PAST EXPERIENCE. SMOKE SCREENS. THE CHANCES OF SUCCESS.
What were the chances of success?
The lessons of personal experience and of past history are the chief
guides when calculating the probability of success in any operation.
He who ignores history acts unwisely. He who studies history and
proposes to attempt something which has always failed hitherto either
may be excessively foolish or may be aware of a new factor affecting
the situation. He may be merely flying in the face of Providence or
basing new proposals on a well-considered judgment of the new
circumstances.
[Sidenote: Analogous Operations]
Naval history contains a few examples of operations somewhat analogous
to that under investigation. The more noted are the attacks on
Martinique in 1794, on Teneriffe in 1797, the attack on Ostende in
1798, the cutting out of the _Hermione_ from Puerto Cabello in 1799,
the sinking of the American steamer _Merrimac_ at Santiago de Cuba in
1898, the Japanese attempts to block the entrance to Port Arthur in
1904, and, during the late war, the attempt to block the Rufigi River
by a British collier in November, 1914.
In none of these cases were the conditions quite parallel to those at
Zeebrugge and Ostende, but some features of each bore a certain
similarity.
The attacks on Martinique and Puerto Cabello {55} showed the great
value of determination and initiative in the face of powerful shore
defences. They also showed the disadvantage accruing to the defence
force by reason of the latter's ignorance as to the true nature and
object of an attack by sea forces.
The attack on Santa Cruz, Teneriffe, was led by the immortal Nelson
himself. It involved the storming of the Mole which was defended by
the enemy's batteries. Two attempts were made. The first was carried
out in the face of adverse weather conditions which rendered "surprise"
impossible; the attack was withdrawn soon after the landing parties had
left their ships. The second attempt, made two days later, was also a
failure, but a glorious failure indeed. Very few of the boats reached
the Mole, which, however, after a desperate encounter was captured by
the storming parties. The latter were unable to advance owing to the
fire from the hostile batteries. Nelson, who, it will be remembered,
lost his right arm in this engagement, failed in his object. This
failure provided the outstanding interruption to the long list of
victories gained by our greatest naval hero of all time; Nelson himself
expressed his feelings of disappointment and physical incapacity with
the words "I go hence and am no more seen."
The attack on Ostende in May, 1798, was directed against the lock gates
for the purpose of interfering with the concentration of the flotillas
destined for the invasion of England. This attack had originally
included a blocking operation, but that idea was apparently abandoned.
The attack, carried out in the face of a rather feeble defence, was
completely successful, but a severe gale prevented the {56}
re-embarkation of the forces, with the result that over one hundred and
sixty were killed or wounded and nearly eleven hundred and fifty were
taken prisoners--an interesting point in view of the fact that only
about half a dozen casualties occurred during the attack itself. The
embodiment of the main principles of fighting led to success on that
occasion as they will usually do under similar conditions. The moral
effect in England, in spite of the heavy losses, is recorded as having
been most beneficial.
The blocking attempts at Santiago and Port Arthur, carried through with
complete indifference to danger in each case, were failures.
[Sidenote: Main Factors of Difficulty]
The main difficulties with which blockships must contend may be briefly
stated as follows:
(_a_) That of _locating the destination_ in darkness, increased by the
absence of the usual local navigational aids such as lighthouses,
buoys, etc.
(_b_) That of _reaching the destination_, when located, in the face of
the enemy's opposition.
(_c_) That of _turning and sinking the vessel_, after reaching the
destination, so that the channel will be efficiently blocked.
Dealing with these difficulties in detail, the reader is probably aware
of the fact that navigation is by no means an exact science. On the
open sea a captain is usually satisfied if he knows his position to
within three or four miles. When approaching the coast this wide
margin of safety must be considerably reduced--hence the need of
lighthouses, buoys, fog signals, and so forth. The upkeep of such aids
is naturally in the hands of the power which occupies the coast {57}
concerned. Thus, under war conditions, one aims at removing all
navigational aids, as far as one's own requirements will allow, which
may assist the enemy. By this means, the enemy when approaching one's
coast, must either trust to the rather inexact methods used in the open
sea or they must establish their own navigational aids beforehand. The
objection to the latter is manifest; craft sent ahead to lay down
buoys, etc., are apt to give one's intentions away, and it is open to
the enemy to remove such aids as soon as they are placed.
