THE YPRES SALIENT
_22nd January to 26 July 1916_
The left sector of the XIVth Corps front--German attacks on
the left of the line--Arrival of the Machine Gun Companies and
Medium Trench Mortar Batteries--Major-General Davies succeeded
by Major-General Douglas Smith--Attack on the 7th D.C.L.I.--The
Division in reserve--Reorganisation of the artillery--The sector
north of Hooge--Attack on the 7th Somerset L.I.--Attack on the
Canadians at Hooge--Gas attacks and raids by the Division--Move
south.
(_Vide_ Map I.)
Although the Division began its march north into the Ypres Salient on
the 22nd of January 1916, it was more than a fortnight before any of
the troops took over a part of the front line. Twelve days were spent
in the area round Cassel. During this time, in order to learn the
ground and the local conditions, parties of officers and N.C.O.’s were
attached for two or three days at a time to the 14th Division, which
was holding the left sector of the VIth Corps front, and which the 20th
was under orders to relieve. On the 3rd of February the Division moved
to the Reserve Area vacated by the 49th Division, with Headquarters
at Château Esquelbecque--an interesting old house built in 1606 and
occupied by General Grant with the 15th Hussars for two years after
the battle of Waterloo. Next day the VIth Corps handed over to the
newlyformed XIVth, which consisted at this time of the Guards, 6th and
20th Divisions.
The new line, held by two brigades with one in reserve, was the left
sector of the British front and ran on the north side of Ypres from
a point 1500 yards due north of St Jean to the canal bank about 1000
yards south-east of Boesinghe. On the right was the 6th Division and
on the left the French Thirty-sixth Corps. The difference between this
sector and the area about Laventie immediately became apparent from
the daily casualty lists. During the first month alone at Ypres the
Division suffered 1000 casualties, equal to the whole number sustained
during the five months at Laventie.
In order to make clear the operations that followed, it is necessary to
describe in some detail the trenches on this front. They were numbered
from the right, B 15 to 17, D 19 to 22, and E 23 (just south-east of
Krupp Farm) being in the area of the right brigade. The left brigade
trenches--those with which we are at first chiefly concerned--were E 24
to 29 and F 30 to 35. The ground between the canal and the German lines
was nothing but a quagmire. It was therefore impossible to construct
continuous front line trenches, and those that did exist had in many
places been blown in. These isolated sections of trench, separated from
each other by gaps which in places were 80 yards or more across, were
held by parties varying in strength from 8 or 10 men to a platoon. They
were narrow and shallow, the parapets low and rarely bullet-proof,
with very little wire in front of them. There was only a very small
parados in some places and hardly anywhere any revetment. There were
practically no dug-outs. Communication trenches were few and bad; they
were extremely difficult to drain and were constantly being demolished
by shell fire, so that rations, R.E. material, etc., had to be
brought up a long way from the dumps under very difficult conditions.
The Germans had constructed concrete blockhouses all along the front
at short intervals, and their position on the Pilckem ridge entirely
dominated the whole ground as far as Ypres, rendering any movement in
the front areas very difficult.
The 60th Brigade, under Brig.-General Roy, moved into these trenches
on the night of the 11th/12th of February, coming under the orders of
the G.O.C. 14th Division for the following day until the rest of the
20th had come up into the line and Major-General Davies had taken over
command. The 6th K.S.L.I. were on the right of the front line and the
12th R.B. on the left. The relief began about 9 P.M. and was
still in progress when the Germans opened a very heavy bombardment on
the left of the line where the 12th R.B. were taking over from the 9th
K.R.R.C. A bombing attack then developed against the two trenches F
34 and F 35 on the extreme left, accompanied by artillery and trench
mortar fire on the communication trenches leading to the canal bank.
The attack on F 34 came from the right, from the front and from the
left front, but failed. In F 35 the number of available bombs soon
ran out, owing to two bomb stores having been blown up by shells, and
great difficulty was experienced in getting up a further supply through
communication trenches knee-deep in mud. The Germans bombed their way
up the whole of the trench, at the end of which they were stopped by
rifle fire. Major H. L. Riley, commanding the 12th R.B., then asked the
12th K.R.R.C. for two bombing sections; with these in support Lieut.
Gribble, the bombing officer of the 12th R.B., counter-attacked, and
after half an hour recaptured the whole of F 35 as well as a German
bombing post. Lieut. Gribble, who received the M.C. for his action
on this day, was severely wounded while making a block in the trench.
During this attack valuable help was given by the 20th Divisional
Artillery, which had begun moving into the line as early as the 9th of
the month.
Having been driven out of F 35, the Germans withdrew and began
bombarding the trench with guns and trench mortars. Gradually they
blew it in, necessitating successive withdrawals and causing many
casualties. Several blocks were built during the 12th, and these were
used as one section of the trench after another became untenable.
