BATTLES OF PLATÆA AND MYKALE. — FINAL REPULSE OF THE PERSIANS.
Though the defeat at Salamis deprived the Persians of all hope from
farther maritime attack of Greece, they still anticipated success
by land from the ensuing campaign of Mardonius. Their fleet, after
having conveyed the monarch himself with his accompanying land-force
across the Hellespont, retired to winter at Kymê and Samos: in the
latter of which places large rewards were bestowed upon Theomêstor
and Phylakus, two Samian captains who had distinguished themselves
in the late engagement. Theomêstor was even nominated despot of
Samos under Persian protection.[293] Early in the spring they were
reassembled, to the number of four hundred sail, but without the
Phenicians, at the naval station of Samos, intending, however, only
to maintain a watchful guard over Ionia, and hardly supposing that
the Greek fleet would venture to attack them.[294]
[293] Herodot. viii, 85.
[294] Herodot. viii, 130; Diodor xi. 27.
For a long time, the conduct of that fleet was such as to justify
such a belief in its enemies. Assembled at Ægina in the spring, to
the number of one hundred and ten ships, under the Spartan king
Leotychidês, it advanced as far as Delos, but not farther eastward:
nor could all the persuasions of Chian and other Ionian envoys,
despatched both to the Spartan authorities and to the fleet, and
promising to revolt from Persia as soon as the Grecian fleet should
appear, prevail upon Leotychidês to hazard any aggressive enterprise.
Ionia and the western waters of the Ægean had now been for fifteen
years completely under the Persians, and so little visited by the
Greeks, that a voyage thither appeared, especially to the maritime
inexperience of a Spartan king, like going to the Pillars of
Hêraklês,[295]—not less venturesome than the same voyage appeared
fifty-two years afterwards to the Lacedæmonian admiral Alkidas,
when he first hazarded his fleet amidst the preserved waters of the
Athenian empire.
[295] Herodot. viii, 131, 132: compare Thucyd. iii, 29-32.
Herodotus says, that the Chian envoys had great difficulty in
inducing Leotychidês to proceed even as far as Delos,—τὸ γὰρ
προσωτέρω πᾶν δεινὸν ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, οὔτε τῶν χώρων ἐοῦσι
ἐμπείροισι, στρατιῆς τε πάντα πλέα ἐδόκεε εἶναι· τὴν δὲ Σάμον
ἐπιστέατο δόξῃ καὶ Ἡρακλέας στήλας ἴσον ἀπέχειν.
This last expression of Herodotus has been erroneously
interpreted by some of the commentators, as if it were a measure
of the geographical ignorance, either of Herodotus himself, or
of those whom he is describing. In my judgment, no inferences
of this kind ought to be founded upon it: it marks fear of an
enemy’s country which they had not been accustomed to visit, and
where they could not calculate the risk beforehand,—rather than
any serious comparison between one distance and another. Speaking
of our forefathers, such of them as were little used to the sea,
we might say,—“A voyage to Bordeaux or Lisbon seemed to them as
distant as a voyage to the Indies,”—by which we should merely
affirm something as to their state of feeling, not as to their
geographical knowledge.
Meanwhile the hurried and disastrous retreat of Xerxes had produced
less disaffection among his subjects and allies than might have been
anticipated. Alexander, king of Macedon, the Thessalian Aleuadæ,[296]
and the Bœotian leaders, still remained in hearty coöperation with
Mardonius: nor were there any, except the Phocians, whose fidelity
to him appeared questionable, among all the Greeks northwest of
the boundaries of Attica and Megaris. It was only in the Chalkidic
peninsula, that any actual revolt occurred. Potidæa, situated on the
isthmus of Pallênê, together with the other towns in the long tongue
of Pallênê, declared themselves independent: and the neighboring town
of Olynthus, occupied by the semi-Grecian tribe of Bottiæans, was on
the point of following their example. The Persian general, Artabazus,
on his return from escorting Xerxes to the Hellespont, undertook the
reduction of these towns, and succeeded perfectly with Olynthus. He
took the town, slew all the inhabitants, and handed it over to a
fresh population, consisting of Chalkidic Greeks, under Kritobulus of
Torônê. It was in this manner that Olynthus, afterwards a city of so
much consequence and interest, first became Grecian and Chalkidic.
But Artabazus was not equally successful in the siege of Potidæa,
the defence of which was aided by citizens from the other towns in
Pallênê. A plot which he concerted with Timoxenus, commander of the
Skiônæan auxiliaries in the town, became accidentally disclosed: a
considerable body of his troops perished while attempting to pass at
low tide under the walls of the city, which were built across the
entire breadth of the narrow isthmus joining the Pallenæan peninsula
to the mainland: and after three months of blockade, he was forced to
renounce the enterprise, withdrawing his troops to rejoin Mardonius,
in Thessaly.[297]
[296] Herodot. ix, 1, 2, 67; viii, 136.
[297] Herodot. viii, 128, 129.
The latter, before he put himself in motion for the spring campaign,
thought it advisable to consult the Grecian oracles, especially
those within the limits of Bœotia and Phocis. He sent a Karian,
named Mys, familiar with the Greek as well as the Karian language,
to consult Trophônius at Lebadeia, Amphiaraus, and the Ismenian
Apollo at Thebes, Apollo at mount Ptôon near Akræphiæ, and Apollo
at the Phocian Abæ. This step was probably intended as a sort of
ostentatious respect towards the religious feelings of allies upon
whom he was now very much dependent: but neither the questions put,
nor the answers given, were made public: and the only remarkable
fact which Herodotus had heard was, that the priest of the Ptôian
Apollo delivered his answer in Karian, or at least in a language
intelligible to no person present except the Karian Mys himself.[298]
It appears, however, that at this period, when Mardonius was
seeking to strengthen himself by oracles, and laying his plans for
establishing a separate peace and alliance with Athens against the
Peloponnesians, some persons in his interest circulated predictions,
that the day was approaching when the Persians and the Athenians
jointly would expel the Dorians from Peloponnesus.[299] The way was
thus paved for him to send an envoy to Athens,—Alexander, king of
Macedon; who was instructed to make the most seductive offers, to
promise reparation of all the damage done in Attica, as well as the
active future friendship of the Great King, and to hold out to the
Athenians a large acquisition of new territory as the price of their
consent to form with him an equal and independent alliance.[300] The
Macedonian prince added warm expressions of his own interest in the
welfare of the Athenians, recommending them, as a sincere friend,
to embrace propositions so advantageous as well as so honorable:
especially as the Persian power must in the end prove too much for
them, and Attica lay exposed to Mardonius and his Grecian allies,
without being covered by any common defence as Peloponnesus was
protected by its isthmus.[301]
[298] Herodot. viii, 134, 135; Pausanias, ix, 24, 3.
[299] Herodot. viii. 141. Λακεδαιμόνιοι δὲ ... ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν
λογίων, ὥς σφεας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν
ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ
ὁμολογήσωσι τῷ Πέρσῃ Ἀθηναῖοι, etc.
Such oracles must have been generated by the hopes of the
_medizing_ party in Greece at this particular moment: there is
no other point of time to which they could be at all adapted,—no
other, in which expulsion of all the Dorians from Peloponnesus,
by united Persians and Athenians, could be even dreamed of.
The Lacedæmonians are indeed said here, “to call to mind the
prophecies,”—as if these latter were old, and not now produced
for the first time. But we must recollect that a fabricator of
prophecies, such as Onomakritus, would in all probability at
once circulate them as old; that is, as forming part of some old
collection like that of Bakis or Musæus. And Herodotus doubtless,
himself, believed them to be old, so that he would naturally give
credit to the Lacedæmonians for the same knowledge, and suppose
them to be alarmed by “calling these prophecies to mind.”
[300] Herodot. ix, 7.
[301] Herodot. viii, 142.
