BATTLE OF SALAMIS. — RETREAT OF XERXES.
The sentiment, alike durable and unanimous, with which the Greeks
of after-times looked back on the battle of Thermopylæ, and which
they have communicated to all subsequent readers, was that of just
admiration for the courage and patriotism of Leonidas and his band.
But among the contemporary Greeks that sentiment, though doubtless
sincerely felt, was by no means predominant: it was overpowered
by the more pressing emotions of disappointment and terror. So
confident were the Spartans and Peloponnesians in the defensibility
of Thermopylæ and Artemisium, that when the news of the disaster
reached them, not a single soldier had yet been put in motion: the
season of the festival games had passed, but no active step had yet
been taken.[202] Meanwhile the invading force, army and fleet, was
in its progress towards Attica and Peloponnesus, without the least
preparations,—and, what was still worse, without any combined and
concerted plan,—for defending the heart of Greece. The loss sustained
by Xerxes at Thermopylæ, insignificant in proportion to his vast
total, was more than compensated by the fresh Grecian auxiliaries
which he now acquired. Not merely the Malians, Lokrians, and
Dorians, but also the great mass of the Bœotians, with their chief
town Thebes, all except Thespiæ and Platæa, now joined him.[203]
Demaratus, his Spartan companion, moved forward to Thebes to renew
an ancient tie of hospitality with the Theban oligarchical leader,
Attagînus, while small garrisons were sent by Alexander of Macedon
to most of the Bœotian towns,[204] as well to protect them from
plunder as to insure their fidelity. The Thespians, on the other
hand, abandoned their city, and fled into Peloponnesus; while
the Platæans, who had been serving aboard the Athenian ships at
Artemisium,[205] were disembarked at Chalkis as the fleet retreated,
for the purpose of marching by land to their city, and removing their
families. Nor was it only the land-force of Xerxes which had been
thus strengthened; his fleet also had received some accessions from
Karystus in Eubœa, and from several of the Cyclades,—so that the
losses sustained by the storm at Sêpias and the fights at Artemisium,
if not wholly made up, were at least in part repaired, while the
fleet remained still prodigiously superior in number to that of the
Greeks.[206]
[202] Herodot. viii, 40, 71, 73.
[203] Herodot. viii, 66. Diodorus calls the battle of Thermopylæ
a _Kadmeian victory_ for Xerxes,—which is true only in the
letter, but not in the spirit: he doubtless lost a greater number
of men in the pass than the Greeks, but the advantage which he
gained was prodigious (Diodor. xi, 12); and Diodorus himself sets
forth the terror of the Greeks after the event (xi, 13-15).
[204] Plutarch, De Herodot. Malignit. p. 864; Herodot. viii, 34.
[205] Herodot. viii, 44, 50.
[206] Herodot. viii, 66.
At the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, near fifty years after
these events, the Corinthian envoys reminded Sparta that she had
allowed Xerxes time to arrive from the extremity of the earth at the
threshold of Peloponnesus, before she took any adequate precautions
against him: a reproach true almost to the letter.[207] It was only
when roused and terrified by the news of the death of Leonidas,
that the Lacedæmonians and the other Peloponnesians began to put
forth their full strength. But it was then too late to perform the
promise made to Athens, of taking up a position in Bœotia so as to
protect Attica. To defend the isthmus of Corinth was all that they
now thought of, and seemingly all that was now open to them: thither
they rushed with all their available population under the conduct
of Kleombrotus, king of Sparta (brother of Leonidas), and began to
draw fortifications across it, as well as to break up the Skironian
road from Megara to Corinth, with every mark of anxious energy.
The Lacedæmonians, Arcadians, Eleians, Corinthians, Sikyonians,
Epidaurians, Phliasians, Trœzenians, and Hermionians, were all
present here in full numbers; many myriads of men (bodies of ten
thousand each) working and bringing materials night and day.[208] As
a defence to themselves against attack by land, this was an excellent
position: they considered it as their last chance,[209] abandoning
all hope of successful resistance at sea. But they forgot that a
fortified isthmus was no protection even to themselves against the
navy of Xerxes,[210] while it professedly threw out not only Attica,
but also Megara and Ægina. And thus rose a new peril to Greece from
the loss of Thermopylæ: no other position could be found which, like
that memorable strait, comprehended and protected at once all the
separate cities. The disunion thus produced brought them within a
hair’s breadth of ruin.
[207] Thucyd. i, 69. τόν τε γὰρ Μῆδον αὐτοὶ ἴσμεν ἀπὸ περάτων
γῆς πρότερον ἐπὶ Πελοπόννησον ἐλθόντα, πρὶν τὰ παρ’ ὑμῶν ἀξίως
προαπαντῆσαι.
[208] Herodot. viii, 71. συνδραμόντες ἐκ τῶν πολίων.
[209] Herodot. viii, 74.
[210] Herodot. vii, 139.
If the causes of alarm were great for the Peloponnesians, yet more
desperate did the position of the Athenians appear. Expecting,
according to agreement, to find a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia ready
to sustain Leonidas, or at any rate to coöperate in the defence
of Attica, they had taken no measures to remove their families or
property: but they saw with indignant disappointment as well as
dismay, on retreating from Artemisium, that the conqueror was in full
march from Thermopylæ, that the road to Attica was open to him, and
that the Peloponnesians were absorbed exclusively in the defence of
their own isthmus and their own separate existence.[211] The fleet
from Artemisium had been directed to muster at the harbor of Trœzen,
there to await such reinforcements as could be got together: but the
Athenians entreated Eurybiadês to halt at Salamis, so as to allow
them a short time for consultation in the critical state of their
affairs, and to aid them in the transport of their families. While
Eurybiadês was thus staying at Salamis, several new ships which had
reached Trœzen came over to join him; and in this way Salamis became
for a time the naval station of the Greeks, without any deliberate
intention beforehand.[212]
[211] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9. ἅμα μὲν ὀργὴ τῆς προδοσίας
εἶχε τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, ἅμα δὲ δυσθυμία καὶ κατήφεια μεμονωμένους.
Herodot. viii, 40. δοκέοντες γὰρ εὑρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ
ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίῃ ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὗρον οὐδὲν
ἐὸν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας ἐς τὴν
Πελοπόννησον, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιουμένους περιεῖναι, καὶ ταύτην
ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῇ, τὰ τε ἄλλα ἀπιέναι.
Thucyd. i, 74. ὅτε γοῦν ἦμεν (we Athenians) ἔτι σῶοι, οὐ
παρεγένεσθε (Spartans).
Both Lysias (Oratio Funebr. c. 8) and Isokratês take pride in
the fact that the Athenians, in spite of being thus betrayed,
never thought of making separate terms for themselves with
Xerxes (Panegyric, Or. iv. p. 60). But there is no reason to
believe that Xerxes would have granted them separate terms: his
particular vengeance was directed against them. Isokratês has
confounded in his mind the conduct of the Athenians when they
refused the offers of Mardonius in the year following the battle
of Salamis, with their conduct before the battle of Salamis
against Xerxes.
[212] Herodot. viii, 40-42.
Meanwhile Themistoklês and the Athenian seamen landed at Phalêrum,
and made their mournful entry into Athens. Gloomy as the prospect
appeared, there was little room for difference of opinion,[213] and
still less room for delay. The authorities and the public assembly at
once issued a proclamation, enjoining every Athenian to remove his
family out of the country in the best way he could. We may conceive
the state of tumult and terror which followed on this unexpected
proclamation, when we reflect that it had to be circulated and acted
upon throughout all Attica, from Sunium to Orôpus, within the narrow
space of less than six days; for no longer interval elapsed before
Xerxes actually arrived at Athens, where indeed he might have arrived
even sooner.[214] The whole Grecian fleet was doubtless employed in
carrying out the helpless exiles; mostly to Trœzen, where a kind
reception and generous support were provided for them (the Trœzenian
population being seemingly semi-Ionic, and having ancient relations
of religion as well as of traffic with Athens),—but in part also to
Ægina: there were, however, many who could not, or would not, go
father than Salamis. Themistoklês impressed upon the sufferers that
they were only obeying the oracle, which had directed them to abandon
the city and to take refuge behind the wooden walls; and either
his policy, or the mental depression of the time, gave circulation
to other stories, intimating that even the divine inmates of the
acropolis were for a while deserting it. In the ancient temple of
Athênê Polias on that rock, there dwelt, or was believed to dwell,
as guardian to the sanctuary and familiar attendant of the goddess,
a sacred serpent, for whose nourishment a honey-cake was placed once
in the month. The honey-cake had been hitherto regularly consumed;
but at this fatal moment the priestess announced that it remained
untouched: the sacred guardian had thus set the example of quitting
the acropolis, and it behooved the citizens to follow the example,
confiding in the goddess herself for future return and restitution.
The migration of so many ancient men, women, and children, was a
scene of tears and misery inferior only to that which would have
ensued on the actual capture of the city.[215] Some few individuals,
too poor to hope for maintenance, or too old to care for life,
elsewhere,—confiding, moreover, in their own interpretation[216] of
the wooden wall which the Pythian priestess had pronounced to be
inexpugnable,—shut themselves up in the acropolis along with the
administrators of the temple, obstructing the entrance or western
front with wooden doors and palisades.[217] When we read how great
were the sufferings of the population of Attica near half a century
afterwards, compressed for refuge within the spacious fortifications
of Athens at the first outbreak of the Peloponnesian war,[218] we
may form some faint idea of the incalculably greater misery which
overwhelmed an emigrant population, hurrying, they knew not whither,
to escape the long arm of Xerxes. Little chance did there seem that
they would ever revisit their homes except as his slaves.
[213] Plato, Legg. iii, p. 699.
[214] Herodot. viii, 66, 67. There was, therefore, but little
time for the breaking up and carrying away of furniture, alluded
to by Thucydides, i, 18—διανοηθέντες ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν καὶ
~ἀνασκευασάμενοι~, etc.
[215] Herodot. viii, 41; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.
In the years 1821 and 1822, during the struggle which preceded
the liberation of Greece, the Athenians were forced to leave
their country and seek refuge in Salamis three several times.
These incidents are sketched in a manner alike interesting and
instructive by Dr. Waddington, in his Visit to Greece (London,
1825), Letters, vi, vii, x. He states, p. 92, “Three times
have the Athenians emigrated in a body, and sought refuge from
the sabre among the houseless rocks of Salamis. Upon these
occasions, I am assured, that many have dwelt in caverns, and
many in miserable huts, constructed on the mountain-side by their
own feeble hands. Many have perished too, from exposure to an
intemperate climate; many, from diseases contracted through the
loathsomeness of their habitations; many from hunger and misery.
On the retreat of the Turks, the survivors returned to their
country. But to what a country did they return? To a land of
desolation and famine; and in fact, on the first reoccupation of
Athens, after the departure of Omer Brioni, several persons are
known to have subsisted for some time on grass, till a supply of
corn reached the Piræus from Syra and Hydra.”
A century and a half ago, also in the war between the Turks and
Venetians, the population of Attica was forced to emigrate to
Salamis, Ægina, and Corinth. M. Buchon observes, “Les troupes
Albanaises, envoyées en 1688 par les Turcs (in the war against
the Venetians) se jetèrent sur l’Attique, mettant tout à feu
et à sang. En 1688, les chroniques d’Athènes racontent que ses
malheureux habitants furent obligés de se refugier à Salamine, à
Egine, et à Corinthe, et que ce ne fut qu’après trois ans qu’ils
purent rentrer en partie dans leur ville et dans leurs champs.
Beaucoup des villages de l’Attique sont encore habités par les
déscendans de ces derniers envahisseurs, et avant la dernière
révolution, on n’y parloit que la langue albanaise: mais leur
physionomie diffère autant que leur langue de la physionomie de
la race Grecque.” (Buchon, La Grèce Continentale et la Morée.
Paris, 1843, ch. ii, p. 82.)
