CHAPTER XL.

BATTLES OF THERMOPYLÆ AND ARTEMISIUM.

It was while the northerly states of Greece were thus successively

falling off from the common cause, that the deputies assembled at

the Isthmus took among themselves the solemn engagement, in the

event of success, to inflict upon these recusant brethren condign

punishment,—to tithe them in property, and perhaps to consecrate a

tenth of their persons, for the profit of the Delphian god. Exception

was to be made in favor of those states which had been driven to

yield by irresistible necessity.[128] Such a vow seemed at that

moment little likely to be executed it was the manifestation of

a determined feeling binding together the states which took the

pledge, but it cannot have contributed much to intimidate the rest.

[128] Herodot. vii, 132; Diodor. xi, 3.

To display their own force, was the only effective way of keeping

together doubtful allies; and the pass of Thermopylæ was now fixed

upon as the most convenient point of defence, next to that of

Tempê,—leaving out indeed, and abandoning to the enemy, Thessalians,

Perrhæbians, Magnêtes, Phthiôtid Achæans, Dolopes, Ænianes, Malians,

etc., who would all have been included if the latter line had been

adhered to; but comprising the largest range consistent with safety.

The position of Thermopylæ presented another advantage which was not

to be found at Tempê; the mainland was here separated from the island

of Eubœa only by a narrow strait, about two English miles and a half

in its smallest breadth, between mount Knêmis and cape Kênæum. On

the northern portion of Eubœa, immediately facing Magnesia and Achæa

Phthiôtis, was situated the line of coast called Artemisium: a name

derived from the temple of Artemis, which was its most conspicuous

feature, belonging to the town of Histiæa. It was arranged that

the Grecian fleet should be mustered there, in order to coöperate

with the land-force, and to oppose the progress of the Persians on

both elements at once. To fight in a narrow space[129] was supposed

favorable to the Greeks on sea not less than on land, inasmuch as

their ships were both fewer in number and heavier in sailing than

those in the Persian service. From the position of Artemisium, it was

calculated that they might be able to prevent the Persian fleet from

advancing into the narrow strait which severs Eubœa, to the north

and west, from the mainland, and which, between Chalkis and Bœotia,

becomes not too wide for a bridge. It was at this latter point

that the Greek seamen would have preferred to place their defence:

but the occupation of the northern part of the Eubœan strait was

indispensable to prevent the Persian fleet from landing troops in the

rear of the defenders of Thermopylæ.

[129] Herodot. viii, 15-60. Compare Isokratês, Panegyric, Or. iv,

p. 59.

I shall have occasion presently to remark the revolution which

took place in Athenian feeling on this point between the Persian

and Peloponnesian wars.

Of this Eubœan strait, the western limit is formed by what was

then called the Maliac gulf, into which the river Spercheius poured

itself,—after a course from west to east between the line of Mount

Othrys to the north, and Mount Œta to the south,—near the town of

Antikyra. The lower portion of this spacious and fertile valley of

the Spercheius was occupied by the various tribes of the Malians,

bordering to the north and east on Achæa Phthiôtis: the southernmost

Malians, with their town of Trachis, occupied a plain—in some places

considerable, in others very narrow—inclosed between mount Œta and

the sea. From Trachis the range of Œta stretched eastward, bordering

close on the southern shore of the Maliac gulf: between the two lay

the memorable pass of Thermopylæ.[130] On the road from Trachis to

Thermopylæ, immediately outside of the latter and at the mouth of

the little streams called the Phenix and the Asôpus, was placed the

town of Anthêla, celebrated for its temples of Amphiktyon and of the

Amphiktyonic Dêmêtêr, as well as for the autumnal assemblies of the

Amphiktyonic council, for whom seats were provided in the temple.

[130] The word _Pass_ commonly conveys the idea of a path

inclosed between mountains. In this instance it is employed to

designate a narrow passage, having mountains on one side only,

and water (or marsh ground) on the other.

Immediately near to Anthêla, the northern slope of the mighty and

prolonged ridge of Œta approached so close to the gulf, or at least

to an inaccessible morass which formed the edge of the gulf, as

to leave no more than one single wheel track between. This narrow

entrance formed the western gate of Thermopylæ. At some little

distance, seemingly about a mile, to the eastward, the same close

conjunction between the mountain and the sea was repeated,—thus

forming the eastern gate of Thermopylæ, not far from the first

town of the Lokrians, called Alpêni. The space between these two

gates was wider and more open, but it was distinguished, and is

still distinguished, by its abundant flow of thermal springs, salt

and sulphureous. Some cells were here prepared for bathers, which

procured for the place the appellation of Chytri, or the Pans: but

the copious supply of mineral water spread its mud and deposited

its crust over all the adjacent ground; and the Phocians, some time

before, had designedly endeavored so to conduct the water as to

render the pass utterly impracticable, at the same time building a

wall across it near to the western gate. They had done this in order

to keep off the attacks of the Thessalians, who had been trying to

extend their conquests southward and eastward. The warm springs,

here as in other parts of Greece, were consecrated to Hêraklês,[131]

whose legendary exploits and sufferings ennobled all the surrounding

region,—mount Œta, Trachis, cape Kenæum, Lichades islands, the river

Dyras: some fragments of these legends have been transmitted and

adorned by the genius of Sophoklês, in his drama of the Trachinian

maidens.

[131] According to one of the numerous hypotheses for refining

religious legend into matter of historical and physical fact,

Hêraklês was supposed to have been an engineer, or water-finder,

in very early times,—δεινὸς περὶ ζήτησιν ὑδάτων καὶ συναγωγήν.

See Plutarch, Cum principibus viris philosopho esse disserendum,

c. i, p. 776.

Such was the general scene—two narrow openings with an intermediate

mile of enlarged road and hot springs between them—which passed in

ancient times by the significant name of Thermopylæ, the Hot Gates;

or sometimes, more briefly, Pylæ—The Gates. At a point also near

Trachis, between the mountains and the sea, about two miles outside

or westward of Thermopylæ, the road was hardly less narrow, but it

might be turned by marching to the westward, since the adjacent

mountains were lower, and presented less difficulty of transit; while

at Thermopylæ itself, the overhanging projection of mount Œta was

steep, woody, and impracticable, leaving access, from Thessaly into

Lokris and the territories southeast of Œta, only through the strait

gate;[132] save and except an unfrequented as well as circuitous

mountain-path, which will be presently spoken of. The wall originally

built across the pass by the Phocians was now half-ruined by age and

neglect: but the Greeks easily reëstablished it, determined to await

in this narrow pass, in that age narrower even than the defile of

Tempê, the approach of the invading host. The edge of the sea line

appears to have been for the most part marsh, fit neither for walking

nor for sailing: but there were points at which boats could land,

so that constant communication could be maintained with the fleet

at Artemisium, while Alpêni was immediately in their rear to supply

provisions.

[132] About Thermopylæ, see Herodot. vii, 175, 176, 199, 200.

Ἡ δὲ αὖ διὰ Τρηχῖνος ἔσοδος ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἔστι, τῇ στεινότατον,

ἡμίπλεθρον· οὐ μέντοι κατὰ τοῦτό γ’ ἔστι τὸ στεινότατον τῆς χώρης

τῆς ἄλλης, ἀλλ’ ἔμπροσθέ τε Θερμοπυλέων καὶ ὄπισθε· κατά τε

Ἀλπηνοὺς, ὄπισθε ἐόντας, ἐοῦσα ἁμαξιτὸς μούνη· καὶ ἔμπροσθε κατὰ

Φοίνικα ποταμὸν, ἁμαξιτὸς ἄλλη μούνη.

Compare Pausanias, vii, 15, 2. τὸ στένον τὸ Ἡρακλείας τε μεταξὺ

καὶ Θερμοπυλέων; Strabo, ix, p. 429; and Livy, xxxvi, 12.

Herodotus says about Thermopylæ—στεινοτέρη γὰρ ἐφαίνετο ἐοῦσα τῆς

εἰς Θεσσαλίην, _i. e._ than the defile of Tempê.

If we did not possess the clear topographical indications given

by Herodotus, it would be almost impossible to comprehend

the memorable event here before us; for the configuration of

the coast, the course of the rivers, and the general local

phenomena, have now so entirely changed, that modern travellers

rather mislead than assist. In the interior of the Maliac

gulf, three or four miles of new land have been formed by the

gradual accumulation of river deposit, so that the gulf itself

is of much less extent, and the mountain bordering the gate of

Thermopylæ is not now near to the sea. The river Spercheius has

materially altered its course; instead of flowing into the sea

in an easterly direction considerably north of Thermopylæ, as

it did in the time of Herodotus, it has been diverted southward

in the lower part of its course, with many windings, so as to

reach the sea much south of the pass: while the rivers Dyras,

Melas, and Asôpus, which in the time of Herodotus all reached the

sea separately between the mouth of Spercheius and Thermopylæ,

now do not reach the sea at all, but fall into the Spercheius.

Moreover, the perpetual flow of the thermal springs has tended to

accumulate deposit and to raise the level of the soil generally

throughout the pass. Herodotus seems to consider the road between

the two gates of Thermopylæ as bearing north and south, whereas

it would bear more nearly east and west. He knows nothing of the

appellation of Callidromus, applied by Livy and Strabo to an

undefined portion of the eastern ridge of Œta.

Respecting the past and present features of Thermopylæ, see the

valuable observations of Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern

Greece, vol. ii, ch. x, pp. 7-40; Gell, Itinerary of Greece, p.