This offer, despatched in the spring, found the Athenians
reëstablished wholly or partially in their half-ruined city. A simple
tender of mercy and tolerable treatment, if despatched by Xerxes
from Thermopylæ the year before, might perhaps have been sufficient
to detach them from the cause of Hellas: and even at the present
moment, though the pressure of overwhelming terror had disappeared,
there were many inducements for them to accede to the proposition
of Mardonius. The alliance of Athens would insure to the Persian
general unquestionable predominance in Greece, and to Athens herself
protection from farther ravage as well as the advantage of playing
the winning game: while his force, his position, and his alliances,
even as they then stood, threatened a desolating and doubtful war,
of which Attica would bear the chief brunt. Moreover, the Athenians
were at this time suffering privations of the severest character;
for not only did their ruined houses and temples require to be
restored, but they had lost the harvest of the past summer, together
with the seed of the past autumn.[302] The prudential view of the
case being thus favorable to Mardonius rather than otherwise, and
especially strengthened by the distress which reigned at Athens, the
Lacedæmonians were so much afraid lest Alexander should carry his
point, that they sent envoys to dissuade the Athenians from listening
to him, as well as to tender succor during the existing poverty of
the city. After having heard both parties, the Athenians delivered
their reply in terms of solemn and dignified resolution, which their
descendants delighted in repeating. To Alexander they said: “Cast
not in our teeth that the power of the Persian is many times greater
than ours: we too know _that_, as well as thou: but we, nevertheless,
love freedom well enough to resist him in the best manner we can.
Attempt not the vain task of talking us over into alliance with him.
Tell Mardonius that as long as the sun shall continue in his present
path, we will never contract alliance with Xerxes: we will encounter
him in our own defence, putting our trust in the aid of those gods
and heroes to whom he has shown no reverence, and whose houses
and statues he has burned. Come thou not to us again with similar
propositions, nor persuade us, even in the spirit of good-will, into
unholy proceedings: thou art the guest and friend of Athens, and we
would not that thou shouldst suffer injury at our hands.”[303]
[302] Herodot. viii, 142. Πιεζευμένοισι μέντοι ὑμῖν συναχθόμεθα
(say the Spartan envoys to the Athenians), καὶ ὅτι καρπῶν
ἐστερήθητε διξῶν ἤδη, καὶ ὅτι οἰκοφθόρησθε χρόνον ἤδη πολλόν.
Seeing that this is spoken before the invasion of Mardonius,
the loss of _two crops_ must include the seed of the preceding
autumn; and the advice of Themistoklês to his countrymen,—καί τις
οἰκίην τε ἀναπλασάσθω, καὶ σπόρου ἀνακῶς ἐχέτω (viii, 109)—must
have been found impracticable in most cases to carry into effect.
[303] Lykurgus the Athenian orator, in alluding to this incident
a century and a half afterwards, represents the Athenians as
having been “on the point of stoning Alexander,”—μικροῦ δεῖν
κατέλευσαν (Lykurg. cont. Leokrat. c. 17. p. 186)—one among many
specimens of the careless manner in which these orators deal with
past history.
To the Spartans, the reply of the Athenians was of a similar decisive
tenor: protesting their unconquerable devotion to the common
cause and liberties of Hellas, and promising that no conceivable
temptations, either of money or territory, should induce them to
desert the ties of brotherhood, common language, and religion. So
long as a single Athenian survived, no alliance should ever be made
with Xerxes. They then thanked the Spartans for offering them aid
during the present privations: but while declining such offers, they
reminded them that Mardonius, when apprized that his propositions
were refused, would probably advance immediately, and they therefore
earnestly desired the presence of a Peloponnesian army in Bœotia to
assist in the defence of Attica.[304] The Spartan envoys, promising
fulfilment of this request,[305] and satisfied to have ascertained
the sentiments of Athens, departed.
[304] Herodot. viii, 143, 144; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10.
According to Plutarch, it was Aristeidês who proposed and
prepared the reply to be delivered. But here as elsewhere, the
loose, exaggerating style of Plutarch contrasts unfavorably with
the simplicity and directness of Herodotus.
[305] Herodot. ix, 7. συνθέμενοι δὲ ἡμῖν τὸν Πέρσην ἀντιώσεσθαι
ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, etc.
Diodorus gives the account of this embassy to Athens
substantially in the same manner, coupling it however with some
erroneous motives (xi, 28).
Such unshaken fidelity on the part of the Athenians to the
general cause of Greece, in spite of present suffering, combined
with seductive offers for the future, was the just admiration of
their descendants, and the frequent theme of applause by their
orators.[306] But among the contemporary Greeks it was hailed only
as a relief from danger, and repaid by a selfish and ungenerous
neglect. The same feeling of indifference towards all Greeks outside
of their own Isthmus, which had so deeply endangered the march
of affairs before the battle of Salamis, now manifested itself a
second time among the Spartans and Peloponnesians. The wall across
the Isthmus, which they had been so busy in constructing, and on
which they had relied for protection against the land-force of
Xerxes, had been intermitted and left unfinished when he retired:
but it was resumed as soon as the forward march of Mardonius was
anticipated. It was, however, still unfinished at the time of the
embassy of the Macedonian prince to Athens, and this incomplete
condition of their special defence was one reason of their alarm
lest the Athenians should accept the terms proposed. That danger
being for the time averted, they redoubled their exertions at the
Isthmus, so that the wall was speedily brought into an adequate
state of defence, and the battlements along the summit were in
course of being constructed. Thus safe behind their own bulwark,
they thought nothing more of their promise to join the Athenians in
Bœotia, and to assist in defending Attica against Mardonius: indeed,
their king Kleombrotus, who commanded the force at the Isthmus,
was so terrified by an obscuration of the sun at the moment when
he was sacrificing to ascertain the inclinations of the gods in
reference to the coming war, that he even thought it necessary to
retreat with the main force to Sparta, where he soon after died.[307]
Besides these two reasons,—indifference and unfavorable omens,—which
restrained the Spartans from aiding Attica, there was also a third:
they were engaged in celebrating the festival of the Hyakinthia,
and it was their paramount object, says the historian,[308] to
fulfil “the exigences of the god.” As the Olympia and the Karneia
in the preceding year, so now did the Hyakinthia, prevail over the
necessities of defence, putting out of sight both the duties of
fidelity towards an exposed ally, and the bond of an express promise.
[306] Herodot. ix, 7. ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι
ὁμολογέειν τῷ Πέρσῃ μᾶλλον ἢ πολεμέειν, etc.
The orators are not always satisfied with giving to Athens the
credit which she really deserved: they venture to represent the
Athenians as having refused these brilliant offers from Xerxes
on his first invasion, instead of from Mardonius in the ensuing
summer. Xerxes never made any offers to them. See Isokratês, Or.
iv, Panegyric, c. 27, p. 61.
[307] Herodot. ix, 10.
[308] Herodot. ix, 7. Οἱ γὰρ δὴ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ὅρταζόν τε τοῦτον
τὸν χρόνον καί σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια· περὶ πλείστου δ’ ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ
πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἰσθμῷ ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη
ἐπάλξεις ἐλάμβανε.
Nearly a century after this, we are told that it was always the
practice for the Amyklæan hoplites to go home for the celebration
of the Hyakinthia, on whatever expedition they might happen to be
employed (Xenoph. Hellen. iv, 5, 11).
Meanwhile, Mardonius, informed of the unfavorable reception which his
proposals had received at Athens, put his army in motion forthwith
from Thessaly, joined by all his Grecian auxiliaries, and by fresh
troops from Thrace and Macedonia. As he marched through Bœotia, the
Thebans, who heartily espoused his cause, endeavored to dissuade him
from farther military operations against the united force of his
enemies,—urging him to try the efficacy of bribes, presented to the
leading men in the different cities, for the purpose of disuniting
them. But Mardonius, eager to repossess himself of Attica, heeded
not their advice: about ten months after the retreat of Xerxes, he
entered the country without resistance, and again established the
Persian head-quarters in Athens, May or June, 479 B. C.[309]
[309] Diodor. xi, 28; Herodot. ix, 2, 3, 17. οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι πάντες
παρεῖχον στρατιὴν καὶ συνεσέβαλον ἐς Ἀθήνας ὅσοι περ ἐμήδιζον
Ἑλλήνων τῶν ταύτῃ οἰκημένων, etc.
