CHAPTER XV.

THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE: GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER.

Napoleon received Marshal Grouchy’s letter, dated Gembloux, 10 P.M.

of June 17th, about 2 A.M. of the 18th, at the Caillou House, on the

Brussels turnpike, where he passed the night of the 17th. A close

examination of it might have raised a suspicion in his mind that

Grouchy did not thoroughly comprehend his task, and that he might

possibly fail to take the right course, if the emergency, which he had

in his letter represented as not unlikely to occur, should actually

confront him. He had said, that, if he found that the mass of the

Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he “would follow them in that

direction, in order that they might not be able to gain Brussels, and

to separate them from Wellington,” but if they were retiring on Perwez,

that he would direct himself on that city. We have pointed out above

that it was clearly impossible for him to prevent the Prussians from

getting to Brussels. He was thirty miles from Brussels,—the Prussians

less than twenty,—and they were directly between him and Brussels. And

as for separating the Prussians at Wavre from Wellington, while Grouchy

must of course follow them in the direction of Wavre as distinguished

from that of Perwez, yet the only thing really open to him was to cross

the Dyle at once by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies and then to

act in close connection with the main French army,—to stand between

it and the Prussians, and ward off the danger as best he might. This

could be done; but this was all that could be done. It was not to be

expected that an attack upon the Prussian rearguard at Wavre,—which was

the only other thing that Grouchy could do,—however vigorously made,

could have the result of detaining their whole army. But, in Grouchy’s

letter, a movement on his part to rejoin or to approach the main army

by crossing the Dyle, in case he found that the Prussians were massing

at Wavre, was not even mentioned.

Napoleon and Soult, therefore, one would suppose, might have seen by

the programme which Grouchy had marked out for himself in his despatch

that in all probability he was not clearly apprehending the situation,

and that it was therefore possible that he might make a serious,

perhaps a very serious, mistake the next day. They ought, therefore,

if they suspected this to be the state of the case, to have replied at

once, giving him precise instructions as to his course in the event of

the retreat of the Prussians on Wavre. They should have told him, that,

if he should find this to be the fact, he must at once march to cross

the Dyle above Wavre, at Moustier and Ottignies, approach the main

army, and act in conjunction with it. Yet although Grouchy told the

officer who carried the 10 P.M. despatch to wait for an answer, none

was returned.[561] Grouchy was not even informed where the army was,

and that it was confronted by the English army in position. Nor was he

advised, as he surely should have been, that Domon’s reconnoissance

had proved that a strong Prussian column,—consisting, as we have seen,

of the two beaten corps, those of Zieten and Pirch I.,—had retired on

Wavre by way of Gery and Gentinnes.[562] It is impossible to account

for these omissions.[563]

Now this last-mentioned fact, that “a pretty strong (Prussian) column”

had “passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre,” was the most

important fact that could be ascertained, both for Napoleon and

Grouchy. Napoleon had in fact, at 2 A.M. of the 18th, when Grouchy’s

letter arrived, strong reason to apprehend that Grouchy might, during

the night, ascertain that the whole of Blücher’s army had retired on

Wavre. It certainly would seem that this was one of those cases where

nothing should be omitted that could assist the mind of a subordinate

in arriving at a correct conclusion.[564]

Napoleon, however, seems to have thought it unnecessary to send Grouchy

any precise directions. We know that he expected Grouchy to arrive

the next afternoon by the bridge of Moustier. Marbot, whose Memoirs

have just been published, states,[565] that, towards 11 A.M. of the day

of the battle, he was sent with his own regiment of hussars and a

battalion of infantry to and beyond the extreme right of the army, with

instructions, brought to him by one of the Emperor’s aides, to push

reconnoissances to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. He says that

these detachments were connected by cavalry-posts, “so that they could

quickly inform him of their junction with the advance guard of the

troops of Marshal Grouchy, which were to arrive on the Dyle.”

It may perhaps be, that Grouchy’s expressed intention that he would

try to prevent Blücher from joining Wellington was held by both the

Emperor and his chief-of-staff as indicating with sufficient certainty

that, if he found that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he would

proceed at once to cross the Dyle at Moustier or Limale, and operate

on the left bank of that river, on the right of the main army.[566]

This course was almost necessarily implied in an attempt to prevent the

Prussians at Wavre from joining the English, as we have just pointed

out; it may be, therefore, that the Emperor thought another order

needless. But whatever the reason, no order was sent to Grouchy till

10 A.M. the next morning. This did not reach him till 4 P.M.[567] that

afternoon, when he was fighting in front of Wavre.

Marshal Grouchy, then, acted up till 4 o’clock of the 18th of June

under the order dictated the previous day by the Emperor to Count

Bertrand. This fact we desire distinctly to bring out, so that there

shall be no possibility of further mistake on this subject. The history

of this day, from the very first narratives down to the very last, has

been illustrated by the mistakes of historians and critics as to the

orders under which Marshal Grouchy acted. Not only did Grouchy himself

deliberately deny for nearly thirty years that he received any written

order on the 17th, thereby misleading the most sagacious critics and

rendering their criticisms on this part of the campaign in great part

valueless, but even long after the fact was universally acknowledged

that he did get a written order in the shape of the Bertrand letter,

a certain unwillingness or inability to take in the meaning of this

written order, to recognize that it imposed a different task on

Marshal Grouchy from that laid upon him by the verbal orders which had

previously been given him, has, nevertheless, strangely enough existed.

We have pointed this out in the Notes to Chapter XIII; but we will add

one or two more instances here.

The Bertrand order, as we have seen, instructed Grouchy to find out

what the Prussians were intending to do,—_whether they were intending

to separate themselves from the English, or to unite with them for

the purpose of trying the fate of another battle for the defence

of Brussels or Liége_,—and the order closed without giving him any

directions whatever in case either of these emergencies should arise.

The thing which Grouchy was to do, therefore, was to ascertain whether

the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, _and then to

act in accordance with his best judgment_. No directions whatever,

we repeat, were given to him for his conduct if he should find that

the Prussians were intending to unite with the English. We have just

adverted to this omission of the Emperor to give Grouchy precise

instructions in this emergency. There is no question that he did not

give any. Grouchy was entirely untrammelled. If he found that the

Prussians were intending to unite with the English to fight another

battle for the defence of Brussels, he was absolutely free to adopt

whatever course might seem to him best.

Yet we find the latest American historian of this campaign, in speaking

of Grouchy’s rejection of the advice given by Gérard, when the cannon

of Waterloo was heard, saying, that the question was, “whether to turn

the army to its left on reaching Corbaix, and, crossing the Dyle by

the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, to take the road to Maransart

and Planchenoit, _or to adhere to the Emperor’s orders to follow the

Prussians_ whom they now knew to be at Wavre,”—[568] and, again, that

Grouchy “_persisted in adhering to the orders the Emperor had given

him_.”[569]

In the same way we find the latest English commentator on the campaign

saying, “Whether Grouchy can be held responsible for not having”

marched to the sound of the guns “_when Napoleon’s instructions

directed him on Wavre_, will always be a subject for endless, and, I

think, not very profitable, debate.”[570]

It is quite time that an end should be put to misunderstandings on this

subject. Until 4 P.M., we repeat, Grouchy acted under the Bertrand

order only.

To return to the narrative.

Marshal Grouchy had written to the Emperor at 10 P.M. of the 17th, as

we have seen, telling him that, “arrived at Sauvenières, the Prussians

had divided into two columns, one taking the road for Wavre in passing

by Sart-à-Walhain, and the other appearing to be directed on Perwez.”

He then went on to say that he would operate in the direction in which

he found that the mass of their forces had gone.

Being thus in doubt as to the direction of the retreat of the enemy,

he determined to move at first on Sart-à-Walhain, from which point he

could march either on Wavre or on Perwez according to the information

he might there receive. Inclining probably at this time to the opinion

that the Prussians had retreated by way of Perwez, in which case there

would be no necessity for unusual haste, he determined to give his

troops a good night’s rest. Of the absolute necessity of gaining time

in case he should find that the Prussians had retreated on Wavre with

the intention of joining Wellington, he seems to have been utterly

unmindful.

Hence, at or soon after 10 P.M., he issued his orders to his

corps-commanders to march in the morning to Sart-à-Walhain.

Vandamme,[571] whose corps had bivouacked somewhat in advance of

Gembloux, was to start at 6 A.M. It was to be preceded in the march by

Exelmans’ cavalry, the bulk of which was at Sauvenières. Gérard,[572]

whose troops were in and about Gembloux, was to follow with his corps

at 8 A.M. Pajol[573] was ordered from Mazy on the Namur road, where he

then was, taking with him the division of Teste, to Grand Leez, where

he would receive further orders.

Then, at 2 A.M., Grouchy writes to the Emperor to inform him that he

was intending to march on Sart-à-Walhain,[574] but without indicating

his ulterior course.

