THE LAVENTIE SECTOR
_20th July 1915 to 21st January 1916_
Arrival of the Division in France--Further training in trench
warfare--The Division in the Laventie Sector--Operations in
conjunction with the Battle of Loos--Raid--Gas attack--Move out
of IIIrd Corps Area.
(_Vide_ Sketch A.)
The leading units of the Division left Amesbury on the 20th July. The
route followed was either by Folkestone and Boulogne or by Southampton
and Havre, and then by train from the ports of disembarkation to the
area west of St Omer. The various stages of the journey--embarking men
and horses, entraining and detraining in France, marches to rest camps
and billets--were all accomplished satisfactorily if not without some
discomfort, chiefly due to the rough and rainy weather. On the 22nd
Divisional Headquarters was established at Lumbres, and the Division
was concentrated in this area by the 26th.
The next day orders came for a further move eastwards, and on the 28th
the Division started on a hot and trying march into the area of the
IIIrd Corps (Lieut.-General Sir W. P. Pulteney), which formed part of
the First Army and which was holding a line between Neuve Chapelle and
Armentières.
By the 30th the various units had moved into billets in the area
bounded roughly by the line Hazebrouck--Bailleul--Steenwerck--Neuf
Berquin, with Divisional Headquarters at Merris.
The situation on the British front at this time was briefly as
follows:--
The Third Army under Sir Charles Munro held the right of the line from
the Somme, where it was in touch with the French, to a point south of
Arras. Between this point and Grenay (four miles north-west of Lens)
the French Tenth Army intervened, cutting off the Third Army from
the First, which, under Sir Douglas Haig, continued the line to near
Armentières; north again, Sir Herbert Plumer’s Second Army held the
left of the British line as far as the right of the French troops at
Boesinghe.
The IIIrd Corps, consisting now of the 8th, 27th and 20th Divisions,
was in touch on the right with the Indian Corps near Fauquissart;
thence the line ran in a general north-easterly direction parallel
to the Rue Tilleloy and some 200 to 500 yards on the south-east side
of it, until, opposite Picantin, it turned east for about a mile.
North of Rouge Banes it began to turn north-east again, and kept this
general direction, passing close in front of La Cordonnerie Farm, La
Boutillerie and Rue du Bois to a point on the Armentières-Lille road
about half a mile north-west of Wez Macquart.
[Illustration:
LAVENTIE, 1915. Sketch A.]
The 20th Division, like other troops in England, had been trained
largely with a view to open warfare, so that on its arrival in France
schools and courses of instruction had to be organised to carry on the
training in trench warfare and in those forms of fighting that had
lately come into use. Thus bombing was started almost at once, and
the instruction given was thorough. Officers and N.C.O.’s went to the
8th and 27th Divisions for a course of training; bombing schools were
opened in the Division, and brigade and battalion bombing officers
appointed. Brigade bombing officers at the end of each course
picked out any men who were likely to become really expert and kept
them for a further course. The rest went back to their battalions as
battalion or company bombers. The training was carried on under some
difficulty at first, as nothing was provided. No bombs were available
for instructional purposes, and therefore they had to be improvised.
Machine-gun classes were also formed, and from time to time officers
and N.C.O.’s went to Wisques for a course in the use of machine guns in
the field. Gas-mask drill was very strict, and was practised every day.
Demonstrations and lectures were given, and as many men as possible
were made to pass through gas. In addition to these special courses of
instruction, ordinary training was carried out.
Between the 2nd and the 17th of August all units, from brigade
headquarters downwards, were attached to the 8th and 27th Divisions in
the line, thus introducing officers and men to the realities of trench
warfare.
By the 18th all units had returned to the Divisional area with the
exception of the 83rd and 96th Field Companies R.E. and the 11th D.L.I.
(Pioneers), who were working on the defences. The 90th Field Artillery
Brigade (Colonel E. Pollock), however, instead of undergoing a tour
of instruction, went straight into the line on the 2nd of August, and
that night came into action near Laventie in rear of the 19th Infantry
Brigade, which held the right of the 8th Division line.
On the 9th of August the Division lost the services of A/92 (Howitzer
Battery), which was transferred to the 27th Division.
Between the 15th and 17th the 59th Infantry Brigade moved into the
line, taking over the right of the 8th Division front from the 19th
Brigade, which went to join the Ist Corps. The 59th Brigade came under
the orders of the 8th Division, and Brigade Headquarters was opened at
Laventie. The line, after some readjustment on the 18th, ran from near
Fauquissart to a point east of Petillon, and was held by two battalions
in the front trenches, a third in a line of defended posts about the
Rue Bacquerot, and the fourth in reserve at Laventie. Reliefs between
battalions took place every four to seven days.
It was not until the end of the month that the Division took over
a sector of the line, and while waiting in the reserve area three
battalions of the 61st Brigade, as well as the R.E. and 11th D.L.I.,
were employed as working parties at various points in the IIIrd Corps
area.
