THE SEVENTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON.
Napoleon had, thus far, as we have seen, in the main, accomplished his
programme. Things had turned out, so far as the enemy were concerned,
very much as he had originally expected. He had found Blücher
determined to fight; he had found Wellington wholly unprepared to
assist his ally. He had encountered the Prussians, therefore, alone;
and he had beaten them. He had, in the main, as we have said, done what
he expected to do. It now only remained to complete the original plan
marked out in the letters to Ney and Grouchy of the morning before;
and, leaving the latter with the 3d and 4th Corps and plenty of cavalry
to ascertain the direction in which the Prussians had retreated, to
march himself at the head of the 6th Corps and the Guard to join Ney,
and move promptly against the English. (See Map 8.)
There was no reason in the world for delay. As has been pointed out
above, Napoleon had not been obliged to employ all his troops in
obtaining the victory of Ligny. The troops which he intended to take
with him were fresh, or substantially so. The 6th Corps had not fired
a shot; the Guard, though it had lost perhaps a thousand men, had
certainly done no very hard fighting, and it had been brilliantly
successful. The cavalry, also, had suffered but little. Ney, too, had
plenty of fresh troops. The 1st Corps, d’Erlon’s, had not been engaged;
nor had the light cavalry division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes; only one
of the four brigades of Kellermann’s heavy cavalry had been in action
at Quatre Bras. Thus a formidable army, almost entirely composed of
fresh troops, could be led at once against the Duke of Wellington’s
heterogeneous forces. The weather, in the morning of the 17th, was
fine; the Prussians, wherever they had gone, were, at any rate, for
the time being, out of the way; there was no reason, we repeat,
why advantage should not have been promptly taken of the fortunate
situation in which the victory of Ligny had temporarily placed the
French,—why there should have been any hesitation whatever in dealing
with the Anglo-Dutch army, separated, as it now was, from its ally.
But we may go farther than this. Fortunate as the situation of the
French was on the morning after the battle of Ligny, there were grave
reasons for deeming this advantage to be very brief in its duration.
Napoleon had, indeed, won a victory over Blücher. But the tardiness of
d’Erlon and the disobedience of Ney had prevented Napoleon from getting
from his left wing the assistance on which he had counted; and he
himself had not seen fit to modify his operations so as to conform to
this different state of facts. He had not attacked the Prussians while
they were taking position on the heights of Ligny, because at that
early hour the forward movement of the main army could not have been
covered by the advance of the whole of the left wing. He had not been
able to win the crushing victory over the Prussians when concentrated
which he would undoubtedly have won if Ney had obeyed his orders
intelligently and boldly, and had been able, as he then would have been
able, to send a large force down the Namur road to take the Prussians
in rear. Lastly, Napoleon had not achieved the success on which he
had a right to count without the aid of Ney, for, on the unexpected
appearance of the 1st Corps, he had delayed the final stroke until it
was too dark to take full advantage of it. Napoleon had not in the
battle of Ligny, as he very well knew, destroyed the Prussian army. He
understood perfectly the difference between the victory he had actually
won and the victory which he would have won had he received from Ney
the assistance of d’Erlon’s Corps, or even of 10,000 men.[448] Hence
it is remarkable that he should not have exerted himself to use his
incomplete success to the best advantage, and this required, of course,
the utmost energy and activity on his part.
There was also, had he only known it, a magnificent opportunity before
him on this morning of the 17th. For, owing to the carelessness of
the Prussian staff, Wellington had not been promptly informed of the
result of the battle of Ligny, and he was still at Quatre Bras, only
six miles from Brye, where he could be assailed in front and flank. He
had not yet succeeded in collecting his entire army. It was perfectly
practicable to attack him in this condition before the Prussians could
possibly reorganize their beaten forces, and come to his assistance.
For such an attack Napoleon had ample means, and of the best quality,
as we have just seen. Ney’s movements could easily be coördinated with
his own; Ney could attack the English in front, while the Emperor
brought up the 6th Corps and the Guard over the Namur-Quatre-Bras
turnpike directly upon their flank. The march from Brye could be begun
at sunrise,—at 4 A.M.; Quatre Bras could be reached before 7 o’clock.
Had Napoleon, then, acted with energy in accordance with his own plan,
he would have stood a very good chance of crushing this portion of
Wellington’s army,—so far from its ally, so open to attack.[449] But,
apart from this, this was not one of those cases where time is required
to come to a decision; nothing was risked by marching against the
English at once. And, as it happened, fortune had put in Napoleon’s
way the opportunity of striking a decisive blow.
Napoleon allowed this opportunity to escape him. Up to this moment we
have seen him as active, as sagacious, as energetic as ever. But it
would certainly seem that on this morning of the 17th he was not up
to the mark. He probably was greatly fatigued, and we need not wonder
at it. From half-past three on the morning of the 12th, when he left
Paris, to eleven o’clock at night of the 16th, when, having fought
and won the battle of Ligny, he sought rest at Fleurus, he had been
subjected to a tremendous strain. Neither Wellington nor Blücher had
had anything like it. He had been on the move and at work, night and
day. He had had to decide at the moment the most important questions,
he had had to take the gravest responsibilities. There was a natural
reaction. The Emperor yielded to the sense of fatigue. He put off
the execution of the next part of his plan. He moreover neglected to
ascertain the facts of the situation, and hence was unaware, until too
late, of the great opportunity then presented to him. General Jomini
considerately remarks:—[450] “Undoubtedly the Emperor had powerful
motives for resigning himself to such inactivity; but these motives
have never reached us.”
Napoleon wasted most of the morning. He expected, he says, to hear
from Ney what the result of his operations had been; but that officer,
furious with the Emperor for having, as he supposed, withdrawn the
1st Corps without notice from his command,[451] vouchsafed no report to
headquarters. Finally, about 8 A.M., General Flahaut, the Emperor’s
aide, who had carried the letter to Ney the previous morning and had
remained with him during the day, returned to Napoleon and brought him
the first information of the battle of Quatre Bras.
