THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: NEY.
Marshal Ney, as we have seen,[247] rode back from the front at Frasnes
to report to the Emperor at Charleroi, where he arrived at midnight of
the 15th. He informed the Emperor, so Colonel Heymès says,[248]
“Of the dispositions he had made. The Emperor made him stay to
supper, gave him his orders, and received the Marshal with the frank
confidence of the camp; he unfolded to him his projects and his hopes
for the day of the 16th, which was very soon to begin. He talked with
him a long time in the night of the 15th and 16th. All the officers
of the Imperial headquarters can attest this.”
Among these officers was, no doubt, Marshal Grouchy.
It goes without saying that at this interview Ney told the Emperor
that he had not occupied Quatre Bras, and why he had not done so. With
almost equal certainty may it be believed that Napoleon told him that
he must occupy the place the next forenoon.
Heymès then proceeds as follows:[249]
“The 16th, at two o’clock in the morning, the Marshal returned to
Gosselies (_i.e._, from Charleroi), where he stopped some minutes in
order to confer with General Reille; he gave him the order to set
out, as soon as he could, with his two divisions and his artillery,
and to get his troops together at Frasnes, where the Marshal himself
would arrive almost as soon.”
And he adds that at 8 A.M. Reille at the head of his two divisions
was _en route_ for Frasnes. General Reille, however, while he says[250]
that his troops were ready to march in the morning,[251] says also that
at 7 A.M. he went to see Marshal Ney, to ask for orders; and that the
Marshal said he was expecting them from the Emperor. One may infer from
these statements, which are not perfectly consistent with each other,
that Ney, on his return to Gosselies from Charleroi, told Reille that
they must be ready to move at a moment’s notice, and that that officer
at once proceeded to get his men into marching order, and that he had
them on the Charleroi-Brussels turnpike, ready to march, before seven
o’clock. One may, perhaps, infer more than this; namely, that Ney,
immediately on his return from seeing the Emperor, ordered Reille to
proceed with his two divisions, as soon as he could, from Gosselies to
Frasnes, so that, when the order to seize Quatre Bras should arrive,
it might be executed promptly; but that he afterwards reconsidered the
matter, and allowed Reille to remain in Gosselies till the written
orders should come.
Whether this be so or not, however, it is plain that when Ney had
been, as Heymès says he had been, informed by the Emperor himself
of his projects for the ensuing day, he ought certainly to have
ordered Reille up to Frasnes at once, with the two divisions then at
Gosselies,—thereby uniting all of the 2d Corps that was under his
control,[252]—and to have seen to it that the 1st Corps was ready
to follow promptly in their rear. No special authority for this was
needed. In fact it was obviously necessary to get these two divisions
out of the way of the 1st Corps, which ought to be assembling at
Gosselies in the early morning, if it was to accomplish anything of
consequence during the forenoon. But Ney, whatever may have been his
first intentions on returning from seeing Napoleon, did actually
nothing of this kind.[253] One cannot avoid the feeling that he was
unwilling to take the slightest responsibility, even that involved in
uniting the three divisions of the 2d Corps at Frasnes, and supplying
their place at Gosselies with the four divisions of the 1st Corps,—a
step which, taking account of the situation, and of the written orders
that had been issued to the 1st Corps, it was his manifest duty to
take. The consideration, that, by this course, the formal order to
seize Quatre Bras, which he undoubtedly expected, could be executed at
once, while, by retaining Reille at Gosselies until the order should be
received, the time required to march the five miles which lay between
Gosselies and Frasnes would postpone the carrying out of the movement
by some two hours or more, does not seem to have had any weight with
him. In fact, beyond getting Reille in readiness to march, Ney really
seems to have made no preparations to facilitate the execution of the
important order which he fully expected to receive.