Before he arrived, the Athenians had again removed to Salamis, under
feelings of bitter disappointment and indignation. They had in vain
awaited the fulfilment of the Spartan promise, that a Peloponnesian
army should join them in Bœotia for the defence of their frontier;
at length, being unable to make head against the enemy alone, they
found themselves compelled to transport their families across to
Salamis.[310] The migration was far less terrible than that of the
preceding summer, since Mardonius had no fleet to harass them; but it
was more gratuitous, and might have been obviated had the Spartans
executed their covenant, which would have brought about the battle of
Platæa two months earlier than it actually was fought.
[310] Herodot. ix, 4.
Mardonius, though master of Athens, was so anxious to conciliate
the Athenians, that he at first abstained from damaging either the
city or the country, and despatched a second envoy to Salamis to
repeat the offers made through Alexander of Macedon: he thought that
they might now be listened to, since he could offer the exemption
of Attica from ravage, as an additional temptation. Murychidês, a
Hellespontine Greek, was sent to renew these propositions to the
Athenian senate at Salamis; but he experienced a refusal not less
resolute than that of Alexander of Macedon when sent to Athens,
and all but unanimous. One unfortunate senator, Lykidas, made an
exception to this unanimity, and ventured to recommend acceptance
of the propositions of Murychidês. So furious was the wrath, or so
strong the suspicion of corruption, which his single-voiced negative
provoked, that senators and people both combined to stone him to
death: while the Athenian women in Salamis, hearing what had passed,
went of their own accord to the house of Lykidas, and stoned to death
his wife and children. In the desperate pitch of resolution to which
the Athenians were now wound up, an opponent passed for a traitor:
unanimity, even though extorted by terror, was essential to their
feelings.[311] Murychidês, though his propositions were refused, was
dismissed without injury.
[311] Herodot. ix, 5. I dare not reject this story about Lykidas
(see Lykurgus cont. Leokrat. c. 30, p. 222), though other authors
recount the same incident as having happened to a person named
Kyrsilus, during the preceding year, when the Athenians quitted
Athens: see Demosthen. de Coronâ, p. 296, c. 59; and Cicero de
Officiis, iii, 11. That two such acts were perpetrated by the
Athenians, is noway probable: and if we are to choose between
the two, the story of Herodotus is far the more probable. In the
migration of the preceding year, we know that a certain number of
Athenians actually did stay behind in the acropolis, and Kyrsilus
might have been among them, if he had chosen. Moreover, Xerxes
held out no offers, and gave occasion to no deliberation; while
the offers of Mardonius might really appear to a well-minded
citizen deserving of attention.
Isokrates (Or. iv, Panegyric. p. 74, c. 42) states that the
Athenians condemned many persons to death for _medism_ (in
allusion doubtless to Themistoklês as one), but he adds,—“even
now they imprecate curses on any citizen who enters into amicable
negotiation with the Persians,”—ἐν δὲ τοῖς συλλόγοις ἔτι καὶ νῦν
ἀρὰς ποιοῦνται, εἴτις ἐπικηρυκεύεται Πέρσαις τῶν πολιτῶν. It
is difficult to believe that in his time any such imprecation
can have been included in the solemnities whereby the Athenian
meetings were opened.
While the Athenians thus gave renewed proofs of their steadfast
attachment to the cause of Hellas, they at the same time sent
envoys, conjointly with Megara and Platæa, to remonstrate with the
Spartans on their backwardness and breach of faith, and to invoke
them even thus late to come forth at once and meet Mardonius in
Attica: not omitting to intimate, that if they were thus deserted,
it would become imperatively necessary for them, against their
will, to make terms with the enemy. So careless, however, were the
Spartan ephors respecting Attica and the Megarid, that they postponed
giving an answer to these envoys for ten successive days, while in
the mean time they pressed with all their efforts the completion of
the isthmic fortifications. And after having thus amused the envoys
as long as they could, they would have dismissed them at last with
a negative answer,—such was their fear of adventuring beyond the
Isthmus,—had not a Tegean, named Chileos, whom they much esteemed,
and to whom they communicated the application, reminded them that
no fortifications at the Isthmus would suffice for the defence of
Peloponnesus, if the Athenians became allied with Mardonius, and thus
laid the peninsula open by sea. The strong opinion of this respected
Tegean, proved to the ephors that their selfish policy would not be
seconded by their chief Peloponnesian allies, and brought to their
attention, probably for the first time, that danger by sea might
again be renewed, though the Persian fleet had been beaten in the
preceding year, and was now at a distance from Greece. It changed
their resolution, not less completely than suddenly; and they
despatched forthwith in the night five thousand Spartan citizens
to the Isthmus,—each man with seven Helots attached to him. And
when the Athenian envoys, ignorant of this sudden change of policy,
came on the next day to give peremptory notice that Athens would no
longer endure such treacherous betrayal, but would forthwith take
measures for her own security and separate pacification,—the ephors
affirmed on their oath that the troops were already on their march,
and were probably by this time out of the Spartan territory.[312]
Considering that this step was an expiation, imperfect, tardy, and
reluctant, for foregoing desertion and breach of promise,—the ephors
may probably have thought that the mystery of the night-march, and
the sudden communication of it as an actual fact to the envoys,
in the way of reply, would impress more emphatically the minds of
the latter,—who returned with the welcome tidings to Salamis, and
prepared their countrymen for speedy action. Five thousand Spartan
citizens, each with seven light-armed Helots as attendants, were thus
on their march to the theatre of war. Throughout the whole course of
Grecian history, we never hear of any number of Spartan citizens at
all approaching to five thousand being put on foreign service at the
same time. But this was not all: five thousand Lacedæmonian Periœki,
each with one light-armed Helot to attend him, were also despatched
to the Isthmus, to take part in the same struggle. Such unparalleled
efforts afford sufficient measure of the alarm which, though late
yet real, now reigned at Sparta. Other Peloponnesian cities followed
the example, and a large army was now collected under the Spartan
Pausanias.
[312] Herodot. ix, 10, 11; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 10. Plutarch
had read a decree ascribed to Aristeidês, in which Kimon,
Xanthippus, and Myrônidês, were named envoys to Sparta. But it is
impossible that Xanthippus could have taken part in the embassy,
seeing that he was now in command of the fleet.
Probably the Helots must have followed: one hardly sees how
so great a number could have been all suddenly collected, and
marched off in one night, no preparations having been made
beforehand.
Dr. Thirlwall (Hist. Gr. ch. xvi, p. 366) suspects the
correctness of the narrative of Herodotus, on grounds which do
not appear to me convincing. It seems to me that, after all,
the literal narrative is more probable than anything which we
can substitute in its place. The Spartan foreign policy all
depended on the five ephors; there was no public discussion or
criticism. Now the conduct of these ephors is consistent and
intelligible,—though selfish, narrow-minded, and insensible to
any dangers except what are present and obvious. Nor can I think,
with Dr. Thirlwall, that the manner of communication ultimately
adopted is of the nature of a jest.
It appears that Mardonius was at this moment in secret correspondence
with the Argeians, who, though professing neutrality, are said to
have promised him that they would arrest the march of the Spartans
beyond their own borders.[313] We may reasonably doubt whether they
ever made such a promise: but at any rate, the suddenness of the
march as well as the greatness of the force prevented them from
fulfilling it; and they were forced to content themselves with
apprizing Mardonius instantly of the fact, through their swiftest
courier. It determined that general to evacuate Attica, and to carry
on the war in Bœotia,—a country in every way more favorable to him.
