THE BATTLE OF LIGNY. BLÜCHER’S DECISION TO ACCEPT BATTLE NOT DEPENDENT
ON WELLINGTON’S ASSURANCE OF SUPPORT.
Marshal Blücher, as we have seen,[316] had, on the evening of the
14th, ordered a concentration of his entire army in the neighborhood
of Sombreffe. This, as has been pointed out above, was done without
consultation, at the moment certainly, with the Duke of Wellington;
and we have before stated that we do not find that it was done in
pursuance of any previous arrangement between the two commanders. At
any rate it is not disputed that Marshal Blücher took up a position in
order of battle to the south of the Namur-Nivelles turnpike without
having received either by letter or word of mouth any assurance
whatsoever that his English ally was prepared to support him, other
than that contained in Müffling’s despatch, sent off from Brussels
about midnight, and informing him that Wellington expected to be at
Nivelles at 10 A.M. in strong force. Zieten’s (Ist) Corps, about
five o’clock in the morning of the 16th, withdrew[317] from the
neighborhood of Fleurus, where it had passed the night of the 15th,
to the north side of the brook of Ligny, and took up position in the
villages of St. Amand, Brye and Ligny. Between 9 and 10 A.M. the IId
Corps, commanded by Pirch I.,[318] arrived, and took up a position
behind that occupied by the Ist Corps.[319] Between 11 A.M. and 12 M.
the IIId Corps, Thielemann’s, came up, and occupied the line between
Sombreffe and Tongrinelle. These were the positions which were held
during the battle by the three corps which had been gotten together;
the IVth Corps, Bülow’s, it was then known could not come up during
the day. Not until noon[320] did Wellington’s letter, dated “On the
heights behind Frasnes, 10.30 A.M.,” arrive. Not until 1 P.M.[321] did
the Duke himself meet Marshal Blücher. Then a conversation took place
between them. There is no doubt that Wellington expressed[322] himself
as practically certain that the bulk of his army would be assembled at
Quatre Bras early in the afternoon. His verbal statements to Marshal
Blücher were to the same effect as the statements contained in his
letter. We have seen how mistaken he was in these, and how he came to
be mistaken. What he wrote and said, however, he honestly believed;
and he certainly did give to Marshal Blücher some assurance that he
should be supported by the Anglo-Dutch forces in his impending struggle
with the bulk of the French army. According to some authorities, his
assurance took the form of a positive promise of support; and these
writers do not hesitate to assert that Blücher’s decision to accept
battle at Ligny was based upon this definite promise.[323] “Upon this
assurance,” says Charras, “the Prussian general decided to receive the
battle which he could have avoided.”
The principal knowledge we have of the conversation between Wellington
and Blücher comes from what Müffling has told us about it.[324]
According to him the last words the Duke spoke were:—“Well! I
will come, provided I am not attacked myself.” General Dörnberg’s
evidence[325] is to the same effect. The latest Prussian historian
of the campaign[326] does not claim that the Duke gave Blücher any
unconditional promise of support. That a different impression should
have obtained currency with the Prussians is very natural. The Duke’s
statements of the proximity of his army, made with perfect honesty, but
based, as we have seen, on very erroneous _data_, no doubt raised false
hopes in the minds of the Prussian generals. That these statements
afterwards assumed in the mind of General Gneisenau, the Prussian
chief-of-staff, the aspect and dimensions of a positive pledge of
support, seems from Delbrück’s Life of Gneisenau quite probable.[327]
But the evidence, what there is of it, and the probabilities of the
case, are all the other way. That is to say, Blücher decided to fight
at Ligny, without having any such definite promise of support from
Wellington, as the latter relied upon when he decided to await the
attack of the French at Waterloo, two days later.
This will appear more clearly when we consider the other assertion made
on behalf of the Prussian commander, of which we have made mention
above,—namely, that Blücher’s decision to accept battle at Ligny was
based upon this promise of support from Wellington.[328] Delbrück, in
his Life of Gneisenau,[329] says: “Although this position [_i.e._,
at and near Ligny] had been carefully considered and taken up with
all caution, it was yet not fully decided to receive battle.” This
decision was not arrived at, we are given to understand, until Blücher
had received from Wellington a promise of support. That could not have
been until between 1 and 2 o’clock P.M., for the Duke did not arrive
at Brye till one o’clock. Müffling says[330] that it was “when the
heads of Napoleon’s attacking columns showed themselves moving upon St.
Amand” that “the Duke asked the Field Marshal [Blücher] and General von
Gneisenau: ‘_Que voulez-vous que je fasse?_’”
That is, we are asked to believe that Blücher had not fully decided to
await the attack of these French columns, now seen to be advancing, in
the positions which had been deliberately selected, and on which the
troops had been carefully stationed, until the Duke of Wellington had
stated himself able to do what Blücher and Gneisenau wished him to do.
We are asked to believe that Blücher would have retreated if Wellington
had told him that his situation was such that he could not bring him
any aid.
We must say that such a contention seems to us hardly to deserve
serious consideration. It is surely plain enough that Blücher had
chosen a battle-field,—had posted his army there,—had encouraged his
troops to expect a conflict with the French,—without taking counsel
with the English general.[331] Had he determined to fight only if he
should receive assurance of support from Wellington, would he not have
taken some pains to obtain such assurance? Would he have left it
entirely to the chance of Wellington’s writing him a letter, or riding
over to his headquarters? These questions answer themselves.
