THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NAPOLEON.
It is time that we returned to the headquarters of the French army.
Marshal Ney, as we have seen in the last chapter, reported in person
to the Emperor at Charleroi at midnight of the 15th. “He rendered
account” to him, says Colonel Heymès,[290] “of the dispositions he
had made.” Napoleon was thus informed that Ney had halted at Frasnes
and had not occupied Quatre Bras, the evening before. Ney must have
stopped at Charleroi about an hour and a half, as he reached Gosselies
on his return about two in the morning. He must have told the Emperor
where some, at any rate, of his troops were,—that Bachelu’s infantry
division and Piré’s cavalry division of the 2d Corps were at Frasnes;
that the divisions of Jerome and Foy were at Gosselies; that Durutte’s
division of the 1st Corps was between Jumet and Gosselies. So much as
this Ney knew. But his arrival at the army had been so recent, and his
occupations since his arrival had been so engrossing, that he could
not probably have had much more information to give the Emperor as
to the whereabouts of the 1st Corps. His almost total deficiency of
staff officers was a grievous drawback, and prevented him from getting
that hold on his entire command which otherwise he no doubt would have
secured even by this time. Very possibly he had already sent word to
d’Erlon to hurry up to the front. But he must have reported to the
Emperor that a large part of the 1st Corps, perhaps half of it, was
still far to the rear.
Napoleon does not mention this interview in his Memoirs, or in the
Gourgaud Narrative, nor does he anywhere say that he, on the morning of
the 16th, gave to Marshal Ney any other orders than the written ones of
which we have in the last chapter given the substance.
It would seem from these orders that Napoleon thought it inexpedient
that Ney should make any further endeavor to carry Quatre Bras by a
_coup-de-main_. The situation was a different one from that which
existed (as Napoleon correctly supposed) the evening before. It might
now be expected that the cross-roads would be held by a respectable
force from Wellington’s army; or, at least, it was obviously unwise
and hazardous not to make adequate preparations for this very possible
state of things. It was also plain, from what Ney had stated at the
midnight conference, that his command would not be, in the early
morning hours, sufficiently concentrated for any decisive stroke.[291]
Hence, somewhere about five o’clock, the first of the three orders of
which we have spoken in the last chapter was sent off from Charleroi;
the one in which Ney was informed that Kellermann’s cavalry had been
ordered to him to take the place of that of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and
in which he was directed to report to the Emperor whether the 1st Corps
had “executed its movement,” and to inform him of the exact positions
of the 1st and 2d Corps. This order, as we have seen, Ney replied to
before 7 A.M. His reply, which, we may assume, contained some news of
the advance of the 1st Corps, and also stated that the divisions of
Jerome and Foy of the 2d Corps were at Gosselies ready to march, must
have reached headquarters shortly before 8 A.M. As soon as this reply
was received, Napoleon and Soult prepared the formal order for the
conduct of the left wing during the forenoon.
That order, as we have seen, directed Ney to unite the 1st and 2d Corps
and the cavalry of the Count of Valmy, and to proceed at once to take
possession of Quatre Bras. It was issued as soon as the Emperor had
become satisfied, from Ney’s report, that such a movement had become
practicable,—that is, that it could be made in sufficient force to
overcome any opposition it would be likely to encounter. Until he had
become satisfied of this, it was deemed unadvisable to issue the order
to advance beyond Frasnes.
We are able to fix the hour at which this formal order to seize Quatre
Bras was prepared by Soult with quite an approach to accuracy. We
know that Napoleon dictated a letter to Ney, which he sent by Count
Flahaut,[292] and which arrived at Gosselies about the same time[293]
with the formal order,—that is,—about 10 A.M.[294] Flahaut wrote[295] to
Marshal Ney’s son, then Duke of Elchingen, that, to the best of his
recollection, the Emperor dictated the letter to him between 8 and 9
o’clock in the morning. Such a letter, dictated between 8 and 9, and
afterwards reduced to proper form, would have reached Gosselies, a
distance of about four miles and a half from Charleroi, about 10 A.M.,
as Reille[296] says it did. This accords perfectly with the statement
made above that Napoleon waited to hear more definitely from Ney before
framing his order for the morning’s operations.
