PLANNING THE OPERATION. MATTERS AFFECTING
THE PLAN. ATTACKS ON THE MOLE.
A war operation, such as this, passes through various stages before it
can be put into execution. It emanates originally from a suggestion.
If the suggestion seems to bear further consideration certain
individuals are ordered to appreciate the situation, that is, to
thoroughly thrash out all the arguments for and against and to weigh
the chances and effects of success and failure. Should the results of
such an appreciation be favourable, the investigation leads to the
formation of a Plan.
[Sidenote: Formation of a Plan]
Plans are based, to a considerable extent, on the personnel and
material believed to be available. In like manner the calculations as
to future requirements of personnel and material are based on the types
of operations which are likely to be carried out. But it is
conceivable that a projected plan may be found to involve the
unforeseen use of material to the detriment of other operations already
in view. Thus the feasibility of putting a naval plan into operation
cannot be judged unless fairly complete details are given as to the
numbers and types of ships, men, and stores involved. The formulated
results of such investigation, arising out of the original suggestion
may be designated the first edition of the Plan.
The authorities then consider the Plan both from the view of general
outlook and from that of detailed {65} requirements. Let us suppose
that the Plan is considered to be of value, and that no objections hold
good as to the practicability of execution provided the ships and men
_are_ available. This latter proviso then requires attention. Many
questions have to be considered. Can the ships be diverted from their
present duties? What special alterations or additions are necessary?
Can the dockyard undertake the work? If so, to what extent will other
work in hand be interrupted? Will the men require special training?
Are the necessary stores ready at hand? How long will the preparations
take? And so on. A hundred and one points must be carefully enquired
into. It is only after a great deal of investigation, correspondence
with various departments, and conferences for co-ordinating the results
of enquiries, that the details can be arranged. A plan served up in
the form of a mosaic is of little more use than the works of a
chronometer contained in half a dozen different boxes.
In course of time decisions are arrived at and orders are issued for
the preparatory work to be taken in hand. But it is unlikely that all
the proposals contained in the first edition of the plan have been
agreed to. Modifications are almost sure to be necessary. Perhaps the
suggested vessels are required for other purposes and substitutes must
be forthcoming. The technical experts may decide that different types
of material would lead to improvement. Possibly the facilities for
special training of the personnel are not available at the moment. The
plan must, therefore, be re-drafted on the basis of the personnel and
material available, and must take into consideration the dates by which
the various phases of the preparatory {66} work can be completed. All
this takes time and serves as a reminder, indeed, that patience is a
virtue. The second edition of the plan is evolved and the next stage
is reached.
But put aside, for a moment, the question of what material and
personnel are available. When a plan, conveying a general idea, has
come under the critical examination of the Higher Command to the extent
of being "passed" for the commencement of detailed preparation, it has
then to be _gradually built up_ from the operational point of view.
Additions will almost always be necessary as the investigation
proceeds, and some time will elapse before the plan can be considered
as complete in every particular.
A further duty then devolves upon the operational staff. They must
produce the orders necessary to give effect to the plan as detailed in
its final edition.
[Sidenote: Writing of the Orders]
This again is no small affair. The writing of orders is a high art in
itself. Orders must not be too centralized or too cut-and-dried.
Ample allowance must be made for initiative, while realising that mere
go-as-you-please methods are likely to lead to disaster. It is usually
the unexpected that happens in war. A single set of orders cannot
cover every eventuality. And even if it could, nobody would have
either the time or inclination to wade through such a voluminous
document. This is clearly enough exemplified in legal matters. Laws
are framed to cover every possible case, but as often as not they fail
to attain such success. Even so, how many ordinary folk can be
bothered to wade through a legal document? What with the alternatives,
and saving clauses, such publications are dull to a degree. The
marriage laws are {67} typical of this. A man may not marry his
grandmother. That clause was presumably inserted for the discomfiture
of that unique individual who _might_ contemplate such a peculiar
alliance.
The issue of orders needs careful training and much experience. Orders
must be fool-proof--that is the guiding axiom. If an order is
misunderstood it is ten chances to one that the fault lies with the man
who gives the order.
