THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH OF JUNE: WELLINGTON.
The Duke of Wellington, as we have seen, did not decide on ordering
a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras until the early
morning hours of the 16th of June.
We have produced above two orders, both addressed to Lord Hill, written
at Brussels on the morning of the 16th of June, and we have shown
that the first, at any rate, was written and sent out before the Duke
had made up his mind to concentrate his army at Quatre Bras. We have
also, however, shown, that before he left Brussels, he did make up his
mind to do this, and that orders to this effect were, no doubt, then
issued. We cannot fix the hour or hours at which this was done, but it
was undoubtedly before the Duke left Brussels. This last hour has been
differently fixed,[230] but it was probably about half-past seven. He,
then, leaving the Deputy Quarter Master General and the other heads of
departments in Brussels,—[231] presumably to attend to the issuing of
the orders for the concentration of the army at Quatre Bras,—rode to
the latter place, where he arrived about 10 o’clock. Here he found only
Perponcher’s division of Dutch-Belgian troops, under command of the
Prince of Orange.
At half-past ten, he wrote to Marshal Blücher the letter before
referred to, which, as we have said above, never, as we believe, saw
the light until it was published in Berlin,[232] in 1876, in Von
Ollech’s History[233] of the Campaign of 1815. We give a translation of
it here in full.
On the Heights behind Frasnes:
June 16, 1815. 10.30 A.M.
My dear Prince:
My army is situated as follows:
The Corps d’Armée of the Prince of Orange has a division here and at
Quatre Bras, and the rest at Nivelles.
The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe, where it will
arrive at noon.
The English Cavalry will be at the same hour at Nivelles.
The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte.
I do not see any large force of the enemy in front of us, and I
await news from your Highness and the arrival of troops in order to
determine my operations for the day.
Nothing has been seen on the side of Binche, nor on our right.
Your very obedient servant,
Wellington.
Let us see precisely how far this letter agrees with Colonel De
Lancey’s Memorandum, which he drew up—presumably before the Duke left
Brussels—for the Duke’s information, and of which we have before
spoken, entitled “Disposition of the British army at 7 o’clock A.M.,
16th June.” (See Map 4.)
The 1st Corps, says the Duke in his letter, has a division here,—that
is, in rear of Frasnes,—and at Quatre Bras. This, as we have seen
above, was the 2d division of Dutch-Belgian troops,—Perponcher’s. The
rest of the 1st Corps, says the Duke, are at Nivelles. Now, of the
three divisions,—those of Chassé (Dutch-Belgian), Alten, and Cooke,
which constituted the rest of the 1st Corps,—the first two had been
ordered to Nivelles the previous evening,—the last, Cooke’s, is stated
in the De Lancey “Disposition” to be, at 7 A.M., at Braine-le-Comte.
The Duke, therefore, might well suppose that it would accomplish the
greater part of the distance between Braine-le-Comte and Nivelles, nine
miles, in three hours and a half.
The Duke next says “The Reserve is in march from Waterloo to Genappe,
where it will arrive at noon.” For this statement the Duke did not
have to refer to the “Disposition.” He had passed Picton’s division on
the road, a mile or two north of Waterloo, probably a little before 9
A.M.; and, supposing, as he did, that Picton either had then received,
or shortly would receive, orders to push on to Quatre Bras, he was
warranted in saying that the division would reach Genappe at noon. He
did not take the trouble to except from his general statement, which he
doubtless thought was sufficiently accurate for all practical purposes,
the division of Sir Lowry Cole, which the “Disposition” placed at
Assche, eight miles north-west of Brussels, nor the 5th Hanoverian
brigade, which was at Hal.
The Duke next says that the English Cavalry will be at Nivelles at
noon. The “Disposition” puts them at Braine-le-Comte at 7 A.M. Relying
on this statement, the Duke says they will accomplish the nine miles
between that place and Nivelles by noon.
“The Corps of Lord Hill is at Braine-le-Comte,” is the next and last
statement in the letter. That corps consisted of the 2d and 4th British
divisions, of the 1st Dutch-Belgian division, and of Anthing’s brigade.
