1 Secretary of State.--_Editor._.

The Washington administration shews great desire that the treaty between

France and the United States be preserved. Nobody can doubt their

sincerity upon this matter. There is not a British Minister, a British

merchant, or a British agent or sailor in America, that does not

anxiously wish the same thing. The treaty with France serves now as

a passport to supply England with naval stores and other articles of

American produce, whilst the same articles, when coming to France, are

made contraband or seizable by Jay's treaty with England. The treaty

with France says, that neutral ships make neutral property, and thereby

gives protection to English property on board American ships; and Jay's

treaty delivers up French property on board American ships to be seized

by the English. It is too paltry to talk of faith, of national honour,

and of the preservation of treaties, whilst such a bare-faced treachery

as this stares the world in the face.

The Washington administration may save itself the trouble of proving to

the French government its _most faithful_ intentions of preserving

the treaty with France; for France has now no desire that it should be

preserved. She had nominated an Envoy extraordinary to America, to make

Mr. Washington and his government a present of the treaty, and to

have no more to do with _that_, or with _him_. It was at the same time

officially declared to the American Minister at Paris, _that the French

Republic had rather have the American government for an open enemy

than a treacherous friend_. This, sir, together with the internal

distractions caused in America, and the loss of character in the world,

is the _eventful crisis_, alluded to in the beginning of this letter, to

which your double politics have brought the affairs of your country. It

is time that the eyes of America be opened upon you.

How France would have conducted herself towards America and American

commerce, after all treaty stipulations had ceased, and under the sense

of services rendered and injuries received, I know not. It is, however,

an unpleasant reflection, that in all national quarrels, the innocent,

and even the friendly part of the community, become involved with the

culpable and the unfriendly; and as the accounts that arrived from

America continued to manifest an invariable attachment in the general

mass of the people to their original ally, in opposition to the

new-fangled Washington faction,--the resolutions that had been taken

in France were suspended. It happened also, fortunately enough, that

Gouverneur Morris was not Minister at this time.

There is, however, one point that still remains in embryo, and

which, among other things, serves to shew the ignorance of Washington

treaty-makers, and their inattention to preexisting treaties, when they

were employing themselves in framing or ratifying the new treaty with

England.

The second article of the treaty of commerce between the United States

and France says:

"The most christian king and the United States engage mutually, not to

grant any particular favour to other nations in respect of commerce and

navigation that shall not immediately become common to the other party,

who shall enjoy the same favour freely, if the concession was freely

made, or on allowing the same compensation if the concession was

conditional."

All the concessions, therefore, made to England by Jay's treaty are,

through the medium of this second article in the pre-existing treaty,

made to France, and become engrafted into the treaty with France, and

can be exercised by her as a matter of right, the same as by England.

Jay's treaty makes a concession to England, and that unconditionally,

of seizing naval stores in American ships, and condemning them as

contraband. It makes also a concession to England to seize provisions

and _other articles_ in American ships. _Other articles are all other

articles_, and none but an ignoramus, or something worse, would have put

such a phrase into a treaty. The condition annexed in this case is, that

the provisions and other articles so seized, are to be paid for at a

price to be agreed upon. Mr. Washington, as President, ratified

this treaty after he knew the British Government had recommended an

indiscriminate seizure of provisions and all other articles in American

ships; and it is now known that those seizures were made to fit out the

expedition going to Quiberon Bay, and it was known before hand that they

would be made. The evidence goes also a good way to prove that Jay and

Grenville understood each other upon that subject. Mr. Pinckney,(1)

when he passed through France on his way to Spain, spoke of the

recommencement of the seizures as a thing that would take place.

1 Gen. Thomas Pinckney, U. S. Minister to England.--

_Editor._

The French government had by some means received information from London

to the same purpose, with the addition, that the recommencement of

the seizures would cause no misunderstanding between the British and

American governments. Grenville, in defending himself against the

opposition in Parliament, on account of the scarcity of corn, said (see

his speech at the opening of the Parliament that met October 29, 1795)

that _the supplies for the Quiberon expedition were furnished out of the

American ships_, and all the accounts received at that time from

England stated that those seizures were made under the treaty. After the

supplies for the Quiberon expedition had been procured, and the expected

success had failed, the seizures were countermanded; and had the French

seized provision vessels going to England, it is probable that the

Quiberon expedition could not have been attempted.