We conclude, then, that it is a fact beyond controversy that Marshal
Blücher decided to accept battle at Ligny altogether independently of
any support or assistance that might be afforded him by the Anglo-Dutch
army. He deliberately ran the risk of encountering, unsupported by his
allies, and with such only of his troops as he could on short notice
collect close to the frontier, the bulk of the French army under
Napoleon himself. How far he was wise in this we will consider in
another place; what we have sought to make plain now is that such was
the fact.
FOOTNOTES:
[316] _Ante_, p. 70.
[317] Ollech, p. 120.
[318] Pirch II. commanded a brigade in the 1st Corps.
[319] Ollech, p. 122.
[320] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 373.
[321] Ollech, p. 125.
[322] Müffling: Passages, 230, 231, 237.
[323] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 150, 151, and note. Damitz, p. 92.
Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375. Charras states in the note cited above that
Clausewitz “says that it was the promise of help from Wellington that
decided Blücher to receive battle,”—but we have not been able to find
the passage. He also says that Siborne substantially follows Damitz in
this matter; but we can not find that Siborne represents Wellington as
making any such promise. In his official report of the battle Blücher
does not claim that such a promise was given. Jones, pp. 320, 321.
[324] Müffling: Passages, pp. 233-237.
[325] Ollech, p. 127, note.
[326] Ib., p. 127.
[327] Ollech (p. 142) quotes Gneisenau as writing on the 17th: “We
received from the Duke of Wellington the written promise that if the
enemy should attack us, he would attack them in the rear.” There is no
such promise in Wellington’s letter to Blücher.
[328] La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 109, entirely disbelieves this assertion.
[329] Gneisenau, p. 372.
[330] Müffling: Passages, p. 234.
[331] Blücher’s Report leaves the question open. Jones, pp. 320, 321.
_NOTE TO CHAPTER X._
What were the reasons which induced Marshal Blücher to take up a
defensive position at Ligny, and there await the attack of Napoleon?
The question is certainly an important one. We have considered above
and rejected the answer to this question offered by some Prussian
writers, that Blücher accepted battle only on the definite promise of
support from Wellington. It remains to see what other reasons have been
adduced for his taking a step so perilous to the fortunes of the allies.
Neither Clausewitz nor Jomini pay any attention to the question.
Damitz’[332] explanation is as follows:—
“Marshal Blücher was free to refuse the combat; he could very well
have avoided it, and have waited until the IVth Corps should have
joined him. But, seeing himself at the head of 80,000 men, it was not
in his firm and decided character to turn his back on an adversary.
He knew that he could not vanquish Napoleon by skilful manœuvres,
but only by repeated blows. The General and his army felt themselves
strong enough; that was of itself a reason for not avoiding a battle.”
He then goes on to show that a march to join the English army would
involve a temporary renunciation of the Prussian base of operations.
These are the reasons he gives. He adds most unexpectedly:—[333]
“It is then evident that the Prussians decided on accepting battle
because the Duke of Wellington had given them his word.” But of any
such fact as this no mention whatever is made until the writer has
occasion to speak[334] of the conversation between Wellington and
Blücher between 1 and 2 P.M., when the French were deploying their
columns for the attack. It is impossible to believe that Blücher had
not before this made up his mind to fight, altogether independently of
anything Wellington might say to him.
Ollech[335] suggests, as an answer to the question, “Why did Blücher
give battle on the 16th although a whole army corps had not arrived?”
that he did it in order to give the English army time to concentrate.
This writer does not pretend that Wellington gave the Field Marshal any
definite promise of support.[336]
Delbrück, in his Life of Gneisenau, says[337] that Blücher, relying
on Wellington’s promise, and still hoping that at least late in the
evening a portion of the IVth Corps would arrive, concluded to give
battle.
There is really not much to be said on this subject. The truth is
plain enough. Blücher had, as we have said above,[338] long ago fixed
upon Sombreffe as the point of concentration for his army in case the
French should cross the Sambre at or near Charleroi; and he had, most
likely, communicated this determination to the Duke of Wellington. In
arriving at this determination he undoubtedly assumed that he would be
able to collect his whole army together,—say, 120,000 men. He thought,
and he had a right to think, that if Napoleon should advance by way of
Charleroi, he would be sure to attack the Prussian army if it should
be found posted at or south of Sombreffe; and that Napoleon would
be obliged to employ against it the bulk of his army. Hence Blücher
calculated that the Anglo-Dutch concentration could be effected without
serious molestation, and that some assistance at any rate from that
quarter might safely be counted on. But when the day arrived, he found
that he could not reckon on the arrival of one of his corps in time
for the battle. Yet he still adhered to his determination to accept
the contest, partly from unwillingness to retreat at the outset of the
campaign, and partly in the hope that important aid would be received
from Wellington. This determination, however, was arrived at without
consultation with Wellington and before his letter was received,—in
which, it is to be noted, there is no promise whatever,—and, of course,
before the Duke himself rode over to Brye. What Wellington said no
doubt strengthened the Field Marshal in his belief in the soundness of
his decision; it reinforced his judgment; it gave him hopes of victory.
But to say that his decision to receive the attack of the French at
Ligny was based upon any promise of support made by Wellington, is
entirely contrary to the evidence.
FOOTNOTES:
[332] Damitz, p. 85.
[333] Damitz, p. 87.
[334] Ib., p. 92.
[335] Ollech, pp. 123, 124.
[336] Ib., p. 127.
[337] Gneisenau, vol. 4, p. 375.
[338] _Ante_, p. 70.