If I have sorely tried the patience of the reader it is because of my
endeavour to emphasise the point that the order "carry on" is not
sufficient to put a suggestion into execution in the matter of a few
hours. New situations have to be met by fresh dispositions, and this
fact has come very much to the fore in these days of strife.
The operations on the Flanders coast were the outcome of some months of
hard work--mental as well as manual. A few details of the plan may now
be worthy of consideration.
On December 3, 1917, the plan had emanated from an Admiralty Department
under the direction of Rear-Admiral Keyes, Director of Plans, to give
him his titles at that time. The nature of the operation and the
customary procedure, having regard to the locality concerned, would
entail its execution coming under the command of the Vice-Admiral at
Dover. The latter apparently desired to modify the plan and submitted
his proposals on December 18th. He suggested the idea that an attack
on the Mole, not previously mentioned in the plan, should accompany the
blocking operations. As a diversion (pardon the anticipation) this
idea was eventually embodied after {68} exhaustive consideration had
shown it to be necessary.
[Sidenote: Vice-Admiral Keyes]
As already stated this particular type of diversion was somewhat
similar to that included in a previous scheme, referred to on page 17
as having been forwarded in May, 1917, which at that time was
considered impracticable by the Vice-Admiral at Dover. The actual
method proposed on December 18th by the latter for giving effect to his
idea of a Mole attack was not followed, for it happened that
Rear-Admiral Keyes took over the Dover Command, with the acting rank of
Vice-Admiral, after his own plan had been submitted, and nearly four
months before it could be carried out. The coincidence--if it was a
coincidence--was extremely advantageous. An operation can be so much
better worked up by an officer who has handled the plan from its
inception. But in the ordinary course of events such an arrangement is
impracticable. An admiral or general in active employment in the face
of the enemy, as a general rule, has not sufficient spare time for the
formation of plans in every detail, nor has he a superabundance of
staff officers for the purpose. No words of mine could ever do justice
to Sir Roger Keyes, so I will not make the attempt. Suffice it to
record that every soul in the enterprise possessed complete confidence
in his leadership; this fact was half the battle won before we even
started.
Admiral Keyes was given an absolutely free hand by Their Lordships; all
the details, from A to Z, were worked out under his direction. The
"paper scheme" rapidly developed into practical shape; I will endeavour
to describe the data and arguments from {69} which its final shape was
evolved. Before doing so, however, it may be as well to put on record
a fact that might escape the notice of the reader. The responsibility
of the Officer in Command of an operation must necessarily be great,
but the responsibility of the Higher Command, in this case the Board of
Admiralty, which has to either sanction or disallow the execution of
proposed operations, is by no means small. That they sanctioned it in
this case and also chose the right man to carry it out must never be
forgotten.
Having reached a decision as to our object and considered the obstacles
in the way of attainment, let us now pass on to the manner in which it
was proposed to overcome the various difficulties. We will commence
with the most important phase of the operation, namely, the actual
blocking and the nature, requirements, and duties of the blockships.
Reference to the previous description of the locality and to the
principles governing the use of blockships serves to show that a single
vessel of the light-cruiser class, or above, would suffice as far as
dimensions were concerned. But nothing possesses such a large element
of chance as war; for that reason it was considered advisable to
provide at least three blockships at Zeebrugge and two at Ostende.
With regard to the requirements of each blockship, they may be briefly
stated as follows. Firstly, she must have the ability to proceed under
her own steam to her destination. The task of towing a blockship into
position in the face of enemy opposition is quite impracticable.
Secondly, her draught of water must not be excessive, having due regard
to the depth of {70} the channel. Next, she would require a certain
degree of defensive power; it would be rather heartrending, after all
one's efforts at taking a blockship to within a short distance of her
destination, if any small enemy craft could approach without hindrance
and sink the ship before her destination was actually reached.
The blockships must also be handy vessels, so that they would be
manageable up to the last moment, provided they escaped serious damage.
