THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.
Napoleon, as we have seen, took up his headquarters on the evening
of the 17th at the Caillou house on the Brussels road, about a mile
and a half south of the little tavern known then and now as La Belle
Alliance. All the afternoon and night it rained hard. We may suppose
that, as his custom was, he slept during the evening. At 1 A.M. of
the 18th, he mounted his horse, and, with Bertrand, rode out to the
front.[671] Here he rode or walked along the line of the pickets until
he had satisfied himself that Wellington’s army was in position,
awaiting battle. The fires at which the soldiers of the English and
Dutch army were drying and warming themselves left no doubt of this. He
must have been occupied in this way more than two hours, as he was near
the wood of Hougomont at half-past two in the morning.
After returning, various reports came in. Between 7 and 8 A.M. he
received from an officer who had been sent to the advanced posts, word
that the enemy were retiring. This information he at once communicated
to d’Erlon,[672] whose corps was in the first line,—that of Reille not
having got fully up,—and ordered him to put his troops in march and
to pursue the enemy with vigor. But d’Erlon having judged the enemy’s
movement quite differently, sent his chief-of-staff to the Emperor to
tell him that he, d’Erlon, thought that the English were making their
dispositions to receive battle. D’Erlon proceeds:—
“The Emperor came immediately to the advanced posts. I accompanied
him; we dismounted in order to get near the enemy’s vedettes, and to
examine more closely the movements of the English army. He perceived
that I was right, and being convinced that the English army was
taking position, he said to me:—
‘Order the men to make their soup, to get their pieces in order, and
we will determine what is to be done towards noon.’”
Napoleon seems in fact not to have spared himself any trouble, and
there evidently was no very conspicuous deficiency in the physical
energy of a man who, after a good afternoon’s work in the saddle in
directing the march of an army, was able to go out twice in the deep
mud during a rainy night and morning to visit the outer pickets of
his line of battle, nearly two miles from the house where he had
established his headquarters.
The reason of this apparently rather unnecessary solicitude is really
not far to seek. Napoleon felt as confident of beating Wellington’s
army that day as he had felt of beating Blücher’s army on the day but
one before, provided only that it would accept battle. He believed,
and he was justified in believing, that his army was superior to that
opposed to him, in fighting capacity certainly, and even, possibly, in
numbers. He trusted to Grouchy to keep the Prussians off, as he had on
the day of Ligny trusted to Ney to protect him against the English, and
he may also have thought it possible that Grouchy would arrive on the
field in time to make the victory more crushing,—playing, in this way,
much the same _rôle_ which Napoleon had marked out for Ney at Ligny. He
accordingly feared nothing so much as the retreat of the English.
That he supposed that Grouchy would cross the Dyle at Moustier is
certainly a fair inference from Marbot’s report and letter, from
which we have made extracts above.[673] That he should have been so
certain about it, however, is remarkable, as he had given Grouchy
no instructions[674] of any kind whatsoever since he had sent him the
Bertrand order, and that left him entire freedom of action.
Another very remarkable thing is that Napoleon should not have drawn
from the fact that Wellington was awaiting battle the inference that
he was expecting the assistance, and the powerful assistance, of
Blücher.[675] At least it would seem pretty certain that he did not draw
this inference, for he took neither of the steps which, if he had come
to that conclusion, would seem to be dictated by common sense,—he
neither attacked Wellington as early as he possibly could, nor did he
do anything to make sure of Grouchy’s intervention until 10 A.M., when
he sent him the order which we have given above.[676] If, on his return
to the Caillou house at half-past three or thereabouts in the morning,
he had sent an officer to order Grouchy to march towards the main army
by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, he would have done only what
the fact of Wellington’s confronting him, which he had just ascertained
with his own eyes, should have led him to do.
The rain ceased, according to Charras,[677] at 6 A.M.;
Vaudoncourt,[678] a much earlier authority, puts it at 8 o’clock; Van
Loben Sels[679] says that the rain had diminished at break of day,
but it was not until 10 o’clock that the atmosphere became clear;
Baudus,[680] who was at the battle on Soult’s staff, says the rain
ceased towards 9 o’clock. We may probably assume that the rain had
ceased by 8 o’clock, and that in another hour, had Napoleon so chosen,
he might have begun the battle.
This, in point of fact, he originally intended to do. He had issued an
order in good season to the corps-commanders, that they should see that
the soldiers cleaned their guns and got their breakfasts, so that at
9 o’clock precisely they should be ready to commence the battle.[681]
Drouot, who was a distinguished artillery-officer, and was then acting
as adjutant-general of the Guard, tells us[682] that Napoleon intended
to begin the battle by 8 or 9 at the latest. But Drouot advised a delay
of two to three hours on account of the condition of the ground, which
the heavy rain of the past afternoon and night had rendered too soft
for the rapid and effective movements of artillery; and Napoleon, who
was himself an artillery officer, and always made great use of this
arm, yielded to the suggestion, and determined to put off the main
attack till towards one o’clock P.M.
About 8 A.M. the Emperor rode along the lines,[683] examining the
enemy’s position, which he had already, as we have seen, inspected
twice since midnight. He then dictated an order of battle, or, rather,
an order of movement, the result of which would be that the army would
be arranged in three lines, ready for the attack. This marshalling of
the army was, according to all accounts, a magnificent and imposing
spectacle; the bands played; the men shouted “Vive l’Empereur!”; the
movement was skilfully designed and beautifully executed; but, except
as a way of occupying the time, it would probably never have been
thought of. It began shortly before nine and was over by half-past
ten.[684] It showed at any rate that had it been thought advisable, the
battle might have been begun at 9 A.M.
After this pageant “Napoleon passed before the lines and was received
by immense, by enthusiastic acclamations.”[685] He then, shortly before
eleven o’clock, dictated his plan of attack. Of this we shall speak
later on.
One cannot but be struck with a recurrence here of the same error to
which we have had occasion to call attention before,—namely, the error
of acting on the probabilities of the situation when it is admitted
that a different state of things may nevertheless, in spite of the
probabilities, exist, and that, if it does exist, a wholly different
course of action must be taken, or a fatal result will inevitably
follow. Napoleon was, very likely, warranted in thinking it probable
that morning that, what with the loss and demoralization consequent
on their defeat at Ligny, and what with the interference with their
plans which Grouchy with his 33,000 men could reasonably be expected
to make, he himself was safe against any intervention on the part of
the Prussians. But he did not and could not know where the Prussians
were; in fact, he had great reason to believe that a large part of them
had gone to Wavre; and at that very moment he thought it very likely
that their action in going to Wavre would induce Grouchy to come to
him by way of Moustier. If, then, the exigency called in the Emperor’s
mind for this course on the part of Grouchy, why did it not equally
demand from Napoleon the promptest action against Wellington, and the
exertion of every means to make sure of Grouchy’s intervention? This
criticism is, in fact, only an extension of that made in reference to
the step taken by Napoleon in detaching Grouchy’s large force when he
felt it necessary at the same time to warn Grouchy expressly that the
Prussians might be intending to unite with the English.
However we may explain these apparent contradictions, they certainly
existed in Napoleon’s mind and also in his actions. He was so sure
of having only the Anglo-Dutch army to fight that he deliberately
postponed attacking it until he could do so in the most approved style;
he was confident that if the Prussians had gone in the direction of
Wavre with the intention of joining the English or of attacking the
French, Grouchy would return to him by the bridge of Moustier. And
yet, from 1 P.M. of the afternoon of the 17th to 10 A.M. of the 18th,
he sent Grouchy no orders, and no information. Where such is the lack
of ordinary care on the part of the commanding general, a great deal
surely must depend upon the energy and capacity of the subordinate.
While this was the general situation at the French headquarters, the
Duke of Wellington, having with his customary carefulness set his army
in battle array, was quietly waiting until it should suit his adversary
to assault his lines. Every hour’s delay was a distinct gain to him;
and he knew it. He knew, what Napoleon of course could not know, that
the Prussians were on their way to attack the French and to join the
English.
At the same time, it must not be supposed that the Duke had no cause
for anxiety. Of the defects of his army he was well aware. No one knew
better than he that such a conglomerate mass of troops as that which he
commanded, consisting, too, in great part of raw and untried soldiers,
could not possibly be equal to the well-appointed army of Napoleon’s
veterans whose blows he was soon to receive. His only reliance,
therefore, was on Blücher’s promised support. As Sir James Shaw-Kennedy
well says:—[686]
“In order at all to understand the views of the Duke of Wellington
as to accepting battle on the field of Waterloo, it is essential
to keep this arrangement [_i.e._, with Blücher] fully in view;
otherwise the Duke might justly be accused of the utmost temerity
and folly in accepting battle, as much the greater portion of his
army consisted of mere Landwehr and of Dutch-Belgian troops. The
latter, from political and other causes, could not be depended upon;
which, in fact, had been already proved on the 16th. It would be
an error to suppose that it was from any want of courage that the
Dutch-Belgian troops could not be depended upon; proof enough exists
that the people of those countries are capable of the most heroic
and persevering exertions when engaged in a cause that they care to
support; but under the circumstances in which they were placed on
this occasion, they were without confidence, were not acting in a
cause which they cordially supported, and showed that it was not one
in which they wished to oppose themselves seriously to French troops.”
But Wellington felt that he could rely on Blücher’s promise, and he
took his chance that Blücher would be able to fulfil his promise, and
that he himself would be able to hold out until the promise should be
fulfilled. These risks, however, were by no means small.
In the first place, the Duke not only did not know that Napoleon had
given Grouchy two whole corps; he even supposed that he had given him
but one, and that Napoleon was confronting him on the morning of the
battle with his whole army, “with the exception of the 3d Corps, which
had been sent to observe Marshal Blücher.”[687] This risk, fortunately
for the Duke of Wellington, was not actually incurred. But, all the
same, Wellington is entitled to the credit of having faced it with his
eyes open.
Secondly, there was the chance that Grouchy might intervene, and
prevent the Prussians from fulfilling their promise. We have already
shown what Grouchy could have done in this way had he either acted of
his own motion in accordance with the demands of the situation by
marching at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier, or had followed the
counsel of Gérard at noon.
The issue of the battle of Waterloo, in fact, might have been entirely
changed if the movements of troops not under the control of either of
the commanding generals had been other than they were; it is this fact
among others which gives the battle a peculiar interest.
The position to the south of the villages of Mont St. Jean and
Waterloo, known as the field of Waterloo, had been, some time before
the campaign opened, reconnoitred by the English engineers; “the
several sketches of the officers had been put together, and one fair
copy made for the Prince of Orange; a second had been commenced for
the Duke.”[688] The chief-of-engineers, Lieutenant-Colonel Smyth,
who was present at the action of Quatre Bras, sent back to Brussels
during the afternoon, presumably by the Duke’s direction, for a
plan of this position; and the original sketches, which, together,
constituted a plan, were forwarded to him by Captain Oldfield, the
brigade-major of engineers.[689] The next morning, “upon the receipt
of a communication from Blücher,”[690] the Duke obtained from Colonel
Smyth these sketches, and gave them to Sir William De Lancey, his
Deputy-Quartermaster-General, or chief-of-staff, “with orders” (as
Major Oldfield states)[691] “to take up the ground on which we fought
the next day. Colonel Smyth was at the same time desired to take the
necessary measures for entrenching the village of Braine-la-Leud.”