239; Kruse, Hellas, vol. iii, ch. x, p. 129. Dr. Clarke observes:

“The hot springs issue principally from two mouths at the foot of

the limestone precipices of Œta, upon the left of the causeway,

which here passes close under the mountain, and on this part

of it scarcely admits two horsemen abreast of each other, the

morass on the right, between the causeway and the sea, being so

dangerous, that we were very near being buried, with our horses,

by our imprudence in venturing a few paces into it from the paved

road.” (Clarke’s Travels, vol. iv, ch. viii, p. 247.)

Though the resolution of the Greek deputies assembled at the Isthmus,

to defend conjointly Thermopylæ and the Eubœan strait, had been

taken, seemingly, not long after the retreat from Tempê, their troops

and their fleet did not actually occupy these positions until Xerxes

was known to have reached the Thermaic gulf. Both were then put in

motion; the land-force under the Spartan king Leonidas, the naval

force under the Spartan commander Eurybiadês, apparently about the

latter part of the month of June. Leonidas was the younger brother,

the successor, and the son-in-law, of the former Eurystheneid king

Kleomenês, whose only daughter Gorgo he had married. Another brother

of the same family—Dorieus, older than Leonidas—had perished, even

before the death of Kleomenês, in an unsuccessful attempt to plant

a colony in Sicily; and room had been thus made for the unexpected

succession of the youngest brother. Leonidas now conducted from the

Isthmus to Thermopylæ a select band of three hundred Spartans,—all

being citizens of mature age, and persons who left at home sons

to supply their places.[133] Along with them were five hundred

hoplites from Tegea, five hundred from Mantineia, one hundred and

twenty from the Arcadian Orchomenus, one thousand from the rest of

Arcadia, four hundred from Corinth, two hundred from Phlius, and

eighty from Mykenæ. There were also, doubtless, Helots and other

light troops, in undefined number, and probably a certain number of

Lacedæmonian hoplites, not Spartans. In their march through Bœotia

they were joined by seven hundred hoplites of Thespiæ, hearty in

the cause, and by four hundred Thebans, of more equivocal fidelity,

under Leontiadês. It appears, indeed, that the leading men of Thebes,

at that time under a very narrow oligarchy, decidedly _medized_,

or espoused the Persian interest, as much as they dared before the

Persians were actually in the country: and Leonidas, when he made

the requisition for a certain number of their troops to assist

in the defence of Thermopylæ, was doubtful whether they would not

refuse compliance, and openly declare against the Greek cause. The

Theban chiefs thought it prudent to comply, though against their real

inclinations, and furnished a contingent of four hundred men,[134]

chosen from citizens of a sentiment opposed to their own. Indeed the

Theban people, and the Bœotians generally, with the exception of

Thespiæ and Platæa, seem to have had little sentiment on either side,

and to have followed passively the inspirations of their leaders.

[133] Herodot. vii, 177, 205. ἐπιλεξάμενος ἄνδρας τε τοὺς

κατεστεῶτας τριηκοσίους, καὶ τοῖσι ἐτύγχανον παῖδες ἐόντες.

In selecting men for a dangerous service, the Spartans took by

preference those who already had families: if such a man was

slain, he left behind him a son to discharge his duties to the

state, and to maintain the continuity of the family sacred rites,

the extinction of which was considered as a great misfortune. In

our ideas, the life of the father of a family in mature age would

be considered as of more value, and his death a greater loss,

than that of a younger and unmarried man.

[134] Herodot. vii, 205; Thucyd. iii, 62; Diodor. xi, 4;

Plutarch, Aristeides, c. 18.

The passage of Thucydides is very important here, as confirming,

to a great degree, the statement of Herodotus, and enabling us

to appreciate the criticisms of Plutarch, on this particular

point very plausible (De Herodoti Malign. pp. 865, 866). The

latter seems to have copied from a lost Bœotian author named

Aristophanes, who tried to make out a more honorable case for his

countrymen in respect to their conduct in the Persian war.

The statement of Diodorus,—Θηβαίων ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας μέριδος ὡς

τετρακόσιοι,—is illustrated by a proceeding of the Korkyræan

government (Thucyd. iii, 75), when they enlisted their enemies in

order to send them away: also that of the Italian Cumæ (Dionys.

Hal. vii, 5).

With these troops Leonidas reached Thermopylæ, whence he sent

envoys to invite the junction of the Phocians and the Lokrians of

Opus. The latter had been among those who had sent earth and water

to Xerxes, of which they are said to have repented: the step was

taken, probably, only from fear, which at this particular moment

prescribed acquiescence in the summons of Leonidas, justified by

the plea of necessity in case the Persians should prove ultimately

victorious:[135] while the Phocians, if originally disposed to

_medize_, were now precluded from doing so by the fact that their

bitter enemies, the Thessalians, were active in the cause of Xerxes,

and influential in guiding his movements.[136] The Greek envoys added

strength to their summons by all the encouragement in their power.

“The troops now at Thermopylæ, they said, were a mere advanced body,

preceding the main strength of Greece, which was expected to arrive

every day: on the side of the sea, a sufficient fleet was already

on guard: nor was there any cause for fear, since the invader was,

after all, not a god, but a man, exposed to those reverses of fortune

which came inevitably on all men, and most of all, upon those in

preëminent condition.”[137] Such arguments prove but too evidently

the melancholy state of terror which then pervaded the Greek mind:

whether reassured by them or not, the great body of the Opuntian

Lokrians, and one thousand Phocians, joined Leonidas at Thermopylæ.

[135] Diodor. xi, 4.

[136] Herodot. viii, 30.

[137] Herodot. vii, 203. λέγοντες δι’ ἀγγέλων, ὡς αὐτοὶ μὲν

ἥκοιεν πρόδρομοι τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ τῶν συμμάχων προσδόκιμοι

πᾶσάν εἰσι ἡμέρην· ... καί σφι εἴη δεινὸν οὐδέν· οὐ γὰρ θεὸν

εἶναι τὸν ἐπίοντα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπον· εἶναι δὲ θνητὸν

οὐδένα, οὐδὲ ἔσεσθαι, τῷ κακὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς γινομένῳ οὐ συνεμίχθη,

τοῖσι δὲ μεγίστοισι αὐτέων, μέγιστα· ὀφείλειν ὦν καὶ τὸν

ἐπελαύνοντα, ὡς ἐόντα θνητὸν, ἀπὸ τῆς δόξης πεσέειν ἄν.

That this terror was both genuine and serious, there cannot be any

doubt: and the question naturally suggests itself, why the Greeks

did not at once send their full force instead of a mere advanced

guard? The answer is to be found in another attribute of the

Greek character,—it was the time of celebrating both the Olympic

festival-games on the banks of the Alpheius, and the Karneian

festival at Sparta and most of the other Dorian states.[138] Even

at a moment when their whole freedom and existence were at stake,

the Greeks could not bring themselves to postpone these venerated

solemnities: especially the Peloponnesian Greeks, among whom this

force of religious routine appears to have been the strongest. At

a period more than a century later, in the time of Demosthenes,

when the energy of the Athenians had materially declined, we shall

find them, too, postponing the military necessities of the state to

the complete and splendid fulfilment of their religious festival

obligations,—starving all their measures of foreign policy in order

that the Theôric exhibitions might be imposing to the people and

satisfactory to the gods. At present, we find little disposition in

the Athenians to make this sacrifice,—certainly much less than in the

Peloponnesians. The latter, remaining at home to celebrate their

festivals while an invader of superhuman might was at their gates,

remind us of the Jews in the latter days of their independence, who

suffered the operations of the besieging Roman army round their

city to be carried on without interruption during the Sabbath.[139]

The Spartans and their confederates reckoned that Leonidas with his

detachment would be strong enough to hold the pass of Thermopylæ

until the Olympic and Karneian festivals should be past, after which

period they were prepared to march to his aid with their whole

military force:[140] and they engaged to assemble in Bœotia for the

purpose of defending Attica against attack on the land-side, while

the great mass of the Athenian force was serving on shipboard.

[138] Herodot. vii, 206. It was only the Dorian states

(Lacedæmon, Argos, Sikyon, etc.) which were under obligation of

abstinence from aggressive military operations during the month

of the Karneian festival: other states (even in Peloponnesus),

Elis, Mantineia, etc., and of course Athens, were not under

similar restraint (Thucyd. v, 54, 75).

[139] Josephus, Bell. Judaic. i, 7, 3; ii, 16, 4; ibid. Antiqq.

Judaic. xiv, 4, 2. If their bodies were attacked on the Sabbath,

the Jews defended themselves; but they would not break through

the religious obligations of the day in order to impede any

military operations of the besiegers. See Reimar. ad Dion. Cass.

lxvi, 7.

[140] Herodot. vii, 206; viii, 40.

At the time when this plan was laid, they believed that the narrow

pass of Thermopylæ was the only means of possible access for an

invading army. But Leonidas, on reaching the spot, discovered for

the first time that there was also a mountain-path starting from the

neighborhood of Trachis, ascending the gorge of the river Asôpus and

the hill called Anopæa, then crossing the crest of Œta and descending

in the rear of Thermopylæ near the Lokrian town of Alpêni. This

path-–then hardly used, though its ascending half now serves as

the regular track from Zeitun, the ancient Lamia, to Salona on the

Corinthian gulf, the ancient Amphissa–-was revealed to him by its

first discoverers, the inhabitants of Trachis, who in former days

had conducted the Thessalians over it to attack Phocis, after the

Phocians had blocked up the pass of Thermopylæ. It was therefore

not unknown to the Phocians: it conducted from Trachis into their

country, and they volunteered to Leonidas that they would occupy and

defend it.[141] But the Greeks thus found themselves at Thermopylæ

under the same necessity of providing a double line of defence,

for the mountain-path as well as for the defile, as that which had

induced their former army to abandon Tempê: and so insufficient did

their numbers seem, when the vast host of Xerxes was at length

understood to be approaching, that a panic terror seized them; and

the Peloponnesian troops especially, anxious only for their own

separate line of defence at the isthmus of Corinth, wished to retreat

thither forthwith. The indignant remonstrances of the Phocians

and Lokrians, who would thus have been left to the mercy of the

invader, induced Leonidas to forbid this retrograde movement: but he

thought it necessary to send envoys to the various cities, insisting

on the insufficiency of his numbers, and requesting immediate

reinforcements.[142] So painfully were the consequences now felt, of

having kept back the main force until after the religious festivals

in Peloponnesus.

