THE BATTLE OF QUATRE BRAS.
Marshal Ney, as we have seen, took no steps what ever, on his return
to Gosselies from his midnight interview with the Emperor, to get his
command in readiness for the work of the coming day. Frasnes, in any
event, he must have known, would have to be occupied in force, whether
an advance from that place to Quatre Bras should be decided on or
not.[396] Yet, instead of getting the divisions of Foy and Jerome up
to Frasnes at once, where Bachelu and Piré already were, and supplying
their place at Gosselies by the divisions of the 1st Corps, one of
which, we know (Durutte’s), had bivouacked between Jumet and Gosselies,
he suffered them to remain at Gosselies; and, so far as appears, sent
officers to hurry up d’Erlon only after he had ordered him to Frasnes
(_ante_, p. 119), that is, after 11 A.M. Then there was a delay of an
hour and three-quarters, for which Ney was not directly responsible,
which was caused by Reille,[397] who, instead of obeying Ney’s order
to march promptly from Gosselies to the front on receipt of any orders
of movement from the headquarters of the army, delayed doing so until
he had informed Ney, who was at Frasnes, that he had heard from Girard
that the Prussians were concentrating near St. Amand, and had thereupon
received fresh orders. But this delay could never have occurred had
Reille been at Frasnes himself, to which place he ought to have been
ordered by Ney hours before.
It is, therefore, perfectly correct to say, that if Reille’s two
divisions at Gosselies had been, early in the morning, ordered to
Frasnes, where Bachelu and Piré had been since the previous evening,
Marshal Ney could have commenced the battle of Quatre Bras with all
the 2d Corps, except Girard’s division, which was with the main army,
at eleven o’clock, the hour when he received his orders from Soult and
his letter from the Emperor. Or, if he had thought best to defer the
attack until he should have communicated to the Emperor the information
as to the concentration of the Prussian army near St. Amand conveyed
by Girard,[398] he would have been able to obey his orders, whatever
they were, the moment his messenger returned. There was also no reason
why d’Erlon should not have been likewise ordered up from Gosselies
to Frasnes to support Reille, certainly with Durutte’s division,
leaving the other divisions to come along as fast as they could. And
it is not going too far to say that the measures above suggested were
simply those which common sense would dictate, to an officer in Ney’s
position.[399]
However, as a matter of fact, Ney did not take these measures, nor
did he, even on the receipt of his orders, which, as we have seen,
peremptorily directed him to assemble the 1st and 2d Corps and
Kellermann’s two divisions of cavalry, and with this force to carry
Quatre Bras, proceed to comply with them. He ordered d’Erlon to halt
at Frasnes; he ordered Kellermann[400] to station one division at
Frasnes and one at Liberchies; and he assailed the enemy’s position
at Quatre Bras about 2 P.M. with the infantry divisions of Bachelu
and Foy, and the cavalry division of Piré. It was not until nearly 3
o’clock[401] that the division of Jerome[402] arrived, and took its
place in the line of battle. With the 2d Corps alone, then, did Marshal
Ney attempt the task which he had been directed to undertake with
all the troops which had been assigned to him. The 1st Corps and the
cavalry he ordered to stay behind to protect his flanks and line of
retreat.
When such are the preparations, nothing but extraordinary luck can give
success in battle; and at first it seemed as if this luck was in store
for Marshal Ney. When he began the action, Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian
division constituted the sole force of the enemy at Quatre Bras; and
Wellington not having yet returned from Brye, where he had been to see
Blücher, the Prince of Orange, a gallant young officer, but possessing
no remarkable abilities, was in command. Ney’s two divisions gave him a
slight superiority in infantry, which was augmented by the arrival of
the third, and his soldiers were much the better fighters. He easily
gained ground, and success seemed assured.
The Duke of Wellington reached the field about half-past two; and
of course assumed control. He now had occasion to see how far the
statements of the “Disposition” were from the actual facts; he found
himself obliged to sustain a vigorous and well-conducted attack by
superior forces, as best he might. Fortunately, about 3.30 P.M.,[403]
Picton’s British division arrived, followed immediately by the Duke of
Brunswick’s Corps, and Ney found himself slightly outnumbered.[404]
Nevertheless, the quality of his troops, both officers and men, was so
good, and his superiority to his antagonists in cavalry and artillery
was so great, that he continued the fight with the expectation of
success and with the chances in his favor.[405] But no efforts of his
could overcome the steadiness and courage of the British infantry.