It has been stated previously that these ships must be so fitted and
sunk that their removal would be extremely difficult. Five old light
cruisers which were available, or rather which could be replaced at
their present duties, were chosen for the purpose. They were H.M.S.
_Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia, Brilliant, and Sirius_; the first three
being destined for Zeebrugge and the others for Ostende.
[Illustration: THE BLOCKSHIPS FITTING OUT FOR THE ENTERPRISE. H.M.S.
VINDICTIVE BEFORE FITTING OUT.]
A few months previously a couple of steamers had been fitted out for
some such operation under another Vice-Admiral, but it will be seen
that, as a result of detailed investigation of all the obstacles and
factors affecting the problem, the Plan described herein differed from
its predecessors in that respect; in fact the arguments against the use
of merchant vessels were considered from the outset to be overwhelming.
[Sidenote: Hazards of the Blockships]
The work of surmounting such difficulties as escorting the blockships
across the seas and locating their destinations would require the use
of other units, and will, therefore, be described later. Speaking
generally, the actual tasks of reaching their destinations _when
located_ and of sinking themselves in position, difficult though they
were, could best be left to the pilotage and seamanship of the
blockship officers. {71} Here again, the author is anxious to lay
special emphasis on the fact that successful results of the blocking
operation--such as had never been attained in history--were absolutely
dependent upon the good work of the blockship personnel; to them would
the credit be due.
At Ostende, the work of the blockships, with regard to reaching their
destination, was confined to that of running the gantlet of the shore
batteries when once the entrance had been located, but the
latter--i.e., the location of the entrance--presented considerable
difficulty.
At Zeebrugge, there would be less difficulty in finding the entrance if
the Mole extremity, three-quarters of a mile to seaward, could be
located. But a serious factor existed here which was absent at Ostende.
Blockships proceeding into Zeebrugge would have to risk the fire of the
Mole batteries during the first part of the approach. They would then
have to steam in _behind those batteries_ and run the gantlet of the
batteries ashore. Now this was a pretty big proposition.
In the second chapter it was shown that the three-gun battery situated
on the broad portion of the Mole at its northeastern extremity, taken
in conjunction with the establishment of the barge boom and
entanglement nets, rendered it extremely hazardous for the blockships
to round the Mole _en route_ to the canal entrance; in fact it was
almost a certainty that they would be sunk by the Mole guns.
Nevertheless, the canal entrance was our objective. Somehow, by hook
or crook, the blockships were intended to reach it. Thus, one of the
first local {72} problems requiring solution was that of removing,
temporarily or otherwise, the obstacle afforded by the three-gun Mole
battery. Similarly, though perhaps in a lesser degree, we had also to
take into account the battery of six smaller guns on the lighthouse
extension of the Mole.
[Sidenote: Object of Attacking Mole]
Considered in a general manner, there were three lines of enquiry from
which a solution of the problem might be forthcoming. Firstly, that
concerning the destruction of the guns or their crews, or both, or
diverting their fire, by means of action from a distance. Secondly,
that of attaining a similar result by action on the spot. Thirdly,
that of rendering the blockships invisible during their passage. These
may be dealt with briefly. The first method entailed the use of either
gun-fire or poison gas. The outcome of a gun-fire duel between a ship
and a battery has already been described sufficiently to show that the
chances of destroying the battery guns are exceedingly small. The use
of poison gas has been shown to be inadvisable. The third method--that
of rendering the blockships invisible to the battery--would have
entailed the use of a smoke screen. If such a screen could have the
effect mentioned it is obvious to the meanest intellect that it would
also have the effect of hiding their destination from the blockships
just at the critical period when it would be absolutely essential to
see exactly where they were going.
[Illustration: A PORTION OF THE BROAD PART OF THE MOLE. Note the
concrete submarine shelter (white)]
And so no method would suffice, except the second mentioned above,
namely, destroying the guns or their crews, or both, or diverting their
fire, by means of action _on the spot_. This entailed an attack on the
Mole itself, carried out by vessels actually berthed {73} alongside.