During the early morning hours, however, information was received[575]

which removed his doubts as to the direction of the Prussian retreat,

for we find him writing to Pajol[576] “at daybreak,” as follows:—

“The movement of retreat of Blücher’s army appears to me very clearly

to be upon Brussels.”[577]

Marshal Grouchy, therefore, at daybreak,—which in Belgium at that

season of the year is at least as early as 3.30 A.M.,—for the sun rises

at 3.48 A.M.,—had come to the conclusion that Blücher was retiring on

Brussels by way of Wavre. Yet he still adhered to his plan of marching

on Sart-à-Walhain, although that place had been chosen the evening

before as the first stage in the next day’s march because he had then

been in doubt as to whether his ultimate movement would be in the

direction of Wavre or in that of Perwez.[578] Moreover, although he

had come to the conclusion that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre,

towards the English, which made promptness and celerity on his part of

the very first importance, he did not change the very late hours he had

fixed for the march of the next morning. In fact, even these hours were

not adhered to. Exelmans,[579] who preceded the column, did not start

till 7.30 A.M.; Vandamme,[580] who came next, did not move until 8

A.M.; and it was not until 9 A.M. that Gérard’s[581] corps got through

the town of Gembloux, and was in full march for Sart-à-Walhain. And yet

no one knew better than Marshal Grouchy that the Prussians had many

hours the start of him, and that if he was going to do anything that

day to prevent them from joining Wellington, there was no time to be

lost.

There is no difference of opinion among the Continental[582]

authorities as to Marshal Grouchy’s true course on this morning. As

soon as he had arrived at the conclusion that the Prussians were

retiring on Wavre, which was, as we have seen, between 3 and 4 A.M.,

he should have changed his evening orders entirely; he should have

begun his march at once, and should have directed it to the bridge of

Moustier. (See Map 9.)

Says Jomini:—[583]

“The Marshal should not, then, have hesitated; he should at daybreak

on the 18th have marched with all speed on Moustier with Exelmans,

Vandamme and Gérard, directing Pajol’s cavalry and Teste’s division

on Wavre, in pursuit of the enemy’s rearguard.

“Being able to reach Moustier by ten o’clock,[584] he could have then

forwarded his infantry on Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans’ dragoons

on St. Lambert, or else have marched to Lasne himself.”

Says Clausewitz:—[585]

“But the moment he learnt that Blücher had turned towards the Dyle,

which must have happened in Gembloux in the night between the 17th

and 18th, the idea must have shot at once into his mind that this

could only be in order to join Wellington, for one does not leave

one’s natural line of retreat without reason. From that moment he

had to consider it his duty, not to lie at the heels of Blücher’s

rear-guard, but to get between him and Bonaparte, in order to be able

to throw himself in front of Blücher in case he wanted to march off

to his right. According to this, he would have to turn from Gembloux

to the Dyle by the shortest road, &c.”

Says Charras:—[586]

“Everything indicated that the most advantageous manœuvre for

Blücher was that which would bring him the most quickly near

Wellington,—would unite the Prussians to the Anglo-Dutch. Since

the opening of hostilities the two allied generals had manœuvred

to bring about this union; and it was evident that they were not

going to renounce this idea after the defeat of one of their armies;

the activity, energy, audacity,—so well known,—of Blücher—the

tenacity,—equally well known,—of Wellington, sufficed to guarantee

that they would not easily renounce this intention.

“If they should succeed in this, Napoleon would find himself exposed

to being crushed under the weight of the two allied armies.

“This catastrophe, the greatest of all misfortunes, Grouchy ought,

before everything, to put himself in position to avert, so far as he

could do so. Hence it was imperative that he should come as speedily

as possible within the sphere of Napoleon’s operations; and hence,

also, he must march on Moustier.

“From this point, in fact, better than from any other, he would be

equally in position to diminish the consequences of the union of

the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch, if it should already have been

effected, or to hinder it, if it should not yet have taken place.”

With these authorities we entirely concur. Marshal Grouchy, as soon as

he had made up his mind that Blücher was retiring on Brussels by way

of Wavre, should have marched for the bridge of Moustier, and should

have started at daybreak.[587] Instead of this, he adhered to the

direction of Sart-à-Walhain, although, even if he were proposing to

follow Blücher straight to Wavre, Sart-à-Walhain was out of the direct

route. It had in fact been selected _because_ it lay to the eastward

of the Wavre road. He might have saved from two to four hours by

starting at daybreak, but of this he was utterly unmindful. He did not

thoroughly reconnoitre with his cavalry towards the Dyle, to see if the

enemy were not marching towards the English, although it was certainly

his manifest duty to do so.[588] All he did in this direction was to

send[589] a staff-officer with a small escort at daybreak or soon after

to the bridge of Moustier, to see, apparently, if any Prussian troops

had crossed there, but he rejoined Grouchy before Grouchy had arrived

at Sart-à-Walhain, that is, before 11 A.M. With this exception the

Marshal made absolutely no reconnoissances to his left until he had

arrived in front of Wavre.

Somewhere between 10 and 11 A.M. he reached Sart-à-Walhain. Thence

he proceeded to Walhain, or, as it is sometimes called, Walhain St.

Paul.[590] He alighted at the house of a M. Hollert, the notary of the

neighboring village of Nil St. Vincent, who lived in a large house

in Walhain known as the Chateau Marette. Here he stopped to write

a despatch to the Emperor and to get his breakfast. The cavalry of

Exelmans and the 3d Corps under Vandamme had passed this point on the

road to Wavre, and had reached or perhaps passed Nil St. Vincent.

The despatch, which is dated Sart-à-Walhain, by an error for

Walhain,—11 A.M.,—begins by stating that the Ist, IId and IIId Corps

of Blücher’s army are marching in the direction of Brussels. Grouchy

subsequently says:—[591]

“This evening I expect to be concentrated at Wavre, and thus to find

myself between Wellington, whom I presume to be in retreat before

your majesty, and the Prussian army.”

He also states that some of the Prussians are proceeding towards

the plain of the Chyse, near the Louvain road, with the design of

concentrating there, or of fighting any troops which may pursue them

there, or of uniting themselves to Wellington. This part of the

despatch looks as if Grouchy thought that a part of the Prussians

intended to concentrate to his right. Still, as he distinctly states

that the Ist, IId and IIId Corps are marching in the direction of

Brussels, we must suppose that he is not referring to these three corps

when he speaks of those Prussians who are proceeding towards the

plain of the Chyse. So that, when he says that at Wavre he expects to

be between Wellington, who he supposes is retiring on Brussels by the

Charleroi turnpike, and the Prussian army, three of whose corps are, he

says, also retiring on Brussels, it is difficult, if not impossible, to

know what he means. He seems to have been completely bewildered.

This despatch had hardly been handed to the staff-officer[592] who

was to carry it to the Emperor, when the cannon of Waterloo was

heard. Then, at any rate, Marshal Grouchy knew that the English were

not retreating before Napoleon, but were standing “on this side of

the Forest of Soignes,” as the Emperor had, the afternoon before,

conjectured they might. Three Prussian corps had gone towards Brussels,

as Grouchy had just written to the Emperor. It was very possible that

they might at that moment be marching across the country to join the

Anglo-Dutch army. Perhaps nothing could prevent this. But it was

plainly Grouchy’s duty to march towards the Emperor as fast as he

could. If he could not prevent the Prussians from joining the English,

he might at any rate be able to prevent them from attacking the French.

If he should cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, and move

directly towards the line of march which they must take in order to

attack the French, their march would, if he arrived in time, assuredly

be suspended. This was at any rate the thing to try to do. It was to

be feared that a terrible disaster was impending over Napoleon and his

army; but there was a chance of averting it. There was only one thing

to do,—and that was, promptly and gallantly to make the attempt to

avert it. (See Map 10.)

Gérard, who had arrived at Walhain with his corps, strenuously urged

Grouchy to march to the sound of the cannon. He pressed this on

Grouchy with perhaps undue heat; but the occasion was one that admitted

of no delay. The son of Marshal Grouchy, who may be supposed to have

heard his father’s account of the interview, says:—[593]

“The commander of the 4th Corps uttered haughtily, and in a fashion

little in harmony with the respect due to his chief and with military

discipline, the advice that the right wing ought to march to the

sound of the cannon in order to effectuate a junction with the

Emperor.

“Grouchy did not find the advice bad in itself, but the form employed

to present it. At the same time he consented to discuss Gérard’s

opinion with him.”

That personal feelings had some influence on Marshal Grouchy’s decision

would seem from the above statement very probable.[594]

We do not reproduce the arguments of Marshal Grouchy here, because

they are based mainly upon his statement, which we have found to be

erroneous, that “his instructions, from which he was not permitted to

depart, enjoined formally upon him not to lose sight of the Prussians

when he should have joined them.”

A discussion where one of the parties concealed the existence of a

written order, which prescribed no such instructions as those stated

above, cannot enlighten us much.

The difficulties of marching across the country by way of Mont St.

Guibert to the Dyle were also dwelt upon,—the chief-of-artillery of the

4th Corps, Baltus, having great doubts as to the possibility of such

a march, and the chief-of-engineers, Valazé, offering to remove the

obstacles.