He also brought word that Ney had received no news of the result of
the battle of Ligny.[452] Thereupon Soult wrote a despatch[453] to Ney
informing him that the Prussians had been “put to rout,” and that
Pajol was pursuing them on the roads to Namur and Liége. Ney was
then told that the Emperor was going to Brye; that it did not seem
possible for the English to do anything against him, Ney, but that if
they should undertake anything, the Emperor would march directly upon
them. Then the Emperor comments on the fact that Ney did not act on
the preceding day with his entire force.[454] Lastly, Ney is ordered to
take up position at Quatre Bras; but if that should not be possible,
then he was at once to state the facts in detail, and the Emperor would
immediately march on Quatre Bras himself, while Ney should assail the
enemy in front. If, on the contrary, there should be only a rear-guard
there, Ney was to attack it and take up position there. Ney was also
directed to inform the Emperor of the exact situation of his divisions,
and of all that was going on in his front.
That no move of importance was then under contemplation at headquarters
appears from this sentence:—
“To-day will be needed to terminate this operation, to supply
ammunition, bring in stragglers, and call in detachments. Give your
orders accordingly; and see to it that all the wounded are cared for
and transported to the rear; we hear complaints that the ambulances
have not done their duty.”
This despatch was probably written about 8 A.M.[455] It is clear
from reading it that Napoleon presumed, as a matter of course, that
Wellington had long before heard of the defeat of Blücher, and had
fallen back towards Brussels, leaving only a rear-guard at Quatre Bras.
Had he known the truth,—which was, as we shall soon see, that the
Duke did not move a man till 10 A.M.,—he would no doubt have attacked
him at once. It is true that Napoleon’s conjecture as to Wellington’s
movements was a very natural one. It is true, also, that he had a
perfect right to expect to receive from the commander of his left wing
an accurate and full account of the situation there; Ney ought, it is
not necessary to say, to have prepared a report of the battle of Quatre
Bras on the evening of the 16th, and sent it off to headquarters at
once. Furthermore, he ought to have informed the Emperor on the morning
of the 17th that the English were still at Quatre Bras in force.
Napoleon’s inactivity does not in the least excuse him. But Ney’s
neglect to make proper reports of the situation at Quatre Bras does not
in any way justify Napoleon’s delay in marching upon the English. The
propriety of this step was not dependent on the accounts to be received
from Marshal Ney. To unite the reserves to the left wing and move
upon Wellington at the earliest possible moment was the thing to do,
whatever might be the reports from Ney.
Marshal Soult seems to have been of no assistance to the Emperor on
this morning. If he had been a competent and efficient chief-of-staff
he would assuredly have had all needed information ready for the
Emperor when the latter made his appearance in the morning. As it
was, knowing nothing of what had happened at Quatre Bras till nearly
eight o’clock, waiting till it should suit Ney to furnish him with
the information requested in the 8 A.M. despatch, assuming that
Wellington must have heard of the defeat of Blücher and fallen back in
consequence, the Emperor amused himself with going over the field of
battle, and talking politics to the generals.[456] He did not exert
himself in the least to stimulate the energy and activity of his
subordinates; in fact, he yielded to that lassitude which is so apt
to succeed unusual exertion. He deliberately postponed the execution
of the next step in his campaign, notwithstanding that the incomplete
result of his encounter with the Prussians rendered it all the more
imperative that no time should be lost and no opportunity neglected.
During the forenoon, however, the troops intended to join Ney were
ordered to Marbais on the turnpike,—Lobau[457] at ten o’clock,—the Guard
and Milhaud’s cuirassiers at eleven. At noon, it having been reported
that the English were still at Quatre Bras, another order[458] was
sent to Ney, directing him to attack the enemy there, and informing
him that the Emperor was leading the troops now at Marbais to support
his operations. Thus the execution of the plan of campaign marked out
in the letters to Ney and Grouchy was at last resumed; the reserves
under Napoleon marched to join the left wing under Ney; the right wing
under Grouchy was assigned to take care of the defeated Prussians.
Girard’s division of the 2d Corps, which had suffered severely in the
battle,—Girard himself having been mortally hurt,—was left on the field
to take care of the wounded.
Napoleon had undoubtedly assumed that the Prussian army, if beaten,
would retire on its base of operations, towards Namur and Liége. This
assumption was strengthened by the circumstances of the battle of
Ligny. He had not failed to note the strong force retained by Marshal
Blücher to protect his communications with Namur as well as the road
to Gembloux, by which the IVth Corps was expected to arrive. He was
perfectly justified in inferring that if Blücher had established a new
or secondary base at Wavre, for instance, or Louvain, or if he had
had any idea whatever of renouncing his line of communications, so as
to be able to coöperate with the English in subsequent operations, he
would without doubt have placed his left wing in a wholly different
position, where he could have made some use of it in the battle.[459]
The fact that Thielemann’s Corps was placed where it could not be of
any assistance to those of Zieten and Pirch I., seemed to indicate
that reliance was placed upon the English for any help these corps
might need, and corroborated the presumption that Blücher and Gneisenau
were willing to take the risk of the defeat of a part of the Prussian
army by accepting battle where support could only be furnished by
their allies, and had no intention whatever of renouncing their base
of operations, _via_ Namur and Liége. Added to these considerations
was the general presumption against such a dangerous and inconvenient
course as a change of base must always be.[460]
It must also be remembered that the Prussians held the villages of
Brye and Sombreffe till after midnight, so that there was no obstacle
whatever to the troops of the two beaten corps retiring after the
battle by the Quatre-Bras-Namur turnpike towards Namur. It may well be
questioned whether there was any need for these troops to cross the
pike at all; or whether any of them would have crossed it, had Blücher
given orders for the whole army to retire on Namur.[461]
Hence it was assumed at the headquarters of the French army that it
was in the direction of Namur that the Prussians had retreated.[462]
Soult, early in the morning, sent out Pajol on the Namur road with a
division of his own corps, supported by a brigade from Exelmans’ Corps,
to ascertain the facts; and before 8 A.M. Pajol reported the capture
of a battery and prisoners at Le Mazy on that road.[463] It was on
this information that Soult informed Ney that Pajol was pursuing the
Prussians on the road to Namur.