In one point of view, the treaty with England operates as a loan to

the English government. It gives permission to that government to take

American property at sea, to any amount, and pay for it when it suits

her; and besides this, the treaty is in every point of view a surrender

of the rights of American commerce and navigation, and a refusal to

France of the rights of neutrality. The American flag is not now a

neutral flag to France; Jay's treaty of surrender gives a monopoly of it

to England.

On the contrary, the treaty of commerce between America and France

was formed on the most liberal principles, and calculated to give the

greatest encouragement to the infant commerce of America. France was

neither a carrier nor an exporter of naval stores or of provisions.

Those articles belonged wholly to America, and they had all the

protection in that treaty which a treaty could give. But so much has

that treaty been perverted, that the liberality of it on the part

of France, has served to encourage Jay to form a counter-treaty with

England; for he must have supposed the hands of France tied up by her

treaty with America, when he was making such large concessions in favour

of England. The injury which Mr. Washington's administration has done to

the character as well as to the commerce of America, is too great to be

repaired by him. Foreign nations will be shy of making treaties with

a government that has given the faithless example of perverting the

liberality of a former treaty to the injury of the party with whom it

was made.(1)

1 For an analysis of the British Treaty see Wharton's

"Digest of the International Law of the United States," vol.

it, Sec. 150 a. Paine's analysis is perfectly correct.--

_Editor._.

In what a fraudulent light must Mr. Washington's character appear in the

world, when his declarations and his conduct are compared together! Here

follows the letter he wrote to the Committee of Public Safety, while Jay

was negotiating in profound secrecy this treacherous treaty:

"George Washington, President of the United States of America, to the

Representatives of the French people, members of the Committee of Public

Safety of the French Republic, the great and good friend and ally of the

United States.

"On the intimation of the wish of the French republic that a new

Minister should be sent from the United States, I resolved to manifest

my sense of the readiness with which _my_ request was fulfilled, [that

of recalling Genet,] by immediately fulfilling the request of your

government, [that of recalling Morris].

"It was some time before a character could be obtained, worthy of the

high office of expressing the attachment of the United States to

the happiness of our allies, _and drawing closer the bonds of our

friendship_. I have now made choice of James Monroe, one of our

distinguished citizens, to reside near the French republic, in quality

of Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States of America. He is

instructed to bear to you our _sincere solicitude for your welfare, and

to cultivate with teal the cordiality so happily subsisting between

us_. From a knowledge of his fidelity, probity, and good conduct, I have

entire confidence that he will render himself acceptable to you,

and give effect to your desire of preserving and _advancing, on all

occasions, the interest and connection of the two nations_. I beseech

you, therefore, to give full credence to whatever he shall say to you

on the part of the United States, and _most of all, when he shall assure

you that your prosperity is an object of our affection_.

"And I pray God to have the French Republic in his holy keeping.

"G. Washington."

Was it by entering into a treaty with England to surrender French

property on board American ships to be seized by the English, while

English property on board American ships was declared by the French

treaty not to be seizable, _that the bonds of friendship between America

and France were to be drawn the closer?_ Was it by declaring naval

stores contraband when coming to France, whilst by the French treaty

they were not contraband when going to England, that the _connection

between France and America was to be advanced?_ Was it by opening the

American ports to the British navy in the present war, from which ports

the same navy had been expelled by the aid solicited from France in the

American war (and that aid gratuitously given) (2) that the gratitude

of America was to be shewn, and the _solicitude_ spoken of in the letter

demonstrated?

1 The italics are Paine's. Paine's free use of this document

suggests that he possessed the confidence of the French

Directory.--_Editor._

2 It is notable that Paine adheres to his old contention in

his controversy with Deane. See vol. i., ch. aa of this work;

and vol. i., ch. 9 of my "Life of Paine."--_Editor._.

As the letter was addressed to the Committee of Public Safety, Mr.

Washington did not expect it would get abroad in the world, or be seen

by any other eye than that of Robespierre, or be heard by any other ear

than that of the Committee; that it would pass as a whisper across the

Atlantic, from one dark chamber to the other, and there terminate. It

was calculated to remove from the mind of the Committee all suspicion

upon Jay's mission to England, and, in this point of view, it was suited

to the circumstances of the movement then passing; but as the event

of that mission has proved the letter to be hypocritical, it serves no

other purpose of the present moment than to shew that the writer is

not to be credited. Two circumstances serve to make the reading of the

letter necessary in the Convention. The one was, that they who succeeded

on the fall of Robespierre, found it most proper to act with publicity;

the other, to extinguish the suspicions which the strange conduct of

Morris had occasioned in France.