Grouchy finally decided to resume the march towards Wavre. His army

marched in a single column by the road which, passing through Nil

St. Vincent and just to the north of Corbaix, reaches La Baraque,

and thence leads to Wavre by a line, almost straight. Not a half a

mile beyond La Baraque there is a road which leads to the bridge of

Moustier, less than three miles off; three-quarters of a mile farther

on is another road, which, with its branches, leads to the bridges of

Limelette and Limale, at a distance of only two miles. Half a mile

north of the bridge of Moustier is another bridge, that of Ottignies.

These bridges had not been destroyed, and they were all unguarded.[595]

Then there were convenient woods able to conceal any movement of the

troops towards the river.

There was a slight affair in a wood a short distance beyond La Baraque,

in which the cavalry of Ledebur,[596] assisted by two battalions of

infantry, skirmished for an hour or so. While this was going on, two

divisions of the IId Corps, which had been making their way through the

town of Wavre, were brought back, and took up position, facing south,

about a mile south of the town. But there was no resistance to speak

of. When the French advanced, the Prussians retired on Wavre.

In its march, which was made to the sound of the cannon of

Waterloo,[597] the army of Marshal Grouchy had then abundant

opportunity to cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, at Limelette

and Limale.[598] La Baraque, on the main road to Wavre, from near which

the roads to these bridges diverge, was reached about two o’clock.[599]

From this point on to Wavre, the Prussians were clearly to be seen

marching to the field of Waterloo.[600] If Grouchy had in season

recalled Pajol and the division of Teste from the extreme right of the

column, in order to mask the movement by threatening Wavre, it would

certainly seem that Vandamme’s Corps might have crossed at Limale and

Limelette, and Gérard’s at Ottignies and Moustier, and that, before 4

P.M., the whole force could have been _en route_ for St. Lambert.[601]

The fact is, the whole question of Grouchy’s flank march at noon has

been unnecessarily confused by three very general misconceptions,

namely:—

(1) That it was at Sart-à-Walhain where the sound of the cannon was

heard. It was at Walhain, a good mile nearer to the bridges.

(2) That it was necessary, in order to go to the bridges, for Grouchy’s

column to cut across the marshy and difficult country between Walhain

and Moustier,[602] by way of Mont St. Guibert. Instead of this, the

main road could be kept until the army had arrived at La Baraque; or,

possibly, the 4th Corps could have taken a somewhat long cross-road

which leads to Moustier from Neuf Sart, a village on the main road

about a mile to the south-east of La Baraque, while the 3d Corps could

have marched on the roads which branch off to the bridges just beyond

La Baraque.

No doubt, if Grouchy had started at daybreak from Gembloux, as he

ought to have done, he would have passed through Mont St. Guibert,

and over very bad and miry roads; but to gain the bridge of Moustier

from Walhain, the route he actually pursued, by way of La Baraque, was

nearly as short as the other, and was, up to that point, so far as we

know, a tolerable road.[603] At least there were no such complaints of

it as were made of the roads from Ligny to Gembloux.

Now, from the point just beyond La Baraque, where the first road

branches off, it is nearer to Moustier than it is to Wavre. From where

the other road branches off to Limale and Limelette, the distance is

about the same as to Wavre. Making allowance, then, for the badness of

the river roads, on the one hand, and for the time saved by passing the

army over several instead of over one single road on the other hand,

and assuming that there had been no fighting, the whole force could

have successfully crossed the river by 4 P.M., which was the hour at

which Grouchy’s force arrived in front of Wavre.

(3) That there would have been any serious resistance experienced at

the bridges.

Not one of these bridges, as has been above pointed out,[604] was

occupied in force by the Prussians. Only one, that at Limale, was

occupied at all, and that only by a small detachment. They had had also

some cavalry and two battalions of infantry in observation at Mont St.

Guibert, but these retreated to La Baraque on finding that the cavalry

of Exelmans had got in their rear by way of Corbaix.

Had Marshal Grouchy, therefore, pursued his march to the neighborhood

of La Baraque, which place his head of column reached about 2 P.M., and

had he then promptly availed himself of the roads which lead to the

bridges, directing Pajol, who was a very able and experienced officer,

to cover and conceal the movement with his cavalry and the division

of Teste, he could, as it seems to us, in all probability, have been

across the Dyle at 4 o’clock, ready to march towards Lasne and St.

Lambert.

Now at 4 o’clock only two brigades[605] of Bülow’s (IVth) Corps had

passed through Lasne. They, with the artillery and cavalry which

accompanied them, were at that moment resting and reforming in the Wood

of Paris,[606] a little wood just west of the town of Lasne, after an

exhausting march.[607] The other two brigades were between St. Lambert

and Lasne. The IId Corps was stretched along the road between Wavre and

St. Lambert. It had not yet reached the latter place.[608] The Ist Corps

was a mile and a half from Ohain, on the northerly road. The IIId Corps

was in and about Wavre. (See Map 11.)

If, then, Marshal Grouchy had succeeded in the operation of crossing

the Dyle at the four bridges or any of them while Thielemann’s Corps

was detained in Wavre by Pajol and Teste, and if he had boldly advanced

towards Lasne and St. Lambert, he would certainly have arrested the

march of Bülow and Pirch I. Although the Prussians would have been

superior in numbers, they yet would have been compelled to halt and

form line of battle on observing the advance of Grouchy’s 30,000 men.

The chances are that Grouchy would ultimately have been forced to

retire; he could hardly have been a match for the 50,000 men opposed

to him; and his retreat could at any time have been precipitated by

an attack on his right flank by Thielemann, if that officer had felt

himself at liberty to leave Wavre. Yet these operations would without

question have consumed the rest of the afternoon; it would almost

certainly have been impossible for the corps of Bülow and Pirch I. to

have attacked the French at Planchenoit that day. Zieten certainly

might have pursued his march unmolested if he had thought it wise

to do so. How these movements would have affected the result of the

battle of Waterloo, we will consider when we come to the account of the

battle. All we want to show at this stage of the narrative is, that,

had Gérard’s counsel been taken, Marshal Grouchy’s command might have

been across the Dyle at Moustier and the other bridges by 4 P.M., and

that at that moment the van of the IVth Corps had only just passed

through Lasne.

It is time that we returned to the Prussians.

Bülow, whose corps (the IVth) had not been engaged at Ligny, was

ordered to march at daybreak from Dion-le-Mont, where he had passed

the night, for St. Lambert, with the view of attacking the French

right.[609] He had a long distance to go, and was, moreover, detained by

a fire which broke out in the streets of Wavre, and his main body did

not reach St. Lambert till noon.[610] Here there was a long halt.[611]

The IId Corps was to follow the IVth, but for some reason or other it

did not begin to leave Wavre till nearly noon,[612] and it was not until

4 P.M. that the whole corps had got through the town and had taken the

road for St. Lambert.[613]

The Ist Corps,—Zieten’s,—which was to march by the northerly road, by

way of Ohain, to join the army of Wellington, also did not start until

nearly noon.[614] The IIId Corps, which was to be the last to leave

Wavre, was to march by way of Couture towards Planchenoit, in support

of the IVth and IId Corps. But it was to remain in Wavre, if the

enemy should show himself there in force.

These arrangements, it must be confessed, do not indicate that

determination to march with all possible speed to the support of an

ally in danger of being defeated before the promised support arrives,

which has usually been attributed to Marshal Blücher. They are so

deliberate, so tardy even, that we must seek an explanation of them.

Bülow, it is true, moved out promptly enough; but the delay of the IId

Corps in leaving Wavre is most extraordinary, under the circumstances,

considering that its commander had been informed at midnight that the

IVth Corps had been ordered to march at break of day, and that he

himself had been ordered to join that corps immediately, and follow its

line of march.[615]

It appears now, from the recent history of Von Ollech, that about 9.30

A.M. Marshal Blücher dictated a note to General Müffling, stating

that he would place himself, ill as he was, at the head of his troops

in order to attack at once the right of Napoleon’s army; and that

Gneisenau, still disposed to be cautious in trusting to the assurances

of the English general that he would accept battle at Waterloo, added a

postscript in these words:—[616]

“General Gneisenau has been informed of the contents of this letter,

but asks your Excellency to ascertain definitely whether the Duke

really has a fixed determination to fight in his present position,

or whether perhaps it is a mere demonstration, which at the best

would be very unfortunate for our army. Your Excellency will have the

kindness to obtain for me full information on this matter, as it is

of the highest importance to be thoroughly assured of what the Duke

is going to do, in order to determine our course of action.”

Ollech[617] goes on to tell us that Gneisenau was, even at this late

hour, not without his misgivings. He says that Gneisenau believed that

the Duke had left him in the lurch at Ligny. He also says that he fully

took in the exposed situation of the Prussian army, if the Anglo-Dutch

forces should fall back to Brussels,—a retreat by way of Louvain being

probably then the only thing open to the Prussians. He says, indeed,

that before an answer was received to this communication, Gneisenau had

determined to go ahead, and carry out the plan, and that between 11 and

12 in the morning Zieten had been ordered to Ohain.