[141] Herodot. vii, 212, 216, 218.

[142] Herodot. vii, 207.

Nor was the feeling of confidence stronger at this moment in their

naval armament, though it had mustered in far superior numbers

at Artemisium on the northern coast of Eubœa, under the Spartan

Eurybiadês. It was composed as follows: one hundred Athenian

triremes, manned in part by the citizens of Platæa, in spite of

their total want of practice on shipboard; forty Corinthian, twenty

Megarian, twenty Athenian, manned by the inhabitants of Chalkis, and

lent to them by Athens; eighteen Æginetan, twelve Sikyonian, ten

Lacedæmonian, eight Epidaurian, seven Eretrian, five Trœzenian, two

from Styrus in Eubœa, and two from the island of Keos. There were

thus in all two hundred and seventy-one triremes; together with nine

pentekonters, furnished partly by Keos and partly by the Lokrians of

Opus. Themistoklês was at the head of the Athenian contingent, and

Adeimantus of the Corinthian; of other officers we hear nothing.[143]

Three cruising vessels, an Athenian, an Æginetan, and a Trœzenian,

were pushed forward along the coast of Thessaly, beyond the island of

Skiathos, to watch the advancing movements of the Persian fleet from

Therma.

[143] Herodot. viii, 1, 2, 3. Diodorus (xi, 12) makes the

Athenian number stronger by twenty triremes.

It was here that the first blood was shed in this memorable contest.

Ten of the best ships in the Persian fleet, sent forward in the

direction of Skiathos, fell in with these three Grecian triremes,

who probably supposing them to be the precursors of the entire

fleet sought safety in flight. The Athenian trireme escaped to the

mouth of the Peneius, where the crew abandoned her, and repaired

by land to Athens, leaving the vessel to the enemy: the other two

ships were overtaken and captured afloat,—not without a vigorous

resistance on the part of the Æginetan, one of whose hoplites,

Pythês, fought with desperate bravery, and fell covered with wounds.

So much did the Persian warriors admire him, that they took infinite

pains to preserve his life, and treated him with the most signal

manifestations both of kindness and respect, while they dealt with

his comrades as slaves.

On board the Trœzenian vessel, which was the first to be captured,

they found a soldier named Leon, of imposing stature: this man was

immediately taken to the ship’s head and slain, as a presaging omen

in the approaching contest: perhaps, observes the historian, his name

may have contributed to determine his fate.[144] The ten Persian

ships advanced no farther than the dangerous rock Myrmêx, between

Skiathos and the mainland, which had been made known to them by a

Greek navigator of Skyros, and on which they erected a pillar to

serve as warning for the coming fleet. Still, so intense was the

alarm which their presence—communicated by fire-signals[145] from

Skiathos, and strengthened by the capture of the three look-out

ships—inspired to the fleet at Artemisium, that they actually

abandoned their station, believing that the entire fleet of the enemy

was at hand.[146] They sailed up the Eubœan strait to Chalkis, as the

narrowest and most defensible passage; leaving scouts on the high

lands to watch the enemy’s advance.

[144] Herodot. vii, 180. τάχα δ’ ἄν τι καὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος ἐπαύροιτο.

Respecting the influence of a name and its etymology, in this

case unhappy for the possessor, compare Herodot. ix, 91; and

Tacit. Hist. iv, 53.

[145] For the employment of fire-signals, compare Livy, xxviii,

5; and the opening of the Agamemnon of Æschylus, and the same

play, v. 270, 300; also Thucydides, iii, 22-80.

[146] Herodot. vii, 181, 182, 183.

Probably this sudden retreat was forced upon the generals by the

panic of their troops, similar to that which king Leonidas, more

powerful than Eurybiadês and Themistoklês, had found means to arrest

at Thermopylæ. It ruined for the time the whole scheme of defence,

by laying open the rear of the army at Thermopylæ to the operations

of the Persian fleet. But that which the Greeks did not do for

themselves was more than compensated by the beneficent intervention

of their gods, who opposed to the invader the more terrible arms of

storm and hurricane. He was allowed to bring his overwhelming host,

land-force as well as naval, to the brink of Thermopylæ and to the

coast of Thessaly, without hindrance or damage; but the time had

now arrived when the gods appeared determined to humble him, and

especially to strike a series of blows at his fleet which should

reduce it to a number not beyond what the Greeks could contend

with.[147] Amidst the general terror which pervaded Greece, the

Delphians were the first to earn the gratitude of their countrymen by

announcing that divine succor was at hand.[148] On entreating advice

from their own oracle, they were directed to pray to the Winds, who

would render powerful aid to Greece. Moreover, the Athenian seamen,

in their retreat at Chalkis, recollecting that Boreas was the husband

of the Attic princess or heroine Oreithyia, daughter of their ancient

king Erechtheus, addressed fervent prayers to their son-in-law for

his help in need. Never was help more effective, or more opportune,

than the destructive storm, presently to be recounted, on the coast

of Magnesia, for which grateful thanks and annual solemnities were

still rendered even in the time of Herodotus, at Athens as well as at

Delphi.[149]

[147] Herodot. vii, 184. μέχρι μὲν δὴ τούτου τοῦ χώρου καὶ τῶν

Θερμοπυλέων, ἀπαθής τε κακῶν ἔην ὁ στρατὸς, καὶ πλῆθος ἔην

τηνικαῦτα ἔτι τόσον, etc.—viii, 13. ἐποιέετο δὲ πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ,

ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῷ Ἑλληνικῷ τὸ Περσικὸν, μηδὲ πολλῷ πλέον εἴη.

Compare viii, 109; and Diodor. xi, 13.

[148] Herodot. vii, 178. Δελφοὶ δὲ δεξάμενοι τὸ μαντήϊον, πρῶτα

μὲν, Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἐξήγγειλαν τὰ

χρησθέντα αὐτοῖσι· καί σφι δεινῶς καταῤῥωδέουσι τὸν βάρβαρον

ἐξαγγείλαντες, χάριν ἀθάνατον κατέθεντο.

[149] Herodot. vii, 189. The language of the historian in this

chapter is remarkable: his incredulous reason rather gets the

better of religious acquiescence.

Clemens Alexandrinus, reciting this incident together, with some

other miracles of Ækus, Aristæus, Empedoklês, etc., reproves his

pagan opponents for their inconsistency, while believing these,

in rejecting the miracles of Moses and the prophets (Stromat. vi,

pp. 629, 630).

Xerxes had halted on the Thermaic gulf for several days, employing

a large portion of his numerous army in cutting down the woods and

clearing the roads, on the pass over Olympus from upper Macedonia

into Perrhæbia, which was recommended by his Macedonian allies as

preferable to the defile of Tempê.[150] Not intending to march

through the latter, he is said to have gone by sea to view it; and

remarks are ascribed to him on the facility of blocking it up so

as to convert all Thessaly into one vast lake.[151] His march from

Therma through Macedonia, Perrhæbia, Thessaly, and Achæa Phthiôtis,

into the territory of the Malians and the neighborhood of Thermopylæ,

occupied eleven or twelve days:[152] the people through whose towns

he passed had already made their submission, and the Thessalians

especially were zealous in seconding his efforts. His numerous host

was still farther swelled by the presence of these newly-submitted

people, and by the Macedonian troops under Alexander; so that

the river Onochônus in Thessaly, and even the Apidanus in Achæa

Phthiôtis, would hardly suffice to supply it, but were drunk up,

according to the information given to Herodotus. At Alus in Achæa, he

condescended to listen to the gloomy legend connected with the temple

of Zeus Laphysteus and the sacred grove of the Athamantid family:

he respected and protected these sacred places,—an incident which

shows that the sacrilege and destruction of temples imputed to him

by the Greeks, though true in regard to Athens, Abæ, Milêtus, etc.,

was by no means universally exhibited, and is even found qualified

by occasional instances of great respect for Grecian religious

feeling.[153] Along the shore of the Malian gulf he at length came

into the Trachinian territory near Thermopylæ, where he encamped,

seemingly awaiting the arrival of the fleet, so as to combine

his farther movements in advance,[154] now that the enemy were

immediately in his front.

[150] The pass over which Xerxes passed was that by Petra,

Pythium, and Oloosson,—“saltum ad Petram,”—“Perrhæbiæ

saltum,”—(Livy, xlv, 21; xliv, 27.) Petra was near the point

where the road passed from Pieria, or lower Macedonia, into upper

Macedonia (see Livy, xxxix, 26).

Compare respecting this pass, and the general features of the

neighboring country, Colonel Leake, Travels in Northern Greece,

vol. iii, ch. xviii, pp. 337-343, and ch. xxx, p. 430; also Boué,

La Turquie en Europe, vol. i, pp. 198-202.

The Thracian king Sitalkês, like Xerxes on this occasion, was

obliged to cause the forests to be cut, to make a road for his

army, in the early part of the Peloponnesian war (Thucyd. ii, 98).