The Dutch-Belgians retired after a couple of hours’ fighting; the
Brunswickers were broken, and the Duke of Brunswick was killed; but the
British and Hanoverian troops, though outmatched at this stage of the
action, stubbornly maintained the fight.
At five or soon after, two brigades of Alten’s 3d British division
arrived, and gave Wellington an equality, perhaps even a slight
superiority in force. Ney, on the other hand, had not been reinforced
either by d’Erlon or by Kellermann’s two divisions of cavalry, all
which troops had been placed at his disposal by the Emperor, and all
which he had been, by the last order which he had received from Marshal
Soult, expressly directed to employ in the movement upon Quatre Bras.
That is to say, as late as five o’clock, when the battle had been in
progress for three hours, Ney had not got his command together, had
not, in fact, assembled one-half of it on the field. Where were these
missing troops? (See Map 7.)
Take, first, the case of the 1st Corps. We have seen that the division
of the 2d Corps, which was the last to arrive, arrived on the field of
battle at or shortly before 3 P.M. Quatre Bras is distant from Frasnes
about two miles and a half, and the field of battle, therefore, was
about two miles beyond Frasnes. Since Jerome arrived on the field at 3
o’clock, he must have left Frasnes about or soon after 2 o’clock. If
Durutte, who commanded the leading division of the 1st Corps, had
followed Jerome promptly from Jumet, which is not over a mile and a
half to the south of Gosselies, he would have reached Frasnes before 3
o’clock. The other two divisions, which were ordered to Frasnes, should
have arrived certainly in the course of the next hour and a half; so
that by 4 or 4.30 P.M. Ney should have had the three divisions of the
1st Corps which he had ordered to Frasnes, ready for use there.
What actually happened was this. Durutte, who commanded the leading
division of the 1st Corps, when in march from Jumet for Frasnes,[406]
received orders from Ney to continue his march to Quatre Bras. But, as
he was reaching Frasnes,[407] he was ordered by one of the Emperor’s
aides, on his own responsibility,[408] to direct his march towards
Brye. This order Durutte obeyed, and, on arriving at Frasnes, turned
the head of the column to the right. D’Erlon, who, had he been present,
might have stopped this unauthorized proceeding, had unfortunately
ridden in advance of his corps. The aide, who, according to d’Erlon’s
statement, was carrying a pencil note to Marshal Ney, came up with
d’Erlon just beyond Frasnes, and told him what he had done. D’Erlon
then rode back to join his command, sending his chief-of-staff to
Marshal Ney to inform him what had happened. The 1st Corps then
proceeded by way of Villers-Peruin towards St. Amand for possibly
a couple of miles,[409] when it was seen by Vandamme, who between
5.30 and 6 o’clock reported to the Emperor the appearance of this
unexpected body of troops.[410] The corps must have been seen,
therefore, shortly after 5 o’clock. It must, therefore, have left the
Charleroi road at Frasnes somewhere about 4.30 P.M. That is, the head
of d’Erlon’s column did not reach Frasnes till two hours and a half
after the rear of the 2d Corps had left it. For, as we have seen, the
last division of the 2d Corps, Jerome’s, had passed through Frasnes by
2 o’clock.
This fact, that there was a march of two hours and a half between
the two corps which constituted the principal part of Marshal Ney’s
command, has not received due attention.[411] It is impossible to
account for it without laying a grave responsibility on the shoulders
of both Marshal Ney and the Comte d’Erlon. There is no need of dwelling
on the importance of the matter. That there was no sufficient effort
to obey the orders of the Emperor,—vigorously and energetically to
carry out the duty assigned to this wing of the army,—is too plain for
argument. It needs hardly to be remarked, that if Durutte had followed
closely on the traces of Jerome,—even if he had started from Jumet at
the moment when Jerome started from Gosselies, and had not (as would
have been natural and proper) moved up nearer to Gosselies before the
order to march to Quatre Bras arrived,—he could not have been turned
off the main road by the Emperor’s staff-officer, for, long before
half-past four o’clock, which was the hour when the staff-officer
reached Frasnes, Durutte would have been fighting the English at Quatre
Bras. One cannot avoid the conclusion that Marshal Ney’s measures for
getting his command together on the field of battle this day were
singularly ineffective.