[216] Pausanias seems to consider these poor men somewhat
presumptuous for pretending to understand the oracle better than
Themistoklês,—Ἀθηναίων τοὺς πλέον τι ἐς τὸν χρησμὸν ἢ Θεμιστοκλῆς
εἰδέναι νομίζοντας (i, 18, 2).
[217] Herodot. viii, 50.
[218] Thucyd. ii, 16, 17.
In the midst of circumstances thus calamitous and threatening,
neither the warriors nor the leaders of Athens lost their energy,—arm
as well as mind was strung to the loftiest pitch of human resolution.
Political dissensions were suspended: Themistoklês proposed to the
people a decree, and obtained their sanction, inviting home all who
were under sentence of temporary banishment: moreover, he not only
included but even specially designated among them his own great
opponent Aristeidês, now in the third year of ostracism. Xanthippus
the accuser, and Kimon the son, of Miltiadês, were partners in the
same emigration: the latter, enrolled by his scale of fortune among
the horsemen of the state, was seen with his companions cheerfully
marching through the Kerameikus to dedicate their bridles in the
acropolis, and to bring away in exchange some of the sacred arms
there suspended, thus setting an example of ready service on
shipboard, instead of on horseback.[219] It was absolutely essential
to obtain supplies of money, partly for the aid of the poorer exiles,
but still more for the equipment of the fleet; there were no funds in
the public treasury,—but the Senate of Areopagus, then composed in
large proportion of men from the wealthier classes, put forth all its
public authority as well as its private contributions and example to
others,[220] and thus succeeded in raising the sum of eight drachms
for every soldier serving.
[219] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 10, 11; and Kimon, c. 5.
[220] Whether this be the incident which Aristotle (Politic. v,
3, 5) had in his mind, we cannot determine.
This timely help was indeed partly obtained by the inexhaustible
resource of Themistoklês, who, in the hurry of embarkation, either
discovered or pretended that the Gorgon’s head from the statue of
Athênê was lost, and directing upon this ground every man’s baggage
to be searched, rendered any treasures, which private citizens might
be carrying out, available to the public service.[221] By the most
strenuous efforts, these few important days were made to suffice for
removing the whole population of Attica,—those of military competence
to the fleet at Salamis,—the rest to some place of refuge,—together
with as much property as the case admitted. So complete was the
desertion of the country, that the host of Xerxes, when it became
master, could not seize and carry off more than five hundred
prisoners.[222] Moreover, the fleet itself, which had been brought
home from Artemisium partially disabled, was quickly repaired,
so that, by the time the Persian fleet arrived, it was again in
something like fighting condition.
[221] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. x.
[222] Herodot. ix, 99.
The combined fleet which had now got together at Salamis consisted
of three hundred and sixty-six ships,—a force far greater than at
Artemisium. Of these, no less than two hundred were Athenian; twenty
among which, however, were lent to the Chalkidians, and manned by
them. Forty Corinthian ships, thirty Æginetan, twenty Megarian,
sixteen Lacedæmonian, fifteen Sikyonian, ten Epidaurian, seven
from Ambrakia, and as many from Eretria, five from Trœzen, three
from Hermionê, and the same number from Leukas; two from Keos, two
from Styra, and one from Kythnos; four from Naxos, despatched as a
contingent to the Persian fleet, but brought by the choice of their
captains and seamen to Salamis;—all these triremes, together with
a small squadron of the inferior vessels called pentekonters, made
up the total. From the great Grecian cities in Italy there appeared
only one trireme, a volunteer, equipped and commanded by an eminent
citizen named Phayllus, thrice victor at the Pythian games.[223] The
entire fleet was thus a trifle larger than the combined force, three
hundred and fifty-eight ships, collected by the Asiatic Greeks at
Ladê, fifteen years earlier, during the Ionic revolt. We may doubt,
however, whether this total, borrowed from Herodotus, be not larger
than that which actually fought a little afterwards at the battle
of Salamis, and which Æschylus gives decidedly as consisting of
three hundred sail, in addition to ten prime and chosen ships. That
great poet, himself one of the combatants, and speaking in a drama
represented only seven years after the battle, is better authority on
the point even than Herodotus.[224]
[223] Herodot. viii, 43-48.
[224] Æschylus, Persæ, 347; Herodot. viii, 48; vi, 9; Pausanias,
i, 14, 4. The total which Herodotus announces is three hundred
and seventy-eight; but the items which he gives amount, when
summed up, only to three hundred and sixty-six. There seems
no way of reconciling this discrepancy except by some violent
change, which we are not warranted in making.
Ktesias represents that the numbers of the Persian war-ships
at Salamis were above one thousand, those of the Greeks seven
hundred (Persica, c. 26).
The Athenian orator in Thucydides (i, 74) calls the total of the
Grecian fleet at Salamis “nearly four hundred ships, and the
Athenian contingent somewhat less than _two parts_ of this total
(ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν).”
The Scholiast, with Poppo and most of the commentators on
this passage, treat τῶν δύο μοιρῶν as meaning unquestionably
_two parts out of three_: and if this be the sense, I should
agree with Dr. Arnold in considering the assertion as a mere
exaggeration of the orator, not at all carrying the authority of
Thucydides himself. But I cannot think that we are here driven
to such a necessity; for the construction of Didot and Göller,
though Dr. Arnold pronounces it “a most undoubted error,” appears
to me perfectly admissible. They maintain that αἱ δύο μοιραὶ does
not of necessity mean two parts _out of three_: in Thucydid.
i, 10, we find καίτοι Πελοποννήσου τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο μοιρὰς
νέμονται, where the words mean _two parts out of five_. Now in
the passage before us, we have ναῦς μέν γε ἐς τὰς τετρακοσίας
ὀλίγῳ ἐλάσσους τῶν δύο μοιρῶν: and Didot and Göller contend, that
in the word τετρακοσίας is implied a quaternary division of the
whole number,—_four hundreds_ or _hundredth parts_: so that the
whole meaning would be—“To the aggregate _four hundreds_ of ships
we contributed something less than _two_.” The word τετρακοσίας,
equivalent to τέσσαρας ἑκατοντάδας, naturally includes the
general idea of τέσσαρας μοιράς: and this would bring the passage
into exact analogy with the one cited above,—τῶν πέντε τὰς δύο
μοιράς. With every respect to the judgment of Dr. Arnold on an
author whom he had so long studied, I cannot enter into the
grounds on which he has pronounced this interpretation of Didot
and Göller to be “an undoubted error.” It has the advantage of
bringing the assertion of the orator in Thucydides into harmony
with Herodotus, who states the Athenians to have furnished one
hundred and eighty ships at Salamis.
Wherever such harmony can be secured by an admissible
construction of existing words, it is an unquestionable
advantage, and ought to count as a reason in the case, if there
be a doubt between two admissible constructions. But on the
other hand, I protest against altering numerical statements in
one author, simply in order to bring him into accordance with
another, and without some substantive ground in the text itself.
Thus, for example, in this very passage of Thucydides, Bloomfield
and Poppo propose to alter τετρακοσίας into τριακοσίας, in
order that Thucydides may be in harmony with Æschylus and other
authors, though not with Herodotus; while Didot and Göller would
alter τριακοσίων into τετρακοσίων in Demosthenes de Coronâ (c.
70), in order that Demosthenes may be in harmony with Thucydides.
Such emendations appear to me inadmissible in principle: we are
not to force different witnesses into harmony by retouching their
statements.
Hardly was the fleet mustered at Salamis, and the Athenian
population removed, when Xerxes and his host overran the deserted
country, his fleet occupying the roadstead of Phalêrum with the
coast adjoining. His land-force had been put in motion under the
guidance of the Thessalians, two or three days after the battle of
Thermopylæ, and he was assured by some Arcadians who came to seek
service, that the Peloponnesians were, even at that moment, occupied
with the celebration of the Olympic games. “What prize does the
victor receive?” he asked. Upon the reply made, that the prize was
a wreath of the wild olive, Tritantæchmês, son of the monarch’s
uncle Artabanus, is said to have burst forth, notwithstanding the
displeasure both of the monarch himself and of the bystanders:
“Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of men are these against whom thou
hast brought us to fight! men who contend not for money, but for
honor!”[225] Whether this be a remark really delivered, or a dramatic
illustration imagined by some contemporary of Herodotus, it is not
the less interesting as bringing to view a characteristic of Hellenic
life, which contrasts not merely with the manners of contemporary
Orientals, but even with those of the earlier Greeks themselves
during the Homeric times.
[225] Herodot. viii, 26. Παπαὶ, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ’ ἄνδρας
ἤγαγες μαχησομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα
ποιεῦνται, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς.
Among all the various Greeks between Thermopylæ and the borders
of Attica, there were none except the Phocians disposed to refuse
submission: and they refused only because the paramount influence of
their bitter enemies the Thessalians made them despair of obtaining
favorable terms.[226] Nor would they even listen to a proposition of
the Thessalians, who, boasting that it was in their power to guide
as they pleased the terrors of the Persian host, offered to insure
lenient treatment to the territory of Phocis, provided a sum of fifty
talents were paid to them.[227] The proposition being indignantly
refused, they conducted Xerxes through the little territory of Doris,
which _medized_ and escaped plunder, into the upper valley of the
Kephisus, among the towns of the inflexible Phocians. All of them
were found deserted; the inhabitants having previously escaped either
to the wide-spreading summit of Parnassus, called Tithorea, or even
still farther, across that mountain into the territory of the Ozolian
Lokrians. Ten or a dozen small Phocian towns, the most considerable
of which were Elateia and Hyampolis, were sacked and destroyed by
the invaders, nor was the holy temple and oracle of Apollo at Abæ
better treated than the rest: all its treasures were pillaged, and
it was then burnt. From Panopeus Xerxes detached a body of men to
plunder Delphi, marching with his main army through Bœotia, in which
country he found all the towns submissive and willing, except Thespiæ
and Platæa: both were deserted by their citizens, and both were now
burnt. From hence he conducted his army into the abandoned territory
of Attica, reaching without resistance the foot of the acropolis at
Athens.[228]
[226] Herodot. viii, 30.
[227] Herodot. viii, 28, 29.
[228] Herodot. viii, 32-34.
Very different was the fate of that division which he had detached
from Panopeus against Delphi: Apollo defended his temple here
more vigorously than at Abæ. The cupidity of the Persian king was
stimulated by accounts of the boundless wealth accumulated at Delphi,
especially the profuse donations of Crœsus. The Delphians, in the
extreme of alarm, while they sought safety for themselves on the
heights of Parnassus, and for their families by transport across the
gulf into Achaia, consulted the oracle whether they should carry
away or bury the sacred treasures. Apollo directed them to leave the
treasures untouched, saying that he was competent himself to take
care of his own property. Sixty Delphians alone ventured to remain,
together with Akêratus, the religious superior: but evidences of
superhuman aid soon appeared to encourage them. The sacred arms
suspended in the interior cell, which no mortal hand was ever
permitted to touch, were seen lying before the door of the temple;
and when the Persians, marching along the road called Schistê, up
that rugged path under the steep cliffs of Parnassus which conducts
to Delphi, had reached the temple of Athênê Pronœa,—on a sudden,
dreadful thunder was heard,—two vast mountain crags detached
themselves and rushed down with deafening noise among them, crushing
many to death,—the war-shout was also heard from the interior of
the temple of Athênê. Seized with a panic terror, the invaders
turned round and fled; pursued not only by the Delphians, but also,
as they themselves affirmed, by two armed warriors of superhuman
stature and destructive arm. The triumphant Delphians confirmed this
report, adding that the two auxiliaries were the heroes Phylakus and
Autonoüs, whose sacred precincts were close adjoining: and Herodotus
himself when he visited Delphi, saw in the sacred ground of Athênê
the identical masses of rock which had overwhelmed the Persians.[229]
Thus did the god repel these invaders from his Delphian sanctuary
and treasures, which remained inviolate until one hundred and thirty
years afterwards, when they were rifled by the sacrilegious hands of
the Phocian Philomêlus. On this occasion, as will be seen presently,
the real protectors of the treasures were the conquerors at Salamis
and Platæa.
