THE PERSONNEL. SECRECY. TRAINING. SOME PERSONALITIES.
No naval or military training is necessary to realise that the success
of any war operation is mainly dependent upon the personnel. In these
days of machinery and munitions, however, we are apt to become
ultra-materialistic in our imagination. We read of so many million
rounds of ammunition, so many thousand tons of merchant shipping, such
and such new-fangled weapons. But the necessity for efficient
personnel is, after all, the crux of the whole matter. What use a ship
without a crew, or an aeroplane without a pilot? Truly the question of
personnel is paramount. No belligerent state ever suffered from a
surplus of fighting men in the midst of a war. How strange it seemed
to us in those critical days that we had ever been content to rely on
an overseas expeditionary force of only 150,000 men.
The ordinary use of warships against the enemy involves no special
requirements of personnel beyond those which can be foreseen when the
ships are originally designed. Design naturally results from projected
employment whether the design be constructional or instructional. But
for the purposes of this unusual kind of operation special types of
officers and men were required and special training had to be arranged
for. The operation itself--in official {102} parlance--was considered
to be _hazardous_. Success would depend upon the work of the personnel
to an unusual degree. This fact was early recognised.
It is difficult to define the type of men required. They should be
volunteers as far as that was practicable. They must be "all out for
business." In view of the hazardous nature of their enterprise it was
advisable that they should be unmarried.
In the Grand Fleet alone there were many thousands of men spoiling for
a fight. Nor was this surprising. During nearly four years of
waiting, tuned up to the last note of efficiency, there had been only
one action in which the major portion of the main fleet was engaged,
and only a few smaller actions in which opportunities were available
for the crews of our large ships to show their worth. But how many of
the public realised the vastness of its work?--the incessant
patrolling, the continual sweeps up and down and across the North Sea,
with only a glimpse of an enemy vessel on the rarest occasions, and
that but a momentary vision of her stern disappearing at the utmost
speed as the vessel fled to her nearest port of refuge. As a
blue-jacket was heard to remark, "It's always tip and run with devilish
little of the tip."
The everlasting practices, manoeuvring, and drills, designed towards
the attainment and upkeep of efficiency, may have been novel enough for
the first few months, but the novelty soon wore off. Not that the men
ever showed any sign of weariness. It was more a case of hope deferred.
I was in that fleet for three years and three months and can speak from
experience. One marvelled at the spirit of the men. They were always
ready for "the {103} day"--hungry for it, praying for it. Even the
theatrical entertainments, which they organised in their spare time,
were brimful of topical allusions to the absent enemy.
[Sidenote: Grand Fleet Personnel]
The personnel of the Grand Fleet--I especially allude to those who had
served in the Fleet from the outbreak of war--were, indeed, spoiling
for a fight. They had read from time to time of the splendid actions
fought by their contemporaries in other theatres of the war; it was
only human that they should feel extremely envious of these others.
It must not be forgotten that the efficiency of our main fleet at the
outbreak of war was mainly due to the untiring efforts of its
personnel. The work of the fleet in the years immediately preceding
the war had been exceedingly strenuous; very different from the sea
life of a decade earlier. The days of "hurrah" cruises, when gunnery
practices took second place to festivities, had long since passed.
Manoeuvres, firing exercises with guns and torpedoes, night attacks and
steam trials at sea were alternated with "rests" in harbour, where
evolutions, drills, and instructions of all sorts, conferences and war
games had kept us pretty well occupied. Admittedly, then, service in
the main fleet required a high state of efficiency; an individual who
fell short of this requirement was not wanted. Thus, speaking
generally, the personnel of the main fleet at the outbreak of war were
only there because they were considered to be deserving of a place on
the efficiency roll. Yet many of these very officers and men had not
seen an enemy ship since the outbreak of war. It is not difficult,
therefore, to imagine their envy of those others to whom {104}
opportunities had been vouchsafed to prove their worth in action.
The choice of the personnel for our particular enterprise had to be
governed, to a certain extent, by those most readily available. The
question thus arose as to whether the Commander-in-Chief of the Grand
Fleet, Sir David Beatty, would consent to lend any of his officers and
men for the operation. The Vice-Admiral was anxious that the Grand
Fleet should be given a share in this affair. The Commanders-in-Chief
of the three southern dockyard ports and the Commandants of the Royal
Marine Artillery and Light Infantry were also consulted; many personnel
at these latter establishments would be awaiting draft in the ordinary
course of events and might, therefore, be more easily spared than those
from the Grand Fleet.