It is nevertheless very strange that no reconnoissance should have been
ordered in the direction of Tilly and Wavre.[464] This may perhaps be
partly due to the fact that the cavalry divisions belonging to the
3d and 4th Corps, upon which such duties would most naturally fall,
were exhausted by their efforts of the day before, that the 6th Corps,
which bivouacked nearest to Brye, had no cavalry division attached to
it, and that the rest of the cavalry was on the right of the position.
These facts may perhaps serve to account in a way for what cannot but
be considered as an inexcusable neglect. There was plenty of cavalry
with the army. Exelmans could have been sent out towards Wavre, as
easily as Pajol towards Namur. Both routes were equally open to the
enemy. It was certainly by no means impossible that Blücher should,
in spite of his defeat, endeavor to keep up his communication with
Wellington, especially considering that half his army,—the IIId and
IVth Corps,—was untouched, as Napoleon very well knew. The neglect,
therefore, to explore the country to the north of the turnpike cannot
be excused. The blame for this neglect must fall primarily upon
Napoleon, for he ought to have ordered Soult to attend to this matter
in the early morning. This he certainly failed to do. Soult ought, to
be sure, to have had the reconnoissance made, on his own motion; and
in neglecting this, he shows that he was not a good chief-of-staff.
But the Emperor seems to have been satisfied with what Soult had done;
hence, the blame of not ascertaining that the two beaten Prussian
Corps had retreated in the direction of Wavre, falls finally on his
shoulders. Nor can Napoleon’s fault in this matter be explained or
excused on the ground of his fatigue; it costs no exertion to order
a cavalry officer to make an exploration in a certain direction; the
reason the order was not given was because the Emperor was so sure that
such an exploration would result in nothing,—because in fact he was
so confident that the Prussians had retired to the eastward, towards
their base of operations. There was, it is true, as we have pointed out
above, strong reason to believe this to be the fact; but there was also
a possibility that it might not be the fact; and if it should turn out
not to be the fact, the plan of Napoleon would have to be essentially
modified, for a retreat of the two beaten corps in the direction of
Wavre, where they could easily be united with the two unbroken corps,
could hardly have any other object than a junction with the English
army, retiring, as that army was sure to do, from Quatre Bras towards
Brussels.
Before Napoleon left the field of battle for Marbais, shortly before
twelve o’clock, he called Grouchy to him and gave him instructions by
word of mouth. Up to this time no further information had been received
since Pajol had reported the capture of guns and prisoners on the Namur
road. The Emperor at first simply told him to take the 3d and 4th
Corps and the cavalry of Pajol and Exelmans and to pursue the enemy.
“I replied to him,” says Marshal Grouchy, whose account[465] we are
now giving, “that the Prussians had commenced their retreat at ten
o’clock the evening before; that much time must elapse before my
troops, who were scattered over the plain, were cleaning their guns
and making their soup, and were not expecting to be called upon
to march that day, could be put in movement; that the enemy had
seventeen or eighteen hours the start of the troops sent in pursuit;
that although the reports of the cavalry gave no definite information
as to the direction of the retreat of the mass of the Prussian army,
it was apparently on Namur that they were retiring; and that thus, in
following them, I should find myself isolated, separated from him,
and out of the range of his movements. These observations,” Marshal
Grouchy goes on to say, “were not well received; the Emperor repeated
his orders, adding that it was for me to discover the route taken
by Marshal Blücher; that he himself was going to fight the English,
‘if they will stand on this side of the Forest of Soignes’[466] that
it was for me to complete the defeat of the Prussians in attacking
them as soon as I should have caught up with them, and that I must
communicate with him by the paved road,”[467]—the Namur-Quatre-Bras
turnpike.
These objections raised by Marshal Grouchy were clearly not well
taken. His two corps had done the principal part of the fighting the
day before; they were unquestionably in need of repose the forenoon
after the battle. The fresh troops in the army were required for the
operations which were to be immediately undertaken against the English.
Hence the delay in beginning the pursuit of the Prussians, of which
Grouchy complained, was unavoidable, unless the whole plan of campaign
was to be changed. It would have been very desirable, no doubt, had it
been possible, to follow up the defeated Prussians with the greatest
promptness and vigor. But under the circumstances this was not
practicable, unless, as we have said, Napoleon should change his plan,
and should march against Blücher with the bulk of his army, consisting
almost entirely of fresh troops, and should leave Grouchy with the
corps of Vandamme and Gérard to watch the English. This the Emperor was
not proposing to do. Moreover, if the Prussians were really retiring
on their base, as both Napoleon and Grouchy at this time supposed was
the case, delay in following them up could not be a very material
matter.[468]
Then, as for the objection that, if he followed the Prussians towards
Namur, he would “find himself isolated, separated from the Emperor,
and out of the range of his movements,” this was to a certain extent
unavoidable. The fact that such an objection should be raised shows how
unfit Grouchy was for an independent command. The slightest reflection
should have convinced him that the task assigned to him could not well
be assigned to any one else; and that it was a task which some one must
perform. It was, therefore, his manifest duty to undertake it with
cheerful alacrity, and not in the fault-finding spirit which he does
not even attempt to conceal.