To this position, then, well understood and mapped out, the Duke of
Wellington fell back on the afternoon of the 17th from Quatre Bras with
that part of his army which was under his immediate command, and to it
also he directed the greater part of the troops which were at Nivelles
and other places. (See Map 13.)
The position was a strong one. The first or main line of battle crossed
the Charleroi-Brussels pike at right angles where the road from Ohain
and Wavre strikes into it, nearly three-quarters of a mile south of the
hamlet of Mont St. Jean, where the _chaussée_ to Nivelles branches off
from the pike. To the east of this pike the English left extended for a
mile or so,—for more than half this distance on the crest of a gentle
slope; but the little villages of Smohain, Papelotte and La Haye, lying
from a quarter to a half a mile in front, were occupied. To the west
of the pike the line ran along the same ridge for nearly a third of
a mile, when it turned somewhat towards the southwest, but still ran
along the crest of the ridge, and so continued for nearly a half a mile
farther. Here the line was covered by a garden and a considerable wood
enclosing a solid old building, known as the Chateau of Hougomont. This
building and its enclosures lay about 350 yards in front of the main
line of battle, at its extreme right, and they were occupied in force.
The ridge was admirably suited for defensive purposes. The reverse
slope offered excellent protection for infantry lying behind it; and
in front, there were no trees or other impediments; every movement of
the enemy was plainly to be seen, and was exposed to fire. Moreover the
ground over which the enemy must advance for the attack was so moist
and muddy, that all rapidity of movement, even of cavalry, was out of
the question.
Wellington had on the field the whole of the 1st, 2d, 3d, 5th and 6th
British divisions, one brigade (Mitchell’s) of the 4th division, the
2d and 3d Dutch-Belgian divisions, and the contingents from Brunswick
and Nassau,—numbering in all 49,608 infantry, 12,408 cavalry and 5,645
artillery, with 156 guns,—a total of 67,661 men.[692]
These troops, as we have before observed,[693] were stationed on the
field without reference to the corps to which they belonged. The reason
for this probably was that the Duke desired to distribute his foreign
troops, on some, at any rate, of whom he placed no great reliance,
among his British troops and those of the King’s German Legion,
which were his main dependence. Then, inasmuch as the army had never
before acted by corps, or, in fact, at all, in the field, no special
inconvenience was to be apprehended from this arrangement.
The army of the Duke was composed as follows:—[694]
British troops:—
Infantry 15,181
Cavalry 5,843
Artillery 2,967
------
23,991
King’s German Legion:—
Infantry 3,301
Cavalry 1,997
Artillery 526
------
5,824
Total British and King’s
German Legion ------ 29,815 Men
Hanoverians:—
Infantry 10,258
Cavalry 497
Artillery 465
------
11,220 „
Brunswickers:—
Infantry 4,586
Cavalry 866
Artillery 510
5,962 „
Nassauers:—
Infantry 2,880 „
Dutch-Belgians:—
Infantry 13,402
Cavalry 3,205
Artillery 1,177 17,784 „
Total as above. 67,661 „
To the eastward, or English left, of the turnpike, were stationed in
the first line the 5th and 6th British divisions, the 2d Dutch-Belgian
division, and the British cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur.
This part of the line seems to have been commanded by Sir Thomas
Picton,[695] although it is not clear whether he had any authority
except over his own division, the 5th. Of these troops the cavalry were
stationed on the extreme left. One brigade of Dutch-Belgians, that
of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, occupied the villages of Smohain,
Papelotte and La Haye. The English infantry were placed on the reverse
of the slope of the ridge, so as to be sheltered from the enemy’s fire.
But the other Dutch-Belgian brigade, Bylandt’s, was, as Sir James
Shaw-Kennedy says,[696] “posted, most unaccountably, in front of the
Wavre road, on the slope. * * * In this position, it was jutted forward
in front of the real line of battle, which was mainly the Wavre road.
It was directly exposed to the fire of the greatest French battery
that was on the field, and singly exposed to the first onset of the
French attacking columns.” Who was responsible for this inconsiderate
and dangerous measure we do not know. In rear of the left wing, and
protected from the French fire, stood the Union brigade, so called, of
Major General Sir William Ponsonby, composed of the Royal Dragoons, the
Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons.
The right of the left wing rested on the Charleroi turnpike. The 3d
British division, Alten’s, continued the line to the west of the
turnpike. On the westerly side of the pike, and about 300 yards to the
south of the point where the Wavre road crosses it, was the farmhouse
of La Haye Sainte, which was strongly occupied by a battalion of the
King’s German Legion under Major Baring. An _abatis_ was formed across
the road at the south end of the boundary wall of the house,[697] but it
was broken up during the course of the battle.
Beyond the third division, on the allied right, were stationed the
two brigades constituting the 1st division, Cooke’s,—a part of the 2d
brigade, Byng’s, occupying, with some Nassau and other foreign troops,
the Chateau and enclosures of Hougomont.
The 2d division, Clinton’s, was in reserve near Merbe Braine, as was
also the Brunswick contingent. The 3d Dutch-Belgian division, Chassé’s,
was on the extreme right, and partly in the village of Braine-la-Leud.
The heavy cavalry brigade of Lord Edward Somerset was stationed in the
rear, near the Charleroi pike; the Dutch-Belgian cavalry were farther
to the right.
It is plain from the foregoing that, with the exception of the
unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, the army was skilfully arranged so as
to escape as far as was possible the fire of the enemy’s artillery,
which was known to be extremely formidable. The occupation of Hougomont
was most carefully attended to; the walls were loop-holed,—not only
of the house, but of the garden; and, surrounded, as it was, on the
sides nearest the French by a considerable wood, it was a really
strong place. So long as it was held, the right of Wellington’s line
was practically unassailable.[698] The farmhouse of La Haye Sainte
on the Brussels road was also made very strong, although, owing to
some oversight, no adequate mode of reinforcing the defenders, or of
supplying them with ammunition, was provided. No earth-works had been
thrown up anywhere.[699] An _abatis_ had, as has been observed, been
placed across the Charleroi road, and another was thrown across the
Nivelles road in rear of Hougomont.
Napoleon brought to the field of Waterloo the 1st, 2d, and 6th Corps
(_minus_ the division of Teste), the Imperial Guard, the heavy cavalry
of Kellermann and Milhaud, the light cavalry of Domon, detached from
the 3d Corps, and of Subervie, detached from the cavalry-corps of
Pajol,—a total of 71,947 men, of whom 48,950 were infantry, 15,765
cavalry, and 7,232 artillery. There were 246 guns.[700]
The 1st Corps constituted the right of the first line. Its left rested
on the Charleroi turnpike near the inn of La Belle Alliance, and its
light cavalry observed the villages of La Haye and Papelotte on the
extreme right. The 2d Corps continued the first line to the west, the
cavalry of Piré being stationed beyond the Nivelles road. The 6th Corps
and the Guard, with the cavalry of Kellermann and Milhaud, were in
reserve.
Of the three divisions of the 2d Corps present at the battle,—that of
Girard having been left at Ligny,—the division of Jerome was on the
left, that of Foy in the centre, and that of Bachelu on the right,—its
right resting on the Charleroi road.
Of the four divisions of the 1st Corps, that of Donzelot was the left,
and its left rested on the Charleroi road; then came that of Allix,
commanded by Quiot; then that of Marcognet, and then that of Durutte.
This last was opposite Papelotte and La Haye.
The two armies were nearly equal in numbers; and had that of the Duke
of Wellington been equal in point of material to that of the Emperor,
the advantage of position which it possessed would have fully made up
for the slight superiority in numbers possessed by the French. As it
was, however, the superiority of the French, not only in artillery
and cavalry, but so far as a large part of the Anglo-Dutch army was
concerned, in _moral_, was unquestionable, and Wellington’s only
justification for receiving battle lay, as Kennedy points out above, in
his expectation of receiving help from Blücher.
Napoleon, as we have seen, dictated his plan of battle before eleven
o’clock. It provided that,[701] as soon as the whole army should be
ranged in order of battle, about 1 P.M., and the Emperor should give
the order to Marshal Ney, the attack should commence, having for its
object to get possession of the village of Mont St. Jean, where the
road from Nivelles strikes into the Charleroi turnpike. This attack was
to be made by the 1st Corps, supported on the left by the 2d Corps. To
aid this attack a formidable battery of seventy-eight guns, many of
them twelve-pounders, was to be moved forward on the east side of the
road to a ridge which ran in front of and parallel to the French line
of battle, and only 600 yards from the English position.
The Emperor had then definitely decided before eleven o’clock to defer
the principal move of the day till about one in the afternoon. In this
decision he was mainly, if not wholly, influenced by the difficulties
which he saw would be caused by the deep mud of the fields over which
his troops would have to manœuvre.
The determination of Napoleon to make his main effort against the
village of Mont St. Jean, so as to possess himself of the principal
avenue of retreat open to the enemy,—the road to Brussels,—has always
elicited the commendation of military men. The Emperor undoubtedly
intended to aid the attack of the 1st Corps by advancing the 6th Corps
in its support; but this, as we shall see, owing to the intervention
of the Prussians, he did not attempt. Whether, in case the attack
had succeeded, so far as to give to the French the possession of
the Brussels road, the Forest of Soignes would have afforded cover
to Wellington’s retreating army, as English writers have always
maintained, or would have necessitated the abandonment of the greater
part of their artillery, as Napoleon contended, is a question which we
will not undertake to discuss here.
At 11.30 A.M., before the time arrived for beginning the main operation
of the day, Napoleon ordered Reille to attack Hougomont with his left
division, that of Prince Jerome.[702] This movement, intended only as
a diversion, was undertaken without any sufficient examination of the
enemy’s position, and in the most inconsiderate manner.[703] Neither
Jerome, who commanded the division, nor Guilleminot, who, Charras
maintains, really controlled its operations, took the pains to direct
the boiling courage and superfluous energy of the men, which, skilfully
used, might have resulted in obtaining at least partial success. For
example, the western entrance of the Chateau was perfectly open to
artillery fire, and, had a few heavy guns been employed, the doors
and adjacent wall would have been demolished, and the building would
probably have been taken,[704] although it is doubtful if it could have
been held. Bags of powder, also, would have destroyed the garden wall,
but no one thought of supplying them to the men.[705] In consequence
of these neglects, the soldiers of Jerome’s division, after possessing
themselves of the wood and orchard, were shot down by their opponents
from behind the garden wall, and from the loopholes in the house and
its outbuildings, and could make no further progress. This, of itself,
was, perhaps, of no great consequence; but Reille, impatient of being
thwarted, and still neglecting to ascertain the precise reasons of the
ill-success of the attack, sent in the division of Foy to support that
of Jerome. In fact, later in the day, the division of Bachelu was also
employed in this useless and most costly attempt to get possession of
Hougomont. When it is considered that the 2d Corps contained on this
morning not far from 12,000 foot soldiers, and that very few of them
assisted in the attacks on the main line of the English army, one gets
an idea of the wasteful, and, in fact, inexcusable mismanagement of the
resources of the French army on this day. Not more than half the above
number of men were employed to maintain the position.