On the 22nd of August orders came for the Division to move forward. The
IIIrd Corps was extending its right by taking over a part of the Indian
Corps front as far as a point just north of Mauquissait. This line was
to be held by three divisions--the 20th on the right, the 8th in the
centre and the 27th on the left, each division keeping one brigade in
reserve. The 20th Divisional Artillery (Brig.-General Hotham) began
moving to the new area on the night of the 23rd/24th. By the 28th the
move of all units was completed, and Divisional Headquarters was opened
at Nouveau Monde, near Estaires.
The Divisional front ran from the corps right flank near Mauquissait
to Petillon. The 59th Brigade (Brig.-General C. D. Shute), with its
left at Petillon, then became the left brigade of the Division. On the
right was the 60th Brigade (Brig.-General J. W. G. Roy) in touch with
the 59th just east-north-east of Fauquissart. The 61st (Brig.-General
C. Ross) was in reserve at Estaires, where the battalions which had
been detached rejoined it--the 7th K.O.Y.L.I. and the 7th D.C.L.I. on
the 28th, the 12th King’s on the 6th of September. The artillery was
organised in two groups, the La Flinque group supporting the right
of the line and the Laventie group the left, with headquarters at
Estaires. Of the field companies R.E., the 84th and 96th were in the
60th Brigade area, and the 83rd with the 59th Brigade.
Both the 60th and 59th Brigades had two battalions holding the front
trenches, with the others either in reserve or holding a line of
defended posts which ran about a mile behind the line. These posts
were either entrenched positions or farm-houses, more or less battered
about but still habitable. They were put into a state of defence,
and occupied by a platoon or half a company, and in a few cases the
civilian inhabitants of the house went on living there at the same time
as the military garrison.
The country in this sector was flat and low--an expanse of grass or
mud intersected by small ditches. Though at this time of the year the
surface was still very hard and dry, the water level was only some
three or four feet below the ground, and this made the normal form of
trench, in the southern part of the area, out of the question. Instead,
breastworks of sandbags were built up and strengthened with loose
earth. Dug-outs, as known in later times or even then in some parts
of the line, did not exist. Small recesses in the breastwork and some
splinter proofs behind were all that could be made. Many breastworks
had no parados to give cover from the backward effect of shells
bursting behind, and this had to be made. Fortunately the shelling of
the front trenches in this area was not severe except on the 25th of
September and during a feint attack in October. In consequence very
few casualties were due to this lack of cover from the rear.
The German front line was much on the same level as our own, and
anything from 80 to 250 yards away. Behind that, the ground rose gently
to the long low ridge running by Aubers, Fromelles and Radinghem--not
more than 50 feet above the rest of the country, but for all that a
commanding height completely overlooking our positions.
The artillery was to the east and south-east of Laventie, where clumps
of trees, orchards and hedges gave good cover for the guns. Excellent
observation was obtained from the ruined houses along the Rue Tilleloy.
On the whole of the British front the year 1915 was really a time of
preparation. The hard fighting of 1914 and the first four months of
1915 had caused a considerable drain on the personnel of the army,
and though many reinforcements had come out both as drafts and as
units--the latter for the most part Territorial troops--yet the great
bulk of the New Army was still in England, and could not be expected
to turn the balance decisively in our favour until well on in 1916.
Nevertheless there was much fighting, especially in certain parts of
the front such as the Ypres salient and about La Bassée and in the
battles of Neuve Chapelle and Loos.
The sector about Laventie during the autumn and winter of 1915 was one
of the quietest on the British front. The first month that the Division
spent in the line was uneventful, though there was continued activity
in some form or other; mining was always being carried out by both
sides, and enemy sniping never ceased. The latter caused a certain
number of casualties, so that steps had to be taken to deal with it
by training snipers of our own. These worked in pairs, the same pair
always working on the same ground, so that they got to know every yard
of it.
The Germans undoubtedly had an excellent system of intelligence. They
seemed to know exactly what reliefs were being carried out, for they
often shouted the names of regiments that had just come in, and on one
occasion correctly whistled the regimental march. This is explained by
the fact that they had listening sets of which at that time we knew
nothing. Later many orders were issued to prevent leakage, and open
earth circuits were strictly forbidden.
Just at the time when the Division took over this sector, a deserter
came in and reported that the Germans were mining against us near
Mauquissait, and also had gas cylinders there, and were preparing to
attack us on the 30th. To meet this it was decided to fire a camouflet
on the 29th and to follow up with a bombardment of the enemy trenches
in order to damage them sufficiently to show whether or not he had a
gas attack in preparation. The bombardment was carried out by the La
Flinque group, in conjunction with the Meerut Divisional Artillery and
a brigade of 9·2 howitzers.
It was a hazy day with fine rain falling, and observation was
difficult, so the bombardment was curtailed and was resumed on the 30th
under better conditions on a section of trench somewhat further south.
Considerable damage was done. A part of the parapet was demolished and
a magazine exploded, but no evidence of gas was found.
The 93rd Field Artillery Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel A. T. Anderson) and
one section of each battery of the 92nd Brigade (Lieut.-Colonel H.
G. Ricardo) moved on the 30th to positions south and south-east of
Fleurbaix in the 8th Division area. Here they came into action during
the first two nights of September, and later, on the 25th of the month,
supported an attack by the 8th Division.