For d’Erlon’s marching off towards St. Amand, Ney, of course, was in no
wise responsible. When he heard of it, he sent him a peremptory order
to return at once. For this he has been severely, and, in our opinion,
unjustly blamed by many critics who have approached the question in
the belief that d’Erlon was ordered to leave Ney’s immediate command by
the Emperor himself. But this was not so. Napoleon addressed no order
to d’Erlon. The only orders which the Emperor sent on this afternoon of
the 16th of June of which we have any knowledge were sent to Marshal
Ney. Napoleon cannot be imagined to have sent a direct order to one
of Ney’s corps-commanders, for they, the Emperor must have supposed,
were acting under the Marshal’s immediate supervision. Napoleon himself
always denied having sent any order to d’Erlon, and even Charras
believes him to be correct in this statement. We shall recur to this
subject later; suffice it to say here that we are inclined to think
that it was the 2 P.M. order that was shown, or, of which more likely,
the supposed purport or intent was stated, to Durutte.[412] The time at
which Durutte’s column was perceived heading for St. Amand indicates
approximately when he must have left the turnpike at Frasnes; and this,
as we shall hereafter see, was about the hour when the officer who
carried the 2 P.M. order must have reached Frasnes.
D’Erlon, on receiving Ney’s order to return, retraced his steps,
leaving Durutte’s division on his right in the neighborhood of Marbais,
but he did not reach Frasnes till after 9 P.M. Thus the 1st Corps was
of no use either to Ney or Napoleon that afternoon.
Take next the case of Kellermann’s cavalry. The last order which Ney
received was, as we have seen, perfectly explicit in terms.[413] It
directed him to “unite the corps of Counts Reille and d’Erlon, and that
of the Count of Valmy [Kellermann],” and stated that “with these forces
he ought to be able to beat and destroy any force of the enemy which
might present itself.” Yet Ney ordered one of Kellermann’s divisions
to halt at Frasnes and the other at Liberchies,—two miles, and two
miles and a half, respectively, from the field of battle. It is not
going too far to say that there is no excuse for such flat disobedience
of orders. Cavalry, as respects the use to which they were put in those
days, must be on the spot, ready to take advantage in an instant of a
weak place in the enemy’s line of battle. No one knew this better than
Marshal Ney. The disposition he made of his cavalry was deliberately
made, from the same reason which induced him to order the 1st Corps to
take up position at Frasnes,—probably because he deemed it unwise and
even dangerous that the left wing should be advanced so far in front of
the main army; and he did not send for Kellermann till six o’clock, and
then he only employed one brigade.[414]
To return now to the battle. The arrival of Alten’s division gave
Wellington the advantage, certainly in point of numerical force;
still, the three infantry-divisions of the 2d Corps were superior in
numbers to the two divisions of Picton and Alten; and the Dutch-Belgian
and Brunswick troops had suffered so much that there was very little
fight left in them. The cavalry of Piré was easily superior to that of
the Brunswickers and Dutch-Belgians; none of the English cavalry had
arrived; and the French were decidedly superior in artillery.
About 5 P.M.[415] the 2 o’clock order from Napoleon was received, but
it was impossible for Ney, situated as he was, to execute it. At 6
P.M.[416] the 3.15 P.M. order arrived. Then, according to Charras,[417]
Ney for the first time sent to Kellermann to bring up L’Heritier’s
division. The veteran of Marengo made a gallant and at first a
successful charge[418] at the head of the cuirassier brigade of this
division, but, finally, the galling fire from the British in the
farm-enclosures near the intersection of the roads, received when the
horses were blown and the impetus of the charge was exhausted, brought
about a panic, and the troops retired in great disorder. Soon after
this, which was the last offensive move made by the French, Cooke’s
division of the English Guards came up from Nivelles, and the French
were forced to retire to Frasnes, which they did in good order.
At the close of the action, the Duke of Wellington had employed his
1st, 3d and 5th British divisions, the 2d Dutch-Belgian division,
and the Brunswick contingent, numbering in all over 31,000[419] men;
Marshal Ney, of the 43,000 men which had been entrusted to him and with
which he was to “beat and destroy any enemy’s force” in his front, had
brought to the encounter less than 22,000 men. The casualties of the
Anglo-Dutch army were nearly or quite 4,500,—those of the French over
4,000.