But the backwardness of d’Erlon’s Corps not only deferred the forward
moment of the left wing; it seems to have delayed the advance of the
main body. Until Napoleon could be sure that Ney with the large force
that had been assigned to him was in march on his left, able to give
a good account of any Anglo-Dutch forces which might attempt to unite
with the Prussians or to molest the left flank of the main French
army, he seems to have been unwilling to move upon Blücher. It was
part of his plan that Ney with the left wing should at least “contain”
that part of Wellington’s army which that general might reasonably be
expected to get together at Quatre Bras. Hence, when Ney reported to
the Emperor at midnight the very backward state of the 1st Corps, the
latter not only decided to wait before giving him further orders until
something more definite and satisfactory should be learned respecting
that corps, and until Ney could fairly be supposed to have had time
enough to get his entire command well in hand, but he also postponed
his own forward movement upon Fleurus and Sombreffe until Ney could
move simultaneously upon Quatre Bras. These considerations certainly
go far to account for and justify the delay in the early morning hours
of the 16th, which has drawn down upon the Emperor so much severe and
almost contemptuous criticism. Napoleon, in truth, could have done
nothing else, unless he had risked a battle with the Prussians on the
chance that Ney, with the 2d Corps alone, could prevent their being
assisted by the English. It is true, this is what actually happened;
but it was Napoleon’s intention that Ney should operate against the
English with his entire command, and in deferring the giving of orders
for the advance of the army until he had reason to believe that Ney
could do this, he was simply carrying out his original scheme.
To finish now with Napoleon’s intentions and expectations in regard
to his left wing. He may well have expected that Ney had, in advance
of receiving the formal order, sent Reille to Frasnes with his two
divisions, which Ney’s reply to his early morning inquiry had informed
him were then all ready to march, thus uniting the entire 2d Corps,
_minus_ Girard’s division; also, that the leading divisions of the
1st Corps would be gotten under arms without delay in Gosselies, so
as to be ready to march at once. He must have expected his order to
reach Gosselies by 10 A.M., and Frasnes by 11 A.M., and he may well
have thought it quite possible,—as indeed it would have been,—that
Ney, at the head of three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry,
might be able to drive out of Quatre Bras the Dutch-Belgians who
had been encountered the evening before, unless, indeed, they had
been largely reinforced. At or about 1 P.M., however, the 1st Corps
ought to be arriving at Quatre Bras, as its leading divisions would
leave Gosselies—as Napoleon would have a right to suppose—between
10 and 11 A.M.; so that, by 2, or, at any rate, by 3 P.M., Marshal
Ney would have his entire command at Quatre Bras, well in hand, and,
pretty certain,—at least so Napoleon would be likely to think,—to be
successful over any troops they might encounter. On these expectations,
which, as we have seen, were quite warranted by the information he had
received, he based his calculations for the day’s doings.
While Napoleon was thus awaiting at Charleroi definite news of the
progress and condition of the left wing of his army, he employed his
time,—or a part of it, at least,—in determining on the lines of action
he would pursue in view of possible emergencies. As we have already
seen, he desired nothing so much as to join battle with Marshal Blücher
on the 16th of June. It had been his expectation[297] that the Prussian
general would assemble his army near Sombreffe, and fight a battle,
somewhere to the south of that village, for the preservation of his
line of communications with the Duke of Wellington,—the Namur-Nivelles
turnpike. At the same time, it was, of course, perfectly possible
that the allied commanders had made other arrangements.[298] It was
not impossible, for instance, that Napoleon’s concentration had been
such a surprise to them that they were purposing to fall back, for the
present at least, either divergently towards their respective bases,
or in a northerly direction by parallel lines. In any event it would
be manifestly desirable to inform the commanders of the right and left
wings of the army of the Emperor’s probable course in any such event,
so that every advantage might be promptly taken of the situation. It
was certainly true, that instructions of this nature might not be
required; they would assuredly not be required if Blücher should do
what Napoleon had thought it likely he would do. In that case there
would be no need of elaborate instructions being given to either Ney
or Grouchy; the issue of the battle would settle everything. But in
order to be prepared for the other state of affairs, Napoleon employed
himself with preparing letters to the commanders of the wings of the
army.
