18th Year of Independence.
1 State Archives, Paris: Etats Unis, vol. 38, fol. 90. This
pamphlet is in English, without indication of authorship or
of the place of publication. It is accompanied by a French
translation (MS.) inscribed "Par Thomas Payne." In the
printed pamphlet the date (18th Year, etc) is preceded by
the French words (printed): "Philadelphie 28 Juillet 1793."
It was no doubt the pamphlet sent by Paine to Monroe, with
various documents relating to his imprisonment, describing
it as "a Letter which I had printed here as an American
letter, some copies of which I sent to Mr. Jefferson." A
considerable portion of the pamphlet embodies, with
occasional changes of phraseology, a manuscript (Etats Unis,
vol. 37, Do. 39) endorsed: "January 1793. Thorn. Payne.
Copie. Observations on the situation of the Powers joined
against France." This opens with the following paragraph:
"It is always useful to know the position and the designs of
one's enemies. It is much easier to do so by combining and
comparing the events, and by examining the consequences
which result from them, than by forming one's judgment by
letters found or intercepted. These letters could be
fabricated with the intention of deceiving, but events or
circumstances have a character which is proper to them. If
in the course of our political operations we mistake the
designs of our enemy, it leads us to do precisely that which
he desires we should do, and it happens by the fact, but
against our intentions, that we work for him." That the date
written on this MS. is erroneous appears by an allusion to
the defeat of the Duke of York at Dunkirk in the closing
paragraph: "There are three distinct parties in England at
this moment: the government party, the revolutionary party,
and an intermedial party,--which is only opposed to the war
on account of the expense it entails, and the harm it does
commerce and manufactures. I am speaking of the People, and
not of the Parliament. The latter is divided into two
parties: the Ministerial, and the Anti-ministerial. The
revolutionary party, the intermedial party, and the anti-
ministerial party, will all rejoice, publicly or privately,
at the defeat of the Duke of York at Dunkirk." The two
paragraphs quoted represent the only actual additions to the
pamphlet. I have a clipping from the London Morning
Chronicle of Friday, April 25, 1794, containing the part of
the pamphlet headed "Of the present state of Europe and the
Confederacy," signed "Thomas Paine, Author of Common Sense,
etc." On February 1,1793, the Convention having declared
war, appointed Paine, Barere, Condorcet and Faber, a
Committee to draft an address to the English people. It was
never done, but these fragments may represent notes written
by Paine with reference to that task. The pamphlet
probably appeared late in September, 1793.--_Editor._,
Understanding that a proposal is intended to be made at the ensuing
meeting of the Congress of the United States of America "to send
commissioners to Europe to confer with the Ministers of all the Neutral
Powers for the purpose of negotiating preliminaries of peace," I address
this letter to you on that subject, and on the several matters connected
therewith.
In order to discuss this subject through all its circumstances, it
will be necessary to take a review of the state of Europe, prior to the
French revolution. It will from thence appear, that the powers leagued
against France are fighting to attain an object, which, were it possible
to be attained, would be injurious to themselves.
This is not an uncommon error in the history of wars and governments, of
which the conduct of the English government in the war against America
is a striking instance. She commenced that war for the avowed purpose of
subjugating America; and after wasting upwards of one hundred millions
sterling, and then abandoning the object, she discovered, in the course
of three or four years, that the prosperity of England was increased,
instead of being diminished, by the independence of America. In short,
every circumstance is pregnant with some natural effect, upon which
intentions and opinions have no influence; and the political error
lies in misjudging what the effect will be. England misjudged it in
the American war, and the reasons I shall now offer will shew, that she
misjudges it in the present war. In discussing this subject, I leave out
of the question everything respecting forms and systems of government;
for as all the governments of Europe differ from each other, there is no
reason that the government of France should not differ from the rest.
The clamours continually raised in all the countries of Europe were,
that the family of the Bourbons was become too powerful; that the
intrigues of the court of France endangered the peace of Europe. Austria
saw with a jealous eye the connection of France with Prussia; and
Prussia, in her turn became jealous of the connection of France with
Austria; England had wasted millions unsuccessfully in attempting to
prevent the family compact with Spain; Russia disliked the alliance
between France and Turkey; and Turkey became apprehensive of the
inclination of France towards an alliance with Russia. Sometimes the
quadruple alliance alarmed some of the powers, and at other times a
contrary system alarmed others, and in all those cases the charge was
always made against the intrigues of the Bourbons.
Admitting those matters to be true, the only thing that could have
quieted the apprehensions of all those powers with respect to the
interference of France, would have been her entire NEUTRALITY in Europe;
but this was impossible to be obtained, or if obtained was impossible
to be secured, because the genius of her government was repugnant to all
such restrictions.
It now happens that by entirely changing the genius of her government,
which France has done for herself, this neutrality, which neither wars
could accomplish nor treaties secure, arises naturally of itself, and
becomes the ground upon which the war should terminate. It is the
thing that approaches the nearest of all others to what ought to be the
political views of all the European powers; and there is nothing that
can so effectually secure this neutrality, as that the genius of the
French government should be different from the rest of Europe.
But if their object is to restore the Bourbons and monarchy together,
they will unavoidably restore with it all the evils of which they have
complained; and the first question of discord will be, whose ally is
that monarchy to be?
Will England agree to the restoration of the family compact against
which she has been fighting and scheming ever since it existed? Will
Prussia agree to restore the alliance between France and Austria, or
will Austria agree to restore the former connection between France and
Prussia, formed on purpose to oppose herself; or will Spain or Russia,
or any of the maritime powers, agree that France and her navy should be
allied to England? In fine, will any of the powers agree to strengthen
the hands of the other against itself? Yet all these cases involve
themselves in the original question of the restoration of the Bourbons;
and on the other hand, all of them disappear by the neutrality of
France.
If their object is not to restore the Bourbons, it must be the
impracticable project of a partition of the country. The Bourbons will
then be out of the question, or, more properly speaking, they will be
put in a worse condition; for as the preservation of the Bourbons made
a part of the first object, the extirpation of them makes a part of the
second. Their pretended friends will then become interested in their
destruction, because it is favourable to the purpose of partition that
none of the nominal claimants should be left in existence.
But however the project of a partition may at first blind the eyes of
the confederacy, or however each of them may hope to outwit the other
in the progress or in the end, the embarrassments that will arise are
insurmountable. But even were the object attainable, it would not be of
such general advantage to the parties as the neutrality of France, which
costs them nothing, and to obtain which they would formerly have gone to
war.