It cannot be seriously questioned that the result of the action would
have been a victory for the French if the 1st Corps, d’Erlon’s, had
not been diverted from the turnpike.[420] The head of his column
reached Frasnes, as we have seen, about half-past four o’clock, and the
leading division could have been put in line before half-past five,
that is, shortly after the arrival of Alten’s division. Wellington
at this moment was deeply involved in the battle. He was expecting
reinforcements hourly. He probably would not have thought of retiring.
In fact his deficiency in cavalry and artillery would have made it a
difficult matter to bring off his command in good order, and it is not
likely that any of his troops save his (so called) British divisions
could have sustained with firmness the strain of a retreat before an
enemy fired with the success of the first battle of the campaign.
The chances are that if d’Erlon’s Corps had marched straight on to
Quatre Bras, the result would have been a severe defeat for the Duke
of Wellington. Distrust and even demoralization would almost certainly
have appeared in most of his foreign contingents; and with only his
English regiments and those of the King’s German Legion he could not
have mustered a sufficient force to justify him in accepting battle at
Waterloo, even if he had been otherwise disposed to do so. In fact, one
may safely conclude, that the battle of Waterloo would not have been
fought had not d’Erlon’s Corps been turned aside by the unauthorized
act of the staff-officer. We may, and in fact we must, even go further.
It is altogether improbable that if Blücher had found that Wellington
was in no condition to receive battle on the 18th, he would have
deviated from his natural course of action after losing the battle of
Ligny; he would without doubt, in such case, have retired on either
Liége or Namur. These consequences are assuredly not too remote. The
immediate and palpable results of an action, or of a failure to act,
are within the legitimate field of inquiry; in fact, unless this be
permitted, history can yield no lessons at all; it is only when we
carry our speculation into the region of remote results, or vary too
much from the conditions which actually existed, that we are going
beyond the line of legitimate inference and useful deduction. It may be
added that it is, and in the nature of things must be, for each person
to draw the line in each case.
If, now, we ask what would probably have happened if Ney had collected
his troops at Frasnes during the forenoon, in order that he might be
able promptly to obey his orders as soon as they should be received,
as we have above maintained he ought to have done, we are inclined to
think that the simultaneous movement upon Quatre Bras between twelve
and two o’clock of 40,000 men would have brought about the prompt
retirement by the Prince of Orange[421] of Perponcher’s division.
It would probably have fallen back on Nivelles, where Chassé was
assembling the other Dutch-Belgian division. Whether the Duke on
his return from Brye could have effected a concerted attack on the
French by combining a movement on the Brussels road by Picton and the
Brunswickers with one on the Nivelles road by Perponcher and Alten, it
is not easy to say. The advantage of position would have clearly been
with the French, and in fact they would have been considerably superior
in numbers. There would certainly have existed no reason why in this
case Ney could not have sent 10,000 or even 20,000 men down the Namur
road in compliance with the orders of 2 and 3.15 P.M.[422]
Neither of the above-described advantages was gained by Marshal Ney.
By leaving the divisions of Jerome and Foy at Gosselies instead of
bringing them up to Frasnes early in the morning,—by leaving that of
Durutte at Jumet, and the other three of d’Erlon’s divisions still
further in rear until long after the last regiments of the 2d Corps had
left Gosselies,—he rendered a prompt and bloodless occupation of Quatre
Bras almost impossible. Exactly how far he was responsible for the
gap between his two corps, we do not know. But we can certainly say
that a diligent and experienced officer in Ney’s place would have known
to a half an hour just how long after the arrival of the last division
of the 2d Corps, the van of the 1st Corps might be expected. The whole
management of Marshal Ney on this day shows distrust of the Emperor’s
judgment, unwillingness to take the most obvious steps, finally,
disobedience of orders. As the natural consequence of his wilfulness
and perverseness he failed to reap the enormous successes which the
Emperor’s sagacity had placed within his power. All he did was to
prevent Wellington from giving any aid to Blücher. This he certainly
accomplished; and an important service it was. He also showed himself
as he always did, a brave, resolute, capable officer on the field of
battle. Probably he did as much as any one could have done with the
force actually under his hand. But had he taken the necessary steps to
get the large and powerful body of troops which Napoleon had entrusted
to his care well in hand in due season, he could not have failed, so
far as we can see, to achieve a striking success, which might very
possibly have had a decisive effect on the fortunes of the war. If
each of the two allied generals had been defeated at the outset of the
campaign, the chances of Napoleon for final victory would have been
greatly in his favor.
