1 Printed from the first edition, whose title is as above,
with the addition: "By Thomas Paine, Author of Common Sense;
Rights of Man; Age of Reason. Paris, Printed at the
English Press, me de Vaugerard, No. 970. Third year of the
French Republic." The pamphlet seems to have appeared early
in July (perhaps the Fourth), 1795, and was meant to
influence the decision of the National Convention on the
Constitution then under discussion. This Constitution,
adopted September 23d, presently swept away by Napoleon,
contained some features which appeared to Paine reactionary.
Those to which he most objected are quoted by him in his
speech in the Convention, which is bound up in the same
pamphlet, and follows this "Dissertation" in the present
volume. In the Constitution as adopted Paine's preference
for a plural Executive was established, and though the
bicameral organization (the Council of Five Hundred and the
Council of Ancients) was not such as he desired, his chief
objection was based on his principle of manhood suffrage.
But in regard to this see Paine's "Dissertations on
Government," written nine years before (vol. ii., ch. vi. of
this work), and especially p. 138 seq. of that volume, where
he indicates the method of restraining the despotism of
numbers.--_Editor._,
There is no subject more interesting to every man than the subject of
government. His security, be he rich or poor, and in a great measure
his prosperity, are connected therewith; it is therefore his interest
as well as his duty to make himself acquainted with its principles, and
what the practice ought to be.
Every art and science, however imperfectly known at first, has been
studied, improved, and brought to what we call perfection by the
progressive labours of succeeding generations; but the science of
government has stood still. No improvement has been made in the
principle and scarcely any in the practice till the American revolution
began. In all the countries of Europe (except in France) the same forms
and systems that were erected in the remote ages of ignorance still
continue, and their antiquity is put in the place of principle; it is
forbidden to investigate their origin, or by what right they exist.
If it be asked how has this happened, the answer is easy: they are
established on a principle that is false, and they employ their power to
prevent detection.
Notwithstanding the mystery with which the science of government has
been enveloped, for the purpose of enslaving, plundering, and imposing
upon mankind, it is of all things the least mysterious and the most easy
to be understood. The meanest capacity cannot be at a loss, if it begins
its enquiries at the right point. Every art and science has some point,
or alphabet, at which the study of that art or science begins, and by
the assistance of which the progress is facilitated. The same method
ought to be observed with respect to the science of government.
Instead then of embarrassing the subject in the outset with the numerous
subdivisions under which different forms of government have been
classed, such as aristocracy, democracy, oligarchy, monarchy, &c.
the better method will be to begin with what may be called primary
divisions, or those under which all the several subdivisions will be
comprehended.
The primary divisions are but two:
First, government by election and representation.
Secondly, government by hereditary succession.
All the several forms and systems of government, however numerous
or diversified, class themselves under one or other of those primary
divisions; for either they are on the system of representation, or on
that of hereditary succession. As to that equivocal thing called mixed
government, such as the late government of Holland, and the present
government of England, it does not make an exception to the general
rule, because the parts separately considered are either representative
or hereditary.
Beginning then our enquiries at this point, we have first to examine
into the nature of those two primary divisions.
If they are equally right in principle, it is mere matter of opinion
which we prefer. If the one be demonstratively better than the other,
that difference directs our choice; but if one of them should be so
absolutely false as not to have a right to existence, the matter settles
itself at once; because a negative proved on one thing, where two only
are offered, and one must be accepted, amounts to an affirmative on the
other.
The revolutions that are now spreading themselves in the world have
their origin in this state of the case, and the present war is a
conflict between the representative system founded on the rights of the
people, and the hereditary system founded in usurpation. As to what are
called Monarchy, Royalty, and Aristocracy, they do not, either as things
or as terms, sufficiently describe the hereditary system; they are but
secondary things or signs of the hereditary system, and which fall of
themselves if that system has not a right to exist. Were there no
such terms as Monarchy, Royalty, and Aristocracy, or were other terms
substituted in their place, the hereditary system, if it continued,
would not be altered thereby. It would be the same system under any
other titulary name as it is now.
The character therefore of the revolutions of the present day
distinguishes itself most definitively by grounding itself on the system
of representative government, in opposition to the hereditary. No other
distinction reaches the whole of the principle.
Having thus opened the case generally, I proceed, in the first place, to
examine the hereditary system, because it has the priority in point of
time. The representative system is the invention of the modern world;
and, that no doubt may arise as to my own opinion, I declare it
before hand, which is, _that there is not a problem in Euclid more
mathematically true, than that hereditary government has not a right to
exist. When therefore we take from any man the exercise of hereditary
power, we take away that which he never had the right to possess, and
which no law or custom could, or ever can, give him a title to_.