He had for some time refrained from committing devastations in or
round Athens, hoping that the Athenians might be induced to listen
to his propositions; but the last days of his stay were employed in
burning and destroying whatever had been spared by the host of Xerxes
during the preceding summer. After a fruitless attempt to surprise a
body of one thousand Lacedæmonians which had been detached for the
protection of Megara,[314] he withdrew all his army into Bœotia,
not taking either the straight road to Platæa through Eleutheræ,
or to Thebes through Phylê, both which roads were mountainous and
inconvenient for cavalry, but marching in the northeasterly direction
to Dekeleia, where he was met by some guides from the adjoining
regions near the river Asôpus, and conducted through the deme of
Sphendaleis to Tanagra. He thus found himself, by a route longer but
easier, in Bœotia, on the plain of the Asôpus: along which river
he next day marched westward to Skôlus, a town in the territory of
Thebes, seemingly near to that of Platæa.[315] He then took up a
position not far off, in the plain on the left bank of the Asôpus:
his left wing over against Erythræ, his centre over against Hysiæ,
and his right in the territory of Platæa: and he employed his army
in constructing forthwith a fortified camp[316] of ten furlongs
square, defended by wooden walls and towers, cut from trees in the
Theban territory.
[313] Herodot. ix, 12.
[314] There were stories current at Megara, even in the time of
Pausanias, respecting some of these Persians, who were said to
have been brought to destruction by the intervention of Artemis
(Pausan. i, 40, 2).
[315] Herodot. ix, 15. The situation of the Attic deme Sphendalê,
or Sphendaleis, seems not certainly known (Ross, Über die Demen
von Attika, p. 138); but Colonel Leake and Mr. Finlay think that
it stood “near Aio Merkurio, which now gives name to the pass
leading from Dekeleia through the ridges of Parnes into the
extremity of the Tanagrian plain, at a place called Malakasa.”
(Leake, Athens and the Demi of Attica, vol. ii, sect. iv, p. 123.)
Mr. Finlay (Oropus and the Diakria, p. 38) says that “Malakasa is
the only place on this road where a considerable body of cavalry
could conveniently halt.”
It appears that the Bœotians from the neighborhood of the
Asôpus were necessary as guides for this road. Perhaps even the
territory of Orôpus was at this time still a part of Bœotia: we
do not certainly know at what period it was first conquered by
the Athenians.
The combats between Athenians and Bœotians will be found to
take place most frequently in this southeastern region of
Bœotia,—Tanagra, Œnophyta, Delium, etc.
[316] Herodot. ix, 15.
Mardonius found himself thus with his numerous army, in a plain
favorable for cavalry; with a camp more or less defensible,—the
fortified city of Thebes[317] in his rear,—and a considerable stock
of provisions as well as a friendly region behind him from whence to
draw more. Few among his army, however, were either hearty in the
cause or confident of success:[318] even the native Persians had been
disheartened by the flight of the monarch the year before, and were
full of melancholy auguries. A splendid banquet to which the Theban
leader Attagînus invited Mardonius, along with fifty Persians and
fifty Theban or Bœotian guests, exhibited proofs of this depressed
feeling, which were afterwards recounted to Herodotus himself by
one of the guests present,—an Orchomenian citizen of note named
Thersander. The banquet being so arranged as that each couch was
occupied by one Persian and one Theban, this man was accosted by his
Persian neighbor in Greek, who inquired to what city he belonged,
and, upon learning that he was an Orchomenian,[319] continued thus:
“Since thou hast now partaken with me in the same table and cup,
I desire to leave with thee some memorial of my convictions: the
rather, in order that thou mayst be thyself forewarned so as to take
the best counsel for thine own safety. Seest thou these Persians here
feasting, and the army which we left yonder encamped near the river?
Yet a little while, and out of all these thou shalt behold but few
surviving.” Thersander listened to these words with astonishment,
spoken as they were with strong emotion and a flood of tears, and
replied: “Surely, thou art bound to reveal this to Mardonius, and to
his confidential advisers:” but the Persian rejoined: “My friend,
man cannot avert that which God hath decreed to come: no one will
believe the revelation, sure though it be. Many of us Persians know
this well, and are here serving only under the bond of necessity.
And truly this is the most hateful of all human sufferings,—to
be full of knowledge, and at the same time to have no power over
any result.”[320] “This (observes Herodotus) I heard myself from
the Orchomenian Thersander, who told me farther that he mentioned
the fact to several persons about him, even before the battle of
Platæa.” It is certainly one of the most curious revelations in the
whole history; not merely as it brings forward the historian in
his own personality, communicating with a personal friend of the
Theban leaders, and thus provided with good means of information as
to the general events of the campaign,—but also as it discloses to
us, on testimony not to be suspected, the real temper of the native
Persians, and even of the chief men among them. If so many of these
chiefs were not merely apathetic, but despondent, in the cause,
much more decided would be the same absence of will and hope in
their followers and the subject allies. To follow the monarch in his
overwhelming march of the preceding year, was gratifying in many ways
to the native Persians: but every man was sick of the enterprise as
now cut down under Mardonius: and Artabazus, the second in command,
was not merely slack but jealous of his superior.[321] Under such
circumstances we shall presently not be surprised to find the whole
army disappearing forthwith, the moment Mardonius is slain.
[317] The strong town of Thebes was of much service to him
(Thucyd. i, 90).
[318] Herodot. ix, 40, 45, 67; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 18.
[319] Herodot. ix, 16. Thersander, though an Orchomenian, passes
as a Theban—Πέρσην τε καὶ Θηβαῖον ἐν κλίνῃ ἑκάστῃ—a proof of the
intimate connection between Thebes and Orchomenus at this time,
which is farther illustrated by Pindar, Isthm. i, 51 (compare the
Scholia ad loc. and at the beginning of the Ode), respecting the
Theban family of Herodotus and Asôpodôrus. The ancient mythical
feud appears to have gone to sleep, but a deadly hatred will be
found to grow up in later times between these two towns.
[320] Herodot. ix, 16, 17. The last observation here quoted is
striking and emphatic—ἐχθίστη δὲ ὀδύνη ἐστὶ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποισι
αὕτη, πολλὰ φρονέοντα μηδενὸς κρατέειν. It will have to be
more carefully considered at a later period of this history,
when we come to touch upon the scientific life of the Greeks,
and upon the philosophy of happiness and duty as conceived by
Aristotle. If carried fully out, this position is the direct
negative of what Aristotle lays down in his Ethics, as to the
superior happiness of the βίος θεωρητικὸς, or life of scientific
observation and reflection.
[321] Herodot. ix, 66.
Among the Grecian allies of Mardonius, the Thebans and Bœotians were
active and zealous, most of the remainder lukewarm, and the Phocians
even of doubtful fidelity. Their contingent of one thousand hoplites,
under Harmokydês, had been tardy in joining him, having only come up
since he retired from Attica into Bœotia: and some of the Phocians
even remained behind in the neighborhood of Parnassus, prosecuting
manifest hostilities against the Persians. Aware of the feeling
among this contingent, which the Thessalians took care to place
before him in an unfavorable point of view, Mardonius determined to
impress upon them a lesson of intimidation. Causing them to form
in a separate body on the plain, he then brought up his numerous
cavalry all around them: while the phêmê, or sudden simultaneous
impression, ran through the Greek allies as well as the Phocians
themselves, that he was about to shoot them down.[322] The general
Harmokydês, directing his men to form a square and close their ranks,
addressed to them short exhortations to sell their lives dearly,
and to behave like brave Greeks against barbarian assassins,—when
the cavalry rode up, apparently to the charge, and advanced close
to the square, with uplifted javelins and arrows on the string,
some few of which were even actually discharged. The Phocians
maintained, as enjoined, steady ranks with a firm countenance, and
the cavalry wheeled about without any actual attack or damage. After
this mysterious demonstration, Mardonius condescended to compliment
the Phocians on their courage, and to assure them, by means of a
herald, that he had been greatly misinformed respecting them: he at
the same time exhorted them to be faithful and forward in service
for the future, and promised that all good behavior should be amply
recompensed. Herodotus seems uncertain,—difficult as the supposition
is to entertain,—whether Mardonius did not really intend at first
to massacre the Phocians in the field, and desisted from the
intention only on seeing how much blood it would cost to accomplish.