In regard to the conduct of this battle by the Duke of Wellington
nothing new can be said. He has always received the credit which he
certainly fully merited, of maintaining most skilfully and with great
spirit and tenacity a fight in which he was outmatched until nearly the
close of the day. He had been gravely misled by his chief-of-staff as
to the situation of the various bodies which composed his army; and in
fact it must be admitted that his own calculations were very far from
being worthy of his reputation. Hence he ran the risk of encountering
a largely superior force; and that he had actually to deal with only
half of this force was due to no strategy of his. He found himself
in a most perplexing and dangerous situation, in which he displayed
undoubtedly great skill and courage, but for the successful result of
the day he was largely indebted to the “fortune of war.”[423]
FOOTNOTES:
[396] _Cf._ Jomini, p. 221.
[397] Jomini, p. 226, defends Reille’s course. We shall discuss this
question in the Notes to this chapter.
[398] _Cf._ Jomini, pp. 221, 226.
[399] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92, 145; Muquardt, pp. 145, 146, 149,
n. Charras, though discussing Ney’s conduct at considerable length
(vol. 2, pp. 236 _et seq._), does not touch upon this part of it.
[400] Kellermann, Charras says, vol. 1, p. 188, had at 10.30 A.M.
passed Gosselies. His two divisions were, therefore, long before 2
P.M., at Frasnes, and Liberchies.
[401] “_Vers 3 heures._” Reille’s statement, Doc. Inéd, p. 59.
[402] Or that of Guilleminot, as Charras prefers to call it. Charras,
vol. 1, pp. 195, 196, n.
[403] Gomm, p. 353; Waterloo Letters, p. 23.
[404] Siborne, vol. 1, p 108.
[405] We shall not attempt a tactical account of the battle. It is well
described by Siborne and Charras, and there is much of value in other
writers. But it is not worth while at this late day to go into detail.
[406] Doc. Inéd., p. 71, Durutte’s statement.
[407] Drouet, p. 95.
[408] Ib., p. 95; Doc. Inéd, p. 65; d’Erlon’s statement.
[409] As it would seem from the map. But the distance is a matter of
conjecture only.
[410] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 207.
[411] But see “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 132 _et seq._
[412] So, Hooper, pp. 136, 137.
[413] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381.
[414] Charras, vol. 1, p. 206.
[415] Ib., p. 204, n.
[416] Ib., p. 206.
[417] Ib., p. 206. Charras says that Roussel’s division remained where
it was. He is probably correct. But see Siborne, vol. 1, p. 136, and
Hooper, p. 127.
[418] Siborne is in error in supposing that there were two charges.
Only one brigade was put in, the cuirassiers, and this was towards the
end of the action.
[419] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 153. Charras, vol. 1, p. 210, rates
Wellington’s force as high as 37,000 men.
[420] Even Hooper admits (p. 137) that the “timely presence” of these
troops would have “placed Wellington in an extremity of peril.” _Cf._
Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 162, 163.
[421] The Duke of Wellington did not get back from Brye, where he had
gone to confer with Marshal Blücher, until half-past two o’clock.
[422] Jomini, however, says (p. 227) that all that could have been
expected of Ney even in this case would have been to maintain his
position. But he says this in a letter to Marshal Ney’s son, and his
statement cannot be taken seriously. The events of the day demonstrated
that one corps would have been amply sufficient to hold the place, had
it been once occupied by the French.
[423] _Cf._ Chesney, p. 137.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER XII._
1. Charras’ references to the orders to Marshal Ney as respects
Kellermann’s cavalry, are disingenuous and very misleading. They are
evidently intended to throw the blame for the non-employment of this
body of troops upon the shoulders of Napoleon.
It will be remembered that in his letter[424] to Ney, which the Emperor
said might arrive a little before the formal order signed by Marshal
Soult, the Emperor told Ney what his wishes were as to the disposition
of his troops after he should have occupied Quatre Bras. One division
was to be stationed two leagues in front of Quatre Bras,—six divisions
around Quatre Bras,—and Kellermann’s cavalry at the intersection of
the Roman road with the Charleroi turnpike, so that the Emperor might
recall it, if he desired so to do. In the same letter he tells Ney to
be careful of Lefebvre-Desnouettes’ division, which belonged to the
Guard.