The author, although well aware of the unpardonable fault of
repetition, desires at this stage to lay great emphasis on the fact
that an attack on the Mole itself could only be designed as a
diversionary measure calculated to directly assist the blockships past
one of the positions of danger. The reader is requested to pardon
anticipation. Subsequent to the operation, many of the public appeared
to have formed the idea that the attack on the Mole was the main
attack, and that the use of the blockships was a sort of afterthought.
I shall have more to say about this later.
Just as the three-gun battery provided a serious obstacle to the
passage of blockships round the Mole end, so also would it prevent the
similar passage of other vessels endeavouring to secure alongside the
berthing wharf on the inner side of the Mole preparatory to attacking
the Mole batteries. Thus, if the Mole was to be stormed, _the storming
parties must land on the outer side of the Mole_, remembering that the
three-gun battery could not fire to the northward owing to being twenty
feet below the top of the high outer wall. But the outer wall of the
Mole was never intended for use as a berthing position for vessels, and
probably never had been used by any vessel for such a purpose--hence
the complete absence of all berthing facilities as described in an
earlier chapter. The development of the argument concerning this
projected attack had led us to the point where we needed to consider
seriously the practicability of getting any vessel, or vessels,
alongside the outer wall, of securing there, and of landing men thence
for attacking the Mole batteries.
The depth of water, the construction of the Mole, {74} the rate of the
tidal current, and many other matters required careful examination.
The depth was a doubtful matter; but, the operation being timed to take
place near high tide so that the blockships could enter the canal,
there was every likelihood of its being sufficient. Breakwaters when
also intended as wharfs are usually built with their inner sides--i.e.,
the sides protected from bad weather--vertical like the face of an
ordinary wall, but with their seaward sides formed of large blocks of
material dropped more or less indiscriminately, one above the other, so
that the wall will be jagged for the purpose of breaking up the waves
in bad weather. In such cases a ship could not possibly secure to the
seaward side without being severely damaged, and certainly could not
remain there. At Zeebrugge, however, we had reason to believe that the
seaward side of the Mole was nearly vertical and that no danger would
accrue from jagged blocks of stone or concrete.
[Illustration: SECTION of MOLE through No. 3 Shed]
At high tide the tidal current on the Belgian coast is flowing at its
greatest speed--a phenomenon nearly always found in comparatively
narrow waters--and its rate was expected to be about three and a half
miles per hour, its direction of flow being to the eastward. So far,
then, the matter of reaching a position alongside chiefly concerned the
art of seamanship if we leave the enemy's opposition out of account.
Next we had to consider the problem of securing alongside and of
disembarking the storming parties. The most simple method of berthing
alongside a wall, in the case of a sizable vessel, is to place the
vessel roughly in position and then to use tugs to push her bodily
against the wall, afterwards securing the {76} hawsers in the usual
manner. This led to the idea of having a second vessel to act as tug
and of providing special means to take the place of the ordinary
hawser-and-bollard method of securing.
The wall on the outer side, as previously described, rose to a height
of twenty-nine feet above the level of high water. This height was far
above that of the deck of an average vessel. The fact that the landing
would have to be made on a narrow parapet, high above the level of the
Mole proper, was also hardly calculated to assist matters. The
probable existence of guns on the parapet itself, so placed as to be
able to rake the decks of a vessel alongside, and the possible presence
of obstructions placed by the Germans on the outer side of the Mole,
had to be taken into account. It has also been mentioned above that
the use of smoke screens necessitated a wind blowing towards the shore;
thus the Mole itself could afford no protection from the wind or sea.
The Austrian military failure on the River Piave, during the late war,
afforded a good example of the disabilities resulting from insufficient
room to debouch a force which has crossed an obstacle into the enemy's
territory. Clearly, it might be very awkward if the storming parties
were unable to descend from the parapet rapidly enough to forestall any
enemy attempts at concentration near the storming point.
All these considerations led to the choice of H.M.S. _Vindictive_ for
carrying the main portion of the storming parties.
The attack on the Mole might also provide an opportunity for destroying
material thereon. Although this was obviously a secondary
consideration it was {77} an opportunity not to be missed. The amount
of destructive work which could be done would depend upon the
circumstances of the moment, but it was decided to have a special
demolition party, provided with the necessary gear, to accompany the
primary attacking forces.