Eventually, when the whole of F 35 had been practically obliterated,
a position was taken up a little further back. During the morning of
the 12th three bombing sections of the 12th K.R.R.C. and three of
the Oxford and Bucks L.I., with two platoons of the 12th K.R.R.C.,
were sent up to reinforce the 12th R.B., and the garrisons of the
trenches in rear were strengthened. The difficulties of communication
were increased by the telephone wires having been broken during the
bombardment. The 12th R.B. lost three officers and about 100 other
ranks, but they made a fine stand--recognised by the Commander-in-Chief
and the Army, Corps, Divisional and Brigade Commanders in the
messages which they sent next day. One of these messages ran: “The
Commander-in-Chief and the Corps Commander both wish to express their
gratification at the most successful action of both the artillery and
infantry of the 20th Division yesterday under novel conditions which
might have placed them at a disadvantage.”
Another, addressed to the 12th R.B., was as follows: “Corps and
Divisional Commanders convey thanks and congratulations to all ranks
for good work done yesterday under trying conditions. Brigadier also
thanks all ranks for excellent work.”
About 3.30 P.M. on the 12th an intense bombardment was put
down on the trench F 30, held by 2nd Lieut. Fish and 30 men of the 12th
R.B. After ten minutes the barrage lifted, on which about 200 Germans,
under cover of heavy machine-gun fire, crossed to an unoccupied trench
on the right. A small party reached the right sentry group but was
driven back. Later, between 4 and 5 P.M., two bombing attacks
were repulsed by 2nd Lieut. Fish and his garrison--reduced during the
day to one sergeant and seven men. During the whole time the machine
gun of this party was out of action. On request for reinforcements 30
men of the battalion were sent up at 9 P.M., and the garrison
worked all night strengthening the parapet and barricades. 2nd Lieut.
Fish was awarded the M.C. on the 2nd of March.
The 59th Brigade took over the right of the Divisional front on the
night of the 12th/13th, after some delay caused by the heavy shelling
of Poperinghe and Vlamertinghe. Next day the 61st Brigade went into the
reserve area in and about Poperinghe; Divisional Headquarters moved on
the 12th into hutments about two miles north-east of the town, and at 8
A.M. on the 13th Major-General Davies took over command of the
sector from the G.O.C. 14th Division.
Infantry action was over for a few days, during which the necessary
reliefs were carried out and work on the trenches begun. There was, of
course, a tremendous amount to be done to make a good line. Sixteen
hundred men of the 59th Brigade worked almost every night at this
time, and good progress was made during the month. The line of the
60th Brigade was worse than ever after the recent bombardments, which
had destroyed the parapets in many places, and in all parts of the
Divisional front shelling continued daily, hampering the working
parties and necessitating still more work. The canal bank was under
enfilade fire from some German guns, which did a good deal of damage
there and caused many casualties on the night of the 12th/13th.
The only bridge in the left sub-sector which could be used by day
was broken on the 13th, so that communication across the canal on
this flank was cut off until the R.E. had repaired the damage at 10
P.M. that night.
All companies of the R.E. and of the 11th D.L.I. were kept working hard
during the time spent in this sector, reclaiming the front line system
and improving communications. The field companies, working in the areas
of their brigades, constructed among other things extensive breastwork
trenches in No Man’s Land and a large number of framed machine-gun
emplacements with concrete head cover. The amount of work that was
done by the R.E. and infantry is indicated by the fact that at one
time an average of four tons of material was taken up to the line each
night from the workshops and dumps of the 96th Field Company alone.
The artillery did a great deal of work constructing new observation
posts and improving communications and battery positions. The 11th
D.L.I. were employed in digging and revetting trenches, putting out
wire, making dug-outs and machine-gun emplacements, sinking wells,
and repairing and relaying tramways. Later, in April, one company of
the battalion was sent to each of the brigades in the front line, and
a letter received from the C.R.E. on the 9th of the month especially
praised the work of these companies.
The system of communications taken over by the Signal Company was in
keeping with the general condition of the trenches. Shallow buried
cables were found in the back areas and open cables forward of
brigades. As these were continually being cut, the work of the company
became increasingly difficult. The forward communication trenches were
so overlooked from Pilckem Ridge that lines could not be mended in
daytime. As subsidiary methods which were adopted in later times were
not then used, the standard of communication was necessarily less high
than it had been in the Laventie area.