That this statement is not too strong, appears when we consider what
Ney did to get the 1st Corps up and well in hand, a matter which
assuredly demanded his most strenuous and active efforts at this
moment. Ney arrived at Gosselies from Charleroi, as we have seen, about
2 A.M. He stayed there, apparently, till shortly after 7 A.M.[254] We
know[255] that, even at 3 A.M. one division of the 1st Corps had not
arrived at the river, and that another was still at Marchienne. The
other two divisions had crossed the Sambre, and the leading one[256]
was between Jumet and Gosselies. Colonel Heymès, after stating the
positions of the English at Quatre Bras,[257] says:[258] “In default
of staff-officers, of whom the Marshal had none, officers of the
chasseurs and lancers of the Guard were sent to meet the 1st Corps
in the direction of Marchienne-au-Pont; they had orders to press its
march to Frasnes.” But we shall presently see, that it was not until 11
A.M., when Reille, with the divisions of Foy and Jerome, was ordered to
advance from Gosselies to Quatre Bras, that the first three divisions
of d’Erlon’s Corps were ordered to Frasnes. It appears, then, from
Heymès’ statement, that the activity exhibited by Marshal Ney, to
which he calls attention, was not shown until Ney had ordered these
divisions to Frasnes, that is, until after eleven o’clock. That this
conjecture is correct, appears also from the fact, stated by Colonel
Heymès,[259] that the regiments of the chasseurs and lancers of the
Guard, from which officers were detailed on staff duty, as above
stated, were in reserve behind the village of Frasnes, and, therefore,
not at Gosselies. There is, therefore, nothing to show that Marshal
Ney did anything in regard to getting up the 1st Corps until after 11
o’clock A.M.[260] If he had, Colonel Heymès, who was on his staff,
would doubtless have mentioned it. And it seems to be an unavoidable
inference from what Colonel Heymès says, that at the time when these
extemporized staff-officers were sent to find the 1st Corps and hurry
it up, part of it, at any rate, was supposed by Marshal Ney to be yet
in the neighborhood of Marchienne.
The first written order[261] which Marshal Ney received on this morning
of the 16th, was from Marshal Soult, who informed him that the Count
of Valmy had been ordered to Gosselies with his corps of cavalry,
and placed under his, Ney’s, orders; these troops were to replace
the division of cavalry of the Guard under Lefebvre-Desnouettes.[262]
Marshal Soult then inquired whether the 1st Corps had executed its
movement, that is, had crossed the river, and had joined the 2d Corps
at Gosselies, in pursuance of the orders[263] to the Count d’Erlon of
the day before. He further desired that Ney would inform him as to
the exact positions of the 1st and 2d Corps, and of the two divisions
of cavalry, which were attached to them. We do not know what answer
Marshal Ney returned to these interrogatories, but he told Reille,[264]
in the course of the conversation to which we have before referred,
shortly before seven o’clock in the morning, that he had rendered to
the Emperor an account of his situation. This first order, therefore,
must have arrived about 6 A.M.; and from its contents, and also from
the hour when it was sent, as well as from the tenor of the orders to
d’Erlon of the day before, we can see how carefully the operations of
the left wing were watched at the headquarters of the army.
Shortly after this conversation between Ney and Reille, the Marshal
went back to Frasnes,[265] leaving word with Reille that, if any orders
for the movement of troops should arrive in his absence, they were
to be executed at once, and their contents communicated to the Count
d’Erlon, who was at Jumet, or in rear of that place.
About 9 o’clock, General Reille continues,[266] a report was received
from General Girard, who commanded that division of the 2d Corps which
had gone off to the right and joined the main army, to the effect
that the Prussians were forming beyond Fleurus. This report Reille
transmitted at once to the headquarters of the army at Charleroi; but
he sent no word of it to Ney, at Frasnes, at that time.
About an hour afterwards, that is, about 10 A.M.,[267] General Flahaut
of the Emperor’s staff, passed through Gosselies, bringing with him an
important letter[268] for Marshal Ney, written by the Emperor himself,
the contents of which Flahaut communicated to Reille. Of this letter we
shall speak at length in another connection. Suffice it to say here,
that it treated of the occupation of Quatre Bras, the formal order for
which, emanating from the chief-of-staff, it stated would arrive about
the same time. This no doubt was the case.[269]
Reille’s orders from Ney, it will be recollected, were imperative
and precise, to execute[270] at once during Ney’s absence, any
instructions for the movement of troops that might arrive. Yet
we find him writing[271] from Gosselies at 10.15 A.M., to Ney at
Frasnes,—a distance of five miles,—to say that he has been informed
by General Flahaut of the contents of the Emperor’s letter, but that,
in consequence of the information as to the Prussians taking up their
positions near Fleurus, which he had received from Girard before 9
A.M., he has thought it best to postpone the march of his two divisions
from Gosselies to Frasnes until the return of his messenger.[272] And
this, too, just after he had read a letter from the Emperor himself,
prescribing what dispositions Ney should make of his troops after he
had executed the movement on Quatre Bras. One cannot but recall the
criticisms on the generals in this army made by both Napoleon and
Charras, which we have given in an earlier chapter.[273] If Reille
thought the information sent by Girard was so important, why did he not
send it to Ney at once, instead of waiting an hour and a half?