[Sidenote: Selecting the Men]
If the German High Seas Fleet had shown any activity it is a doubtful
matter whether Sir David Beatty would have allowed his officers and men
to leave the fleet. It must be understood that it was not merely a
case of borrowing these men for a day or two, but for a period of
several weeks, so that they could be specially trained for their
somewhat unusual duties. Sir David Beatty, however, considered that
the risk of rendering his ships temporarily short-handed was justified
in view of the importance of our expedition. His chief difficulty lay
in the matter of selection. Owing to the necessity of secrecy he could
not issue an ordinary memorandum to all and sundry stating our object
and asking for volunteers. So each Flag Officer was requested to
produce a certain number of officers and men from his own particular
{105} squadron. Likely individuals were to be asked if they were
prepared to undertake something "hazardous"; no further intimation as
to the nature of the enterprise was to be promulgated. Similar methods
of selection were adopted at the naval and marine depots. It is not
difficult to imagine the buzz of excitement which passed through each
ship when rumour suggested that there was something afoot.
If the nature of the operation had been divulged and volunteers
requested, there would have been twenty thousand names sent in. That
was the Commander-in-Chief's own opinion. But the secret must be
safeguarded. So the selection was made by the officers--so many men
from each ship, seamen, stokers, and marines. At that stage the
selected men knew nothing except that they were required for something
"hazardous."
Life in the fleet was not altogether free from hazard in the ordinary
course of events. With one's living space surrounded by the most
destructive of high explosives in close proximity, perhaps a matter of
inches, with the seas either mine-strewn or, in the absence of mines,
containing lurking submarines, with the ever-present danger of
collision between vessels steaming at high speed without lights on the
darkest night, it cannot be said that naval life in war-time carries an
insignificant insurance premium.
But the coming operation was something different. It was declared to
be "hazardous." If the usual life at sea as described above carried no
such descriptive title, the word "hazardous" meant much.
Though little enough was known as to the business ahead, it was
sufficient to raise the envy of the great {106} majority of men who
were not fortunate enough to be selected. One could well imagine the
little knots of men who gathered together in the evening and discoursed
on the injustice of being left behind. The intense interest with which
the special training of the chosen few was watched could almost be
felt. For boat-pulling, physical drill, and route marching, commenced
immediately, were the order of the day, just to prepare the men for the
more intensive training to follow.
A good deal of consideration had to be given to the choice of officers.
The question of seniority of the blockship commanders gave food for
thought. Each of these vessels would also require at least three
executive officers. The chance of the captain being bowled over early
in the proceedings was none too small. So the conning and steering
arrangements and the whole system of command in each ship was to be
triplicated. Thus each officer must be ready to take over the
responsibility of command at a moment's notice. Similar considerations
affected the choice of officers for the storming vessels. Still
further executive officers were required for charge of the storming
parties. Engineer officers must be forthcoming for these special
vessels. At first all these officers, just as in the case of the men,
knew nothing of the circumstances under which they were required,
except that it was for a hazardous business.
The majority of the officers and men for the blockships and storming
vessels were drawn from the Grand Fleet; most of the remainder were
obtained from the naval depots.
[Sidenote: The American Battle Squadron]
When visiting the United States of America at the {107} end of 1918 I
was often asked to explain why American naval personnel were not
included in the enterprise. On more than one occasion there were
strong evidences of disagreeable insinuations having been circulated
through pro-German influences. It was suggested that relations between
the British and American squadrons in the Grand Fleet left much to be
desired, and that feelings of jealousy had caused us to decline
American assistance for the purposes of our enterprise. Nothing could
be further from the truth. The American battle squadron was never
referred to as such. They formed the "sixth" battle squadron of the
Grand Fleet. Their ships and ours constituted _one_ fleet, working for
a single end and guided by common sentiment. For the furtherance of
successful co-operation the Americans had literally "thrown overboard"
everything that could weaken the combination. Their signalling
arrangements, tactical manoeuvring, and special gunnery methods had all
been brought into line with ours. The unselfishness and sacrifice
involved can only be fully appreciated by members of our own sea
service.
