MATTERS AFFECTING THE PASSAGE. THE SUPPORTING FORCES. THE GERMAN
SEA-FORCES. THE PREPARATORY WORK
Safe passage across the seas, especially from the navigational point of
view, provided much food for thought. The liability of new shoals to
form and of old shoals to move their position, the consequent lack of
dependence on the charts, and the absence of the usual navigational
aids have already been mentioned.
These navigational difficulties, increased by the low visibility which
obtains at night, combined to form the first of the three main
obstacles to be encountered in blocking operations of this nature,
namely, the difficulty of locating the destination.
Considerable amusement was caused in naval circles, subsequent to the
operation, when a certain individual, from another country, published a
special piece of "inside information," to wit, that the method whereby
_Vindictive_ reached Zeebrugge Mole was a great secret, known only to
Captain Carpenter and one other, involving intricate calculations in
connection with astronomical phenomena. I was extremely interested in
this suggestion for it was the first that I had heard of it. As a
matter of fact the safe navigation was largely the outcome of a very
fine piece of work by two officers specially lent from the Hydrographic
Department of the Admiralty.[1]
[1] Captain H. P. Douglas and Lieutenant-Commander F. E. B. Haselfoot.
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The major portion of the area through which the various forces were to
pass was surveyed under great difficulties.
[Sidenote: Object of Special Survey]
The surveying vessels were often forced to remain within the danger
zone of the German batteries, and, owing to shortness of time, had to
utilise every possible opportunity for fixing positions of buoys,
taking soundings, examining areas where new shoals were suspected,
marking the limits of old shoals, laying down special marks to assist
the passage of the expedition, and to enable the bombarding vessels to
take up their positions with accuracy. Old obstructions had to be
removed and wrecks had to be correctly charted. The vagaries of the
weather rendered the task all the more difficult, and interference from
the enemy was experienced on more than one occasion. Incidentally both
these officers were on board H.M.S. _Botha_ when she rammed and sank
the German torpedo-boat A-19, which was out with a few others on one of
their very infrequent tip-and-run escapades off Dunkirk; this was a
pleasant interlude for these hard-worked officers. No country in the
world can boast of such an efficient Hydrographic Department as our
own. Their work in the war passed almost unrecorded, but none the less
appreciated by those of us "who went down to the sea in ships." No
praise could be too great for the work of the surveyors employed on our
behalf.
It will be readily understood that little reliance could be placed on
large conspicuous buoys laid by us near the enemy's coast. On
discovering such navigational marks the enemy would presumably either
move them a mile or so, for the purpose of interfering {92} with our
navigation, or else remove them altogether. Buoys, to be of any
practical use, must be conspicuous, hence the likelihood of their being
seen by the enemy unless placed in position at the last possible
moment. This alternative was actually followed; it does not require
much imagination to realise the difficulties and dangers in placing
them in readiness for the operation and in removing them again on each
occasion when the operation was postponed.
The strong tidal stream in the southern portion of the North Sea
renders navigation rather anxious work in misty weather, or in
darkness, especially as the normal rate of the current is much
influenced by weather. Naturally, there is less danger of hitting a
shoal which one is endeavouring to avoid, if the ship is steaming
either directly with or against the current; the error in such cases is
confined to the time at which any particular position will be reached.
But when steaming _across_ the current a small eccentricity on the part
of the latter may make all the difference between reaching the desired
position and missing it altogether. The current running parallel to
the Belgian coast attains a speed of about three knots under normal
conditions. Should a three-knot allowance be made when steaming across
the tide there would be a serious error of position at the end of an
hour's run if the tidal stream happened to be running at the rate of
two and three-quarters or three and one-quarter knots; it must be
realised that a ship cannot discover the rate of the tidal stream in a
given area until she has completed her passage through it; i.e., until
she has already suffered from its eccentricities.
For the purposes of the particular case under review {93} it was
necessary for the expedition to arrive at an _exact_ position, thus
tidal calculations and navigational aids assumed great importance. But
they alone were insufficient to ensure accurate navigation. Compasses
must be correct, or their errors known, and the speed of the ship due
to its own engines requires to be carefully gauged. For a given speed
of engine the speed of a ship varies according to her draught and the
state of the ship's hull under water. All these considerations will
serve to show the extreme necessity for working out courses, speeds,
and times beforehand with the utmost accuracy, for repeatedly checking
them to ensure the absence of clerical error, for reconsidering
allowances for the vagaries of the elements, and for correcting the
results from day to day according to the tidal differences due to the
ever-changing phases of the moon. The careful navigator always follows
a similar procedure, but, in ordinary cases, he knows that a fault in
position can probably be remedied in time to avoid untoward incident.
In our movements, however, there would be small chance of remedy if the
blockships failed to find the canal entrance, or if the submarines were
unable to locate the viaduct, or if the storming vessels missed the
Mole.
