THE BATTLE OF LIGNY.
Marshal Blücher had taken up a position, which although in some
respects determined by the nature of the ground, was nevertheless
intended to secure two objects,—first, his line of communications with
Namur, and an unobstructed march for his expected IVth Corps, Bülow’s,
and, secondly, his avenue of communication with the Anglo-Dutch
army, from which he expected to receive at least some assistance in
the course of the afternoon. It thus came about that the centre of
the Prussian army was at Sombreffe,—that the line of the right wing
ran through the villages of Ligny and St. Amand in a south-westerly
direction, and that that of the left wing ran from Sombreffe
through the hamlet of Mont Potriaux to Tongrinelle and Balâtre in a
south-easterly direction. This left wing consisted entirely of the
IIId Corps, Thielemann’s. It contained 22,051 infantry, 2,405 cavalry,
and 48 guns.[339] The Ist Corps, Zieten’s held the front of the centre
and right wing, and was supported by the IId Corps, that of Pirch I.,
throughout its whole extent. These two corps contained 56,803 infantry,
6,093 cavalry, and 176 guns.[340] The right wing was “in the air”; it
was possible to turn it completely, by way of St. Amand and Wagnelée.
Behind Ligny and St. Amand, and on commanding ground, was the village
of Brye. Blücher’s whole force thus consisted of 87,352 men, of whom
8,498 were cavalry,—with 224 guns.
Napoleon, having finished giving his orders shortly after nine, arrived
at Fleurus about 11 A.M.[341] He busied himself, while the troops were
arriving, with examining the enemy’s position. From the tower of an old
and disused windmill in the outskirts of the town he made, it is said,
his first observations. Then he went,—without his staff, as his custom
was before a battle,—partly on horseback and partly on foot, along
the front of the enemy’s position, seeing for himself everything that
could be seen. By the time the troops had arrived in the neighborhood
of Fleurus, he had formed his plan. He had not, however, correctly
estimated the numbers of the force opposed to him; the nature of the
ground prevented his being able to see all the enemy’s troops.[342]
The more natural and obvious plan for Napoleon would have been to
direct his attack upon the exposed Prussian right wing, and to operate
in conjunction with the column under Marshal Ney, so far as that
might seem expedient. By moving upon Wagnelée and Brye, he would turn
the position of St. Amand, and almost certainly secure a victory.
But Napoleon did not see in this operation any chance of inflicting
a decisive blow.[343] At most, he would only have defeated an exposed
wing of the enemy’s army. There would have been nothing to prevent its
falling back upon the centre and left wing. The Prussians would no
doubt be worsted, but their defeat could hardly be of a character to
cripple them. Nor would their communications be in the slightest degree
imperilled.
What Napoleon determined on was an operation far more decisive. He saw
that that part of the Prussian army which lay in the neighborhood of
Sombreffe, Tongrinelle and Balâtre, placed there, as it had been, for
the purpose of protecting the communications with Namur, would in all
probability not dare to move from its position, and would accordingly
not be able to take any active part in the battle. He would therefore
have to deal only with that portion of the enemy’s army which lay
between Sombreffe and St. Amand,—say, two-thirds of their entire force.
He also saw that if the enemy’s centre, between Ligny and Sombreffe,
could be broken, the Prussian right wing would be separated from the
rest of the army, and that he might hope to overwhelm it. He saw also
one other thing. If, at or about the time when this success should be
obtained, a strong column from Marshal Ney’s command could march down
the Quatre Bras-Namur turnpike and move upon Brye, that success would
almost certainly be of the most decisive character.[344] Attacked in
front and rear at the same time, its connection with the rest of the
army severed, surrounded by superior numbers, the utter rout of that
part of the Prussian army was inevitable. (See Map 6.)
At one o’clock the French army had arrived, and was in and about
Fleurus. The Emperor threw the 4th Corps, Gérard’s, about 16,000
strong,[345] with 38 guns, far to the right, opposite the whole front
of the village of Ligny; the 3d Corps, Vandamme’s, about 19,000
strong,[346] with 38 guns, connected with the left of the 4th Corps,
and, assisted by Girard’s division of the 2d Corps, about 4,300
strong,[347] with 8 guns, menaced the Prussians in the village of St.
Amand; while the cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans, to the number of about
6,500 men,[348] with 24 guns, supported by Hulot’s division of the 4th
Corps, observed the Prussian left wing,—stationed from Sombreffe to
Balâtre. The Guard, with Milhaud’s Cuirassiers, in all about 22,000
men, with 102 guns,[349] was kept in reserve, near Fleurus, ready to
strike the final blow when the enemy in Ligny and St. Amand should
have been sufficiently weakened by a continuous struggle of three or
four hours. The whole force consisted of 67,787 men, of whom 13,394
were cavalry, with 210 guns.[350] These dispositions consumed perhaps
an hour or more. At 2 o’clock the chief-of-staff, Soult, wrote[351]
to Marshal Ney, informing him that, at half-past two Marshal Grouchy,
with the 3d and 4th Corps, would commence an attack on a Prussian
corps stationed between Sombreffe and Brye; that it was the Emperor’s
intention that Ney should also attack the enemy before him; and, after
having vigorously driven them, should fall back upon the main army to
join in enveloping this Prussian corps, of which mention had just been
made.