From the day of their arrival the Americans had been actuated with but
one purpose, namely, that of leaving no stone unturned to enhance their
value as a reënforcement. Admiral Rodman, who commanded the Sixth
Battle Squadron, was ever in close touch with Admiral Beatty. The
genuine friendship between his squadron and the rest of the fleet will
never be forgotten in our service. There was but one fleet. But the
question of utilising their personnel for our immediate affair was
governed by something more than cordiality and co-operation. Secrecy
had to be {108} maintained. If we had transferred a few score American
officers and men to Chatham, where there were no American ships, for
special training with our own, curiosity would have been aroused at
once, comment would have followed and, in a very short while, the
secret might have been public property.
Admiral Beatty and Admiral Rodman had discussed the whole subject and
decided that American assistance was inadvisable for the reason given.
I was also asked if it was true that an American officer had come over
to Zeebrugge in _Vindictive_ as a stowaway. It was not true.
Admiral Rodman had previously held an important post in connection with
the Panama Canal, and he let us have the benefit of his experiences
with regard to questions of salvage. Nearly a year later he was kind
enough to attend a large meeting with the author in New York, where, in
no uncertain language, he nailed the pro-German insinuations to the
board.
[Sidenote: Captains of Blockships]
Amongst the first officers to leave the Grand Fleet were those destined
to command the blockships; the fitting out of the latter had already
commenced. The usual custom concerning seniority for command of light
cruisers was waived, these officers, whose ranks varied from a
Commander to a Lieutenant of less than three years' standing, being
selected from those available mainly by virtue of their character and
capability. Those selected to command _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were also
sent south as early as practicable. On arrival at Dover they were told
the "secret." It was probably self-control combined with the somewhat
artificial reserve arising from good discipline which enabled them to
refrain from giving vent to {109} their feelings of elation. One of
them told me that he had the sensation of being released from prison;
the opportunity of being able to show his worth had come at last. Each
officer read through the "plan" so as to make himself acquainted with
the broad outlines of the whole enterprise. One of the blockship
commanders expressed the opinion that the blocking of Ostende would be
"easy meat" compared to the undertaking at Zeebrugge, and he earnestly
requested that he might command a blockship destined for the latter
place. This request was granted. Incidentally his opinion was wrong.
Subsequently, thanks to his own splendid efforts, he caused his
comparison between the two places to appear all the more erroneous by
assisting to make the blocking of Zeebrugge seem relatively simple.
The main ideas governing the preparatory work, as already stated, had
been evolved under the direction of Admiral Keyes. Many questions,
however, of a more local description remained to be decided on the
spot. The blockship officers, therefore, thoroughly investigated every
detail which bore on their duties and devised many local improvements,
especially in connection with the handling of the vessels.
They left nothing undone to ensure a successful issue of their efforts.
No other subject held any interest for them in those days. Just how to
take their ships to their allotted positions--that was their one
consideration. The question of being rescued after their work was
completed held a very secondary place. Perhaps the rescue vessels
might be able to do something towards it. Perhaps not. Anyway, that
mattered nothing in comparison with the crucial {110} point. And so
they schemed and discussed and organised and tested. And what a grand
reward they obtained for their labours!
I should like to mention in passing that the first blockship officer to
come south was Lieutenant Ivor B. Franks, in whose hands much of the
early work connected with fitting out the blockships was placed, with
splendid results which reflected great credit on him. He commanded
_Iphigenia_ during the first two attempts made against Zeebrugge, but,
most unluckily for him, he developed appendicitis just before the final
attempt. It was largely due to his earnest entreaties that Admiral
Keyes gave the command to the previous second-in-command, who was a
Lieutenant of only one year standing. Once again Lieutenant Franks,
for whom we all felt the greatest sympathy, had shown the value of his
judgment.
During this period the constructive work on the ships proceeded apace.
The _Vindictive_ rapidly changed her appearance. Every unessential
fitting that could be removed in the time at our disposal was wafted
away. The foremast was cut off just above the fighting-top. The
mainmast was removed altogether and a large portion of it was fitted
horizontally across the deck, extending several feet over the port side
of the ship, as a bumpkin designed to prevent the port propeller from
bumping against the Mole at Zeebrugge.
Special fenders were fitted on the ship's side to prevent damage to the
latter when secured to the Mole, and a fender of colossal proportions
was added to the port side of the forecastle for the express purpose of
bumping the Mole on arrival.