On the 5th of September the 61st Brigade relieved the 23rd Brigade
of the 8th Division, and took over the line running east and then
north-east from the left of the 59th Brigade to a point about 600 yards
south-west of La Boutillerie. The line was held by three battalions,
with the fourth battalion in support. At first Brigade Headquarters
was at Rouge de Bout, near Laventie, but a heavy shelling on the 9th
compelled a move to an estaminet some little distance away.
On the night of the 12th/13th the 7th Somerset L.I. relieved the 12th
King’s in the front line. At 5.30 A.M. the enemy blew up a
mine under a small salient of the front trench held by a platoon of
“B” Company. About twenty men were buried by the explosion. In spite
of heavy artillery, machine gun and trench mortar fire which the enemy
poured into the area of the explosion, the crater was occupied at once,
and the rest of the company began to rescue their buried comrades,
five of whom were killed and twelve injured. The casualties among the
rescuers were two killed and five wounded. Lieut. B. E. F. Mitchell,
the platoon commander, was awarded the M.C., and Lance-Corporal C.
Ward, who was in charge of the company stretcher-bearers, the D.C.M.
for conspicuous gallantry under heavy fire. Major R. P. Preston Whyte,
commanding “B” company, received the written congratulations of the
Divisional Commander.
The 84th Field Company R.E. (Major H. S. Christie) moved to Rue Biache
in the 61st Brigade area. Each field company was now with an infantry
brigade, the 96th (Major A. C. Scott) with the 60th Brigade, the
83rd (Major L. E. Hopkins) with the 59th, and the 84th with the 61st,
and henceforward this arrangement was kept, each brigade and its
field company working together. Similarly the 60th Field Ambulance
(Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Osburn), the 61st Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel
W. J. S. Harvey), and the 62nd Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel J. G.
Gill) worked respectively with the 59th, 60th and 61st Brigades.
The two companies of the 11th D.L.I. (Pioneers), which had remained to
work under the R.E. when the Division came into the line, returned in
the beginning of September.
Meanwhile, plans had been made for operations on a considerable scale
further south, to begin on the 25th of September. The general plan was
that the French were to advance in Champagne, and in conjunction with
this the British troops were to attack near Loos on a front from about
Grenay to the La Bassée canal.
Along the rest of the front subsidiary operations were to be carried
out:--
(1) By the 2nd Division of the First Army near Givenchy.
(2) By the Meerut Division (Indian Corps) near Neuve Chapelle.
(3) By the 8th Division (IIIrd Corps) near Le Bridoux.
(4) By the Vth Corps near Bellewarde Farm, east of Ypres.
It is with the operations of the Meerut and 8th Divisions, on the
immediate right and left of the 20th, that we are now concerned.
The Meerut Division was to assault the enemy’s trenches about
Mauquissait with the ultimate objective, should the enemy show signs
of demoralisation, of the high ground between Haut Pommereau and La
Cliqueterie Farm. This would pave the way for a further advance of
the Indian Corps in a south-easterly direction, breaking the enemy’s
line and assisting the advance further south by turning the La Bassée
defences. The Gharwal Brigade was detailed to attack on the right and
the Bareilly Brigade on the left.
The 8th Division, on the left of the 20th, was to attack the German
line from about La Boutillerie to Le Bridoux. Its further objective
was the capture of Bas Maisnil, Le Bridoux and Ferme Houssain, to
prepare the way for a possible advance of the whole corps to the
Aubers-Radinghem ridge. This operation was to be carried out in the
first instance by the 25th Brigade.
Between these two operations the 20th Division was to co-operate:--
(1) By making a smoke screen along the whole front, so as to
conceal the true points of attack.
(2) By covering its own front and the advance of the assaulting
columns on its flanks by fire.
(3) By cutting wire at certain points, both to deceive the enemy
and to facilitate a possible advance.
(4) By being prepared to assault the enemy’s line on the right
or left and to press forward in the centre, according to the
progress made by the divisions on the flanks.
The attack was preceded by a four days’ bombardment of the enemy’s
lines. His front and support trenches were badly damaged; strong-points
and houses in and behind his line were breached and lanes cut in his
wire. Although considerable damage was observed to have been done, the
enemy made very little retaliation.
During the bombardment, various means were adopted with the idea
of deceiving the enemy as to the actual time of attack. Rapid fire
was opened by the artillery as if for the final bombardment, and
searchlights were turned on to the enemy’s parapet which was then
brought under fire. One night, having fired a rocket, the troops in the
front trenches immediately began cheering, showing bayonets over the
parapet and throwing empty jam tins into the wire in order to induce
the enemy to man his parapet. One round was then fired by each gun on
the enemy’s front line.
On the night of the 24th/25th, headquarters of brigades proceeded to
their advanced report centres, and units in reserve were moved up to
support and assembly trenches which had been dug close behind the front
line so as to be ready, if necessary, to assume the offensive.
One battalion of the 59th Brigade was kept at Laventie to form, with
the 11th D.L.I. and the Divisional Mounted Troops, the Divisional
reserve.
Of the two attacks on the flanks of the 20th Division the first to be
launched was that on the left. At 4.30 A.M. the 8th Division
advanced and soon gained a footing in the enemy trenches, with the
exception of a detached force (on the immediate left of the 61st
Brigade) which was unable to get forward.