Marshal Ney sent back a peremptory order to Reille to move up to the
front at once.[274] The march began at about a quarter before twelve
o’clock,[275] the division of Foy leading.
Let us now look at the Emperor’s letter and at the orders which Ney
received from Soult during the morning of the 16th.
The orders which were received by Ney on the 16th prior to the
commencement of the battle of Quatre Bras, were three in number. Of the
first[276] we have already spoken.[277] The second,[278] which was the
formal order, directed the Marshal to put the 2d and 1st Corps, and
the 3d Corps[279] of cavalry, in march for Quatre Bras, where he was
to take up a position, and make reconnoissances in the directions of
Brussels and Nivelles. He was to station a division with cavalry at
Genappe, and another division at or near Marbais.
The letter[280] states that the major-general (Soult) has issued the
orders, but that Ney may perhaps receive this letter a little sooner,
as the Emperor’s aides are better mounted. The Emperor then tells
Ney what his own plans are for the day,—a subject which will be more
appropriately treated in another place,—and then says:—“You can then
dispose of your troops in the following manner: the first division at
two leagues in front of Quatre Bras; * * * six divisions of infantry
at and near Quatre Bras and another at Marbais, so that I can order it
to me at Sombreffe, if I have need of it. * * * The corps of the Count
of Valmy * * * at the intersection of the Roman and Brussels roads,
so that I may draw it to me, if I have need of it. * * * Your wing
will be composed of the four divisions of the 1st Corps, of the four
divisions of the 2d Corps, of the two divisions of light cavalry [those
of Jaquinot and Piré], and of the two divisions of the corps of Valmy.”
It has been asserted[281] that this letter restricted Ney in the
employment of the cavalry of the Count of Valmy; but it seems perfectly
clear that all the above-mentioned bodies of troops are put explicitly
at Ney’s disposal for the purpose of carrying out the orders which he
would receive from the major-general; and that the dispositions of his
command which Ney is requested to make, are to be made _only after the
accomplishment of the main object of the movement_,—_the seizure of the
cross-roads_.
But it is impossible that Ney could have had any doubt on the subject,
inasmuch as there was a third formal order sent by Marshal Soult.
This order[282] informs Ney that an officer of lancers reports
considerable bodies of the enemy near Quatre Bras. It then proceeds
thus: “Unite the corps of the Counts Reille and d’Erlon and that of
the Count of Valmy,[283] who has this instant started to join you; with
these forces you ought to be able to beat and destroy any force of the
enemy which you may meet.” It then says that it is not very likely that
Blücher has sent any troops to Quatre Bras, so that Ney will have to
do only with the troops coming from Brussels. It concludes by stating
that Grouchy has made the movement on Sombreffe of which Ney had been
informed in the former order.
Now these orders, and certainly the last one, are as plain as plain can
be. They do not admit of two constructions. Yet Ney, still unwilling to
surrender his own judgment, still deeming it injudicious to push his
command so far in advance of the main army, orders[284] the first three
divisions of the 1st Corps to take up a position at Frasnes. Frasnes,
it must be remembered, is two miles and a half from Quatre Bras,—nearly
two miles from the field of battle,—an hour’s march. Not only this,
but he orders the two divisions of cavalry of the Count of Valmy to
establish themselves at Frasnes and Liberchies,—the latter a village
two miles southwest of Frasnes.