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Other alterations and additions have been described in Chapter V.
H.M.S. _Hindustan_, Captain A. P. Davidson, D.S.O., was lent as a depot
vessel for our officers and men who had been concentrated at Chatham.
There was then no living accommodation on board _Vindictive_ or in the
blockships.
[Sidenote: Informing the Officers]
The Vice-Admiral took an early opportunity of assembling all the
officers and making the whole plan known to them collectively. The
secret was to be kept from the men until later, in accordance with the
principle of never divulging a secret to anybody except those to whom
the information is indispensable.
The personnel specially required for storming the Mole at Zeebrugge
were divided into three main parties, viz., Seamen storming parties
under the command of Captain Henry C. Halahan, D.S.O., R.N., Marine
storming parties (drawn from the 4th Battalion) under the command of
Lieutenant-Colonel Bertram N. Elliot, D.S.O., R.M.L.I., and a
demolition party consisting of both Seamen and Marines under the
command of Lieutenant-Commander Cecil C. Dickinson, R.N.
The Marine Infantrymen were put through intensive training at one of
the southern depots; this training was arranged and personally
supervised by Lieutenant-Colonel Elliot, whose powers of imagination
and organisation were of a high order and whose optimism was very
encouraging. He was tremendously enthusiastic from the first moment
when he was let into the secret. As second-in-command of the Naval
Forces in Servia he had previously rendered splendid service and had
been awarded the D.S.O. {112} After the fall of Belgrade I believe
that he had traversed the entire country on foot in his endeavour to
help his force to safety. I remember a lady telling me that she and
her friends had been much interested on recent nights in watching a
large party of Marines indulging in peculiar antics on a hill opposite
her house; also that the hill was partly covered with strips of canvas
in a seemingly aimless fashion. I expressed my astonishment at the
strange proceeding. Incidentally the canvas strips were laid out to
represent different portions of Zeebrugge Mole, though, at that period,
the men believed they represented some enemy position elsewhere.
[Sidenote: Intensive Training]
The Marine Artillerymen, destined to man the howitzers and some other
guns in _Vindictive_, were trained at another depot.
The seamen were largely trained at Chatham under military supervision
and advice; the excellence of this training received a well-deserved
tribute in the official despatch. The demolition parties were also
trained at Chatham.
Training in night fighting was the main idea. Instruction in bombing,
bayonet fighting, and all types of trench raiding was given. The men
believed that they were required for some special service in France;
their enthusiasm was unbounded.
[Illustration: LIEUT.-COL. BERTRAM N. ELLIOT, D.S.O., R.M.L.I.,
LIEUT.-COM. ARTHUR L. HARRISON, R.N., WING-COM. FRANK A. BROCK,
R.N.A.S., CAPTAIN HENRY C. HALAHAN, D.S.O., R.N.]
Taking everything into consideration and looking at the operation of
attacking the Mole from a general point of view, it was not dissimilar
to a trench raid on a large scale. The preparatory bombardment, the
rush "over the top," the probability of encountering barbed wire, the
descent to the main level of the Mole, the hand-to-hand fighting in the
dark, and {113} finally the clearing of dug-outs, all combined to liken
that phase of the operation to one of the many night raids with which
the military were so well acquainted on the western front. The senior
officers of the Seamen and Marine storming parties had both gained much
experience of such fighting ashore. It was to be a raid of the first
water, a super-raid. The military officers were most enthusiastic
about our men. They declared that these men could carry any position.
For they were all picked men; and even so some of them were weeded out
as not quite reaching high-water mark at the game. It was generally
conceded that the Hun, wherever he was to come to close quarters with
such antagonists, would have an uncomfortable evening.
It has been mentioned above that special personnel were not required
for the large majority of vessels which were already in full commission
and employed on active duty in the Dover Command. The personnel
required for the blockships and storming vessels and for other special
purposes amounted to eighty-six officers and sixteen hundred and
ninety-eight men; of these, seven hundred and fifty, in the aggregate,
were drawn from the Royal Marines.
