1 State Archives, Paris, Etats Unis, vol. 43, fol. 100.
Undated, but evidently written early in the year 1795, when
Jay's Treaty was as yet unknown. Paine was then staying in
the house of the American Minister, Monroe.--' Editor,
The United States of America are negociating with Spain respecting the
free Navigation of the Mississippi, and the territorial limits of this
large river, in conformity with the Treaty of Peace with England dated
30th November, 1782. As the brilliant successes of the French Republic
have forced England to grant us, what was in all justice our due, so the
continuation of the prosperity of the Republic, will force Spain to make
a Treaty with us on the points in controversy.
Since it is certain that all that we shall obtain from Spain will be due
to the victories of France, and as the inhabitants of the western part
of the United States (which part contains or covers more than half
the United States), have decided to claim their rights to the free
navigation of the Mississippi, would it not be a wiser policy for the
Republican Government (who have only to command to obtain) to arrogate
all the merit, by making our demands to Spain, one of the conditions, of
France, to consent to restore peace to the Castilians. They have only
to declare, they will not make Peace, or that they will support with
all their might, the just reclamations of their allies against these
Powers,--against England for the surrender of the frontier posts, and
for the indemnities due through their depredations on our Trade, and
against Spain for our territorial limits, and the free navigation of
the Mississippi. This declaration would certainly not prolong the War a
single day more, nor cost the Republic an obole, whilst it would assure
all the merit of success to France, and besides produce all the good
effects mentioned above.
It may perhaps be observed that the Negociation is already finished
with England, and perhaps in a manner which will not be approved of by
France. That may be, (though the terms of this arrangement may not be
known); but as to Spain, the negociation is still pending, and it is
evident that if France makes the above _Declaration_ as to this Power
(which declaration would be a demonstrative proof of what she would
have done in the other case if circumstances had required it), she would
receive the same credit as if the Declaration had been made relatively
to the two Powers. In fact the Decree or resolution (and perhaps this
last would be preferable) can be worded in terms which would declare
that in case the arrangement with England were not satisfactory, France
will nevertheless, maintain the just demands of America against
that Power. A like Declaration, in case Mr. Jay should do anything
reprehensible, and which might even be approved of in America, would
certainly raise the reputation of the French Republic to the most
eminent degree of splendour, and lower in proportion that of her
enemies.
It is very certain that France cannot better favour the views of the
British party in America, and wound in a most sensible manner the
Republican Government of this country, than by adopting a strict and
oppressive policy with regard to us. Every one knows that the injustices
committed by the privateers and other ships belonging to the French
Republic against our navigation, were causes of exultation and joy
to this party, even when their own properties were subjected to these
depredations, whilst the friends of France and the Revolution were vexed
and most confused about it. It follows then, that a generous policy
would produce quite opposite effects--it would acquire for France the
merit that is her due; it would discourage the hopes of her adversaries,
and furnish the friends of humanity and liberty with the means of acting
against the intrigues of England, and cement the Union, and contribute
towards the true interests of the two republics.
So sublime and generous a manner of acting, which would not cost
anything to France, would cement in a stronger way the ties between
the two republics. The effect of such an event, would confound and
annihilate in an irrevocable manner all the partisans for the British
in America. There are nineteen twentieths of our nation attached through
inclination and gratitude to France, and the small number who seek
uselessly all sorts of pretexts to magnify the small occasions of
complaint which might have subsisted previously will find itself reduced
to silence, or have to join their expressions of gratitude to ours.--The
results of this event cannot be doubted, though not reckoned on: all the
American hearts will be French, and England will be afflicted.
An American.