The main operation of the day was to be, as we have said, an advance by
the 1st Corps under d’Erlon to break the centre of the English line at
and near the junction of the Wavre road with the turnpike. The great
battery of seventy-eight pieces of cannon continued firing for an hour
and a half at a distance of less than a third of a mile from the crest
in front of which lay the brigade of Bylandt, and behind which lay the
brigades of Kempt and Pack and Best of Picton’s division. At half-past
one Napoleon ordered d’Erlon forward.
His attack was to be made in four columns, marching in _échelon_, the
left in advance. The formation of these columns was so extraordinary,
and so ill-suited for the work to be done, that it has always excited
the comment of military men. We owe to Charras[706] a clear explanation
of this formation. The first, or left, column consisted of the
brigade of Bourgeois of the division of Allix,—the other brigade of
this division, that of Quiot, being assigned to the special task of
capturing La Haye Sainte. This brigade of Bourgeois contained four
battalions, one behind another; each battalion stood in three ranks,
one behind the other; and there was a distance of five paces between
the battalions. The front of this column, therefore, consisted of
one-third of the number of men in the leading battalion; and there
being four battalions in the brigade, there were of course twelve ranks
in the column. It was the same, _mutatis mutandis_, with the other
columns. Donzelot’s division, which contained nine battalions, had,
therefore, twenty-seven ranks in its column; the divisions of Marcognet
and Durutte, which had only eight battalions each, had each twenty-four
ranks. This formation was quite an exceptional one. A column very
generally in use at that day consisted of a battalion in the centre, in
line,—that is, in three ranks,—flanked on either side, by battalions in
column of divisions, capable of promptly forming line or square. And
then there were other convenient formations in frequent use. But these
formations of d’Erlon’s divisions were unwieldy,—they lacked mobility.
Why Ney and d’Erlon should have departed from the usual practice on
this occasion, no one knows.[707]
The story of d’Erlon’s charge has been often told.[708] How the
soldiers of the unfortunate brigade of Bylandt, utterly unable, as
they were, after having been exposed to the fire of the great battery
for an hour and a half, to resist alone the impact of such an enormous
force, broke in confusion and fell to the rear amid the undeserved
curses of their English allies;[709] how the French in their unwieldy
masses pressed forward to the crest of the ridge to receive the
fire at short range of the brigades of Pack and Kempt, which only
the leading battalions were able, owing to the faulty formation of
the columns, to return at all; and how, when staggered by the fire,
and while endeavoring to disengage their closely following ranks,
Ponsonby’s brigade of heavy cavalry charged them furiously, riding
down between the columns, throwing them into confusion, cutting down
the exposed foot-soldiers, capturing two eagles, and many prisoners,
disabling some 15 guns, and forcing the three left columns to fall
back in disorder,—all this is familiar to all readers of the story of
Waterloo. It is difficult to find a parallel to this clumsily executed
movement of d’Erlon’s. At the same time, faulty as the formation of
the columns was, the troops got actually on the crest of the British
position; and had there been any timidity or hesitation on the part
of their adversaries, the columns would undoubtedly have forced their
way through the British line. But the necessary time was not allowed
them. Sir Thomas Picton was alive to the danger; he was prompt to seize
the opportunity; his troops by their close and deadly fire threw the
heads of the columns into confusion, and then charged them with the
bayonet. Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the cavalry, rode over from his
own position on the other side of the turnpike, and ordered Ponsonby
to charge. He then returned to lead Somerset’s cavalry brigade in a
successful charge on the west of the pike. The whole affair was a great
and deserved success for the English. Their cavalry, however, was very
severely handled on returning to its original positions.
Shortly before d’Erlon moved out, Napoleon had seen a body of troops
on the heights of St. Lambert, far off on his right. It was soon
ascertained that they were Prussians. He then sent off the 1 P.M.
order to Grouchy.[710] By the time that the unfortunate charge of the
1st Corps had resulted in the repulse narrated above, certainly before
3 P.M., Napoleon had decided that he must employ the 6th Corps in
resisting the Prussians, and not in supporting the 1st Corps in further
operations against the English, as he had originally intended to do.
But whatever shape the next movement might assume, the first thing to
be done was evidently to carry the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, which
had just been unsuccessfully attempted.
This was undertaken in the same reckless and careless manner which had
characterized the assault on Hougomont. Although the French had an
abundance of heavy guns, none were used to batter down the doors and
walls, in front of which the bravest officers and men could accomplish
but little, and were sacrificed to no purpose.[711] The place was
finally taken shortly before 4 P.M.[712]
But the capture of La Haye Sainte was only a necessary preliminary to
a serious attack on the enemy’s main line. Napoleon (or perhaps Ney)
seems to have thought that the troops of d’Erlon had been too severely
handled to warrant the expectation of any immediate aid from them. They
would require an hour or two, perhaps, to recover. At any rate, it was
determined to assail the English centre to the west of the Charleroi
road, and as the infantry of the 1st Corps were not for the moment
available, and as that of the 2d Corps, or at least, the greater part
of it, was engaged in attacking Hougomont, it was decided to make the
assault this time with cavalry alone.
The troops on this portion of Wellington’s line,—between the Charleroi
road and Hougomont,—had been subjected only to artillery fire, and even
that had not been anything like as severe as that sustained by the
troops exposed to the great French battery on the opposite side of the
road. They consequently were in good condition to resist cavalry,[713]
especially considering that the bad ground over which the cavalry must
pass would be certain to diminish the force of their assaults. Sir
James Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line, tells us that the
opinion at the time among the English officers was that the attack was
premature.
This was also Napoleon’s own opinion; he seems to have yielded to Ney’s
solicitations against his own judgment. But at this time, shortly
after 4 P.M., the advance of Bülow’s Corps occupied the constant
attention of the Emperor; he was constrained to leave the conduct
of the battle against Wellington to Marshal Ney, in whose tactical
skill and management he had great confidence, and to devote himself
mainly to the task of directing the movements of the 6th Corps and of
those portions of the Guard, which from time to time he was obliged to
detach for its support, so as to prevent the Prussians from seizing
the village of Planchenoit and thus menacing the communications of the
army. Napoleon’s neglect of the conduct of the operations against the
English has often been the subject of comment and severe criticism;
but we imagine that he was far more anxious to hinder the Prussians,
who were aiming, so to speak, at a vital part, from succeeding, than
even to defeat the English. To fend off the Prussians was an absolute
necessity; to drive the English from the field, a thing no doubt
very desirable; but as there was no fear that they would take the
offensive, and as, if they did, the army, or, at least, the great bulk
of it, was in line of battle opposed to them, no great danger was to
be apprehended from them. Whereas the Prussians were striking at the
flank and rear, aiming to get control of the Charleroi road, and thus
of the line of communications and retreat of the army. To prevent their
succeeding in this was, therefore, of vital importance. Hence Napoleon
attended to this himself, and left to Ney the conduct of the fight
against Wellington’s army.
Marshal Ney, then, determined to carry the allied centre by charges
of cavalry. He seems to have made no effort to support this attack by
the infantry of the 2d Corps, although it would certainly have been
quite possible to have withdrawn at least Bachelu’s division from the
wood of Hougomont and to have used it with good effect. But Ney was
originally an officer of cavalry; this fact may have made him think
it possible to accomplish more with cavalry alone than to others
would seem practicable. At any rate, from 4 to 6 P.M. the splendid
divisions of Milhaud, Lefebvre-Desnouettes, Kellermann and Guyot were
successively launched against the English lines. Every one has heard
of the magnificent gallantry of these fine troops; every one knows the
indomitable steadiness with which their repeated onsets were borne.
At the close of these assaults the French cavalry had become wellnigh
exhausted; and they had not broken a single square. Nevertheless, the
English, Hanoverian, Nassau and Brunswick troops had suffered severely;
obliged to remain in squares for fear of the repeated irruptions of
the French cavalry, they presented an easy mark to the French infantry
skirmishers of Donzelot’s division, which with a portion of Quiot’s
was finally brought over from the east side of the turnpike, as well
as to the artillery from the French main position, which, necessarily
silent while the cavalry were on the plateau, constantly recommenced
its fire as soon as the cavalry retired down the slope, as was done
many times during these two hours. In fact this part of the allied line
was finally weakened so much that it was very near giving way, as we
shall shortly see. At one time, all the troops for nearly half a mile
to the west of the Brussels pike had retired from exhaustion, and in
disorder, and the Duke himself had to lead up fresh troops to take
their places.[714]
More, however, might have been accomplished by the French. For
instance, the enfilading batteries, which towards the close of the day,
dismounted Mercer’s guns[715] and practically destroyed several squares
of infantry, might have been employed quite as easily two hours before,
and more of them might well have been used.[716]
But no use whatever was made, except as above stated, of the very
great advantage afforded by the position of La Haye Sainte for the
posting of batteries which should sweep the whole line of the allies,
dismount their guns, riddle their squares, and render their infantry
unable to resist the shock of cavalry. Nor was the infantry of the 1st
Corps brought up in season. As for that of the 2d Corps, Ney hardly
made any use of it at all; he suffered it to remain in the wood and
enclosures of Hougomont.
Napoleon said, and it cannot be seriously disputed, that the heavy
cavalry of the Guard, the division of Guyot, went in without his
orders. Whether Ney ordered it in is, however, doubtful. His
chief-of-staff, Colonel Heymès, denies that he did. He says that the
cavalry of the Guard went in of its own accord. (Doc. Inéd., pp. 16,
17.) At any rate, it was a great mistake, whoever committed it, as all
the authorities freely say. It destroyed the last cavalry-reserve of
the army.
While these operations were going on in front, Napoleon was personally
superintending the desperate and gallant fight made by the two
divisions of the 6th Corps under Lobau against Bülow’s advance.
The two leading divisions of the IVth Corps, which moved out about
4.30 P.M., were easily checked at first; but they rallied, and were
reinforced by the rest of the corps; and, between 5 and 6 P.M., Lobau
was driven back, and Planchenoit itself was threatened. The Emperor
was obliged to put in the Young Guard, which, with three batteries,
occupied Planchenoit, while the 6th Corps extended on its left so as
to connect with the right of the 1st Corps. But the Prussians drove
the Young Guard out of the village; and the Emperor had to order in
three battalions of the Old and Middle Guard with two batteries. These
troops, gallantly supported by the Young Guard, retook the town, and
the Prussians fell back some distance. Napoleon then seems to have
thought that the attack of the Prussians was exhausted. It was nearly
seven o’clock.[717] In this action the fighting on both sides was very
obstinate. The French troops were superior in point of experience to
those of Bülow,—those of the 6th Corps were led by a very able officer,
Lobau, and the regiments of the Guard were the _élite_ of the army.
Hence, though much inferior in numbers, they obtained this success,
which under other circumstances, would have been decisive. But in this
case their enemies had reinforcements at hand. Pirch I., at the head of
the IId Corps, was only two miles in rear.