Then, at half-past two precisely, the battle began;[352] Gérard
vigorously attacked Ligny,—Vandamme and Girard, St. Amand. With
equal vigor did the Prussians defend their positions. The engagement
immediately became very hot, and very sanguinary. Both sides fought
with singular determination. In less than an hour Napoleon was
convinced that he had more than a single corps to deal with,—as he
had written to Ney,—it was an army. The success, therefore, could be
made more decisive than he had at first thought possible, if only
at the proper time Ney’s coöperation could be secured. Without that
coöperation, indeed, he was practically sure of victory; it was plain
to him that the Prussians in the villages of Ligny and St. Amand and
its neighboring hamlets, and on the heights in the rear of these
villages, were becoming exhausted, and were suffering terribly from
the fire of his guns, to which their position on the heights exposed
them;[353] he knew that when the proper moment arrived he could defeat
them; but he wanted something more than a defeat; he saw that the rout
or capture of this part of the Prussian army was a certain thing if
Ney could only make that movement from Quatre Bras upon their right
and rear, of which he had spoken in his 2 o’clock order. Hence at
a quarter-past three Soult wrote to Ney again,[354] urging him to
manœuvre at once, so as to envelop the enemy’s right, and to fall on
his rear. He told him that the Prussian army was lost if he acted
vigorously; that “the fate of France was in his hands.” “Thus,” the
order proceeds, “do not hesitate an instant to make the movement which
the Emperor orders, and direct yourself on the heights of Brye and St.
Amand to assist in a victory perhaps decisive.”
The officers who carried these orders had some thirteen miles to ride,
about six miles on cross-roads, as far as Gosselies, and the remainder
on the great Brussels turnpike, on which d’Erlon’s troops were marching
towards Frasnes. Their errands could not have been performed in less
than two hours,[355] and as a matter of fact they required three hours.
Napoleon could hardly have expected the first order to reach Ney much
before 5 P.M., and the second hardly before 6 P.M. The distance from
Quatre Bras to Marbais, where the road branches off from the Namur
turnpike in the direction of Wagnelée, is nearly four miles. If then
at 5 o’clock it should be in Marshal Ney’s power to execute the 2 P.M.
order, his troops might be looked for or heard from in the direction of
Marbais about 7 o’clock. If he should be unable to obey the 2 o’clock
order, but should be able to execute the 3.15 order, his movement down
the Namur road might be looked for about 8 o’clock.
The battle then went on with unabated determination and with heavy loss
on both sides. Blücher reinforced his troops from time to time; in this
way he exhausted his reserves; nearly all his divisions were brought
under fire. Napoleon on the other hand was exceedingly chary of giving
aid to the two corps engaged; he wished to keep his reserves as large
as possible; at half-past five he had employed ten thousand fewer men
than his adversary.[356] At this time, also, the 6th Corps was well
on its way from Charleroi. The hour was approaching, too, when Ney’s
coöperation might be expected.
Up to this time Napoleon had remained in his position in front of
Fleurus;[357] it was a central position, and nothing had called for his
personal superintendence elsewhere.
But now he prepared to strike the decisive blow. He determined to put
in the Guard. He proposed to send to Vandamme the infantry division
known as the Young Guard, and one of the two brigades of the division
known as the chasseurs of the Guard;[358] the other brigade of this
division he would place at the disposal of Gérard. He himself, at
the head of the infantry division of grenadiers of the Guard, known
as the Old Guard, with all the artillery of the Guard, with Guyot’s
division of the heavy cavalry of the Guard, and Milhaud’s division of
cuirassiers of the line,—to take the place of Lefebvre-Desnouettes’
division of light cavalry of the Guard which was with the left wing
under Marshal Ney,—prepared to carry the village of Ligny, and the
commanding heights above and to the right of the village, thereby
breaking the centre of the enemy’s line.
At this moment, however, word came from Vandamme that a column of
the enemy was seen debouching from a wood some two miles away, and
apparently marching on Fleurus. This was not the quarter in which the
expected reinforcement from Ney was looked for. Curiously enough,
Vandamme did not ascertain what this column was. Why he should not
have done this it is not easy to see. Had he sent a patrol to find out
who these troops were, time would have been saved, and time, at that
hour in the day, was most important. The Emperor sent one of his own
aides to ascertain the facts; and, pending his report, suspended the
projected attack. The battle went on as before, but Blücher drew more
and more from his centre and left wing to support his right at St.
Amand and the neighboring villages.
In something less than two hours the aide returned. The troops which
Vandamme had reported advancing were those of d’Erlon’s Corps.[359] All
anxiety was relieved. Napoleon naturally concluded[360] that d’Erlon
had been sent by Ney, and would immediately move on Brye. He instantly
resumed the suspended movement.[361] Before half-past seven, Vandamme
had received his reinforcements, and had renewed the fight with energy.