The arguments that have hitherto been employed against the hereditary
system have been chiefly founded upon the absurdity of it, and its
incompetency to the purpose of good government. Nothing can present to
our judgment, or to our imagination, a figure of greater absurdity, than
that of seeing the government of a nation fall, as it frequently does,
into the hands of a lad necessarily destitute of experience, and often
little better than a fool. It is an insult to every man of years, of
character, and of talents, in a country. The moment we begin to reason
upon the hereditary system, it falls into derision; let but a single
idea begin, and a thousand will soon follow. Insignificance, imbecility,
childhood, dotage, want of moral character; in fine, every defect
serious or laughable unite to hold up the hereditary system as a figure
of ridicule. Leaving, however, the ridiculousness of the thing to the
reflections of the reader, I proceed to the more important part of the
question, namely, whether such a system has a right to exist.
To be satisfied of the right of a thing to exist, we must be satisfied
that it had a right to begin. If it had not a right to begin, it has not
a right to continue. By what right then did the hereditary system begin?
Let a man but ask himself this question, and he will find that he cannot
satisfy himself with an answer.
The right which any man or any family had to set itself up at first to
govern a nation, and to establish itself hereditarily, was no other than
the right which Robespierre had to do the same thing in France. If he
had none, they had none. If they had any, he had as much; for it is
impossible to discover superiority of right in any family, by virtue of
which hereditary government could begin. The Capets, the Guelphs,
the Robespierres, the Marats, are all on the same standing as to the
question of right. It belongs exclusively to none.
It is one step towards liberty, to perceive that hereditary government
could not begin as an exclusive right in any family. The next point
will be, whether, having once begun, it could grow into a right by the
influence of time.
This would be supposing an absurdity; for either it is putting time in
the place of principle, or making it superior to principle; whereas time
has no more connection with, or influence upon principle, than principle
has upon time. The wrong which began a thousand years ago, is as much a
wrong as if it began to-day; and the right which originates to-day, is
as much a right as if it had the sanction of a thousand years. Time with
respect to principles is an eternal now: it has no operation upon them:
it changes nothing of their nature and qualities. But what have we to
do with a thousand years? Our life-time is but a short portion of that
period, and if we find the wrong in existence as soon as we begin to
live, that is the point of time at which it begins to us; and our right
to resist it is the same as if it never existed before.
As hereditary government could not begin as a natural right in any
family, nor derive after its commencement any right from time, we have
only to examine whether there exist in a nation a right to set it up,
and establish it by what is called law, as has been done in England. I
answer NO; and that any law or any constitution made for that purpose is
an act of treason against the right of every minor in the nation, at the
time it is made, and against the rights of all succeeding generations.
I shall speak upon each of those cases. First, of the minor at the time
such law is made. Secondly, of the generations that are to follow.
A nation, in a collective sense, comprehends all the individuals of
whatever age, from just born to just dying. Of these, one part will be
minors, and the other aged. The average of life is not exactly the same
in every climate and country, but in general, the minority in years are
the majority in numbers; that is, the number of persons under twenty-one
years, is greater than the number of persons above that age. This
difference in number is not necessary to the establishment of the
principle I mean to lay down, but it serves to shew the justice of it
more strongly. The principle would be equally as good, if the majority
in years were also the majority in numbers.
The rights of minors are as sacred as the rights of the aged. The
difference is altogether in the different age of the two parties, and
nothing in the nature of the rights; the rights are the same rights;
and are to be preserved inviolate for the inheritance of the minors when
they shall come of age. During the minority of minors their rights are
under the sacred guardianship of the aged. The minor cannot surrender
them; the guardian cannot dispossess him; consequently, the aged part
of a nation, who are the law-makers for the time being, and who, in the
march of life are but a few years ahead of those who are yet minors, and
to whom they must shortly give place, have not and cannot have the right
to make a law to set up and establish hereditary government, or, to
speak more distinctly, _an hereditary succession of governors_; because
it is an attempt to deprive every minor in the nation, at the time such
a law is made, of his inheritance of rights when he shall come of age,
and to subjugate him to a system of government to which, during his
minority, he could neither consent nor object.