As respects the 2d division, the “Disposition” states that it was at 7
A.M. at Braine-le-Comte. The 4th division, the “Disposition” states,
was at Audenarde at 7 A.M. and was marching on Braine-le-Comte; but the
Duke certainly could not have supposed it possible that that division
could have marched from Audenarde to Braine-le-Comte, a distance of
more than thirty miles, between seven and half-past ten in the morning.
And as for the 1st Dutch-Belgian division and the Indian brigade,
the “Disposition” puts them at Sotteghem, a village near Audenarde,
at 7 A.M., and states that they are marching on Enghien. The Duke,
therefore, had not the authority of the “Disposition” for the statement
made in his letter as to these portions of Lord Hill’s Corps; but
then these divisions had been stationed so far away, that probably
he never counted on them at all in his own mind in connection with a
concentration at Quatre Bras. These were the troops which he left at
Hal and Tubize on the day of Waterloo to protect his right.
It is, therefore, we submit, easy to see that the Duke had the
“Disposition” before him when he wrote the letter to Marshal Blücher.
He seems to have taken it,—so to speak,—blindfold; it never seems
to have occurred to him that it was practically impossible that his
various divisions could have been at seven o’clock that morning where
his chief-of-staff had said that they were. He accepted the memorandum
as official, and followed it substantially—with a few deviations, to
be sure, as we have pointed out—in his letter to Blücher. Not only
this; the Duke acted at once on the faith of the representations
contained in the “Disposition.” He, about noon, rode over to Brye to
confer with Marshal Blücher, and to propose to coöperate with him. It
is evident from the narrative[234] of Baron Müffling, who accompanied
the Duke, that Wellington was, in his opinion, laboring under grave
misconceptions as to the whereabouts of his army. The conversation,
according to Müffling, was mainly concerned with the manner of the
promised coöperation,—Gneisenau wishing the Duke to march from Quatre
Bras to Brye, and Wellington being unwilling thus to expose his
communications with Brussels and Nivelles. Towards the close of the
discussion, says Müffling, the Duke adopted a suggestion of his, and
said “I will overthrow what is before me at Frasnes and will direct
myself on Gosselies.” We cite this simply to show how confident
Wellington was that he would find a sufficiently large force at Quatre
Bras on his return from Brye, at about half-past two o’clock. If
Alten’s division was at Nivelles at 7 A.M., _en route_ for Quatre Bras,
it should have arrived there before noon. The reserves, which marching
from Brussels for Quatre Bras, had by 7 A.M. nearly reached Waterloo,
ought to be at Quatre Bras, which is not over eleven miles further,
by 2 or 3 P.M. If the cavalry was actually at Braine-le-Comte at 9
A.M. it might well be at Nivelles by noon, and at Quatre Bras, only
seven miles further, by 3 P.M. Cooke might be expected about the same
time, with his division of Guards. These expectations were no doubt
in the mind of the Duke of Wellington as he rode back to Quatre Bras
from his meeting with Marshal Blücher. The theory advanced, or perhaps
suggested, by the Prussian biographer of Gneisenau, Delbrück,[235]
that the Duke misrepresented the position of his army for the purpose
of inducing Blücher to give battle at Ligny on the strength of his
promise to support him, and of his ability to keep his promise, so that
he, Wellington, might gain the necessary time for the concentration of
his army, has not, in our judgment, anything to support it.[236] The
truth plainly is, that the Duke was himself entirely deceived by the
statement drawn up for his information by his chief-of-staff. He took
it for granted that the troops were where they were stated to be, and
made his dispositions accordingly. He was destined thereby not only
to be greatly disappointed, but to incur imminent danger of defeat.
For, as a matter of fact, many of his divisions were at seven that
morning nowhere near the positions assigned them in Colonel De Lancey’s
Memorandum. We shall refer to this matter in another place; suffice it
to say now that the Duke’s reinforcements came on the field very much
later than he had reason to expect; that the allied troops were for a
couple of hours or so in a very precarious situation, and would without
doubt have been disastrously defeated had Napoleon’s orders been
carried out.
FOOTNOTES:
[230] Müffling (Passages, p. 230) says about 5. Mudford puts it at
7. Gardner, p. 58, at 8. Sir A. Frazer (Letters of Colonel Sir A. S.
Frazer, London, 1859, p. 536), writes at 6 A.M., that he has “just
learned that the Duke moves in half an hour.” The Duke had 22 miles
to ride to arrive at Quatre Bras, and he got there about 10 A.M. His
letter to Blücher is dated 10.30 A.M. Oldfield (MSS.) puts the time of
the Duke’s departure as before that of Sir George Wood and Lieutenant
Colonel Smyth, who “drove out in a calêche of the latter” “between
seven and eight o’clock,” and soon after the departure of the Brunswick
troops, which was “at an early hour.”