However this may be, the scene itself was a remarkable reality,
and presented one among many other proofs of the lukewarmness and
suspicious fidelity of the army.[323]
[322] Herodot. ix, 17. διεξῆλθε φήμη, ὡς κατακοντιεῖ σφέας.
Respecting φήμη, see a note a little farther on, at the battle of
Mykalê, in this same chapter.
Compare the case of the Delians at Adramyttium, surrounded
and slain with missiles by the Persian satrap, though not his
enemies—περιστήσας τοὺς ἑαυτοῦ κατηκόντισε (Thucyd. viii, 108).
[323] Οὐκ ἔχω δ’ ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὔτε εἰ ἦλθον μὲν ἀπολέοντες
τοὺς Φωκέας, δεηθέντων τῶν Θεσσαλῶν, etc. (Herodot. ix, 18.)
This confession of uncertainty as to motives and plans,
distinguishing between them and the visible facts which he is
describing, is not without importance as strengthening our
confidence in the historian.
Conformably to the suggestion of the Thebans, the liberties of Greece
were now to be disputed in Bœotia: and not only had the position of
Mardonius already been taken, but his camp also fortified, before the
united Grecian army approached Kithæron in its forward march from the
Isthmus. After the full force of the Lacedæmonians had reached the
Isthmus, they had to await the arrival of their Peloponnesian and
other confederates. The hoplites who joined them were as follows:
from Tegea, fifteen hundred; from Corinth, five thousand,—besides a
small body of three hundred from the Corinthian colony of Potidæa;
from the Arcadian Orchomenus, six hundred; from Sikyon, three
thousand; from Epidaurus, eight hundred; from Trœzen, one thousand;
from Lepreon, two hundred; from Mykênæ and Tiryns, four hundred; from
Phlius, one thousand; from Hermionê, three hundred; from Eretria and
Styra, six hundred; from Chalkis, four hundred; from Ambrakia, five
hundred; from Leukas and Anaktorium, eight hundred; from Palê in
Kephallenia, two hundred; from Ægina, five hundred. On marching from
the Isthmus to Megara, they took up three thousand Megarian hoplites;
and as soon as they reached Eleusis in their forward progress,
the army was completed by the junction of eight thousand Athenian
hoplites, and six hundred Platæan, under Aristeidês, who passed over
from Salamis.[324] The total force of hoplites, or heavy-armed
troops, was thus thirty-eight thousand seven hundred men: there were
no cavalry, and but very few bowmen; but if we add those who are
called light-armed, or unarmed generally,—some perhaps with javelins
or swords, but none with any defensive armor,—the grand total was not
less than one hundred and ten thousand men. Of these light-armed, or
unarmed, there were, as computed by Herodotus; thirty-five thousand
in attendance on the five thousand Spartan citizens, and thirty-four
thousand five hundred in attendance on the other hoplites,—together
with eighteen hundred Thespians, who were properly hoplites, yet so
badly armed as not to be reckoned in the ranks.[325]
[324] Compare this list of Herodotus with the enumeration which
Pausanias read inscribed on the statue of Zeus, erected at
Olympia by the Greeks who took part in the battle of Platæa
(Pausan. v, 23, 1).
Pausanias found inscribed all the names here indicated by
Herodotus except the Palês of Kephallenia: and he found in
addition the Eleians Keans, Kythnians, Tenians, Naxians, and
Mêlians. The five last names are islanders in the Ægean:
their contingents sent to Platæa must, at all events, have
been very small, and it is surprising to hear that they sent
any,—especially when we recollect that there was a Greek fleet at
this moment on service, to which it would be natural that they
should join themselves in preference to land-service.
With respect to the name of the Eleians, the suspicion of
Bröndstedt is plausible, that Pausanias may have mistaken the
name of the Palês of Kephallenia for theirs, and may have fancied
that he read FΑΛΕΙΟΙ when it was really written ΠΑΛΕΙΣ, in an
inscription at that time about six hundred years old. The place
in the series wherein Pausanias places the name of the Eleians,
strengthens the suspicion. Unless it be admitted, we shall be
driven, as the most probable alternative, to suppose a fraud
committed by the vanity of the Eleians, which may easily have
led them to alter a name originally belonging to the Palês.
The reader will recollect that the Eleians were themselves the
superintendents and curators at Olympia.
Plutarch seems to have read the same inscription as Pausanias (De
Herodoti Malignit. p. 873).
[325] Herodot. ix, 19, 28, 29.
Such was the number of Greeks present or near at hand in the combat
against the Persians at Platæa, which took place some little time
afterwards: but it seems that the contingents were not at first
completely full, and that new additions[326] continued to arrive
until a few days before the battle, along with the convoys of cattle
and provisions which came for the subsistence of the army. Pausanias
marched first from the Isthmus to Eleusis, where he was joined by the
Athenians from Salamis: at Eleusis, as well as at the Isthmus, the
sacrifices were found encouraging, and the united army then advanced
across the ridge of Kithæron, so as to come within sight of the
Persians. When Pausanias saw them occupying the line of the Asôpus in
the plain beneath, he kept his own army on the mountain declivity
near Erythræ, without choosing to adventure himself in the level
ground. Mardonius, finding them not disposed to seek battle in the
plain, despatched his numerous and excellent cavalry under Masistius,
the most distinguished officer in his army, to attack them. For the
most part, the ground was so uneven as to check their approach,—but
the Megarian contingent, which happened to be more exposed than the
rest, were so hard pressed that they were forced to send to Pausanias
for aid. They appear to have had not only no cavalry, but no bowmen
or light-armed troops of any sort with missile weapons; while the
Persians, excellent archers and darters, using very large bows,
and trained in such accomplishments from their earliest childhood,
charged in successive squadrons and overwhelmed the Greeks with darts
and arrows,—not omitting contemptuous taunts on their cowardice for
keeping back from the plain.[327] So general was then the fear of
the Persian cavalry, that Pausanias could find none of the Greeks,
except the Athenians, willing to volunteer and go to the rescue of
the Megarians. A body of Athenians, however, especially three hundred
chosen troops under Olympiodorus, strengthened with some bowmen,
immediately marched to the spot and took up the combat with the
Persian cavalry. For some time the struggle was sharp and doubtful:
at length the general, Masistius,—a man renowned for bravery, lofty
in stature, clad in conspicuous armor, and mounted on a Nisæan horse
with golden trappings,—charging at the head of his troops, had
his horse struck by an arrow in the side. The animal immediately
reared and threw his master on the ground, close to the ranks of the
Athenians, who, rushing forward, seized the horse, and overpowered
Masistius before he could rise. So impenetrable were the defences of
his helmet and breastplate,[328] however, that they had considerable
difficulty in killing him, though he was in their power: at length
a spearman pierced him in the eye. The death of the general passed
unobserved by the Persian cavalry, but as soon as they missed him and
became aware of the loss, they charged furiously and in one mass to
recover the dead body. At first the Athenians, too few in number to
resist the onset, were compelled for a time to give way, abandoning
the body; but reinforcements presently arriving at their call, the
Persians were driven back with loss, and it finally remained in their
possession.[329]
[326] Herodot. ix, 28. οἱ ἐπιφοιτῶντές τε καὶ οἱ ἀρχὴν ἐλθόντες
Ἑλλήνων.
[327] About the missile weapons and skill of the Persians, see
Herodot. i, 136; Xenophon, Anabas. iii, 4, 17.
Cyrus the younger was eminent in the use both of the bow and the
javelin (Xenoph. Anab. i, 8, 26; i, 9, 5: compare Cyropæd. i, 2,
4).