[229] Herodot. viii, 38, 39; Diodor. xi, 14; Pausan. x, 8, 4.
Compare the account given in Pausanias (x, 23) of the subsequent
repulse of Brennus and the Gauls from Delphi: in his account, the
repulse is not so exclusively the work of the gods as in that of
Herodotus: there is a larger force of human combatants in defence
of the temple, though greatly assisted by divine intervention:
there is also loss on both sides. A similar descent of crags from
the summit is mentioned.
See for the description of the road by which the Persians
marched, and the extreme term of their progress, Ulrichs, Reisen
und Forschungen in Griechenland, ch. iv, p. 46; ch. x, p. 146.
Many great blocks of stone and cliff are still to be seen near
the spot, which have rolled down from the top, and which remind
the traveller of these passages.
The attack here described to have been made by order of Xerxes
upon the Delphian temple, seems not easy to reconcile with
the words of Mardonius, Herodot. ix, 42: still less can it be
reconciled with the statement of Plutarch (Numa, c. 9), who says
that the Delphian temple was burnt by the Medes.
Four months had elapsed since the departure from Asia when Xerxes
reached Athens, the last term of his advance. He brought with him
the members of the Peisistratid family, who doubtless thought their
restoration already certain,—and a few Athenian exiles attached to
their interest. Though the country was altogether deserted, the
handful of men collected in the acropolis ventured to defy him: nor
could all the persuasions of the Peisistratids, eager to preserve
the holy place from pillage, induce them to surrender.[230] The
Athenian acropolis,—a craggy rock rising abruptly about one hundred
and fifty feet, with a flat summit of about one thousand feet
long from east to west, by five hundred feet broad from north to
south,—had no practicable access except on the western side:[231]
moreover, in all parts where there seemed any possibility of climbing
up, it was defended by the ancient fortification called the Pelasgic
wall. Obliged to take the place by force, the Persian army was posted
around the northern and western sides, and commenced their operations
from the eminence immediately adjoining on the northwest, called
Areopagus:[232] from whence they bombarded, if we may venture upon
the expression, with hot missiles, the woodwork before the gates;
that is, they poured upon it multitudes of arrows with burning tow
attached to them. The wooden palisades and boarding presently took
fire and were consumed: but when the Persians tried to mount to the
assault by the western road leading up to the gate, the undaunted
little garrison still kept them at bay, having provided vast stones,
which they rolled down upon them in the ascent. For a time the Great
King seemed likely to be driven to the slow process of blockade; but
at length some adventurous men among the besiegers tried to scale the
precipitous rock before them on its northern side, hard by the temple
or chapel of Aglaurus, which lay nearly in front of the Persian
position, but behind the gates and the western ascent. Here the rock
was naturally so inaccessible, that it was altogether unguarded,
and seemingly even unfortified:[233] moreover, the attention of the
little garrison was all concentrated on the host which fronted the
gates. Hence the separate escalading party was enabled to accomplish
their object unobserved, and to reach the summit in the rear of the
garrison; who, deprived of their last hope, either cast themselves
headlong from the walls, or fled for safety to the inner temple.
The successful escaladers opened the gates to the entire Persian
host, and the whole acropolis was presently in their hands. Its
defenders were slain, its temples pillaged, and all its dwellings and
buildings, sacred as well as profane, consigned to the flames.[234]
The citadel of Athens fell into the hands of Xerxes by a surprise,
very much the same as that which had placed Sardis in those of
Cyrus.[235]
[230] Herodot. viii, 52.
[231] Pausanias, i, 22, 4; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p.
76. Ernst Curtius (Die Akropolis von Athens, p. 5, Berlin,
1844) says that the plateau of the acropolis is rather less
than four hundred feet higher than the town: Fiedler states it
to be one hundred and seventy-eight fathoms, or one thousand
and sixty-eight feet above the level of the sea. (Reise durch
das Königreich Griechenland, i, p. 2); he gives the length and
breadth of the plateau in the same figures as Kruse, whose
statement I have copied in the text. In Colonel Leake’s valuable
Topography of Athens, I do not find any distinct statement
about the height of the acropolis. We must understand Kruse’s
statement, if he and Curtius are both correct, to refer only to
the precipitous impracticable portion of the whole rock.
[232] Athenian legend represented the Amazons as having taken
post on the Areopagus, and fortified it as a means of attacking
the acropolis,—ἀντεπύργωσαν (Æschyl. Eumenid. 638).
[233] Herodot. viii, 52, 53. ... ἔμπροσθε ὦν πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος,
ὄπισθε δὲ τῶν πύλεων καὶ τῆς ἀνόδου, τῇ δὴ οὔτε τις ἐφύλασσε,
οὔτ’ ἂν ἤλπισε μή κοτέ τις κατὰ ταῦτα ἀναβαίη ἀνθρώπων, ταύτῃ
ἀνέβησάν τινες κατὰ τὸ ἱρὸν τῆς Κέκροπος θυγατρὸς Ἀγλαύρου,
καίτοιπερ ἀποκρήμνου ἐόντος τοῦ χώρου.
That the Aglaurion was on the north side of the acropolis,
appears clearly made out; see Leake, Topography of Athens, ch.
v, p. 261; Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 119; Forchhammer,
Topographie Athens, pp. 365, 366; in Kieler Philologischen
Studien, 1841. Siebelis (in the Plan of Athens prefixed to his
edition of Pausanias, and in his note on Pausanias, i, 18, 2)
places the Aglaurion erroneously on the eastern side of the
acropolis.
The expressions ἔμπροσθε πρὸ τῆς ἀκροπόλιος appear to refer to
the position of the Persian army, who would naturally occupy the
northern and western fronts of the acropolis: since they reached
Athens from the north,—and the western side furnished the only
regular access. The hill called Areopagus would thus be nearly
in the centre of their position. Forchhammer explains these
expressions unsatisfactorily.
[234] Herodot. viii, 52, 53.
[235] Herodot. i, 84.
Thus was divine prophecy fulfilled: Attica passed entirely into
the hands of the Persians, and the conflagration of Sardis was
retaliated upon the home and citadel of its captors, as it also was
upon their sacred temple of Eleusis. Xerxes immediately despatched
to Susa intelligence of the fact, which is said to have excited
unmeasured demonstrations of joy, confuting, seemingly, the gloomy
predictions of his uncle Artabanus.[236] On the next day but one,
the Athenian exiles in his suite received his orders, or perhaps
obtained his permission, to go and offer sacrifice amidst the ruins
of the acropolis, and atone, if possible, for the desecration of the
ground: they discovered that the sacred olive-tree near the chapel
of Erechtheus, the special gift of the goddess Athênê, though burnt
to the ground by the recent flames, had already thrown out a fresh
shoot of one cubit long,—at least the piety of restored Athens
afterwards believed this encouraging portent,[237] as well as that
which was said to have been seen by Dikæus, an Athenian companion of
the Peisistratids, in the Thriasian plain. It was now the day set
apart for the celebration of the Eleusinian mysteries; and though in
this sorrowful year there was no celebration, nor any Athenians in
the territory, Dikæus still fancied that he beheld the dust and heard
the loud multitudinous chant, which was wont to accompany in ordinary
times the processional march from Athens to Eleusis. He would even
have revealed the fact to Xerxes himself, had not Demaratus deterred
him from doing so: but he as well as Herodotus construed it as
an evidence that the goddesses themselves were passing over from
Eleusis to help the Athenians at Salamis. But whatever may have been
received in after times, on that day certainly no man could believe
in the speedy resurrection of conquered Athens as a free city:
not even if he had witnessed the portent of the burnt olive-tree
suddenly sprouting afresh with preternatural vigor. So hopeless did
the circumstances of the Athenians then appear, not less to their
confederates assembled at Salamis than to the victorious Persians.
[236] Herodot. v, 102; viii, 53-99; ix, 65. ἔδεε γὰρ κατὰ τὸ
θεοπρόπιον πᾶσαν τὴν Ἀττικὴν τὴν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ
Πέρσῃσι.
[237] Herodot. viii, 55-65.
About the time of the capture of the acropolis, the Persian fleet
also arrived safely in the bay of Phalêrum, reinforced by ships from
Karystus as well as from various islands of the Cyclades, so that
Herodotus reckons it to have been as strong as before the terrible
storm at Sêpias Aktê,—an estimate certainly not admissible.[238]
[238] Herodot. viii, 66. Colonel Leake observes upon this
statement (Athens and the Demi of Attica, App. vol. ii, p.
250), “_About one thousand ships_ is the greatest accuracy we
can pretend to, in stating the strength of the Persian fleet at
Salamis: and from these are to be deducted, in estimating the
number of ships engaged in the battle, those which were sent to
occupy the Megaric strait of Salamis, two hundred in number.”
The estimate of Colonel Leake appears somewhat lower than the
probable reality. Nor do I believe the statement of Diodorus,
that ships were detached to occupy the Megaric strait: see a note
shortly following.
Soon after their arrival, Xerxes himself descended to the shore
to inspect the fleet, as well as to take counsel with the various
naval leaders about the expediency of attacking the hostile fleet,
now so near him in the narrow strait between Salamis and the coasts
of Attica. He invited them all to take their seats in an assembly,
wherein the king of Sidon occupied the first place and the king of
Tyre the second. The question was put to each of them separately
by Mardonius, and when we learn that all pronounced in favor of
immediate fighting, we may be satisfied that the decided opinion of
Xerxes himself must have been well known to them beforehand. One
exception alone was found to this unanimity,—Artemisia, queen of
Halikarnassus in Karia; into whose mouth Herodotus puts a speech of
some length, deprecating all idea of fighting in the narrow strait
of Salamis,—predicting that if the land-force were moved forward to
attack Peloponnesus, the Peloponnesians in the fleet at Salamis would
return for the protection of their own homes, and thus the fleet
would disperse, the rather as there was little or no food in the
island,—and intimating, besides, unmeasured contempt for the efficacy
of the Persian fleet and seamen as compared with the Greek, as well
as for the subject contingents of Xerxes generally. That queen
Artemisia gave this prudent counsel, there is no reason to question;
and the historian of Halikarnassus may have had means of hearing
the grounds on which her opinion rested: but I find a difficulty in
believing that she can have publicly delivered any such estimate of
the maritime subjects of Persia,—an estimate not merely insulting
to all who heard it, but at the time not just, though it had come
to be nearer the truth at the time when Herodotus wrote,[239] and
though Artemisia herself may have lived to entertain the conviction
afterwards. Whatever may have been her reasons, the historian tells
us that friends as well as rivals were astonished at her rashness in
dissuading the monarch from a naval battle, and expected that she
would be put to death. But Xerxes heard the advice with perfect good
temper, and even esteemed the Karian queen the more highly: though he
resolved that the opinion of the majority, or his own opinion, should
be acted upon: and orders were accordingly issued for attacking the
next day,[240] while the land-force should move forward towards
Peloponnesus.
[239] The picture drawn in the Cyropædia of Xenophon represents
the subjects of Persia as spiritless and untrained to war
(ἀνάλκιδες καὶ ἀσύντακτοι) and even designedly kept so, forming a
contrast to the native Persians (Xenophon, Cyropæd. viii, 1, 45).
[240] Herodot. viii, 68, 69, 70.
Whilst on the shore of Phalêrum, an omnipotent will compelled seeming
unanimity and precluded all real deliberation,—great, indeed, was
the contrast presented by the neighboring Greek armament at Salamis,
among the members of which unmeasured dissension had been reigning.
It has already been stated that the Greek fleet had originally got
together at that island, not with any view of making it a naval
station, but simply in order to cover and assist the emigration of
the Athenians. This object being accomplished, and Xerxes being
already in Attica, Eurybiadês convoked the chiefs to consider what
position was the fittest for a naval engagement. Most of them,
especially those from Peloponnesus, were averse to remaining at
Salamis, and proposed that the fleet should be transferred to the
isthmus of Corinth, where it would be in immediate communication with
the Peloponnesian land-force, so that in case of defeat at sea, the
ships would find protection on shore, and the men would join in the
land service,—while if worsted in a naval action near Salamis, they
would be inclosed in an island from whence there were no hopes of
escape.[241] In the midst of the debate, a messenger arrived with
news of the capture and conflagration of Athens and her acropolis by
the Persians: and such was the terror produced by this intelligence,
that some of the chiefs, without even awaiting the conclusion of the
debate and the final vote, quitted the council forthwith, and began
to hoist sail, or prepare their rowers, for departure. The majority
came to a vote for removing to the Isthmus, but as night was
approaching, actual removal was deferred until the next morning.[242]
[241] Herodot. viii, 70.