The letter[299] to Ney, which, as we have seen, was dictated by the
Emperor to General Flahaut between 8 and 9 A.M., and was carried by
that officer to Ney, whom it must have reached at Frasnes shortly
before eleven o’clock,[300] informs him that Marshal Grouchy is
marching on Sombreffe with the 3d and 4th Corps; that the Emperor is
taking the Guard to Fleurus, where he will be before midday; that he
will attack the enemy if he meets him, and will clear the road as far
to the eastward as Gembloux. There, at Gembloux, the Emperor will
make up his mind what to do next,—perhaps at three in the afternoon,
perhaps not till evening. But he tells Marshal Ney that, just as soon
as he has made up his mind, he wants him to be ready to march on
Brussels; that he will support him with the Guard, which will be at
Fleurus or Sombreffe,[301] and that he would like to get to Brussels
the next morning. He then tells him where he would like him to station
his various divisions.[302] He informs him that he has divided his army
into two wings and a reserve; that Ney’s wing will consist of the 1st
and 2d Corps, comprising eight divisions of infantry and two of light
cavalry, and of the cavalry of the Count of Valmy; that Marshal Grouchy
commands the right wing; that the Guard will constitute the reserve.
He closes by reiterating the importance of Ney’s dispositions being so
well made that he can march on Brussels,—_i.e._, from Quatre Bras,—as
soon as ordered to do so.
To Grouchy the Emperor sent a similar[303] letter, giving him the
command of the 3d and 4th Corps,—those of Vandamme and Gérard,—and of
the three cavalry-corps of Pajol, Milhaud and Exelmans. He orders him
to Sombreffe with his entire command; the cavalry are to be sent off
at once, the infantry to follow without halting anywhere. The Emperor
states that he is removing his headquarters from Charleroi to Fleurus,
where he will arrive between 10 and 11 A.M., and that he is going to
Sombreffe, leaving the Guard, unless it should be necessary to employ
it, at Fleurus. “If the enemy is at Sombreffe,” he goes on to say,
“I propose to attack him; I propose to attack him even at Gembloux,
and to possess myself of that position; my intention being, after
having explored [_connu_] these two positions, to set out this night,
and operate with my left wing, which Marshal Ney commands, against the
English.” He then desires Grouchy to send him reports of everything he
may learn, and finishes by saying:—“All my information is to the effect
that the Prussians cannot oppose to us more than forty thousand men.”
It is quite true, that this last remark shows, as several writers[304]
have pointed out, that the Emperor was to a considerable extent
mistaken on this morning of the 16th in his apprehension of the
situation. But it is an error to take these letters as if they
were written for the purpose of giving Napoleon’s estimates of the
probabilities; they are rather instructions in the event of the
occurrence of not impossible contingencies. The fact in the case was
just this,—the main army was about to make a forward movement against
the Prussians; if they were found to be in force and offered battle,
the result of this battle would of course settle everything; but if
they should retire, instead of offering battle, they must be followed,
and that involved the separation of the French army into two unequal
portions. Hence it was very desirable to inform Ney, from whom in this
event the right wing and reserves would march away, about how far the
Prussians would be followed, and, especially to enjoin upon him, in
case the Emperor should deem it safe to leave the care of the Prussians
to Grouchy, and should himself retrace his steps, and, with his Guard,
join the left wing, to be ready to march on Brussels at an instant’s
notice.
It must be noted, too, that these letters, especially when taken in
connection with the formal orders of Soult to the two Marshals, show
how absolutely Napoleon adhered to his original conception of the
campaign, as we have before described it. To attack the Prussians
first,—to follow them up for a considerable distance, so as to be
assured of the direction which their retreat was taking,—and then,
and only then, to return to the Brussels road and advance on the
English,—such was the programme marked out in the two letters to Ney
and Grouchy. We shall have occasion to refer to this in another place.
Lastly, while the Emperor expressly states in his letter to Grouchy
that he estimates that the Prussians can not oppose to him a force of
over forty thousand men, and while it may perhaps be inferred from
his letter to Ney that he thought that that officer would meet with
little or no opposition, it is to be observed that Napoleon acted in
all respects as if he expected that the enemy would be found in force.