The 59th and 61st Brigades found the line opposite to them strongly
held by the enemy, whom they engaged with rifle and machine-gun fire.
No advance was possible on this part of the front.
About 10.30 A.M., the 8th Division asked for machine-gun fire
to be opened on its flank. During the afternoon it seemed to have
difficulty in holding the line it had gained, and the 61st Brigade
and the guns in support of it assisted by bringing artillery and
machine-gun fire to bear on parts of the enemy line near Bas Maisnil.
About half-past four a counter attack drove back the 8th Division
troops, who were reported at 6.40 P.M. to be again holding
their original line.
On the right of the 20th Division two battalions of the 60th Brigade
were able to advance. Astride the Winchester road the German line ran
out into a sharp salient, protruding into a wider re-entrant in our own
line. Opposite the north face of this salient, a sap had been dug for a
short distance out from the 60th Brigade trenches. It was intended in
the case of an advance of our troops, to continue this sap through to
the German line and make a fire trench of it, so connecting up the line
already held with the ground newly won.
Zero was fixed at 5.50 A.M. on the 25th. Two minutes before this a mine
was exploded in the enemy salient, and at zero the final bombardment
of the enemy line began. Six minutes later the smoke barrage was
started all along the front of the Division. This was effected by means
of smoke candles lighted on the parapet, or by phosphorus bombs and
grenades of all descriptions thrown by catapults and trench mortars. At
6 A.M. the Bareilly and Gharwal Brigades attacked.
The smoke barrages possibly helped the brigades on the right to
advance, but made it very difficult to observe from our line what was
going on. About 7 A.M., however, the troops of the Meerut
Division were known to be making good progress, and at their request
orders were issued at 7.30 A.M. for the 12th R.B. to advance
and connect up with the left of the Bareilly Brigade.
“D” Company of the 12th R.B. was ordered into the fire trench to
prepare for assault, with “B” and “C” in support, while “A” Company was
detailed to work on the sap. The actual order to assault was sent to
“D” Company at 8.10 A.M. but telephone communication with the
front line had broken down, and the message had to go by orderly and so
did not arrive till 8.25 A.M. when the assault began.
By this time the smoke barrages had cleared and all companies,
especially those in support, as they appeared in the open, suffered
heavy casualties both from shelling and from rifle and machine-gun fire
which enfiladed them from the left.
All three companies were across by 9.30 A.M., and once they had gained
the enemy’s trenches they met with little immediate opposition, and
began to consolidate a line running north and east of Mauquissait. They
gained touch with the left of the Bareilly Brigade and bombers were
pushed forward along the enemy trenches.
At the request of the Bareilly Brigade, the bombing officer and some
bombers of the 12th R.B. were sent forward towards the Moulin du Piètre
and joined the bombers of the Black Watch.
Meanwhile “A” Company had been working on the sap, but little progress
had been made owing to the heavy enfilade fire from the German
trenches. The first two sections who worked on this sap lost all their
men except two.
As soon as it was seen that the Bareilly Brigade had gained a footing
in the enemy trenches, a platoon of “A” Company got across to the
salient and began to sap back towards our line so as to meet the
trench which the rest of the company was making. This work also was
found to be impossible. The parapet was broken through and the sap
pushed some six or eight yards out, when work was practically brought
to a standstill by heavy fire further along the German line.
At 9.45 A.M. “A” Company of the 12th R.B. was relieved by “B”
Company of the 6th K.S.L.I., who continued to work under heavy fire.
The difficulties under which these parties worked were very great, and
the sap was never completed.
“A” Company of the 12th R.B. on being relieved from work on the sap
re-formed behind the parapet, and two platoons went forward. They were,
however, held up about half way across and had to take cover in a
ditch.
On the advance of the 12th R.B. the 6th K.S.L.I. occupied the trenches
just vacated along the Rue Tilleloy and later were ordered to advance.
At 11.30 A.M., just as the leading company reached the trenches forming
the north face of the salient, the Germans launched a strong bombing
attack against the Bareilly Brigade, which was forced to retire to its
original line. The second company advancing in support came under very
heavy fire, and was forced to take cover in a ditch where it was pinned
to the ground.
It was then about mid-day, and the survivors of the Bareilly Brigade
had got back to their own trenches. The right flank of the 12th R.B.
was thus uncovered, and the battalion was heavily attacked by bombers
on the front and on both flanks. The supply of bombs in the battalion
ran short, and casualties were heavy.
At 12.30 P.M., the 12th R.B. and the two companies of the 6th
K.S.L.I. were forced to retire. While doing so all companies again lost
heavily, though the retirement was gallantly covered by detachments of
both battalions from the reverse slope of the enemy’s parapet. These
men held their ground until the enemy came within a few yards of them,
and eventually got back by working their way along the ditches that ran
by the side of Winchester Road.
The bombers and machine gunners of the brigade worked under the brigade
bombing and machine-gun officers, and did very good work. The brigade
bombing officer--Lieut. Shaw--blocked one of the enemy’s trenches
on the left of our position in the salient. He held this block for
nearly two hours, and did not withdraw until he and his sergeant
were the only two left and all his bombs, including such German ones
as he could find, had been used. Lieut. Hankey of the 12th K.R.R.C.
also distinguished himself. For his excellent work in covering the
withdrawal, he was awarded the Legion of Honour.