[242] Herodot. viii. 49, 50, 56.
Now was felt the want of a position like that of Thermopylæ, which
had served as a protection to all the Greeks at once, so as to check
the growth of separate fears and interests. We can hardly wonder
that the Peloponnesian chiefs,—the Corinthian in particular, who
furnished so large a naval contingent, and within whose territory
the land-battle at the Isthmus seemed about to take place,—should
manifest such an obstinate reluctance to fight at Salamis, and should
insist on removing to a position where, in case of naval defeat,
they could assist, and be assisted by, their own soldiers on land.
On the other hand, Salamis was not only the most favorable position,
in consequence of its narrow strait, for the inferior numbers of the
Greeks, but could not be abandoned without breaking up the unity
of the allied fleet; since Megara and Ægina would thus be left
uncovered, and the contingents of each would immediately retire for
the defence of their own homes,—while the Athenians also, a large
portion of whose expatriated families were in Salamis and Ægina,
would be in like manner distracted from combined maritime efforts at
the Isthmus. If transferred to the latter place, probably not even
the Peloponnesians themselves would have remained in one body; for
the squadrons of Epidaurus, Trœzen, Hermionê, etc., each fearing
that the Persian fleet might make a descent on one or other of these
separate ports, would go home to repel such a contingency, in spite
of the efforts of Eurybiadês to keep them together. Hence the order
for quitting Salamis and repairing to the Isthmus was nothing less
than a sentence of extinction for all combined maritime defence; and
it thus became doubly abhorrent to all those who, like the Athenians,
Æginetans, and Megarians, were also led by their own separate safety
to cling to the defence of Salamis. In spite of all such opposition,
however, and in spite of the protest of Themistoklês, the obstinate
determination of the Peloponnesian leaders carried the vote for
retreat, and each of them went to his ship to prepare for it on the
following morning.
When Themistoklês returned to his ship, with the gloom of this
melancholy resolution full upon his mind, and with the necessity of
providing for removal of the expatriated Athenian families in the
island as well as for that of the squadron,—he found an Athenian
friend named Mnêsiphilus, who asked him what the synod of chiefs
had determined. Concerning this Mnêsiphilus, who is mentioned
generally as a sagacious practical politician, we unfortunately
have no particulars: but it must have been no common man whom fame
selected, truly or falsely, as the inspiring genius of Themistoklês.
On learning what had been resolved, Mnêsiphilus burst out into
remonstrance on the utter ruin which its execution would entail:
there would presently be neither any united fleet to fight, nor any
aggregate cause and country to fight for.[243] He vehemently urged
Themistoklês again to open the question, and to press by every means
in his power for a recall of the vote for retreat, as well as for a
resolution to stay and fight at Salamis. Themistoklês had already in
vain tried to enforce the same view: but disheartened as he was by
ill-success, the remonstrances of a respected friend struck him so
forcibly as to induce him to renew his efforts. He went instantly to
the ship of Eurybiadês, asked permission to speak with him, and being
invited aboard, reopened with him alone the whole subject of the past
discussion, enforcing his own views as emphatically as he could. In
this private communication, all the arguments bearing upon the case
were more unsparingly laid open than it had been possible to do in
an assembly of the chiefs, who would have been insulted if openly
told that they were likely to desert the fleet when once removed
from Salamis. Speaking thus freely and confidentially, and speaking
to Eurybiadês alone, Themistoklês was enabled to bring him partially
round, and even prevailed upon him to convene a fresh synod. So soon
as this synod had assembled, even before Eurybiadês had explained the
object and formally opened the discussion, Themistoklês addressed
himself to each of the chief’s separately, pouring forth at large his
fears and anxiety as to the abandonment of Salamis: insomuch that the
Corinthian Adeimantus rebuked him by saying: “Themistoklês, those
who in the public festival-matches rise up before the proper signal,
are scourged.” “True, (rejoined the Athenian), but those who lag
behind the signal win no crowns.”[244]
[243] Herodot. viii, 57. Οὖτοι ἄρα ἤν ἀπαίρωσι τὰς νῆας ἀπὸ
Σαλαμῖνος, περὶ οὐδεμίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις
ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, etc. Compare vii, 139, and Thucyd. i, 73.
[244] Herodot. viii, 58, 59. The account given by Herodotus, of
these memorable debates which preceded the battle of Salamis, is
in the main distinct, instructive, and consistent. It is more
probable than the narrative of Diodorus (xi, 15, 16), who states
that Themistoklês succeeded in fully convincing both Eurybiadês
and the Peloponnesian chiefs of the propriety of fighting at
Salamis, but that, in spite of all their efforts, the armament
would not obey them, and insisted on going to the Isthmus. And
it deserves our esteem still more, if we contrast it with the
loose and careless accounts of Plutarch and Cornelius Nepos.
Plutarch (Themist. c. 11) describes the scene as if Eurybiadês
was the person who desired to restrain the forwardness and
oratory of Themistoklês, and with that view, first made to
him the observation given in my text out of Herodotus, which
Themistoklês followed up by the same answer,—next, lifted up his
stick to strike Themistoklês, upon which the latter addressed to
him the well-known observation,—“Strike, but hear me,” (Πάταξον
μὲν, ἄκουσον δέ.) Larcher expresses his surprise that Herodotus
_should have suppressed_ so impressive an anecdote as this
latter: but we may see plainly from the tenor of his narrative
that he cannot have heard it. In the narrative of Herodotus,
Themistoklês gives no offence to _Eurybiadês_, nor is the latter
at all displeased with him: nay, Eurybiadês is even brought
over by the persuasion of Themistoklês, and disposed to fall in
with his views. The persons whom Herodotus represents as angry
with Themistoklês, are the Peloponnesian chiefs, especially
Adeimantus the Corinthian. They are angry too, let it be added,
not without plausible reason: a formal vote has just been taken
by the majority, after full discussion; and here is the chief
of the minority, who persuades Eurybiadês to reopen the whole
debate: not an unreasonable cause for displeasure. Moreover, it
is _Adeimantus_, not _Eurybiadês_, who addresses to Themistoklês
the remark, that “persons who rise before the proper signal are
scourged:” and he makes the remark because Themistoklês goes
on speaking to, and trying to persuade, the various chiefs,
_before_ the business of the assembly has been formally opened.
Themistoklês draws upon himself the censure by sinning against
the forms of business, and talking before the proper time. But
Plutarch puts the remark into the mouth of Eurybiadês, without
any previous circumstance to justify it, and without any fitness.
His narrative represents Eurybiadês as the person who was anxious
both to transfer the ships to the Isthmus, and to prevent
Themistoklês from offering any opposition to it: though such an
attempt to check argumentative opposition from the commander of
the Athenian squadron is noway credible.
Dr. Blomfield (ad Æschyl. Pers. 728) imagines that the story
about Eurybiadês threatening Themistoklês with his stick, grew
out of the story as related in Herodotus, though to Herodotus
himself it was unknown. I cannot think that this is correct,
since the story will not fit on to the narrative of that
historian: it does not consist with his conception of the
relations between Eurybiadês and Themistoklês.
Eurybiadês then explained to the synod that doubts had arisen in his
mind, and that he called them together to reconsider the previous
resolve: upon which Themistoklês began the debate, and vehemently
enforced the necessity of fighting in the narrow sea of Salamis and
not in the open waters at the Isthmus,—as well as of preserving
Megara and Ægina: contending that a naval victory at Salamis would
be not less effective for the defence of Peloponnesus than if it
took place at the Isthmus, whereas, if the fleet were withdrawn to
the latter point, they would only draw the Persians after them. Nor
did he omit to add, that the Athenians had a prophecy assuring to
them victory in this, their own island. But his speech made little
impression on the Peloponnesian chiefs, who were even exasperated
at being again summoned to reopen a debate already concluded,—and
concluded in a way which they deemed essential to their safety. In
the bosom of the Corinthian Adeimantus, especially, this feeling
of anger burst all bounds. He sharply denounced the presumption of
Themistoklês, and bade him be silent as a man who had now no free
Grecian city to represent,—Athens being in the power of the enemy:
nay, he went so far as to contend that Eurybiadês had no right to
count the vote of Themistoklês, until the latter could produce some
free city as accrediting him to the synod. Such an attack, alike
ungenerous and insane, upon the leader of more than half of the whole
fleet, demonstrates the ungovernable impatience of the Corinthians
to carry away the fleet to their Isthmus: it provoked a bitter
retort against them from Themistoklês, who reminded them that while
he had around him two hundred well-manned ships, he could procure
for himself anywhere both city and territory as good or better than
Corinth. But he now saw clearly that it was hopeless to think of
enforcing his policy by argument, and that nothing would succeed
except the direct language of intimidation. Turning to Eurybiadês,
and addressing him personally, he said: “If thou wilt stay here, and
fight bravely here, all will turn out well: but if thou wilt not
stay, thou wilt bring Hellas to ruin.[245] For with us, all our means
of war are contained in our ships. Be thou yet persuaded by me. If
not, we Athenians shall migrate with our families on board, just as
we are, to Siris in Italy, which is ours from of old, and which the
prophecies announce that we are one day to colonize. You chiefs then,
when bereft of allies like us, will hereafter recollect what I am now
saying.”
[245] Herodot. viii, 61, 62. Σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ, καὶ μένων ἔσεαι
ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μὴ, ἀνατρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα.
All the best commentators treat this as an elliptical
phrase,—some such words as σώσεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα or καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι,
being understood after ἀγαθός. I adopt their construction, not
without doubts whether it be the true one.
Eurybiadês had before been nearly convinced by the impressive
pleading of Themistoklês. But this last downright menace clenched
his determination, and probably struck dumb even the Corinthian and
Peloponnesian opponents: for it was but too plain, that without
the Athenians the fleet was powerless. He did not however put
the question again to vote, but took upon himself to rescind the
previous resolution and to issue orders for staying at Salamis to
fight. In this order all acquiesced, willing or unwilling;[246] the
succeeding dawn saw them preparing for fight instead of for retreat,
and invoking the protection and companionship of the Æakid heroes
of Salamis,—Telamon and Ajax: they even sent a trireme to Ægina to
implore Æakus himself and the remaining Æakids. It seems to have been
on this same day, also, that the resolution of fighting at Salamis
was taken by Xerxes, whose fleet was seen in motion, towards the
close of the day, preparing for attack the next morning.
[246] Herodot. viii, 64. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ περὶ Σαλαμῖνα, ἔπεσι
ἀκροβολισάμενοι, ἐπεί τε Εὐρυβιάδῃ ἔδοξε, αὐτοῦ παρεσκευάζοντο ὡς
ναυμαχήσοντες.