It seems plain enough that this letter must be taken in connection with
Soult’s definite order,[425] to which the letter refers, which ordered
Ney to direct the 1st and 2d _corps d’armée_ and the 3d corps of
cavalry,—Kellermann’s,—upon Quatre Bras, and there take up his position.
But the latest order[426] of Soult positively instructs Ney to unite
the two corps of Counts Reille and d’Erlon and also that of the Count
of Valmy, and says in so many words that with these forces he ought to
be able “to beat and destroy” the enemy.
There is not either in the letter or in these orders a single word
limiting the employment of Kellermann’s cavalry to “a case of
necessity.” Yet this is what Charras states[427] was contained in
Soult’s order. He even says that Ney did not dare[428] to employ
but one out of the four brigades of which Kellermann’s Corps
consisted,—meaning that he was so hampered by his orders.
Hooper[429] also says that Ney used Kellermann’s cavalry “sparingly, in
obedience to the instructions of Napoleon.”
The orders speak for themselves. Ney was not only permitted to
use Kellermann’s Corps, but was positively directed to do so. It
was only in his use of the cavalry of the Guard—the division of
Lefebvre-Desnouettes[430]—that he was restricted.
2. Napoleon in his account of the campaign labored under a mistake as
to the time when he gave Ney his orders on the 16th. He says it was
in the night. This involved him in another mistake, namely, that the
orders directed Ney “to push on at daybreak beyond Quatre Bras.” It
is true that he rendered it possible for the readers of his book to
rectify these errors, for he says that Flahaut was the bearer of these
orders, and he survived the campaign. Doubtless if the Emperor could
have had access to him, these mistakes would have been rectified; as it
is, they render much of what Napoleon says of no value. Then, Napoleon
never learned the truth about the wanderings of d’Erlon’s Corps; and
this of course, invalidates his criticisms as to that matter. But in
regard to the main point made in this chapter, the Emperor’s opinion
is given explicitly. He blames Ney[431] _for not having_ “executed his
orders and _marched on Quatre Bras with his 43,000 men_.” That Ney
should concentrate his entire command was in reality, the burden of his
orders.
That this neglect to keep his command together was in Napoleon’s eyes
Ney’s principal fault in his conduct on the 16th, appears unmistakably
from the following passages in Soult’s despatch[432] to Ney of the next
day:—
“The Emperor has seen with pain that you did not yesterday unite
your divisions; they acted independently of each other; hence they
experienced losses.
“If the corps of the Counts d’Erlon and Reille had been together, not
an Englishman of the troops which attacked you would have escaped.
If the Count d’Erlon had executed the movement upon St. Amand which
the Emperor had ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally
destroyed, and we should have taken perhaps 30,000 prisoners.
“The corps of Generals Gérard and Vandamme and the Imperial Guard
have always been united: one exposes one’s self to reverses when
detachments are put in peril.
“The Emperor hopes and desires that your seven divisions of infantry
and your cavalry shall be well united and organized, and that
together they shall not occupy more than one league of ground, so
that you may have them under your hand and may be able to employ them
at need.”
What Soult told Sir William Napier,[433] years afterwards, is without
question the truth:—“Ney neglected his orders at Quatre Bras.”
3. It may be worth while to correct a curious error into which Siborne
has fallen in his anxiety to show that Ney was not ordered to seize
Quatre Bras early in the morning. He[434] calls attention to the fact
that the 2 P.M. order to Ney was addressed on the back of the letter
to the Marshal at Gosselies. “This circumstance,” he says, “proves that
Napoleon was under the impression that Ney had not at that time (two
o’clock) commenced his attack, but was still at Gosselies.” But this
argument, if it is good for anything, shows that Napoleon supposed that
Ney and, of course, the bulk of his command also, would be at Gosselies
when the bearer of the letter arrived there, say at 3 o’clock, which
is simply absurd. The fact is that, Ney having the previous night had
his headquarters at Gosselies, all orders to him were naturally and
properly sent there first.