When the British treaty, and the ratification of it by Mr. Washington,

was known in France, all further declarations from him of his good

disposition as an ally and friend, passed for so many cyphers; but still

it appeared necessary to him to keep up the farce of declarations. It

is stipulated in the British treaty, that commissioners are to report

at the end of two years, on the case of _neutral ships making neutral

property_. In the mean time, neutral ships do _not_ make neutral

property, according to the British treaty, and they _do_ according to

the French treaty. The preservation, therefore, of the French treaty

became of great importance to England, as by that means she can employ

American ships as carriers, whilst the same advantage is denied to

France. Whether the French treaty could exist as a matter of right after

this clandestine perversion of it, could not but give some apprehensions

to the partizans of the British treaty, and it became necessary to them

to make up, by fine words, what was wanting in good actions.

An opportunity offered to that purpose. The Convention, on the public

reception of Mr. Monroe, ordered the American flag and the French flags

to be displayed unitedly in the hall of the Convention. Mr. Monroe made

a present of an American flag for the purpose. The Convention returned

this compliment by sending a French flag to America, to be presented by

their Minister, Mr. Adet, to the American government. This resolution

passed long before Jay's treaty was known or suspected: it passed in

the days of confidence; but the flag was not presented by Mr. Adet till

several months after the treaty had been ratified. Mr. Washington made

this the occasion of saying some fine things to the French Minister; and

the better to get himself into tune to do this, he began by saying the

finest things of himself.

"Born, sir (said he) in a land of liberty; _having_ early learned its

value; _having_ engaged in a perilous conflict to defend it; _having_,

in a word, devoted the best years of my life to secure its permanent

establishment in my own country; _my_ anxious recollections, my

sympathetic feelings, and _my_ best wishes are irresistibly excited,

whenever, in any country, I see an oppressed people unfurl the banner of

freedom."

Mr. Washington, having expended so many fine phrases upon himself, was

obliged to invent a new one for the French, and he calls them "wonderful

people!" The coalesced powers acknowledged as much.

It is laughable to hear Mr. Washington talk of his _sympathetic

feelings_, who has always been remarked, even among his friends, for

not having any. He has, however, given no proofs of any to me. As to the

pompous encomiums he so liberally pays to himself, on the score of the

American revolution, the reality of them may be questioned; and since

he has forced them so much into notice, it is fair to examine his

pretensions.

A stranger might be led to suppose, from the egotism with which Mr.

Washington speaks, that himself, and himself only, had generated,

conducted, compleated, and established the revolution: In fine, that it

was all his own doing.

In the first place, as to the political part, he had no share in it;

and, therefore, the whole of _that_ is out of the question with respect

to him. There remains, then, only the military part; and it would have

been prudent in Mr. Washington not to have awakened enquiry upon that

subject. Fame then was cheap; he enjoyed it cheaply; and nobody was

disposed to take away the laurels that, whether they were _acquired_ or

not, had been _given_.

Mr. Washington's merit consisted in constancy. But constancy was the

common virtue of the revolution. Who was there that was inconstant? I

know but of one military defection, that of Arnold; and I know of no

political defection, among those who made themselves eminent when the

revolution was formed by the declaration of independence. Even Silas

Deane, though he attempted to defraud, did not betray.(1)

1 This generous judgment by Deane's old adversary has become

questionable under recent investigations.--_Editor._.

But when we speak of military character, something more is to be

understood than constancy; and something more _ought_ to be understood

than the Fabian system of _doing nothing_. The _nothing_ part can be

done by any body. Old Mrs. Thompson, the housekeeper of head quarters,

(who threatened to make the sun and the wind shine through Rivington of

New York,) 'could have done it as well as Mr. Washington. Deborah would

have been as good as Barak.

Mr. Washington had the nominal rank of Commander in Chief, but he was

not so in fact. He had, in reality, only a separate command. He had no

controul over, or direction of, the army to the northward under Gates,

that captured Burgoyne; nor of that to the south under [Nathaniel]

Greene, that recovered the southern States.(2) The nominal rank,

however, of Commander in Chief, served to throw upon him the lustre

of those actions, and to make him appear as the soul and centre of all

military operations in America.

1 The Tory publisher of New York City, whose press was

destroyed in 1775 by a mob of Connecticut soldiers.--

_Editor._

2 See Mr. Winterbotham's valuable History of America, lately

published.--Author. [The "History of the Establishment of

Independence" is contained in the first of Mr.