But the Peloponnesians, though not venturing to disobey the orders of
the Spartan admiral, still retained unabated their former fears and
reluctance, which began again after a short interval to prevail over
the formidable menace of Themistoklês, and were further strengthened
by the advices from the Isthmus. The messengers from that quarter
depicted the trepidation and affright of their absent brethren
while constructing their cross wall at that point, to resist the
impending land invasion. Why were _they_ not there also, to join
hands and to help in the defence,—even if worsted at sea,—at least
on land, instead of wasting their efforts in defence of Attica,
already in the hands of the enemy? Such were the complaints which
passed from man to man, with many a bitter exclamation against the
insanity of Eurybiadês: at length the common feeling broke out in
public and mutinous manifestation, and a fresh synod of the chiefs
was demanded and convoked.[247] Here the same angry debate, and the
same irreconcilable difference, was again renewed; the Peloponnesian
chiefs clamoring for immediate departure, while the Athenians,
Æginetans,[248] and Megarians, were equally urgent in favor of
staying to fight. It was evident to Themistoklês that the majority
of votes among the chiefs would be against him, in spite of the
orders of Eurybiadês; and the disastrous crisis, destined to deprive
Greece of all united maritime defence, appeared imminent,—when he
resorted to one last stratagem to meet the desperate emergency, by
rendering flight impossible. Contriving a pretext for stealing away
from the synod, he despatched a trusty messenger across the strait
with a secret communication to the Persian generals. Sikinnus his
slave,—seemingly an Asiatic Greek,[249] who understood Persian,
and had perhaps been sold during the late Ionic revolt, but whose
superior qualities are marked by the fact that he had the care and
teaching of the children of his master,—was instructed to acquaint
them privately, in the name of Themistoklês, who was represented as
wishing success at heart to the Persians, that the Greek fleet was
not only in the utmost alarm, meditating immediate flight, but that
the various portions of it were in such violent dissension, that
they were more likely to fight against each other than against any
common enemy. A splendid opportunity, it was added, was thus opened
to the Persians, if they chose to avail themselves of it without
delay, first, to inclose and prevent their flight, and then to attack
a disunited body, many of whom would, when the combat began, openly
espouse the Persian cause.[250]
[247] Herodot. viii, 74. ἕως μὲν δὴ αὐτῶν ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παρίστατο,
θώυμα ποιεύμενοι τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ, ἐξεῤῥάγη ἐς
τὸ μέσον, σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο, καὶ πολλὰ ἐλέγετο περὶ τῶν
αὐτῶν, etc. Compare Plutarch, Themist. c. 12.
[248] Lykurgus (cont. Leokrat. c. 17, p. 185) numbers the
Æginetans among those who were anxious to escape from Salamis
during the night, and were only prevented from doing so by the
stratagem of Themistoklês. This is a great mistake, as indeed
these orators are perpetually misconceiving the facts of their
past history. The Æginetans had an interest not less strong than
the Athenians in keeping the fleet together and fighting at
Salamis.
[249] Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 12) calls Sikinnus a _Persian by
birth_, which cannot be true.
[250] Herodot. viii, 75.
Such was the important communication despatched by Themistoklês
across the narrow strait, only a quarter of a mile in breadth at the
narrowest part, which divides Salamis from the neighboring continent
on which the enemy were posted. It was delivered with so much
address as to produce the exact impression which he intended, and
the glorious success which followed caused it to pass for a splendid
stratagem: had defeat ensued, his name would have been covered with
infamy. What surprises us the most is, that after having reaped
signal honor from it in the eyes of the Greeks, as a stratagem,
he lived to take credit for it, during the exile of his latter
days,[251] as a capital service rendered to the Persian monarch:
nor is it improbable, when we reflect upon the desperate condition
of Grecian affairs at the moment, that such facility of double
interpretation was in part his inducement for sending the message.
[251] Thucydid. i, 137. It is curious to contrast this with
Æschylus, Persæ, 351, _seq._ See also Herodot. viii, 109, 110.
Isokratês might well remark about the ultimate rewards given by
the Persians to Themistoklês,—Θεμιστοκλέα δ’, ὃς ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος
αὐτοὺς κατεναυμάχησε, τῶν μεγίστων δωρέων ἠξίωσαν (Panegyric, Or.
iv, p. 74),—though that orator speaks as if he knew nothing about
the stratagem by which Themistoklês compelled the Greeks to fight
at Salamis against their will. See the same Oration, c. 27, p. 61.
It appears to have been delivered to Xerxes shortly after he had
issued his orders for fighting on the next morning: and he entered so
greedily into the scheme, as to direct his generals to close up the
strait of Salamis on both sides during the night,[252] to the north
as well as to the south of the town of Salamis, at the risk of their
heads if any opening were left for the Greeks to escape. The station
of the numerous Persian fleet was along the coast of Attica,—its
head-quarters were in the bay of Phalêrum, but doubtless parts of
it would occupy those three natural harbors, as yet unimproved by
art, which belonged to the deme of Peiræus,—and would perhaps extend
besides to other portions of the western coast southward of Phalêrum:
while the Greek fleet was in the harbor of the town called Salamis,
in the portion of the island facing mount Ægaleos, in Attica.
During the night,[253] a portion of the Persian fleet, sailing from
Peiræus northward along the western coast of Attica, closed round
to the north of the town and harbor of Salamis, so as to shut up
the northern issue from the strait on the side of Eleusis: while
another portion blocked up the other issue between Peiræus and the
southeastern corner of the island, landing a detachment of troops on
the desert island of Psyttaleia, near to that corner.[254] These
measures were all taken during the night, to prevent the anticipated
flight of the Greeks, and then to attack them in the narrow strait
close on their own harbor the next morning.
[252] Æschylus, Persæ, 370.
Herodotus does not mention this threat to the generals, nor does
he even notice the personal interference of Xerxes in any way,
so far as regards the night-movement of the Persian fleet. He
treats the communication of Sikinnus as having been made to the
Persian generals, and the night-movement as undertaken by them.
The statement of the contemporary poet seems the more probable of
the two: but he omits, as might be expected, all notice of the
perilous dissensions in the Greek camp.
[253] Diodorus (xi, 17) states that the Egyptian squadron in
the fleet of Xerxes was detached to block up the outlet between
Salamis and the Megarid; that is, to sail round the southwestern
corner of the island to the northwestern strait. Where the
northwestern corner of the island is separated by a narrow
strait from Megara, near the spot where the fort of Budorum was
afterwards situated, during the Peloponnesian war.
Herodotus mentions nothing of this movement, and his account
evidently implies that the Greek fleet was inclosed to the north
of the town of Salamis, the Persian right wing having got between
that town and Eleusis. The movement announced by Diodorus appears
to me unnecessary and improbable. If the Egyptian squadron had
been placed there, they would have been far indeed removed from
the scene of the action, but we may see that Herodotus believed
them to have taken actual part in the battle along with the rest
(viii, 100).
[254] Herodot. viii, 76. Τοῖσι δὲ ὡς πιστὰ ἐγίνετο τὰ ἀγγελθέντα,
τοῦτο μὲν, ἐς τὴν νησίδα τὴν Ψυττάλειαν, μεταξὺ Σαλαμῖνός τε
κειμένην καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου, πολλοὺς τῶν Περσέων ἀπεβίβασαν· τοῦτο
δὲ, ἐπειδὴ ἐγίνοντο μέσαι νύκτες, ἀνῆγον μὲν τὸ ἀπ’ ἑσπέρης κέρας
κυκλούμενοι πρὸς τὴν Σαλαμῖνα· ἀνῆγον δὲ οἱ ἀμφὶ τὴν Κέον τε καὶ
τὴν Κυνόσουραν τεταγμένοι, κατεῖχόν τε μέχρι Μουνυχίης πάντα τὸν
πορθμὸν τῇσι νηϋσί.
He had previously stated Phalêrum as the main station of the
Persian fleet; not necessarily meaning that the whole of it was
there. The passage which I have just transcribed intimated what
the Persians did to accomplish their purpose of surrounding
the Greeks in the harbor of Salamis and the first part of it,
wherein he speaks of the western (more properly northwestern)
wing, presents no extraordinary difficulty, though we do not
know how far the western wing extended before the movement was
commenced. Probably it extended to the harbor of Peiræus, and
began from thence its night-movement along the Attic coast to get
beyond the town of Salamis. But the second part of the passage
is not easy to comprehend, where he states that, “those who were
stationed about Keos and Kynosura also moved, and beset with
their ships the whole strait as far as Munychia.” What places
are Keos and Kynosura, and where were they situated? The only
known places of those names, are the island of Keos, not far
south of cape Sunium in Attica,—and the promontory Kynosura, on
the northeastern coast of Attica, immediately north of the bay
of Marathon. It seems hardly possible to suppose that Herodotus
meant this latter promontory, which would be too distant to
render the movement which he describes at all practicable: even
the island of Keos is somewhat open to the same objection, though
not in so great a degree, of being too distant. Hence Barthélemy,
Kruse, Bähr, and Dr. Thirlwall, apply the names Keos and Kynosura
to two promontories (the southernmost and the southeasternmost)
of the island of Salamis, and Kiepert has realized their idea in
his newly published maps. But in the first place, no authority
is produced for giving these names to two promontories in the
island, and the critics only do it because they say it is
necessary to secure a reasonable meaning to this passage of
Herodotus. In the next place, if we admit their supposition, we
must suppose that, _before this night-movement commenced_, the
Persian fleet was already stationed in part of _the island of
Salamis_: which appears to me highly improbable. Whatever station
that fleet occupied before the night-movement, we may be very
sure that it was not upon an island then possessed by the enemy:
it was somewhere on the coast of Attica: and the names Keos and
Kynosura must belong to some unknown points in _Attica_, not
in Salamis. I cannot therefore adopt the supposition of these
critics, though on the other hand Larcher is not satisfactory
in his attempt to remove the objections which apply to the
supposition of Keos and Kynosura as commonly understood. It is
difficult in this case to reconcile the statement of Herodotus
with geographical considerations, and I rather suspect that on
this occasion the historian has been himself misled by too great
a desire to find the oracle of Bakis truly fulfilled. It is from
Bakis that he copies the name Kynosura (viii, 77).
Meanwhile, that angry controversy among the Grecian chiefs, in the
midst of which Themistoklês had sent over his secret envoy, continued
without abatement and without decision. It was the interest of the
Athenian general to prolong the debate, and to prevent any concluding
vote until the effect of his stratagem should have rendered retreat
impossible: nor was prolongation difficult in a case so critical,
where the majority of chiefs was on one side and that of naval
force on the other,—especially as Eurybiadês himself was favorable
to the view of Themistoklês. Accordingly, the debate was still
unfinished at nightfall, and either continued all night, or was
adjourned to an hour before daybreak on the following morning, when
an incident, interesting as well as important, gave to it a new
turn. The ostracized Aristeidês arrived at Salamis from Ægina. Since
the revocation of his sentence, proposed by Themistoklês himself,
he had had no opportunity of revisiting Athens, and he now for the
first time rejoined his countrymen in their exile at Salamis; not
uninformed of the dissensions raging, and of the impatience of the
Peloponnesians to retire to the Isthmus. He was the first to bring
the news that such retirement had become impracticable from the
position of the Persian fleet, which his own vessel, in coming from
Ægina, had only eluded under favor of night. He caused Themistoklês
to be invited out from the assembled synod of chiefs, and after a
generous exordium, wherein he expressed his hope that their rivalry
would for the future be only a competition in doing good to their
common country, apprized him that the new movement of the Persians
excluded all hope of now reaching the Isthmus and rendered farther
debate useless. Themistoklês expressed his joy at the intelligence,
and communicated his own secret message whereby he had himself
brought the movement about, in order that the Peloponnesian chiefs
might be forced to fight at Salamis, even against their own consent.
He moreover desired Aristeidês to go himself into the synod, and
communicate the news: for if it came from the lips of Themistoklês,
the Peloponnesians would treat it as a fabrication. So obstinate
indeed was their incredulity, that they refused to accept it as truth
even on the assertion of Aristeidês: nor was it until the arrival of
a Tenian vessel, deserting from the Persian fleet, that they at last
brought themselves to credit the actual posture of affairs and the
entire impossibility of retreat. Once satisfied of this fact, they
prepared themselves at dawn for the impending battle.[255]
[255] Herodot. viii, 79, 80.
Herodotus states, doubtless correctly, that Aristeidês,
immediately after he had made the communication to the synod,
went away, not pretending to take part in the debate: Plutarch
represents him as present, and as taking part in it (Aristeidês,
c. 9). According to Plutarch, Themistoklês desires Aristeidês
to assist him in persuading Eurybiadês: according to Herodotus,
Eurybiadês was already persuaded: it was the Peloponnesian chiefs
who stood out.
The details of Herodotus will be found throughout both more
credible and more consistent than those of Plutarch and the later
writers.