The Germans renewed their activities on the extreme left of the line
on the 19th, when they made another attack on F 34. This was now no
more than a post, quite isolated and in a very exposed position, not
more than 20 yards from a strongly held German trench, with which it
was connected by a sap. It was held by one officer and 30 men of the
12th K.R.R.C., who had relieved the 12th R.B. four days before. About
4.30 P.M., after sweeping the parapet of F 34 with machine-gun
fire, the Germans seem to have come up the sap from their own line and
rushed the post. The S.O.S. call was sent, whereupon the artillery,
assisted by the French, put down a barrage from the canal bank round
trenches F 34 and 33, five batteries of the Divisional Artillery
alone firing over 1200 rounds. Another party of the enemy--they were
estimated at 200 in all--got in on the right of F 34 and also on the
right of F 33, between which post and the next, F 30, there was a gap
of 300 yards in dead ground where the intervening trenches had been
destroyed. The N.C.O. and 12 men in F 33 were thus cut off, and all
except one man were captured. The first intimation received that these
men had been taken prisoner came from the German wireless communiqué. F
30 was then isolated. As the Divisional Commander decided that owing to
the exposed position of the captured trenches no counter-attack should
he made, the garrison of F 30 was ordered to withdraw.
On the 20th of February began a series of most successful artillery
bombardments, which were carried out daily up to the 25th, and
continued after that date at frequent intervals as long as the Division
remained in this sector.
These bombardments produced retaliation from the German guns and trench
mortars, which did a good deal of damage to our positions. Infantry
action was confined to patrols which were frequently out and did good
work.
Meanwhile, on the 18th of February, the Division had received orders
to extend the line to the right, taking over as far as Pratt Street,
just north-west of Wieltje Farm, from the 6th Division. This added some
1500 yards to the front and included a pronounced salient, the right of
which rested on the road 500 yards north of the Farm. The rearrangement
was made by each brigade extending its right, the 60th putting three
battalions into the front line and the 59th keeping two in front and
two behind. The necessary alterations were carried out on the 21st and
22nd, and on the 23rd the 60th Brigade on the left was relieved by the
61st and went into Divisional reserve.
On the 3rd of March an addition was made to the fighting troops of the
Division by the arrival from England of the three Brigade Machine Gun
Companies. They went to join their respective brigades, with which they
served until, under a new organisation in 1918, they became the 20th
Battalion of the Machine Gun Corps.
At this time also three Medium Trench Mortar Batteries (X/20, Y/20 and
Z/20) were formed, under Captain Buckley, the D.T.M.O. On the 8th
Major-General Davies handed over command of the Division. His successor
was Major-General W. Douglas Smith, C.B. During this month also
Lieut.-Colonel A. Rolland succeeded Colonel Kenyon as C.R.E.
While the trenches were being made more secure and more habitable by
hard and continual work, another unpleasantness was added to life in
the Salient by a change in the weather. On the 21st of February it
become cold and frosty. Two days later snow fell and a hard frost
followed, covering the canal with ice. After another fall of snow on
the 26th a thaw set in, leaving the ground sodden and the trenches in
a very bad state. Cold weather came again at the beginning of March,
and snow fell at intervals throughout the month. In these conditions
the problem of keeping the troops warm and giving them hot food had to
be solved. All rations were carried from dumps near the canal bank in
sandbags. Fires in the front line were impossible, as any smoke at once
drew hostile artillery fire. The difficulty was met by buying oil and
spirit stoves, and by supplying “Thermos” cases and food containers. In
this way it was found possible to provide hot tea and food daily.
At 4 P.M. on the 11th of April the enemy began a bombardment
of the front trenches of the left sub-sector, held by the 61st Brigade.
The fire increased in intensity about 6 P.M., trench mortars
being used as much as artillery. Trench E 28, held by the 7th D.C.L.I.
in four posts, was destroyed. Most of the men in this trench managed
to work their way either to a bombing post on the left or into E 27 on
the right, but those in the centre who could not get out were either
killed or wounded. The enemy then attacked E 28. The first line,
about 70 strong, was caught in enfilade by a party of 12 men of the
D.C.L.I., who had taken up a position at the end of the trench, and
was practically wiped out before the second line was over the parapet.
On receiving the S.O.S. signal the French as well as the Divisional
Artillery immediately opened a very accurate fire. The second German
line, about 30 men carrying entrenching tools, was caught by the
artillery fire and turned back.
At the same time two parties attacked trenches E 25 and 26. These
trenches were separated by a gap, in front of which was a large crater
caused by a trench mortar. Some Germans got into this crater, but were
bombed out again. About 30 more were seen in front of E 27 and 28,
and a small party of 15 crawled up and attempted to enter one of the
other trenches, but all were driven off. In the course of the evening
two platoons of the 7th Somerset L.I. went up to bring ammunition and
to reinforce the garrison. During the whole time the enemy kept up a
barrage in rear of the trenches attacked, and much courage and coolness
were shown by officers and men in passing through this very heavy shell
fire and in bringing wounded out of it.