Every effort had been made to cut the sap through between our line and
the enemy’s salient, but the work went very slowly. All digging in the
open was immediately stopped by enfilade machine-gun fire, and even
the continuation of the work by sap incurred casualties from shelling.
The wounded had to be carried back along the narrow trench and this
caused constant interruptions, so that when the retirement began little
progress had been made.
After all the other troops had got back, a few men were left in
occupation of the saphead until between 3 and 4 P.M., when
they also were withdrawn.
The Divisional Artillery did most valuable work during the day, by
keeping under fire the enemy’s trenches on the left of the attack, and
so reducing the very heavy casualties that must otherwise have been
inflicted by the machine guns on that flank.
In the light of later experiences some details of the signal
communications are interesting. Advanced Brigade Headquarters was
within 300 yards of the original front line, and single trench cables
were used up to that line. The shell fire was so local, that on the
whole these cables were maintained during the battle without great
difficulty. Behind Brigade Headquarters the line was never cut.
The retirement of the 12th R.B. and the 6th K.S.L.I. to the original
line was over by 2 P.M., and ended the day’s fighting. The
operations had been successful in holding the enemy to his ground,
and in preventing him from sending reinforcements to the scene of the
main attack. The brunt of the fighting fell on the 12th R.B., who held
on with great determination when their flanks had become exposed,
and who throughout the day fought splendidly, thoroughly earning the
congratulations sent them by the Divisional Commander.
The casualties were heavy considering the number of men actually
engaged--19 officers, and 542 other ranks in all; the 12th R.B. alone
lost 7 officers and 332 men; the 6th K.S.L.I. lost 4 officers and 59
men. During the day the enemy shelled the front trenches heavily, and
caused a considerable number of casualties among some of the battalions
that were not actively engaged. Of these the 12th K.R.R.C. suffered the
most; they lost altogether 3 officers and 75 other ranks.
The 61st Field Ambulance (Lieut.-Colonel W. J. S. Harvey) which was
attached to the 60th Brigade worked extremely well, and all the wounded
were cleared during the day. Lieut. G. A. Maling, R.A.M.C., won the
V.C. for his continuous bravery during these operations. He “worked
incessantly from 6.15 A.M. on the 25th till 8 A.M. on the 26th,
collecting and treating in the open under heavy shell fire more than
300 men. At about 11 A.M. on the 25th he was flung down and temporarily
stunned by the bursting of a large high explosive shell which wounded
his only assistant and killed several of his patients. A second shell
soon after covered him and his instruments with débris, but his high
courage and zeal never failed him, and he continued his gallant work
singlehanded.”[1]
It was expected that there would be a renewal of the fighting the
next day, but no further operations took place. On the contrary, a
demonstration that had been ordered for the 27th was cancelled the
afternoon before, and orders were issued that no gun ammunition of any
kind was to be expended for the time being except to repel attack or
for retaliation.
The casualties of the day’s fighting had materially reduced the
strength of the 60th Brigade, and on the 26th the 11th D.L.I.
(Pioneers) were attached as an extra battalion, and for the next six
weeks took their turn with the other battalions of the brigade in the
front line trenches. The excellent pioneer work that this battalion had
done was marked by letters of appreciation received on the 28th from
the C.E. IIIrd Corps and from the Corps Commander.
As Divisional reserve a brigade of the 23rd Division was attached
to the 20th. This was later reduced to two battalions, but was not
completely dispensed with until the 10th of November.
On the 28th the whole Division side-stepped about a mile to the right.
This brought the right flank to a sunken road about half a mile
north-east of Neuve Chapelle and the left to a point some quarter of
a mile north of Rouge Bancs. The line was held by the three brigades
in the same order as before, each brigade having two battalions in the
front trenches.
The Divisional Artillery was now complete again, the 93rd Brigade
and the sections of the 92nd having returned from Fleurbaix, and was
divided into four groups. On the right was “Tyler’s Group,” which
became “Ricardo’s Group” on the 11th of October, then the La Flinque
and Laventie Groups with the Croix Blanche Group on the left.
The movements necessitated by this rearrangement of the Divisional
front were much hindered by the state of the ground. There had been a
good deal of rain in the last few days, and the communication trenches
were thick in mud and in places nearly knee-deep in water. The night
was very dark and the trenches--especially in the area taken over from
the Meerut Division--were complicated by the labyrinth of assembly and
forming-up places which had been made for the attack on the 25th. The
relief was completed by 3.30 A.M. on the 29th, though minor
adjustments were made the next day.
At one point in the 59th Brigade front the line took a sudden turn
back for a short distance and then ran on in its original direction. A
corner was thus left which at night might very easily come under fire
from further down the line. To prevent this a red lamp was hung out
every night at the corner of the trench, which so came to be known as
the Red Lamp Salient.
A very gallant act was performed here on the 1st October when a mine
shaft got full of foul air and the R.E. listening post was overcome.