Having caused his land-force to be drawn up along the shore opposite
to Salamis, Xerxes had erected for himself a lofty seat, or throne,
upon one of the projecting declivities of mount Ægaleos, near the
Herakleion and immediately overhanging the sea,[256]—from whence he
could plainly review all the phases of the combat and the conduct
of his subject troops. He was persuaded himself that they had not
done their best at Artemisium, in consequence of his absence, and
that his presence would inspire them with fresh valor: moreover, his
royal scribes stood ready by his side to take the names both of the
brave and of the backward combatants. On the right wing of his fleet,
which approached Salamis on the side of Eleusis, and was opposed to
the Athenians on the Grecian left,—were placed the Phenicians and
Egyptians; on his left wing the Ionians,[257]—approaching from the
side of Peiræus, and opposed to the Lacedæmonians, Æginetans, and
Megarians. The seamen of the Persian fleet, however, had been on
shipboard all night, in making that movement which had brought them
into their actual position: while the Greek seamen now began without
previous fatigue, fresh from the animated harangues of Themistoklês
and the other leaders: moreover, just as they were getting on board,
they were joined by the triremes which had been sent to Ægina to
bring to their aid Æakus, with the other Æakid heroes. Honored with
this precious heroic aid, which tended so much to raise the spirits
of the Greeks, the Æginetan trireme now arrived just in time to take
her post in the line, having eluded pursuit from the intervening
enemy.[258]
[256] Æschylus, Pers. 473; Herodot. viii, 90. The throne with
silver feet, upon which Xerxes had sat, was long preserved
in the acropolis of Athens,—having been left at his retreat.
Harpokration, Ἀργυρόπους δίφρος.
A writer, to whom Plutarch refers,—Akestodôrus,—affirmed that
the seat of Xerxes was erected, not under mount Ægaleos, but
much further to the northwest, on the borders of Attica and
the Megarid, under the mountains called Kerata (Plutarch,
Themistoklês, 13). If this writer was acquainted with the
topography of Attica, we must suppose him to have ascribed an
astonishingly long sight to Xerxes: but we may probably take the
assertion as a sample of that carelessness in geography which
marks so many ancient writers. Ktesias recognizes the Ἡρακλεῖον
(Persica, c. 26)
[257] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16.
[258] Herodot. viii, 83; Plutarch (Themistoklês, c. 13;
Aristeidês, c. 9; Pelopidas, c. 21). Plutarch tells a story
out of Phanias respecting an incident in the moment before
the action, which it is pleasing to find sufficient ground
for rejecting. Themistoklês, with the prophet Euphrantidês,
was offering sacrifice by the side of the admiral’s galley,
when three beautiful youths, nephews of Xerxes, were brought
in prisoners. As the fire was just then blazing brilliantly,
and sneezing was heard from the right, the prophet enjoined
Themistoklês to offer these three prisoners as a propitiatory
offering to Dionysus Omêstês: which the clamor of the bystanders
compelled him to do against his will. This is what Plutarch
states in his life of Themistoklês; in his life of Aristeidês, he
affirms that these youths were brought prisoners from Psyttaleia,
when Aristeidês attacked _it at the beginning of the action_.
Now Aristeidês did not attack Psyttaleia until the naval combat
was nearly over, so that no prisoners can have been brought from
thence at the commencement of the action: there could therefore
have been no Persian prisoners to sacrifice, and the story may be
dismissed as a fiction.
The Greeks rowed forward from the shore to attack with the usual
pæan, or war-shout, which was confidently returned by the Persians;
and the latter were the most forward of the two to begin the fight:
for the Greek seamen, on gradually nearing the enemy, became at first
disposed to hesitate,—and even backed water for a space, so that
some of them touched ground on their own shore: until the retrograde
movement was arrested by a supernatural feminine figure hovering
over them, who exclaimed with a voice that rang through the whole
fleet,—“Ye worthies, how much farther are ye going to back water?”
The very circulation of this fable attests the dubious courage of the
Greeks at the commencement of the battle.[259] The brave Athenian
captains Ameinias and Lykomêdês (the former, brother of the poet
Æschylus) were the first to obey either the feminine voice or the
inspirations of their own ardor: though according to the version
current at Ægina, it was the Æginetan ship, the carrier of the Æakid
heroes, which first set this honorable example.[260] The Naxian
Demokritus was celebrated by Simonides as the third ship in action.
Ameinias, darting forth from the line, charged with the beak of his
ship full against a Phenician, and the two became entangled so that
he could not again get clear: other ships came in aid on both sides,
and the action thus became general. Herodotus, with his usual candor,
tells us that he could procure few details about the action, except
as to what concerned Artemisia, the queen of his own city: so that we
know hardly anything beyond the general facts. But it appears that,
with the exception of the Ionic Greeks, many of whom—apparently a
greater number than Herodotus likes to acknowledge—were lukewarm, and
some even averse;[261] the subjects of Xerxes conducted themselves
generally with great bravery: Phenicians, Cyprians, Kilikians,
Egyptians, vied with the Persians and Medes serving as soldiers on
shipboard, in trying to satisfy the exigent monarch who sat on shore
watching their behavior. Their signal defeat was not owing to any
want of courage,—but, first, to the narrow space which rendered their
superior number a hindrance rather than a benefit: next, to their
want of orderly line and discipline as compared with the Greeks:
thirdly, to the fact that, when once fortune seemed to turn against
them, they had no fidelity or reciprocal attachment, and each ally
was willing to sacrifice or even to run down others, in order to
effect his own escape. Their numbers and absence of concert threw
them into confusion, and caused them to run foul of each other:
those in the front could not recede, nor could those in the rear
advance:[262] the oar-blades were broken by collision,—the steersmen
lost control of their ships, and could no longer adjust the ship’s
course so as to strike that direct blow with the beak which was
essential in ancient warfare. After some time of combat, the whole
Persian fleet was driven back and became thoroughly unmanageable, so
that the issue was no longer doubtful, and nothing remained except
the efforts of individual bravery to protract the struggle. While
the Athenian squadron on the left, which had the greatest resistance
to surmount, broke up and drove before them the Persian right, the
Æginetans on the right intercepted the flight of the fugitives to
Phalêrum:[263] Demokritus, the Naxian captain, was said to have
captured five ships of the Persians with his own single trireme. The
chief admiral, Ariabignês, brother of Xerxes, attacked at once by two
Athenian triremes, fell, gallantly trying to board one of them, and
the number of distinguished Persians and Medes who shared his fate
was great:[264] the more so, as few of them knew how to swim, while
among the Greek seamen who were cast into the sea, the greater number
were swimmers, and had the friendly shore of Salamis near at hand.
It appears that the Phenician seamen of the fleet threw the blame
of defeat upon the Ionic Greeks; and some of them, driven ashore
during the heat of the battle under the immediate throne of Xerxes,
excused themselves by denouncing the others as traitors. The heads
of the Ionic leaders might have been endangered if the monarch had
not seen with his own eyes an act of surprising gallantry by one of
their number. An Ionic trireme from Samothrace charged and disabled
an Attic trireme, but was herself almost immediately run down by
an Æginetan. The Samothracian crew, as their vessel lay disabled
on the water, made such excellent use of their missile weapons,
that they cleared the decks of the Æginetan, sprung on board, and
became masters of her. This exploit, passing under the eyes of
Xerxes himself, induced him to treat the Phenicians as dastardly
calumniators, and to direct their heads to be cut off: his wrath and
vexation, Herodotus tells us, were boundless, and he scarcely knew on
whom to vent it.[265]
[259] Herodot. viii, 84. φανεῖσαν δὲ διακελεύσασθαι, ὥστε καὶ
ἅπαν ἀκοῦσαι τὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων στρατόπεδον, ὀνειδίσασαν πρότερον
τάδε· Ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμναν ἀνακρούεσθε;
Æschylus (Pers. 396-415) describes finely the war-shout of the
Greeks and the response of the Persians: for very good reasons,
he does not notice the incipient backwardness of the Greeks,
which Herodotus brings before us.
The war-shout, here described by Æschylus, a warrior actually
engaged, shows us the difference between a naval combat of
that day and the improved tactics of the Athenians fifty years
afterwards, at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war. Phormio
especially enjoins on his men the necessity of silence (Thucyd.
ii, 89).
[260] Simonides, Epigram 138, Bergk; Plutarch, De Herodot.
Malignitate, c. 36.
According to Plutarch (Themist. 12) and Diodorus (xi, 17), it was
the Persian admiral’s ship which was first charged and captured:
if the fact had been so, Æschylus would probably have specified
it.
[261] Herodot. viii, 85; Diodor. xi, 16. Æschylus, in the Persæ,
though he gives a long list of the names of those who fought
against Athens, does not make any allusion to the Ionic or to
any other Greeks as having formed part of the catalogue. See
Blomfield ad Æschyl. Pers. 42. Such silence easily admits of
explanation: yet it affords an additional reason for believing
that the persons so admitted did not fight very heartily.
[262] Herodot. viii, 86; Diodor. xi, 17. The testimony of the
former, both to the courage manifested by the Persian fleet, and
to their entire want of order and system, is decisive, as well as
to the effect of the personal overlooking of Xerxes.
[263] Simonides, Epigr. 138, Bergk.
[264] The many names of Persian chiefs whom Æschylus reports as
having been slain, are probably for the most part inventions
of his own, to please the ears of his audience. See Blomfield,
Præfat. ad Æschyl. Pers. p. xii.
[265] Herodot. viii, 90.
In this disastrous battle itself, as in the debate before the battle,
the conduct of Artemisia of Halikarnassus was such as to give him
full satisfaction. It appears that this queen maintained her full
part in the battle until the disorder had become irretrievable; she
then sought to escape, pursued by the Athenian trierarch, Ameinias,
but found her progress obstructed by the number of fugitive or
embarrassed comrades before her. In this dilemma, she preserved
herself from pursuit by attacking one of her own comrades; she
charged the trireme of the Karian prince, Damasithymus, of Kalyndus,
ran it down and sunk it, so that the prince with all his crew
perished. Had Ameinias been aware that the vessel which he was
following was that of Artemisia, nothing would have induced him to
relax in the pursuit,—for the Athenian captains were all indignant
at the idea of a female invader assailing their city;[266] but
knowing her ship only as one among the enemy, and seeing her thus
charge and destroy another enemy’s ship, he concluded her to be a
deserter, turned his pursuit elsewhere, and suffered her to escape.
At the same time, it so happened that the destruction of the ship of
Damasithymus happened under the eyes of Xerxes and of the persons
around him on shore, who recognized the ship of Artemisia, but
supposed the ship destroyed to be a Greek. Accordingly they remarked
to him, “Master, seest thou not how well Artemisia fights, and how
she has just sunk an enemy’s ship?” Assured that it was really her
deed, Xerxes is said to have replied, “My men have become women; my
women, men.” Thus was Artemisia not only preserved, but exalted to
a higher place in the esteem of Xerxes by the destruction of one of
his own ships,—among the crew of which not a man survived to tell the
true story.[267]
[266] Compare the indignant language of Demosthenês a century and
a quarter afterwards, respecting the second Artemisia, queen of
Karia, as the enemy of Athens,—ὑμεῖς δ’ ὄντες Ἀθηναῖοι βάρβαρον
ἄνθρωπον, καὶ ταῦτα γυναῖκα, φοβηθήσεσθε (Demosthenes, De
Rhodior. Libertat. c. x, p. 197).
[267] Herodot. viii, 87, 88, 93. The story given here by
Herodotus respecting the stratagem whereby Artemisia escaped,
seems sufficiently probable; and he may have heard it from
fellow-citizens of his own who were aboard her vessel. Though
Plutarch accuses him of extravagant disposition to compliment
this queen, it is evident that he does not himself like the
story, nor consider it to be a compliment; for he himself
insinuates a doubt: “I do not know whether she ran down the
Kalyndian ship intentionally, or came accidentally into collision
with it.” Since the shock was so destructive that the Kalyndian
ship was completely run down and sunk, so that every man of her
crew perished, we may be pretty sure that it was intentional; and
the historian merely suggests a possible hypothesis to palliate
an act of great treachery. Though the story of the sinking of the
Kalyndian ship has the air of truth, however, we cannot say the
same about the observation of Xerxes, and the notice which he is
reported to have taken of the act: all this reads like nothing
but romance.