Second Lieut. R. Tawney received the M.C. and Sgt. J. Bristow the M.M.
for their gallant action at this time.
The casualties in the D.C.L.I. were about 60. The enemy must have
suffered much more heavily, as in front of trenches E 27 and 28 alone
30 dead were found.
The next day a message was received from the Army Commander conveying
his appreciation of the gallant defence made by the 7th D.C.L.I., and
the quickness of the artillery in supporting them. Recognition of
individual acts of courage in this battalion came later, on the 15th
May, when Captain W. W. Forestier and 2nd Lieut. L. E. Oudin, who was
afterwards killed on the Somme, were awarded the M.C., and Sgt. C. W.
Hood, Company-Sgt.-Major W. Burman and Pte. H. Morris the M.M., for
their action on this day.
The Division then went back for a month’s rest. The relief by the 6th
Division began on the 15th, and units moved into the reserve area some
miles west of Poperinghe, with Divisional Headquarters at Esquelbecque.
During this time brigade groups went in turn to Calais, first the 61st,
then the 60th, and then the 59th, for periods of a week or ten days
each. The Division was in turn in G.H.Q. and in Corps reserve, and
spent the time training and refitting. The Divisional Band was formed
at this time, and Sgt. Eldridge, 11th D.L.I., was appointed Bandmaster.
On the 3rd of May it played for the first time in the square at
Esquelbecque.
On the 5th Brig.-General the Hon. L. Butler took over command of the
60th Brigade from Brig.-General Roy.
On the 12th the Divisional Artillery held a horse show, which proved a
great success. The condition of the artillery horses and the excellence
of their turnout evoked the admiration of the whole Corps. Organised
sports, horse shows, bombing and bayonet fighting competitions were
also held at this period by the brigades at Calais. The march of the
59th Brigade from Calais, on the 13th of May, was rather a severe test,
and showed the state of fitness to which the men had been brought.
Orders reached battalions only two to two and a half hours before the
move, which began at 7 P.M. The brigade marched 16 miles that
night in the rain, arriving in billets at 4 A.M. on the 14th.
Starting again at 11 A.M., the troops covered another 17
miles, and got into billets between six and seven in the evening. Thus
33 miles had been done in twenty-four hours. Hardly any men fell out
and the march was continued in the morning.
Next day the following letter arrived from Corps Headquarters: “The
Corps Commander has heard with great pleasure of the soldier-like way
in which the 59th Infantry Brigade tackled the difficulties of a sudden
move and a wet night march. It was only to be expected of a brigade
like the 59th, but it reflects great credit, all the same, on all
concerned.”
During May an alteration was made in the organisation of the artillery.
The Brigade Ammunition Columns disappeared, and the Divisional
Ammunition Column, under Lieut.-Colonel Foster, was divided into a
first échelon (Nos. 1, 2 and 3 Section), and a second échelon (No. 4
Section), the latter supplying the wants of the infantry alone.
This was followed by a reorganisation of the batteries. The 92nd
Brigade was to be a howitzer brigade no longer. The 91st, 92nd and
93rd Brigades were each to consist of three 18 pdr. batteries and one
howitzer battery, and the 90th Brigade to consist of three 18 pdr.
batteries. Each battery, as before, consisted of four guns.
On the 20th of May it was arranged to work the ammunition supply from
a central dump at Divisional Ammunition Column Headquarters, whence
issues would be made to sections, the sections delivering to battery
gun positions and to infantry brigade transport lines.
In May the Divisional Mounted Troops left the Division. Headquarters
and “D” Squadron of the Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry, after a
fortnight’s training with the 2nd Cavalry Division, moved on the 15th
to join the remaining squadrons as a regiment under XIth Corps. The
Divisional Cyclist Company from the 26th of May became absorbed in the
XIVth Corps Cyclist Battalion.
On the 18th of May the Division began to relieve the Guards in the
right sector of the Corps line. The G.O.C., 20th Division, took over
command of this sector on the 21st. The 60th Brigade was on the
right, the 61st on the left, and the 59th in reserve, with Divisional
Headquarters at the Mairie in Poperinghe. On the right of the 20th was
the Canadian Corps; on the left the 6th Division.
The line ran from some 400 yards north-west of Hooge in a general
north-westerly direction, passing in front of Y Wood, through the cast
of Railway Wood, and just in front of Crump and Warwick Farms and the
village of Wieltje. A few hundreds of yards north-west of Wieltje the
sector ended at the point where the Divisional right had formerly
rested.