But may we not fairly infer, that, under the impression of these

feelings,—of this doubt whether Wellington really intended to fight,—a

doubt, it must be remembered, which no sound of cannon until half-past

eleven in the morning came to dispel,—Bülow had been ordered to be very

cautious, and to proceed with all deliberation,—and that the departure

of Pirch I. and Zieten had been delayed? It would certainly seem as if

this were the case.

The welcome sound of the cannon of Waterloo, however, shortly before

noon, dispelled all doubts and all hesitations; and there can be no

question that every one in the Prussian army from the old Field Marshal

down to the privates in the ranks did their best for the success of

the day. The roads were frightful; it was almost impossible to get the

artillery and waggons over them; but every exertion was made.

Grouchy’s obstinate determination to operate on the right bank of the

Dyle brought him in front of Wavre. He displayed more troops than the

Prussian generals had supposed that he had with him. But their plan was

not altered. To Thielemann’s Corps alone was it left to defend the town.

It is not necessary to go into the details of this action. It was

not fought by Marshal Grouchy with any skill. The troops of Vandamme

entangled themselves in the vain endeavor to carry the lower bridges

in the town. The 4th Corps repeatedly but ineffectually endeavored to

get possession of the Mill of Bierges, just above the town. Here Gérard

was wounded. Between 6 and 7 P.M. Pajol carried the bridge of Limale,

and this position was held, despite an attempt of the Prussians to

repossess themselves of it. The attack on Wavre was conducted in the

most gallant manner by the French, but without any well-arranged plan.

Their efforts were in the main uselessly directed against an enemy

behind walls and in houses, when nothing would have been easier than

to have turned the whole position by crossing the river at Limale. The

resistance of the Prussians was worthy of all praise.

During the action Marshal Grouchy received two despatches from Marshal

Soult. These demand our careful consideration, not because they can in

any way explain the motives which actuated Marshal Grouchy in directing

his command upon Wavre instead of upon Lasne and St. Lambert, for they

were received too late to have influenced him at all, but because they

throw light on the expectations entertained by Napoleon in regard to

Grouchy’s movements and especially in regard to his coöperation with

the main army.

These orders were both signed by Marshal Soult, the chief-of-staff, and

were no doubt drafted by him.

The first, dated at 10 A.M., reads as follows:—[618]

In front of the Farm of Caillou,

June 18, 1815, 10 A.M.

Marshal:

The Emperor has received your last report, dated from Gembloux.[619]

You speak to his Majesty of only two Prussian columns, which have

passed at Sauvenières and Sart-à-Walhain. Nevertheless, reports say

that a third column, which was a pretty strong one, has passed by

Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre.[620]

The Emperor instructs me to tell you that at this moment his Majesty

is going to attack the English army, which has taken position at

Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignes. Thus his Majesty desires that

you will direct your movements on Wavre, in order to approach us, to

put yourself in the sphere of our operations, and to keep up your

communications with us, pushing before you those portions[621] of the

Prussian army which have taken this direction, and which may have

stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible.

You will follow the enemy’s columns which are on your right by some

light troops, in order to observe their movements and pick up their

stragglers. Instruct me immediately as to your dispositions and your

march, as also as to the news which you have of the enemy; and do not

neglect to keep up your communications with us. The Emperor desires

to have news from you very often.

The Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia.

To understand this despatch one must refer to that to which it

professes to be an answer, namely, that dated Gembloux, at ten

o’clock the night before. In that despatch Grouchy says, as will

be remembered,[622] that, at Sauvenières, the Prussians apparently

divided into two columns, one directed on Wavre and the other on

Perwez; and that he will follow the principal force of the enemy in

either direction as his information may indicate. Now Soult, having

this before his eyes when he is writing the 10 A.M. despatch, simply

says,—Do not take the Perwez direction,—take the Wavre direction,—for

that will bring you nearer to us. We, also, have heard of a pretty

strong Prussian column which has retreated on Wavre; that is an

additional reason why you should take that direction. We want you to

approach us,—to get within the sphere (_en rapport_) of our operations;

to keep up your communications with us; therefore you ought to get to

Wavre as soon as possible.

The object of directing Grouchy on Wavre was therefore that he might

approach the main army; that he might keep in strict communication

with it,—might be within the sphere of its operations. There is no

strategical or other object even hinted at in directing Grouchy on

Wavre, save that of approaching the main army.[623] Nor is there any

difficulty whatever in discerning the meaning of the writer.

It is also perfectly plain that no opposition to Marshal Grouchy’s

occupation of Wavre was apprehended. It is therefore fairly to be

inferred that the writer intended, that, if the situation should be

such from any cause that the occupation of Wavre or the attempt to

occupy it, would not subserve the purpose of enabling Grouchy to draw

nearer to the main army, he should carry out this purpose in some

other way. It seems to us foolish to say that this despatch would have

justified Grouchy in taking the course which he did take, supposing,

that is, that he had received it in time for it to affect his action.

If, for example, a gentleman on a walking tour should order his servant

to bring his baggage to a certain town, so that he might easily get at

it from the place where he was himself expecting to be the next day,

and the servant should find that all communication between this town

and the region where his master expected to be had been interrupted by

some accident, like the destruction of a railway-bridge, for instance,

and he should nevertheless bring his master’s baggage to that town,

instead of bringing it within his master’s reach by carrying it to

some other place, justifying himself by the terms of the letter, he

would generally be regarded as having acted like a fool. Yet this is

very nearly a parallel case to that of Marshal Grouchy, supposing that

he had received the despatch in time to have acted on it, and had then

acted as he did. The only thing needed to make it absolutely parallel

is, that the servant in the case supposed should be in possession of

information, of which his master was ignorant, making the carrying of

the baggage to him at the earliest possible moment a matter of the

utmost importance. Then the cases would be on all fours with each other.

But we have delayed perhaps too long to show that this order cannot

justify Grouchy’s action. Our excuse is that it has been so used by

more than one authority.[624] Nor does the order show that Napoleon

would have made the same mistake that Grouchy did, as has sometimes

been thoughtlessly said; for Napoleon, at the time the despatch

was sent off, knew nothing, as has just been pointed out, of the

circumstances then under Grouchy’s observation.

It cannot, of course, be contended that Napoleon was not responsible

for this order of 10 A.M. A commander-in-chief must be supposed to

know what orders are issued in his name. Yet it is certainly true that

the directions given to Marbot do not tally at all with this order to

Grouchy. According to the latter, Grouchy would be looked for in the

direction of Wavre,—that is, of Lasne and St. Lambert; but Marbot was

given to understand that the Emperor expected Grouchy to cross the Dyle

at the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. Colonel Marbot, in a letter

written to Marshal Grouchy in 1830, says:—[625]

“At the commencement of the action, towards 11 A.M., I was detached

from the division with my own regiment and a battalion of infantry,

which had been placed under my command. These troops were posted on

our extreme right, behind Frischermont, facing the Dyle.

“Particular instructions were given to me on the part of the Emperor

by his aide-de-camp, Labedoyère, and by a staff officer whose name I

do not recall. They prescribed to me to leave the bulk of my command

always in view of the field of battle, to post 200 infantry in the

Wood of Frischermont[626] one squadron at Lasne, having outposts

as far as St. Lambert; another squadron, half at Couture, half at

Beaumont, sending reconnoissances as far as the Dyle, to the bridges

of Moustier and Ottignies.”

He then describes the arrangements for the speedy transmission of

intelligence, and proceeds:—

“A note from Captain Eloy,[627] which the intermediate posts promptly

transmitted to me, informed me that he had found no force at

Moustier, nor at Ottignies, and that the inhabitants assured him that

the French on the right bank of the Dyle would pass the river at

Limale, Limelette and Wavre.”

He sent this word to the Emperor, who ordered him to push

reconnoissances in those directions. Then, half a mile beyond St.

Lambert, they captured some Prussians, who informed him that they were

followed by a large part of the Prussian army. He then says:—

“I proceeded to St. Lambert with a squadron to reinforce the troops

there. I saw in the distance a strong column, approaching St.

Lambert. I sent an officer in all haste to forewarn the Emperor,

who replied, telling me to advance boldly, that this body of troops

could be nothing else than the corps of Marshal Grouchy, coming from

Limale, and pushing before it some stray Prussians, of whom the

prisoners I had just taken were a part.”

Soon after, the fact that the approaching column was composed of

Prussian troops was manifest. The Emperor was now sure that Grouchy

would come by the upper bridges:—

“My adjutant, whom I had ordered to go and inform the Emperor of the

positive arrival of the Prussians at St. Lambert, returned, saying

to me that the Emperor ordered me to inform the head of Marshal

Grouchy’s column, which ought at this moment to be debouching by the

bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, since it had not come by Limale

and Limelette, of the fact that the Prussians were advancing by way

of St. Lambert.”