We have to regret (as Plutarch observes, De Malign. Herodot. p.
873) that Herodotus tells us so much less about others than about
Artemisia; but he doubtless _heard_ more about her than about
the rest, and perhaps his own relatives may have been among her
contingent.
Of the total loss of either fleet, Herodotus gives us no estimate;
but Diodorus states the number of ships destroyed on the Grecian side
as forty, on the Persian side as two hundred; independent of those
which were made prisoners with all their crews. To the Persian loss
is to be added, the destruction of all those troops whom they had
landed before the battle in the island of Psyttaleia: as soon as the
Persian fleet was put to flight, Aristeidês carried over some Grecian
hoplites to that island, overpowered the enemy, and put them to death
to a man. This loss appears to have been much deplored, as they were
choice troops; in great proportion, the native Persian guards.[268]
[268] Herodot. viii, 95; Plutarch, Aristid. c. 9; Æschyl. Pers.
454-470; Diodor. xii, 19.
Great and capital as the victory was, there yet remained after it a
sufficient portion of the Persian fleet to maintain even maritime
war vigorously, not to mention the powerful land-force, as yet
unshaken. And the Greeks themselves, immediately after they had
collected in their island, as well as could be done, the fragments
of shipping and the dead bodies, made themselves ready for a second
engagement.[269] But they were relieved from this necessity by the
pusillanimity[270] of the invading monarch, in whom the defeat had
occasioned a sudden revulsion from contemptuous confidence, not only
to rage and disappointment, but to the extreme of alarm for his own
personal safety. He was possessed with a feeling of mingled wrath and
mistrust against his naval force, which consisted entirely of subject
nations,—Phenicians, Egyptians, Kilikians, Cyprians, Pamphylians,
Ionic Greeks, etc., with a few Persians and Medes serving on board,
in a capacity probably not well suited to them. None of these
subjects had any interest in the success of the invasion, or any
other motive for service except fear, while the sympathies of the
Ionic Greeks were even decidedly against it. Xerxes now came to
suspect the fidelity, or undervalue the courage, of all these naval
subjects;[271] he fancied that they could make no resistance to the
Greek fleet, and dreaded lest the latter should sail forthwith to the
Hellespont, so as to break down the bridge and intercept his personal
retreat; for, upon the maintenance of that bridge he conceived his
own safety to turn, not less than that of his father Darius, when
retreating from Scythia, upon the preservation of the bridge over the
Danube.[272] Against the Phenicians, from whom he had expected most,
his rage broke out in such fierce threats, that they stole away from
the fleet in the night, and departed homeward.[273] Such a capital
desertion made future naval struggle still more hopeless, and Xerxes,
though at first breathing revenge, and talking about a vast mole or
bridge to be thrown across the strait to Salamis, speedily ended by
giving orders to the whole fleet to leave Phalêrum in the night,—not
without disembarking, however, the best soldiers who served on
board.[274] They were to make straight for the Hellespont, and there
to guard the bridge against his arrival.[275]
[269] Herodot. viii, 96.
[270] The victories of the Greeks over the Persians were
materially aided by the personal timidity of Xerxes, and of
Darius Codomannus at Issus and Arbela (Arrian, ii, 11, 6; iii,
14, 3).
[271] See this feeling especially in the language of Mardonius
to Xerxes (Herodot. viii, 100), as well as in that put into the
mouth of Artemisia by the historian (viii, 68), which indicates
the general conception of the historian himself, derived from the
various information which reached him.
[272] Herodot. vii, 10.
[273] This important fact is not stated by Herodotus: but it is
distinctly given in Diodorus, xi, 19. It seems probable enough.
If the tragedy of Phrynichus, entitled _Phœnissæ_, had been
preserved, we should have known more about the position and
behavior of the Phenician contingent in this invasion. It was
represented at Athens only three years after the battle of
Salamis, in B. C. 477 or 476, with Themistoklês as choregus, four
years earlier than the Persæ of Æschylus, which was affirmed
by Glaukus to have been (παραπεποιῆσθαι) altered from it. The
Chorus in the Phœnissæ consisted of Phenician women, possibly the
widows of those Phenicians whom Xerxes had caused to be beheaded
after the battle (Herodot. viii, 90, as Dr. Blomfield supposes,
Præf. ad Æsch. Pers. p. ix), or only of Phenicians absent on the
expedition. The fragments remaining of this tragedy, which gained
the prize, are too scanty to sustain any conjectures as to its
scheme or details (see Welcker Griechische Tragœd. vol. i, p. 26;
and Droysen, Phrynichos, Æschylos, und die Trilogie, pp. 4-6).
[274] Herodot. ix, 32.
[275] Herodot. viii, 97-107. Such was the terror of these
retreating seamen, that they are said to have mistaken the
projecting cliffs of Cape Zôstêr (about half-way between Peiræus
and Sunium) for ships, and redoubled the haste of their flight
as if an enemy were after them,—a story which we can treat as
nothing better than silly exaggeration in the Athenian informants
of Herodotus.
Ktesias, Pers. c. xxvi; Strabo, ix, p. 395; the two latter
talk about the intention to carry a mole across from Attica to
Salamis, as if it had been conceived _before_ the battle.
This resolution was prompted by Mardonius, who saw the real terror
which beset his master, and read therein sufficient evidence of
danger to himself. When Xerxes despatched to Susa intelligence of
his disastrous overthrow, the feeling at home was not simply that of
violent grief for the calamity, and fear for the personal safety of
the monarch,—it was farther imbittered by anger against Mardonius,
as the instigator of this ruinous enterprise. That general knew full
well that there was no safety for him[276] in returning to Persia
with the shame of failure on his head: it was better for him to take
upon himself the chance of subduing Greece, which he had good hopes
of being yet able to do,—and to advise the return of Xerxes himself
to a safe and easy residence in Asia. Such counsel was eminently
palatable to the present alarm of the monarch, while it opened to
Mardonius himself a fresh chance not only of safety, but of increased
power and glory. Accordingly, he began to reassure his master, by
representing that the recent blow was after all not serious,—that
it had only fallen upon the inferior part of his force, and upon
worthless foreign slaves, like Phenicians, Egyptians, etc., while the
native Persian troops yet remained unconquered and unconquerable,
fully adequate to execute the monarch’s revenge upon Hellas;—that
Xerxes might now very well retire with the bulk of his army if he
were disposed, and that he, Mardonius, would pledge himself to
complete the conquest, at the head of three hundred thousand chosen
troops. This proposition afforded at the same time consolation
for the monarch’s wounded vanity, and safety for his person: his
confidential Persians, and Artemisia herself, on being consulted,
approved of the step. The latter had acquired his confidence by the
dissuasive advice which she had given before the recent deplorable
engagement, and she had every motive now to encourage a proposition
indicating solicitude for his person, as well as relieving herself
from the obligation of farther service. “If Mardonius desires to
remain (she remarked, contemptuously[277]), by all means let him
have the troops: should he succeed, thou wilt be the gainer: should
he even perish, the loss of some of thy slaves is trifling, so long
as thou remainest safe, and thy house in power. Thou hast already
accomplished the purpose of thy expedition, in burning Athens.”
Xerxes, while adopting this counsel, and directing the return of his
fleet, showed his satisfaction with the Halikarnassian queen, by
intrusting her with some of his children, directing her to transport
them to Ephesus.
[276] Compare Herodot. vii, 10.
[277] Herodot. viii, 101, 102.
The Greeks at Salamis learned with surprise and joy the departure
of the hostile fleet from the bay of Phalêrum, and immediately put
themselves in pursuit; following as far as the island of Andros
without success. Themistoklês and the Athenians are even said to
have been anxious to push on forthwith to the Hellespont, and there
break down the bridge of boats, in order to prevent the escape of
Xerxes,—had they not been restrained by the caution of Eurybiadês and
the Peloponnesians, who represented that it was dangerous to detain
the Persian monarch in the heart of Greece. Themistoklês readily
suffered himself to be persuaded, and contributed much to divert his
countrymen from the idea; while he at the same time sent the faithful
Sikinnus a second time to Xerxes, with the intimation that he,
Themistoklês, had restrained the impatience of the Greeks to proceed
without delay and burn the Hellespontine bridge,—and that he had
thus, from personal friendship to the monarch, secured for him a safe
retreat.[278] Though this is the story related by Herodotus, we can
hardly believe that, with the great Persian land-force in the heart
of Attica, there could have been any serious idea of so distant an
operation as that of attacking the bridge at the Hellespont. It seems
more probable that Themistoklês fabricated the intention, with a view
of frightening Xerxes away, as well as of establishing a personal
claim upon his gratitude in reserve for future contingences.
[278] Herodot. viii, 109, 110; Thucyd. i, 137. The words
ἢν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο may probably be understood in a
sense somewhat larger than that which they naturally bear
in Thucydidês. In point of fact, not only was it false that
Themistoklês was the person who dissuaded the Greeks from going
to the Hellespont, but it was also false that the Greeks had ever
any serious intention of going there. Compare Cornelius Nepos,
Themistokl. c. 5.
Such crafty manœuvres and long-sighted calculations of possibility,
seem extraordinary: but the facts are sufficiently attested,—since
Themistoklês lived to claim as well as to receive fulfilment of the
obligation thus conferred,—and though extraordinary, they will not
appear inexplicable, if we reflect, first, that the Persian game,
even now, after the defeat of Salamis, was not only not desperate,
but might perfectly well have succeeded, if it had been played
with reasonable prudence: next, that there existed in the mind of
this eminent man an almost unparalleled combination of splendid
patriotism, long-sighted cunning, and selfish rapacity. Themistoklês
knew better than any one else that the cause of Greece had appeared
utterly desperate, only a few hours before the late battle: moreover,
a clever man, tainted with such constant guilt, might naturally
calculate on being one day detected and punished, even if the Greeks
proved successful.
He now employed the fleet among the islands of the Cyclades, for the
purpose of levying fines upon them as a punishment for adherence to
the Persian. He first laid siege to Andros, telling the inhabitants
that he came to demand their money, bringing with him two great
gods,—Persuasion and Necessity. To which the Andrians replied, that
“Athens was a great city, and blest with excellent gods: but that
_they_ were miserably poor, and that there were two unkind gods who
always stayed with them and would never quit the island,—Poverty
and Helplessness.[279] In these gods the Andrians put their trust,
refusing to deliver the money required; for the power of Athens could
never overcome their inability.” While the fleet was engaged in
contending against the Andrians with their sad protecting deities,
Themistoklês sent round to various other cities, demanding from them
private sums of money on condition of securing them from attack.
From Karystus, Paros, and other places, he thus extorted bribes for
himself apart from the other generals,[280] but it appears that
Andros was found unproductive, and after no very long absence, the
fleet was brought back to Salamis.[281]
[279] Herodot. viii, 111. ἐπεὶ Ἀνδρίους γε εἶναι γεωπείνας ἐς τὰ
μέγιστα ἀνήκοντας, καὶ θεοὺς δύο ἀχρήστους οὐκ ἐκλείπειν σφέων
τὴν νῆσον, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ φιλοχωρέειν—Πενίην τε καὶ Ἀμηχανίην.
Compare Alkæus, Fragm. 90, ed. Bergk, and Herodot. vii, 172.
[280] Herodot. viii, 112; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 21,—who
cites a few bitter lines from the contemporary poet Timokreon.
[281] Herodot. viii, 112-121.
The intimation sent by Themistoklês perhaps had the effect of
hastening the departure of Xerxes, who remained in Attica only a few
days after the battle of Salamis, and then withdrew his army through
Bœotia into Thessaly, where Mardonius made choice of the troops to
be retained for his future operations. He retained all the Persians,
Medes, Sakæ, Baktrians, and Indians, horse as well as foot, together
with select detachments of the remaining contingents: making in all,
according to Herodotus, three hundred thousand men. But as it was now
the beginning of September, and as sixty thousand out of his forces,
under Artabazus, were destined to escort Xerxes himself to the
Hellespont, Mardonius proposed to Winter in Thessaly, and to postpone
farther military operations until the ensuing spring.[282]
[282] Herodot. viii, 114-126.