[Sidenote: Clearing the Mines]
Preparation for the passage across the seas involved yet another matter
of considerable importance. Vast numbers of mines had been laid, both
by ourselves and by the enemy, during the previous three and a half
years, in the areas through which the expedition must pass before
reaching the permanent German defence mine-fields near the Flanders
coast. Doubtless other mines had dragged with the tide {94} across our
desired route. Special mine-sweeping work was, therefore, necessary to
render the major portion of the passage even tolerably safe from mines.
The reader can probably appreciate the difficult nature of that task
with its attendant risks and necessity for thoroughness.
In addition to the one hundred and sixty-two vessels whose duties have
been mentioned, other supporting squadrons were necessary far out at
sea. The possibility of our intentions having become known to the
enemy had to be borne in mind. In such an event the enemy would, of
course, adopt special measures to ensure giving the expedition a warm
reception on arrival, but a most important eventuality for us to guard
against was that of meeting a superior concentrated enemy force already
at sea waiting to intercept us _en route_. Scouting craft, both aerial
and naval, were therefore required; it was also advisable that our
fighting fleet should be conveniently situated in case the chance arose
of defeating any such counter to our expedition.
[Sidenote: German High Seas Fleet]
Whenever we employed our small craft to operate in enemy waters we had
to bear in mind a certain possibility. The enemy on becoming aware of
our movements, or intentions, and perhaps feeling unusually courageous,
_might_ say, "Here are a number of small enemy vessels close to our
harbours, let us engage them with the whole strength of our fleet and
thereby achieve a great victory for the Fatherland." And so, in case
the German Fleet left their harbours, unlikely though it might be, our
Grand Fleet was always "in the offing" at such times ready to meet the
so-called High Seas Fleet and send them down to the place where they
ought to go.
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The man-in-the-street must have wondered what the Grand Fleet was doing
at sea so often in view of the fact that the enemy hid themselves
almost throughout the war. The difficulty lay in the fact that we
could not be perfectly certain that the constitution of German naval
valour would continue to include ninety-nine per cent of discretion.
Time after time the Grand Fleet hoped against hope that they might meet
the enemy. The operations off the Belgian coast seemed to hold out yet
another slender hope; this, pardon the anticipation, proved to be as
forlorn as usual. The history of the High Seas Fleet, with respect to
their oft-repeated desire to try conclusions with the Grand Fleet, can
be briefly narrated. In the four and a quarter years following the
outbreak of war the High Seas Fleet came out once, and once only, with
the express intention of meeting the Grand Fleet--and that was to
surrender! On the one other occasion when they met our fleet,
incidentally by accident, they concentrated all their efforts at escape
and then claimed the victory. The German Navy never had any
traditions--now they have one less!
The reader may well ask what connection these remarks have with the
subject of the blocking operation. A very close connection indeed.
Napoleon--perhaps the greatest student of war and certainly one of the
greatest generals that the world has seen--remarked, and repeated again
and again, that in war "the moral is to the physical as three is to
one." Every great leader understands the value of morale and every man
who has served his country in war has at least a subconscious
realisation of the moral factor.
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Just consider the moral effect of the German inactivity. In our men
the uppermost feelings towards the enemy were those of contempt. There
is small need to consider the morale of the High Seas Fleet, for is it
not recorded by their own Admiral, von Scheer, that the men mutinied at
the last because they believed they were being sent out to fight our
fleet? Take the case of our Dover Patrol force. They knew that the
enemy could choose their own time for dashing out of the Belgian ports
to attack our cross-channel communications. They knew that the chances
of intercepting such enemy under adverse conditions, such as during
darkness or fog, were very small. Yet month after month passed by and
the enemy surface craft did next to nothing. Sometimes our advanced
patrols came into touch with enemy patrols. On each occasion, I
believe almost without exception, the enemy craft turned and ran at
utmost speed for home. In the case of our small motor boats there had
been meetings with those of the enemy within a mile or two of the
latter's bases: here again, there is no recorded instance of one, or
even two, of their craft standing up to one of ours. The reader will
understand the resultant moral effect. Some day perhaps we shall hear
the romantic story of these adventurous small craft working from the
Dover area--how one of them coolly steamed in underneath Ostende Pier
one night to repair her engine whilst the German sentries paraded up
and down just overhead, how another ran in behind Zeebrugge Mole in
broad daylight and fired her torpedoes at German vessels berthed
alongside, and so on. Is it difficult to imagine the feeling of
superiority and confidence possessed by our personnel?
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[Sidenote: German Morale]
The morale of the German naval forces in Flanders concerned us much
more closely than that of the High Seas Fleet. Under ordinary
circumstances we should have been exceedingly apprehensive of any
German torpedo craft at Zeebrugge or in the vicinity, especially those
at Blankenberghe, but experience had served to show that they were none
too ready to further the "über" portion of "Deutschland über Alles."