At the same time the Emperor, at the head of the grenadiers and cavalry
of the Guard and of Milhaud’s cuirassiers, marched for the village
of Ligny, of which the eastern portion was already in the possession
of Gérard’s Corps. The Prussians, though fighting desperately, were
speedily overcome; the village was carried; the brook of Ligny, a
serious obstacle for both cavalry and artillery, was crossed on the
bridges in the town; and at half-past eight o’clock[362] the French
troops, passing out of the northern end of the village, deployed on
the heights lying between that village and Sombreffe, and ascended the
plateau, the key to the field of battle, on which stood the windmill of
Bussy. The Prussian troops which Blücher had allowed to remain on this
part of the line offered a stout but ineffectual resistance. The old
Marshal himself came up from St. Amand, where he had wrongly supposed
that the crisis of the battle was being decided, and at the head of a
body of cavalry fiercely charged the victorious French. In one of the
encounters his horse was killed, he himself was badly bruised, and came
very near being taken prisoner.
Meantime, the Prussians fell back from St. Amand and the neighboring
villages, which were at once occupied by Vandamme. Brye, however,
was held until midnight by Pirch I. with a strong rear guard, and
Thielemann occupied Sombreffe and Point du Jour. The corps of Zieten,
followed finally by that of Pirch I., retreated on Tilly, a town just
north of Sombreffe, and in the direction of Wavre.
The Prussians lost[363] in this battle about 18,000 men killed and
wounded; and, a day or two afterwards, about 10,000 or 12,000 more,
who would seem to have done their duty in the fight, abandoned their
colors, and retired towards Liége. These men belonged to provinces
which had formerly been part of the French Empire, and their sympathies
were with Napoleon.[364] The French captured some thousands of the
Prussian wounded, and 25 or 30 guns. The French loss was between 11,000
and 12,000 men.[365]
The battle was over at about half-past nine. The 3d Corps established
itself in bivouac beyond St. Amand and Wagnelée; the 6th Corps occupied
the plateau of Bussy; the 4th Corps was on the right of the 6th, with
one division at and near Potriaux. The Guard and Milhaud’s cuirassiers
occupied a line behind these troops.[366] At 11 P.M. the Emperor
returned to Fleurus,[367] where he established his headquarters.
All parts of the French army on the field had taken part in this action
except the 1st and 6th Corps. The 1st Corps retired towards Frasnes
soon after it had been seen. As for the 6th Corps, the order to Lobau,
which was not sent until 2.30 P.M., could not have reached him in his
bivouac near Charleroi till 3.30 P.M. He had eight miles to march
before reaching Fleurus; he was then directed on Ligny, and he passed
through Ligny, just after the successful attack of that place by the
Imperial Guard, to his final position on the plateau of Bussy, between
Brye and Sombreffe, where he arrived about 9.30 P.M.[368] It has been
considered singular, that when Lobau arrived at Fleurus, say, about
7.30 P.M.,[369] he should have been directed on Ligny, apparently to
support the movement of the Guard; whereas if he had been instructed
to move on Brye by passing around St. Amand and Wagnelée it would seem
that he might have struck the defeated Prussians in flank and rear, and
accomplished substantially what Napoleon expected from Ney. But the
withdrawal of the 1st Corps could only be explained by the supposition
that Ney had encountered the English in considerable force; and under
these circumstances Napoleon may have deemed it wiser to retain the 6th
Corps as a reserve for the whole army.[370]
The battle of Ligny was a great victory, although it was not a
decisive victory. Napoleon had diminished by one-third the strength of
his opponent’s army, and had also driven him from the field. He had
certainly achieved a great success. But the advantage obtained was not
all that he had a right to expect. Had it not been for the appearance
of d’Erlon’s Corps in the neighborhood of St. Amand, the attack by the
Guard would have been made at half-past five o’clock, when there would
have been sufficient daylight left to have made it possible to follow
up the victory. On such a result as would have been obtained in this
event Napoleon had a right to calculate, and that he did not obtain
such a result was in no way his fault.[371] For the purpose therefore,
of estimating the adequacy of the Emperor’s measures to the task before
him, and the danger which Marshal Blücher ran when he accepted battle,
we should consider what would have been the result, if the attack of
the Guard had been made two hours earlier than it was made, and there
had been two hours of daylight in which to complete the defeat and to
pursue the enemy.
As for the coöperation of Ney, that is a different matter. Napoleon
could not know what resistance Ney might encounter; hence he could not
calculate on his overcoming that resistance and sending a reinforcement
to the main army,—he could only hope that Ney would be able to do
this. If Ney should be able to keep off the English, all that Napoleon
had a right to calculate on would be effected. Whether Ney could have
accomplished more than he did accomplish will be considered in another
place.
Owing, then, to the postponement of the attack on the Prussian centre
caused by the unexpected apparition of a large body of troops (the 1st
Corps), in a quarter where it threatened the French left, the victory
of Ligny was by no means so complete as it otherwise would have been.