The German front line run at a general distance of 250 to 400 yards
from our own, with, however, certain important variations. A sharp
German salient at the north-east corner of Railway Wood ran to within
70 yards of the British trenches; opposite Verlorenhoek the lines were
a little over 200 yards apart. About 300 yards north of Warwick Farm a
sharp triangular salient projected from the German line, and there was
a rather blunt German salient on the south-east side of the Wieltje
road.
On the night of the 20th/21st of May three bombing attacks covered by
the fire of six machine guns were made against the 7th Somerset L.I.
in the left sub-sector. This battalion had moved into the trenches
the night before, and was still under the G.O.C. Guards Division. The
attacks were made simultaneously at 11.45 P.M. against the
right, centre and left of the battalion line, and were driven off
chiefly by the bombing sections, which had been placed at the weak
points in the trench. On the right, a party estimated at 20 tried to
force the barricade on the Ypres-Zonnebeke road, but was driven off
by two bombing sections and the fire of Lewis guns. The attack in the
centre failed to reach the trenches. On the left one of the sentries,
Pte. Harris, heard the enemy coming up an old communication trench
which ran towards the German lines. As soon as a wiring party which
was out in front had been recalled, Pte. Harris began throwing bombs,
whereupon the enemy came out of the communication trench and tried to
get through the wire. The bombing section stationed in this part of the
trench was now reinforced by another, and between them they drove back
the attack. Sgt. Tanner then led the two sections up the communication
trench in pursuit of the Germans, who, however, had retired to their
own line. In the course of the night the Somersets had 1 man killed and
3 officers and 16 other ranks wounded. The G.O.C. Guards’ Division, in
his report on these attacks, wrote: “The Somerset L.I. deserve great
credit for the manner in which their bombing sections were organised,
and for the immediate action taken.... Sgt. Tanner and his bombing
sections showed initiative in at once pursuing the enemy.”
June was a month of much greater activity, which began with the German
attack on the Canadians at Hooge. On the 2nd of the month, when this
action began, the 60th Brigade was still holding the right of the
Divisional front, in touch with the 3rd Canadian Division; the 59th
Brigade had relieved the 61st about a week before, and was holding the
left sub-sector.
On this day Brig.-General Sweny, Major R. Dashwood, his Brigade-Major,
and Captain Beddington, his Staff-Captain, were all unfortunately
wounded by a shell in Ypres. Brig.-General Hobkirk temporarily took
over command of the 61st Brigade.
At 8.50 A.M. on the 2nd the Germans opened an intense bombardment on
the Canadians and the 6th K.S.L.I., the right battalion of the 6Oth
Brigade. Our artillery responded so effectively that the enemy, who
tried to advance on the right of the 6th K.S.L.I. front, was unable
to get forward, and lost heavily. At 12.30 P.M. the Germans attacked
the Canadians, and during the day succeeded in taking two lines of
trenches, including Hill 62 and Sanctuary Wood.
This advance compelled the temporary abandonment of two forward guns
of C/92 Battery which had been placed in Maple copse, close to the
Canadian front line, in order to enfilade “No man’s land” opposite the
front of the 20th Division.
Nearly all the gunners were killed or wounded, the sergeant in charge
eventually receiving the M.M. for his gallant defence. The guns, when
eventually recovered some days later, were riddled with bullets and
badly smashed by shell-fire.
At 9 A.M. on the 2nd the 61st Machine Gun Company at Brandhoek
was ordered to stand to. Although the transport was three-quarters of a
mile away, the company was ready to move fifty minutes after the order
had been received. Later, at 1.30 P.M., one section of this
company was sent up through Ypres, which was being severely shelled, to
the 60th Brigade, to strengthen the right flank.
“A” and “B” Companies of the 12th K.R.R.C., under Captain D. Gardiner,
were sent forward through a heavy barrage at 2 P.M. to reinforce
the Canadian Division, and suffered rather severely going up. They
rejoined their battalion on the 5th.
The enemy artillery and trench mortars were unusually active all
along the line during the day, but no further attack developed on
the Divisional front. During the night the Canadians made several
counter-attacks, and on the 3rd were reported to have got back some of
the lost trenches. Fighting continued about Hooge and Sanctuary Wood on
the 4th and 5th, which were, however, comparatively quiet days on the
front of the 20th Division. The 6th K.S.L.I. were relieved by the 6th
Oxford and Bucks L.I. on the night of the 3rd/4th of June.
At 12.30 P.M. on the 6th the enemy opened an intense fire on
the 60th Brigade line; it lasted till 3.45 P.M. On the right,
on the front of the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I., the shelling was chiefly
on the support trenches, leaving the front line little damaged, but the
front trenches of the 12th R.B. on the left were breached in several
places. Telephone communication from this battalion headquarters to all
companies was broken.
At the same time the enemy attacked the Canadians, and the 6th Oxford
and Bucks L.I. several times got rifle and machine-gun fire well in to
parties of Germans moving towards Hooge.