If a person who is a minor at the time such a law is proposed, had
happened to have been born a few years sooner, so as to be of the age of
twenty-one years at the time of proposing it, his right to have objected
against it, to have exposed the injustice and tyrannical principles of
it, and to have voted against it, will be admitted on all sides. If,
therefore, the law operates to prevent his exercising the same rights
after he comes of age as he would have had a right to exercise had he
been of age at the time, it is undeniably a law to take away and annul
the rights of every person in the nation who shall be a minor at the
time of making such a law, and consequently the right to make it cannot
exist.
I come now to speak of government by hereditary succession, as it
applies to succeeding generations; and to shew that in this case, as in
the case of minors, there does not exist in a nation a right to set it
up.
A nation, though continually existing, is continually in a state of
renewal and succession. It is never stationary.
Every day produces new births, carries minors forward to maturity, and
old persons from the stage. In this ever running flood of generations
there is no part superior in authority to another. Could we conceive an
idea of superiority in any, at what point of time, or in what century of
the world, are we to fix it? To what cause are we to ascribe it? By
what evidence are we to prove it? By what criterion are we to know it? A
single reflection will teach us that our ancestors, like ourselves, were
but tenants for life in the great freehold of rights. The fee-absolute
was not in them, it is not in us, it belongs to the whole family of
man, thro* all ages. If we think otherwise than this, we think either as
slaves or as tyrants. As slaves, if we think that any former generation
had a right to bind us; as tyrants, if we think that we have authority
to bind the generations that are to follow.
It may not be inapplicable to the subject, to endeavour to define what
is to be understood by a generation, in the sense the word is here used.
As a natural term its meaning is sufficiently clear. The father, the
son, the grandson, are so many distinct generations. But when we speak
of a generation as describing the persons in whom legal authority
resides, as distinct from another generation of the same description who
are to succeed them, it comprehends all those who are above the age of
twenty-one years, at the time that we count from; and a generation of
this kind will continue in authority between fourteen and twenty-one
years, that is, until the number of minors, who shall have arrived at
age, shall be greater than the number of persons remaining of the former
stock.
For example: if France, at this or any other moment, contains
twenty-four millions of souls, twelve millions will be males, and twelve
females. Of the twelve millions of males, six millions will be of the
age of twenty-one years, and six will be under, and the authority
to govern will reside in the first six. But every day will make some
alteration, and in twenty-one years every one of those minors who
survives will have arrived at age, and the greater part of the former
stock will be gone: the majority of persons then living, in whom the
legal authority resides, will be composed of those who, twenty-one years
before, had no legal existence. Those will be fathers and grandfathers
in their turn, and, in the next twenty-one years, (or less) another race
of minors, arrived at age, will succeed them, and so on.
As this is ever the case, and as every generation is equal in rights to
another, it consequently follows, that there cannot be a right in any
to establish government by hereditary succession, because it would be
supposing itself possessed of a right superior to the rest, namely,
that of commanding by its own authority how the world shall be hereafter
governed and who shall govern it. Every age and generation is, and must
be, (as a matter of right,) as free to act for itself in all cases, as
the age and generation that preceded it. The vanity and presumption of
governing beyond the grave is the most ridiculous and insolent of all
tyrannies. Man has no property in man, neither has one generation a
property in the generations that are to follow.
In the first part of the Rights of Man I have spoken of government by
hereditary succession; and I will here close the subject with an extract
from that work, which states it under the two following heads. (1)
1 The quotation, here omitted, will be found in vol. ii. of
this work, beginning with p. 364, and continuing, with a few
omissions, to the 15th line of p. 366. This "Dissertation"
was originally written for circulation in Holland, where
Paine's "Rights of Man" was not well known.--_Editor._
*****
The history of the English parliament furnishes an example of this kind;
and which merits to be recorded, as being the greatest instance of
legislative ignorance and want of principle that is to be found in any
country. The case is as follows:
The English parliament of 1688, imported a man and his wife from
Holland, _William and Mary_, and made them king and queen of England.
(2) Having done this, the said parliament made a law to convey the
government of the country to the heirs of William and Mary, in the
following words: "We, the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, do,
in the name of the people of England, most humbly and faithfully submit
_ourselves, our heirs, and posterities_, to William and Mary, _their
heirs and posterities_, for ever." And in a subsequent law, as quoted by
Edmund Burke, the said parliament, in the name of the people of England
then living, _binds the said people, their heirs and posterities, to
William and Mary, their heirs and posterities, to the end of time_.
2 "The Bill of Rights (temp. William III.) shows that the
Lords and Commons met not in Parliament but in convention,
that they declared against James II., and in favour of
William III. The latter was accepted as sovereign, and, when
monarch. Acta of Parliament were passed confirming what had
been done."--Joseph Fisher in Notes and Queries (London),
May 2,1874. This does not affect Paine's argument, as a
Convention could have no more right to bind the future than
a Parliament.--_Editor._.