4. Jomini,[435] in a letter to the Duke of Elchingen, suggests that
Napoleon might well have left Reille’s corps and Lefebvre-Desnouettes’
cavalry at Frasnes to watch the enemy at Quatre Bras, and thrown
d’Erlon’s Corps and Kellermann’s cavalry on the rear of the Prussians
at Brye, a manœuvre which, he says, “could be executed from Frasnes as
well as from Quatre Bras.” Into the merits of this suggestion we do
not propose to enter; there is certainly much to recommend it. But in
a postscript General Jomini takes special pains to express his opinion
that General Reille is not “deserving of the least censure” for having
deferred putting his corps in motion from Gosselies for Frasnes, on the
morning of the 16th, until he had communicated Girard’s information to
Marshal Ney.
“We must not forget that General Reille had just sent—nine
o’clock—positive information of the presence of the entire Prussian
army towards Ligny: he must have concluded from this that the left
would be called upon to take part in the attack of this army, and
that it would be unfortunate if, after such information, he took the
Genappe [Quatre Bras] route when it would be necessary to turn to
the right towards Brye. This reasoning was more than logical, it was
based on the laws of _la grande tactique_.”[436]
In this passage Jomini seems to overlook what he has just before said
about Frasnes. Even if the left should be called upon to take part
in the attack of the Prussians instead of being concentrated for the
attack of Quatre Bras, it would still be necessary for a large force to
establish itself at Frasnes, in order to observe the enemy at Quatre
Bras; to proceed then to Frasnes, with the two divisions of Foy and
Jerome, from Gosselies, where he was when the Emperor’s order reached
him, was the right thing for Reille to do in any event. Jomini in fact
suggests this very thing as in his judgment the correct course, viz.:
to leave the 2d Corps at Frasnes and to throw the 1st Corps on Brye.
This attempt, therefore, to justify Reille’s delay in marching to
Frasnes, fails.
5. Other theories than the one we have adopted as to the cause of
the wanderings of d’Erlon’s Corps have been broached. Thiers thinks
that Napoleon sent d’Erlon a direct order; Charras[437] has combated
this view in a careful examination of the evidence, and we agree
with him. There is, however, considerable conflict of testimony.
Lieutenant-Colonel de Baudus, who was on the staff of Marshal Soult in
this campaign, in his “Études sur Napoléon,”[438] tells this story:—
“At the moment when the affair [the battle of Ligny] was at its
height, Napoleon called me and said to me: ‘I have sent an order
to the Comte d’Erlon to direct his whole corps in the rear of the
right of the Prussian army; go and carry to Marshal Ney a duplicate
of this order, which ought to be communicated to him. You will tell
him that, whatever may be the situation in which he finds himself,
it is absolutely necessary that this disposition should be executed;
that I do not attach any great importance to what is passing to-day
on his wing; that the important affair is here, where I am, because
I want to finish with the Prussian army. As for him, he must,
if he cannot do better, confine himself to keeping the English
army in check.’[439] When the Emperor had finished giving me his
instructions, the major-general [Soult] recommended me in the most
energetic terms to insist most forcibly on the Duke of Elchingen
that, on his part, nothing should hinder the execution of the
movement prescribed to the Comte d’Erlon.”
Notwithstanding this circumstantial narrative, we do not believe
that Napoleon sent d’Erlon a direct order. Napoleon had in all his
communications with Ney placed d’Erlon under him; the letter written to
Ney that morning by the Emperor said:—“The major-general has given the
most precise instructions, so that there shall be no difficulty about
obedience to your orders when you are detached from the main army; when
I am present, the corps-commanders will take their orders from me.” Now
Napoleon must have supposed that d’Erlon would be with Ney at 5 P.M.
Baudus’ book was published twenty-six years after the battle. His
recollection of the fact that he was sent on such a mission was no
doubt clear; very likely he remembered with approximate accuracy what
Napoleon and Soult said to him; but he may easily have been mistaken
as to the order itself. It would be very natural that an order to Ney
directing him to send the 1st Corps to attack the Prussian right might
be mistaken for an order to d’Erlon, who commanded the 1st Corps,
to do this. And what to our mind settles the matter is, that if the
order had really been one directed to d’Erlon, neither the Emperor nor
Soult would have wasted their time in asking Baudus to ask Ney not to
interfere with its execution. If, on the other hand, it was an order
to Ney, urging on him to detach a part of his command to take the
Prussians in rear, such remarks as Napoleon and Soult made to Baudus
were directly apposite, and were made, no doubt, in order that they
might be repeated to Ney, so that he might enter more fully into the
Emperor’s view of the situation. Lastly, although no specific mention
might be made in the written order of the troops which Ney was to
detach, it is extremely probable that both Napoleon and Soult spoke
of the 1st Corps in this connection, as it was of course known that
d’Erlon was to come up in rear of Reille, who might very probably be
actively engaged, and that d’Erlon’s Corps, therefore, would probably
be sent, if any was sent.