These were the only orders which Marshal Grouchy ever admitted having
received on the 17th; he denied, over and over again, in his pamphlets
written about the battle, ever having received any written order,
whether from Napoleon or Soult, until the next day.[469] In consequence
of these formal and explicit denials, which were very generally
credited, the statements made by Napoleon in his St. Helena narratives,
which, though anything but exact, nevertheless conveyed the truth
substantially, were generally disbelieved. For nearly thirty years
after the battle of Waterloo a wholly false notion was prevalent as
to the task assigned by Napoleon to Marshal Grouchy. Neither Siborne,
who wrote in 1844, nor Van Loben Sels, who wrote in 1849, was aware of
the existence of the written order which we are now about to give. The
mischievous influence which this deliberate concealment of his orders
by Marshal Grouchy has exerted upon the general opinion of Napoleon’s
conduct of this campaign can hardly be exaggerated.
Shortly after giving these verbal orders to Grouchy, which were plainly
based on the theory that Blücher had fallen back on Namur, Napoleon
received[470] a report from Berton, who commanded the brigade which
was sent out in support of Pajol, to the effect that he had been led
by the statements of the inhabitants to proceed to Gembloux, where he
had seen, at 9 A.M., a Prussian corps of some 20,000 men.[471] This
certainly looked as if the Prussians were not retiring on Namur. The
first thing to be done, therefore, was to find out where they were
going, and what they were proposing to do. At Gembloux, so it now
appeared, one would be sure to get on the track of the Prussians, and
obtain news of their movements and designs. Accordingly the Emperor, in
the temporary absence of Marshal Soult, dictated to General Bertrand
the following order[472] to Grouchy:—
“Proceed to Gembloux with the cavalry corps of General Pajol,
the light cavalry of the 4th Corps, the cavalry corps of General
Exelmans, the division of General Teste, of which you will take
particular care, it being detached from its own corps,[473] and the 3d
and 4th corps of infantry.
“You will explore in the directions of Namur and of Maestricht,[474]
and you will pursue the enemy. Explore his march, and instruct me
respecting his manœuvres, _so that I may be able to penetrate what he
is intending to do_.[475]
“I am carrying my headquarters to Quatre Bras, where the English
still were this morning. Our communication will then be direct by
the paved road of Namur. If the enemy has evacuated Namur, write to
the general commanding the second military division at Charlemont to
cause Namur to be occupied by some battalions of the national guard
and some batteries which he will organize at Charlemont. He will give
the command to a brigadier-general.
“_It is important to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do;
whether they are separating themselves from the English, or whether
they are intending still to unite, to cover Brussels or[476] Liége,
in trying the fate of another battle._[477] In all cases, keep
constantly your two corps of infantry united in a league of ground,
and occupy every evening a good military position, having several
avenues of retreat. Post intermediate detachments of cavalry, so as
to communicate with headquarters.
Dictated by the Emperor,
in the absence of the major-general, to the
Grand-marshal Bertrand.”[478]
Ligny, 17 June, 1815.
Not only is the tone of this letter altogether different from that of
the verbal orders previously given, but the duty assigned to Grouchy is
a wholly different one.
There is in the letter no trace of that certainty as to the position
of affairs so plainly exhibited in the verbal orders. The news that a
Prussian corps has been seen at Gembloux has evidently made a strong
impression on the Emperor. It may very possibly indicate that Blücher
is not falling back to Namur. The statement is twice made in the
letter that the Emperor is in doubt as to the intentions of the
Prussians, and the chief task now imposed upon Grouchy is to ascertain
those intentions. _The precise danger to be anticipated is stated
explicitly._ Grouchy is warned in so many words that the Prussians
may be intending to unite with the English to try the fate of another
battle for the defence of Brussels,—which was exactly what they were
intending to do, and what they succeeded in doing. Whether they are
or are not intending to do this, is the principal thing for Grouchy
to find out. As the Emperor had previously informed Grouchy of his
determination to fight the English “if they will stand on this side
of the Forest of Soignes,”—which meant of course that he looked upon
a battle with them the next day as very possible,—this question of
the Prussians uniting with the English in fighting this battle was of
vital importance to him.[479] _What Grouchy was to do if he found the
Prussians directing their movements so as to compass this end, it was
left to him to determine for himself._ It might be that he could hinder
the accomplishment of their design most effectually by attacking them;
it might be that his best course would be to rejoin the main army as
soon as he could, or to manœuvre so as to act in conjunction with it.
It was impossible for Napoleon to tell beforehand how things would turn
out. Full discretion was therefore left to Grouchy to take whatever
course might seem best to him.
Marshal Grouchy was making his arrangements to get his command under
way when he received this letter. He experienced great delay in
beginning his march to Gembloux. Vandamme did not get started till two
o’clock. Gérard left Ligny an hour later. It came on to rain hard about
two o’clock, and the roads soon became very bad. Grouchy did not
succeed in getting farther with his two infantry corps that night than
Gembloux, which is rather less than eight miles from St. Amand.[480]
The cavalry of Exelmans was, however, stationed at Sauvenières, to
gather information. Grouchy had with him a force of 33,319 men of
all arms, of whom 4,446 were the cavalry belonging to the two corps
of Pajol and Exelmans.[481] Napoleon took with himself Domon’s light
cavalry division of the 3d Corps, but Grouchy retained that of Maurin,
belonging to the 4th Corps,—say, 1,500 men. That is, he had 6,000
cavalry in all.
At ten o’clock that evening Grouchy wrote to the Emperor from Gembloux
a letter[482] which seemed to indicate that he comprehended, at least
to a certain extent, the nature of his task. He says that it appeared
to him that the Prussians had passed through Sauvenières, where his
(Grouchy’s) cavalry now have arrived, and that, at Sauvenières,
they had divided into two columns, one taking the road to Wavre, by
Sart-à-Walhain, and the other that to Perwez, a town on the way to
Maestricht. Grouchy then goes on to say:—
“One may perhaps infer that a part is going to join Wellington, and
that the centre, which is the army of Blücher, is retiring on Liége;
another column with artillery has effected its retreat on Namur.
Exelmans has been ordered to send this evening six squadrons to
Sart-à-Walhain and three to Perwez.