It is not sufficient that we laugh at the ignorance of such law-makers;
it is necessary that we reprobate their want of principle. The
constituent assembly of France, 1789, fell into the same vice as the
parliament of England had done, and assumed to establish an hereditary
succession in the family of the Capets, as an act of the constitution
of that year. That every nation, _for the time being_, has a right to
govern itself as it pleases, must always be admitted; but government by
hereditary succession is government for another race of people, and
not for itself; and as those on whom it is to operate are not yet in
existence, or are minors, so neither is the right in existence to set it
up for them, and to assume such a right is treason against the right of
posterity.
I here close the arguments on the first head, that of government by
hereditary succession; and proceed to the second, that of government
by election and representation; or, as it may be concisely expressed,
_representative government_, in contra-distinction to _hereditary
government_.
Reasoning by exclusion, if _hereditary government_ has not a right to
exist, and that it has not is proveable, _representative government_ is
admitted of course.
In contemplating government by election and representation, we amuse
not ourselves in enquiring when or how, or by what right, it began. Its
origin is ever in view. Man is himself the origin and the evidence
of the right. It appertains to him in right of his existence, and his
person is the title deed.(1)
The true and only true basis of representative government is equality of
Rights. Every man has a right to one vote, and no more, in the choice
of representatives. The rich have no more right to exclude the poor from
the right of voting, or of electing and being elected, than the poor
have to exclude the rich; and wherever it is attempted, or proposed, on
either side, it is a question of force and not of right. Who is he that
would exclude another? That other has a right to exclude him.
That which is now called aristocracy implies an inequality of rights;
but who are the persons that have a right to establish this inequality?
Will the rich exclude themselves? No. Will the poor exclude themselves?
No. By what right then can any be excluded? It would be a question, if
any man or class of men have a right to exclude themselves; but, be this
as it may, they cannot have the right to exclude another. The poor will
not delegate such a right to the rich, nor the rich to the poor, and to
assume it is not only to assume arbitrary power, but to assume a right
to commit robbery. Personal rights, of which the right of voting for
representatives is one, are a species of property of the most sacred
kind: and he that would employ his pecuniary property, or presume upon
the influence it gives him, to dispossess or rob another of his property
of rights, uses that pecuniary property as he would use fire-arms, and
merits to have it taken from him.
1 "The sacred rights of mankind are not to be rummaged for
among old parchments or musty records. They are written as
with a sunbeam in the whole volume of human nature by the
hand of Divinity itself, and can never be erased or obscured
by mortal power."--Alexander Hamilton, 1775. (Cf. Rights of
Man, Toi. ii., p. 304): "Portions of antiquity by proving
everything establish nothing. It is authority against
authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of
the rights of man at the creation."--_Editor._.
Inequality of rights is created by a combination in one part of the
community to exclude another part from its rights. Whenever it be made
an article of a constitution, or a law, that the right of voting, or
of electing and being elected, shall appertain exclusively to persons
possessing a certain quantity of property, be it little or much, it is a
combination of the persons possessing that quantity to exclude those who
do not possess the same quantity. It is investing themselves with powers
as a self-created part of society, to the exclusion of the rest.
It is always to be taken for granted, that those who oppose an equality
of rights never mean the exclusion should take place on themselves; and
in this view of the case, pardoning the vanity of the thing, aristocracy
is a subject of laughter. This self-soothing vanity is encouraged by
another idea not less selfish, which is, that the opposers conceive they
are playing a safe game, in which there is a chance to gain and none
to lose; that at any rate the doctrine of equality includes _them_,
and that if they cannot get more rights than those whom they oppose and
would exclude, they shall not have less. This opinion has already been
fatal to thousands, who, not contented with _equal rights_, have sought
more till they lost all, and experienced in themselves the degrading
_inequality_ they endeavoured to fix upon others.
In any view of the case it is dangerous and impolitic, sometimes
ridiculous, and always unjust, to make property the criterion of the
right of voting. If the sum or value of the property upon which the
right is to take place be considerable, it will exclude a majority of
the people, and unite them in a common interest against the government
and against those who support it; and as the power is always with
the majority, they can overturn such a government and its supporters
whenever they please.