Darkness came on before the Prussians, retiring from St. Amand and the
neighboring hamlets, could be vigorously pressed. Nevertheless, the
victory of Ligny had disposed of Blücher for thirty-six hours, at the
very least. It gave Napoleon an opportunity of attacking Wellington
the next day without danger of interference from the Prussians. And
as this success had been achieved with no loss at all on the part of
the 1st and 6th Corps and with a trifling loss on the part of the
Guard, Napoleon was in excellent condition to take advantage of the
opportunity thus presented. That is to say, the decision of Marshal
Blücher to accept battle when he had collected only three-fourths of
his army, and the inability of the Duke of Wellington to render him any
assistance, had produced this result at the close of the second day of
the campaign,—that one of the allied armies had been badly beaten, and
that Napoleon was perfectly free to attack the other the next day with
superior forces, most of which consisted of fresh troops.
FOOTNOTES:
[339] Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n.
[340] Ib., p. 155, n.
[341] Charras, vol. 1, p. 145.
[342] Ib., p. 150.
[343] For a further discussion of this subject see the Notes to this
chapter.
[344] “A movement that would certainly have obtained an immense
victory.” Jomini, p. 223.
[345] Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n. The division of Hulot and the cavalry
of Maurin were stationed opposite the bend in the enemy’s line, beyond
Ligny. Ib., p. 161.
[346] Ib., p. 155, n.
[347] Charras, vol. 1, p. 155, n.
[348] Ib., p. 155, n.
[349] Ib., p. 155, n.
[350] Ib., p. 155, n. This is exclusive of the 6th Corps, which was in
reserve. It numbered 10,465 men, with 32 guns.
[351] Doc. Inéd., XIII, p. 40; App. C, xxv; _post_, pp. 383, 384.
[352] The battle of Ligny has often been described. Charras, La Tour
d’Auvergne, Thiers, on the French side, Clausewitz and Ollech on the
German side, give excellent descriptions. Siborne’s account is also
very clear and good. It is unnecessary to repeat the details here.
[353] Sir Henry Hardinge, speaking to the Duke of Wellington, said:
“When you had examined the Prussian position, I remember you much
disapproved of it, and said to me, ‘if they fight here they will be
damnably mauled.’”
* * * The Duke added: “They were dotted in this way—all their bodies
along the slope of a hill, so that no cannon ball missed its effect
upon them.” Stanhope, p. 109. _Cf._ Hooper, p. 96.
[354] Doc. Inéd., XIV, p. 42; App. C, xxvi; _post_, p. 384.
[355] The Duke of Elchingen—Doc. Inéd., p. 41—estimates the distance at
nearly five leagues, that is, 12-1/2 miles, and allows two hours for
the time occupied. Charras, vol. 1, page 204, n., makes the distance
six leagues (15 miles) and estimates the time at three hours.
[356] Charras, vol. 1, p. 166.
[357] Ib., p. 164.
[358] Sometimes classed as part of the Old Guard, as in Charras, vol.
1, p. 67 and La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 48, and sometimes as “the Middle
Guard” (_la Garde moyenne_). See “Napoléon à Waterloo,” p, 315, n. 1;
p. 325.
[359] We shall consider in another place how d’Erlon’s Corps came to be
there. Shortly after it was seen by Vandamme it retired to Frasnes.
[360] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 135: Jomini, pp. 138, 139.
[361] There was no delay, as suggested by Siborne, vol. 1, p. 218. From
where the Guard had been stationed to the northerly end of the village
of Ligny, where it was put in, was at least two miles and a half. Only
a small part of this distance had been traversed before the news from
Vandamme caused a halt.
[362] Charras, vol. 1, p. 175, n. 2: letter from Soult to Joseph
Bonaparte.
[363] Charras, vol. 1, p. 179, where he discusses the Prussian
authorities. _Cf._ Muquardt, p. 139, n.
[364] _Cf._ Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 381, 382. Müffling: Passages, pp.
204, 205, 223. Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 302, 303.
[365] Charras, vol. 1, p. 180.
[366] Ib., pp. 177, 178.
[367] Ib., p. 179.
[368] Charras, vol. 1, p. 178.
[369] Charras (vol. 1, p. 184) thinks it was not later than 6.30 P.M.
when the 6th Corps reached Fleurus.
[370] Charras (vol. 1, pp. 184, 185) severely criticises this decision.
[371] Unless he erred in arresting the attack of the Guard on the
appearance of the strange corps. See _post_, p. 174, note 8.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER XI._
1. Napoleon has been often blamed because he did not begin the battle
of Ligny till between two and three o’clock in the afternoon. We
have spoken of this criticism before, and recur to it now merely to
repeat that the greater part of this delay may (in all probability)
be accounted for by his wish that his own advance-movement should be
contemporaneous with that of the left wing, one-half of which was far
in the rear. There was probably also an unusual amount of time spent in
examining the position of the enemy.
Clausewitz[372] is undoubtedly right in saying that
“If the actual tactical shock of battle could have been arranged to
take place in the morning of the 16th, it would have been an enormous
mistake in Napoleon to have delayed it, for Blücher was collecting
his troops at that time, and, as the whole force of the Prussians
[including Bülow’s Corps, which for anything Napoleon knew to the
contrary, might arrive during the day] was far superior to the 75,000
men which he could use against it, nothing was so important as to
offer battle before it was all got together.”
