THE VESSELS INVOLVED: THEIR DUTIES. THE RESCUE WORK.
In addition to the special vessels mentioned in the preceding chapter,
many other vessels and craft were required to assist in the operation.
One can imagine the amateur reckoning up the probable number as
follows. Three blockships at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende, three
storming ships and two submarines at the former place. That makes ten
vessels of sorts. Allow a few more for other purposes--say, fifteen
altogether. As a matter of fact, there were one hundred and sixty-two.
Let us see why so many were required.
Take the requirements necessitated by the use of smoke screens. It has
already been stated that the section of coast on which the Germans had
established heavy gun batteries was twenty-one miles in length. Smoke
screens were required to mask those guns so that the approach of the
blockships and storming vessels should remain undiscovered until the
latest possible moment. This meant that a large number of craft were
necessary for smoke screening alone. Again, if the smoke screens were
to be efficient the smoke would have to be emitted within a short
distance of the coast; i.e., in comparatively shallow water. Thus
shallow-draught vessels were necessary. Shallow draught goes
hand-in-hand with small dimensions. The carrying capacity of small
craft is very {84} limited; this constituted an additional reason for
employing large numbers.
Further craft were required for assisting to locate the destination,
for dealing with enemy vessels putting to sea during the attack, for
defending our ships against other enemy vessels already at sea, for
assisting to tow some of the smaller units across the seas, for
rescuing the crews of the blockships, and for various diversionary
measures. The latter included long-range bombardments from the sea and
subsidiary attacks on the Mole, the units required being monitors and
their attendant craft and fast motor boats. Other diversionary
measures, not requiring naval vessels for their accomplishment, were
bombing attacks by aircraft and bombardments from our shore guns.
[Illustration: ONE OF THE MONITORS. H.M. SHIPS IRIS (RIGHT) AND
DAFFODIL.]
The aircraft were intended to attract the attention of those on duty in
an overhead direction, whilst encouraging the remainder to keep under
cover. The long-range bombardments would tend to keep the enemy's
larger batteries occupied in expending ammunition in their endeavour to
locate and silence our guns. Subsidiary attacks, carried out by fast
motor craft against the Mole, and against German vessels berthed at its
inner side, were calculated to confuse the situation as far as the
enemy were concerned. It was arranged that the R.M.A. siege guns on
the northern flank of the Allied army should bombard for the purpose of
simulating a prelude to a land attack.
The reason for the employment of one hundred and sixty-two vessels, not
including aircraft, will now be somewhat more clear. The various
classes comprised cruisers, submarines, ferry-boats, monitors,
destroyers, motor launches, small motor boats of a fast type, {85} and
one ordinary ship's steamboat; the latter was to be used in connection
with rescuing the crews of the submarines.
With the exception of the blockships, storming vessels, and submarines,
the majority of the craft were drawn from the forces attached to the
Dover Command; these latter, being in full commission already, did not
require new officers and men to be specially appointed for our
purposes. Seven French torpedo craft and four French motor launches
were included in the operation. The aircraft were drawn from the 61st
and 65th Wings of the Royal Air Force.
Space does not admit of describing the work of all these units in
detail, but it may be of interest to mention one or two.
[Sidenote: Precautions Against Fatigue]
Whenever an operation of this description is afoot, it is extremely
advisable that the personnel destined to take part in the more hectic
part of the fighting should not only be trained to the last ounce, but
quite fresh on arrival. The individual cannot give of his best when
fatigued--a truism exemplified again and again during the late war.
But ships do not cross the ocean without any effort on the part of
their personnel. It is not a case of merely turning on a tap, saying,
"hey presto," and going to bed. Far from it. Engines do not revolve
merely for the asking. Large vessels carry large engineering
complements, but always require about half on duty at a time when at
sea. Small craft may have small engines, but their complements are
also small. So, whether the vessel be large or small, the work below
calls for strenuous duties from the engineering personnel--only those
who have undertaken such duties can realise the {86} immense effort and
the accompanying fatigue which falls to their lot. Then again the ship
cannot navigate herself. The steering and the lookout duties both call
for great concentration of attention, especially at night when steaming
without lights in the close company of other vessels, in the vicinity
of shoals, and in enemy waters. Guns' crews must stand by the guns so
as to be ready at a moment's notice.