About 2.30 the enemy came over his parapet towards the lines of the
12th R.B. and of the 11th K.R.R.C., who were holding the right of the
59th Brigade front. Rifle fire was opened on them, and the artillery
immediately barraged the trenches in answer to the S.O.S. A party of
about thirty, advancing towards the 11th K.R.R.C., was seen to turn
back hurriedly into cover, under the fire of our Lewis guns. Most of
those who attacked the 12th R.B. dropped into long grass when fire was
opened, and tried to crawl back; none reached our line.
About 3.15 P.M. the enemy exploded two mines. One was well in
front of the 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. line, and did no damage; but the
other, under the trenches of the 12th R.B., about Gully Farm, destroyed
fifty yards of trench, and buried Second-Lieut. Messenger and 22 men.
Only Second-Lieut. Messenger and 10 men survived.
Meanwhile the main attack, which was being delivered with great
determination against the Canadians, was meeting with some success. At
3.26 P.M. the 3rd Canadian Division reported that the enemy
was advancing north of the Menin road and through Sanctuary Wood; and
at 7.55 P.M. that the Germans had captured Hooge.
The 7th K.O.Y.L.I. left Poperinghe at 4.10 P.M. for Vlamertinghe, and
came under the orders of the 60th Brigade. At 10 P.M. the 12th R.B.
were reinforced by two platoons of the 12th K.R.R.C. and two Lewis
guns; and a working party of 100 men of the 12th K.R.R.C. was sent up
to them.
Throughout the operations of this day the trench mortar batteries did
most valuable work, Captain Buckley, the D.T.M.O., and Captain Traill,
commanding Y/20 Battery, both receiving the M.C.
In the course of the fighting some of the Canadian communications broke
down. Fortunately, with the help of recently completed buried cables,
some laid in the sewers of Ypres, the 20th Divisional Signal Company
was able to maintain communication for the Canadians for a considerable
time during the most critical period of the fighting.
During the night the damage done to the trenches was repaired and a
new line dug. Patrols searched the front, bringing in prisoners,
and discovering parties of the enemy consolidating their line. These
parties were brought under fire from our machine guns and snipers,
and suffered much loss. Touch with the Canadians, which had been lost
during the day’s fighting, was re-established, and was maintained
throughout the night.
The casualties of the 60th Brigade were about 100, of which 77,
including 25 killed, were in the 12th R.B.
On the 10th of June the following message was received from G.O.C. 3rd
Canadian Division: “I am writing on behalf of the whole of the 3rd
Canadian Division to thank you most heartily for the immediate and
substantial assistance which the 20th Division gave us on June 2nd
and on the subsequent days, and to ask you also to repent our thanks
to General Butler and to the 12th K.R.R.C., who sent two companies to
strengthen our line. We shall always remember with gratitude the help
given so promptly and freely by your Division.”
The next few days were spent in harassing the enemy parties working on
their new positions, and in work on our own trenches. On the 8th and
9th the 6Oth Brigade was relieved by the 61st in the right sub-sector.
Though the 60th went into reserve, the troops had not much rest, for
by the 10th, 600 men of the Brigade were working nightly on the new
line from Cork Cottages to Dragoon Farm, and 200 men were employed
in burying cables. On the 11th an additional 600 men (300 from the
artillery and 300 from the reserve brigade) were required to bury
cables for the XIVth Corps.
The last phase of these operations was carried out on the 13th, when
the Canadians attacked in order to regain the lost ground. To assist
them, the 20th Division was ordered to discharge gas and smoke along
its front and then push out patrols, following these up by larger
raiding parties if possible, at four selected points in the German
line. Zero was 1.30 A.M. on the 13th. Owing to the short
notice that had been given, it was found impossible to get all the gas
cylinders into the trenches in time. By some mistake in one part of
the line, the smoke bombs were thrown three minutes before zero. This
unfortunately gave alarm to the enemy, who thus had time to put on gas
masks.
The gas, discharged at zero from 130 cylinders, went well and quickly.
In three minutes practically all the rifle and machine-gun fire from
the German trenches had ceased. The artillery barrage also began at
zero, and was most effective. After twenty-five minutes it lifted to
allow our infantry raiding parties to go forward.
On the right one party of the Somerset L.I., under Captain J. N. C.
Peard, was held up by the wire near Railway Wood. Owing to the gas
this party had to put on gas masks, and while attempting to cut a
passage through the wire 3 men were killed and Captain Peard and 10
men wounded. All the wounded, however, were brought back safely. A
party of the 11th K.R.R.C. under Lieut. H. A. Denison got in at the
Mound (south-west of Verlorenhoek), which was found to be practically
obliterated by our trench mortar bombardment. This party beat off a
counter attack, and returned with only five slight casualties. The left
party got as far as the German wire and reconnoitered the position,
but, being only a small patrol, did not attempt to enter the trenches.