Having been working in the Plans Department of the Admiralty when the
operation was originally thought out under Admiral Keyes, my further
services had been lent to him, after he took over the Command at Dover,
in connection with the operational staff work. Very much to my delight
I had then been offered the billet of navigator of the expedition, and
my duties were to include those of placing _Vindictive_ alongside the
Mole. The Vice-Admiral originally {114} proposed to direct the
operation from on board _Vindictive_, but was forced to the conclusion
that he could do so more satisfactorily from a destroyer, thus avoiding
the possibility of being confined to any single position in the area of
the attack. In the Vice-Admiral's absence Captain Halahan, appointed
in command of the seamen storming parties, became the Senior Executive
Officer in the ship. It was pointed out that that fact would result in
the unusual case of the Senior Officer on board not being responsible
for the handling of the ship. Captain Halahan would not even listen to
any suggestion of difficulty arising from such a situation, and, I am
anxious to record this fact, he proposed that his acting rank of
Captain should be transferred from himself to me, so that the officer
responsible for handling the vessel should also be the Senior Executive
Officer on board in accordance with the usual service custom; in other
words that he should be made junior to myself. This proposal was
typical of Halahan, who, in my opinion, was one of the finest fellows
that our Service ever knew. His death brought an irreparable loss to
the Navy. Throughout the greater part of the war he had been in
command of the naval guns on the northern front and within field-gun
range of the enemy for no less than three years. He had fought in most
of the great battles on that part of the Allied lines. A more
efficient, earnest, upright, and altogether large-minded officer never
fought for his country or paid the supreme sacrifice more readily. The
days which we spent together working at the details of the enterprise,
his wonderful enthusiasm, and his certainty of success are
unforgettable. I feel that I could not {115} continue this story
without recording my unqualified admiration for this splendid officer.
Needless to say, it was unnecessary to carry his proposal into effect,
for his unselfishness had served to guarantee that all questions of
rank were immaterial where the only thing that really mattered was the
attainment of our object.
I regret that my lack of literary ability prevents my doing justice to
such men.
[Sidenote: Wing-Commander Brock]
It would be difficult for anybody to speak too highly of Wing-Commander
Frank A. Brock. He was a rare personality. An inventive genius, than
whom the country had no better, it was his brain that differentiated
this blocking enterprise from all previous attempts in history in one
most important particular. The difficulty of reaching the destination
in the face of a strenuous opposition had hitherto brought failure, but
he provided an antidote in the form of a satisfactory artificial fog
designed to protect the blockships from the enemy's guns during the
critical period of approach. That in itself was a wonderful
achievement, but his inventive mind was not satisfied therewith. To
him we owed the special flares intended for turning darkness into light.
A special buoy was wanted--one that would automatically provide its own
light on being thrown into the water. Brock made so little of the
problem that he produced such a buoy, designed, constructed, and ready
for use in less than twenty-four hours. Special signal lights were
required. Brock produced them. Flame projectors, far exceeding
anything hitherto known, were mooted. Brock produced them also. No
matter what our requirements were Brock was {116} undefeated. With a
highly scientific brain he possessed extraordinary knowledge of almost
any subject. He had travelled much and could tell you all that was
worth knowing of any country from Patagonia to Spitzbergen. He was no
mean authority on old prints and books, was also a keen philatelist,
and was blessed with a remarkable memory. Wherever he went he carried
with him a pocket edition of the New Testament, which was his favourite
possession; his knowledge of the contents was quite unique. And with
it all he was a great shot and an all-round sportsman. His fine
physique was well remembered by many a Rugby footballer from the days
when he played in the pack of one of the leading club fifteens. His
geniality and humour were hard to beat. But of all his qualities,
optimism perhaps held first place. At times we, who were far from
being pessimistic, thought his optimism excessive, but it was justified
absolutely with regard to the success of the enterprise.
Sad to relate, the only occasion on which I can remember his optimism
failing to carry him through was connected with his own personal
safety. He had telephoned up to Halahan in our office and mentioned
having broken a looking-glass. "That means seven years bad luck," said
Halahan, in a jocular spirit. "Never mind," came the instant reply,
"it shows that I'm going to live for another seven years, anyway."
Both Brock and Halahan had done so much to ensure our success, it was
indeed sad that they did not survive long enough to see the results.
My readers will excuse me, I feel sure, for bringing such personalities
to their notice. It is very difficult {117} to continue the story
without writing of many others to whom we owed so much in the
preparatory work. But there will be a chance of mentioning some of
them later on, when we come to the actual description of the fight.
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