Winterbotham's four volumes (London, 1795).--_Editor._.]

He commenced his command June, 1775, during the time the Massachusetts

army lay before Boston, and after the affair of Bunker-hill. The

commencement of his command was the commencement of inactivity. Nothing

was afterwards done, or attempted to be done, during the nine months

he remained before Boston. If we may judge from the resistance made at

Concord, and afterwards at Bunker-hill, there was a spirit of enterprise

at that time, which the presence of Mr. Washington chilled into cold

defence. By the advantage of a good exterior he attracts respect, which

his habitual silence tends to preserve; but he has not the talent of

inspiring ardour in an army. The enemy removed from Boston in March

1776, to wait for reinforcements from Europe, and to take a more

advantageous position at New York.

The inactivity of the campaign of 1775, on the part of General

Washington, when the enemy had a less force than in any other future

period of the war, and the injudicious choice of positions taken by

him in the campaign of 1776, when the enemy had its greatest force,

necessarily produced the losses and misfortunes that marked that gloomy

campaign. The positions taken were either islands or necks of land.

In the former, the enemy, by the aid of their ships, could bring their

whole force against apart of General Washington's, as in the affair

of Long Island; and in the latter, he might be shut up as in the bottom

of a bag. This had nearly been the case at New York, and it was so in

part; it was actually the case at Fort Washington; and it would have

been the case at Fort Lee, if General Greene had not moved precipitately

off, leaving every thing behind, and by gaining Hackinsack bridge, got

out of the bag of Bergen Neck. How far Mr. Washington, as General, is

blameable for these matters, I am not undertaking to determine; but they

are evidently defects in military geography. The successful skirmishes

at the close of that campaign, (matters that would scarcely be noticed

in a better state of things,) make the brilliant exploits of General

Washington's seven campaigns. No wonder we see so much pusillanimity in

the President, when we see so little enterprise in the General!

The campaign of 1777 became famous, not by anything on the part of

General Washington, but by the capture of General Burgoyne, and the

army under his command, by the Northern army at Saratoga, under General

Gates. So totally distinct and unconnected were the two armies of

Washington and Gates, and so independent was the latter of the authority

of the nominal Commander in Chief, that the two Generals did not so much

as correspond, and it was only by a letter of General (since Governor)

Clinton, that General Washington was informed of that event. The British

took possession of Philadelphia this year, which they evacuated

the next, just time enough to save their heavy baggage and fleet of

transports from capture by the French Admiral d'Estaing, who arrived at

the mouth of the Delaware soon after.

The capture of Burgoyne gave an eclat in Europe to the American arms,

and facilitated the alliance with France. The eclat, however, was

not kept up by any thing on the part of General Washington. The same

unfortunate languor that marked his entrance into the field, continued

always. Discontent began to prevail strongly against him, and a party

was formed in Congress, whilst sitting at York-town, in Pennsylvania,

for removing him from the command of the army. The hope, however,

of better times, the news of the alliance with France, and the

unwillingness of shewing discontent, dissipated the matter.

Nothing was done in the campaigns of 1778, 1779, 1780, in the part

where General Washington commanded, except the taking of Stony Point by

General Wayne. The Southern States in the mean time were over-run by the

enemy. They were afterwards recovered by General Greene, who had in a

very great measure created the army that accomplished that recovery.

In all this General Washington had no share. The Fabian system of war,

followed by him, began now to unfold itself with all its evils; but

what is Fabian war without Fabian means to support it? The finances of

Congress depending wholly on emissions of paper money, were exhausted.

Its credit was gone. The continental treasury was not able to pay the

expense of a brigade of waggons to transport the necessary stores to the

army, and yet the sole object, the establishment of the revolution,

was a thing of remote distance. The time I am now speaking of is in the

latter end of the year 1780.

In this situation of things it was found not only expedient, but

absolutely necessary, for Congress to state the whole case to its ally.

I knew more of this matter, (before it came into Congress or was known

to General Washington) of its progress, and its issue, than I chuse

to state in this letter. Colonel John Laurens was sent to France as an

Envoy Extraordinary on this occasion, and by a private agreement between

him and me I accompanied him. We sailed from Boston in the Alliance

frigate, February 11th, 1781. France had already done much in accepting

and paying bills drawn by Congress. She was now called upon to do more.