It is also true,[373] that, had Napoleon advanced early in the morning
with the main body of his army, leaving Ney to push forward with the
left wing as soon as he could, he would have been able to interrupt
the formation of the Prussian line of battle, and would not have been
in the least interfered with by the Anglo-Dutch army. But Napoleon,
although it is plain from his letters to Grouchy and Ney that he did
not expect to find either the Prussians or the English in great force,
preferred on the whole to make his own advance coincide in point of
time with that of Marshal Ney. He could not estimate with any certainty
the number of troops which Blücher might have on the heights of
Ligny or within call; he could not know how large a part of his army
Wellington had been able to collect. Hence he decided to defer his own
movement until Ney was ready, or, at least, ought to have been ready,
with all the troops which had been assigned to him, to protect the left
flank of the main army from all danger of an attack by the Anglo-Dutch
forces.
The question is one on which different opinions will always exist.
The course adopted by Napoleon was unquestionably the one most in
accordance with the principles of war. Whether a chance of success
justifies a departure from the practice of those principles, or whether
such a departure is warranted only in cases of emergency, is the real
question. We have no room to discuss it further here.
2. Napoleon’s plan of battle at Ligny has been severely criticised.
Clausewitz,[374] Rogniat,[375] Marshal Davout,[376] are especially
pronounced in their opinion that Napoleon should have manœuvred so
as to turn the Prussian right, and not to pierce their centre. The
question is thus stated by Rogniat:
“We arrived upon their right flank; reason counselled us to attack
this wing; in this way we should have avoided in part the defiles of
the brook; we should have approached our own left wing, which was
fighting at Quatre Bras, so that both armies could have helped each
other, and finally we should have thrown the Prussians far from the
English, in forcing them to retire on Namur.”
To this Napoleon[377] replied from St. Helena:
“The question in this battle was not that of separating the English
from the Prussians; we knew that the English could not be ready to
act till the next day; but here the point was to hinder that part of
the IIId Corps of Blücher which had not joined him by 11 A.M., and
which came by way of Namur, and also the IVth Corps, which came from
Liége by way of Gembloux, from uniting [with the Ist and IId Corps]
on the field of battle. In cutting the enemy’s line at Ligny, his
whole right wing at St. Amand was turned and compromised; while by
simply becoming masters of St. Amand, we should have accomplished
nothing.”
In other words, Napoleon defends his plan of battle by showing that it
aimed at a decisive tactical success; that its accomplishment would
practically have destroyed half of the Prussian army; which an attack
upon the exposed right wing would not have effected. He contends that
the Prussians being, as they certainly were, on this day, completely
separated from the English, the best thing he could possibly do was to
take advantage of their faulty formation, and cut off and destroy the
two exposed corps. This he calculated he could effect with the troops
he had in hand. Then he undoubtedly hoped that he would get assistance
from Ney in this operation.[378] The order to Ney at 2 P.M. shows this
beyond a question; and this order was reiterated at a quarter-past
three. Napoleon said to Gérard during the battle,[379] “It is possible
that in three hours the issue of the war may be decided. If Ney
executes his orders well, not a cannon in the Prussian army can escape
capture. That army is taken _en flagrant délit_.” This last expression
occurs also in the 3.15 P.M. order. The possibility of Ney’s sending a
force down the Quatre-Bras-Namur turnpike to take the exposed Prussian
right wing in rear, was therefore an additional reason for inclining
him to make his main attack at Ligny, and thereby isolate this wing,
with the hope of surrounding and destroying it. That he had no right to
count on Ney’s coöperation is certainly true, as has been stated above;
but then Napoleon believed that he could carry out his plan without
Ney’s coöperation, and that if Ney should assist him, his success would
be overwhelming.
To the reasons advanced by Rogniat for making the main attack upon the
right flank of the Prussians, Marshal Davout adds another:—[380]
“He ought not to have left the Prussian army between himself and
Marshal Ney; because, in that case, if he should beat the Prussians,
he would force them to retire in the direction of the English.”
To the same effect Clausewitz[381] asks, “whether Bonaparte ought to
have arranged his attack so as to drive Blücher towards Wellington,
or so as to push him away from him,”—implying that the result of the
battle as fought by Napoleon had the former effect.
“If,” says Clausewitz, “Bonaparte had attacked St. Amand with his
right wing, Wagnelée with his left, and had advanced with a third
column against the road from Brussels,[382] the Prussians, if they
lost the battle, would have been forced to retreat along the Roman
road, that is, towards the Meuse, and a union with Wellington in the
days immediately following the battle would have been very uncertain,
perhaps impossible.”
We can have no hesitation in admitting that if the Prussians had been
driven in the direction of the Meuse as the result of the battle, they
could not have afforded aid to the English on the 18th of June. But we
can hardly believe that if Napoleon had destroyed their Ist and IId
Corps, which he expected would be the result of his plan of battle, the
Prussians could possibly have afforded any further assistance to the
English. Still, while the decision of the Prussian generals after the
battle to maintain their communication with the Duke of Wellington,
and to come to his assistance at Waterloo with their whole army, was
not arrived at merely or chiefly because the two corps which had
been beaten at Ligny were able to fall back in a northerly direction
instead of in an easterly direction, in retiring from the field of
battle,[383] it is certainly true that this fact did make the task
easier of accomplishment; it saved time, also. At the same time, it
did not affect in any way the risk involved in the operation,—that of
renouncing for the time being their line of supplies.