This, however, Napoleon of course could not know. Hence, thinking that
the danger from the Prussians was practically over, he hastened towards
the front, where for the last hour, ever since the conclusion of the
cavalry attacks, the battle had languished. It had in fact consisted
during this period only of a general skirmish firing along the centre
of the English position to the west of the Brussels pike, the result of
which, however, was, undoubtedly, to weaken perceptibly the strength
and _moral_ of the allied troops. This part of the English line was
in fact in a bad way at this period of the battle.[718] As Sir James
Shaw-Kennedy, who was on this part of the line on the staff of the 3d
division, says:—[719]
“La Haye Sainte was in the hands of the enemy; also the knoll on
the opposite side of the road; also the garden and ground on the
Anglo-Allied side of it; Ompteda’s brigade was nearly annihilated,
and Kielmansegge’s so thinned, that those two brigades could not
hold their position. That part of the field of battle, therefore,
which was between Halkett’s[720] left and Kempt’s[721] right, was
unprotected; and being the very centre of the Duke’s line of battle,
was consequently that point, above all others, which the enemy
wished to gain. The danger was imminent; and at no other period of
the action was the result so precarious as at this moment. Most
fortunately Napoleon did not support the advantage his troops had
gained at this point by bringing forward his reserve; proving that
he did not exert that activity and personal energy in superintending
and conforming to the progress of the action, which he ought to have
done.”
As to this last observation, we have just seen how the Emperor was
employed during this critical period of the action. He was in truth
fighting another battle with inferior forces against the Prussians,
and this, too, at a distance of a mile and a half from the English
line of battle.[722] The criticism on Napoleon is therefore unfounded;
it is due simply to the fact that his occupation during this period
of the battle was not borne in mind by General Shaw-Kennedy. But the
fact remains; if there had been no other battle to fight,—no desperate
action at Planchenoit, requiring the presence and personal direction of
the Emperor,—if the attack upon the allied lines could have been made
under the eye and direct orders of Napoleon himself,—in the opinion
of Kennedy, whose account of the battle is one of the best we have,
it would have gone hard with Wellington’s army. Add to this, that if
there had been no other battle to fight, the Emperor could have brought
16,000 fresh men to bear upon this exhausted force of Wellington’s.
It should be added, also, that the English heavy cavalry of Somerset
and Ponsonby, which had been well nigh exhausted by their charges at
the beginning of the action, and had suffered more or less during the
afternoon, were not able to render efficient service at the close of
the day.
Napoleon, as we have seen, as soon as he had, as he supposed,
definitely repulsed the Prussians in the neighborhood of Planchenoit,
hastened to the front, where he must have arrived somewhere about
seven o’clock. His absence from the field during this time was, as we
have seen, not due to any fault or neglect of his, but nevertheless
it was most unfortunate for the success of his army.[723] Marshal Ney
had exhausted, as he supposed,[724] all the resources available to him.
Over the Imperial Guard he had no authority; and the only infantry in
the army that had not been put in belonged to the Guard. Meanwhile
Wellington had exerted himself to the utmost to restore at least a
semblance of strength to his line of battle west of the turnpike; he
had rallied the men of Alten’s division, who had been shaken by the
fall of that officer, who was severely wounded; he had brought forward
some Brunswick troops; he had ordered Chassé’s (3d) Dutch-Belgian
division from its position near Merbe Braine to a position in rear
of the guards; he had brought over to the centre the light cavalry
brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur from the extreme left. He had, in
fact, done all that could be done, and he was now awaiting the next
move of his antagonist with a coolness, vigilance and alertness which
the discouraging aspects of the fight did not in the least affect. But
his situation was a perilous one. His losses had been very great. His
English troops were much exhausted; the patience and confidence of
most of his foreign allies were nearly worn out; and on that part of
his line lying to the west of the turnpike his artillery was mostly
dismounted. He had, however, in reserve some of his best troops, and
one or two batteries.
Maitland’s brigade of guards and Adam’s brigade of Clinton’s division
had suffered but little, and were troops of the best quality.
Ney had acquainted the Emperor with the state of things in his front,
and had been informed that, as soon as he could, the Emperor would
sustain him with a part of the Guard. Meantime, he was to collect as
much of the cavalry, and of Reille’s infantry, as he could, to support
the attack which might soon be expected to be made by the Guard,
supported by the infantry of the 1st Corps.
It was, as must be sufficiently apparent to the reader, out of the
question at this period of the action for Napoleon to organize an
attack against the English lines with the Imperial Guard, in any such
fashion as that which he employed with such crushing effect on the day
but one before, at Ligny. To begin with, the cavalry of the Guard, both
the light and the heavy, had been shattered, and virtually ruined for
the time being, by their repeated, ineffectual and costly efforts to
carry the plateau during the previous few hours. Then, but a fraction
of the infantry and artillery of the Guard was disposable. The Young
Guard, consisting of eight battalions, organized in four regiments,
with twenty-four guns, was in Planchenoit,[725] where, also, was one
of the eight battalions of the Old Guard (grenadiers), two battalions
of the Middle Guard (chasseurs), and two batteries.[726] Two more
battalions[727] of the Old Guard and one battery were on the road
which, leading from Planchenoit to the Charleroi pike, comes out near
the Maison du Roi, and one battalion of the Middle Guard was at the
farm of Chantelet, in the neighborhood of the Caillou house, where
were the headquarters-baggage and trains. As each of the divisions of
the Guard consisted of eight battalions, there were therefore but ten
battalions left which could be employed against the English.[728] But,
in addition to these detachments, for which we have the authority of
Charras, we learn from Damitz,[729] who states with more minuteness
than any other author the disposition made of the Imperial Guard, that
one battalion of grenadiers and one of chasseurs were brought forward
from Rossomme and stationed near La Belle Alliance. This left but eight
battalions disposable for the projected attack.
These eight battalions[730] constituted four regiments, namely, the 3d
and 4th grenadiers (Old Guard) and the 3d and 4th chasseurs (Middle
Guard). The 3d and 4th regiments of grenadiers constituted the brigade
of General Roguet; the 3d regiment was commanded by General Poret
de Morvan, the 4th by General Harlet. The 3d and 4th regiments of
chasseurs constituted the brigade of General Michel; the 3d regiment
was commanded by General Mallet, the 4th by General Henrion.[731] The
whole force, which could not have much exceeded 3,000 men, was under
the command of General Friant, a very distinguished officer, titular
colonel of the 1st regiment of foot-grenadiers of the Guard.
The Imperial Guard, which consisted of 24 battalions, organized into
12 regiments, of which 4 belonged to the Old Guard, 4 to the Middle
Guard, and 4 to the Young Guard, had been stationed at the beginning of
the day just in front of the farm of Rossomme, and on either side of
the Charleroi turnpike. From this point 16 battalions had been detached
to various points, as we have seen. The Emperor in person now took the
remaining 8 battalions[732] from this position to the front, and handed
them over to Ney just to the south of La Haye Sainte. This was about 7
P.M. Here he addressed them; he encouraged them, and urged them to make
their best efforts. These eight (or, probably, only six battalions)
were then formed in as many columns, each of a front of two companies,
and arranged in _échelon_,[733] the right battalion in front.[734] This
was the 1st battalion of the 3d regiment of grenadiers, commanded by
General Poret de Morvan. Two batteries of horse-artillery, placed on
the left flank, accompanied the infantry. There seems to have been no
arrangement for the proper support of the movement by cavalry, although
a body of cuirassiers did, shortly before the main shock took place,
charge Napier’s battery. They were, however, easily and speedily driven
off. The French cavalry was, in fact, nearly exhausted. Protection
on the left of the advancing column, however, the Guard imperatively
needed, as, in its march towards the enemy, its left flank would
inevitably be exposed to all the troops stationed between the north end
of Hougomont and the main British line. On its right, the column was
protected from a flank attack by the troops of the 1st Corps. (See Map
14.)
It was, according to all the accounts, Napoleon’s intention that Reille
should disengage at least one division of his corps from the enclosures
of Hougomont, and support this charge of the Guard on the left; but
this does not seem to have been even attempted. D’Erlon, on the other
hand, must have exerted himself to the utmost to support the Guard;
for the divisions of Donzelot and Quiot most gallantly and forcibly
attacked the Anglo-Allied line for about a third of a mile to the west
of the turnpike, overthrowing and driving back the Brunswick and Nassau
troops, and even the Hanoverians and English, so that the personal
interposition of the Duke was required to reëstablish the line. These
attacks were made about the time when the Guard began its forward
movement, and they had the effect of shaking the allied troops on this
part of the field so much that they certainly could not have stood
another serious and well-sustained assault, such as might have been
delivered by the Imperial Guard.
But the movement of the column[735] of the Imperial Guard was not made
in this direction, but diagonally across the field towards the enemy’s
right centre, where Wellington had stationed his reserves, and where he
had at least one battery, Bolton’s, then commanded by Napier, in good
condition.
The English, as soon as they perceived the famous bearskin caps of
the Imperial Guard, directed all their disposable guns upon their
approaching foes; but, whether it was owing to the smoke, or to the
inequalities of the ground, the Guard does not seem to have suffered
until it got to close quarters with the 1st (Maitland’s) brigade of the
English guards.[736]
The leading battalion of the Guard was, as we have seen, formed in
column with a front of two companies in three ranks. As each battalion
had four companies,[737] and consisted of about 500 men,[738] there
would be about 75 men in the front rank of the leading battalion,
allowing for the file-closers. To its left and rear, marching in
_échelon_, were the other battalions which constituted the attacking
force, accompanied by two batteries of horse artillery of six pieces
each, which kept up a destructive fire as the infantry advanced. We
quote from the journal of an officer[739] in the English guards:—
“Suddenly the firing ceased, and, as the smoke cleared away, a most
superb sight opened on us. A close column of Grenadiers (about
seventies in front) of _la Moyenne Garde_,[740] about 6,000 strong,
led, as we have since heard, by Marshal Ney, were seen ascending
the rise, _au pas de charge_, shouting “_Vive l’Empereur_.” They
continued to advance till within fifty or sixty paces of our front,
when the brigade[741] were ordered to stand up. Whether it was from
the sudden and unexpected appearance of a corps so near them, which
must have seemed as starting out of the ground, or the tremendously
heavy fire we threw into them, _La Garde_, who had never before
failed in an attack, _suddenly_ stopped. Those, who from a distance
and more on the flank could see the affair, tell us that the effect
of our fire seemed to force the head of the column bodily back.
“In less than a minute above 300 were down. They now wavered, and
several of the rear divisions began to draw out as if to deploy,
whilst some of the men in their rear beginning to fire over the heads
of those in front was so evident a proof of their confusion that Lord
Saltoun * * * holloaed out, ‘_Now’s the time, my boys._’ Immediately
the brigade sprang forward. _La Garde_ turned, and gave us little
opportunity of trying the steel. We charged down the hill till we
had passed the end of the orchard of Hougomont, when our right flank
became exposed to another heavy column (as we afterwards understood,
of the chasseurs of the _Garde_) who were advancing in support of
the former column. This circumstance, besides that our charge was
isolated, obliged the brigade to retire towards their original
position.”