With regard to the second main difficulty, namely, that of reaching the
destination, when located, in the face of the enemy's opposition, the
difficulty here is so obvious as to render detailed remarks unnecessary.
With regard to the difficulty of turning and sinking the vessel
satisfactorily, this is largely a matter of seamanship. With wind and
tide both affecting a vessel it is seldom possible either to keep her
stationary over a particular position or to turn her through a large
angle without such aids as tugs, hawsers, and anchors, etc.
But a ship does not go down instantaneously, nor is it a simple matter
to sink her in an upright position. One end of the ship is likely to
sink before the other: most of us have seen photographs of a ship with
her bows or stern standing vertically in the water just before the
vessel makes her final plunge. Whilst the ship is actually sinking the
local current is apt to move her considerably before she is resting on
the bottom throughout her whole length. Thus the third difficulty can
only be surmounted by a specially fine display of seamanship, and, in
such cases as we are {58} reviewing, this display must be rendered
under the most trying conditions imaginable.
Now, in the case of the blocking attempt at Santiago the _Merrimac_,
Lieutenant Hobson of United States Navy, failed to reach her desired
destination after it had been located. The attempt could scarcely have
been more gallantly made, but the difficulties, arising from
insufficient opportunity to make complete preparations, almost
foredoomed the operation to failure.
At Port Arthur, the Japanese made three attempts to block the exit
against the egress of the Russian Fleet. No less than eighteen
blockships were used. In spite of great determination and splendid
self-sacrifice on the part of all concerned no blockship managed to
sink herself in the correct position.
During the late war the difficulty of sinking the ship satisfactorily,
after reaching the desired position, was made manifest both in the
River Tigris and in the Cameroon River. In each case our enemies, the
Turks and Germans respectively, _endeavoured to block their own
channels before we even arrived on the scene_. In the absence of all
opposition from an enemy, in broad daylight, and at their own leisure,
they sunk their ships and _failed to block the channels_--two clear
illustrations of seamanship difficulties.
All the searchings into past history failed to discover one single
occasion in which a blocking enterprise of any real similarity to that
desired had succeeded. That fact, taken into conjunction with the
difficulties brought to light by a detailed consideration of the
problem, was neither productive of encouragement nor conducive to
optimism.
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The reader will probably admit, at this stage, that the difficulties of
blocking the highly fortified canal entrances at Zeebrugge and Ostende
appeared almost insuperable.
But where there's a will there's often a way. A way had to be found.
_A way was found_.
[Sidenote: The Use of Artificial Fogs]
The factors which combined to make "the game worth the candle" were as
follows: firstly, the use of smoke screens; secondly, the element of
surprise and the use of diversionary measures; thirdly, detailed
preparation and determination combined with efficiency.
The use of smoke screens provided a factor which had been absent in
previous attempts in history.
Mention has already been made of the great deterrent afforded by the
presence of hostile batteries and of the varying degrees of efficiency
of gun-fire as a defence against attacks from the sea. If smoke could
be utilised in such a manner as to hide the attacking force from the
batteries without completely blinding the former, and if at the same
time the attack could be made under cover of darkness so as to prevent
aircraft from assisting those batteries, a set of conditions less
unfavourable to the attackers would then be forthcoming. Obviously,
this necessitated the smoke drifting shorewards ahead of the
approaching vessels; i.e., the assistance of a wind blowing more or
less directly towards the shore.
It is well here to caution the reader against a commonly erroneous idea
in this connection. It is often supposed that the use of smoke was a
sort of panacea for all evils, that it provided a counter to all
obstacles. This was very far from being the case, as will now be {60}
explained. Firstly, let us consider the navigational difficulties.
Smoke could not possibly assist the ships to avoid shoals when
approaching the coast. Smoke could not prevent the vessels from being
seen and reported by surface patrol craft, submarines, or aircraft
during the trip across the sea. The danger from mines could not be
avoided by the use of smoke. It has already been pointed out that it
is quite difficult enough to locate one's destination on a dark night
when the lighthouses have been extinguished and other navigational aids
withdrawn. Even a landsman will realise that if, as an addition to
such inconvenient conditions, one places an artificial fog between the
approaching vessels and their destination the problem is not going to
become any more easy to solve. The utmost that one could gain from the
use of smoke was some measure of protection from the shore batteries,
but, as just shown, such use provided a further obstacle to be
surmounted. Then again there is nothing so fickle in the life of a
sailor as the wind. If the wind died away or changed to an off-shore
direction, smoke might be practically useless for covering one's
approach.