[151] Herodot. vii, 130, 131. That Xerxes, struck by the view of

Olympus and Ossa, went to see the narrow defile between them, is

probable enough; but the remarks put into his mouth are probably

the fancy of some ingenious contemporary Greeks, suggested by the

juxtaposition of such a landscape and such a monarch. To suppose

this narrow defile walled up, was easy for the imagination of any

spectator: to suppose that _he_ could order it to be done, was

in character with a monarch who disposed of an indefinite amount

of manual labor, and who had just finished the cutting of Athos.

Such dramatic fitness was quite sufficient to convert that which

_might have been_ said into that which _was_ said, and to procure

for it a place among the historical anecdotes communicated to

Herodotus.

[152] The Persian fleet did not leave Therma until eleven days

after Xerxes and his land-force (Herodot. vii, 183); it arrived

in one day on the Sêpias Aktê, or southeastern coast of Magnesia

(ibid.), was then assailed and distressed for three days by the

hurricane (vii, 191), and proceeded immediately afterwards to

Aphetæ (vii, 193). When it arrived at the latter places, Xerxes

himself had been _three days_ in the Malian territory (vii, 196).

[153] This point is set forth by Hoffmeister, Sittlich-religiöse

Lebensansicht des Herodotos, Essen, 1832, sect. 19, p. 93.

[154] Herodot. vii, 196, 197, 201.

But his fleet was not destined to reach the point of communication

with the same ease as he had arrived before Thermopylæ. After having

ascertained by the ten ships already mentioned, which captured

the three Grecian guardships, that the channel between Skiathos

and the mainland was safe, the Persian admiral Megabates sailed

with his whole fleet from Therma, or from Pydna,[155] his station

in the Thermaic gulf, eleven days after the monarch had begun his

land-march; and reached in one long day’s sail the eastern coast

of Magnesia, not far from its southernmost promontory. The greater

part of this line of coast, formed by the declivities of Ossa and

Pelion, is thoroughly rocky and inhospitable: but south of the town

called Kasthanæa there was a short extent of open beach, where the

fleet rested for the night before coming to the line of coast called

the Sêpias Aktê.[156] The first line of ships were moored to the

land, but the larger number of this immense fleet swung at anchor in

a depth of eight lines. In this condition they were overtaken the

next morning by a sudden and desperate hurricane,—a wind called by

the people of the country Hellespontias, which blew right upon the

shore. The most active among the mariners found means to forestall

the danger by beaching and hauling their vessels ashore; but a large

number, unable to take such a precaution, were carried before the

wind and dashed to pieces near Melibœa, Kasthanæa, and other points

of this unfriendly region. Four hundred ships of war, according to

the lowest estimate, together with a countless heap of transports

and provision craft, were destroyed: and the loss of life as well as

property was immense. For three entire days did the terrors of the

storm last, during which time the crews ashore, left almost without

defence, and apprehensive that the inhabitants of the country might

assail or plunder them, were forced to break up the ships driven

ashore in order to make a palisade out of the timbers.[157] Though

the Magian priests who accompanied the armament were fervent in

prayer and sacrifice,—not merely to the Winds, but also to Thetis

and the Nereids, the tutelary divinities of Sêpias Aktê,—they could

obtain no mitigation until the fourth day:[158] thus long did the

prayers of Delphi and Athens, and the jealousy of the gods against

superhuman arrogance, protract the terrible visitation. At length,

on the fourth day, calm weather returned, when all those ships which

were in condition to proceed, put to sea and sailed along the land,

round the southern promontory of Magnesia, to Aphetæ, at the entrance

of the gulf of Pagasæ. Little, indeed, had Xerxes gained by the

laborious cutting through mount Athos, in hopes to escape the unseen

atmospheric enemies which howl around that formidable promontory: the

work of destruction to his fleet was only transferred to the opposite

side of the intervening Thracian sea.

[155] Diodor. xi, 12.

[156] Diodorus (xi, 12), Plutarch (Themistoklês, 8), and Mannert

(Geogr. der Gr. und Römer, vol. vii, p. 596), seem to treat

Sêpias as a _cape_, the southeastern corner of Magnesia: this

is different from Herodotus, who mentions it as a line of some

extent (ἅπασα ἡ ἀκτὴ ἡ Σηπιὰς, vii, 191), and notices separately

τὴν ἄκρην τῆς Μαγνησίης, vii, 193.

The geography of Apollonius Rhodius (i, 560-580) seems sadly

inaccurate.

[157] Herodot. vii, 189-191.

[158] Herodot. vii, 191. On this occasion, as in regard to the

prayers addressed by the Athenians to Boreas, Herodotus suffers

a faint indication of skepticism to escape him: ἡμέρας γὰρ δὴ

ἐχείμαζε τρεῖς· τέλος δὲ, ἔντομά τε ποιεῦντες καὶ καταείδοντες

γόοισι τῷ ἀνέμῳ οἱ Μάγοι, πρός τε τούτοισι, καὶ Θέτι καὶ τῇσι

Νηρηΐσι θύοντες, ἔπαυσαν τετάρτῃ ἡμέρῃ· ~ἢ ἄλλως κως αὐτὸς ἐθέλων

ἐκόπασε~.

Had the Persian fleet reached Aphetæ without misfortune, they

would have found the Eubœan strait evacuated by the Greek fleet

and undefended, so that they would have come immediately into

communication with the land army, and would have acted upon the rear

of Leonidas and his division. But the storm completely altered this

prospect, and revived the spirits of the Greek fleet at Chalkis. It

was communicated to them by their scouts on the high lands of Eubœa,

who even sent them word that the entire Persian fleet was destroyed:

upon which, having returned thanks and offered libations to Poseidon

the Saviour, the Greeks returned back as speedily as they could to

Artemisium. To their surprise, however, they saw the Persian fleet,

though reduced in number, still exhibiting a formidable total and

appearance at the opposite station of Aphetæ. The last fifteen

ships of that fleet, having been so greatly crippled by the storm

as to linger behind the rest, mistook the Greek ships for their

own comrades, fell into the midst of them, and were all captured.

Sandôkês, sub-satrap of the Æolic Kymê,—Aridôlis, despot of Alabanda

in Karia,—and Penthylus, despot of Paphos in Cyprus,—the leaders of

this squadron, were sent prisoners to the isthmus of Corinth, after

having been questioned respecting the enemy: the latter of these

three had brought to Xerxes a contingent of twelve ships, out of

which eleven had foundered in the storm, while the last was now taken

with himself aboard.[159]

[159] Herodot. vii, 194.

Meanwhile Xerxes, encamped within sight of Thermopylæ, suffered

four days to pass without making any attack: a probable reason may

be found in the extreme peril of his fleet, reported to have been

utterly destroyed by the storm: but Herodotus assigns a different

cause. Xerxes could not believe, according to him, that the Greeks

at Thermopylæ, few as they were in number, had any serious intention

to resist: he had heard in his march that a handful of Spartans and

other Greeks, under an Herakleid leader, had taken post there,

but he treated the news with scorn: and when a horseman,—whom he

sent to reconnoitre them, and who approached near enough to survey

their position, without exciting any attention among them by his

presence,—brought back to him a description of the pass, the wall of

defence, and the apparent number of the division, he was yet more

astonished and puzzled. It happened too, that at the moment when this

horseman rode up, the Spartans were in the advanced guard, outside of

the wall: some were engaged in gymnastic exercises, others in combing

their long hair, and none of them heeded the approach of the hostile

spy. Xerxes next sent for the Spartan king, Demaratus, to ask what

he was to think of such madness; upon which the latter reminded him

of their former conversation at Doriskus, again assuring him that

the Spartans in the pass would resist to the death, in spite of the

smallness of their number; and adding, that it was their custom, in

moments of special danger, to comb their hair with peculiar care.

In spite of this assurance from Demaratus, and of the pass not only

occupied, but in itself so narrow and impracticable, before his eyes,

Xerxes still persisted in believing that the Greeks did not intend

to resist, and that they would disperse of their own accord. He

delayed the attack for four days: on the fifth he became wroth at the

impudence and recklessness of the petty garrison before him, and sent

against them the Median and Kissian divisions, with orders to seize

them and bring them as prisoners into his presence.[160]

[160] Herod. vii, 208, 210. πέμπει ἐς αὐτοὺς Μήδους τε καὶ

Κισσίους θυμωθεὶς, ἐντειλάμενός σφεας ζωγρήσαντας ἄγειν ἐς ὄψιν

τὴν ἑωϋτοῦ.

Though we read thus in Herodotus, it is hardly possible to believe

that we are reading historical reality: we rather find laid out

before us a picture of human self-conceit in its most exaggerated

form, ripe for the stroke of the jealous gods, and destined, like the

interview between Crœsus and Solon, to point and enforce that moral

which was ever present to the mind of the historian; whose religious

and poetical imagination, even unconsciously to himself, surrounds

the naked facts of history with accompaniments of speech and motive

which neither Homer nor Æschylus would have deemed unsuitable. The

whole proceedings of Xerxes, and the immensity of host which he

summoned, show that he calculated on an energetic resistance; and

though the numbers of Leonidas, compared with the Persians, were

insignificant, they could hardly have looked insignificant in the

position which they then occupied,—an entrance little wider than a

single carriage-road, with a cross wall, a prolonged space somewhat

widened, and then another equally narrow exit, behind it. We are

informed by Diodorus[161] that the Lokrians, when they first sent

earth and water to the Persian monarch, engaged at the same time to

seize the pass of Thermopylæ on his behalf, and were only prevented

from doing so by the unexpected arrival of Leonidas; nor is it

unlikely that the Thessalians, now the chief guides of Xerxes,[162]

together with Alexander of Macedon, would try the same means of

frightening away the garrison of Thermopylæ, as had already been so

successful in causing the evacuation of Tempê. An interval of two or

three days might be well bestowed for the purpose of leaving to such

intrigues a fair chance of success: the fleet, meanwhile, would be

arrived at Aphetæ after the dangers of the storm: we may thus venture

to read the conduct of Xerxes in a manner somewhat less childish than

it is depicted by Herodotus.