“According to their reports, _if the mass of the Prussians is
retiring on Wavre, I shall follow them in that direction, in order
that they may not be able to gain Brussels, and to separate them from
Wellington_.[483]
“If, on the contrary, my information proves that the principal
Prussian force has marched on Perwez, I shall direct myself on that
city in pursuit of the enemy.”
That Marshal Grouchy understood something of the nature of the task
before him is apparent from this despatch. But when he says that his
object in following the mass of the Prussians in the direction of Wavre
is to prevent their gaining Brussels, he is plainly beside the mark.
No movement of his from Gembloux to Wavre or in the direction of Wavre
could possibly hinder a force at Wavre from marching on Brussels.
When he declares that his object in proceeding in the direction of
Wavre would be to separate the Prussians from Wellington, he must be
understood to mean the direction of Wavre, as contradistinguished from
the direction of Perwez,—that is, in other words, if the Prussians go
north instead of east he will also go north instead of east. And as he
had abundance of cavalry, there was certainly no reason, now that he
had cause, as he says he had, to suspect that a part of the Prussians
had gone to Wavre, with the intention of uniting with Wellington,
why he should not have reconnoitred to his left the next morning and
ascertained the facts.
Leaving Marshal Grouchy at Gembloux with the right wing, we now return
to Napoleon, who, when we left him, was about to lead the reserves,
consisting of the 6th Corps and the Guard, and some cavalry, to Quatre
Bras. Orders, repeated orders, had been sent, as we have seen, to
Marshal Ney, to get him to move upon Quatre Bras. But Ney had not
moved a man.[484] Charras thinks he must have informed the Emperor, in
obedience to the 8 A.M. order, that the English were still in force
in his front. But there is no evidence whatever of this. Charras
himself,[485] after censuring the Emperor for his delays on this
morning, does not assign as the cause of the second and more peremptory
despatch to Ney, dated at noon, any reply of Ney’s to the 8 A.M.
despatch, but the return of a reconnoitring party sent out by Napoleon
himself, which reported the English at Quatre Bras. If anything
further were needed to show that Ney vouchsafed no reply to the 8
A.M. despatch, it is found in the fact that this noon order refers to
no such reply. In fact it was not until Ney saw the column under the
Emperor in person advancing on the Namur road that he put his cavalry
in motion, and it was the Emperor’s own staff officers[486] that
ordered d’Erlon forward in pursuit of the English. This was about 1 P.M.
Wellington had collected at Quatre Bras about 45,000 men. The rest
of his army was at Nivelles and Braine-le-Comte. Since 10 A.M. he
had been quietly withdrawing his forces, and Ney had not offered an
interruption.[487] Probably he did not know what Wellington was doing.
Yet Ney must have had at his disposal about 40,000 men, 25,000 of whom
had not fired a shot or drawn a sword. There is no saying what loss the
English might not have been obliged to suffer, if he had vigorously
pressed them. His conduct on this day is even more culpable than on the
day before. There was not only not any of that intelligent coöperation
which, as has been remarked, Napoleon always counted upon in his
lieutenants,—there was positive disobedience of orders.
At Quatre Bras, the Emperor, who had ridden from Ligny in his carriage,
mounted his horse,[488] and led the pursuit in person. He now saw, and
no doubt with mortification, what an opportunity he had missed. He
was also, and with reason, indignant[489] with Ney for not having
obeyed his orders, ascertained that Wellington was withdrawing his
forces, sent him word at once, and energetically pressed the enemy.
His fatigue seems to have wholly disappeared, and he showed, this
afternoon of the 17th as he had on the afternoon of the 15th,[490] how
he could infuse his own activity and energy into his troops. We have
two pictures of Napoleon on this afternoon, by eye witnesses. The Count
d’Erlon, in his autobiography,[491] says:—
“The Emperor found me in advance of this position (Quatre Bras), and
said to me in a tone of profound chagrin these words, which have been
always graven on my memory:—
“‘They have ruined France; come, my dear general, put yourself at the
head of this cavalry, and vigorously push the English rearguard.’
“The Emperor never quitted the head of column of the advance-guard,
and was even engaged in a charge of cavalry in debouching from
Genappe.”
Says the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo,”—an officer of artillery of
the Guard, who was near the Emperor throughout the campaign:—[492]
“One must needs have been a witness of the rapid march of this army
on the day of the 17th,—a march which resembled a steeplechase
rather than the pursuit of an enemy in retreat,—to get an idea of
the activity which Napoleon knew how to impress upon his troops when
placed under his immediate command. Six pieces of the horse-artillery
of the Guard, supported by the headquarters squadrons, marched in the
first line, and vomited forth grape upon the masses of the enemy’s
cavalry, as often as, profiting by some accident of ground, they
endeavored to halt, to take position, and retard our pursuit. The
Emperor, mounted on a small and very active Arab horse, galloped
at the head of the column;[493] he was constantly near the pieces,
exciting the gunners by his presence and by his words, and more
than once in the midst of the shells and bullets which the enemy’s
artillery showered upon us.”
There was a smart skirmish at Genappe. The 7th English regiment of
hussars was injudiciously ordered to charge the French lancers, and was
beaten back. Then the pursuing French, in mounting the hill behind the
town of Genappe, were ridden down by the 1st Life Guards.
During the whole afternoon the rain fell in torrents, and there was a
severe storm of thunder and lightning. Very possibly the bad weather
may have favored the retiring army. The retreat of the English was
continued to the position to the south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean,
where the battle of the next day was fought.
FOOTNOTES:
[448] See his despatch to Ney, of the 17th, cited above; p. 191.
[449] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 255.
[450] Jomini, p. 148.
[451] See Ney’s letter to the Duke of Otranto; Jones, 386.
[452] See Charras’ very apposite remarks on this: vol. 1, p. 234.
[453] Doc. Inéd., XVII, pp. 45, 47; App. C, xxvii.; _post_, pp. 384,
385.
[454] See _ante_, p. 191.