[Illustration: THE OUTER WALL, SHOWING THE PARAPET PATHWAY 16 FEET
ABOVE THE FLOOR OF THE MOLE]
Clearly enough, it would be somewhat futile if one only began to
consider the work of demolition as soon as the moment arrived for such
work to commence. With the object of being prepared in all respects
careful consideration, therefore, was given to the different methods of
demolition which would be most suitable under varying circumstances.
Following such consideration it would be necessary to train one's
demolition parties in this technical pursuit and to provide a
sufficiency of suitable destructive material.
[Sidenote: Plans for Demolition]
When making preparations for an operation of this, or similar type, one
is apt to allow secondary objects to loom too large unless great
caution is taken to prevent it. In this particular case, however
correct it might be to fully prepare, down to the smallest detail, for
everything in advance, it was necessary to bear in mind that demolition
on the Mole could hardly assist the blockships to seal the canal exit
and, even if successful, could not bring us very great benefit. Thus
it was clear that demolition should only be prepared for and undertaken
provided that it did not hinder the attainment of our main object in
the smallest particular.
H.M.S. _Vindictive_ had to be fitted with a special deck from which
gangways could be extended to bridge the gulf between the ship and the
top of the twenty-nine-foot wall. For this purpose she was given {78}
a large number of gangways poised at an angle of about forty-five
degrees from the ship's side. The idea was that on arriving alongside
the Mole, the gangways would be lowered till they rested on the top of
the wall. The storming parties, at a prearranged signal, should run
out along the gangways and jump down to the parapet pathway four feet
below the wall top. They should then get across the pathway, over the
iron handrails on its inner side, down to the floor level of the Mole,
sixteen feet below, and then start the work. Now, one cannot expect
men carrying all their accoutrements and paraphernalia, such as rifles,
machine-guns, flame-throwers, bombs and grenades, rifle and gun
ammunition, and such-like to jump down a drop of sixteen feet on to a
stone surface. So it was arranged that the advanced storming parties
should carry long storming ladders to place against the wall on its
inner side and thus facilitate access to the floor level. Seamen were
to land first, both for the purpose just stated and for securing the
ship to the Mole after the _Vindictive_ had been pushed alongside the
Mole by another vessel.
[Illustration: H.M.S. VINDICTIVE'S SPECIALLY CONSTRUCTED GANGWAYS. Two
of the parapet anchors for grappling the Mole can be seen at the end of
the bridge in the background]
[Sidenote: Fittings in _Vindictive_]
Owing to the absence of bollards for securing hawsers, special
grappling irons, fitted with double pronged hooks, with hawsers
attached to them and the ship, were designed for the purpose of hooking
on top of the wall. In reality we proposed using the methods of the
good old days when vessels grappled each other and indulged in
hand-to-hand fighting between their respective storming parties. The
weight of these grappling irons necessitated the use of special davits
for suspending them in a similar manner to that used for the gangways.
Special weapons, such as {79} bomb-mortars and flame-throwers, to be
worked from the ship, were provided for clearing the Mole immediately
abreast the ship prior to sending the storming parties over the top.
The _Vindictive_ also carried most of her original gun armament for
engaging enemy vessels _en route_, for shelling the six-gun battery on
the lighthouse extension of the Mole, and for defending herself against
attacks, when at the Mole, from enemy vessels in a seaward direction.
Special howitzers were carried for engaging the shore batteries after
the ship was secured, and rapid-firing guns were placed in the
fighting-top of the foremast for engaging the batteries on the Mole.
The wall being at least twenty-nine feet above the water, no gun at a
less height could fire over it in a downward direction. Much other
special material--peculiar to the operation in hand--was required, but
space does not admit of describing it all in detail.
The reader will already have realised that the _Vindictive_ was to be a
weird craft indeed--something very different from the usual run of
warships even in these days.