The 1st Canadian Division in a most successful attack regained Mount
Sorrel and Observatory Ridge.
On the 24th of June the Division began a series of
operations--bombardments and raids--against the enemy. The first day
was devoted to wire cutting--very successfully done by the artillery
and trench mortar batteries. On the 25th the enemy lines were shelled
during the day, and at 10 o’clock that night a raid on the enemy
salient east-south-east of Wieltje was carried out by three columns
of the 10th K.R.R.C., with the assistance of 1 officer and 4 men of
the 84th Field Company R.E. The assaulting troops--3 officers and
80 men--were under the command of Captain R. S. Cockburn; the three
raiding parties were led by Lieut. F. V. Le Pavoux, Lieut. R. L. Jones
(both of whom were wounded during the raid), and Lieut. G. A. Langley.
The R.E. party was under Lieut. Manisty.
This raid had been previously practised against facsimile trenches in
the back area, and Lieut.-Colonel Blacklock, D.S.O. (later promoted
Major-General), who commanded this battalion, had carefully supervised
the training for this operation. It was in a great measure due to him
that the raid proved so successful.
All three parties entered the enemy’s lines and went thoroughly
through the salient, suffering very few casualties. The German
trenches had been badly knocked about by our artillery fire, but a
great deal of work had evidently been expended on them. They were
found to be deep and strong, well revetted, and absolutely dry.
Seven prisoners--including an officer--were taken, but the officer
was killed and five of the men were wounded by a German shell after
they had reached our lines. A considerable amount of loot--equipment,
papers, etc.--was also brought in. Captain R. S. Cockburn, Lieut. F.
V. Le Pavoux, Second-Lieut. R. L. Jones, Second-Lieut. G. A. Langley
and Lieut. Manisty, were all awarded the M.C. The M.M. was given to
Lance-Cpl. J. Frost, Lance-Sgt. F. W. Webb, and Rfm. E. Coates, of the
10th K.R.R.C., Sgt. A. McKay, 84th Field Company, Sapper H. Holland,
20th Divisional Signal Company, and Rfm. J. P. Mansfield, 59th Trench
Mortar Battery.
Our casualties during the raid were 1 officer and 3 other ranks.
Unfortunately the parties on their return came into the enemy’s barrage
on our front and support lines, and lost a good many men. This brought
the total casualties to 3 officers and 38 other ranks. The raid was
a great success in every way, the information alone which it secured
being of the greatest value.
Another raid was carried out on the night of the 29th/30th of June by
the 6th K.S.L.I., commanded by Lieut.-Colonel E. A. Wood, D.S.O. A
bombardment by the Divisional Artillery and the heavy guns of the XIVth
Corps during the day and night did great damage to the trenches and
provoked considerable retaliation, especially on Railway Wood. Under
cover of these bombardments the trench mortars effectively cut the
German wire.
Two raiding parties went forward, each composed of 2 officers and
40 men of the 6th K.S.L.I. They were all volunteers, and had been
specially trained for this raid at Vlamertinghe on a model of the
German trenches to be attacked. Special equipment was carried, such as
revolvers, knobkerries, explosives, rockets and torches, and one party
had bells and the other rattles, to be used as the signal to withdraw.
The two parties were commanded by Lieut. D. S. A. McKimm on the right
and Captain H. M. O’Connor on the left, and were accompanied by a party
of the 83rd Field Company R.E., under Second-Lieut. H. Y. V. Jackson,
and some of the 177th Tunnelling Company R.E. They moved out at
midnight, and on the barrage lifting, made for the enemy trenches.
The right party got in first, and found the line badly knocked about.
Lieut. McKimm and his men thoroughly searched the trenches, blocked
the enemy’s communications, and did as much damage as possible. Eleven
Germans were bayonetted emerging from a shelter into the trench, six
dug-outs with parties of four to six inside were bombed, and other
casualties caused and prisoners taken. By 12.30 A.M. the party
had returned without casualties.
Captain O’Connor’s party also successfully entered German lines. One
section, under Corporal Richards, who gallantly continued to lead his
men although wounded early in the raid, bombed seven dug-outs and took
six prisoners, pushed forward against strong opposition, and then held
on until the order to retire was given. Other sections dealt similarly
with all the enemy they met. Lance-Cpl. Walker was killed while making
a splendid fight with his section, which was able to account for 35 of
the enemy.
The casualties of this party were 2 killed, 1 missing and 9 wounded. In
the course of the raid 60 or 70 prisoners were taken.