It is plain from the above narrative that the Emperor, when he sent

Marbot off, shortly before 11 A.M., expected Marshal Grouchy to arrive

during the afternoon,[628] and that his first idea was that he would

arrive by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. This seems to show

that the Emperor did not revise the 10 A.M. despatch sent off by Soult,

which indicated that they expected Grouchy to arrive from Wavre.

Napoleon must have been at this hour,—10-11 A.M.,—making his final

preparations for the battle.

Then there was another despatch to Grouchy, which we also give here in

full:—[629]

Field of Battle of Waterloo,

the 18th of June: 1 P.M.

Marshal:

You wrote to the Emperor at 2 o’clock[630] this morning, that you

would march on Sart-lez-Walhain; your plan then is to proceed to

Corbaix or[631] to Wavre. This movement is conformable to his

Majesty’s arrangements which have been communicated to you.

Nevertheless, the Emperor directs me to tell you that you ought

always to manœuvre in our direction.[632] It is for you to see the

place where we are, to govern yourself accordingly, and to connect

our communications, so as to be always prepared to fall upon any of

the enemy’s troops which may endeavor to annoy our right, and to

destroy them.

“At this moment the battle is in progress[633] on the line of

Waterloo. The enemy’s centre is at Mont St. Jean; manœuvre,

therefore, to join our right.

The Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia.

“P. S. A letter, which has just been intercepted, says that General

Bülow is about to attack our right flank; we believe that we see this

corps on the height of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant in drawing

near us and joining us, in order to crush Bülow, whom you will take

in the very act.”

In this letter the Emperor’s desire that Grouchy would manœuvre in

his direction is expressed again and again, and even in the body

of the letter it is plain that some apprehension is entertained at

headquarters of an attack upon the right of the army by the Prussians.

The postscript, of course, speaks for itself.

Grouchy did not receive this letter till between 6 and 7 P.M.,[634] when

it was too late for him to accomplish much. He, however, carried the

bridge of Limale, and established himself on the left bank of the Dyle

for the night.

Taking the two letters together,—and leaving out of view for the moment

the postscript of the second,—we see that Napoleon was expecting that

Grouchy would approach him. He had learned of the “pretty strong

column” which had passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre. He,

no doubt, supposed that Grouchy had also learned of it; and he knew

from Grouchy’s despatches of 10 P.M. of the 17th and 2 A.M. of the

18th, that Grouchy had recognized the necessity of manœuvring in the

direction of Wavre, if the mass of the Prussian army should have taken

that course. Hence he expected to see him. He thought it likely that

he would come by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, and strike in

on his right and keep off any of the enemy’s troops who might seek to

molest him.

Of any apprehension of a serious attack by the Prussians in force there

is no trace till we come to the postscript to the second letter. Up

to the time when this postscript was written, Napoleon would seem to

have felt pretty sure (though perhaps with some misgivings), either

that Grouchy would prevent the Prussians from attacking him, or would

himself join, or connect with, the main army. But the appearance of

the Prussians at St. Lambert and the absence of any information from

Grouchy evidently alarmed him.

FOOTNOTES:

[561] Mém. du Duc de Raguse, vol. 7, pp. 124, 125.

[562] Soult’s despatch to Grouchy: June 18th, 10 A.M.

[563] Even if the Emperor had been asleep when Grouchy’s aide arrived,

or had been at the front, where he was between one and two o’clock

in the morning, to see if the English army was still in position, a

competent chief-of-staff should, of his own motion, have sent back at

once to Grouchy the information possessed at headquarters.

[564] Especially when, according to Marshal Marmont, the subordinate

was a man like Grouchy: Mém., vol. 4, p. 125. See, also, Napoléon à

Waterloo, p. 226, n.

[565] Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 _et seq._; Gérard: Dern. Obs. p. 44.

[566] _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 232, 233, 245.

[567] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 70, 87, 131, n.

[568] Gardner, pp. 160, 161. The italics are our own.

[569] Ib., pp. 161, 162.

[570] Maurice, p. 550: Sept. 1890., The italics are our own. It is

possible that Colonel Maurice may have had in mind the language of

Soult’s order dated 10 A.M., in which Grouchy’s movement on Wavre is

approved. But this did not reach Grouchy till 4 P.M., as we have just

stated. See, also, Kennedy, p. 159.

[571] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 315, n. 1. The hour of starting is given

in the Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 56) as “before four o’clock.” But

this is a gross and manifest error. _Cf._ Charras, vol. 2, p. 33, where

the hour is given as 6 A.M.

[572] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 1; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4. p. 55.

[573] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 2; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 57.

[574] This despatch is not in existence, but its receipt was

acknowledged and the above statement in it was referred to in Soult’s

despatch to Grouchy, dated 1 P.M., June 18th. From Grouchy’s statement

that he was going to Sart-à-Walhain, Soult drew the inference that he

was going to Corbaix or to Wavre.

[575] Gérard: Dern. Obs., pp. 13, 14; Letter of General Exelmans.

[576] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 62, 63.

[577] There is in the Grouchy Mémoires, vol. 4, pp. 65, 66, what

purports to be a copy of a despatch to the Emperor dated Gembloux,

3 A.M. But its authenticity is more than doubtful. _Cf._ La Tour

d’Auvergne, p. 318, n. It begins with the statement that all Grouchy’s

reports and information confirm the idea that the Prussians are

retiring on Brussels, to concentrate there, or to deliver battle after

being united to the English.

[578] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 33, 55. Charras seems to us to be in error

in supposing that Grouchy’s uncertainty still existed on the morning of

the 18th. He has, perhaps, overlooked the statement in Grouchy’s order

to Pajol, dated at daybreak, quoted in the text.

[579] Gérard: Dernières Obs., p. 24; Letter of General Exelmans.

[580] Ib., p. 25; Letter of General Berthezène.

[581] Gérard: Quelques Doc., p. 12.

[582] We shall examine the English authorities in the Notes to this

chapter. See _post_, p. 280.

[583] Jomini, pp. 175 _et seq._

[584] 10.30 A.M., according to Charras, vol. 2, p. 62.

[585] Clausewitz, ch. 50, p. 146.

[586] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 57, 58.

[587] We reserve for the Notes to this chapter the consideration of the

various opinions on the consequences of this movement, had it been made.

[588] See Siborne’s excellent remarks on this subject,—vol. 1, pp. 318

_et seq._

[589] Declaration of M. Leguest, in the Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 141,

142. The staff-officer, by name Pont-Bellanger, must have left Moustier

several hours before Marbot’s officer, Captain Eloy, got there. See

Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407.

[590] See the Notes to this chapter.

[591] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 72. This despatch is given in full

in Appendix C, xxx; _post_, pp. 386, 387.

[592] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 75.

[593] Le Mal. de Grouchy, p. 15, n. 2: p. 59; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p.

75.

[594] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 328. _Cf._ Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 295.

[595] The one of these bridges which was nearest Wavre, that at Limale,

was passed at six o’clock by Valin’s cavalry, without experiencing

any serious resistance. Siborne, vol. 2, p. 286. Berton, pp. 66,

67. Marbot’s cavalry-picket occupied the bridge of Moustier all the

afternoon. Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407. _Cf._ Charras, vol. 2, p. 69.

[596] Ollech, pp. 208, 209.

[597] Berthezène, in Gérard, Dem. Obs., p. 25.

[598] Berton, p. 66, n.

[599] Charras, vol. 2, p. 44.

[600] Berthezène, in Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 25.

[601] Charras’ discussion of this movement will be considered in the

Notes to this chapter: _post_, p. 284, n. 6.

[602] Charras, vol. 2, p. 69, n.

[603] The paved _chaussée_ which now runs straight from Gembloux to

Wavre was not built in 1815. Nor was the _chaussée_ from Sombreffe to

Gembloux.

[604] _Ante_, p. 258.

[605] The Prussian brigade corresponded then to the French or English

division.

[606] Sometimes called the Wood of Frischermont.

[607] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 127, 128.

[608] See Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock P.M., 18th

June.

[609] Ollech, p. 187.

[610] Clausewitz, ch. 42, p. 107.

[611] Maurice, p. 549: Sept., 1890.

[612] Charras, vol. 2, p. 43.

[613] Ib., p. 45. _Cf._ Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock

P.M., June 18th.

[614] Ib., p. 43.

[615] Ollech, p. 188.

[616] Ib., p. 189; Maurice, p. 537: Sept., 1890.

[617] Ollech, p. 190.

[618] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 79; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 283, 284; App.

C, xxxiii; _post_, p. 388.

[619] _Ante_, p. 212; also App. B, _post_, p. 358.

[620] This must have been the Ist and IId Corps.

[621] The original has “corps”; but army-corps are not meant. The same

word is used below,—“quelques corps légers.”

[622] _Ante_ p. 212; App. B, _post_, p. 358.

[623] Gérard (Dern. Obs. p. 19) remarks:—“If one analyzes separately

the text of these two despatches, * * * one perceives that the Emperor

has spoken of the direction of Wavre only because he finds it indicated

in the reports of the commander of the right wing. The principal object

of both of them was to insist upon movements which would bring the

troops of the right wing near the main body.” Gérard is here referring

to the order sent to Grouchy at 1 P.M. (_post_, p. 270), as well as to

that dated 10 A.M.