It is plain from this account that the head of the French column
consisted of some 70 (or 75) men, as we have pointed out would be the
case if the leading battalion was in column with a two company front;
and that the fire of Maitland’s brigade, which must have had a front of
about 450 men, added to that of a part of Halkett’s brigade, to that
of Napier’s battery, and to that of the Dutch-Belgian battery of Van
der Smissen,[742] which General Chassé had most opportunely brought up,
destroyed this leading battalion and one or more of those in _échelon_
with it on its left and rear. It is also clear from this account
that the pursuing troops soon found themselves flanked by the other
battalions of the Imperial Guard, which they took to be a separate
column, and were obliged to fall back. It is very unlikely, by the way,
that they advanced as far as the end of the orchard of Hougomont, a
quarter of a mile from their position.
It may be that the rear battalions of the Guard inclined in their
advance, by accident or oversight, more to their left than they should
have done, and thus presented the appearance of a separate column.
General Maitland says:—[743]
“As the attacking force moved forward, it separated; the chasseurs
inclined to their left. The grenadiers ascended the acclivity towards
our position in a more direct course, leaving La Haye Sainte on their
right, and moving towards that part of the eminence occupied by the
1st brigade of Guards.”
He also speaks of the effect of the fire of the batteries which
accompanied the Guard:—
“Numerous pieces of ordnance were distributed on the flanks of
this column. The brigade suffered by the enemy’s artillery, but it
withheld its fire for the nearer approach of the column. The latter,
after advancing steadily up the slope, halted about twenty paces from
the front rank of the brigade.
“The diminished range of the enemy’s artillery was now felt most
severely in our ranks; the men fell in great numbers before the
discharges of grape shot and the fire of the musketry distributed
among the guns.”
General Maitland goes on to describe the repulse of the French attack:—
“The smoke of the [French] artillery happily did not envelop the
hostile column, or serve to conceal it from our aim.
“With what view the enemy halted in a situation so perilous, and in a
position so comparatively helpless, he was not given time to evince.
“The fire of the brigade opened with terrible effect.
“The enemy’s column, crippled and broken, retreated with the utmost
rapidity, leaving only a heap of dead and dying men to mark the
ground which it had occupied.”
The attempt of some of the rear battalions to deploy, noticed by
Captain Powell, is thus mentioned by Charras:—[744]
“Unhappily, whether by orders, or by the instinct of the soldier,
the Guard deploys, in order to reply to the musketry which decimates
it from moment to moment; and, by this movement, it masks the
two batteries which have followed it, which have taken position on
the crest of the plateau, and whose fire has, up to this instant,
protected its flanks.”
But what the leading battalions of the Guard needed at the moment
when they were being destroyed by the superior fire of the brigade of
English guards was not so much the continued effect of the fire of
artillery upon the brigade as the prompt advance of cavalry, which
would have compelled Maitland to throw his regiments into squares.
Failing this, the best thing for the Guard would have been a flank
attack on Maitland’s brigade by troops of the 1st Corps; but this was
averted by the gallant and skilful conduct of Sir Colin Halkett and
Colonel Elphinstone in bringing the remains of Halkett’s brigade, which
had suffered terribly during the past hour, to the left of the English
guards, and thus protecting them in their contest with the Imperial
Guard.[745] In fact the attack on Halkett’s brigade by Donzelot’s troops
at this time was very sharp, and at one time caused great confusion.
It was a critical moment; for, if Halkett had been beaten, Donzelot’s
troops would have flanked Maitland’s brigade, and, attacked as it
then would have been, on front and flank, it would have been forced
to retire, and perhaps even routed. Donzelot’s troops did their best
to gain a foothold on the plateau; they did gain a temporary success;
they knew the importance of the task assigned to them, and gallantly
strove to support the charge of the Guard. On the other hand, the
intelligent appreciation of the emergency on the part of Halkett and
his subordinates, and their obstinate and courageous maintenance of
their exposed position deserve the highest commendation.
If this attack of the Imperial Guard had been supported on the right
by cavalry, this resistance on the part of Halkett’s and Maitland’s
commands could not have been encountered.
It seems probable that the failure of the attack of the Guard upon
Maitland’s brigade involved in confusion both the 3d and 4th regiments
of grenadiers (Old Guard), the four (or, more probably, three)
battalions of which were the leading battalions in the whole column.
This, however, is by no means certain. All we know is, that those
troops which were not swept off the field by the charge of Maitland’s
guards, among which assuredly were the 3d and 4th regiments of
chasseurs (Middle Guard), ignorant, probably, of the fate which had
befallen their comrades, steadily pursued their way towards the right
centre of the English position. As the eight (or, more probably, six)
battalions of the original column were formed in _échelon_, the right
in advance, it is plain that the march of the four (or, more probably,
three) rear battalions would bring them on a part of the English line
to the English right of the position of Maitland’s brigade,—in fact,
“towards that part of” the English “position which had been vacated
by the second brigade of Guards, when it moved to Hougomont.”[746]
In this direction, then, these remaining battalions of the Imperial
Guard advanced. To all intents and purposes they now constituted a
second column. As a second column they must have appeared not only to
the men of Maitland’s brigade, when their pursuit of the leading and
defeated battalions brought them on a line with the left _échelons_ of
the original formation, but also to the troops of the brigade of Sir
Frederick Adam, who, having been lying behind a ridge, a little to the
north of Hougomont, were now advanced, and found the French guard in
full march for the summit of the acclivity.
The initiative seems to have been assumed without a moment’s
hesitation by Sir John Colborne, the lieutenant-colonel of the 52d
regiment, who brought his command into line parallel to the flank of
the Imperial Guard, and at once opened fire. This action was approved
on the spot by General Adam, who ordered the other regiments of the
brigade to support the 52d. The French column was obliged to halt,
and to deploy to its left, in order to return the fire, and for a few
minutes the action was very heavy on both sides.[747] But the other
British regiments coming up, and the French, who were acting at a
manifest disadvantage in being thus compelled to halt when half way up
the slope, and resist an unexpected and resolute attack on their flank
while they were exposed also to the fire from the enemy’s batteries
in front, becoming evidently uneasy, Colborne ordered a charge, which
broke the column up completely. He followed the disintegrated and
demoralized battalions without an instant’s hesitation even across the
Charleroi turnpike.
In this attack, the Imperial Guard was supported on its left flank
neither by cavalry nor by the infantry of Reille’s Corps. Had either
been employed, the disaster could not have happened. A charge of
cavalry would have forced the 52d to form square; an advance of
Bachelu’s division, or a part of it, would have engaged all the
attention of Adam’s brigade, and permitted the Guard to pursue its way
unmolested to the crest of the hill.
What would have succeeded the repulse and defeat of the Imperial
Guard had the Prussians not interposed, no one of course can tell.
But while these movements were going on, about 7.30 P.M., the van of
Zieten’s Corps reached Papelotte;[748] and the division of Steinmetz,
supported by cavalry and artillery, turning at once the right of the
1st Corps and the left of the 6th, advanced upon the field of battle,
spreading terror and confusion throughout the right wing of the French
army. Durutte’s and Marcognet’s divisions abandoned their positions;
Lobau retired towards Planchenoit; while the immense success which the
English had obtained over the French left in routing the Imperial Guard
was instantly improved by Wellington in ordering his two remaining and
as yet untouched cavalry brigades, those of Vivian and Vandeleur, to
charge. These bodies of horse, which had been, in the latter part of
the afternoon, brought over from the English left to the rear of their
centre, were now launched upon the troops of Donzelot and Quiot, and
the remains of the French cavalry; and then the Duke, seeing that the
battle was won, ordered the whole line to advance. (See Map 12.)
There was no resistance of any consequence made, except by the
scattered regiments of the Imperial Guard, and by the 6th Corps
under the Count de Lobau, which held Planchenoit against the renewed
assaults of Bülow’s Corps, supported now by two divisions of the
corps of Pirch I. until the retreat of the army beyond that point
was assured. The Emperor did what he could; he exerted himself in
every way;[749] his headquarters-cavalry charged the English light
horse; but the army was too much exhausted to make any extraordinary
exertions; and, attacked both in front and flank as the French were,
nothing but extraordinary exertions could possibly suffice to check the
victorious enemy, superior in numbers as well as in position. Hence
with the exception of the 6th Corps, whose task was a definite one,
and undoubtedly comprehended by every soldier in it, and of which one
of the most courageous and efficient officers in the French army had
charge, no resistance on a large scale was offered. The 1st Corps was
hopelessly disorganized, and necessarily so; the 2d Corps could no
doubt have effected an orderly retreat on Nivelles,[750] but Reille did
not see the necessity of this course, and perhaps could not have been
expected to do so. Most of the battalions of the Guard preserved their
organization, and resisted heroically to the last. The Emperor was
finally forced to take refuge in one of the squares of the Guard, and
in its midst he was safely borne off his last field of battle.[751]
The French army was routed; but its condition was made exceptionally
bad because only one avenue of retreat was followed, and also because
this avenue was practically blocked at Genappe by the supposed
necessity of crossing the Dyle on a single bridge.[752] Had the army
been able to spread itself over an open country, it is not likely that
the rout would have been so complete, and it is quite certain that the
captures of artillery would not have been so great. But the Prussian
cavalry took up the pursuit which neither the Prussian nor the British
infantry were sufficiently fresh to maintain; and in the exhausted
condition of body and bewildered state of mind in which the mass of
the French soldiers were when the catastrophe came, little was needed
to complete their demoralization. At Genappe over a hundred pieces of
cannon were abandoned, and from that point on no attempt was made to
keep up even a semblance of order.
Such was the famous battle of Waterloo. It has become a synonym for
hopeless and irremediable disaster. It is not, however, necessary here
to review the causes of the catastrophe. What we have still to say on
this head we shall put into the Notes to this chapter. But there is one
subject that properly belongs here.
What would have been the effect if Grouchy had detained the corps of
Bülow and Pirch I., so that they could not have taken part in the
action?
In this discussion we shall assume the correctness of our conclusions,
reached previously, that if Grouchy had started at daybreak for the
bridge of Moustier, or even if he had followed the counsel of Gérard,
he would almost certainly have prevented Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann
from taking any part in the battle.[753] We shall not reargue these
questions, for they have been already fully discussed.
Let us suppose, then, that Napoleon could have utilized his whole force
against the army of Wellington during the whole afternoon; that he
could have given his personal direction to the conduct of the action;
that he could have followed up the repulse of the 1st Corps with a new
attack in which Lobau should support d’Erlon, and in which the cavalry
should take its proper part; that he had been on the spot when La Haye
Sainte fell, and had improved that advantage as he well knew how to do;
that he had had the whole of the Imperial Guard—infantry, cavalry, and
artillery,—at his disposal for the carrying of Wellington’s position;
it seems to us there can be no reasonable question as to the result;
the Duke would have been badly beaten, and the action would in all
probability have been over, or substantially so, by six o’clock. This
question is not asked to gratify the imagination, or for purposes of
speculation, but simply that we may form a judgment on the adequacy
of Napoleon’s means to the end which he had in view; for, if military
history cannot assist us in forming correct opinions on the adequacy of
certain available means to the attainment of certain proposed objects,
it is of no use whatever. The view we hold as to the necessity of
Blüchers support to Wellington’s success is the same as that which
we have seen[754] put forth by Sir James Shaw-Kennedy, where he is
justifying the Duke for accepting battle at Waterloo.[755]
As for Zieten, he could not have come up till half-past seven o’clock,
which would have been too late for him to be of any use to the English.