I have sometimes been asked why we made no use of poison gas clouds.
There were two main reasons. The last thing we desired was to risk
killing those downtrodden Belgians who were still allowed to reside in
their unhappy country. In addition to that, the fickleness of the wind
might waft the poison gas in the direction of our own vessels.
[Sidenote: Surprise Essential]
With regard to the element of surprise and the use of diversionary
measures, one of the principles laid down by Stonewall Jackson is,
"Always mystify, {61} mislead, and surprise the enemy." The meaning of
surprise is apt to be misconstrued. In an operation of this kind one
could not arrange for the blockships to arrive suddenly "as a bolt from
the blue" at a moment when the enemy have no suspicions whatever that
any trouble is brewing. Thus, surprise and mystification had to go
hand in hand. The only practical method in such cases, whether in
trench warfare or in sea fighting, is to give the enemy as much to
think about as one possibly can, to make him wonder what on earth is
going to happen next, to mislead him into believing the eventuality is
very different from that intended, and, then, as the late war
expression so aptly puts it, "when the enemy has the wind up," surprise
him by carrying out your main object in view.
Diversionary measures in this particular case were not difficult to
evolve. Many different reasons obtained for employing our sea forces
off the Flanders coast. To mention a few, there were bombardments from
the sea, landing operations on the shore, supporting the flank of the
military in their land attacks, mining or mine-sweeping operations,
laying submarine traps, supporting aerial attacks, and so on. The
presence of our vessels might indicate any one of these objects and
each would call for a different set of defensive measures.
The full development of defensive measures cannot be attained until one
can clearly ascertain the attacker's object. Even when the latter has
been discovered, the time required to bring all your powers of defence
into action must vary according to how far you have just previously
been misled. Our best {62} course, therefore, was to ensure that our
object would be discovered so late in the proceedings that it would be
attained before full advantage of the discovery could be utilised.
Initiative usually pertains to the attacking force. Where the defence
is open to several different forms of attack, the defending commander
is apt to be so apprehensive beforehand, and so perplexed at the time,
that his position will be weakly defended at all points. As the attack
develops and he receives an _apparent_ indication of its object he will
make haste to concentrate all his defence measures at the threatened
position, and then, if the attackers have acted wisely, there is
considerable likelihood of his being taken by surprise too late to
guard efficiently against the real blow. Uneasy lies the head of the
commander who is forced to adopt the defensive role in war.
The diversionary measures actually undertaken will be described
presently.
[Sidenote: Attention to Detail]
Determination and efficiency are not unknown in His Majesty's Navy.
But efficiency of a particular description was required, and this would
necessitate special training, which, if practicable, must be continued
until every officer and every man knew instinctively what to do and how
to set about it, no matter what circumstances might arise, and until
every piece of machinery and every device, however intricate, had been
proved to be satisfactory for the purpose in hand.
What then were the chances of success? Who could say? Clearly enough,
there must have been a divergence of opinion on this point.
Difficulties loom large. Optimism, on the other hand, is a very
pleasant {63} encouragement. I believe, however, that even the most
optimistic individual concerned in the enterprise was not entirely free
from qualms as the event drew nearer. Complete success seemed at times
to be so much to hope for. But Sir David Beatty and Sir Roger Keyes
wouldn't hear of failure, and that alone did much to ensure success.
They did not set themselves up on pedestals as men who _could not
fail--they left no stone unturned to ensure success_. It would be
difficult to imagine anything more calculated to bring about failure
than any sign of doubt, or hesitation, on the part of the leaders of an
enterprise. There _must_ be no failure--that was the long and short of
it--it was the spirit which governed the actions of the great leaders
of the past.
But sentiment alone is insufficient to guarantee success. It is but a
foundation stone on which to commence the building. Rotten timber
erected on the firmest foundation will not provide adequate protection
against the lightest gale. Nobody realised this more fully than
Vice-Admiral Keyes, who was determined that every link of the chain
should be of maximum strength commensurate with elasticity and general
handiness. Many were the hours given to the consideration of the
smallest details; without such work an operation becomes a mere gamble.
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