Consider this a moment. The principal formal order directed Ney, in
so many words, to unite the two _corps d’armeé_, and the corps of
cavalry, and to take position at Quatre Bras,—not at Frasnes. Even
if the Emperor’s letter admitted of a construction at variance with
this, so far as the cavalry of the Count of Valmy was concerned, the
last order of Soult’s was unmistakable. It left no room for latitude
of construction. All the troops were to be united in the effort to
get possession of the intersection of the roads, and the cavalry of
the Count of Valmy is explicitly included. Instead of carrying out
this order, which was both plain and peremptory, and called for the
simultaneous employment of his entire command, or, at any rate, for the
employment of as much of his command as he could assemble, more than
half the force which had been placed at Ney’s disposal was ordered by
him to halt and “take position,” “establish themselves,” two miles and
more to the south of the cross-roads. He himself, in his letter to the
Duke of Otranto,[285] states that the 1st Corps “had been left by him
in reserve at Frasnes.” Although this statement is incorrect, inasmuch
as that unlucky command never got quite so far as Frasnes, yet it shows
beyond controversy what Marshal Ney _intended_ to do with the 1st
Corps. He furthermore says in this letter, that it was at the moment
when he was about to order it up from Frasnes, that he learned that the
Emperor had disposed of it. That is to say, he had actually _intended_
to keep a whole corps of 20,000 men (or at least three-fourths of them)
two miles from the battle-field till five o’clock in the afternoon,
for (as we shall see hereafter) it was not until five o’clock that he
learned that d’Erlon’s Corps had wandered off.
FOOTNOTES:
[247] _Ante_, p. 54.
[248] Doc. Inéd., Heymès’ Rel. p. 6. See _ante_, p. 65, n. 28.
[249] Ib., pp. 6, 7.
[250] Doc. Inéd., Reille, Not. Hist., p. 57.
[251] From the context, he would seem to mean before 7 A.M.
[252] Girard’s division was with the main army under Napoleon.
[253] _Cf._ La Tour D’Auvergne, p. 189. Muquardt, pp. 145, 146.
[254] Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57.
[255] _Ante_, p. 51.
[256] _Ante_, p. 50, n. 25.
[257] Doc. Inéd., Heymès, pp. 7, 8.
[258] Ib., p. 8.
[259] Ib., pp. 5, 7. _Ante_, p. 49.
[260] Ib., Reille, p. 57.
[261] Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; _post_, p. 377.
[262] _Ante_, p. 49.
[263] Doc. Inéd., Heymès. V, VI, p. 25; App. C, v, vi; _post_, pp. 367,
368.
[264] Ib., Reille, p. 57.
[265] Ib., p. 57.
[266] Doc. Inéd., Reille, p. 57.
[267] Reille in his “Notice Historique” says 11 A.M. But his despatch
to Ney, in which he says that he read the Flahaut order, is dated 10.15
A.M. Doc. Inéd., XI, pp. 37, 38; App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379.
[268] Ib., X, pp. 32 _et seq._ App. C, xviii; _post_, pp. 377, 378.
[269] Ib., p. 30: at least this was the opinion of Marshal Ney’s son.
[270] Ib., Reille, p. 57.
[271] Ib., XI, pp. 37, 38. App. C, xix; _post_, p. 379. He does not
mention in his “Notice Historique” that he delayed executing Ney’s
order.
[272] The delay thus occasioned is estimated by Charras (vol.
2, p. 238) at an hour and a quarter. It was really an hour and
three-quarters, as Reille ought to have started at ten.
[273] _Ante_, p. 19.
[274] Doc. Inéd., Reille, XII, p. 38; App. C, xx; _post_, pp. 379, 380.
[275] Charras, vol. 1, p. 189. _Cf._ vol. 2, p. 238.
[276] Doc. Inéd., VII, pp. 26, 27; App. C, xvii; _post_, p. 377.
[277] _Ante_, p. 120.
[278] Doc. Inéd., VIII, p. 27; App. C, xxi; _post_, pp. 380, 381.
[279] That of the Count of Valmy, Kellermann.
[280] Doc. Inéd., X, pp. 32 _et seq._; App. C, xvii; _post_, pp. 377,
378.
[281] Charras, vol. 1, pp. 204, 205.
[282] Doc. Inéd., IX, p. x31; App. C, xxii; _post_, p. 381.
[283] Charras (vol. 1, p. 190) says that this order differed from
Soult’s previous orders in authorizing Ney to employ the cavalry of the
Count of Valmy. But both Soult’s orders direct this in express terms.