The event of Colonel Laurens's mission, with the aid of the venerable

Minister, Franklin, was, that France gave in money, as a present, six

millions of livres, and ten millions more as a loan, and agreed to send

a fleet of not less than thirty sail of the line, at her own expense,

as an aid to America. Colonel Laurens and myself returned from Brest the

1st of June following, taking with us two millions and a half of livres

(upwards of one hundred thousand pounds sterling) of the money given,

and convoying two ships with stores.

We arrived at Boston the 25th of August following. De Grasse arrived

with the French fleet in the Chesapeak at the same time, and was

afterwards joined by that of Barras, making 31 sail of the line.

The money was transported in waggons from Boston to the Bank at

Philadelphia, of which Mr. Thomas Willing, who has since put himself at

the head of the list of petitioners in favour of the British treaty, was

then President. And it was by the aid of this money, and this fleet, and

of Rochambeau's army, that Cornwallis was taken; the laurels of which

have been unjustly given to Mr. Washington. His merit in that affair was

no more than that of any other American officer.

I have had, and still have, as much pride in the American revolution as

any man, or as Mr. Washington has a right to have; but that pride has

never made me forgetful whence the great aid came that compleated

the business. Foreign aid (that of France) was calculated upon at the

commencement of the revolution. It is one of the subjects treated of

in the pamphlet _Common Sense_, but as a matter that could not be hoped

for, unless independence was declared.1 The aid, however, was greater

than could have been expected.

It is as well the ingratitude as the pusillanimity of Mr. Washington,

and the Washington faction, that has brought upon America the loss

of character she now suffers in the world, and the numerous evils her

commerce has undergone, and to which it is yet exposed. The British

Ministry soon found out what sort of men they had to deal with, and they

dealt with them accordingly; and if further explanation was wanting, it

has been fully given since, in the snivelling address of the New York

Chamber of Commerce to the President, and in that of sundry merchants of

Philadelphia, which was not much better.

1 See vol. i. of this work, p. ixx. Paine was sharply taken

to task on this point by "Cato." Ib.% pp. 145-147.--

_Editor._.

When the revolution of America was finally established by the

termination of the war, the world gave her credit for great character;

and she had nothing to do but to stand firm upon that ground. The

British ministry had their hands too full of trouble to have provoked

a rupture with her, had she shown a proper resolution to defend her

rights. But encouraged as they were by the submissive character of the

American administration, they proceeded from insult to insult, till none

more were left to be offered. The proposals made by Sweden and Denmark

to the American administration were disregarded. I know not if so much

as an answer has been returned to them. The minister penitentiary,

(as some of the British prints called him,) Mr. Jay, was sent on a

pilgrimage to London, to make up all by penance and petition. In the

mean time the lengthy and drowsy writer of the pieces signed _Camillas_

held himself in reserve to vindicate every thing; and to sound in

America the tocsin of terror upon the inexhaustible resources of

England. Her resources, says he, are greater than those of all the other

powers. This man is so intoxicated with fear and finance, that he knows

not the difference between _plus_ and _minus_--between a hundred pounds

in hand, and a hundred pounds worse than nothing.

The commerce of America, so far as it had been established by all the

treaties that had been formed prior to that by Jay, was free, and the

principles upon which it was established were good. That ground ought

never to have been departed from. It was the justifiable ground

of right, and no temporary difficulties ought to have induced an

abandonment of it. The case is now otherwise. The ground, the scene, the

pretensions, the everything, are changed. The commerce of America is, by

Jay's treaty, put under foreign dominion. The sea is not free for her.

Her right to navigate it is reduced to the right of escaping; that is,

until some ship of England or France stops her vessels, and carries them

into port. Every article of American produce, whether from the sea or

the sand, fish, flesh, vegetable, or manufacture, is, by Jay's treaty,

made either contraband or seizable. Nothing is exempt. In all other

treaties of commerce, the article which enumerates the contraband

articles, such as fire arms, gunpowder, &c, is followed by another

article which enumerates the articles not contraband: but it is not so

in Jay's treaty. There is no exempting article. Its place is supplied by

the article for seizing and carrying into port; and the sweeping phrase

of "provisions and _other articles _" includes every thing. There never

was such a base and servile treaty of surrender since treaties began to

exist.

This is the ground upon which America now stands. All her rights

of commerce and navigation are to begin anew, and that with loss of

character to begin with. If there is sense enough left in the heart

to call a blush into the cheek, the Washington administration must

be ashamed to appear.--And as to you, Sir, treacherous in private

friendship (for so you have been to me, and that in the day of danger)

and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide

whether you are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned

good principles, or whether you ever had any.

Thomas Paine.

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