3. We have seen that Napoleon believed that Ney’s intervention, which,
as we have seen, might have occurred at the moment when the Prussian
centre was being pierced, would have gained him a great victory. But
Clausewitz[384] asks: “Why was it inevitable that 10,000 men in the rear
of the strong Prussian army of 80,000 men, in an open country, where
one can see on all sides, should bring about its complete overthrow?”
In other words, Napoleon was not warranted (so Clausewitz contends) in
expecting such a decisive success, even if Ney should send 10,000 men
down the Namur road.
But Clausewitz has not in his question, above quoted, put the case
quite fairly. The question which Napoleon considered was this:—What
would in all probability be the effect upon two Prussian corps,
numbering at the commencement of the action not over 63,000 men,
attacked vigorously for three or four hours, subjected during that
time to a most destructive fire of artillery, reduced by casualties to
a force not greatly exceeding 50,000 men, assailed in front by over
20,000 fresh troops in addition to their opponents of the last few
hours, forced to make a precipitate retreat by having their connection
with the rest of their army broken,—what would be the effect upon them
at this moment of an unexpected and vigorous attack in rear of 10,000
fresh troops? Napoleon thought and said, that, in his judgment, the
result would be the total rout of the two corps, the capture of all
their guns and perhaps half of their men. It is probable that he was
right in his opinion.
4. But how far was Napoleon warranted in expecting aid from Ney?
As to Ney’s whereabouts at the time when the 2 P.M. order should reach
him, say, at 5 P.M., we have spoken before,[385] and have shown that,
long before that hour, certainly as early as 4 P.M., the whole of the
2d Corps and the greater part of the 1st Corps ought to have arrived
at Quatre Bras. In fact, it will be remembered that had Reille obeyed
at once Ney’s order to him he would have arrived at Quatre Bras at
noon; and there was nothing to prevent d’Erlon following promptly on
his traces. Napoleon, it is true, as we learn from his own narrative,
had heard of this vexatious delay, caused by Reille,—which he naturally
but erroneously attributed to Reille’s superior, Ney,—but he still
seemed to think it possible that Ney could be at Quatre Bras at noon,
notwithstanding. This, to be sure, was absolutely out of Ney’s power,
as we have seen; but there was no reason whatever why Ney should not
have had long before 5 P.M. his whole command well in hand, at or in
front of Quatre Bras. Napoleon was perfectly justified in assuming this
to be the case.
But though Ney might well be at Quatre Bras with his whole force, he
might yet be entirely unable to comply with the Emperor’s order to
detach a force to attack the Prussians in rear.
Clausewitz[386] points out that Ney with his 40,000 men could easily
encounter 50,000 to 60,000 English and Dutch. This is certainly true.
It may be added that the last dispatch[387] sent to Ney informed him
that an officer of lancers had just informed the Emperor that large
masses of the enemy were to be seen near Quatre Bras. This information
was incorrect, as a matter of fact, yet it was believed to be true at
the time the despatch was written. Of course the truth may have been
ascertained before the 2 P.M. order was sent to Ney; but we do not know
this for a fact. There was certainly no reason why Napoleon should have
felt certain that Ney would find it possible to send troops to his
assistance; it all depended upon the forwardness of the concentration
of the Duke of Wellington’s army; and as to this Napoleon could but
guess,—he had no information at all.
5. If Napoleon, then, could not rely with any certainty on Ney’s
assistance, was he justified in adopting a plan of battle, to the full
success of which Ney’s coöperation was essential? Would it not have
been wiser for him to have adopted the plan recommended by Rogniat,
Davout and Clausewitz, and to have thrown his whole force on the
exposed right wing of the Prussians?
This question cannot be properly answered without a careful examination
of the tactical conditions, and this no one of Napoleon’s critics
has attempted with any detail. We will leave the matter, therefore,
with this single observation. Napoleon, when he had completed his
examination of the Prussian position, saw that there were open to
him two plans of attack, each giving excellent promise of success.
He chose the one which in his judgment offered the greater chance of
success, independent of Ney’s coöperation, and promised a decisive
success if Ney’s coöperation could be secured. As it was, without Ney’s
assistance, and in spite of an unfortunate accident which caused an
injurious delay in the final attack, he gained a great victory. It
hardly seems worth our while to speculate on what the results would
have been if he had adopted the other plan.
6. Why did not Napoleon order d’Erlon’s Corps to remain and take part
in the action? For not doing this he has been most severely criticised
by Charras[388] and others. But Napoleon must have supposed that d’Erlon
had come upon the field under orders from Marshal Ney expressly to
remain and take part in the action. Why, then, should he send him any
orders? Jomini, indeed, says[389] that Napoleon should have sent d’Erlon
an order directing him on Brye. We can see now that this would have
been wise; but it might well have appeared unnecessary at the time,
inasmuch as the order of 2 P.M. by implication directs Ney’s troops on
Brye. It must also be remembered that at this moment Napoleon had all
he could attend to in organizing the decisive movement on Ligny.