The probability is that he would have joined the other corps that
were fighting Grouchy. It is hardly likely that he would have pursued
his intention of joining Wellington, after he had heard that the
other three corps were not likely to interfere in the battle between
Napoleon and Wellington. This would have been to run a great risk;
and one that under the circumstances no prudent officer would run. We
are supposing now that Zieten hears at Ohain, for instance, that the
other corps are engaged with Grouchy at St. Lambert or Couture,—now,
then, he must admit that if Grouchy shall be able, owing to obstinate
or skilful fighting, or to the lateness of the hour, or to chance, to
prevent Bülow, Pirch I. and Thielemann from attacking Napoleon that
afternoon, the chances are that Napoleon will defeat Wellington before
he, Zieten, can possibly arrive; and, therefore, for him to proceed
further than Ohain will simply be to involve himself in the disaster of
the Anglo-Dutch army.
But while we must state our conviction that Grouchy would have
prevented the defeat of Napoleon had he crossed the Dyle, we certainly
do not consider him the sole cause of the defeat.
FOOTNOTES:
[671] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 219; Charras, vol. 1, p. 263.
[672] Drouet, pp. 96, 97; Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, p. 24.
[673] _Ante_, pp. 268 _et seq._
[674] The question of the alleged orders sent to Grouchy during this
night will be treated of in Appendix A; _post_, p. 353.
[675] Van Loben Sels, p. 319.
[676] _Ante_, p. 265.
[677] Charras, vol. 1, p. 265.
[678] Vaudoncourt, vol. 4, 24.
[679] Van Loben Sels, p. 270.
[680] Baudus, vol. 1, p. 225.
[681] Doc. Inéd., XVIII, p. 52; App. C, xxxi; _post_, p. 387.
[682] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 157, n.
[683] Charras, vol. 1, p. 270.
[684] Charras, vol. 1, p. 274.
[685] Ib., p. 275.
[686] Kennedy, p. 131.
[687] Wellington’s Official Report: Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 481.
[688] Oldfield MSS.; Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 380.
A copy of this sketch is inserted opposite page 565 of C. D. Yonge’s
“Life of Wellington”; London: Chapman and Hall; 1860. See, also, p. 616
of the same work.
[689] Curiously enough they were very nearly lost in the action; the
officer who had them in his keeping, Lieutenant Waters, being unhorsed
in the _melée_.
[690] Probably the information brought by Lieutenant Massow; _ante_, p.
233.
[691] Oldfield MSS.
[692] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461; App. xxx. Charras, vol. 1, p. 269,
n. 2, raises the total to 70,187 men of all arms, of whom 13,432 were
cavalry. He gives the number of guns as 159.
[693] _Ante_, p. 35, n. 3.
[694] Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 460, 461: App. xxx.
[695] Sir Lowry Cole, commanding the 6th British division, was not in
the action.
[696] Kennedy, p. 61; Waterloo Letters, pp. 30, 31, Sir W. Gomm.
[697] Waterloo Letters, pp. 403, 404.
[698] Kennedy, p. 65.
[699] Oldfield MSS.
[700] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 461: App. xxxi. Charras (vol. 1. p. 238, n.)
gives the total as 72,447 men and 240 guns.
[701] Doc. Inéd., XIX, pp. 53, 54; App. C, xxxii; _post_, p. 388.
[702] We shall not attempt to give a complete tactical description of
the battle of Waterloo. The narratives of Siborne, Charras, Hooper, La
Tour d’Auvergne, and others give all the facts. With the exception of
two or three points, their accounts do not differ materially.
[703] The following extract from a letter by Baron Müffling written on
June 24, 1815, is directly in point here:—
“Before we arrived there I said to the Duke, ‘If only there were an
apparently weak point in the right flank of your position, so that
Bonaparte might assail it right furiously, and neglect his own right
wing to such an extent that he should fail to discover the march of the
Prussians!’
“And see! when we arrived there, there lay the advanced post of
Hougomont, upon which he (B.) indeed fell.” Militär Wochenblatt, Nov.
14, 1891.
[704] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 266; Charras, vol. 1, p. 281.
[705] Charras, vol. 2, p. 18.
[706] Charras, vol. 1, p. 288, and note 2.
[707] Charras, vol. 1, p. 288; La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 274. D’Erlon in
his autobiography throws no light on the matter; Drouet, p. 97.
[708] Nowhere better, perhaps, than in Erckmann-Chatrian’s “Waterloo.”
[709] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 5, 6.
[710] _Ante_, p. 270.
[711] Charras, vol. 2, p. 18. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff says that
more than 2,000 men were killed in endeavoring to get possession of La
Haye Sainte. Doc. Inéd., p. 17. This, however, must be an excessive
estimate.
[712] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303; vol. 2, p. 18; Hooper, p. 213, n.;
O’Connor Morris, p. 352. Other authorities put the capture of La Haye
Sainte two hours later. Colonel Heymès of Ney’s staff places the hour
between 6 and 7 P.M. Doc. Inéd., pp. 18, 19.
[713] Kennedy, pp. 114-116. Kennedy’s account of this part of the
battle, as indeed of all parts of it, is most valuable; but we think
he is in error in supposing that La Haye Sainte had not fallen before
these cavalry attacks were made.
[714] Kennedy, pp. 127 _et seq._; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 _et seq._
[715] Mercer, vol. 1, p. 325; Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315; Siborne,
vol. 2, pp. 154, 155. Mercer in his Diary seems to think these
enfilading batteries were Prussian; but see his letter and plan in the
Waterloo Letters, pp. 214 _et seq._ _Cf._ Waterloo Letters, p. 330.
[716] Van Loben Sels, p. 333.
[717] Charras, vol. 1, p. 318.
[718] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 152 _et seq._; Van Loben Sels, p. 295. _Cf._
Porter’s Hist. Royal Engineers, vol. 1, p. 382: Waterloo Letters, p.
339, where the hour is fixed by Lieutenant-Colonel Dawson Kelly at
“about half-past six.”
[719] Kennedy, p. 127.
[720] Halkett’s brigade was on the main line, nearly half of a mile
west of the pike.
[721] Kempt’s brigade was on the east side of the Brussels pike; its
right rested on it.
[722] It is almost exactly a mile and a half from the point of
intersection of the Brussels turnpike with the Wavre road to the church
in Planchenoit.
[723] See Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 313, 318.
[724] The principal question as to this is in regard to the corps of
Reille, a part of which, certainly, might have been more usefully
employed in sustaining the cavalry attacks than in fighting in the wood
of Hougomont, or on the Nivelles road on the west side of Hougomont.
See Heymès’ statement in Doc. Inéd., pp. 17, 18.
[725] Charras, vol. 1, p. 316.
[726] Ib., p. 317.
[727] Ib., p. 321, n.; correcting the statement on p. 318, which speaks
of only one battalion of grenadiers being on the road to the Maison du
Roi.
[728] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
[729] Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285. Damitz gives a complete roster of the
Guard, and, in fact, of the whole army, at the end of his first volume.
He also gives the numbers of the regiments and battalions detached in
and around Planchenoit.
[730] Damitz, vol. 1, p. 285, states that owing to the losses suffered
at Ligny these eight battalions had been consolidated into six. Batty
(pp. 106, 107) also says that the 4th regiment of grenadiers consisted
of but one battalion, and that the same was true of the 4th regiment of
chasseurs.
[731] At least this was the fact on the 16th of June, prior to the
battle of Ligny. See the Roster at the end of Damitz’ first volume. All
these officers, except Henrion, are mentioned by Charras (vol. 1, p.
322) as participating in this charge. _Cf._ Gore, p. 59. This work is
an explanation, in 1817, of Craän’s Map of the Field.
[732] Ney: Letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, p. 387. But Drouot
(Jones, p. 227) and Napoleon (Corresp., vol. 31, p. 238) say four
battalions only, and the latter adds “of the Middle Guard.” It is not
unlikely that the other battalions had previously been brought up to
the neighborhood of La Haye Sainte.
[733] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
[734] This is implied in Damitz’ statement, vol. 1, p. 286, as well as
from Charras’ statement that the horse-batteries were on the left flank
of the column. It is distinctly so stated in Van Loben Sels, p. 295.
[735] We call the whole mass, consisting of columns of
battalions,—division (or two company) front,—arranged in _échelon_,—a
column, merely for convenience’ sake. It may be remarked that the
French infantry were formed in three ranks.
[736] Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 257; _Contra_, Siborne, vol. 2, p. 166.
[737] St. Hilaire: Hist. de la Garde, p. 634.
[738] Charras, vol. 1, p. 67.
[739] Captain Powell, in Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.
[740] This is an error. “La Moyenne Garde” consisted solely of the
chasseurs of the Guard; the grenadiers constituted the Old Guard,
strictly so called. It is not uncommon to find the grenadiers and
chasseurs spoken of as constituting the Old Guard; this is Charras’
usage. But it is an error to speak of the grenadiers of the Middle
Guard. The grenadiers whom he saw were the 1st battalion of the 3d
regiment,—_ante_, p. 317. See Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 315, n. 1; pp.
321, 325, 327, n. 1. _Contra_, Gore, p. 75.
[741] The 1st brigade of guards, about 1,800 strong,—Siborne, vol. 1,
p. 460. App. xxx. They were formed in four ranks.
[742] Relation Belge, pp. 74 _et seq._
[743] Waterloo Letters, pp. 244, 245.
[744] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 325, 326.
[745] See Waterloo Letters, pp. 320, 321; Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 170,
171, n.; See, also, Waterloo Letters, pp. 330, 331, 339, 340.
[746] Waterloo Letters, p. 245; Maitland’s narrative.
[747] Waterloo Letters; Colborne’s narrative, pp. 284, 285; Gawler’s
narrative, p. 293.
[748] Charras, vol. 1, p. 327, n.
[749] Charras, vol. 1, p. 331.
[750] Doc. Inéd., p. 62; Reille’s Statement.
[751] Hist. de l’Ex-Garde, pp. 538, 539.
[752] Charras, vol. 1, p. 334.
[753] _Ante_, pp. 261, 283.
[754] _Ante_, pp. 294, 295.
[755] _Cf._ Wellington’s Report (Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 484; App. C,
xii; _post_, pp. 372, 373). where he says that _he attributes the
successful result of the day to the assistance he received from the
Prussians_.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI._
1. That the tactics employed by the French at the battle of Waterloo
in their operations against the army of the Duke of Wellington were
unworthy of the experience and reputation of their commanders is almost
universally admitted. The word “commanders” is used advisedly, because
Ney seems to have had the immediate direction of the 1st and 2d Corps
even when the Emperor was personally superintending the battle, and
when Napoleon was called off to direct the defence of Planchenoit, Ney
was certainly in sole control. But this does not fully exonerate the
Emperor from responsibility for the dispositions which were made.