Both Ney and Grouchy were explicitly directed to employ the whole of
their respective forces. We have spoken of this before as it affected
Ney. It was the same with the movement prescribed to Grouchy,—“Take
your right wing to Sombreffe,”—[305] _i.e._, the two _corps-d’armée_,
and the three cavalry corps. Whatever Napoleon may have conjectured as
to the force or intentions of the enemy, both of his movements this
forenoon,—that of the main army on Sombreffe, and that of the left wing
on Quatre Bras,—were to be made in force,—with all the force he could
muster. If he did expect, as some writers think, that his enemies would
retire before him, he at any rate made every preparation to fight and
overcome them, should they give him battle. It was in order, as we have
pointed out, that these movements might be made simultaneously, and in
sufficient force, that they were deferred to such a late period in the
day,—the backwardness of the 1st Corps having postponed for several
hours the concentration of the left wing.
It will be noticed that in none of these letters or formal orders is
the 6th Corps under the Count of Lobau mentioned. The inference is,
that, at that time, the Emperor desired to retain this body of troops
as a reserve for the whole army. He wanted to get along, if he could,
without employing it at all in the present stage of the campaign.
FOOTNOTES:
[290] Doc. Inéd., Heymès, p. 6.
[291] _Cf._ La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 91, 92.
[292] Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378.
[293] _Ante_, p. 121, note 23.
[294] _Ante_, p. 121, note 21.
[295] Doc. Inéd., XXI, p. 63; App. C, xxiii; _post_, p. 382.
[296] Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379.
[297] _Ante_, pp. 5, 13, 14.
[298] Ollech, p. 123.
[299] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334. Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii;
_post_, pp. 377, 378.
[300] Flahaut, says Reille, passed through Gosselies about 10 A.M. Doc.
Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379.
[301] This seems to imply that the Emperor did not propose to carry the
Guard to Gembloux.
[302] See _ante_, p. 123.
[303] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; _post_, pp. 382, 383.
[304] Ollech, pp. 112, 113: D’Auvergne, pp. 103, 104: Charras, vol. 1,
pp. 143, 144.
[305] “_Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe._”
_NOTES TO CHAPTER IX._
1. The very simple explanation suggested in this chapter of the cause
of the delay on the morning of the 16th in the movement of the main
body of the French army under the Emperor in person, namely, that that
movement was deferred because of the inability of the left wing of the
army to make a simultaneous movement on Quatre Bras, does not seem to
have occurred to most of the historians of this campaign.[306] But
surely, when allowance is made for this fact, the severe criticisms of
Jomini,[307] Charras,[308] Siborne[309] and others, must be held to be
quite beside the mark. Had Ney occupied Quatre Bras on the evening of
the 15th, the forward movement of the main French army would certainly
not have been thus delayed. It would doubtless have been made in the
early morning of the 16th, even though it might have been necessary to
give Ney the 6th Corps in place of the backward 1st. But as Quatre Bras
had not been occupied the evening before, and as the backward state
of d’Erlon’s Corps rendered it impossible for Ney to make a forward
movement with the entire force which had been assigned to him until
the forenoon was well advanced, the operations of the main body were
postponed, and the troops were allowed what would otherwise have been
an unnecessary[310] time to rest and recruit.
2. It is to be observed here, that for the backwardness of the 1st
Corps at midnight of the 15th, Marshal Ney was in no wise responsible.
His recent arrival at the army and his lack of a proper staff exonerate
him completely from any blame for this unfortunate delay. For this
d’Erlon alone must be held responsible.
3. It is unnecessary to repeat here what we have said above as to Ney’s
conduct on his return to Gosselies from his interview with Napoleon at
Charleroi. It seems to us that any competent and energetic officer,
bent upon getting ready to execute his orders as soon as they should
be received, and to execute them to the letter when he should receive
them, would have accomplished far more than Marshal Ney accomplished
that morning.
