In the first place the confederacy is not of that kind that forms
itself originally by concert and consent. It has been forced together by
chance--a heterogeneous mass, held only by the accident of the moment;
and the instant that accident ceases to operate, the parties will retire
to their former rivalships.
I will now, independently of the impracticability of a partition
project, trace out some of the embarrassments which will arise among the
confederated parties; for it is contrary to the interest of a majority
of them that such a project should succeed.
To understand this part of the subject it is necessary, in the
first place, to cast an eye over the map of Europe, and observe the
geographical situation of the several parts of the confederacy; for
however strongly the passionate politics of the moment may operate, the
politics that arise from geographical situation are the most certain,
and will in all cases finally prevail.
The world has been long amused with what is called the "_balance of
power_." But it is not upon armies only that this balance depends.
Armies have but a small circle of action. Their progress is slow and
limited. But when we take maritime power into the calculation, the scale
extends universally. It comprehends all the interests connected with
commerce.
The two great maritime powers are England and France. Destroy either of
those, and the balance of naval power is destroyed. The whole world of
commerce that passes on the Ocean would then lie at the mercy of the
other, and the ports of any nation in Europe might be blocked up.
The geographical situation of those two maritime powers comes next under
consideration. Each of them occupies one entire side of the channel from
the straits of Dover and Calais to the opening into the Atlantic. The
commerce of all the northern nations, from Holland to Russia, must pass
the straits of Dover and Calais, and along the Channel, to arrive at the
Atlantic.
This being the case, the systematical politics of all the nations,
northward of the straits of Dover and Calais, can be ascertained from
their geographical situation; for it is necessary to the safety of their
commerce that the two sides of the Channel, either in whole or in part,
should not be in the possession either of England or France. While one
nation possesses the whole of one side, and the other nation the other
side, the northern nations cannot help seeing that in any situation of
things their commerce will always find protection on one side or the
other. It may sometimes be that of England and sometimes that of France.
Again, while the English navy continues in its present condition, it is
necessary that another navy should exist to controul the universal sway
the former would otherwise have over the commerce of all nations. France
is the only nation in Europe where this balance can be placed. The
navies of the North, were they sufficiently powerful, could not be
sufficiently operative. They are blocked up by the ice six months in the
year. Spain lies too remote; besides which, it is only for the sake of
her American mines that she keeps up her navy.
Applying these cases to the project of a partition of France, it will
appear, that the project involves with it a DESTRUCTION OF THE BALANCE
OF MARITIME POWER; because it is only by keeping France entire and
indivisible that the balance can be kept up. This is a case that at
first sight lies remote and almost hidden. But it interests all the
maritime and commercial nations in Europe in as great a degree as any
case that has ever come before them.--In short, it is with war as it
is with law. In law, the first merits of the case become lost in the
multitude of arguments; and in war they become lost in the variety of
events. New objects arise that take the lead of all that went before,
and everything assumes a new aspect. This was the case in the last great
confederacy in what is called the succession war, and most probably will
be the case in the present.
I have now thrown together such thoughts as occurred to me on the
several subjects connected with the confederacy against France, and
interwoven with the interest of the neutral powers. Should a conference
of the neutral powers take place, these observations will, at least,
serve to generate others. The whole matter will then undergo a more
extensive investigation than it is in my power to give; and the evils
attending upon either of the projects, that of restoring the Bourbons,
or of attempting a partition of France, will have the calm opportunity
of being fully discussed.
On the part of England, it is very extraordinary that she should have
engaged in a former confederacy, and a long expensive war, to _prevent_
the family compact, and now engage in another confederacy to _preserve_
it. And on the part of the other powers, it is as inconsistent that they
should engage in a partition project, which, could it be executed, would
immediately destroy the balance of maritime power in Europe, and would
probably produce a second war, to remedy the political errors of the
first.
A Citizen of the United States of America.