The faulty formation of d’Erlon’s Corps in its great assault on the
English left was the first blunder. The employment of the whole of
Reille’s Corps in the attack on Hougomont was the next. Then the
negligent and wasteful way in which the attacks on both Hougomont and
La Haye Sainte were conducted warrant severe criticism. The employment
of all the reserve cavalry of the army was a most unheard of and
uncalled for proceeding; they were all put in, and kept in until they
were all exhausted. One would certainly suppose that Ney, who was
responsible for this proceeding, must have seen, long before the close
of the afternoon, that the cavalry were being completely ruined, and
that no appreciable injury was being inflicted on the enemy.
We cannot but think that if Napoleon had personally directed the
battle at this period, this useless and wasteful employment of the
cavalry would not have been made. And we cannot help thinking, also,
that the Emperor would have brought some at least of Reille’s troops
out of the enclosures of Hougomont to support any attacks of cavalry
which he might have ordered, either in conjunction with the divisions
of Donzelot and Quiot, or with the Imperial Guard, which, but for the
attack of the Prussians, he would no doubt have put in between 4 and 5
o’clock. We must bear in mind, that Napoleon was fighting the Prussians
near Planchenoit during a large part of the afternoon, and, in fact
during the critical period of the battle; and that he cannot fairly be
held liable to the censure for the tactics used in the fight against
the English, which some English writers, in forgetfulness of this fact,
have undertaken to apply to him.
The 1st Corps, after its severe repulse, rallied well and did
extremely good work. The persistent attacks of Quiot’s and Donzelot’s
infantry showed great enterprise and daring, up to the very last; and
these troops deserve all praise. No doubt the bravery of the men of
the 2d Corps in their ineffectual attacks on Hougomont was equally
commendable; but it was a great waste of material to employ the
entire corps in such an operation as attacking Hougomont. Hougomont
should have been attacked, undoubtedly, but only by a moderate
force; very possibly it might have been carried, had proper means
been employed.[756] But it was of far more importance to utilize the
infantry of the 2d Corps in breaking the English lines to the eastward
of Hougomont, in conjunction with cavalry or the Imperial Guard, than
to persist in throwing fresh regiments against the brick walls of the
house and garden. Hougomont might in fact have been turned; and, if
the last charge had succeeded, it would have been. A notable exception
to the unfavorable criticism on the French tactics on this day is made
by all historians when speaking of the gallant, skilful and obstinate
defence of Planchenoit against the Prussians by the 6th Corps under
the Count de Lobau, assisted by the Young Guard and some regiments of
grenadiers and chasseurs. No praise is too high for these troops.
2. The English tactics deserved, and have always received, the high
commendation of historians. Not only was the Duke himself always
watchful and alert, but his efforts were admirably seconded by his
officers. The unfailing energy and enterprise shown even at the very
close of this exhausting day by the Duke himself and his lieutenants
is at least quite as remarkable as the obstinacy and courage displayed
in resisting the repeated attacks of their antagonists. The conduct of
Maitland, Halkett and Colborne in the last great emergency exhibits
the tenacity, courage, presence of mind, and readiness to seize
the opportunity, which are the great military virtues, existing in
undiminished vigor at the close of a most bloody and doubtful contest.
3. The account given in the text of the charge of the Imperial Guard
does not agree fully with any of the narratives, but will be found,
on reflection, it is submitted, to harmonize most of the conflicting
evidence. The subject is a large one, and the testimony is very
confusing. It is impossible to reconcile all the statements. But it is
believed that the view maintained in the text,—that the Imperial Guard
advanced in one body, or column, not in two; that this column (as we
may call it, for lack of a better term) consisted at most of eight, and
probably of only six battalions, each formed in close column of grand
divisions,—that is, with a front of two companies,—the usual practice
in those days,—presenting about 75 men in the front rank,—that these
battalions advanced in _échelon_, the right in advance,—explains most
of the discrepancies, and accounts for all or nearly all the important
statements contained in the different narratives. It was the leading
battalions of this column which were met and defeated by Maitland’s
guards; it was the rear battalions which were flanked and routed by the
52d and the other regiments of Adam’s (light) brigade.
A. There is, in our judgment, no foundation for the hypothesis of two
columns, which, introduced by Siborne, has received the indorsement
of Chesney, Kennedy and Hooper. It is opposed to the contemporaneous
authorities of both nations. Napoleon’s report of the battle,[757]—Ney’s
letter to the Duke of Otranto,[758]—Drouot’s speech in the chamber of
Peers,[759]—speak but of one column,—of one attack,—of one repulse. Sir
Digby Mackworth, who was on Lord Hill’s staff, in a position where he
could observe everything, wrote in his journal at eleven o’clock at
night, after the battle was over, as follows:—[760]
“A black mass of the grenadiers of the Imperial Guard, with music
playing and the great Napoleon at their head, came rolling onward
from the farm of La Belle Alliance. * * * The point at which the
enemy aimed was now evident. It was an angle formed by a brigade of
guards [Maitland’s] and the light brigade [Adam’s] of Lord Hill’s
Corps.”
Mackworth then goes on to describe the contest, and the rout of the
enemy. There is not a word of there being two columns and two attacks.
This is true, it is believed, of all the early narratives by British
officers.[761] It may fairly be deduced from this evidence that the
repulse of the right and advanced battalions by the guards, and the
attack on the left and rear ones by the light brigade were nearly
synchronous,—the latter being probably a few minutes later than the
former.
B. The claims put forward on behalf of the light brigade (Adam’s), and
specially of the 52d regiment, next demand our consideration.
Gawler, a distinguished officer of the 52d, in his “Crisis and Close
of the Action at Waterloo”[762] admits that “the headmost companies of
the Imperial Guard * * * crowned the very summit of the position.” He
says that “the fire of the brigade of guards then opened upon them, but
they still pressed forward.” And he claims[763] that their attack was
repulsed not “by a charge of General Maitland’s brigade of guards,”
“but * * * by a charge of the 52d, covered by the 71st regiment,
without the direct coöperation of any other portion of the allied army.”
Unfortunately for this claim, however, we have it from another officer
of the 52d, Leeke, that Gawler was on the extreme right of the
regiment.[764] In this position, as Leeke remarks, he could not have
seen what took place at the head of the French column.[765] When he
says, therefore, that the flank attack of the 52d alone overthrew the
Imperial Guard, he is speaking without any personal knowledge of what
took place in the front of that column, and we are thrown back on the
evidence of the officers of Maitland’s brigade.
Leeke has a curious theory on this matter. He says that the advance of
the Guard was preceded and covered by “a mass of skirmishers,”[766] and
that it was these skirmishers and these only that were driven off by
Maitland’s brigade.
In order to maintain this contention, Leeke is compelled to assume the
presence in front of the main body of the Imperial Guard of “massed
skirmishers” thrown out by the Guard, and also that the battalions of
the Guard never got nearer to Maitland’s brigade than 300 yards.[767]
But this is mere guess work. Sharpin, an officer in Napier’s battery,
which was stationed close to Maitland’s brigade, says:—[768]
“We saw the French bonnets just above the high corn and within 40 or
50 yards of our guns. I believe they were in close columns of grand
divisions.”
Says Captain Powell of the 1st Foot Guards:—[769]
“A close column of grenadiers (about seventies in front) * * * were
seen ascending the rise * * * They continued to advance till within
50 or 60 paces of our front.”
Says Captain Dirom of the same regiment:—[770]
“The Imperial Guard advanced in close column with ported arms, the
officers of the leading division in front waving their swords. The
French columns showed no appearance of having suffered on their
advance, but seemed as regularly formed as if at a field-day. When
they got within a short distance we were ordered to make ready,
present and fire.”
Leeke’s theory of “massed skirmishers” needs no further refutation.
There can be no question that the officers of Maitland’s guards saw
right before them the leading battalions of the Imperial Guard formed
in the ordinary manner, in close columns of grand divisions. The
skirmishers had all been withdrawn by the time the leading battalions
reached the top of the acclivity.
It should, however, be added that the left and rear battalions which
Colborne attacked in flank were entirely unaffected by the charge of
Maitland’s brigade. The British guards did undoubtedly charge the
troops in their front, and drove them down the hill a short distance,
but on finding other troops, _i.e._, the four (or, more probably,
three) rear and left battalions of the Imperial Guard, on their right
flank, they retired to the crest of the hill, and certainly did not
assist the 52d and the other regiments of Adam’s brigade in their
brilliant flank attack. The credit of having overthrown the rear half
of the column of the Imperial Guard is due entirely to that brigade;
and it assuredly was a most skilfully designed and daringly executed
movement. Colborne saw at a glance that the several battalions of the
Guard could not be deployed in such a way as to return anything like
as destructive a fire as that which the unbroken line of the 52d could
deliver. The Guard undoubtedly did its best; the firing was very hot
for a time; Gawler says[771] his regiment lost 150 officers and men in
four or five minutes. But his men were perfectly steady; their fire
was at very close range and well kept up; they had the advantage of
position; the loss of the French columns was fearful;[772] and when
Colborne, perceiving that the moment had come, ordered a charge, the
Guard broke into a confused mass, and were pursued to and across the
Charleroi road. The flank attack of Adam’s brigade was certainly a most
brilliant, and yet a well-justified, manœuvre,—impossible to any but
veteran troops, and which none but an experienced, vigilant and daring
officer would ever have ordered. Colborne took, it must be admitted,
great risks. He says himself[773] that, as his skirmishers opened fire
on the Guards, his attention was completely drawn to his position and
dangerous advance,—a large mass of cavalry having been seen on the
right. Certainly it must have required some nerve to decide to run such
a risk as this, and on his own responsibility too, for he advanced his
regiment before receiving any order from General Adam. But success
justified his decision.
4. Whether Napoleon was warranted in ordering the Guard forward, or
rather that portion of it which could be mustered, is a question
which has been much discussed, and, we are inclined to think, to no
great profit. The answer must depend on the extent of the information
possessed by Napoleon as to the actual condition of things at the time
when he ordered the movement; and this, of course, must be mainly a
matter of conjecture. The order was given somewhere about half-past
six o’clock,—an hour before Zieten arrived at Papelotte; and Napoleon
certainly did not expect him. Bülow had been forced to retire. The news
from the front received by the Emperor when he was conducting the fight
against the Prussian flank attack near Planchenoit had been decidedly
favorable. The army of Wellington was reported as manifestly getting
weaker and weaker. The guns placed near La Haye Sainte had done serious
damage to the English squares and batteries. The activity and energy
of Quiot’s and Donzelot’s infantry showed no abatement. It seems to us
that the Emperor had good reason to think that the English lines would
give way before a determined attack made by fresh troops, and those the
veterans of the Imperial Guard. He told Ney to mass on the right of
Hougomont all the troops of Reille’s Corps that he could collect, to
concentrate the divisions of Quiot and Donzelot near La Haye Sainte,
and to prepare to support the attack with cavalry.[774]
He must, however, have been grievously disappointed as to the execution
of this order by Marshal Ney. When the Emperor brought up the Guard,
Bachelu’s infantry had not been drawn out of the wood of Hougomont.[775]
Piré’s cavalry, which were in perfectly good condition, had not been
brought over from the Nivelles road.[776] No attempt apparently had been
made to organize any cavalry force from the wrecks of the splendid
divisions which Ney had so obstinately and blindly launched again and
again upon the English squares. And the Emperor, who must have expected
that an officer of the ability and experience of Marshal Ney would have
made some at least of the necessary arrangements for the proper support
of the charging column, must have experienced a disappointment as
sudden as it must have been bitter, when he saw the battalions of the
Guard ascend the plateau without a regiment of cavalry to protect their
flanks, or any part of the 2d Corps supporting their attack.
