up till then, opened a heavy fire on and behind the assembly
trenches, causing a certain number of casualties in the Oxford and
Bucks L.I.
The formation of the ground hid the opposing trenches from view--a
factor of great importance, for it made the task of cutting the enemy
wire a most difficult one for the artillery. The only point from which
a little wire could be seen was close behind our front trenches. The
F.O.O.’s and signallers had therefore to lay out and maintain very
long telephone wires over fire-swept ground, which owing to the heavy
rain of the last few days was little better than a morass. These
difficulties were nevertheless overcome and the wire cutting was
steadily carried out.
On the morning of the 7th patrols found that there was still wire in
front of the German lines, so the guns again opened fire on it.
At zero--1.45 P.M.--the stationary barrage was put down, and
at 1.47 it began to creep forward. In these two minutes three Stokes
mortars with the 60th Brigade (the fourth had just been buried by
a shell) fired 180 rounds on the German front line. The assaulting
battalions moved forward close under the barrage with two companies
in front and two in support, and with each company in two lines, thus
forming four waves. With the fourth wave of each battalion were four
machine guns from the 60th and 61st M.G. Companies.
The lending companies, advancing, according to a report from an officer
in an observation post, “as though on Salisbury Plain,” came under
heavy fire as soon as they reached the crest of the slope, which was
about twenty yards short of the enemy wire. Some of the wire was still
standing, at least on the front of the 60th Brigade, and for a short
time held up the first two waves. The casualties here were heavy. Of
the five company officers in the two leading companies of the 12th
R.B., four were killed between this point and the wire, and one was
severely wounded; of the rank and file about half were casualties. The
6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. suffered almost as much. Many of their losses
were caused by a machine gun in a sap close to the wire. The third and
fourth waves were following close behind, and as they came up they
carried the first and second waves with them and together they captured
Rainbow Trench. The 61st Brigade had less trouble with the enemy’s
wire, but suffered from very severe rifle and machine-gun fire from
the left flank, where a heavy barrage had prevented the 12th Division
from reaching its objective. As the troops came up to Rainbow Trench
the enemy surrendered in large numbers. At one point in the attack of
the 61st Brigade the two opposing lines were seen to meet; then there
was a moment’s pause, followed by the advance of our line and the
return of a large number of prisoners. On the left of this brigade
more resistance was met and a hand-to-hand fight ensued before the
Germans--or such of them as were able to get away--were driven out of
the position.
On the capture of the objective the first and second waves entered and
held the trench, while the third and fourth formed up beyond it ready
for the next advance.
When, at 2.5 P.M., the barrage again began to creep forward
the attack was continued in three waves, the third being composed of
the original first and second, less some machine guns and a few parties
of men left behind to form posts in Rainbow Trench. The losses in this
advance were comparatively slight, although the Germans, for the most
part, remained in the position throwing bombs until the attacking lines
were close upon them. Many of the enemy were killed at the second
objective, which was captured about 2.15 P.M. Cloudy Trench
was found to be little more than a line of disturbed earth, and all
along the line the troops had to dig themselves in.
At the time the second objective was occupied the position of the
flanks was a very dangerous one. The battalions in support had moved
forward as the attack progressed, and had kept in touch with the
leading units, but the divisions on the right and left had not captured
their objectives, and so both flanks were in the air and under enfilade
fire. Defensive flanks had therefore to be thrown back, leaving the
Division occupying a pronounced salient. The heavy casualties in
the Oxford and Bucks L.I. and the 12th R.B. have been mentioned; in
the 61st Brigade also the leading battalions had suffered severely,
especially in officers. The 12th King’s had only Capt. Milligan up in
the second objective; the front line of the K.O.Y.L.I. was commanded by
Lieut. Wright. Both these officers found their flank exposed, as there
was a gap of three to four hundred yards between the two brigades, and
they showed great initiative and judgment in siting their trenches and
organising their defences so as to deal with any counter attacks that
might develop. The situation on the left was especially difficult, as
the troops were under a perfect hail of machine-gun and rifle fire,
and casualties were becoming serious. The Somersets were called on
for assistance and sent up two platoons under Sgt. W. E. Parker to
strengthen the left flank, and a company to fill up the gap between the
two brigades.
The enemy made several counter attacks in the course of the day, but
all failed. Sgt. Parker was awarded the M.M. for his gallantry and good
leadership in beating off one of these attacks. At 4 P.M. a
company of the D.C.L.I. was sent as a further reinforcement to the left
flank, arriving just in time to help to drive back a counter attack
at this point. A working party of 200 men of the 11th R.B. came up to
finish a communication trench in the 61st Brigade area, and to act as
reinforcements if necessary. The 83rd and 84th Field Companies R.E.
and 200 men of the 6th K.S.L.I. assisted the front line troops to
consolidate their positions during the night; in spite of considerable
casualties from the enemy’s heavy shell-fire this work was successfully
completed. Behind the line a section of the 96th Field Company and
three companies of the 11th D.L.I. dug a communication trench for the
use of both brigades.
At 9 P.M. Brig.-General Banbury ordered Major Simcox, commanding the
7th D.C.L.I., to go forward with the rest of his battalion and take
over and reorganise the front line system.
The casualties were 626 in the 60th Brigade, 469 in the 61st and 17 in
the 59th. 192 prisoners, including five officers, and four machine guns
and two mortars were taken.
The casualties of the last month are evidence in themselves of
the enormous work thrown upon the R.A.M.C. and the regimental
stretcher-bearers. It is difficult to praise too highly the unselfish
and unobtrusive work of these men.
The state of the trenches and the conditions under which the battle was
fought made the task of supplying and replenishing the various wants of
the Division a most difficult one. Major J. M’Gown, the D.A.D.O.S., and
the supply officers nevertheless overcame all difficulties and earned
the deep gratitude of all ranks.
The 60th and 61st Brigades held the positions they had won on the 7th
until the night of the 8th/9th of October, when the 20th Division was
relieved by the 6th and moved back to the neighbourhood of Treux for a
well-earned rest.
Here on the 13th the Corps Commander, Lord Cavan, inspected each of the
three brigades in turn on a ceremonial parade, and addressed the troops.
“I have come here to-day,” he said, “to thank you from the bottom of
my heart for the magnificent work you have done for the Army and for
the Corps. The capture of Guillemont was chiefly due to you” (the
59th Brigade). He praised all brigades for the part they had taken in
the Somme battle, and referred to the vigorous action by which the
60th had assisted the 6th Division in its successful attack on the
Quadrilateral. After congratulating the 61st Brigade on the part it had
taken in the capture of Guillemont, he said: “The Brigade was attached
to the Guards Division from the 15th to the 17th of September and
attacked on the 16th, when it gained the whole of its objectives, in
spite of the fact that the units attacking on the two flanks were held
up.” “On October the 7th the Brigade attacked with the 60th Brigade
and once more gained the whole of its objectives.” He said how pleased
he was with the extremely smart and soldier-like manner in which the
troops had turned out on parade, and added: “I have asked the Army
Commander and the Commander-in-Chief not to take away the 20th Division
if they can help it, and they have promised to do their best. I would
not lose the 20th Division for crowns and crowns.”