[624] Chesney, p. 206; Kennedy, p. 162; Gardner, p. 161, n.; Grouchy

Mém., vol. 4, pp. 78, 80, 87.

[625] Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 _et seq._ This letter is chiefly made up

from his report, which is to be found in “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 344

_et seq._ The editors of Marbot’s Memoirs say (vol. 3, p. 408) that the

steps they have taken to find the report at the War Office have been

unsuccessful.

[626] Sometimes called the Wood of Paris.

[627] He commanded the picket at Moustier.

[628] This was Marbot’s own conviction; vol. 3, p. 408.

[629] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 270, 271; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 286, 287;

Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 400, 401; Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 279, 280; App.

C, xxxiv; _post_, p. 389.

[630] The Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 82) give this as 3 o’clock.

[631] The text given in the Grouchy Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 82, replaces

this “or” by an “and.” This is not followed in any other work.

[632] The text of the Grouchy Memoirs inserts here the following:—“and

to seek to come near to our army, in order that you may join us before

any body of troops can put itself between us. I do not indicate to you

the direction you should take.”

[633] The original is “engagée.” “This letter,” says Marshal Grouchy

(Fragm. Hist., Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy; p. 14), “was in

a hand writing so difficult to decipher that I read it, as did

also my chief-of-staff, and my senior aide-de-camp, ‘gagnée.’” The

chief-of-staff, General Le Sénécal, says that the Marshal closely

questioned the officer who was the bearer of the despatch, but he was

so intoxicated that they could not get anything from him. Grouchy Mém.,

vol. 4, pp. 132, 133. _Cf._ Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 20, n.

[634] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 87.

_NOTES TO CHAPTER XV._

1. The first question that demands consideration in connection with the

matters narrated in this chapter is this:—

Was it wise in Napoleon to detach from his main army such a large

force as that which he gave to Grouchy? Or,—to state the question

more carefully,—Napoleon, being, at 1 P.M. of the 17th (through his

own neglect, but the cause is not important in this connection), in

ignorance of the direction of the retreat of the Prussians, but having

in mind that they might be intending to unite with the English and

fight another battle for the defence of Brussels,[635]—was it wise in

him to detach 33,000 men from his main army to find out about and take

care of the Prussians?

This question, it must be observed, is quite a different one from

that presented to Napoleon in the forenoon of the 17th, when he and

Grouchy and every one else believed that the Prussians had fallen back

on Namur. If the Prussians had retreated on Namur, they had assuredly

given up all idea of further coöperation with the English, at any rate

for the present. The two corps entrusted to Marshal Grouchy might

perhaps accelerate their retreat, and ought to be able to prevent

an offensive return on their part against the communications of the

French. For this purpose they could perfectly well be spared; for

the army which Napoleon was taking with him to Waterloo was able

alone to defeat the army of Wellington. It was a somewhat larger

army,[636]—it was composed throughout of excellent troops,—it was full

of enthusiasm,—and it was commanded by the greatest general of the

day. Nor was it a matter of any great importance that Grouchy could

not well be detached till after twelve o’clock, owing to the necessity

of giving his troops time to recover from the fatigues of the battle

of the day before, the stress of which had fallen almost wholly on

them, for, if the Prussians had retreated on Namur and Liége, there

was no special and imminent danger to be apprehended.[637] To detach

Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men under these circumstances, which were

then believed to exist, was one thing. But the question we are now

considering is,—whether Napoleon’s adhering to the plan of sending

Grouchy off with two corps is to be justified after he had seen reason

to be apprehensive of the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the

English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels.

This danger of the union of the two allied armies was, as the Bertrand

order shows, distinctly recognized as a possible danger by Napoleon

when he dictated the order to Bertrand. It is true that Napoleon

did not think it likely that this union would be made, but he knew

perfectly well that if it should be made, it would place him in the

greatest peril. He, therefore, expressly warned Grouchy that the

Prussians might be intending to unite with the English to fight another

battle for the defence of Brussels; and we have seen that, in the event

of Grouchy’s finding this to be the case, Napoleon expected him to

cross the Dyle and act in conjunction with the main army. If this was,

in Napoleon’s opinion, to be his true course in the not impossible

event of Blücher’s falling back on Wavre, why send him off at all? What

was there to be gained by sending him off which made it worth while

to run the risks inseparable from detaching such a large force from

the main army when such a terrible danger as the union of the Prussian

and English armies was even remotely apprehended? For there certainly

was a chance of Grouchy’s not coming back in time to prevent the

catastrophe; Napoleon ran the risk of Grouchy’s not receiving accurate

or trustworthy information as to the doings of the enemy,—of his not

acting on the information which he might obtain in accordance with

sound military principles,—of his being delayed by the destruction of

the bridges, and by the manœuvres of the enemy.

But this is not all. If the Prussians had fallen back on Wavre with

the intention of uniting with the English and fighting another battle

for the defence of Brussels, as Napoleon in the Bertrand order warns

Grouchy they might be intending to do, they must have carried out their

project in great part at the time when Napoleon was dictating his order

to Bertrand. On this hypothesis, they had certainly already obtained a

great advantage over any force sent to pursue them or to interrupt the

execution of their scheme. Was it not therefore much wiser to keep the

whole army together, well in hand, and under the Emperor’s immediate

direction?

These risks and chances, and others, Napoleon took, when he sent

Grouchy off with his 33,000 men; and for what?

The fact probably is this; that Grouchy was originally ordered to

follow up and observe the Prussians when every one supposed them to

be retreating towards the Rhine, and especially to prevent or check

any offensive return upon the French communications; and that when

Napoleon, between 12 and 1, received information which awakened in

his mind doubts of the correctness of this supposition, and even some

apprehension that Blücher might be intending to unite with Wellington

and fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, he adhered to his

original disposition of Grouchy’s force, contenting himself with giving

him an express warning of the danger to be apprehended.

The question then comes down to this:—

If the Prussians were going to separate themselves from the English,

there was no great risk in making such a large detachment from the main

army, and there might very possibly be occasions in which a force of

33,000 men might accomplish more than a smaller one. It may, however,

well be questioned whether half the number would not have answered

every end, and allowed the Emperor the use of 15,000 more men in his

contest with Wellington, who certainly could have brought to the

encounter 18,000 more men than he actually had on the field.

On the other hand, if the Prussians were intending to unite with the

English, as Napoleon had some reason at any rate to believe, and if

Grouchy did not rejoin the main army, or at least act in connection

with it, or defeat the Prussians while marching to the field of battle,

Napoleon was ruined. There was then the risk of his not doing either

of these things,—whether through the Prussians having so many hours

the start of him,—or through ignorance of the facts,—bad roads,—broken

bridges,—unsound judgment,—it matters not,—and that risk was assumed

by Napoleon when he detached him, without, as it seems to us, any

compensating advantage.

Our conclusion, then, is this: if Napoleon had sent off Grouchy with

his 33,000 men in the full belief that the Prussians had fallen back on

Namur, he would be chargeable only with neglect in not having found

out where they had gone; but his sending off this large force after he

had so much reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to

unite with the English that he expressly warned Grouchy to that effect,

was to take a wholly unnecessary and very dangerous risk. It was to

persist in carrying out a plan which new information had rendered

entirely inapplicable to the circumstances as now understood to exist.

Had Napoleon, when he had come to entertain the apprehension that the

Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, followed on

the 17th the same general plan which he had adopted on the 15th, and,

leaving, say, Pajol with the division of Teste, to find out where the

Prussians had gone and what they were proposing to do, had taken the

rest of the army with him, sending Grouchy at daybreak of the 18th with

one, or perhaps both, of his corps to St. Lambert, with instructions

to delay the Prussians in every way possible should they come from

Wavre either to attack the main army or to reinforce Wellington, he

would have taken no serious risk, and he would have had his whole army

under his own eye and subject to his immediate control on the day of

the great battle. In this case Grouchy would have performed at St.

Lambert the task which Ney performed at Quatre Bras,—of preventing the

intervention of the other allied army in the battle then in progress.

There is not the least reason to suppose that this course would have

affected the decision either of Wellington to accept battle or of

Blücher to support him. But the chances in favor of Napoleon’s success

in the battle would have been vastly greater than they actually were.

2. We have expressed the doubt whether, even if the Prussians were

known to be separating from the English, it would not have been wiser

if Napoleon had given Grouchy only one corps wherewith to pursue

them. But while this may be true, we cannot agree with Sir James

Shaw-Kennedy in his reasons for criticising the detachment of Grouchy’s

force from the main army. He says:—[638]

“His (Napoleon’s) great difficulty—as he ought well to have known

from the experience of a whole succession of disastrous campaigns to

his armies in Spain—was the overthrow of the Anglo-Allied army; and

against it he should have led his last man and horse, even had the

risk been great in the highest degree; which, as has been seen,[639]

it clearly was not. Had Napoleon attacked the Anglo-Allied army with

his whole force, and succeeded in defeating it, there could be little

question of his being able to defeat afterwards the Prussian army

when separated from Wellington.”