Captain G. H. Gilbey, Sgt. Toole and Pte. Holmes of “C” Company, 11th
R.B., descended the mine shaft at great risk and succeeded in rescuing
three out of the five men of the listening post. They persevered in
this work until they were exhausted. Captain Gilbey was given the M.C.
and Sgt. Toole and Pte. Holmes the D.C.M.
After the 25th of September there was no further offensive action on
the Laventie front to assist the operations that were still going on
south of the La Bassée Canal. Various measures, however, were adopted
from time to time with the purpose of leading the enemy to expect an
attack and of holding his troops to this part of the line.
Thus on the night of the 8th/9th of October an attempt to cut the
enemy’s wire at two points with gun-cotton torpedoes was made by the
59th Brigade.
Lieut. Hugh Jones and Lieut. Grant, both of the 96th Field Company,
R.E., directed the operations, and escorts were found by the 10th R.B.
and the 11th K.R.R.C. The enemy was very alert, and the right party
under Lieut. Grant was unable to reach the German lines owing to the
activity of hostile patrols. Eventually at 2.10 A.M. the
charge was fired in on enemy sap, where it did considerable damage;
the party then got away under heavy fire without casualties. Lieut.
Hugh Jones with the left party reached the wire at 1.30 A.M.
and placed the torpedoes in position. He attempted to fire them, but
was delayed by a faulty fuze. Suddenly the enemy opened a heavy fire
at point-blank range. Lieut. Hugh Jones was badly wounded, but he made
another attempt to fire the charge and only when this also failed and
two of his four men had been wounded did he withdraw. For his action on
this occasion he was awarded the M.C.
Still with the idea of holding the enemy to his ground a demonstration
was made on the 13th of October by the IIIrd and Indian Corps. On the
20th Division front the line of the 60th Brigade near Mauquissait was
chosen as the scene of a feint attack in which the assaulting troops
were to be represented by dummies.
During the preceding night a false parapet was built across a
re-entrant in the line. At 7 A.M. on the 13th the Divisional
Artillery opened fire, cutting the wire very effectively and shelling
various points in rear of the German position. The intense bombardment
which begun at 12.30 P.M. badly damaged the enemy’s front
line, and one gun firing on certain of his trenches in enfilade is
believed to have caused much loss to his troops as they manned the
parapet. At the same time a smoke barrage was started along the whole
of the 60th Brigade front. Boxes of free phosphorus had been put out
during the night between the lines and these were fired electrically
from the trenches, while catapults and trench mortars helped by
throwing smoke bombs. The screen was very effective, and covered the
front with a thick cloud for nearly two hours.
The 60th Brigade front line was at this time held by the 6th K.S.L.I.
on the right, the 11th D.L.I. in the centre, and the 12th R.B. on the
left. Two battalions--the D.L.I. and the R.B.--used dummies which
were made of sacks stuffed with straw and clothed with old salvaged
greatcoats and with caps either salvaged or else lent by the men.
On the front of the D.L.I. the smoke was too thick for the dummies to
be seen except for the first few minutes, when they were effectively
used.
Opposite the 12th R.B. on the left the smoke was not continually
dense, and in the clearer intervals the dummies were a great success.
They were stuck on bayonets, put over the parapet and then withdrawn;
they were rolled over the parapet as if shot, and then pulled back by
strings when the smoke became thick again; they were poked out of the
sally ports, moved up and down n sap in front of the trenches and laid
out in ditches in front so as to be just visible.
When the smoke barrage began the enemy opened heavy rifle and
machine-gun fire which he kept up for half an hour. Judging from
the intensity of this fire he must have been manning his parapet in
strength. At the same time the enemy field guns and howitzers severely
shelled our trenches, creating a barrage along the 60th Brigade front.
Most of the shells seem to have fallen on the support trenches and on
the old assembly places, for the 12th R.B. had only two casualties, and
this they attribute to the fact that all men of this battalion were
kept in the front trenches during the bombardment and none behind in
support. The trench mortars also came in for fairly heavy shelling. One
of the detachments had bad luck, for when the gun was being packed up
the officer and two men were killed and the third man wounded by the
last shell that the Germans fired in the course of these operations.
Our bombardment ceased at 2.10 P.M. and by 2.45 all was quiet.
There is no doubt that the demonstration was a success. The enemy must
have suffered a good deal from our shell fire, while the casualties
in the 20th Division were only about 50. The dummies were most
realistically worked so that the enemy was thoroughly deceived and
certainly concentrated his artillery on the area of the 60th Brigade.
A German communiqué dealing with this demonstration came later into
our hands. It ran: “A strong attack by the enemy was stopped at his
trenches.”
All this time mining, sniping, and other activities inseparable from
trench warfare continued on both sides. Patrols were constantly at
work at night examining the German line, noting the state of the wire
and the position of new works and showing much coolness and daring in
collecting all the information they could. 2nd Lieut. M. L. Cope of
the 11th R.B. won the M.C. while out with a patrol on the night of
the 16th of October. He raided and bombed a German listening post,
killing two of the enemy and routing the rest, and obtaining two
greatcoats and a rifle. When his bombs were exhausted he followed up
with his revolver and emptied the chambers into the Germans at six
yards’ range. Having no more ammunition he immediately went to the
assistance of a severely wounded man, whom he helped into cover. The
action for which Lieutenants G. Meredith and H. H. de D. Monk, both
of the 11th K.R.R.C., were awarded the M.C. may also be given here,
though it occurred on the night of the 24th-25th of November. These two
officers were reconnoitring with their company officer when the latter
was killed. For over an hour, under continuous and heavy fire and over
flooded and difficult ground, they dragged the body back until they
reached our trenches.