[231] Oldfield, MSS.
[232] Von Ollech, p. 125. Maurice, June, 1890, p. 257. App. C, xvi;
_post_, pp. 376, 377.
[233] Charras, vol. 1, p. 192, note, refers to it to show that
Wellington was opposite Frasnes at 10.30 A.M., but he makes no other
reference to it.
[234] Müffling, Passages, p. 236. Ollech, p. 126.
[235] Gneisenau, vol. 4, pp. 369, 370.
[236] At the same time, it must be said that Delbrück was quite
naturally led to adopt this suggestion. It is only on the supposition
that the “Disposition” is an authentic document and that the Duke
followed it blindly, but honestly, in his letter to Marshal Blücher,
that we can find a satisfactory answer to Delbrück’s suggestion.
_NOTES TO CHAPTER VII._
1. It may be worth while to state, as nearly as we can, the actual
positions at 7 A.M. of the 16th of the various bodies of troops
mentioned in the “Disposition.” (See Map 5.)
The 1st division was not at 7 A.M. at Braine-le-Comte. It did not reach
that place from Enghien until 9 A.M.[237] Its commander, General Cooke,
having received no further orders, halted the division till noon, when
he took upon himself the responsibility of continuing the march to
Nivelles, where he arrived at 3 P.M. Here he received orders to proceed
at once to Quatre Bras.
The 2d division, Clinton’s, which was also stated in the “Disposition”
to have been at 7 A.M. at Braine-le-Comte, and to be marching on
Nivelles, did not, in fact,[238] receive the order to march from the
neighborhood of Ath, where it was stationed, to Enghien till twelve
hours after it was dated,—_i.e._, not until 10 A.M. of the 16th! The
troops did not reach Enghien till 2 P.M., and missing, apparently, the
direct road, did not arrive at Braine-le-Comte till midnight.
The 3d division, Alten’s, is said in the “Disposition” to have been at
Nivelles at 7 A.M., and marching to Quatre Bras. It did not arrive at
Nivelles till noon.[239]
The 4th division, Colville’s, was no doubt correctly stated in the
“Disposition” to have been at Audenarde at 7 A.M. The 10 P.M. orders of
the 15th of June directed it on Enghien; and we must presume, for the
reasons given above, that further orders to march on Braine-le-Comte
had been issued.
The 5th division, Picton’s, was not “beyond Waterloo” at 7 A.M., as
stated in the “Disposition.” In point of fact, it must have been some
six miles on the Brussels side of Waterloo at that hour.[240] Included
in this division was the 4th Hanoverian brigade,[241] and the Duke of
Brunswick’s Corps.
The 6th division, Cole’s, is no doubt correctly stated in the
“Disposition” to have been at 7 A.M. at Assche; but whether orders for
it to march to Genappe and Quatre Bras had arrived at so early an hour,
may be doubted.
Similar observations apply to the 5th Hanoverian brigade, stated in the
“Disposition” to have been at 7 A.M. at Hal, and marching to Genappe
and Quatre Bras, and to the 1st Dutch-Belgian Division and Anthing’s
Indian brigade, stated to be at Sotteghem, and marching to Enghien.
The “Disposition” states that the 2d and 3d divisions of the Army of
the Low Countries were at Nivelles and Quatre Bras at 7 A.M. This
was not true of the 3d division, Chassé’s, which did not assemble at
Nivelles till near noon.[242] The 2d division, Perponcher’s, as we have
seen, was at Quatre Bras at 7 A.M.
As for the statement in the “Disposition” that Major General
Dörnberg’s brigade and the Cumberland Hussars were “beyond Waterloo” at
7 A.M., it certainly was far from correct. Dörnberg had been directed
by an order sent off from Brussels between 5 and 7 P.M. of the 15th to
retire his brigade from the neighborhood of Mons to Vilvorde, a town
seven miles north of Brussels. He could not have reached Vilvorde,
which is a distance of forty-five miles, until late in the afternoon.