Now, this expedition would have to steam many miles across the seas.
How then could the crews be fresh on arrival? This particular problem
was solved as follows. Arrangements were made to provide each
blockship with a number of men, over and above the minimum required at
the climax of the operation, for the purpose of handling the vessel and
its engines during the passage overseas whilst those men required for
the "final run" would be resting. Extra officers could not be spared
for this purpose.
The _Vindictive_, _Iris_, and _Daffodil_ were differently situated in
this respect. It was intended--as I shall explain presently--to bring
these three vessels back on completion of the operation; the total
number of personnel on board need not be kept down to the barest
minimum. In fact, they were each to carry two complete sets of
personnel, namely, those remaining in the ship throughout and those
landing on the Mole.
The submarines, motor launches, and fast motor boats, owing to lack of
accommodation, could not be given extra personnel for the trip across;
it was, therefore, decided to tow all such craft throughout the greater
portion of the passage across the seas. Even that decision did not
relieve the crews of all {87} duty, but gave them some respite, and,
what was equally important, helped to ensure their arrival in the
vicinity of their place of duty.
[Sidenote: Rescue Work]
The rescue work required much thought. Bearing in mind the main object
which had to be attained, it will be understood that all such questions
as rescue work and retirement, however important from the point of view
of humanity, must be relegated to a comparatively secondary
consideration.
One cannot wage war without "breaking eggs." He who attempts to do so
will seldom accomplish anything worth while. The lives of men are,
indeed, a precious responsibility on the shoulders of their leader, but
his primary duty in action is to obtain the utmost value from his men
rather than to adopt the negative attitude of merely preventing their
lives from being lost. This does not signify that lives should be
thrown away without a thought. Not one life should be sacrificed in
the execution of superior order unless the order is absolutely
essential to the success of the work in hand, or, putting it in another
way, unless the life is given so that others may live. The leader,
therefore, has a difficult problem to solve. How far is he justified
in risking failure through the natural desire to preserve life? The
armchair critic, who has never been faced with such responsibility, who
can have no conception of the different situations which arise in war,
may sneer at the leader who places too great a store on the lives of
his subordinates, or may hurl accusations of callous indifference at
the superior whose successful operation is accompanied by a long
casualty list. But we can leave any such critic to his sneers and
accusations, knowing, as we do, that he is {88} least dangerous to the
community in war-time if he remains in his chair.
Each blockship, as already stated, was to carry the minimum number of
personnel which could bring success. But the minimum number was large.
During the "final run" to their destinations they would require the
engineering and stokehold parties, lookouts, guns' crews for
self-defence, the navigation party conning and steering the ship, and
complete spare navigation parties for taking over command in an
emergency. These with a few others, such as signalmen, brought the
total in each ship up to no less than fifty-three.
In the case of the _Merrimac_ at Santiago, during the Spanish-American
war, Lieutenant Hobson was accompanied by only about half a dozen men.
At Port Arthur the Japanese blockships, at each of their attempts, also
carried very small crews. But it must not be forgotten that all those
attempts failed.
Now, it was decided to give each blockship a large lifeboat and some
life-saving rafts, and also to arrange for other craft to proceed to
the rescue. The chances of recovering any of the personnel certainly
appeared to be very remote, especially when one realised that the
rescue would have to be effected practically underneath the enemy's
guns, and even behind their trench defence system on the coast-line.
The chances of rescue must bear some relation to the numbers to be
rescued. For this reason it was decided to disembark the oversea
passage crews from each blockship before arriving within the danger
zone.
[Sidenote: Motor Launches for Rescue Work]
When the question arose as to which of the motor {89} launches should
be used for effecting the rescue of the crews from the blockships,
volunteers were asked for. In spite of the almost incredible
difficulties and tremendous risk involved the number of applications
for this dangerous task was most embarrassing. Eventually lots were
drawn and the winners were greatly envied by their less fortunate
confrères.
The organisation necessary to ensure efficient co-operation, and
co-ordination of effort, was no small matter. Every vessel, however
small, had important duties to fulfil. At any moment during the
operation success might depend on the action of a single unit: it would
be difficult to conceive any circumstances where the value of
initiative would be more pronounced. Nothing could be left to
chance--any suggestion of possible failure was unthinkable.
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