The artillery support was all that could be desired. During the
barrage, half the guns fired on the front line and half on the support
lines, so as to prevent the enemy from recognising when the lift took
place, and the raiding parties, entering as soon as the barrage lifted,
took the enemy completely by surprise.
The whole operation was very well carried out, and all ranks showed
extraordinary keenness and determination to make the raid a success.
Among the many honours awarded to officers and men of the 6th K.S.L.I.
for their services on this occasion were the following: M.C., Captain
H. M. O’Connor, Lieut. D. S. A. McKimm; D.C.M., Cpl. R. Richards.
All these raids and bombardments entailed harder work on the troops
behind the front line. R.E. material was constantly required for the
trenches, but owing to the operations transport for it was difficult
to obtain. The ammunition requirements, too, during June were heavy.
Great credit must be given to the officers and men of the Divisional
Ammunition Column, who were kept working at very high pressure during
the whole month.
On the 5th and 6th of July the 59th Brigade relieved the 61st in the
left sub-sector.
On the night of the 10th a minor operation was carried out by the 59th
Brigade. Gas was turned on at 10.30, accompanied by a smoke screen and
an artillery and trench mortar barrage, while four raiding parties
formed up ready to go forward. This time the enemy seemed to be well
prepared. As soon as the gas was discharged he lighted fires along his
parapet to make the cloud rise. Severe artillery, rifle and machine-gun
fire prevented the raiding parties from reaching his lines except
at one point. This was at the Mound, where Second-Lieut. Rudd and a
party of the 11th K.R.R.C. successfully bombed their way up one of the
communication trenches.
On the 12th the Germans severely shelled the Wieltje salient. Great
damage was done, and one company alone--“A” Company of the 10th
R.B.--lost 25 casualties, one-third of its whole strength. On the 12th
and 14th the town of Poperinghe was heavily bombarded; over 200 shells
fell near the square and railway station on the 12th, so that on the
14th, under the orders of the Corps Commander, all troops moved out of
the town. Divisional Headquarters moved to a camp about 1000 yards to
the north.
On the night of the 13th/14th, orders were received directing the
60th Brigade to move to Steenwerck, to be placed under the orders of
the IInd Anzac Corps. The brigade, with its machine gun company and
light trench mortar battery, entrained next morning at Poperinghe,
which was being shelled at the time, but fortunately got away without
casualties. The troops detrained at Steenwerck, and marched from there
to Erquinghem. The 12th R.B. went straight into the trenches, the 6th
K.S.L.I. and 6th Oxford and Bucks L.I. extending the line to the left
on the 15th, when Brigade Headquarters and the 12th K.R.R.C. went into
billets at Fleurbaix. The Brigade held a line running north-east and
east from La Cordonnerie Farm on the right to just north of Le Bridoux;
covering this line were three attached batteries of the 24th Field
Artillery Brigade, of the 6th Division.
The next two days were spent in registering the guns and in cutting
the wire, in preparation for an attack which was to be made by the
61st Division and the 5th Australian Division on the right of the
60th Brigade. On the 19th, after a bombardment during the day, a mine
was sprung opposite La Cordonnerie Farm at 7 P.M., and the
assaulting troops went forward. Delangre Farm was the left of the
attack, so that the 60th Brigade was not involved in these operations
beyond firing on the Germans, who stood to in their trenches north of
the farm and offered a good target for the machine guns. The ground
gained could not be held by the attacking troops, who were back in
their own trenches by 6.15 A.M. on the 20th.
On the night of the 22nd/23rd the 60th Brigade was relieved and marched
back to billets about Bailleul.
Meanwhile, the rest of the 20th Division, with the exception of the
artillery, had been relieved between the 14th and the 18th by the
6th Division, and had moved to an area west of Poperinghe, with
headquarters at Esquelbecque. Here a warning order was received on
the 17th that the Division, less artillery, would be required in the
next few days to move to the area of the Vth Corps, to which the
84th Field Company R.E. had been attached since the 15th. On the
19th the move began, and on the 20th Major-General Douglas Smith
took over from the G.O.C. 24th Division a line facing Messines and
Wytschaete, and extending from the river Douve a little west of the
Ploegsteert-Messines road to a point just south-west of the cross-roads
at Kruisstraat.
The G.O.C. had not assumed command of this sector more than an
hour, and the relief was not yet completed, when he received verbal
instructions that the 20th Division would be required to move south as
soon as it had been relieved by the 36th and 50th Divisions. Definite
orders arrived next day, and the relief began at once. On the 23rd
and 24th, units concentrated in the back area about Steenwerck and
Hondeghem, where the 60th Brigade rejoined, and on the 25th and 26th
the Division, leaving the artillery still at Ypres, went south to
Doullens.