Having left most of these troops under the orders of Mardonius in
Thessaly, Xerxes marched away with the rest to the Hellespont,
by the same road as he had taken in his advance a few months
before. Respecting his retreat, a plentiful stock of stories were
circulated,[283]—inconsistent with each other, fanciful and
even incredible: Grecian imagination, in the contemporary poet
Æschylus, as well as in the Latin moralizers Seneca or Juvenal,[284]
delighted in handling this invasion with the maximum of light and
shadow,—magnifying the destructive misery and humiliation of the
retreat so as to form an impressive contrast with the superhuman
pride of the advance, and illustrating the antithesis with unbounded
license of detail. The sufferings from want of provision were
doubtless severe, and are described as frightful and death-dealing:
the magazines stored up for the advancing march had been exhausted,
so that the retiring army were now forced to seize upon the corn of
the country through which they passed,—an insufficient maintenance,
eked out by leaves, grass, the bark of trees, and other wretched
substitutes for food. Plague and dysentery aggravated their misery,
and occasioned many to be left behind among the cities through
whose territory the retreat was carried; strict orders being left
by Xerxes that these cities should maintain and tend them. After
forty-five days’ march from Attica, he at length found himself at
the Hellespont, whither his fleet, retreating from Salamis, had
arrived long before him.[285] But the short-lived bridge had already
been knocked to pieces by a storm, so that the army was transported
on shipboard across to Asia, where it first obtained comfort and
abundance, and where the change from privation to excess engendered
new maladies. In the time of Herodotus, the citizens of Abdêra still
showed the gilt cimeter and tiara, which Xerxes had presented to them
when he halted there in his retreat, in token of hospitality and
satisfaction: and they even went the length of affirming that never,
since his departure from Attica, had he loosened his girdle until he
reached their city. So fertile was Grecian fancy in magnifying the
terror of the repulsed invader! who reëntered Sardis, with a broken
army and humbled spirit, only eight months after he had left it, as
the presumed conqueror of the western world.[286]
[283] The account given by Æschylus of this retiring march
appears to me exaggerated, and in several points incredible
(Persæ, 482-513). That they suffered greatly during the march
from want of provisions, is doubtless true, and that many of them
died of hunger. But we must consider in deduction: 1. That this
march took place in the months of October and November, therefore
not very long after the harvest. 2. That Mardonius maintained a
large army in Thessaly all the winter, and brought them out in
fighting condition in the spring. 3. That Artabazus also, with
another large division, was in military operation in Thrace all
the winter, after having escorted Xerxes into safety.
When we consider these facts, it will seem that the statements
of Æschylus, even as to the sufferings by famine, must be taken
with great allowance. But his statement about the passage of the
Strymon appears to me incredible, and I regret to find myself
on this point differing from Dr. Thirlwall, who considers it
an undoubted fact. (Hist. Greece, ch. xv, p. 351, 2d ed.) “The
river had been frozen in the night hard enough to bear those who
arrived first. But the ice suddenly gave way under the morning
sun, and numbers perished in the waters,”—so Dr. Thirlwall
states, after Æschylus,—adding, in a note, “It is a little
surprising that Herodotus, when he is describing the miseries
of the retreat, does not notice this disaster, which is so
prominent in the narrative of the Persian messenger in Æschylus.
There can, however, be no doubt as to the fact: and perhaps it
may furnish a useful warning, not to lay too much stress on the
silence of Herodotus, as a ground for rejecting even important
and interesting facts which are only mentioned by later writers,”
etc.
That a large river, such as the Strymon, near its mouth (180
yards broad, and in latitude about N. 40° 50′), at a period which
could not have been later than the beginning of November, should
have been frozen over in one night so hardly and firmly as to
admit of a portion of the army marching over it at daybreak,
before the sun became warm,—is a statement which surely requires
a more responsible witness than Æschylus to avouch it. In fact,
he himself describes it as a “frost out of season,” (χειμῶν’
ἄωρον,) brought about by a special interposition of the gods.
If he is to be believed, none of the fugitives were saved,
except such as were fortunate enough to cross the Strymon on
the ice during the interval between break of day and the sun’s
heat. One would imagine that there was a pursuing enemy on
their track, leaving them only a short time for escape: whereas
in fact, they had no enemy to contend with,—nothing but the
difficulty of finding subsistence. During the advancing march
of Xerxes, a bridge of boats had been thrown over the Strymon:
nor can any reason be given why that bridge should not still
have been subsisting: Artabazus must have recrossed it after he
had accompanied the monarch to the Hellespont. I will add, that
the town and fortress of Eion, which commanded the mouth of the
Strymon, remained as an important strong-hold of the Persians
some years after this event, and was only captured, after a
desperate resistance, by the Athenians and their confederates
under Kimon.
The Athenian auditors of the Persæ would not criticize nicely,
the historical credibility of that which Æschylus told them about
the sufferings of their retreating foe, nor his geographical
credibility when he placed Mount Pangæus on the hither side of
the Strymon, to persons marching out of Greece (Persæ, 494).
But I must confess that, to my mind, his whole narrative of the
retreat bears the stamp of the poet and the religious man, not
of the historical witness. And my confidence in Herodotus is
increased when I compare him on this matter with Æschylus,—as
well in what he says as in what he does not say.
[284] Juvenal, Satir. x, 178.
Ille tamen qualis rediit, Salamine relictâ,
In Caurum atque Eurum solitus sævire flagellis, etc.
[285] Herodot. viii, 130.
[286] See the account of the retreat of Xerxes, in Herodotus,
viii, 115-120, with many stories which he mentions only to
reject. The description given in the Persæ of Æschylus (v, 486,
515, 570) is conceived in the same spirit. The strain reaches its
loudest pitch in Justin (ii, 13), who tells us that Xerxes was
obliged to cross the strait in a fishing-boat. “Ipse cum paucis
Abydon contendit. Ubi cum solutum pontem hibernis tempestatibus
offendisset, piscatoriâ scaphâ trepidus trajecit. Erat res
spectaculo digna et, æstimatione sortis humanæ, rerum varietate
miranda—in exiguo latentem videre navigio, quem paulo ante vix
æquor omne capiebat: carentem etiam omni servorum ministerio,
cujus exercitus propter multitudinem terris graves erant.”
Meanwhile the Athenians and Peloponnesians, liberated from the
immediate presence of the enemy either on land or sea, and passing
from the extreme of terror to sudden ease and security, indulged in
the full delight and self-congratulation of unexpected victory. On
the day before the battle, Greece had seemed irretrievably lost: she
was now saved even against all reasonable hope, and the terrific
cloud impending over her was dispersed.[287] In the division of the
booty, the Æginetans were adjudged to have distinguished themselves
most in the action, and to be entitled to the choice lot; while
various tributes of gratitude were also set apart for the gods. Among
them were three Phenician triremes, which were offered in dedication
to Ajax at Salamis, to Athênê at Sunium, and to Poseidon at the
isthmus of Corinth; farther presents were sent to Apollo at Delphi,
who, on being asked whether he was satisfied, replied, that all had
done their duty to him except the Æginetans: from them he required
additional munificence on account of the prize awarded to them, and
they were constrained to dedicate in the temple four golden stars
upon a staff of brass, which Herodotus himself saw there. Next to the
Æginetans, the second place of honor was awarded to the Athenians;
the Æginetan Polykritus, and the Athenians Eumenês and Ameinias,
being ranked first among the individual combatants.[288] Respecting
the behavior of Adeimantus and the Corinthians in the battle, the
Athenians of the time of Herodotus drew the most unfavorable picture,
representing them to have fled at the commencement, and to have been
only brought back by the information that the Greeks were gaining
the victory. Considering the character of the debates which had
preceded, and the impatient eagerness manifested by the Corinthians
to fight at the Isthmus instead of at Salamis, some such backwardness
on their part, when forced into a battle at the latter place, would
not be in itself improbable: yet in this case it seems that not only
the Corinthians themselves, but also the general voice of Greece,
contradicted the Athenian story, and defended them as having behaved
with bravery and forwardness. We must recollect that, at the time
when Herodotus probably collected his information, a bitter feeling
of hatred prevailed between Athens and Corinth, and Aristeus, son of
Adeimantus, was among the most efficient enemies of the former.[289]
[287] Herodot. viii, 109. ἡμεῖς δὲ, εὕρημα γὰρ εὑρήκαμεν ἡμέας
αὐτοὺς καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, μὴ διώκωμεν ἄνδρας φεύγοντας.
[288] Herodot. viii, 93-122; Diodor. xi, 27.
[289] Herodot. viii, 94; Thucyd. i, 42, 103. τὸ σφοδρὸν μῖσος
from Corinth towards Athens. About Aristeus, Thucyd. ii, 67.
Plutarch (De Herodot. Malignit. p. 870) employs many angry words
in refuting this Athenian scandal, which the historian himself
does not uphold as truth. The story advanced by Dio Chrysostom
(Or. xxxvii, p. 456), that Herodotus asked for a reward from the
Corinthians, and on being refused, inserted this story into his
history for the purpose of being revenged upon them, deserves
no attention without some reasonable evidence: the statement of
Diyllus, that he received ten talents from the Athenians as a
reward for his history, would be much less improbable, so far
as the fact of pecuniary reward, apart from the magnitude of
the sum: but this also requires proof. Dio Chrysostom is not
satisfied with rejecting this tale of the Athenians, but goes the
length of affirming that the Corinthians carried off the palm
of bravery, and were the cause of the victory. The epigrams of
Simonides, which he cites, prove nothing of the kind (p. 459).
Marcellinus (Vit. Thucyd. p. xvi), insinuates a charge against
Herodotus, something like that of Plutarch and Dio.
Besides the first and second prizes of valor, the chiefs at the
Isthmus tried to adjudicate among themselves the first and second
prizes of skill and wisdom. Each of them deposited two names on the
altar of Poseidon: and when these votes came to be looked at, it was
found that each man had voted for himself as deserving the first
prize, but that Themistoklês had a large majority of votes for the
second.[290] The result of such voting allowed no man to claim the
first prize, nor could the chiefs give a second prize without it;
so that Themistoklês was disappointed of his reward, though exalted
so much the higher, perhaps, through that very disappointment, in
general renown. He went shortly afterwards to Sparta, where he
received from the Lacedæmonians honors such as were never paid,
before nor afterwards, to any foreigner. A crown of olive was indeed
given to Eurybiadês as the first prize, but a like crown was at
the same time conferred on Themistoklês as a special reward for
unparalleled sagacity; together with a chariot, the finest which the
city afforded. Moreover, on his departure, the three hundred select
youths called Hippeis, who formed the active guard and police of the
country, all accompanied him in a body as escort of honor to the
frontiers of Tegea.[291] Such demonstrations were so astonishing,
from the haughty and immovable Spartans, that they were ascribed
by some authors to their fear lest Themistoklês should be offended
by being deprived of the general prize,—and they are even said to
have excited the jealousy of the Athenians so much, that he was
displaced from his post of general and Xanthippus nominated.[292]
Neither of these last reports is likely to be true, nor is either of
them confirmed by Herodotus: the fact that Xanthippus became general
of the fleet during the ensuing year, is in the regular course of
Athenian change of officers, and implies no peculiar jealousy of
Themistoklês.
[290] Herodot. viii, 123. Plutarch (Themist. c. 17: compare De
Herodot. Malign. p. 871) states that _each individual_ chief gave
his second vote to Themistoklês. The more we test Herodotus by
comparison with others, the more we shall find him free from the
exaggerating spirit.
[291] Herodot. viii 124; Plutarch, Themist. c. 17.
[292] Diodor. xi, 27; compare Herodot. viii, 125, and Thucyd. i,
74.