[161] Diodor. xi, 4.

[162] Herodot. vii, 174; viii, 29-32.

The Medes, whom Xerxes first ordered to the attack, animated as well

by the recollection of their ancient Asiatic supremacy as by the

desire of avenging the defeat of Marathon,[163] manifested great

personal bravery. The position was one in which bows and arrows were

of little avail: a close combat hand to hand was indispensable,

and in this the Greeks had every advantage of organization as well

as armor. Short spears, light wicker shields, and tunics, in the

assailants, were an imperfect match for the long spears, heavy and

spreading shields, steady ranks,[164] and practised fighting of the

defenders. Yet the bravest men of the Persian army pressed on from

behind, and having nothing but numbers in their favor, maintained

long this unequal combat, with great slaughter to themselves and

little loss to the Greeks. Though constantly repulsed, the attack was

as constantly renewed, for two successive days: the Greek troops

were sufficiently numerous to relieve each other when fatigued, since

the space was so narrow that few could contend at once; and even

the Immortals, or ten thousand choice Persian guards, and the other

choice troops of the army, when sent to the attack on the second day,

were driven back with the same disgrace and the same slaughter as the

rest. Xerxes surveyed this humiliating repulse from a lofty throne

expressly provided for him: “thrice (says the historian, with Homeric

vivacity) did he spring from his throne, in agony for his army.”[165]

[163] Diodor. xi, 6.

[164] Herodot. vii, 211; ix, 62, 63; Diodor. xi, 7: compare

Æschyl. Pers. 244.

[165] Herodot. vii, 212. Ἐν ταύτῃσι τῇσι προσόδοισι τῆς μάχης

λέγεται βασιλέα, θηεύμενον, τρὶς ἀναδραμεῖν ἐκ τοῦ θρόνου,

δείσαντα περὶ τῇ στρατίῃ. See Homer, Iliad, xx, 62; Æschyl. Pers.

472.

At the end of two days’ fighting no impression had been made, the

pass appeared impracticable, and the defence not less triumphant

than courageous,—when a Malian, named Ephialtês, revealed to Xerxes

the existence of the unfrequented mountain-path. This at least was

the man singled out by the general voice of Greece as the betrayer

of the fatal secret: after the final repulse of the Persians, he

fled his country for a time, and a reward was proclaimed by the

Amphiktyonic assembly for his head; having returned to his country

too soon, he was slain by a private enemy, whom the Lacedæmonians

honored as a patriot.[166] There were, however, other Greeks who

were also affirmed to have earned the favor of Xerxes by the same

valuable information; and very probably there may have been more than

one informant,—indeed, the Thessalians, at that time his guides, can

hardly have been ignorant of it. So little had the path been thought

of, however, that no one in the Persian army knew it to be already

occupied by the Phocians. At nightfall, Hydarnês with a detachment of

Persians was detached along the gorge of the river Asôpus, ascended

the path of Anopæa, through the woody region between the mountains

occupied by the Œtæans and those possessed by the Trachinians, and

found himself at daybreak near the summit, within sight of the

Phocian guard of one thousand men. In the stillness of daybreak,

the noise of his army trampling through the wood[167] aroused

the defenders; but the surprise was mutual, and Hydarnês in alarm

asked his guide whether these men also were Lacedæmonians. Having

ascertained the negative, he began the attack, and overwhelmed the

Phocians with a shower of arrows, so as to force them to abandon the

path and seek their own safety on a higher point of the mountain.

Anxious only for their own safety, they became unmindful of the

inestimable opening which they were placed to guard. Had the full

numerical strength of the Greeks been at Thermopylæ, instead of

staying behind for the festivals, they might have planted such

a force on the mountain-path as would have rendered it not less

impregnable than the pass beneath.

[166] Herodot. vii, 213, 214; Diodor. xi, 8.

Ktesias states that it was two powerful men of Trachis, Kalliadês

and Timaphernês, who disclosed to Xerxes the mountain-path

(Persica, c. 24).

[167] Herodot. vii, 217, 218. ἠώς τε δὴ διέφαινε—ἦν μὲν δὴ

νηνεμίη, ψόφου δὲ γενομένου πολλοῦ, etc.

I cannot refrain from transcribing a remark of Colonel Leake:

“The _stillness of the dawn_, which saved the Phocians from being

surprised, is very characteristic of the climate of Greece in

the season when the occurrence took place, and like many other

trifling circumstances occurring in the history of the Persian

invasion, is an interesting proof of the accuracy and veracity of

the historian.” (Travels in Northern Greece, vol. ii, c. x, p.

55.)

Hydarnês, not troubling himself to pursue the Phocians, followed the

descending portion of the mountain-path, shorter than the ascending,

and arrived in the rear of Thermopylæ not long after midday.[168] But

before he had yet completed his descent, the fatal truth had already

been made known to Leonidas, that the enemy were closing in upon him

behind. Scouts on the hills, and deserters from the Persian camp,

especially a Kymæan[169] named Tyrastiadas, had both come in with

the news: and even if such informants had been wanting, the prophet

Megistias, descended from the legendary seer Melampus, read the

approach of death in the gloomy aspect of the morning sacrifices. It

was evident that Thermopylæ could be no longer defended; but there

was ample time for the defenders to retire, and the detachment of

Leonidas were divided in opinion on the subject. The greater number

of them were inclined to abandon a position now become untenable,

and to reserve themselves for future occasions on which they might

effectively contribute to repel the invader. Nor is it to be doubted

that such was the natural impulse, both of brave soldiers and of

prudent officers, under the circumstances. But to Leonidas the idea

of retreat was intolerable. His own personal honor, together with

that of his Spartan companions and of Sparta herself,[170] forbade

him to think of yielding to the enemy the pass which he had been

sent to defend. The laws of his country required him to conquer or

die in the post assigned to him, whatever might be the superiority

of number on the part of the enemy:[171] moreover, we are told that

the Delphian oracle had declared that either Sparta itself, or a king

of Sparta, must fall a victim to the Persian arms. Had he retired,

he could hardly have escaped that voice of reproach which, in Greece

especially, always burst upon the general who failed: while his

voluntary devotion and death would not only silence every whisper of

calumny, but exalt him to the pinnacle of glory both as a man and as

a king, and set an example of chivalrous patriotism at the moment

when the Greek world most needed the lesson.

[168] Herodot. vii, 216, 217.

[169] Diodor. xi, 9.

[170] Herodot. vii, 219. ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο οἱ Ἕλληνες, καί

σφεων ἐσχίζοντο αἱ γνῶμαι.

[171] Herodot. vii, 104.

The three hundred Spartans under Leonidas were found fully equal to

this act of generous and devoted self-sacrifice. Perhaps he would

have wished to inspire the same sentiment to the whole detachment:

but when he found them indisposed, he at once ordered them to retire,

thus avoiding all unseemly reluctance and dissension:[172] the same

order was also given to the prophet Megistias, who however refused to

obey it and stayed, though he sent away his only son.[173] None of

the contingents remained with Leonidas except the Thespian and the

Theban. The former, under their general Demophilus, volunteered to

share the fate of the Spartans, and displayed even more than Spartan

heroism, since they were not under that species of moral constraint

which arises from the necessity of acting up to a preëstablished

fame and superiority. But retreat with them presented no prospect

better than the mere preservation of life, either in slavery or in

exile and misery; since Thespiæ was in Bœotia, sure to be overrun by

the invaders;[174] while the Peloponnesian contingents had behind

them the isthmus of Corinth, which they doubtless hoped still to

be able to defend. With respect to the Theban contingent, we are

much perplexed; for Herodotus tells us that they were detained by

Leonidas against their will as hostages, that they took as little

part as possible in the subsequent battle, and surrendered themselves

prisoners to Xerxes as soon as they could. Diodorus says that the

Thespians alone remained with the Spartans; and Pausanias, though

he mentions the eighty Mykenæans as having stayed along with the

Thespians (which is probably incorrect), says nothing about the

Thebans.[175] All things considered, it seems probable that the

Thebans remained, but remained by their own offer,—being citizens of

the anti-Persian party, as Diodorus represents them to have been, or

perhaps because it may have been hardly less dangerous for them to

retire with the Peloponnesians, than to remain, suspected as they

were of _medism_: but when the moment of actual crisis arrived, their

courage not standing so firm as that of the Spartans and Thespians,

they endeavored to save their lives by taking credit for _medism_,

and pretending to have been forcibly detained by Leonidas.

[172] Herodot. vii, 220. Ταύτῃ καὶ μᾶλλον τῇ γνώμῃ πλεῖστός εἰμι,

Λεωνίδην, ἐπεί τε ἤσθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους, καὶ

οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφεας ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι·

αὐτῷ δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα

ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

Compare a similar act of honorable self-devotion, under less

conspicuous circumstances, of the Lacedæmonian commander

Anaxibius, when surprised by the Athenians under Iphikratês in

the territory of Abydus (Xenophon. Hellenic. iv, 8, 38). He and

twelve Lacedæmonian harmosts, all refused to think of safety by

flight. He said to his men, when resistance was hopeless, Ἄνδρες,

ἐμοὶ μὲν καλὸν ἔνθαδε ἀποθανεῖν· ὑμεῖς δὲ, πρὶν συμμίξαι τοῖς

πολεμίοις, σπεύδετε εἰς τὴν σωτηρίαν.