If any other explanation than the above be needed, it has been
furnished by Clausewitz.[390] He says that the lateness of the hour
probably prevented Napoleon from directing personally the employment of
the 1st Corps.
“Napoleon seems to have received information of the approach of this
corps somewhere in the neighborhood of half-past five; it took till
seven before the news that it was d’Erlon was brought him; it would
have taken an hour before d’Erlon could have received the order, and
another hour would have passed before he could have appeared in the
neighborhood of Brye,” _i.e._, in obedience to such an order.
The inference is that Napoleon may well have thought it better to let
d’Erlon proceed in obedience to the orders under which he was acting
when he came upon the field.
7. We may fairly say that Napoleon fought few battles in his whole
career more carefully and more skilfully than the battle of Ligny. The
difference between a brave and zealous general of ordinary capacity and
a master in the art was well illustrated on this field. Clausewitz’s
remarks on this battle are very clear and instructive. We give them in
full,—premising that the figures vary more or less from those which we
have adopted.
[391]“If we get a picture of the whole battle, it is like all modern
battles, a slow destruction of the opposing forces in the first line,
where they touch each other, in a fire lasting many hours, subjected
to only slight oscillations, till, at last, one part obtains a clear
superiority in reserves, _i.e._, in fresh bodies, and then with
these gives the deciding blow to the already wavering forces of the
enemy.
“Bonaparte advances with about 75,000 men[392] against Blücher, whose
three united corps form a force of 78,000 men,[393] that is of equal
strength.
“With about 30,000 men he combats, from 3 o’clock till 8, the two
chief points of Blücher’s position, St. Amand and Ligny. He employs
some 6,000 men to occupy the IIId Prussian army corps, and with
33,000 he remains far behind the fighting line, quietly in reserve.
Of these he employs 6,000 men finally to sustain the battle at St.
Amand.
“As early as 6 o’clock he determines to give the deciding blow at
Ligny with the Guard: at that moment he receives the information
that a considerable corps has appeared on his left flank, about one
hour’s march distant. Bonaparte stops his movement, for it might be a
corps coming from the enemy at Brussels. The fact is, it was Frasnes
against St. Amand. A troop of cavalry is sent in haste to reconnoitre
this corps, but nearly two hours go by before the news comes back
that it is the 1st French army corps. On this account the attack on
Ligny does not take place till 8 o’clock.
“Even this blow Bonaparte does not give with the whole mass of his
reserves, but only with about half of them, that is, with the Guard;
the 6th Corps remains behind as a reserve.
“Blücher has in the beginning of the battle employed the Ist army
corps of 27,000 men in the positions of Ligny and St. Amand, and the
IIId, of 22,000 men, in that extending from Sombreffe to Balâtre,
and has kept back only the IId, with 29,000 men, as a reserve. It is
true that the IIId army corps could have been concentrated, since the
enemy did not attack it in earnest, and it may have been looked upon
as a reserve. Blücher, it is true, counted still on Bülow’s arrival;
but it did not take place, and so the situation of the Prussian
reserves remained always unfavorable. The IId army corps, that is,
the reserves, were gradually, as we have seen, employed to sustain
the battle. Nothing therefore remained to decide the battle even if
the state of the battle had remained perfectly balanced, or even had
turned out favorably for us.
“As the day ended, the situation of the opposing forces was somewhat
as follows: Blücher had used up in the villages 38,000 infantry,
who had suffered considerably, had in great part expended their
ammunition, and must be looked upon as useless, in which there
was not much more force. 6,000 infantry were stationed behind the
villages, scattered in single battalions which had however not yet
fought. The rest of the 56,000 men of the Ist and IId army corps were
cavalry and artillery, of which only a small part was fresh.
“If the IIId army corps had been collected, or if it had been
sufficiently provided for, it would have been a reserve of about
18,000 men; it could therefore have been said that Blücher had still
24,000 men in reserve.
“Bonaparte, although originally some few thousand men weaker than
Blücher, had now, however, several thousand more fresh troops than
that general: the cause of this was his keeping back more men, a
greater economy of forces in the firing.
“This small[394] superiority of reserves would naturally not have
decided much, but it must nevertheless be looked on as the first
cause of the victory.
“The second reason was the unequal result which the firing had up to
that time produced.
“It is true that when Bonaparte advanced against Ligny we still
occupied part of this village, but we had then lost the rest; it
is true that we still occupied a position between Wagnelée and St.
Amand, but here, too, we had lost villages and ground; the engagement
had therefore turned out everywhere a little to our disadvantage, and
in such a case the preparations for the deciding blow are already
made.
“The third and most important reason was, however, without doubt, the
fact that Blücher did not have at his disposal the troops which had
not yet fought, namely, the IIId Corps. It is true that the XIIth
brigade was very near him, but that was too little: the IXth was also
not far away; but of this, as well as of the whole of Thielemann’s
Corps, there had been no thought; and the IIId Corps, therefore,
as regards a decisive blow to be given by it, was as good as out
of reach and could be used only for the retreat. Perhaps and very
probably, this scattered disposition of Thielemann is to be looked
upon as on the whole an actual advantage. If the IIId Corps had been
at hand, it would have been employed also, without increasing the
chances for a successful result, which, considering the turn which
the whole affair had taken, could have been secured only by a decided
superiority, such, in fact, as the arrival of Bülow’s Corps would
have procured. And if the IIId Corps had been used, the loss in
battle would probably have been greater by 10,000 men.”