[328] See Quintus Curtius, iii, 11, 15; and the note of Mützel.
[329] Herodot. ix, 21, 22, 23; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 14.
The death of Masistius, coupled with that final repulse of the
cavalry which left his body in possession of the Greeks, produced
a strong effect on both armies, encouraging the one as much as it
disheartened the other. Throughout the camp of Mardonius, the grief
was violent and unbounded, manifested by wailings so loud as to echo
over all Bœotia; while the hair of men, horses, and cattle, was
abundantly cut in token of mourning. The Greeks, on the other hand,
overjoyed at their success, placed the dead body in a cart, and
paraded it around the army: even the hoplites ran out of their ranks
to look at it; not only hailing it as a valuable trophy, but admiring
its stature and proportions.[330] And so much was their confidence
increased, that Pausanias now ventured to quit the protection of
the mountain-ground, inconvenient from its scanty supply of water,
and to take up his position in the plain beneath, interspersed only
with low hillocks. Marching from Erythræ in a westerly direction
along the declivities of Kithæron, and passing by Hysiæ, the Greeks
occupied a line of camp in the Platæan territory along the Asôpus and
on its right bank; with their right wing near to the fountain called
Gargaphia,[331] and their left wing near to the chapel, surrounded
by a shady grove, of the Platæan hero, Androkratês. In this position
they were marshalled according to nations, or separate fractions of
the Greek name,—the Lacedæmonians on the right wing, with the Tegeans
and Corinthians immediately joining them,—and the Athenians on the
left wing; a post which, as second in point of dignity, was at first
claimed by the Tegeans, chiefly on grounds of mythical exploits,
to the exclusion of the Athenians, but ultimately adjudged by the
Spartans, after hearing both sides, to Athens.[332] In the field,
even Lacedæmonians followed those democratical forms which pervaded
so generally Grecian military operations: in this case, it was not
the generals, but the Lacedæmonian troops in a body, who heard the
argument, and delivered the verdict by unanimous acclamation.
[330] Herodot. ix, 24, 25. οἰμωγῇ τε χρεώμενοι ἀπλέτῳ· ἅπασαν γὰρ
τὴν Βοιωτίην κατεῖχε ἠχώ, etc.
The exaggerated demonstrations of grief, ascribed to Xerxes and
Atossa. in the Persæ of Æschylus, have often been blamed by
critics: we may see from this passage how much they are in the
manners of Orientals of that day.
[331] Herodot. ix, 25-30; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 11. τὸ τοῦ
Ἀνδροκράτους ἡρῷον ἐγγὺς ἄλσει πυκνῶν καὶ συσκίων δένδρων
περιεχόμενον.
The expression of Herodotus respecting this position taken by
Pausanias, Οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταχθέντες ἐπὶ τῷ Ἀσωπῷ ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο,
as well as the words which follow in the next chapter (31)—Οἱ
βάρβαροι, πυθόμενοι εἶναι τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἐν Πλαταιῇσι, παρῇσαν καὶ
αὐτοὶ ἐπὶ τὸν Ἀσωπὸν τὸν ταύτῃ ῥέοντα,—show plainly that the
Grecian troops were encamped along the Asôpus on the Platæan
side, while the Persians in their second position occupied the
ground on the opposite, or Theban side of the river. Whichever
army commenced the attack had to begin by passing the Asôpus (c.
36-59).
For the topography of this region, and of the positions occupied
by the two armies, compare Squire, in Walpole’s Turkey, p. 338;
Kruse, Hellas, vol. ii, ch. vi, p. 9, _seq._, and ch. viii, p.
592. _seq._: and the still more copious and accurate information
of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii,
pp. 324-360. Both of them have given plans of the region; that
which I annex is borrowed from Kiepert’s maps. I cannot but think
that the fountain Gargaphia is not yet identified, and that both
Kruse and Leake place the Grecian position farther from the river
Asôpus than is consistent with the words of Herodotus; which
words seem to specify points near the two extremities, indicating
that the fountain of Gargaphia was near the river towards the
right of the Grecian position, and the chapel of Androkratês
also _near_ the river towards the left of that position, where
the Athenians were posted. Nor would such a site for a chapel of
Androkratês be inconsistent with Thucydides (iii, 24), who merely
mentions that chapel as being on the right hand of the first mile
of road from Platæa to Thebes.
Considering the length of time which has elapsed since the
battle, it would not be surprising if the spring of Gargaphia
were no longer recognizable. At any rate, neither the fountain
pointed out by Colonel Leake (p. 332) nor that of Vergutiani,
which had been supposed by Colonel Squire and Dr. Clarke, appear
to me suitable for Gargaphia.
The errors of that plan of the battle of Platæa which accompanies
the Voyage d’Anacharsis, are now well understood.
[332] Herodot. ix, 26-29. Judging from the battles of Corinth (B.
C. 396) and Mantineia (B. C. 418), the Tegeans seem afterwards to
have dropped this pretension to occupy the left wing, and to have
preferred the post in the line next to the Lacedæmonians (Xenoph.
Hellen. iv, 2, 19).
Mardonius, apprized of this change of position, marched his army also
a little farther to the westward, and posted himself opposite to the
Greeks, divided from them by the river Asôpus. At the suggestion of
the Thebans, he himself, with his Persians and Medes, the picked
men of his army, took post on the left wing, immediately opposite
to the Lacedæmonians on the Greek right, and even extending so far
as to cover the Tegean ranks on the left of the Lacedæmonians:
Baktrians, Indians, Sakæ, with other Asiatics and Egyptians, filled
the centre: and the Greeks and Macedonians in the service of Persia,
the right,—over against the hoplites of Athens. The numbers of these
last-mentioned Greeks Herodotus could not learn, though he estimates
them conjecturally at fifty thousand:[333] nor can we place any
confidence in the total of three hundred thousand, which he gives as
belonging to the other troops of Mardonius, though probably it cannot
have been much less.
[333] Herodot. ix, 31, 32.
In this position lay the two armies, separated only by a narrow space
including the river Asôpus, and each expecting a battle, whilst the
sacrifices on behalf of each were offered up. Pausanias, Mardonius,
and the Greeks in the Persian army, had each a separate prophet to
offer sacrifice, and to ascertain the dispositions of the gods; the
two first had men from the most distinguished prophetic breeds in
Elis,—the latter invited one from Leukas.[334] All received large
pay, and the prophet of Pausanias had indeed been honored with a
recompense above all pay,—the gift of full Spartan citizenship for
himself as well as for his brother. It happened that the prophets
on both sides delivered the same report of their respective
sacrifices,—favorable for resistance if attacked; unfavorable for
beginning the battle. At a moment when doubt and indecision was
the reigning feeling on both sides, this was the safest answer for
the prophet to give, and the most satisfactory for the soldiers
to hear. And though the answer from Delphi had been sufficiently
encouraging, and the kindness of the patron-heroes of Platæa[335]
had been solemnly invoked, yet Pausanias did not venture to cross the
Asôpus and begin the attack, in the face of a pronounced declaration
from his prophet. Nor did even Hegesistratus, the prophet employed
by Mardonius, choose on his side to urge an aggressive movement,
though he had a deadly personal hatred against the Lacedæmonians,
and would have been delighted to see them worsted. There arose
commencements of conspiracy, perhaps encouraged by promises or bribes
from the enemy, among the wealthier Athenian hoplites, to establish
an oligarchy at Athens under Persian supremacy, like that which now
existed at Thebes,—a conspiracy full of danger at such a moment,
though fortunately repressed[336] by Aristeidês, with a hand at
once gentle and decisive. More over, the annoyance inflicted by the
Persian cavalry, under the guidance of the Thebans, was incessant:
their constant assaults, and missile weapons from the other side
of the Asôpus, prevented the Greeks from using it for supplies of
water, so that the whole army was forced to water at the fountain
Gargaphia, at the extreme right of the position,[337] near the
Lacedæmonian hoplites. Moreover, the Theban leader, Timegenidas,
remarking the convoys which arrived over the passes of Kithæron, in
the rear of the Grecian camp, and the constant reinforcements of
hoplites which accompanied them, prevailed upon Mardonius to employ
his cavalry in cutting off such communication. The first movement
of this sort, undertaken by night against the pass called the Oak
Heads, was eminently successful: a train of five hundred beasts of
burden with supplies, was attacked descending into the plain with its
escort, all of whom were either slain or carried prisoners to the
Persian camp: nor was it safe for any farther convoys to approach the
Greeks.[338] Eight days had already been passed in inaction before
Timegenidas suggested, or Mardonius executed, this manœuvre, which
it is fortunate for the Greeks that he did not attempt earlier,
and which afforded clear proof how much might be hoped from an
efficient employment of his cavalry, without the ruinous risk of a
general action. Nevertheless, after waiting two days longer, his
impatience became uncontrollable, and he determined on a general
battle forthwith.[339] In vain did Artabazus endeavor to dissuade
him from the step,—taking the same view as the Thebans, that in a
pitched battle the united Grecian army was invincible, and that the
only successful policy was that of delay and corruption to disunite
them: he recommended standing on the defensive, by means of Thebes,
well fortified and amply provisioned,—which would allow time for
distributing effective bribes among the leading men throughout the
various Grecian cities. This suggestion, which Herodotus considers as
wise and likely to succeed, was repudiated by Mardonius as cowardly
and unworthy of the recognized superiority of the Persian arms.[340]
[334] Herodot. ix, 36, 38. μεμισθωμένος οὐκ ὀλίγου.