[455] Charras, vol. 1, p. 235, n.
[456] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 214. See also, pp. 208 and 233.
[457] One division of the 6th Corps, that of Teste, was detached, and
added to Grouchy’s command.
[458] Doc. Inéd., XVI, p. 44; App. C, xxviii; _post_, pp. 385, 386.
[459] Maurice, p. 350; July, 1890: citing Clausewitz, ch. 33, p. 76.
Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 386.
[460] Maurice, pp. 350, 354: July, 1890.
[461] But see Maurice, pp. 350, 351: July, 1890. He thinks that
the troops of the two beaten corps must at first have retreated
northward,—that is, across the turnpike, in the direction of Wavre.
[462] This mistake could not have been made, as Ollech points out (p.
172) if the battle had been decided before nightfall.
[463] As a matter of fact, these troops were not a part of a column in
retreat for Namur; but, of course, this could not be known at once. See
Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 286, 287. Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 92.
[464] Jomini states (p. 150, n.) that General Monthion reconnoitred
in the direction of Tilly and Mont St. Guibert in pursuance of orders
given him by the Emperor on the morning of the 17th. Siborne, vol. 1,
p. 317, states that Domon’s cavalry division of the 3d Corps, which had
been temporarily attached to the main column, reconnoitred the country
between the Brussels road and the Dyle. This must have been, however,
in the afternoon of the 17th.
[465] Grouchy, Obs., p. 12 _et seq._
[466] Fragments Hist., Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy; pp. 4, 5.
Grouchy Mem., vol. 4, p. 44.
[467] Grouchy, Obs. p. 13.
[468] Ollech, p. 171. _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 51.
[469] This subject will be treated of in Appendix B; _post_, p. 355.
[470] Charras, vol. 1, p. 240.
[471] Berton, pp. 47, 48. Berton supposed it to be the corps of Bülow,
but it was really that of Thielemann. Ollech, p. 157.
[472] Pascallet, p. 79. Charras, vol. 1, p. 241. Appendix B; _post_, p.
358.
[473] This division belonged to the 6th Corps.
[474] Namur lay nearly south-east and Maestricht nearly north-east from
Sombreffe.
[475] The italics are ours.
[476] The original is “_et_,” but this is plainly an error, very
possibly caused by the fact that the letter was dictated.
[477] The italics are ours.
[478] There are other readings varying in unimportant points from the
above.
[479] Whether it was wise under these circumstances for Napoleon to
detach such a large force as that which he intrusted to Grouchy, is a
question which will be discussed in the notes to Chapter XV.
[480] Charras, vol. 1, p. 242.
[481] Ib., vol. 1, p. 238.
[482] Gérard: Dernières Obs., p. 15; Charras, vol. 1, p. 244;
Siborne, vol. 1, p. 297. Of the mutilations in the text affecting the
significance of this letter, contained in the Grouchy Memoirs, notice
will be taken in Appendix B, _post_, p. 359, where a full copy of it
will be given.
[483] The italics are ours.
[484] Charras, vol. 1, p. 249.
[485] Ib., pp. 236, 237.
[486] Charras, vol. 1, p. 250.
[487] _Cf._ Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 181.
[488] Charras, vol. 1, p. 250.
[489] Gourgaud, pp. 77, 78; Corresp., vol. 31, p. 214.
[490] _Ante_, p. 47.
[491] Le Maréchal Drouet, p. 96.
[492] Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 185, 186.
[493] _Cf._ Gourgaud, pp. 78, 79. _Cf._ Mercer’s Diary, vol. 1, p. 269.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII._
1. In regard to Napoleon’s action with reference to the defeated
Prussians, it is necessary to distinguish between instituting a prompt
and vigorous pursuit of them, and taking immediate measures for
ascertaining in which direction they had retreated. The first was under
the circumstances impossible, that is, without an entire change of
plan, but the second was not only possible, but of prime necessity.
Charras,[494] however, complains bitterly of Napoleon for not following
up the Prussians. “Not to pursue the vanquished, sword in hand, to
leave him time to collect himself, to reform his forces, to gather in
his reinforcements, was so strange a thing for troops accustomed to the
tactics of Napoleon.”
But Clausewitz[495] with better judgment says:—
“If we seem here to find so great a difference from the earlier
methods of procedure adopted by the French, we must get a true
picture of the changed conditions. The extraordinary energy in
pursuit to which the brilliant results of Bonaparte’s former
campaigns were due, was simply pushing very superior forces after
an enemy who had been completely vanquished. Now, however, Napoleon
had to turn with his main force, and above all with his freshest
troops, against a new enemy, over whom victory had yet to be gained.
The pursuit [of the Prussians] had to be carried out by the 3d and
4th Corps, the very two who had been engaged in the bloodiest fight
till ten in the evening, and now necessarily needed time to get into
order again, to recover themselves, and to provide themselves with
ammunition.”
Napoleon, therefore, while censurable for not having ascertained as
early as possible the direction of the retreat of the Prussians, and
for not having moved promptly with his main body against the English,
can not be blamed for having allowed Grouchy’s troops to remain on the
field till noon, to recover from their fatigues.
2. It hardly needs to be said that if Napoleon had known that the
Ist and IId Prussian Corps were retiring on Wavre, he would not have
ordered Grouchy on Gembloux. Exactly what he would have done, it is
needless to conjecture, but in all probability he would have kept the
whole army together, or within easy reach, so as to have concentrated
an overwhelming force against Wellington the next morning, if not on
that afternoon.
3. To illustrate the effect which the concealment of the Bertrand order
by Marshal Grouchy has produced on the mind of an able critic, take the
following passages from Clausewitz,[496] who wrote his narrative before
the order came to light:—
“Bonaparte, it is claimed, ordered Grouchy to keep between Blücher
and the road from Namur (Charleroi) to Brussels, for the second
battle would have to be fought on this road, and only thus was
there a possibility of Grouchy’s coöperating in it. But of such an
order nothing can be found except in the untrustworthy account[497]
of Bonaparte and of the men who have copied him. The account
which Grouchy gives of the movements of the 17th bears too much
the character of the simple truth[498] not to gain credence; and,
according to this, Bonaparte’s instruction was directed in very
general terms towards pursuing Blücher, and was drawn up in very
uncertain expressions.”