If, in order to avoid this danger, a small quantity of property be
fixed, as the criterion of the right, it exhibits liberty in disgrace,
by putting it in competition with accident and insignificance. When a
brood-mare shall fortunately produce a foal or a mule that, by being
worth the sum in question, shall convey to its owner the right of
voting, or by its death take it from him, in whom does the origin of
such a right exist? Is it in the man, or in the mule? When we consider
how many ways property may be acquired without merit, and lost without a
crime, we ought to spurn the idea of making it a criterion of rights.
But the offensive part of the case is, that this exclusion from the
right of voting implies a stigma on the moral char* acter of the persons
excluded; and this is what no part of the community has a right to
pronounce upon another part. No external circumstance can justify it:
wealth is no proof of moral character; nor poverty of the want of it.
On the contrary, wealth is often the presumptive evidence of dishonesty;
and poverty the negative evidence of innocence. If therefore property,
whether little or much, be made a criterion, the means by which that
property has been acquired ought to be made a criterion also.
The only ground upon which exclusion from the right of voting is
consistent with justice, would be to inflict it as a punishment for a
certain time upon those who should propose to take away that right from
others. The right of voting for representatives is the primary right by
which other rights are protected. To take away this right is to reduce
a man to slavery, for slavery consists in being subject to the will of
another, and he that has not a vote in the election of representatives
is in this case. The proposal therefore to disfranchise any class of men
is as criminal as the proposal to take away property. When we speak
of right, we ought always to unite with it the idea of duties: rights
become duties by reciprocity. The right which I enjoy becomes my duty
to guarantee it to another, and he to me; and those who violate the duty
justly incur a forfeiture of the right.
In a political view of the case, the strength and permanent security
of government is in proportion to the number of people interested in
supporting it. The true policy therefore is to interest the whole by
an equality of rights, for the danger arises from exclusions. It is
possible to exclude men from the right of voting, but it is impossible
to exclude them from the right of rebelling against that exclusion; and
when all other rights are taken away, the right of rebellion is made
perfect.
While men could be persuaded they had no rights, or that rights
appertained only to a certain class of men, or that government was a
thing existing in right of itself, it was not difficult to govern
them authoritatively. The ignorance in which they were held, and the
superstition in which they were instructed, furnished the means of doing
it. But when the ignorance is gone, and the superstition with it; when
they perceive the imposition that has been acted upon them; when they
reflect that the cultivator and the manufacturer are the primary
means of all the wealth that exists in the world, beyond what nature
spontaneously produces; when they begin to feel their consequence by
their usefulness, and their right as members of society, it is then no
longer possible to govern them as before. The fraud once detected
cannot be re-acted. To attempt it is to provoke derision, or invite
destruction.
That property will ever be unequal is certain. Industry, superiority
of talents, dexterity of management, extreme frugality, fortunate
opportunities, or the opposite, or the means of those things, will ever
produce that effect, without having recourse to the harsh, ill sounding
names of avarice and oppression; and besides this, there are some men
who, though they do not despise wealth, will not stoop to the drudgery
or the means of acquiring it, nor will be troubled with it beyond their
wants or their independence; whilst in others there is an avidity to
obtain it by every means not punishable; it makes the sole business of
their lives, and they follow it as a religion. All that is required
with respect to property is to obtain it honestly, and not employ it
criminally; but it is always criminally employed when it is made a
criterion for exclusive rights.
In institutions that are purely pecuniary, such as that of a bank or a
commercial company, the rights of the members composing that company are
wholly created by the property they invest therein; and no other rights
are represented in the government of that company, than what arise out
of that property; neither has that government cognizance of _any thing
but property_.
But the case is totally different with respect to the institution of
civil government, organized on the system of representation. Such a
government has cognizance of every thing, and of _every man_ as a member
of the national society, whether he has property or not; and, therefore,
the principle requires that _every man_, and _every kind of right_, be
represented, of which the right to acquire and to hold property is but
one, and that not of the most essential kind. The protection of a man's
person is more sacred than the protection of property; and besides
this, the faculty of performing any kind of work or services by which
he acquires a livelihood, or maintaining his family, is of the nature of
property. It is property to him; he has acquired it; and it is as much
the object of his protection as exterior property, possessed without
that faculty, can be the object of protection in another person.
I have always believed that the best security for property, be it much
or little, is to remove from every part of the community, as far as
can possibly be done, every cause of complaint, and every motive to
violence; and this can only be done by an equality of rights. When
rights are secure, property is secure in consequence. But when property
is made a pretence for unequal or exclusive rights, it weakens the right
to hold the property, and provokes indignation and tumult; for it is
unnatural to believe that property can be secure under the guarantee of
a society injured in its rights by the influence of that property.