4. We desire to call attention to the fact that up to this time there
is no evidence whatever of indolence, or irresolution, on the part of
the Emperor Napoleon. From the time when he left Paris at half-past
three in the morning of the 12th to the time of which we are now
writing, he seems to have been fully up even to his own high standard
of military activity and capacity. His general order for the movement
of the army on the 15th was as clear and full as it was possible for
an order to be. His energy and dash on the 15th were noticeable. His
vigor and endurance also seem to have been equal to the demands put
upon them. From three in the morning to eight in the evening of the
15th he was on horseback, and in personal command of the troops. At
midnight he had a long conference with Marshal Ney. Since the result
of that conference was, as we have seen, to induce the postponement of
the advance of the army, the Emperor may, very possibly, have taken
some rest in the early morning hours of the 16th. But the despatch to
Ney requesting from him an exact account of his position must have been
sent off about five, and at or soon after eight we find him dictating
to Count Flahaut the letters to Ney and Grouchy. It is hardly
necessary to add, that if the explanation given above of the causes of
the delay in the advance-movement of the army on the morning of the
16th be correct, there is not the slightest foundation for the charges
of hesitation or irresolution, which have been so often made.[311]
5. It seems to be difficult for some writers to keep steadily in mind
the absolute necessity of Napoleon’s either defeating the Prussians or
compelling them definitely to retreat, before he undertook any movement
in the direction of Brussels, either with the view of attacking the
English or of occupying that city. Thus Chesney,[312] speaking of
Napoleon’s intentions on the morning of the 16th, says:—
“His morning orders clearly prove that he expected no serious
opposition from them (the Prussians) or the English at present, and
was divided only in his mind between the thought of pressing on
direct to Brussels between the two allied armies, or striking at the
supposed Prussian right, driven back on Fleurus the day before.”
But Napoleon’s letters to Ney and Grouchy, to which Chesney here
refers, explicitly contradict this supposition. Napoleon says in his
letter to Ney:—[313]
“I am sending Marshal Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps of infantry
to Sombreffe. I am taking my Guard to Fleurus, and I shall be there
myself before noon. I shall there attack the enemy if I meet him, and
I shall clear the road as far as Gembloux. There, after what shall
have passed, I shall make up my mind.”
And he directs Ney to be all ready to march to Brussels, as soon as he
(Napoleon) shall have arrived at a decision. But this decision, it is
to be observed, was not to be taken until the Prussians should either
have been attacked and defeated, or should have fallen back at least
as far as Gembloux.
To the same effect is the letter to Grouchy:[314]
“If the enemy is at Sombreffe I am going to attack him; I am going
to attack him even at Gembloux, and to carry even that position; my
intention being, after having explored (_connu_) these two positions,
to set out this night and to operate with my left wing, which is
under the command of Marshal Ney, against the English.”
It is plain from both these letters that to say that Napoleon was
“divided in his mind” between “pressing on direct to Brussels between
the two allied armies” and attacking the Prussians in front of him,—in
other words, that he was hesitating which of these two courses he would
take, is a statement utterly without foundation. In both despatches he
states unequivocally his immediate intention,—namely, to attack the
Prussians; and it was only after he should have attacked and driven
the Prussians and forced them as far to the eastward as Gembloux, that
he proposed to retrace his steps, to reinforce Ney, and march against
the English. Brussels, indeed, was regarded by Napoleon as perhaps the
most important result of the campaign, next to the enormous military
advantage which would be secured by the defeat or dispersion of the
armies of Wellington and Blücher. But this was all. For the Emperor to
gain Brussels, these hostile armies must either be attacked and beaten,
or else they must definitely separate, each retiring towards its own
base. The idea of passing between the two armies at this stage of the
campaign, and so arriving at Brussels, it is safe to say, never entered
Napoleon’s mind. His object, as Jomini[315] correctly states, was “not
to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the opposing masses in succession.”
FOOTNOTES:
[306] It is, however, given in Du Casse’s Vandamme, vol. 2, p. 562.
[307] Jomini, pp. 129, 130.
[308] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 138, 145, 182.
[309] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 85.
[310] The Duke of Wellington, however, thought the inactivity of
Napoleon on the morning of the 16th was necessitated by the long
marches of the past few days. Ellesmere, pp. 296, 297. So, Clausewitz,
ch. 25, p. 53.
[311] _Ante_, pp. 132, 139.
[312] Chesney, pp. 138, 139: See also, Clinton, p. 380.
[313] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 334: Doc. Inéd., X, p. 32; App. C, xviii;
_post_, pp. 377, 378.
[314] Corresp., vol. 28, p. 336; App. C, xxiv; _post_, pp. 382, 383.
[315] Jomini, p. 112.