And again:—[640]

“If Grouchy’s proper place was on the field of battle at Waterloo,

then Napoleon should have sent for him at daylight on the morning

of the 18th, when he saw the Anglo-Allied army in position and

determined to attack it.”

The difficulty with this reasoning, as it seems to us, lies in the fact

that it was not that he might be strong enough to defeat Wellington

that Napoleon needed to have all his army on the field of Waterloo, but

in order to prevent his being overwhelmed by the union of the army of

Blücher to that of Wellington. With the army of Wellington the force

Napoleon had at Waterloo was abundantly able to cope; but against the

two armies of Wellington and Blücher united, he was certain to succumb.

Hence, inasmuch as he, at 1 P.M. of the 17th, had changed his mind

as to the Prussian retreat, had come to regard as very questionable

the view which until after 12 o’clock of that day he certainly had

entertained, that the Prussians were separating themselves definitely

from the English, and had recognized the possibility of their uniting

with the English and even joining with them in a battle to be fought

for the defence of Brussels, he should have changed his dispositions

accordingly. He should have left a comparatively small force,—perhaps

of cavalry only,—to follow up and find out about the Prussians, and

should have taken all his army-corps with him, because if the Prussians

should attempt to take part in the battle he would be sure to need

every man he could muster.[641]

3. It seems for many writers to be well-nigh impossible to treat

separately of the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. This may require some

effort of mind; but it surely is worth while to make it.[642] Suppose

we are of opinion that Napoleon made a mistake in the first place in

detaching him with his 33,000 men; that he was furthermore inexcusable

in not advising him on the night of the 17th and 18th of the most

important fact that the two armies were confronting each other at Mont

St. Jean,—in not sending him the information which Domon had picked

up as to the retreat of a part of the Prussians towards Wavre,—and,

finally, in not directing him in precise terms, that, if he should find

that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he should cross the Dyle at

Moustier and Ottignies, and operate in connection with the main army.

Suppose, we say, we find all this to be true. We have yet to pass upon

Grouchy’s conduct.

The Emperor’s faults cannot excuse Grouchy’s faults, nor can his

faults excuse those of the Emperor.[643] The object of military

criticism is not to see which officer made the most mistakes.

4. As to the proper course for Marshal Grouchy to take after he became

satisfied (as he did about daybreak of the 18th) that the Prussians

were retreating on Wavre, we have seen that the principal continental

critics,—Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras,—are of opinion that he should

at once have manœuvred to his left and crossed the Dyle, so as to get

in communication with the main army under the Emperor.

But General Hamley[644] is of a different opinion. He approves of

Grouchy’s direct movement on Wavre. After remarking that Grouchy did

not know that Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo, he says:—

“He thought the Prussians, if they were really moving on Wavre,

intended to join Wellington at Brussels. * * * And were they so

moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their

communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the

execution of their project, or render it disastrous.”

It is unnecessary to say anything in regard to this observation, except

that, if Grouchy thought as Hamley thinks he did,—and as he very likely

did,—he was wholly mistaken as to the intention of Marshal Blücher.

Very possibly he might have injured the Prussians a good deal had they

been intending to go to Brussels; but, as they were, on the contrary,

intending to join Wellington, who had taken up a position for battle to

the south of the Forest of Soignes, Grouchy’s calculations, as given

us by Hamley, were beside the mark, and his movements were entirely

useless.

It is certainly true, as Hamley says,[645] that Grouchy did not know

that “Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo.” But Grouchy

expressly says that Napoleon told him[646] that he was going “to march

upon the English, and fight them, if they stood this side [_i.e._,

south of] the Forest of Soignes,” _i.e._, at Waterloo. This indicated

that Napoleon thought it quite possible that the English might take

their stand there and fight. And the Bertrand order warned Grouchy

that the Prussians might be intending to unite with them to fight a

battle for the defence of Brussels. But this order, as we have observed

before, is utterly ignored by General Hamley.

5. We have pointed out in the text that the three principal Continental

critics,—Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras,—unite in the opinion that

Marshal Grouchy should have marched at daybreak for the bridge of

Moustier,—covering the movement by his cavalry. What would have been

the result of this manœuvre? (See Map 9.)

Let us suppose that the Prussian detachment of Ledebur, which was

stationed at Mont St. Guibert to observe the movements of Marshal

Grouchy’s column, had been driven out of their position, or flanked out

of it (as they finally were), before six in the morning, by the French

cavalry, and had been compelled to retire to the neighborhood of Wavre.

The movements of the main body of Grouchy’s command might, therefore,

without much difficulty, have been concealed from observation. At least

this seems to be assumed by Jomini,[647] who says that Grouchy could

have been at the bridge of Moustier at 10 A.M.,—and then have moved “on

Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans’ dragoons on St. Lambert, or else

have marched to Lasne himself.”

But Charras[648] thinks that the movement to Moustier would have been at

once perceived by Ledebur’s cavalry, and that Grouchy would probably,

on arriving at Moustier and Ottignies, have found himself in face of

40,000 men and 150 pieces of cannon, in position behind the Dyle,

and that it could only have been by a very unlikely concurrence of

circumstances that Grouchy could have seized these bridges before the

Prussians would have been in sufficient force to oppose him.

These conclusions seem to us very strained. Grouchy had 6,000 excellent

cavalry. Ledebur’s detachment consisted of two battalions of infantry,

four squadrons of cavalry and two guns,—possibly 1,500 men in all.[649]

A movement on Corbaix would have compelled him to fall back to La

Baraque as surely at five in the morning as at one in the afternoon,

when, as we have seen, it had this effect. Certainly, Ledebur could

have been got out of the way, and could only have reported that the

French were very active, and were manœuvring apparently on Wavre by

way of Corbaix and La Baraque. We see no reason to doubt that Jomini

is perfectly correct in supposing that the column of Marshal Grouchy,

with the exception of one of his cavalry divisions, say, that of Pajol,

supported, perhaps, by the infantry division of Teste, could have

crossed the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, without any molestation

whatever, by or soon after 10 A.M., and that they might have been well

on their way towards Lasne and St. Lambert before the Prussians were

aware what they were about.

In speculations of this kind, it is very easy, of course, to omit by

accident some of the _data_ of the problem. But when it is remembered

that the principal subject which the Prussians were contemplating that

morning was not the movements of the 12,000 or 15,000 men, who were

(as they supposed)[650] all the troops which Napoleon had detached

against them, but the very serious question whether the whole army, or

three-fourths of it, should march across the country to attack Napoleon

and succor Wellington, we can hardly believe that any reports which

Ledebur could have brought in would have brought 40,000 men to the

bridges of Moustier and Ottignies by 10 or 10.30 A.M.

It seems to us, then, altogether probable that Marshal Grouchy could

have crossed the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies with the bulk of his

forces before 11 A.M.[651]

At this hour, only “the advanced guard of Bülow’s corps had * * *

reached St. Lambert. The 16th, and then the 13th, brigade arrived much

later, and the 14th brigade, which formed the rear-guard was a long way

behind.”[652] At this hour the Ist, IId and IIId Corps were still in

and about Wavre. It would have been at this moment, when the IVth Corps

was thus strung out, toiling through the bad roads, that Grouchy would

have made his appearance, and have commenced his march from Moustier

and Ottignies to Lasne and St. Lambert. Can it be believed that he

would not have stopped Bülow? What else could Bülow have done but halt,

and concentrate his command, and await the reinforcements which were

expected from Wavre? But this would have involved him in an engagement

with Grouchy’s force, from which he could be released only by the

arrival of those reinforcements. When would they have arrived? (See Map

10.)

If Grouchy’s movement on Moustier had not been observed and promptly

reported to Blücher,—which is the assumption on which we are

proceeding, as being on the whole the most probable,—there is no

reason to suppose that the Ist and IId Prussian Corps would have moved

out of Wavre earlier than they did,—that is, about noon.[653] The IId

Corps followed the IVth, and would of course have become engaged with

Grouchy. The IIId would in time very likely have followed the IId; but

it probably would not have left Wavre till much later. These three

corps would have been Grouchy’s opponents; they would have outnumbered

him considerably, and would, no doubt, ultimately have worsted him.

But he probably would have prevented any portion of their troops from

attacking the main army under Napoleon.

As for the Ist Corps, there would have been nothing to prevent its

marching along the northerly road by way of Ohain to join Wellington,

if Zieten had thought it safe to run the chance of the Anglo-Dutch army

holding out until his arrival.

What effect these operations would have had on the issue of the battle

of Waterloo will be considered later.

6. We have stated above[654] that Grouchy, once arrived at La Baraque,

might have crossed the Dyle by the four bridges of Moustier and

Ottignies, Limale and Limelette, without, as it seems probable to us,

encountering serious opposition.[655] This view is strongly maintained

by Thiers, and as strongly contested by Charras. The latter’s

principal reason for doubting the feasibility of this movement is

the supposed presence in the woods of Sarats and Warlombrout, which

line the road from La Baraque to Wavre on the east and west sides

respectively, just after passing the former place, of the two divisions

of Reckow and Brause of the IId Corps, some 11,000 or 12,000 men.[656]

The wood of Warlombrout lies between the road leading to Moustier and

that leading to Limelette.