[173] Herodot. vii, 221. According to Plutarch, there were also

two persons belonging to the Herakleid lineage, whom Leonidas

desired to place in safety, and for that reason gave them a

despatch to carry home. They indignantly refused, and stayed to

perish in the fight (Plutarch. Herodot. Malign. p. 866).

[174] The subsequent distress of the surviving Thespians is

painfully illustrated by the fact, that in the battle of Platæa

in the following year, they had no heavy armor (Herodot. ix, 30).

After the final repulse of Xerxes, they were forced to recruit

their city by the admission of new citizens (Herodot. viii, 75).

[175] Herodot. vii, 222. Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον, καὶ

οὐ βουλόμενοι, κατεῖχε γάρ σφεας Λεωνίδης, ἐν ὁμήρων λόγῳ

ποιεύμενος. How could these Thebans serve as hostages? Against

what evil were they intended to guard Leonidas, or what

advantages could they confer upon him? Unwilling comrades on

such an occasion would be noway desirable. Plutarch (De Herodot.

Malign. p. 865) severely criticizes this statement of Herodotus,

and on very plausible grounds: among the many unjust criticisms

in his treatise, this is one of the few exceptions.

Compare Diodorus, xi, 9; and Pausan. x, 20, 1.

Of course the Thebans, taking part as they afterwards did

heartily with Xerxes, would have an interest in representing

that their contingent had done as little as possible against

him, and may have circulated the story that Leonidas detained

them as hostages. The politics of Thebes _before_ the battle

of Thermopylæ were essentially double-faced and equivocal: not

daring to take any open part against the Greeks before the

arrival of Xerxes.

The eighty Mykenæans, like the other Peloponnesians, had the

isthmus of Corinth behind them as a post which presented good

chances of defence.

The devoted band thus left with Leonidas at Thermopylæ consisted

of the three hundred Spartans, with a certain number of Helots

attending them, together with seven hundred Thespians and apparently

four hundred Thebans. If there had been before any Lacedæmonians,

not Spartans, present, they must have retired with the other

Peloponnesians. By previous concert with the guide, Ephialtês,

Xerxes delayed his attack upon them until near noon, when the troops

under Hydarnês might soon be expected in the rear. On this last

day, however, Leonidas, knowing that all which remained was to sell

the lives of his detachment dearly, did not confine himself to the

defensive,[176] but advanced into the wider space outside of the

pass; becoming the aggressor and driving before him the foremost of

the Persian host, many of whom perished as well by the spears of the

Greeks as in the neighboring sea and morass, and even trodden down

by their own numbers. It required all the efforts of the Persian

officers, assisted by threats and the plentiful use of the whip, to

force their men on to the fight. The Greeks fought with reckless

bravery and desperation against this superior host, until at length

their spears were broken, and they had no weapon left except their

swords. It was at this juncture that Leonidas himself was slain, and

around his body the battle became fiercer than ever: the Persians

exhausted all their efforts to possess themselves of it, but were

repulsed by the Greeks four several times, with the loss of many of

their chiefs, especially two brothers of Xerxes. Fatigued, exhausted,

diminished in number, and deprived of their most effective weapons,

the little band of defenders retired, with the body of their chief,

into the narrow strait behind the cross wall, where they sat all

together on a hillock, exposed to the attack of the main Persian

army on one side, and of the detachment of Hydarnês, which had

now completed its march, on the other. They were thus surrounded,

overwhelmed with missiles, and slain to a man; not losing courage

even to the last, but defending themselves with their remaining

daggers, with their unarmed hands, and even with their mouths.[177]

[176] The story of Diodorus (xi, 10) that Leonidas made an

attack upon the Persian camp during the night, and very nearly

penetrated tn the regal tent, from which Xerxes was obliged to

flee, suddenly, in order to save his life, while the Greeks,

after having caused immense slaughter in the camp, were at

length overpowered and slain,—is irreconcilable with Herodotus

and decidedly to be rejected. Justin, however (ii, 11), and

Plutarch (De Herodot. Malign. p. 866), follow it. The rhetoric

of Diodorus is not calculated to strengthen the evidence in its

favor. Plutarch had written, or intended to write, a biography of

Leonidas (De Herodot. Mal. ibid.); but it is not preserved.

[177] Herodot. vii, 225.

Thus perished Leonidas with his heroic comrades,—three hundred

Spartans and seven hundred Thespians. Amidst such equal heroism,

it seemed difficult to single out any individual as distinguished:

nevertheless, Herodotus mentions the Spartans Diênekês, Alpheus, and

Maron,—and the Thespian Dithyrambus,—as standing preëminent. The

reply ascribed to the first became renowned.[178] “The Persian host

(he was informed) is so prodigious that their arrows conceal the

sun.” “So much the better (he answered), we shall then fight them

in the shade.” Herodotus had asked and learned the name of every

individual among this memorable three hundred, and even six hundred

years afterwards, Pausanias could still read the names engraved on

a column at Sparta.[179] One alone among them—Aristodêmus—returned

home, having taken no part in the combat. He, together with Eurytus,

another soldier, had been absent from the detachment on leave, and

both were lying at Alpêni, suffering from a severe complaint in the

eyes. Eurytus, apprized that the fatal hour of the detachment was

come, determined not to survive it, asked for his armor, and desired

his attendant Helot to lead him to his place in the ranks; where

he fell gallantly fighting, while the Helot departed and survived.

Aristodêmus did not imitate this devotion of his sick comrade:

overpowered with physical suffering, he was carried to Sparta—but he

returned only to scorn and infamy among his fellow-citizens.[180]

He was denounced as “the coward Aristodêmus;” no one would speak or

communicate with him, or even grant him a light for his fire.[181]

After a year of such bitter disgrace, he was at length enabled to

retrieve his honor at the battle of Platæa, where he was slain, after

surpassing all his comrades in heroic and even reckless valor.

[178] Herodot. vii, 226.

[179] Herodot. vii, 224. ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τριακοσίων.

Pausanias, iii, 14, 1. Annual festivals, with a panegyrical

oration and gymnastic matches, were still celebrated even in

his time in honor of Leonidas, jointly with Pausanias, whose

subsequent treason tarnished his laurels acquired at Platæa.

It is remarkable, and not altogether creditable to Spartan

sentiment, that the two kings should have been made partners in

the same public honors.

[180] Herod. vii, 229. Ἀριστόδημον—λειποψυχέοντα

λειφθῆναι—ἀλγήσαντα ἀπονοστῆσαι ἐς Σπάρτην. The commentators

are hard upon Aristodêmus when they translate these epithets,

“animo deficientem, timidum, pusillanimum,” considering that

ἐλειποψύχησε is predicated by Thucydides (iv, 12) even respecting

the gallant Brasidas. Herodotus scarcely intends to imply

anything like pusillanimity, but rather the effect of extreme

physical suffering. It seems, however, that there were different

stories about the cause which had kept Aristodêmus out of the

battle.

The story of another soldier, named Pantitês, who having been

sent on a message by Leonidas into Thessaly, did not return in

time for the battle, and was so disgraced when he went back to

Sparta that he hanged himself,—given by Herodotus as a report, is

very little entitled to credit. It is not likely that Leonidas

would send an envoy into Thessaly, then occupied by the Persians:

moreover, the disgrace of Aristodêmus is particularly explained

by Herodotus by the difference between his conduct and that of

his comrade Eurytus: whereas Pantitês stood alone.

[181] See the story of the single Athenian citizen, who returned

home alone, after all his comrades had perished in an unfortunate

expedition to the island of Ægina. The widows of the slain

warriors crowded round him, each asking him what had become of

her husband, and finally put him to death by pricking with their

bodkins (Herodot. v, 87).

In the terrible battle of St. Jacob on the Birs, near Basle

(August, 1444), where fifteen hundred Swiss crossed the river and

attacked forty thousand French and Germans under the Dauphin of

France, against strong remonstrances from their commanders,—all

of them were slain, after deeds of unrivalled valor and great

loss to the enemy, except sixteen men, who receded from their

countrymen in crossing the river, thinking the enterprise

desperate. These sixteen men, on their return, were treated

with intolerable scorn and hardly escaped execution (Vogelin,

Geschichte der Schweizer Eidgenossenschaft, vol. i, ch. 5, p.

393).

Amidst the last moments of this gallant band, we turn with repugnance

to the desertion and surrender of the Thebans. They are said to have

taken part in the final battle, though only to save appearances and

under the pressure of necessity: but when the Spartans and Thespians,

exhausted and disarmed, retreated to die upon the little hillock

within the pass, the Thebans then separated themselves, approached

the enemy with outstretched hands, and entreated quarter. They now

loudly proclaimed that they were friends and subjects of the Great

King, and had come to Thermopylæ against their own consent; all which

was confirmed by the Thessalians in the Persian army. Though some few

were slain before this proceeding was understood by the Persians,

the rest were admitted to quarter; not without the signal disgrace,

however, of being branded with the regal mark as untrustworthy

slaves,—an indignity to which their commander, Leontiadês was

compelled to submit along with the rest. Such is the narrative which

Herodotus recounts, without any expression of mistrust or even

of doubt: Plutarch emphatically contradicts it, and even cites a

Bœotian author,[182] who affirms that Anaxarchus, not Leontiadês, was

commander of the Thebans at Thermopylæ. Without calling in question

the equivocal conduct and surrender of this Theban detachment, we

may reasonably dismiss the story of this ignominious branding, as

an invention of that strong anti-Theban feeling which prevailed in

Greece after the repulse of Xerxes.