[499]“As we read Marshal Grouchy’s account of the events which took
place with Bonaparte on the morning of the 17th, we see:—
(1) That this Marshal in all probability actually received no
other direction for his action on the 17th besides a very general
instruction to pursue the Prussians:
(2) That Bonaparte had no idea of the retreat of the Prussians
towards the Dyle, and considered the opinion that they had gone
towards Namur not unreasonable, and therefore did not give the
Marshal the direction of Wavre.”
Clausewitz concludes by surmising that Napoleon was “affected by a sort
of lethargy and carelessness.” Had Clausewitz known the truth, namely,
that Grouchy was sent off with a letter of instructions, telling him in
so many words that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the
English to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels on the turnpike
on which Napoleon was now marching with the intention of encountering
the English, we should have had a very different criticism from this,
we may be sure.
4. But it is a curious thing, that, even with those historians who
wrote after the Bertrand letter came to light, the influence of
Grouchy’s misrepresentations has induced a sort of ignoring of the
letter, and an acquiescence in the erroneous judgment of Napoleon’s
conduct formed when the existence of the letter was unknown, and when
the verbal instructions, as given by Grouchy, were all the orders which
it was believed that Napoleon ever gave to Grouchy. Thus Chesney,[500]
after giving the substance of the document, says:—
“Such was the whole tenor of this important letter, which serves to
show two things only: that Napoleon was uncertain of the line of
Blücher’s retreat, and that he judged Gembloux a good point to move
Grouchy on in any case.”
The injunction to Grouchy, though given by Chesney almost textually, to
ascertain whether or not the Prussians were intending to unite with
the English and fight a battle for the defence of Brussels,—the very
thing which they actually were intending to do,—has evidently made no
impression whatever on his mind.
The same determination,—for we know not what other word indicates more
correctly the temper of mind which must possess a historian of this
campaign who shuts his eyes to the contents of the Bertrand letter,—the
same determination, we say, not to recognize the fact that the Bertrand
letter shows beyond a question that Napoleon was alive to the danger
that the Prussians might be intending to do exactly what they were
intending to do, that is, unite with the English and fight another
battle,—this time on the Brussels road,—is shown also by the latest
English critic, Colonel Maurice. He says:—[501]
“He (Napoleon) gave orders to Grouchy, with a force of 33,000
men and 96 guns, to pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat,
and communicate with him by the Namur road.[502] Written orders
were subsequently given to Grouchy _directing him to move on
Gembloux_.”[503]
Here, the warning contained in the written order, the injunction to
ascertain whether the Prussians were intending to join Wellington, is
absolutely and quietly ignored. One would suppose that all that the
Bertrand letter contained was an order to move on Gembloux. Colonel
Maurice proceeds:—
“He (Grouchy) promised, that if, from the reports he received,
he gathered that the Prussians had for the most part retired on
Wavre, he would follow them there, in order to prevent them gaining
Brussels, and in order to separate them from Wellington. _This is
the first indication we receive, on any authentic evidence, that
any one in the French army supposed that the duty of separating the
Prussians from Wellington would become the task of Grouchy’s force.
Up till then, all the French supposed that there was no prospect of
Blücher’s attempting to unite with Wellington._”[503]
Yet in the body of the Bertrand letter, of which Colonel Maurice quotes
the first line, are these words:—
“It is important to penetrate what the enemy is intending to do;
_whether they are separating themselves from the English, or whether
they are intending still to unite, to cover Brussels, or Liége, in
trying the fate of another battle_.”
We confess our inability to explain or account for criticism of this
nature, unless by the hypothesis that to a mind preoccupied with a
certain view, firmly held, it is often possible that the plainest
evidence should be, so to speak, invisible. It is as plain as anything
can be that Grouchy’s letter, from which Maurice makes his quotation,
_is a reply to that part of the Bertrand letter_ which we have given
above; but Maurice, his mind full of the verbal orders only, wholly
overlooks this.
But Colonel Maurice and Colonel Chesney are not alone in their views.
General Hamley,[504] in his account of the campaign, says of Grouchy:
“His orders were to follow them [the Prussians], complete their rout,
and never lose sight of them.” Hamley does not seem even to have heard
of the Bertrand order. Hence his elaborate criticism on Grouchy’s
conduct,[505]—leaving out, as it does, the two most important _data_,
viz.:—Napoleon’s explicit warning to Grouchy of the possibility of the
Prussians uniting with the English to fight a battle for the defence of
Brussels, and his equally explicit statement to Grouchy (as reported
by the latter), that he was going that very afternoon to attack the
English “if they will stand on this side of the Forest of Soignes,”—is
entirely beside the mark, and cannot be considered as possessing any
practical value whatever. He has addressed himself to a case which
never really existed.[506]
Hooper, also, omits entirely the information which the Emperor gave
of his own intention, and of his conjecture that the English might
fight “on this side of the forest of Soignes,”—where they actually did
fight,—and dismisses the explicit injunction for Grouchy to ascertain
the facts in these words:—[507]
“Yet some doubts of the correctness of his views had entered the mind
of the Emperor before he quitted Ligny, and he remarked (_sic_) to
Grouchy that it was important to learn whether the Prussians were
separating themselves from the English, etc.”
These instances suffice to show how seriously the concealment of the
Bertrand letter by Marshal Grouchy has affected the historians of the
campaign. The prominence assigned to the verbal orders to Grouchy, so
common in most of the narratives, is not only utterly useless,—but most
misleading.