Next to the injustice and ill-policy of making property a pretence
for exclusive rights, is the unaccountable absurdity of giving to mere
_sound_ the idea of property, and annexing to it certain rights; for
what else is a _title_ but sound? Nature is often giving to the world
some extraordinary men who arrive at fame by merit and universal
consent, such as Aristotle, Socrates, Plato, &c. They were truly great
or noble.
But when government sets up a manufactory of nobles, it is as absurd
as if she undertook to manufacture wise men. Her nobles are all
counterfeits.
This wax-work order has assumed the name of aristocracy; and the
disgrace of it would be lessened if it could be considered only as
childish imbecility. We pardon foppery because of its insignificance"
and on the same ground we might pardon the foppery of Titles. But the
origin of aristocracy was worse than foppery. It was robbery. The
first aristocrats in all countries were brigands. Those of later times,
sycophants.
It is very well known that in England, (and the same will be found
in other countries) the great landed estates now held in descent were
plundered from the quiet inhabitants at the conquest. The possibility
did not exist of acquiring such estates honestly. If it be asked how
they could have been acquired, no answer but that of robbery can
be given. That they were not acquired by trade, by commerce, by
manufactures, by agriculture, or by any reputable employment, is
certain. How then were they acquired? Blush, aristocracy, to hear your
origin, for your progenitors were Thieves. They were the Robespierres
and the Jacobins of that day. When they had committed the robbery, they
endeavoured to lose the disgrace of it by sinking their real names under
fictitious ones, which they called Titles. It is ever the practice of
Felons to act in this manner. They never pass by their real names.(1)
1 This and the preceding paragraph have been omitted from
some editions.--Editor.
As property, honestly obtained, is best secured by an equality of
Rights, so ill-gotten property depends for protection on a monopoly of
rights. He who has robbed another of his property, will next endeavour
to disarm him of his rights, to secure that property; for when the
robber becomes the legislator he believes himself secure. That part
of the government of England that is called the house of lords, was
originally composed of persons who had committed the robberies of which
I have been speaking. It was an association for the protection of the
property they had stolen.
But besides the criminality of the origin of aristocracy, it has an
injurious effect on the moral and physical character of man. Like
slavery it debilitates the human faculties; for as the mind bowed down
by slavery loses in silence its elastic powers, so, in the contrary
extreme, when it is buoyed up by folly, it becomes incapable of exerting
them, and dwindles into imbecility. It is impossible that a mind
employed upon ribbands and titles can ever be great. The childishness of
the objects consumes the man.
It is at all times necessary, and more particularly so during the
progress of a revolution, and until right ideas confirm themselves by
habit, that we frequently refresh our patriotism by reference to first
principles. It is by tracing things to their origin that we learn to
understand them: and it is by keeping that line and that origin always
in view that we never forget them.
An enquiry into the origin of Rights will demonstrate to us that
_rights_ are not _gifts_ from one man to another, nor from one class of
men to another; for who is he who could be the first giver, or by what
principle, or on what authority, could he possess the right of giving? A
declaration of rights is not a creation of them, nor a donation of them.
It is a manifest of the principle by which they exist, followed by a
detail of what the rights are; for every civil right has a natural
right for its foundation, and it includes the principle of a reciprocal
guarantee of those rights from man to man. As, therefore, it is
impossible to discover any origin of rights otherwise than in the origin
of man, it consequently follows, that rights appertain to man in right
of his existence only, and must therefore be equal to every man. The
principle of an _equality of rights_ is clear and simple. Every man can
understand it, and it is by understanding his rights that he learns his
duties; for where the rights of men are equal, every man must finally
see the necessity of protecting the rights of others as the most
effectual security for his own. But if, in the formation of a
constitution, we depart from the principle of equal rights, or attempt
any modification of it, we plunge into a labyrinth of difficulties from
which there is no way out but by retreating. Where are we to stop? Or
by what principle are we to find out the point to stop at, that shall
discriminate between men of the same country, part of whom shall be
free, and the rest not? If property is to be made the criterion, it is
a total departure from every moral principle of liberty, because it
is attaching rights to mere matter, and making man the agent of that
matter. It is, moreover, holding up property as an apple of discord,
and not only exciting but justifying war against it; for I maintain the
principle, that when property is used as an instrument to take away the
rights of those who may happen not to possess property, it is used to an
unlawful purpose, as fire-arms would be in a similar case.