Now, as regards the storming of the Mole, it would have been a
dangerous policy to put all "our eggs in one basket." There was no
small chance of the _Vindictive_ being mined _en route_, owing to her
heavy draught, or of being sunk by gun-fire, owing to the large target
which she would present, before reaching the Mole. It was, therefore,
decided to use two other vessels in addition to the _Vindictive_.
The ferry steamers _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were chosen for carrying a
portion of the storming parties to the attack. There was considerable
difficulty in finding {80} two vessels suitable to our purpose; time
did not permit of constructing special craft before the projected date
of the operation. It must be remembered that we could not write round
to all the naval and mercantile ports explaining our requirements. An
officer, sent on a tour for the purpose, unostentatiously visited the
likely places until he found these two vessels. I often wonder what
imaginary yarns he conjured up for the purpose of stifling curiosity.
[Sidenote: _Iris_ and _Daffodil_]
The _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were both well known to Liverpool folk, being
used for conveying passengers across the River Mersey many times daily.
They were extremely handy craft, could each carry fifteen hundred men
if required, and drew very little water, but they possessed two serious
disadvantages. Firstly, their decks were so low as to necessitate the
use of long storming ladders for reaching the parapet. Secondly, their
steaming qualities were comparatively poor, judged from the point of
view of the operation for which they were required. Just picture their
ordinary daily employment for a moment. Waiting alongside one of the
piers at Liverpool till their usual quota of passengers had embarked,
they would make the short trip across the river to the Birkenhead shore
and then wait once more. During this second period of waiting the
steam pressure would be increased in the boilers in readiness for the
next short voyage across the river. Compare that employment with a
trip of nearly one hundred miles across the open sea. It will then be
evident that the task allotted to these two ferry vessels was by no
means simple from the engineering point of view alone.
All this, however, was carefully thought out, and {81} it was decided
that their advantages outweighed their disadvantages. Both craft, by
nature of their work, were designed to stand heavy bumping alongside
piers; their draught was small, and, as already stated, they were easy
to handle. After minor alterations they proceeded to the port of
assembly in charge of their naval crews and adopted the title H.M.S.,
much to the amusement of those of us who made their acquaintance for
the first time. It is rumoured that one of these two vessels arrived
at her destination _with her anti-submarine escort in tow_, which thus
early showed that proud spirit to which she so justly proved her right
on St. George's Day, 1918.
The first duty of the _Daffodil_ on arrival at the Mole was to be that
of pushing the _Vindictive_ bodily alongside. The former vessel was to
place herself at right angles to the latter, bows against the latter's
side, and to continue pushing until _Vindictive_, which would
previously have anchored, was secured by means of the grapnels.
_Daffodil_ was then to drop alongside _Vindictive_ and her parties were
to climb over the latter and up to the Mole. The _Iris_ was to go
alongside the Mole ahead of _Vindictive_, to anchor, to grapnel the
parapet, and to land her storming parties by means of ladders against
the wall, her decks being too low to allow the use of large gangways as
carried in _Vindictive_.
In the event of _Vindictive_ being sunk, _Iris_ and _Daffodil_ were to
storm the Mole as best they could and do everything possible to knock
out the three-gun battery or divert its fire from the blockships.
It was believed that the Mole garrison consisted of about one thousand
men. But what of {82} reënforcements arriving from the shore? Access
to the Mole would entail the crossing of the viaduct by such
reënforcements. Therefore the viaduct must be destroyed.
Consideration on this point led to a decision to utilise one or more
submarines filled with explosives and to blow them up under the
viaduct, so as to cut the latter in twain.
This particular phase of the operation had not been included in the
original Plan evolved at the Admiralty. As previously stated the first
edition could not be expected to cover every single investigation of
every point in the problem. The attack on the viaduct, after a large
amount of experimental work ordered by Vice-Admiral Keyes, took the
following shape.
Two submarines, each carrying several tons of high explosive, were to
accompany the expedition. They were each to carry a crew of two
officers and four men, who, after securing their craft underneath the
viaduct, were to light the time fuses and then to take to the boats.
Each submarine carried a small motor-driven dinghey for this latter
purpose.
So much, then, for the blockships, storming vessels, and submarines at
present.
{83}