[182] Herodot. vii, 233; Plutarch, Herodot. Malign. p. 867. The

Bœotian history of Aristophanês, cited by the latter, professed

to be founded in part upon memorials arranged according to

the sequence of magistrates and generals—ἐκ τῶν κατὰ ἄρχοντας

ὑπομνημάτων ἱστόρησε.

The wrath of that monarch, as he went over the field after the

close of the action, vented itself upon the corpse of the gallant

Leonidas, whose head he directed to be cut off and fixed on a cross.

But it was not wrath alone which filled his mind: he was farther

impressed with involuntary admiration of the little detachment which

had here opposed to him a resistance so unexpected and so nearly

invincible,—he now learned to be anxious respecting the resistance

which remained behind. “Demaratus (said he to the exiled Spartan king

at his side), thou art a good man: all thy predictions have turned

out true: now tell me, how many Lacedæmonians are there remaining,

and are they all such warriors as these fallen men?” “O king (replied

Demaratus), the total of the Lacedæmonians and of their towns is

great; in Sparta alone, there are eight thousand adult warriors, all

equal to those who have here fought; and the other Lacedæmonians,

though inferior to them, are yet excellent soldiers.” “Tell me

(rejoined Xerxes), what will be the least difficult way of conquering

such men?” Upon which Demaratus advised him to send a division of

his fleet to occupy the island of Kythêra, and from thence to make

war on the southern coast of Laconia, which would distract the

attention of Sparta, and prevent her from coöperating in any combined

scheme of defence against his land-force. Unless this were done,

the entire force of Peloponnesus would be assembled to maintain

the narrow isthmus of Corinth, where the Persian king would have

far more terrible battles to fight than anything which he had yet

witnessed.[183]

[183] Herodot. vii, 235.

Happily for the safety of Greece, Achæmenes, the brother of Xerxes,

interposed to dissuade the monarch from this prudent plan of action;

not without aspersions on the temper and motives of Demaratus, who,

he affirmed, like other Greeks, hated all power, and envied all

good fortune, above his own. The fleet, added he, after the damage

sustained by the recent storm, would bear no farther diminution of

number: and it was essential to keep the entire Persian force, on

land as well as on sea, in one undivided and coöperating mass.[184]

[184] Herodot. vii, 236.

A few such remarks were sufficient to revive in the monarch his

habitual sentiment of confidence in overpowering number: yet while

rejecting the advice of Demaratus, he emphatically repelled the

imputations against the good faith and sincere attachment of that

exiled prince.[185]

[185] Herodot. vii, 237. “The citizen (Xerxes is made to observe)

does indeed naturally envy another citizen more fortunate than

himself, and if asked for counsel, will keep back what he has

best in his mind, unless he be a man of very rare virtue. But a

foreign friend usually sympathizes heartily with the good fortune

of another foreigner, and will give him the best advice in his

power whenever he is asked.”

Meanwhile the days of battle at Thermopylæ had been not less actively

employed by the fleets at Aphetæ and Artemisium. It has already been

mentioned that the Greek ships, having abandoned their station at

the latter place and retired to Chalkis, were induced to return, by

the news that the Persian fleet had been nearly ruined by the recent

storm,—and that, on returning to Artemisium, the Grecian commanders

felt renewed alarm on seeing the enemy’s fleet, in spite of the

damage just sustained, still mustering in overwhelming number at the

opposite station of Aphetæ. Such was the effect of this spectacle,

and the impression of their own inferiority, that they again resolved

to retire without fighting, leaving the strait open and undefended.

Great consternation was caused by the news of their determination

among the inhabitants of Eubœa, who entreated Eurybiadês to maintain

his position for a few days, until they could have time to remove

their families and their property. But even such postponement was

thought unsafe, and refused: and he was on the point of giving

orders for retreat, when the Eubœans sent their envoy, Pelagon,

to Themistoklês, with the offer of thirty talents, on condition

that the fleet should keep its station and hazard an engagement in

defence of the island. Themistoklês employed the money adroitly and

successfully, giving five talents to Eurybiadês, with large presents

besides to the other leading chiefs: the most unmanageable among them

was the Corinthian Adeimantus,—who at first threatened to depart with

his own squadron alone, if the remaining Greeks were mad enough to

remain. His alarm was silenced, if not tranquillized, by a present of

three talents.[186]

[186] Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 7; Herodot. viii, 5, 6.

However Plutarch may be scandalized at such inglorious revelations

preserved to us by Herodotus respecting the underhand agencies of

this memorable struggle, there is no reason to call in question

the bribery here described. But Themistoklês doubtless was only

tempted to do, and enabled to do, by means of the Eubœan money,

that which he would have wished and had probably tried to accomplish

without the money,—to bring on a naval engagement at Artemisium.

It was absolutely essential to the maintenance of Thermopylæ, and

to the general plan of defence, that the Eubœan strait should be

defended against the Persian fleet, nor could the Greeks expect a

more favorable position to fight in. We may reasonably presume that

Themistoklês, distinguished not less by daring than by sagacity, and

the great originator of maritime energies in his country, concurred

unwillingly in the projected abandonment of Artemisium: but his high

mental capacity did not exclude that pecuniary corruption which

rendered the presents of the Eubœans both admissible and welcome,—yet

still more welcome to him perhaps, as they supplied means of bringing

over the other opposing chiefs and the Spartan admiral.[187] It

was finally determined, therefore, to remain, and if necessary, to

hazard an engagement in the Eubœan strait: but at any rate to procure

for the inhabitants of the island a short interval to remove their

families. Had these Eubœans heeded the oracles, says Herodotus,[188]

they would have packed up and removed long before: for a text of

Bakis gave them express warning: but, having neglected the sacred

writings as unworthy of credit, they were now severely punished for

such presumption.

[187] The expression of Herodotus is somewhat remarkable:

Οὗτοί τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι (Eurybiadês, Adeimantus, etc.),

ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν, καὶ τοῖσι Εὐβοέεσι ἐκεχάριστο· αὐτός τε ὁ

Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδῃνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων.

[188] Herodot. viii, 20. Οἱ γὰρ Εὐβοέες παραχρησάμενοι τὸν

Βάκιδος χρησμὸν ὡς οὐδὲν λέγοντα, οὔτε τι ἐξεκομίσαντο οὐδὲν,

οὔτε προεσάξαντο, ὡς παρεσομένου σφι πολέμου· περιπετέα δὲ

ἐποιήσαντο σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τὰ πρήγματα. Βάκιδι γὰρ ὧδε ἔχει περὶ

τούτων ὁ χρησμός·

Φράζεο, βαρβαρόφωνον ὅταν ζυγὸν εἰς ἅλα βάλλῃ

Βύβλινον, Εὐβοίης ἀπέχειν πολυμηκάδας αἶγας.

Τούτοισι δὲ οὐδὲν τοῖσι ἔπεσι χρησαμένοισι ἐν τοῖσι τότε παρεοῦσί

τε καὶ προσδοκίμοισι κακοῖσι, παρῆν σφι συμφορῇ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ

μέγιστα.

Among the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, on the other hand, the feeling

prevalent was one of sanguine hope and confidence in their superior

numbers, forming a strong contrast with the discouragement of the

Greeks at Artemisium. Had they attacked the latter immediately, when

both fleets first saw each other from their opposite stations, they

would have gained an easy victory, for the fleet would have fled,

as the admiral was on the point of ordering, even without an attack.

But this was not sufficient for the Persians, who wished to cut off

every ship among their enemies even from flight and escape.[189]

Accordingly, they detached two hundred ships to circumnavigate the

island of Eubœa, and to sail up the Eubœan strait from the south,

in the rear of the Greeks,—and postponing their own attack in front

until this squadron should be in position to intercept the retreating

Greeks. But though the manœuvre was concealed by sending the squadron

round outside of the island of Skiathos, it became known immediately

among the Greeks, through a deserter,—Skyllias of Skionê. This man,

the best swimmer and diver of his time, and now engaged like other

Thracian Greeks in the Persian service, passed over to Artemisium,

and communicated to the Greek commanders both the particulars of

the late destructive storm, and the despatch of the intercepting

squadron.[190]

[189] Herodot. viii, 6. καὶ ἔμελλον δῆθεν ἐκφεύξεσθαι (οἱ

Ἕλληνες)· ἔδει δὲ μηδὲ πυρφόρον, τῷ ἐκείνων (Περσῶν) λόγῳ,

περιγενέσθαι.

[190] Herodot. viii, 7, 8. Wonderful stories were recounted

respecting the prowess of Skyllias as a diver.

It appears that his communications, respecting the effects of the

storm and the condition of the Persian fleet, somewhat reassured the

Greeks, who resolved during the ensuing night to sail from their

station at Artemisium for the purpose of surprising the detached

squadron of two hundred ships, and who even became bold enough, under

the inspirations of Themistoklês, to go out and offer battle to

the main fleet near Aphetæ.[191] Wanting to acquire some practical

experience, which neither leaders nor soldiers as yet possessed,

of the manner in which Phœnicians and others in the Persian fleet

handled and manœuvred their ships, they waited till a late hour of

the afternoon, when little daylight remained.[192] Their boldness in

thus advancing out, with inferior numbers and even inferior ships,

astonished the Persian admirals, and distressed the Ionians and other

subject Greeks who were serving them as unwilling auxiliaries:

to both it seemed that the victory of the Persian fleet, which

was speedily brought forth to battle, and was numerous enough to

encompass the Greeks, would be certain as well as complete. The Greek

ships were at first marshalled in a circle, with the sterns in the

interior, and presenting their prows in front at all points of the

circumference;[193] in this position, compressed into a narrow space,

they seemed to be awaiting the attack of the enemy, who formed a

larger circle around them: but on a second signal given, their ships

assumed the aggressive, rowed out from the inner circle in direct

impact against the hostile ships around, and took or disabled no less

than thirty of them: in one of which Philaon, brother of Gorgus,

despot of Salamis in Cyprus, was made prisoner. Such unexpected

forwardness at first disconcerted the Persians, who however rallied

and inflicted considerable damage and loss on the Greeks: but the

near approach of night put an end to the combat, and each fleet

retired to its former station,—the Persians to Aphetæ, the Greeks to

Artemisium.[194]

[191] Diodorus, xi, 12.