These prophets were men of great individual consequence, as may
be seen by the details which Herodotus gives respecting their
adventures: compare also the history of Euenius, ix, 93.
[335] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. xi; Thucyd. ii, 74.
[336] Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 13.
[337] Herodot. ix, 40, 49, 50. τήν τε κρήνην τὴν Γαργαφίην, ἀπ’
ἧς ὑδρεύετο πᾶν τὸ στράτευμα τὸ Ἑλληνικόν—ἐρυκόμενοι δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ
Ἀσωποῦ, οὕτω δὴ ἐπὶ τὴν κρήνην ἐφοίτεον· ἀπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ γάρ σφι
οὐκ ἐξῆν ὕδωρ φορέεσθαι, ὑπό τε τῶν ἱππέων καὶ τοξευμάτων.
Diodorus (xi, 30) affirms that the Greek position was so well
defended by the nature of the ground, and so difficult of
attack, that Mardonius was prevented from making use of his
superior numbers. It is evident from the account of Herodotus
that this is quite incorrect. The position seems to have had no
protection except what it derived from the river Asôpus, and the
Greeks were ultimately forced to abandon it by the incessant
attacks of the Persian cavalry. The whole account, at once
diffuse and uninstructive, given by Diodorus of this battle (xi,
30-36), forms a strong contrast with the clear, impressive, and
circumstantial narrative of Herodotus.
[338] Herodot. ix, 38, 39.
[339] Herodot. ix, 40, 41.
[340] Herodot. ix, 42.
But while he overruled, by virtue of superior authority, the
objections of all around him, Persian as well as Greek, he could not
but feel daunted by their reluctant obedience, which he suspected
might arise from their having heard oracles or prophecies of
unfavorable augury. He therefore summoned the chief officers, Greek
as well as Persian, and put the question to them, whether they knew
any prophecy announcing that the Persians were doomed to destruction
in Greece. All were silent: some did not know the prophecies, but
others, Herodotus intimates, knew them full well, though they did
not dare to speak. Receiving no answer, Mardonius said, “Since ye
either do not know or will not tell, I, who know well, will myself
speak out. There is an oracle to the effect, that Persian invaders
of Greece shall plunder the temple of Delphi, and shall afterwards
all be destroyed. Now we, being aware of this, shall neither
go against that temple, nor try to plunder it: on that ground,
therefore, we shall not be destroyed. Rejoice ye, therefore, ye who
are well-affected to the Persians,—we shall get the better of the
Greeks.” With that he gave orders to prepare everything for a general
attack and battle on the morrow.[341]
[341] Herodot. ix, 42.
It is not improbable that the Orchomenian Thersander was present
at this interview, and may have reported it to Herodotus. But the
reflection of the historian himself is not the least curious part
of the whole, as illustrating the manner in which these prophecies
sunk into men’s minds, and determined their judgments. Herodotus
knew, though he does not cite it, the particular prophecy to which
Mardonius made allusion; and he pronounces, in the most affirmative
tone,[342] that it had no reference to the Persians: it referred to
an ancient invasion of Greece by the Illyrians and the Encheleis.
But both Bakis, from whom he quotes four lines, and Musæus had
prophesied, in the plainest manner, the destruction of the Persian
army on the banks of the Thermôdon and Asôpus. And these are the
prophecies which we must suppose the officers convoked by Mardonius
to have known also, though they did not dare to speak out: it was the
fault of Mardonius himself that he did not take warning.
[342] Herodot. ix, 43. Τοῦτον δ’ ἔγωγε τὸν χρησμὸν τὸν Μαρδόνιος
εἶπε ἐς Πέρσας ἔχειν, ἐς Ἰλλυρίους τε καὶ τὸν Ἐγχελέων ~στρατὸν
οἶδα πεποιημένον~, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐς Πέρσας. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν Βάκιδι ἐς
ταύτην τὴν μάχην ἔστι πεποιημένα, etc.
The attack of a multitude like that of Mardonius was not likely under
any circumstances to be made so rapidly as to take the Greeks by
surprise: but the latter were forewarned of it by a secret visit from
Alexander, king of Macedon; who, riding up to the Athenian advanced
posts in the middle of the night, desired to speak with Aristeidês
and the other generals. Announcing to them alone his name, and
proclaiming his earnest sympathy for the Grecian cause, as well as
the hazard which he incurred by this nightly visit,—he apprized them
that Mardonius, though eager for a battle long ago, could not by
any effort obtain favorable sacrifices, but was, nevertheless, even
in spite of this obstacle, determined on an attack the next morning.
“Be ye prepared accordingly; and if ye succeed in this war (said he)
remember to liberate me also from the Persian yoke: I too am a Greek
by descent, and thus risk my head because I cannot endure to see
Greece enslaved.”[343]
[343] Herodot. ix, 44-45. The language about the sacrifices is
remarkable,—λέγω δὲ ὦν ὅτι Μαρδονίῳ τε καὶ τῇ στρατιῇ οὐ ~δύναται
τὰ σφάγια καταθύμια γενέσθαι~· πάλαι γὰρ ἂν ἐμάχεσθε, etc.
Mardonius had tried many unavailing efforts to procure better
sacrifices: it _could_ not be done.
The communication of this important message, made by Aristeidês to
Pausanias, elicited from him a proposal not a little surprising
as coming from a Spartan general. He requested the Athenians to
change places with the Lacedæmonians in the line. “We Lacedæmonians
(said he) now stand opposed to the Persians and Medes, against whom
we have never yet contended, while ye Athenians have fought and
conquered them at Marathon. March ye then over to the right wing and
take our places, while we will take yours in the left wing, against
the Bœotians and Thessalians, with whose arms and attack we are
familiar.” The Athenians readily acceded, and the reciprocal change
of order was accordingly directed: nor was it yet quite completed
when day broke, and the Theban allies of Mardonius immediately took
notice of what had been done. That general commanded a corresponding
change in his own line, so as to place the native Persians once more
over against the Lacedæmonians: upon which Pausanias, seeing that his
manœuvre had failed, led back his Lacedæmonians to the right wing,
while a second movement on the part of Mardonius replaced both armies
in the order originally observed.[344]
[344] Herodot. ix, 47; Plutarch, Aristeidês, c. 16. Here, as on
many other occasions, Plutarch rather spoils than assists the
narrative of Herodotus.