We think Charras in error as to the advanced position of these two

brigades, or divisions, as they may more properly be called.

Siborne makes no mention at all of the occupation of the wood of

Warlombrout, and says that that of Sarats was occupied by some

battalions of the 8th brigade, Reckow’s,[657] and that the rest of the

brigade was in rear of the wood. He says that the 7th brigade, that of

Brause, was in reserve. Ollech[658] says that Reckow’s brigade sent two

battalions into this wood of Sarats,[659] and that the brigade took up

position between Manil and St. Anne, which is nearly a mile in rear

of the wood; and that the other brigade was in rear of this. He says

nothing about the occupation of the wood of Warlombrout.

We do not know where Charras obtained his information; but it seems

quite clear that the movement to the bridges would not have met with

the amount of opposition which he claims. These brigades of Reckow and

Brause were portions of the IId Corps, and were expecting to cross

the Dyle at Wavre, and march to support Bülow. No one, of course,

can say what these troops would have done had Grouchy attempted to

cross the Dyle by the bridges or any of them; but it is certain that

these troops were not then expecting any such movement, nor were they

stationed where they could at once or easily have interfered with it.

7. Where was Grouchy when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo,

and rejected the advice of Gérard to march to the support of the

Emperor?

That it was at Sart-à-Walhain where Marshal Grouchy heard the sound of

the cannon of Waterloo, is the universally accepted belief. But it is

an error. It may be interesting to see how it originated.

Berton, who wrote in 1818, says[660] that Grouchy’s column “was still at

the village of Walhain when it heard the first cannon-shots of Mont St.

Jean,” and that it was there that Gérard gave his advice.[661]

Grouchy, writing his “Observations” the same year in Philadelphia,

which were reprinted in Paris in 1819, states[662] that the cannon was

heard while they were skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, between 1

and 2 P.M.

Gérard, in a letter also written in 1819, states[663] that it was “at

Wallin, or Sart-à-Wallin.” He says he found the Marshal eating some

strawberries. It was about 11 A.M., a little more, or a little less. He

gives an account of the interview, and then says “We quitted Wallin,

&c.”

His acting chief-of-staff, Colonel Simon Lorière, says in his

report:—[664]

“At 11 o’clock the Third [Fourth] Corps was entirely assembled at

Walin.

“The Count Gérard, who preceded the march of his corps, learnt that

Marshal Grouchy had stopped at a house in the village belonging to

a M. Hollaert; he went there with the officers of his staff; he told

me to follow; we found his Excellency at breakfast.”

Colonel Denniée of Gérard’s staff locates the incident at Sarra-Walin,

and speaks of Gérard’s having found the Marshal at breakfast.[665]

Gérard wrote to a friend of his at Brussels to look up M. Hollaert; he

did so, and wrote[666] to Gérard to say that he had been to see him at

Sarra-Walin.

This seems to have decided Gérard that the place was Sart-à-Walhain;

for he writes in 1820 to Colonel Grouchy, a son of the Marshal, as

follows:—[667]

“It was not at 3 o’clock in the afternoon that I rejoined the

commander-in-chief of the right wing, but towards 11 o’clock in the

morning; he was at Sarra-Walin, at the house of a M. Hollaert, a

notary, where he was breakfasting.”

Grouchy finally conceded to Gérard that it was long before they were

skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, that the sound of the cannon of

Waterloo was heard. He admitted in a letter[668] published in 1829, that

it was at Sart-à-Walhain, and at 11.30 A.M. This is also the statement

made in the Grouchy Memoirs.[669]

Nevertheless it was at Walhain and not at Sart-à-Walhain where Marshal

Grouchy was when he heard the sound of the cannon, and Gérard proffered

his advice to march toward the field of battle. It is certain that

the incident took place at the house of a notary—a M. Hollaert (or

Hollert, as it should be spelled),—for many of the officers who give

their recollections mention his name; and it is in no wise remarkable

that the name of the village in which his house stood should have made

no distinct impression on their memories. Now there was at that time

no notary at Sart-à-Walhain. There is none now. It is a very small

village. There was not in fact a notary’s office at Walhain in 1815;

there was none until 1818. But M. Joseph Hollert was in 1815 the notary

of the neighboring town of Nil St. Vincent, and he lived in a large

house in Walhain known as the Chateau Marette. It was here that he

received Marshal Grouchy in the forenoon of the 18th of June, 1815, and

it was into his garden that the officers went out from the house to

catch the direction of the firing.[670]

The matter is of no very great importance. Still, Walhain was certainly

a good mile nearer than Sart-à-Walhain to the bridges, whether Grouchy

marched by way of Mont St. Guibert or La Baraque. (See Map 11.)

FOOTNOTES:

[635] See the Bertrand order, _ante_, p. 210.

[636] This statement is true only of the army which the Duke had

in line of battle at Waterloo. There were besides some 18,000 men,

stationed at Hal and Tubize, of whom he did not avail himself.

[637] “Napoleon would not have lost his line of communication with

France had Blücher immediately reoccupied the position of Ligny upon

Napoleon’s leaving it; for his advance upon Wellington necessarily

opened to him both the Mons and Lille great lines to France.” Kennedy,

pp. 154, 155.

[638] Kennedy, p. 157.

[639] _Ante_, p. 274, n. 3.

[640] Kennedy, p. 160; Chesney, pp. 206, 207.

[641] Marshal Soult, according to Baudus (vol. 1, pp. 222, 223), was

opposed to detaching Grouchy with the large body of troops assigned to

him. He said to one of his aides that it was a great fault to detach

so considerable a force from the army which was going to march against

the Anglo-Belgian troops; that in the condition in which the defeat of

the evening before had put the Prussian army, a feeble force, with the

cavalry of General Exelmans, would suffice to follow and observe it in

its retreat. We concur in Marshal Soult’s conclusion, but not with his

reasons. It was not because the Prussian army was so weak, but because

it was still so formidable, that Napoleon should have kept all his army

together.

[642] See the admirable observations of Siborne (vol. 1, pp. 318 _et

seq._); and of Van Loben Sels, pp. 319 _et seq._ With many writers, to

blame Napoleon is to exonerate Grouchy; with others, again, to blame

Grouchy is to exonerate Napoleon.

[643] _Cf._ Kennedy, pp. 160, 161; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. On the other

hand see Van Loben Sels, pp. 323, 324.

[644] Operations of War, p. 196 _et seq._

[645] Hamley, p. 196.

[646] Frag. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5; Grouchy Mém.,

vol. 4, p. 44.

[647] Jomini, p. 176.

[648] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 62, 63. Hooper’s view [pp. 342 _et seq._]

is substantially that of Charras. He also seems to think that unless

Grouchy could succeed in defeating the Prussian troops opposed to him,

his intervention would be useless. It seems to us, on the other hand,

that all that it was needful for Grouchy to do was to engage, and so to

detain, the corps of Bülow and Pirch I.; and by marching from the Dyle

upon their line of march from Wavre to St. Lambert, he was, it seems to

us, certain to accomplish this. This view is well presented by Quinet,

pp. 301-304.

[649] Charras, vol. 2, p. 42.

[650] _Ante_, p. 232.

[651] Siborne (vol. 1, p. 320) thinks that Grouchy could have

successfully crossed the Dyle even if he had not started from Gembloux

earlier than he did.

[652] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 311; Charras, vol. 2, pp. 72, 73.

[653] Charras, vol. 2, p. 43; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 311, 312. Kennedy

(p. 163) seems to suppose that Pirch I. and Zieten followed Bülow

without any interval.

[654] _Ante_, p. 259.

[655] Van Loben Sels (pp. 322, 323, 340) is very positive as to this.

[656] Charras, vol. 2, p. 376; also, p. 44.

[657] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 313. He strictly follows Damitz, p. 247.

[658] Ollech, pp. 208, 209.

[659] Called by him Lautelle. It is sometimes called the wood of

Lauzel, as it adjoins a farm of that name.

[660] Berton, p. 55.

[661] Berton, pp. 55, 59.

[662] Grouchy, Obs., p. 16.

[663] Quelques Doc., p. 7. He means Walhain and Sart-à-Walhain.

[664] Ib., 12. By “Walin,” he means Walhain.

[665] Quelques Doc., pp. 17, 18. By “Sarra-Walin,” he means

Sart-à-Walhain.

[666] Ib., p. 19. His letter was dated September 30, 1819.

[667] Ib., p. 24. See also Gérard’s “Lettre à MM. Germain-Sarrut et B.

Saint Edme,” pp. 10, 11; and his “Dernières Observations,” pp. 8, 29.

[668] Fragm. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry and Barthélemy, p. 9.

[669] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 75.

[670] The writer has abundant proof of the above statements. He has

also visited the house. M. Wenseleers, who is referred to in the

Preface, obtained for him this information in 1888 and 1889.