[192] Herodot. viii, 9. δείλην ὀψίην γινομένην τῆς ἡμέρης

φυλάξαντες, αὐτοὶ ἐπανέπλωον ἐπὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀπόπειραν αὐτῶν

ποιήσασθαι βουλόμενοι τῆς τε μάχης καὶ τοῦ διεκπλόου.

[193] Compare the description in Thucyd. ii, 84, of the naval

battle between the Athenian fleet under Phormio and the

Lacedæmonian fleet, where the ships of the latter are marshalled

in this same array.

[194] Herodot. viii, 11. πολλὸν παρὰ δόξαν

ἀγωνισάμενοι—ἑτεραλκέως ἀγωνιζομένους, etc.

The result of this first day’s combat, though indecisive in itself,

surprised both parties and did much to exalt the confidence of the

Greeks. But the events of the ensuing night did yet more. Another

tremendous storm was sent by the gods to aid them. Though it was the

middle of summer,—a season when rain rarely falls in the climate of

Greece,—the most violent wind, rain, and thunder, prevailed during

the whole night, blowing right on shore against the Persians at

Aphetæ, and thus but little troublesome to the Greeks on the opposite

side of the strait. The seamen of the Persian fleet, scarcely

recovered from the former storm at Sêpias Aktê, were almost driven

to despair by this repetition of the same peril: the more so when

they found the prows of their ships surrounded, and the play of

their oars impeded, by the dead bodies and the spars from the recent

battle, which the current drove towards their shore. If this storm

was injurious to the main fleet at Aphetæ, it proved the entire ruin

of the squadron detached to circumnavigate Eubœa, who, overtaken

by it near the dangerous eastern coast of that island, called the

Hollows of Eubœa, were driven upon the rocks and wrecked. The news

of this second conspiracy of the elements, or intervention of the

gods, against the schemes of the invaders, was highly encouraging

to the Greeks; and the seasonable arrival of fifty-three fresh

Athenian ships, who reinforced them the next day, raised them to a

still higher pitch of confidence. In the afternoon of the same day,

they sailed out against the Persian fleet at Aphetæ, and attacked

and destroyed some Kilikian ships even at their moorings; the fleet

having been too much damaged by the storm of the preceding night to

come out and fight.[195]

[195] Herodot. viii, 12, 13, 14; Diodor. xi, 12.

But the Persian admirals were not of a temper to endure such

insults,—still less to let their master hear of them. About noon

on the ensuing day, they sailed with their entire fleet near to

the Greek station at Artemisium, and formed themselves into a half

moon; while the Greeks kept near to the shore, so that they could

not be surrounded, nor could the Persians bring their entire fleet

into action; the ships running foul of each other, and not finding

space to attack. The battle raged fiercely all day, and with great

loss and damage on both sides: the Egyptians bore off the palm of

valor among the Persians, the Athenians among the Greeks. Though

the positive loss sustained by the Persians was by far the greater,

and though the Greeks, being near their own shore, became masters

of the dead bodies as well as of the disabled ships and floating

fragments,—still, they were themselves hurt and crippled in greater

proportion with reference to their inferior total: and the Athenian

vessels especially, foremost in the preceding combat, found one half

of their number out of condition to renew it.[196] The Egyptians

alone had captured five Grecian ships with their entire crews.

[196] Herodot. viii, 17, 18.

Under these circumstances, the Greek leaders,—and Themistoklês, as

it seems, among them,—determined that they could no longer venture

to hold the position of Artemisium, but must withdraw the naval

force farther into Greece:[197] though this was in fact a surrender

of the pass of Thermopylæ, and though the removal which the Eubœans

were hastening was still unfinished. These unfortunate men were

forced to be satisfied with the promise of Themistoklês to give

them convoy for their boats and their persons; abandoning their

sheep and cattle for the consumption of the fleet, as better than

leaving them to become booty for the enemy. While the Greeks were

thus employed in organizing their retreat, they received news which

rendered retreat doubly necessary. The Athenian Abrônychus, stationed

with his ship near Thermopylæ, in order to keep up communication

between the army and fleet, brought the disastrous intelligence

that Xerxes was already master of the pass, and that the division

of Leonidas was either destroyed or in flight. Upon this the fleet

abandoned Artemisium forthwith, and sailed up the Eubœan strait; the

Corinthian ships in the van, the Athenians bringing up the rear.

Themistoklês, conducting the latter, stayed long enough at the

various watering-stations and landing-places to inscribe on some

neighboring stones invitations to the Ionian contingents serving

under Xerxes: whereby the latter were conjured not to serve against

their fathers, but to desert, if possible,—or at least, to fight as

little and as backwardly as they could. Themistoklês hoped by this

stratagem perhaps to detach some of the Ionians from the Persian

side, or, at any rate, to render them objects of mistrust, and thus

to diminish their efficiency.[198] With no longer delay than was

requisite for such inscriptions, he followed the remaining fleet,

which sailed round the coast of Attica, not stopping until it reached

the island of Salamis.

[197] Herodot. viii, 18. δρησμὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

[198] Herodot. viii, 19, 21, 22; Plutarch, Themistoklês, c. 9.

The news of the retreat of the Greek fleet was speedily conveyed

by a citizen of Histiæa to the Persians at Aphetæ, who at first

disbelieved it, and detained the messenger until they had sent to

ascertain the fact. On the next day, their fleet passed across to

the north of Eubœa, and became master of Histiæa and the neighboring

territory: from whence many of them, by permission and even

invitation of Xerxes, crossed over to Thermopylæ to survey the

field of battle and the dead. Respecting the number of the dead,

Xerxes is asserted to have deliberately imposed upon the spectators:

he buried all his own dead, except one thousand, whose bodies were

left out,—while the total number of Greeks who had perished at

Thermopylæ, four thousand in number, were all left exposed, and

in one heap, so as to create an impression that their loss had

been much more severe than their own. Moreover, the bodies of the

slain Helots were included in the heap, all of them passing for

Spartans or Thespians in the estimation of the spectators. We are

not surprised to hear, however, that this trick, gross and public

as it must have been, really deceived very few.[199] According to

the statement of Herodotus, twenty thousand men were slain on the

side of the Persians,—no unreasonable estimate, if we consider that

they wore little defensive armor, and that they were three days

fighting. The number of Grecian dead bodies is stated by the same

historian as four thousand: if this be correct, it must include a

considerable proportion of Helots, since there were no hoplites

present on the last day except the three hundred Spartans, the seven

hundred Thespians, and the four hundred Thebans. Some hoplites were

of course slain in the first two days’ battles, though apparently

not many. The number who originally came to the defence of the pass

seems to have been about seven thousand:[200] but the epigram,

composed shortly afterwards, and inscribed on the spot by order of

the Amphiktyonic assembly, transmitted to posterity the formal boast

that four thousand warriors “from Peloponnesus had here fought with

three hundred myriads or three million of enemies.”[201] Respecting

this alleged Persian total, some remarks have already been made: the

statement of four thousand warriors from Peloponnesus, must indicate

all those who originally marched out of that peninsula under

Leonidas. Yet the Amphiktyonic assembly, when they furnished words

to record this memorable exploit, ought not to have immortalized the

Peloponnesians apart from their extra-Peloponnesian comrades, of

merit fully equal,—especially the Thespians, who exhibited the same

heroic self-devotion as Leonidas and his Spartans, without having

been prepared for it by the same elaborate and iron discipline.

While this inscription was intended as a general commemoration of

the exploit, there was another near it, alike simple and impressive,

destined for the Spartan dead separately: “Stranger, tell the

Lacedæmonians, that we lie here, in obedience to their orders.” On

the hillock within the pass, where this devoted band received their

death-wounds, a monument was erected, with a marble lion in honor

of Leonidas; decorated, apparently, with an epigram by the poet

Simonides. That distinguished genius composed at least one ode, of

which nothing but a splendid fragment now remains, to celebrate the

glories of Thermopylæ; besides several epigrams, one of which was

consecrated to the prophet Megistias, “who, though well aware of the

fate coming upon him, would not desert the Spartan chiefs.”

[199] Herodot. viii, 24, 25. οὐ μὴν οὐδ’ ἐλάνθανε τοὺς

διαβεβηκότας Ξέρξης ταῦτα πρήξας περὶ τοὺς νεκροὺς τοὺς ἑωϋτοῦ·

καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ γελοῖον ἦν, etc.

[200] About the numbers of the Greeks at Thermopylæ, compare

Herodot. vii, 202; Diodorus, xi, 4; Pausanias, x, 20, 1; and

Manso’s Sparta, vol. ii, p. 308; Beylage 24th.

Isokratês talks about one thousand Spartans, with a few allies,

Panegyric, Or. iv, p. 59. He mentions also only sixty Athenian

ships of war at Artemisium: in fact, his numerical statements

deserve little attention.

[201] Herodot. vii, 228.