5. But was the Bertrand letter sufficiently explicit?
Charras,[508] who, unlike the English historians cited above, fully
admits that the letter shows that Napoleon saw “the possibility of
the union of the allied armies to cover Brussels,” observes that this
involved the necessity of reconnoitring in the directions of Mont St.
Guibert and Wavre. “Nevertheless,” he goes on to say,
“Napoleon did not make this the subject of a special recommendation
to Grouchy; * * * and the latter, given over to his own inspirations,
did not repair the inconceivable fault of the commander-in-chief. He
had an order to proceed to Gembloux; he did not trouble his head about
anything else.”
If Napoleon had entertained as low an opinion of Marshal Grouchy’s
capacity as Charras evidently did, it certainly would have been a
terrible mistake to have omitted to tell him to explore the region
between Gembloux and Wavre. But questions of this kind hardly bear
discussing; every one has his own opinions on such matters, based on
his own estimate of other men’s ability, his own experience, his own
notions of what is fitting. The suggestion of danger to the main army,
if it should find the Prussians as well as the English opposed to it on
the Brussels turnpike, would have amply sufficed for many generals. It
was not, however, sufficient, as we shall soon see, for Marshal Grouchy.
6. We cannot agree with those who contend that it was an error to
direct Grouchy on Gembloux in the first instance.[509] Up to the moment
when the order was dictated to Bertrand no other considerable force of
the enemy had been discovered; at Gembloux, Berton had found a whole
corps. Here, therefore, one could not help getting at the direction
of the Prussian retreat. And, owing to the lack of an early morning
reconnoissance in all directions, this was, at noon, obviously the most
promising direction for the pursuing force to take.
7. We owe to Colonel Maurice some valuable suggestions which serve
to explain Napoleon’s neglect to take adequate measures to ascertain
the direction of the Prussian retreat. He points out in the first
place[510] the folly of such writers as Quinet, who would have Napoleon
sleep in the midst of his Guard,—who expect the commander of an army to
do the work of a sentry on the outer picket-line. It may be remarked in
this connection, by the way, that as the French were not able to push
up to the Namur turnpike on the evening of the 16th, their advanced
posts could not possibly have heard anything more than the withdrawal
of the enemy towards the pike, down which they might have marched
without let or hindrance towards Namur. Colonel Maurice in the next
place quotes an able criticism[511] by an officer whom he does not
name, to the effect that Napoleon’s vast experience enabled him in his
later years to dispense with much of that personal attention to the
facts which in his earlier campaigns it had been absolutely necessary
for him to give.
Colonel Maurice also calls attention to the circumstances which we have
detailed above, which very naturally induced Napoleon to adopt the
opinion that the Prussians had fallen back towards the Rhine.[512]
8. In conclusion, we may admit, fully, with Colonel Maurice, to whom we
owe a great deal for setting this matter of the probabilities of the
case in its true light, that Napoleon’s estimate of the probabilities
was a correct one. He was quite warranted under all the circumstances
in believing that the Prussians had retired towards their base.
Nevertheless, this belief does not justify him for having neglected to
ascertain the facts by a prompt exploration of the whole region through
which the Prussians could have retreated.
The lesson which this neglect teaches, is a plain one. It is, that
where there is any chance at all of the occurrence of an event,
which, if it does happen, will be fatal, it is folly to trust to the
probabilities of the case; every precaution should be taken; nothing
that can avert a fatal calamity should be neglected, no matter how
small may appear to be the chance of its happening. In this case, we
find Napoleon, at one o’clock in the afternoon of the day after the
battle of Ligny, entirely ignorant of the whereabouts and intentions
of the Prussians, and, in fact, alarmed lest they should be intending
to unite with the English, whom he is expecting to fight the next
day; obliged to go off himself to join his left wing, and to leave
the all-important task of preventing the union of his adversaries to
a newly-made Marshal, in whose abilities he cannot place very great
confidence. And all this, because he did not have the facts as to the
Prussian retreat ascertained at day-break.
FOOTNOTES:
[494] Charras, vol. 1, p. 233.
[495] Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 95.
[496] Clausewitz, ch. 37, p. 93.
[497] The Memoirs are exceedingly unsatisfactory in regard to this
part of the campaign. Napoleon evidently had no exact recollection of
the order which he dictated to Bertrand. He was only sure that he gave
Grouchy an intimation that he might need him. See App. A; _post_, p.
351.
[498] Very possibly Grouchy did tell “the simple truth” in his account
of the interview between himself and the Emperor. The trouble with
Grouchy was, that he did not tell “the whole truth.” He denied having
received any written order.
[499] Clausewitz, ch. 48, p. 130.
[500] Chesney, p. 152.
[501] Maurice, pp. 73, 74: April, 1890.
[502] These are the verbal orders.
[503] The italics are our own.
[504] Hamley, Op. of War, p. 190. He also cites the verbal orders.
[505] Ib., pp. 196-198.
[506] Hamley contends that the injunction to Grouchy—which, by the way,
is contained in both the written and the verbal orders,—to communicate
with Napoleon by the Namur-Quatre Bras turnpike, is not consistent with
a movement towards Wavre. But why should not this arrangement have
been prescribed for the sake of greater safety? If the Prussians were
moving towards Wavre and the Dyle, their cavalry might be expected to
make all communication across the country very hazardous for couriers
or staff-officers. And, as a matter of fact, it was by the Brussels
turnpike to Quatre Bras, thence by the Namur turnpike to Sombreffe, and
thence _via_ Gembloux to Grouchy’s position in front of Wavre, that
Napoleon sent Grouchy the two orders on the day of the battle. Napoléon
à Waterloo, pp. 277, 278.
[507] Hooper, p. 153.
[508] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 241, 242.
[509] Assuming, that is, that it was wise in Napoleon to detach Grouchy
with his two corps from the main army after he had reason to apprehend
that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English. See
the Notes to Chapter XV; _post_, pp. 273 _et seq._
[510] Maurice, p. 348: July, 1890.
[511] Ib., p. 353.
[512] Ib., pp. 350-355.