We have little doubt that Baudus carried the duplicate of the 3.15
P.M. order to Marshal Ney. Everything that he says about it points to
this; the statement that the battle was at its height when the order
was given to him would be true at a quarter-past three; the strong
language of the Emperor and Soult as to the importance of persuading
Ney to comply with their request has the same ring as the language of
the order.[440] Baudus tells us that when he was nearing Quatre Bras
he was nearly run down by Kellermann’s cuirassiers, who were, as we
have seen,[441] routed between 6 and 7 P.M.[442] Charras says that the
3.15 P.M. order[443] arrived at 6 o’clock.[444] This duplicate of it,
dated 3.30 P.M.[445] the transmission of which was delayed, as we have
seen, by the verbal messages to Ney, may very possibly not have reached
the Marshal till half-past six. Baudus found Ney in a state of great
exasperation against the Emperor, who had, as he had been told, ordered
the 1st Corps to march upon St. Amand without informing him of this
change of plan. The fact that Baudus saw nothing of the 1st Corps on
the road confirms our hypothesis that that corps had been turned off by
the bearer of the 2 P.M. despatch.
In conclusion, we may say that the evidence as to this matter is not
entirely satisfactory. D’Erlon says the order he saw was addressed to
Marshal Ney. Reille says the same. D’Erlon says the order was brought
by General Labedoyère; Heymès, by Colonel Laurent. Heymès says that
Colonel Laurent, after turning the 1st Corps off the turnpike, informed
Ney what he had done;[446] Baudus says that Ney told him[447] that he
never received any advice of the sort at all, and that he only learned
that the corps had gone off by sending to Frasnes for it, and there
being no troops there. It is idle to seek to reconcile these minor
contradictions. They are not important.
FOOTNOTES:
[424] Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378.
[425] Ib., VIII, p. 27; App. C, xxi; _post_, pp. 380, 381.
[426] Ib., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381. This refers to the
prior order in distinct terms.
[427] Charras, vol. 1, p. 205.
[428] Ib., p. 206.
[429] Hooper, p. 127.
[430] Even in regard to this division, Soult’s order plainly implies
that Ney might make use of it. Doc. Inéd., VIII, p. 28; App. C, xxi.;
_post_, pp. 380,381.
[431] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 209.
[432] Doc. Inéd., XVII, p. 46; App. C, xxvii; _post_, pp. 384, 385.
[433] Life of General Sir W. Napier, vol. 1, p. 505.
[434] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 146, n.
[435] Jomini, pp. 219, 221.
[436] Ib., p. 226.
[437] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 242 _et seq._
[438] Vol. 1, pp. 210 _et seq._ Paris: 1841.
[439] This is exactly what was enjoined on Ney by the 3.15 P.M. order.
It is to be noted that, while the 2 P.M. order expressly directed Ney
to attack the English, and only after having vigorously pushed them,
to turn back and operate against the Prussians, the 3.15 P.M. order
directed him to manœuvre _at once_,—that is, without waiting until he
should have driven the English,—so as to surround the Prussian right
wing. This is precisely what Baudus says the Emperor and Soult desired
him so strongly to urge upon Marshal Ney.
[440] See note 16, on page 194.
[441] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 206-208.
[442] Heymès, Ney’s aide-de-camp, says (Doc. Inéd., pp. 9, 10) that it
was just when Kellermann’s cuirassiers had been routed that Colonel
Laurent arrived and told Marshal Ney that he had ordered d’Erlon to
turn off the main road in the direction of St. Amand. Baudus came up a
little later, evidently, as he met the cuirassiers some distance from
the field of battle. But as Baudus saw nothing of the troops of the 1st
Corps, we think Heymès must be mistaken, as to Laurent’s having just
turned off the head of the column to the right. If so, Baudus must have
passed at least half the corps on the road.
[443] According to Gourgaud, p. 57, Colonel Forbin-Janson carried this
order.
[444] Charras, vol. 1, p. 206.
[445] Doc. Inéd., p. 42.
[446] Ib., pp. 9, 10.
[447] Baudus, vol. 1, p. 212.