In a state of nature all men are equal in rights, but they are not equal
in power; the weak cannot protect themselves against the strong. This
being the case, the institution of civil society is for the purpose
of making an equalization of powers that shall be parallel to, and
a guarantee of, the equality of rights. The laws of a country, when
properly constructed, apply to this purpose. Every man takes the arm of
the law for his protection as more effectual than his own; and therefore
every man has an equal right in the formation of the government, and
of the laws by which he is to be governed and judged. In extensive
countries and societies, such as America and France, this right in the
individual can only be exercised by delegation, that is, by election and
representation; and hence it is that the institution of representative
government arises.
Hitherto, I have confined myself to matters of principle only. First,
that hereditary government has not a right to exist; that it cannot be
established on any principle of right; and that it is a violation of all
principle. Secondly, that government by election and representation has
its origin in the natural and eternal rights of man; for whether a man
be his own lawgiver, as he would be in a state of nature; or whether he
exercises his portion of legislative sovereignty in his own person, as
might be the case in small democracies where all could assemble for the
formation of the laws by which they were to be governed; or whether he
exercises it in the choice of persons to represent him in a national
assembly of representatives, the origin of the right is the same in
all cases. The first, as is before observed, is defective in power; the
second, is practicable only in democracies of small extent; the third,
is the greatest scale upon which human government can be instituted.
Next to matters of _principle_ are matters of _opinion_, and it is
necessary to distinguish between the two. Whether the rights of men
shall be equal is not a matter of opinion but of right, and consequently
of principle; for men do not hold their rights as grants from each
other, but each one in right of himself. Society is the guardian but not
the giver. And as in extensive societies, such as America and France,
the right of the individual in matters of government cannot be exercised
but by election and representation, it consequently follows that the
only system of government consistent with principle, where simple
democracy is impracticable, is the representative system. But as to the
organical part, or the manner in which the several parts of government
shall be arranged and composed, it is altogether _matter of opinion_,
It is necessary that all the parts be conformable with the _principle of
equal rights_; and so long as this principle be religiously adhered to,
no very material error can take place, neither can any error continue
long in that part which falls within the province of opinion.
In all matters of opinion, the social compact, or the principle by which
society is held together, requires that the majority of opinions becomes
the rule for the whole, and that the minority yields practical obedience
thereto. This is perfectly conformable to the principle of equal rights:
for, in the first place, every man has a _right to give an opinion_ but
no man has a right that his opinion should _govern the rest_. In the
second place, it is not supposed to be known beforehand on which side
of any question, whether for or against, any man's opinion will fall.
He may happen to be in a majority upon some questions, and in a minority
upon others; and by the same rule that he expects obedience in the one
case, he must yield it in the other. All the disorders that have arisen
in France, during the progress of the revolution, have had their origin,
not in the _principle of equal rights_, but in the violation of that
principle. The principle of equal rights has been repeatedly violated,
and that not by the majority but by the minority, and _that minority
has been composed of men possessing property as well as of men without
property; property, therefore, even upon the experience already had,
is no more a criterion of character than it is of rights_. It will
sometimes happen that the minority are right, and the majority are
wrong, but as soon as experience proves this to be the case, the
minority will increase to a majority, and the error will reform itself
by the tranquil operation of freedom of opinion and equality of rights.
Nothing, therefore, can justify an insurrection, neither can it ever be
necessary where rights are equal and opinions free.
Taking then the principle of equal rights as the foundation of the
revolution, and consequently of the constitution, the organical part,
or the manner in which the several parts of the government shall be
arranged in the constitution, will, as is already said, fall within the
province of opinion.
Various methods will present themselves upon a question of this kind,
and tho' experience is yet wanting to determine which is the best,
it has, I think, sufficiently decided which is the worst. That is
the worst, which in its deliberations and decisions is subject to
the precipitancy and passion of an individual; and when the whole
legislature is crowded into one body it is an individual in mass. In all
cases of deliberation it is necessary to have a corps of reserve, and it
would be better to divide the representation by lot into two parts, and
let them revise and correct each other, than that the whole should sit
together, and debate at once.
Representative government is not necessarily confined to any one
particular form. The principle is the same in all the forms under which
it can be arranged. The equal rights of the people is the root from
which the whole springs, and the branches may be arranged as present
opinion or future experience shall best direct. As to that _hospital of
incurables_ (as Chesterfield calls it), the British house of peers,
it is an excrescence growing out of corruption; and there is no more
affinity or resemblance between any of the branches of a legislative
body originating from the right of the people, and the aforesaid
house of peers, than between a regular member of the human body and an
ulcerated wen.