The charge, such as it was, of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo was
most firmly and gallantly met and repulsed. But it should never be
forgotten that it was not the sort of charge which Napoleon was in
the habit of making with his Guard; that it was, at best, a charge
of 8 battalions out of 24,—of 12 guns out of 96,—and that no cavalry
at all, light or heavy, supported the charging column. Made, as it
was, without supports, except so far as Donzelot’s gallant infantry
protected its right flank, it was a terrible mistake to make it. And
it is all but certain that if proper care and skill had been expended
on the preparations and accompaniments of the movement,—if, in a word,
Ney had kept his head cool and his hand steady, as did the Duke,—Piré’s
lancers and Bachelu’s division would have given abundant employment to
the whole of Adam’s brigade, and a few squadrons of horse could have
protected the advance on the right. This is not, we submit, going too
far in the region of conjecture. Bachelu and Piré, at any rate, were
close at hand, and under Ney’s command, and were, so far as we know,
doing nothing at the time when the charge was ordered.
Ney, in fact, contributed apparently little, except his example of
desperate courage, to the success of the day. But courage, though
indispensable, does not take the place of judgment and presence of
mind.[777] Ney failed most unmistakably to make the most of his
resources; he lost sight, practically, of one of the two corps under
his orders; he used up all his cavalry; and he neglected to make even
the preparations and arrangements which were yet feasible to second the
attack of the Guard. It is impossible not to contrast his conduct with
that of Wellington, whose admirable forethought and coolness gave him
the control of the situation, and enabled him to utilize fully all the
resources which at the close of this trying day still remained to him.
5. We have not thought it necessary to do more than to call attention
to the fact that the Duke of Wellington retained some 18,000 men of
Colville’s division at Hal and Tubize throughout this perilous and
bloody day. The best English authorities[778] unhesitatingly condemn the
Duke’s action in this regard. Says Sir James Shaw-Kennedy:—[779]
“Wellington certainly ought to have had Colville, with the force
under his command, on the field of battle at Waterloo. There was no
cause whatever for his being kept in the direction of Hal. It would
have been a gross error on the part of Napoleon to have detached
any important force on that road, and Colville should, early on the
morning of the 18th, have been ordered to march to Waterloo, if he
had no information of the advance of the enemy on Hal.”
6. It may be thought by some that the effect upon the corps of Bülow
and Pirch I. of the appearance of Marshal Grouchy’s command, marching
from Moustier and Ottignies upon Lasne and St. Lambert, has been stated
too strongly in the text. But we cannot think so. Imagine 30,000 or
40,000 men marching in a long column along miry roads to attack an
enemy, and still some miles from the field of battle, perceiving a body
of troops of apparently equal or nearly equal strength moving right
upon their line of march, which is also their line of communications.
How many officers in Bülow’s position would not have halted to resist
such an attack?
It is to be observed, that the dilemma in which Bülow and Pirch I.
were placed by knowing that Grouchy was attacking Wavre was quite a
different one. In the first place, they, as we now know, estimated
Grouchy’s force at only half its strength,—they never, it must be
remembered, actually saw it; and in the second place, Grouchy might
well be detained by Thielemann at and about Wavre until the battle of
Waterloo had been won.
If, however, Grouchy had been observed marching from the Dyle directly
on their columns _en route_ for Planchenoit, the Prussian commanders
almost certainly would have been compelled to halt and to give him
battle. And this they must have done even although they might have
been satisfied that their forces were superior in numbers. A smaller
force, if it is directed on the line of march of a larger one, almost
inevitably must detain it.
7. The complete ruin which overtook the French army at Waterloo is
to be attributed mainly to the unexpected appearance and vigorous
attack of Zieten’s Corps at the close of the day, when the French
had become thoroughly exhausted, and when, owing to the darkness, it
was impossible for the Emperor to accomplish anything in the way of
rallying them or making new dispositions. The English had certainly
won a great success in routing the Imperial Guard; but they were not
strong enough to drive the French army from the field, even with
the assistance which Bülow and Pirch I. afforded on the side of
Planchenoit. They had cleared their front of the enemy from Hougomont
to the turnpike; but they were in no condition to attack the strong
position of the French, defended by the troops of the 2d Corps, and
crowned with many and powerful batteries. The French centre, Müffling
tells us,[780] remained immovable after their right wing was in full
retreat, and it was not until some of Zieten’s batteries, which had
been brought over to the west of La Haye Sainte, opened fire, that it
began to retire. Then Wellington ordered his whole line to advance. But
it was a very thin line indeed, consisting, as Müffling says, only of
small bodies, of a few hundred men each, and at great intervals from
each other. Müffling goes on to say:—[781]
“The advance of such weak battalions, with the great gaps between,
appeared hazardous, and General Lord Uxbridge, who commanded the
cavalry, drew the Duke’s attention to the danger; the Duke, however,
would not order them to stop. * * * The Duke with his practised
eye perceived that the French army was no longer dangerous; he was
equally aware, indeed, that, with his infantry so diminished, he
could achieve nothing more of importance: but if he _stood still_,
and resigned the pursuit to the Prussian army _alone_, it might
appear in the eyes of Europe as if the English army had defended
themselves bravely indeed, but that the Prussians alone decided and
won the battle.”
The rout of the divisions of Durutte and Marcognet was entirely due
to Zieten’s attack; this is universally admitted. Had it not been for
Zieten, then, the only contest that would have gone on that evening
would have been at and near Planchenoit; and it is hard to suppose
that Napoleon could not have maintained his position there, if he had
had his whole army to draw from when the Young Guard and Lobau needed
reinforcements. To the unexpected irruption of Zieten’s Corps,—or
rather of his leading division of infantry, all his cavalry, and most
of his artillery,—arriving at the close of the day, on the flank of the
army, and in perfectly open ground, is the rout of the French army,
therefore, principally to be attributed.
8. It only remains to discuss the question of the responsibility for
the intervention of the Prussians, as between the Emperor and Marshal
Grouchy. It may fairly be said that if either of them had taken all
the steps which the situation, as it presented itself to his mind,
demanded, this intervention might have been prevented.
If the Emperor, when he thought it possible that the Prussians might be
intending to unite with the English, had taken Grouchy with him, and
had stationed his two corps, or one of them, on the day of the battle,
at or near Lasne and St. Lambert, or if he had employed one or both of
Grouchy’s corps in attacking the English, Blücher, it is safe to say,
would not have interfered in the duel between Napoleon and Wellington.
If, after sending Grouchy off, Napoleon had informed him of the
impending battle, and had charged him to return to the main army by
way of Moustier if he found that the Prussians had gone to Wavre, it
is altogether probable that the march of the Prussians would have been
arrested.
On the other hand, if Grouchy had acted of his own motion on sound
military principles at daybreak of the 18th, or even had been willing
to follow the counsel of Gérard at noon, the same result would probably
have been attained.
Napoleon took a wholly unnecessary risk when he detached Grouchy with
such a large force, after he had reason to apprehend that the Prussians
were intending to unite with the English, and he negligently omitted to
take the usual means to reduce this risk by supplying his lieutenant
with the necessary information, and with precise orders in case he
should find that Blücher intended to coöperate with Wellington. He
trusted to Grouchy to take the right course, and Grouchy failed to
do so. Both Napoleon and Grouchy are therefore responsible for the
intervention of the Prussians and the loss of the battle.
FOOTNOTES:
[756] _Ante_, pp. 303, 304.
[757] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 343; Jones, p. 384.
[758] Jones, p. 387.
[759] Ib., p. 227.
[760] Sidney’s Life of Lord Hill, p. 309.
[761] Jones (Artillery Operations), p. 177; Sharpin in the “Waterloo
Letters,” pp. 228 _et seq._; Gore, pp. 58 _et seq._ See, also, Captain
Batty’s account (pp. 106 _et seq._,) in his “Historical Sketch of the
Campaign of 1815”: London, 1820. He was an ensign in the 1st regiment
of foot-guards in Maitland’s brigade. He speaks, it is true, of the
chasseurs of the Guard “forming another attack”; but he says that it
was when Maitland was advancing, that he perceived the chasseurs “so
far advanced as to menace the right flank of the brigade,”—which is
substantially the view maintained in the text. _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 2,
p. 170, where the same statement is made. Yet Siborne (vol. 2, p. 174)
says that “between the heads of the two attacking columns there was a
distance during their advance of _from ten to twelve minutes’ march_.”
How such an interval was possible, when the contest of the Guard
with Maitland’s brigade was of such extremely short duration, is not
apparent. See Maitland’s statement in “Waterloo Letters”, pp. 244, 245;
also statements of Powell and Dirom; pp. 255, 257, 258.
[762] Gawler, p. 15.
[763] Ib. pp. 31, 32.
[764] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84.
[765] Lord Seaton, then Sir John Colborne, who commanded the 52d,
admits that he did not himself see, and could not have seen, any
movement of the guards. He simply claims that the Imperial Guard halted
when his skirmishers opened fire on their flank. Leeke, vol. 1, p. 101.
[766] Ib., pp. 43, 44, 84.
[767] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 84. See also his letter to the Editor of the
Army and Navy Gazette, August 17, 1867.
[768] Waterloo Letters, p. 229. _Cf._ a statement of an officer in the
same battery,—Jones, p. 177,—probably Sharpin.
[769] Waterloo Letters, pp. 254, 255.
[770] Waterloo Letters, p. 257.
[771] Ib., p. 293; _Cf._ Colborne’s Letter, p. 285.
[772] Leeke, vol. 1, p. 104; Letter of Colonel Brotherton.
[773] Ib., p. 101.
[774] Charras, vol. 1, p. 321.
[775] Wellington brought up about this time to the right centre of his
line Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian Division, besides other troops.
[776] Wellington about this time brought over the brigades of Vivian
and Vandeleur to the threatened centre of his line, as well as the
remnants of Somerset’s and Ponsonby’s brigades.
[777] On Marshal Ney’s state of mind at this time, see Gourgaud, pp.
48, n.; 111, 112; Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 249, 250; Muquardt, p. 149,
n.; Life of Sir W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505,—where Soult gives his
opinion on Ney’s conduct; Berton, p. 41, where Ney’s extraordinary
letter to Fouché (Jones, pp. 385 _et seq._) is examined.
[778] Chesney, p. 217; Hamley, p. 198.
[779] Kennedy, p. 174.
[780] Müffling; Passages, p. 249.
[781] Müffling; Passages, p. 250.