We cannot leave this subject without calling attention to a remark[395]
of Marshal Davout’s in his criticism of the Emperor’s conduct of this
campaign. He speaks of him in connection with this battle as
“The Napoleon of the Moskowa, who, to make use of a vulgar
expression, takes the bull by the horns; this was the reason why this
battle was so bloody and so hotly fought, etc.”
How much justification there is for this remark appears from
Clausewitz’s review of Napoleon’s tactics, which we have cited above.
But Davout had a case to make out, apparently, and he desired to
score a point at every stage of his criticism; an extremely common
temptation, by the way, to which very many critics yield. As for the
losses suffered by the French to which Davout refers, it must be
remembered that Napoleon would have brought the action to a close
two hours sooner, had it not been for the unexpected apparition of
d’Erlon’s Corps; and that a good part of the French loss was suffered
in those two hours. The same cause also operated to render the victory
much less decisive than it otherwise would have been, as darkness
came on before anything like pursuit could be attempted. Any fair
criticism, therefore, of Napoleon’s conduct of the battle of Ligny
ought to proceed on the supposition that this unlucky incident, for
which a superserviceable staff-officer was solely responsible, had not
occurred. On this supposition, then, the Prussian centre at Ligny would
have been broken between 6 and 7 P.M., the losses of the French would
have been much less, and their victory would necessarily have been much
more complete.
8. The wisdom of Napoleon’s course in arresting the attack on the
Prussian centre when the news of the appearance of a strange corps
which might possibly consist of hostile troops was brought to him, has
perhaps not received the attention it deserves. When Napoleon decided
to wait till he should learn what this body of troops might be, he
was all ready to give the finishing blow to the Prussian army. He was
pretty certain to break up a large part of that army. If the unknown
corps should turn out to have come from Ney, it was certainly in a
position where it could play a most important part in the attack. If,
on the other hand, it should turn out to have come from Wellington,
Napoleon, provided only that he should have time enough to complete his
contemplated stroke against Blücher, would probably be in a much better
situation to deal with his antagonists than he could otherwise hope to
occupy. It would seem, therefore, as if it was by no means clear that
Napoleon took the wisest course when he deferred the main attack on the
Prussians on the appearance of d’Erlon’s Corps.
9. It is not easy to see why Napoleon, certainly when he found that
he would have to fight a battle at Ligny, should not have ordered the
6th Corps up to Fleurus at once, so that he might have it close at
hand in case he needed it. The extreme importance of inflicting, if
possible, a crushing defeat on the Prussians was so clearly seen by
him, as his orders to Ney on the afternoon of the 16th and morning
of the 17th abundantly show, that we cannot understand why he should
not have availed himself of the aid of Lobau’s command. Lobau, even
if he were not sent for until 11 A.M., could have been at Fleurus at
or before 4 P.M.; and had he then been directed to march in rear of
the troops of Vandamme and Girard which were fighting at and near St.
Amand, he could have fallen upon the Prussian right and rear near Brye
at or about half-past five o’clock, which was the moment when Napoleon
was preparing for the decisive stroke at Ligny. Lobau could undoubtedly
have accomplished all that Napoleon expected from Ney. And the
coöperation of Lobau could have been arranged for without any chance of
failure, while that of Ney was necessarily dependent on the situation
in which he might find himself at Quatre Bras.
FOOTNOTES:
[372] Clausewitz, ch. 25, p. 53.
[373] _Cf._ Charras, vol. 1, pp. 182, 183.
[374] Clausewitz, ch. 34.
[375] Cons. sur l’Art de la Guerre, p. 339, cited in Corresp., vol. 31,
p. 472.
[376] Davout, p. 545.
[377] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 472.
[378] Clausewitz (ch. 34, pp. 81 _et seq._) points out that Ney’s
coöperation could not have formed an essential part of Napoleon’s plan
of battle, for Napoleon “could not know whether Ney would be able to
spare him a single man.”
[379] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 206.
[380] Davout, p. 545.
[381] Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 83.
[382] It is not quite clear in which direction this column was to
advance.
[383] Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. Maurice thinks that the beaten
troops must have crossed the turnpike, even if they were intending to
retreat towards the Rhine.
[384] Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 66.
[385] _Ante_, p. 133.
[386] Clausewitz, ch. 31, p. 65.
[387] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. 31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381.
[388] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 170, 171, 183, 184.
[389] Jomini, p. 138.
[390] Clausewitz, ch. 34, p. 84.
[391] Clausewitz, ch. 32, pp. 73 _et seq._
[392] This includes the 6th Corps.
[393] Charras makes the Prussian army about 87,000 strong.
[394] Unless we include the IIId Corps among the Prussian reserves,
the French superiority in reserves was very large; and Blücher, as
Clausewitz goes on to state, did not have the IIId Corps at his
disposal.
[395] Davout, p. 547.