On the 31st a new breastwork was made in order to straighten off a
re-entrant near the Duck’s Bill--a projecting trench on the extreme
right of the Divisional line. The Meerut Division on the right carried
on the work towards the south. One thousand men of the 20th Division
were employed in three reliefs, and between 8 P.M. and 3
A.M. they built the breastwork throughout the whole length to
a height of four feet. The work was continued the following night until
stopped by heavy and continuous rain.
Brig.-General Ross, who had commanded the 61st Brigade since June 1915,
left the Division on the 13th of November to take command of the 6th
Division. He was succeeded by Brig.-General W. F. Sweny.
During November two more changes were made in the extent of the
Divisional front. On the 10th the Indian Corps was relieved by the XIth
Corps, a division of which--the Guards--took over the right of the 20th
Division line on the 14th. The 60th Brigade thus relieved moved to
Laventie in Divisional reserve. The two battalions of the 23rd Division
being then no longer required returned to their own area. At the same
time the 11th D.L.I. look up their regular duties again as a pioneer
battalion.
A further move between the 21st and the 24th left the Division holding
the sector from east of Picantin to west of Le Bridoux with the Guards
Division on the right and the 23rd on the left. Divisional headquarters
was now at Sailly-sur-la-Lys. Two brigades were in the line and one in
reserve, and they relieved each other in regular sequence every ten
days. The headquarters of the Divisional Artillery moved to Sailly on
the 27th, by which date the artillery units were settled in the new
area and organised in two groups, the right and the left, with C/92
Battery acting as a counter-battery.
During the remaining two months which the 20th Division spent in this
area operations were chiefly confined to artillery bombardments. There
was a raid by the 59th Brigade in December, and a modified gas attack
was carried out the night before the Division moved out of the line,
but otherwise the task of keeping the enemy occupied and damaging
his defences fell principally to the artillery, whose accurate fire
also played an important part in supporting the infantry raid. On the
20th of November the enemy’s line had been shelled with the object of
destroying his mine shafts and as much as possible of his trenches.
Other bombardments in which the Divisional Artillery took part were
carried out on the 28th and 30th. Although considerable damage was
done there was very little retaliation. Between the 6th and the 10th
of December the German position at Turk’s Point Salient, just south
of La Boutillerie, was shelled with good results, the heavy artillery
co-operating both in this bombardment and in another which took place
on the 3rd of January.
On the night of the 15th/16th of December a raid was carried out by
the 59th Brigade. For seven days beforehand the artillery fired on the
German wire, cutting eight lanes in it though only four of them were
intended to be used. These lanes were kept under machine-gun fire at
night, but in spite of this the Germans put up a certain amount of new
wire which had to be cut by infantry parties on the night of the raid.
A detailed reconnaissance was carried out and all arrangements were
made with the greatest care.
The attack was originally timed to be launched at 1 A.M. but
was put off till 2 to allow the moon to set. The night was then dark
with a little rain falling, and a slight wind blowing from the German
trenches.
Two attacks were made, one by the 10th R.B. on the right, the other by
the 11th K.R.R.C. on the left.
The right attack under Major Lascelles had much further to go than the
other--about 500 yards--and on this side it was found that the wire had
not been so effectively cut. Lieut. C.E.S. Rucker volunteered to take
out two wire-cutting parties and proceeded to open the lanes through
which the raiding parties were to pass. The wire-cutting parties did
most excellent and arduous work, but the task took longer than was
expected and before it could be completed the 11th K.R.R.C. on the
left had entered the enemy’s trenches. The Germans, now thoroughly
alert, manned a listening post just inside their wire. As surprise was
impossible it was decided to abandon the raid of the 10th R.B. Lieut.
Rucker then took out a bombing party, again volunteering for this task,
and under heavy fire threw six bombs into the listening post from a
distance of a few yards, almost certainly killing all the men inside
it. He was awarded the M.C. for his gallantry in carrying out these
duties.
The left attack was under Major J. F. R. Hope. Patrols sent out before
the assault found only the centre gap open; the other gaps had to be
cut by wire-cutters--a difficult task--to clear a passage through. The
attack was divided into three parties. The one on the right was cutting
the last strand at the time of the assault, and being discovered in
the enemy’s wire did not get in, though severe losses were inflicted
on the enemy by bombing from the parapet. About 24 men of the other
two parties got in and finding the trenches strongly held had sharp
fighting, while the artillery put down a most accurate curtain of fire
which effectually prevented the enemy from being reinforced. Once in
the trench, these two parties turned inwards, fighting their way along
until they met. They then retraced their steps, and the thoroughness
with which the trench was cleared and the effectiveness of the barrage
are shown by the fact that they came out unmolested.