[284] Doc. Inéd., XII, pp. 38, 39; App. C, xx; _post_, pp. 379, 380.
[285] Jones, p. 386. Charras, vol. 1, p. 215.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER VIII._
1. The conduct of Marshal Ney on the 15th and 16th has been the
subject of violent and bitter disputes. One principal cause of these
disputes lies in the supposition that Napoleon in his accounts of the
campaign has misrepresented the facts, so as to throw a large part of
the blame for the final disaster undeservedly upon Ney. Accordingly,
what Napoleon has said about Ney, and his motives in saying it, have
been the subjects of discussion, rather than what Ney himself did. We
have strictly confined our narrative to the consideration of Ney’s
acts, orders, and statements, supplemented by those of one of his
corps-commanders and his chief-of-staff. From these it appears,
(a) That Ney was informed of the Emperor’s intentions during the night
of the 15th and 16th:
(b) That he contented himself, on his return to Gosselies at two
o’clock in the morning, with ordering Reille to get his two divisions
ready to move: he did not order Reille up to Frasnes as he might have
done; nor did he see to it that the places of Reille’s divisions at
Gosselies were taken by the two divisions of d’Erlon’s Corps, which, as
we have seen,[286] were, at that hour well across the river:
(c) That instead of pushing right on to Quatre Bras with all his
disposable force when he finally got his written orders, as those
orders in express terms peremptorily directed him to do, he ordered
three divisions of the 1st Corps to take up a position at Frasnes,
two miles from the field of battle, and Kellermann’s two divisions
of cavalry “to establish themselves” partly there and partly at
Liberchies, a village still further from the field:
(d) That he deliberately intended those three divisions of the 1st
Corps and those two divisions of cavalry to stay at Frasnes and
Liberchies, as his reserve, instead of having them with him for
immediate use on the field of Quatre Bras:
(e) Lastly, all these things are _admitted_ to be true; they are not
accusations against him; they are facts, stated by himself, either in
his own orders or letters, or by his own chief-of-staff, or by General
Reille.
2. There is certainly one inference to be drawn from these facts. It is
that Marshal Ney was not, in that night and morning, preparing for a
decisive blow. So much, we presume, will be conceded. It is also plain
that he was not proposing strictly to obey his orders. He evidently had
his doubts about the wisdom of his orders. He was not going to embark
too deep in what he evidently feared might prove a disastrous venture.
He would proceed to Quatre Bras with the three divisions of the 2d
Corps, but he would leave three divisions of the 1st Corps and the two
divisions of Kellermann’s cavalry to protect his flank and line of
retreat, and also to be at hand in case the Emperor should need them.
He did not dare to trust the Emperor fully. He must, he felt, in this
emergency, act according to his own judgment.
3. If we are right in this conclusion, we can easily understand why
Ney failed to carry out the order given to him at five o’clock on the
afternoon of the 15th, to seize Quatre Bras that evening. We have
left the much disputed question of the giving of this order on one
side in our narrative[287] for reasons already stated; but we have,
nevertheless, expressed our opinion[288] that the order was given.
Ney’s conduct on the 16th is of a piece, we believe, with his conduct
on the 15th.
4. No serious criticism can be passed, we think, on the tenor of the
orders issued to the corps-commanders of the left wing, or to the
commander of that wing, during the afternoon of the 15th and the
morning of the 16th. Neither the Emperor nor Soult could well have done
more than they did to arouse the energy of the officers who had charge
of the operations there.[289] The orders were precise and imperative.
The trouble was that the officers to whom they were addressed lacked
either the disposition or the energy requisite to carry them into
effect.
5. But why, it may be fairly asked, did not Napoleon, as soon as he had
found out that Ney had not seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the
15th, order him forthwith to proceed to do so in the early morning of
the 16th? Why this delay in sending him a formal written order?
This question will be considered in the next chapter, when we come to
describe Napoleon’s doings on the 16th.
FOOTNOTES:
[286] _Ante_, p. 51.
[287] _Ante_, p. 52.
[288] _Ante_, pp. 67, 68.
[289] For an explanation of Chesney’s (pp. 118, 119) severe strictures,
see _ante_, p. 51, n. 29.