As for the “remainder of the cavalry,” which was stationed in and near
Ninove, it not only was not at Braine-le-Comte at 7 A.M., as stated
in the “Disposition,” but it did not receive the first order,—sent
off from Brussels about 10 o’clock in the evening of the 15th,—until
shortly before six in the morning.[243] It was therefore only an hour’s
march from Ninove on its way to Enghien at seven o’clock. It did not
reach the field till “the evening was far advanced and the conflict had
ceased.”[244]
Nor could Kruse’s Nassau brigade have passed Waterloo at 7 A.M., as
stated in the “Disposition,” _en route_ for Genappe, for it did not
arrive at Quatre Bras in season to take part in the action.
We have been at some pains to lay the facts in regard to this
“Disposition” before the reader, because it certainly is the most
misleading statement ever drawn up “for the information” of a
commanding general. No thought seems to have been given either to the
time at which the orders could be received, or to the time required to
carry them out. An officer of sufficient experience in war to occupy
the post of chief-of-staff to the Duke of Wellington ought certainly to
have been quite competent to give to his commanding officer an estimate
of the probable positions at any given time of the various divisions
of the army, on which it would be safe to rely.[245]
2. Whether, if such an estimate had been made, Wellington would have
stayed at Quatre Bras, may be a question, but he probably would have
risked it, as he evidently did not suppose the French to be in great
force in his front, and it was obviously of prime importance to retain
his communications with Blücher, if possible.
3. Finally, it must be said that the Duke of Wellington was not well
served by his subordinates on the day of the 15th in respect to the
transmission to him of information from the front.[246] His first news
of the attack on the Prussian lines near Thuin did not arrive till 3
P.M., although the French movement must have been pronounced some ten
or eleven hours before that hour. Charleroi was occupied by the main
French column at noon, but all the Duke had heard at 10 P.M. simply
warranted him in writing that the enemy “appeared to menace Charleroi.”
Brussels is only 35 or 36 miles from Charleroi; and by a good despatch
system news of such importance ought to have been transmitted in four
hours. If that had been done,—if Wellington had known at four or five
o’clock in the afternoon positively that the French had occupied
Charleroi in force, and if his information from Mons had arrived at
the same time, as certainly ought to have been the case,—there is
every reason to suppose that he would at once have issued orders for
the concentration of the army at Quatre Bras. The orders which he did
issue to this effect were not sent out, as we have seen, till the early
morning hours of the 16th, some nine or ten hours later than those
which we may fairly suppose he would have issued, had information of
the French movements been promptly transmitted to him. But how far the
commander-in-chief is himself responsible for such delays as this is,
of course, a question. It is and must be for him to devise efficient
methods, and to put them to the test often enough beforehand to feel
justified in relying on them in a sudden emergency. And the situation
in which the Duke of Wellington was in the month of June, 1815,
certainly would seem to have called for the utmost watchfulness and for
the taking of every precaution. It is impossible not to conclude that
he failed in these respects.
FOOTNOTES:
[237] Grenadier Guards, vol. 3, p. 15.
[238] Leeke, vol. 1, pp. 10, 11.
[239] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 90.
[240] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, note. Gomm, pp. 353, 354. Waterloo
Letters, pp. 23, 24. Gomm says Picton’s division left Brussels at 5
A.M., marched to Waterloo (a distance of about eleven miles), and
halted there two hours; and then at 1 P.M. resumed its march for Quatre
Bras, where it arrived at 3.30 P.M. Siborne (vol. 1, p. 102) says
that Picton arrived at a quarter before 3 P.M., having left Waterloo
about noon. As the distance is about thirteen miles, the later hour of
arrival given by Gomm is probably correct.
[241] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 103, n.
[242] Van Loben Sels, p. 232.
[243] Historical Record of the Life Guards, p. 193: 2d Ed. London;
Longmans: 1840. Bullock’s Journal; English Historical Magazine, July,
1888, p. 549.
[244] Life Guards, p. 194. Bullock, p. 549, says eight o’clock.
[245] It ought to be remembered, however, that the “Disposition” was
in all probability drawn up in a great hurry. Wellington had put off
the decision to concentrate at Quatre Bras so late that both the giving
of the necessary orders and the preparation of this “Disposition” must
have been done in the greatest haste.
[246] _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 1, p. 166, note.