Thus we were all the more ready to take risks which may have seemed to
be uncommonly close to the border-line between "justifiable" and the
reverse.
In recounting the preparations which followed naturally upon the main
considerations connected with the problem in hand there has been a
certain amount of unavoidable anticipation.
It has already been explained that the conduct of the operation fell to
the Vice-Admiral commanding the Dover Patrol, and that a very large
number of vessels of various classes and many specially trained
personnel were required. Thus the fitting out of the vessels, the
preparation of material, and the training of the personnel also came
under the direction of the Vice-Admiral.
It must not be forgotten that the ordinary work of the Dover Patrol
could not be interrupted even for one day at this period. The lines of
communication across the Channel, important as they had already been
throughout the war, were now of such vital importance that the Allied
situation on the main battle front depended on the work of the Dover
Patrol more than ever before. During February and March, 1918, when
the preparations for our enterprise were in full {98} swing, and
especially during the latter month, the Germans were concentrating
every possible effort to break down the Allied resistance. Their final
great "push" was in full swing and the Allied troops were being hard
pressed almost to the point of giving way. British, Colonial, and
American reënforcements were being poured into France by every
available route; guns, ammunition, and stores were passing across the
Channel in an endless stream of shipping. The situation was critical
to a degree. If the Dover Patrol force had failed at such a time the
war might have had a very different ending. And in the midst of this
terribly anxious period we were forced to request great additional
effort for the purposes which the author is endeavouring to describe.
One may be pardoned for thinking that the blocking operation, with all
its complicated requirements, should have received undivided attention,
but such a thing was impossible. Those were busy days at Dover.
Special material, such as artificial fog apparatus, had to be
constructed and fitted in the craft concerned. The use of the
apparatus had to be practised with a view to discovering the conditions
under which the best results could be obtained. Neighbouring commands,
such as at Portsmouth and The Nore, were exceedingly helpful in this
latter respect. The use of howitzers, flame projectors, bomb-mortars,
grappling irons, scaling ladders, and many other fighting appliances
not usually found in men-o'-war had to be investigated.
[Sidenote: Production of Smoke]
A special factory was established at Dover under Wing-Commander
Brock--of whom I shall have much to tell--mainly in connection with the
{99} developments and use of artificial fog, but also to further the
design and production of other material. Sixty men worked at this
factory. Their output, both in quality and quantity, was most
satisfactory in spite of the many handicaps with which such innovations
have to contend. The difficulty of obtaining special material, when
the output of every large firm in the country was already earmarked for
other purposes, was not lessened by the fact that our urgent demands
could seldom be supported, owing to the necessity for secrecy, by
explanations as to the purposes in view.
The use of artificial fog in war was by no means an entirely new idea.
The device had already been utilised by our naval forces off the
Belgian coast, and a quantity of data on the subject was available as a
result of its use in fighting on land. But all forms of fog
screens--and there were many--had hitherto possessed disadvantages
which would militate against satisfactory results in an enterprise such
as we contemplated. The main difficulty attached to the smoke
apparatus at Dover was that a very visible flame was emitted; this
would have completely given our presence away as the smoke was intended
to _hide our presence_ and cover our advance. Some attempts had been
made to surmount this difficulty, but experiments proved the apparatus
to be hopelessly unsuited to our requirements. The reader, however,
will not desire to be introduced to a highly technical treatise on this
subject. Suffice it to say that, as a result of prolonged experimental
work, a new type of fog was evolved which satisfied all requirements.
The trials were not altogether devoid of humour. It is rumoured that
on one occasion a fog produced in the Dover {100} Straits refused to
dissipate itself for three days, with the result that mercantile
captains said some very hard things about the clerk of the weather.
The blockships and _Vindictive_ were fitted out at Chatham. That
dockyard was already being taxed to its utmost. The situation demanded
that every man should strive to exceed his previous utmost efforts--one
of the few points on which our enemies may congratulate themselves.
Secrecy was, of course, essential. Yet in the case of the ships
fitting out at Chatham the number of men who played an indirect part in
the operation ran into four figures. The same thing applied at
Portsmouth where the _Iris_, the _Daffodil_, and the submarines
destined to attack the railway viaduct at Zeebrugge were fitted out.
The director of Naval Construction, Sir Tennyson D'Eyncourt, and the
Director of Dockyards, Rear-Admiral L. E. Power, brought all their
valuable knowledge, and that of their respective staffs, to bear on the
problem. Much of the usual formality governing inter-departmental
procedure was waived. Paper work was reduced to a minimum. The real
nature of the operation was made known to few at that period. The war
had taught men not to ask questions unless the information was an
absolute necessity. Nevertheless many must have wondered what was
afoot; special steps had to be taken, therefore, to prevent leakage of
information, of which more anon.
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