Very soon, however, the Germans opened fire, making the work of
bringing in the wounded difficult and dangerous. Lieut. F. W. Warre
of the 11th K.R.R.C. received the M.C. for his gallant conduct in
getting all casualties back to our line. Not only was he the last man
to return, but on finding that some wounded had been left behind he
went back under heavy fire and collected them. He was wounded when
returning the second time.
The Germans were completely surprised, but fought with determination.
Their trenches were found to be very neat and well made, but with a
foot of water in the bottom.
The raid was made under most difficult conditions. Rain had flooded
the ditches, forming pools in places thirty yards or more across. Not
only had the men to crawl over the mud for 180 yards, but also they
had to lie down and wait for the time to attack. Their hands became so
numbed with cold that when they reached the objective they had great
difficulty in withdrawing the pins from the Mills bombs, and some were
seen sitting on the fire step under heavy fire pulling out the pins
with their teeth, while an officer was unable to let off his revolver.
In spite of all this at least 39 Germans were killed by the raiding
parties, and the artillery, trench mortars, and machine guns must have
accounted for a good many more. Our casualties were 5 men killed and 1
officer and 10 men wounded.
The artillery was excellent. The infantry report stated: “It would be
impossible to have got more accurate and ready support.”
The moral effect of the raid was very good. It was the first fighting
that this brigade had seen, and keen as the men were it was a source
of great encouragement to them to prove by experience that man for man
they were better than the Germans.
For their conspicuous gallantry and ability throughout the operation,
Sgt. E. G. Wimpey, Sgt. O. Green and Pte. H. Skeele, all of the 11th
K.R.R.C., were awarded the D.C.M.
One of the reasons which made the Divisional Artillery so thoroughly
dependable and effective, not only at this time but throughout the
war, was the close touch which was always maintained with the infantry.
A spirit of real camaraderie existed between the two arms; artillery
officers would frequently come to the dug-outs of infantry commanders
and discuss with them the best means of giving them all possible
assistance. The excellent results of this system were proved over and
over again.
In the middle of December preparations were made for a gas attack
which was to be delivered on the first suitable night after the 20th
of the month, in conjunction with raids by four small columns of the
59th Brigade. By the 20th 800 cylinders had been brought up to the
front line near Cordonnerie Farm and 50 to the parapet astride the La
Boutillerie road, and all preparations were complete.
The operation, however, was delayed for nearly three weeks by a
constantly unfavourable wind. Meanwhile orders arrived for the relief
of the 20th Division by the 8th. The move was to begin on the 9th
of January. Accordingly on the 6th and 7th 450 gas cylinders were
withdrawn from the front trenches. Then, on the 8th, the wind changed,
and as by 2 P.M. it was blowing from the north-west, orders
were immediately issued that the attack should take place that night
with the 400 cylinders which still remained in position.
At this time the Divisional front was held by the 60th Brigade on the
light and the 61st on the left. The 59th Brigade, which was to provide
the raiding parties, was in reserve. As the number of cylinders had
been so much reduced, it was decided to send forward only one raiding
party instead of four.
The gas was turned on at 2 A.M. on the 9th, but went slowly,
and was blown by gusts of westerly wind across the front of the
trenches to be attacked. As the right flank of the raiding party would
then have been exposed, and as the enemy throughout showed himself to
be particularly alert, the raid was finally abandoned.
Smoke barrages were made at 2.10 A.M. on the flanks of the
gas, and the artillery and trench mortars carried out a most excellent
and accurate bombardment. Machine guns assisted with indirect fire
which was good and never dropped. At 2.40 A.M. the gas was
turned off and the smoke barrages and machine gun and trench mortar
fire ceased.
During the time spent in the Laventie sector good work was done by
the Divisional Mounted Troops--Headquarters, “D” Squadron and the
Machine Gun Section, 1/1st Westmoreland and Cumberland Yeomanry--under
Lieut.-Colonel C. Beddington. Parties of “D” Squadron (Major E. B.
Lees) frequently did a tour of duty in the trenches, and the Machine
Gun Section was regularly employed in the line. On the 25th of
September Lieut. Leighton acted as Divisional Observation Officer and
Captain Curtis as Liaison Officer between Divisional Headquarters and
the Meerut Division. On the 8th of December Major Lees was invalided
home and Captain C. A. C. Hazelhurst took command of “D” Squadron. By
the 16th of January the squadron had 54 trained bombers--72 per cent.
of the men available for bombing instruction.
The 20th Divisional Cyclist Company, under Captain C. H. M. Johns, in
addition to providing orderlies, police and men for salvage and other
duties, provided working parties almost every day and night from the
middle of October, and put up a large amount of wire.
The gallant conduct of Lieut. Hankey, 12th K.R.R.C., while instructor
at the 60th Brigade bombing school, should be mentioned here. On three
separate occasions Lieut. Hankey saved lives by picking up and throwing
away lighted bombs which had been dropped or had fallen short. He was
later awarded the Albert Medal for these acts.
On the 9th the relief of the 20th by the 8th Division began, and by the
13th all units were in the reserve area, with Divisional Headquarters
at Blarnighem Château. Here they stayed for a week carrying out
training. Suddenly, on the 20th of January, the Division was ordered to
move north to the Second Army, having been specially selected by Lord
Cavan to form part of the new XIVth Corps.