As to that part of government that is called the _executive_, it is
necessary in the first place to fix a precise meaning to the word.
There are but two divisions into which power can be arranged. First,
that of willing or decreeing the laws; secondly, that of executing or
putting them in practice. The former corresponds to the intellectual
faculties of the human mind, which reasons and determines what shall be
done; the second, to the mechanical powers of the human body, that puts
that determination into practice.(1) If the former decides, and the
latter does not perform, it is a state of imbecility; and if the latter
acts without the predetermination of the former, it is a state
of lunacy. The executive department therefore is official, and is
subordinate to the legislative, as the body is to the mind, in a
state of health; for it is impossible to conceive the idea of two
sovereignties, a sovereignty to _will_, and a sovereignty to _act_.
The executive is not invested with the power of deliberating whether it
shall act or not; it has no discretionary authority in the case; for it
can _act no other thing_ than what the laws decree, and it is _obliged_
to act conformably thereto; and in this view of the case, the executive
is made up of all the official departments that execute the laws, of
which that which is called the judiciary is the chief.
1 Paine may have had in mind the five senses, with reference
to the proposed five members of the Directory.--_Editor._.
But mankind have conceived an idea that _some kind of authority_ is
necessary to _superintend_ the execution of the laws and to see
that they are faithfully performed; and it is by confounding this
superintending authority with the official execution that we get
embarrassed about the term _executive power_. All the parts in the
governments of the United States of America that are called THE
EXECUTIVE, are no other than authorities to superintend the execution of
the laws; and they are so far independent of the legislative, that they
know the legislative only thro' the laws, and cannot be controuled or
directed by it through any other medium.
In what manner this superintending authority shall be appointed, or
composed, is a matter that falls within the province of opinion. Some
may prefer one method and some another; and in all cases, where opinion
only and not principle is concerned, the majority of opinions forms the
rule for all. There are however some things deducible from reason, and
evidenced by experience, that serve to guide our decision upon the case.
The one is, never to invest any individual with extraordinary power; for
besides his being tempted to misuse it, it will excite contention and
commotion in the nation for the office. Secondly, never to invest power
long in the hands of any number of individuals. The inconveniences that
may be supposed to accompany frequent changes are less to be feared than
the danger that arises from long continuance.
I shall conclude this discourse with offering some observations on the
means of _preserving liberty_; for it is not only necessary that we
establish it, but that we preserve it.
It is, in the first place, necessary that we distinguish between the
means made use of to overthrow despotism, in order to prepare the way
for the establishment of liberty, and the means to be used after the
despotism is overthrown.
The means made use of in the first case are justified by necessity.
Those means are, in general, insurrections; for whilst the established
government of despotism continues in any country it is scarcely possible
that any other means can be used. It is also certain that in the
commencement of a revolution, the revolutionary party permit to
themselves a _discretionary exercise of power_ regulated more by
circumstances than by principle, which, were the practice to continue,
liberty would never be established, or if established would soon be
overthrown. It is never to be expected in a revolution that every man is
to change his opinion at the same moment. There never yet was any truth
or any principle so irresistibly obvious, that all men believed it
at once. Time and reason must co-operate with each other to the final
establishment of any principle; and therefore those who may happen to be
first convinced have not a right to persecute others, on whom conviction
operates more slowly. The moral principle of revolutions is to instruct,
not to destroy.
Had a constitution been established two years ago, (as ought to have
been done,) the violences that have since desolated France and injured
the character of the revolution, would, in my opinion, have been
prevented.(1) The nation would then have had a bond of union, and every
individual would have known the line of conduct he was to follow. But,
instead of this, a revolutionary government, a thing without either
principle or authority, was substituted in its place; virtue and crime
depended upon accident; and that which was patriotism one day, became
treason the next. All these things have followed from the want of a
constitution; for it is the nature and intention of a constitution to
_prevent governing by party_, by establishing a common principle that
shall limit and control the power and impulse of party, and that says to
all parties, _thus far shalt thou go and no further_. But in the absence
of a constitution, men look entirely to party; and instead of principle
governing party, party governs principle.
1 The Constitution adopted August 10, 1793, was by the
determination of "The Mountain," suspended during the war
against France. The revolutionary government was thus made
chronic--_Editor._
An avidity to punish is always dangerous to liberty. It leads men to
stretch, to misinterpret, and to misapply even the best of laws. He
that would make his own liberty secure, must guard even his enemy from
oppression; for if he violates this duty, he establishes a precedent
that will reach to himself. Thomas Paine.
Paris, July, 1795.