No incident similar to this will be found throughout the whole course
of Lacedæmonian history. To evade encountering the best troops
in the enemy’s line, and to depart for this purpose from their
privileged post on the right wing, was a step well calculated to
lower them in the eyes of Greece, and could hardly have failed to
produce that effect, if the intention had been realized: it is at
the same time the highest compliment to the formidable reputation
of the native Persian troops,—a reputation recognized by Herodotus,
and well sustained at least by their personal bravery.[345] Nor can
we wonder that this publicly manifested reluctance on the part of
the leading troops in the Grecian army contributed much to exalt
the rash confidence of Mardonius: a feeling which Herodotus, in
Homeric style,[346] casts into the speech of a Persian herald sent
to upbraid the Lacedæmonians, and challenge them to a “single combat
with champions of equal numbers, Lacedæmonians against Persians.”
This herald, whom no one heard or cared for, and who serves but as
a mouthpiece for bringing out the feelings belonging to the moment,
was followed by something very real and terrible,—a vigorous attack
on the Greek line by the Persian cavalry; whose rapid motions, and
showers of arrows and javelins, annoyed the Greeks on this day more
than ever. The latter, as has been before stated, had no cavalry
whatever; nor do their light troops, though sufficiently numerous,
appear to have rendered any service, with the exception of the
Athenian bowmen. How great was the advantage gained by the Persian
cavalry, is shown by the fact that they for a time drove away the
Lacedæmonians from the fountain of Gargaphia, so as to choke it up
and render it unfit for use. As the army had been prevented by the
cavalry from resorting to the river Asôpus, this fountain had been
of late the only watering-place: and without it the position which
they then occupied became untenable,—while their provisions also were
exhausted, inasmuch as the convoys, from fear of the Persian cavalry,
could not descend from Kithæron to join them.[347]
[345] Herodot. ix, 71.
[346] Compare the reproaches of Hektor to Diomêdês (Iliad, viii,
161).
[347] Herodot. ix, 49, 50. Pausanias mentions that the Platæans
restored the fountain of Gargaphia after the victory (τὸ ὕδωρ
ἀνεσώσαντο); but he hardly seems to speak as if he had himself
seen it (ix, 4, 2).
In this dilemma, Pausanias summoned the Grecian chiefs to his tent,
and after an anxious debate the resolution was taken, in case
Mardonius should not bring on a general action in the course of the
day, to change their position during the night, when there would be
no interruption from the cavalry; and to occupy the ground called the
island, distant about ten furlongs in a direction nearly west, and
seemingly north of the town of Platæa, which was itself about twenty
furlongs distant: this island, improperly so denominated, included
the ground comprised between two branches of the river Oeroê,[348]
both of which flow from Kithæron, and, after flowing for a certain
time in channels about three furlongs apart, form a junction and run
in a northwesterly direction towards one of the recesses of the gulf
of Corinth,—quite distinct from the Asôpus, which, though also rising
near at hand in the lowest declivities under Kithæron, takes an
easterly direction and discharges itself into the sea opposite Eubœa.
When in this so-called island, the army would be secure of water from
the stream in their rear; nor would they, as now, expose an extended
breadth of front to a numerous hostile cavalry separated from them
only by the Asôpus.[349] It was farther resolved, that so soon as the
army should once be in occupation of the island, half of the troops
should forthwith march onward to disengage the convoys blocked up on
Kithæron and conduct them to the camp. Such was the plan settled in
council among the different Grecian chiefs; the march to be commenced
at the beginning of the second night-watch, when the enemy’s cavalry
would have completely withdrawn.
[348] See a good description of the ground in Colonel Leake,
Travels in Northern Greece, ch. xvi, vol. ii, p. 358.
[349] Herodot. ix, 51. Ἐς τοῦτον δὴ τὸν χῶρον ἐβουλεύσαντο
μεταστῆναι, ἵνα καὶ ὕδατι ἔχωσι χρᾶσθαι ἀφθόνῳ, καὶ οἱ ἱππέες
σφέας μὴ σινοίατο, ὥσπερ κατ’ ἰθὺ ἐόντων.
The last words have reference to the position of the two hostile
armies, extended front to front along the course of the Asôpus.
In spite of what Mardonius is said to have determined, he passed
the whole day without any general attack: but his cavalry, probably
elated by the recent demonstration of the Lacedæmonians, were on that
day more daring and indefatigable than ever, and inflicted much loss
as well as severe suffering;[350] insomuch that the centre of the
Greek force (Corinthians, Megarians, etc., between the Lacedæmonians
and Tegeans on the right, and the Athenians on the left), when
the hour arrived for retiring to the island, commenced their march
indeed, but forgot or disregarded the preconcerted plan and the
orders of Pausanias, in their impatience to obtain a complete shelter
against the attacks of the cavalry. Instead of proceeding to the
island, they marched a distance of twenty furlongs directly to the
town of Platæa, and took up a position in front of the Heræum, or
temple of Hêrê, where they were protected partly by the buildings,
partly by the comparatively high ground on which the town with its
temple stood. Between the position which the Greeks were about to
leave and that which they had resolved to occupy (_i. e._ between the
course of the Asôpus and that of the Oeroê), there appear to have
been a range of low hills: the Lacedæmonians, starting from the right
wing, had to march directly over these hills, while the Athenians,
from the left, were to turn them and get into the plain on the other
side.[351] Pausanias, apprized that the divisions of the centre had
commenced their night-march, and concluding of course that they
would proceed to the island according to orders, allowed a certain
interval of time in order to prevent confusion, and then directed
that the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans should also begin their movement
towards that same position. But here he found himself embarrassed by
an unexpected obstacle. The movement was retrograde, receding from
the enemy, and not consistent with the military honor of a Spartan;
nevertheless, most of the taxiarchs, or leaders of companies, obeyed
without murmuring; but Amompharetus, lochage or captain of that band
which Herodotus calls the lochus of Pitana,[352] obstinately refused.
Not having been present at the meeting in which the resolution had
been taken, he now heard it for the first time with astonishment
and disdain, declaring “that he for one would never so far disgrace
Sparta as to run away from the foreigner.”[353] Pausanias, with the
second in command, Euryanax, exhausted every effort to overcome his
reluctance: but they could by no means induce him to retreat; nor
did they dare to move without him, leaving his entire lochus exposed
alone to the enemy.[354]
[350] Herodot. ix, 52. κείνην μὲν τὴν ἡμέρην πᾶσαν, προσκειμένης
τῆς ἵππου, εἶχον πόνον ἄτρυτον.
[351] Herodot. ix, 56. Παυσανίης—σημῄνας ἀπῆγε διὰ τῶν κολωνῶν
τοὺς λοιποὺς πάντας· εἵποντο δὲ καὶ Τεγεῆται. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ
ταχθέντες ἤϊσαν τὰ ἔμπαλιν ἢ Λακεδαιμόνιοι. Οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε
ὄχθων ἀντείχοντο καὶ τῆς ὑπωρείης τοῦ Κιθαιρῶνος. Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ,
κάτω τραφθέντες ἐς τὸ πεδίον.
With which we must combine another passage, c. 59, intimating
that the track of the Athenians led them to turn and get behind
the hills, which prevented Mardonius from seeing them, though
they were marching along the plain: Μαρδόνιος—ἐπεῖχε ἐπὶ
Λακεδαιμονίους καὶ Τεγεήτας μούνους· Ἀθηναίους γὰρ τραπομένους ἐς
τὸ πεδίον ὑπὸ τῶν ὄχθων οὐ κατεώρα.
[352] There is on this point a difference between Thucydides and
Herodotus: the former affirms that there never was any Spartan
lochus so called (Thucyd. i, 21).
We have no means of reconciling the difference, nor can we be
certain that Thucydides is right in his negative comprehending
all past time—ὃς οὐδ’ ἐγένετο πώποτε.
[353] Herodot. ix, 53, 54.
[354] Herodot. ix, 52, 53.