equity.” To have in various instances an original and exclusive, in others
a concurrent jurisdiction, and the supreme court in many cases an
appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact. It provides, indeed, that
the trial for crimes shall be by jury, but has left the trial in civil
matters to the mercy of construction and their own legislative sovereign
will and pleasure.
By the 3d art., 3d sec., “The Congress shall have power to declare the
punishment of treason, but no attainder shall work a corruption of blood
or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.” By 1st
art., 9th sec., 3d clause, “No bill of attainder or ex post facto law
shall be passed.”
XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXIII, XL.
The 17th orders “That the supreme executive power and authority of this
State shall be vested in a governor.” By the 18th he is commander-in-chief
of the militia and admiral of the navy of the State; may grant pardons to
all persons convicted of crimes; he may suspend the execution of the
sentence in treason or murder.
By the 19th paragraph he is to see that the laws and resolutions of the
legislature be faithfully executed.
By the 27th he is president of the council of appointment, and has a
casting vote and the commissioning of all officers.
The 20th and 21st paragraphs give the lieutenant-governor, on the death,
resignation, removal from office, or impeachment of the governor, all the
powers of a governor.
The 40th paragraph orders that the militia at all times, both in peace and
war, shall be armed and disciplined, and kept in readiness; in what manner
the Quakers shall be excused; and that a magazine of warlike stores be
forever kept at the expence of the State, and by act of the legislature,
established, maintained, and continued in every county in the State.
Whoever considers the following powers vested in the government, and
compares them with the above, must readily perceive they are either all
enervated or annihilated.
By the 1st art., 8th sec., 15th, 16th and 17th clauses, Congress will be
empowered to call forth the militia to execute the laws of the union,
suppress insurrections and repel invasions; to provide for organizing,
arming and disciplining the militia, for the governing such part of them
as may be employed in the service of the United States, and for the
erection of forts, magazines, etc.
And by the 2nd art., 2d sec., “The president shall be commander-in-chief
of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
several States when called into actual service of the United States,
except in cases of impeachment.”
And by the 6th art., “The members of the several state legislatures, and
all the executive and judicial officers; both of the United States, and of
the several states, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support the
constitution.” Can this oath be taken by those who have already taken one
under the constitution of this state?
XVIII, SEC. 17; XIX, SEC. 17; XX SEC. 17; XXI, SEC. 17; XXIII, SEC. 17;
XXII TO XXX INCLUSIVE.
These paragraphs regulate the election, appointment, construction and
duration of all the state, county and district officers, including the
delegates to Congress, and how they severally are to be created and
commissioned.
The 22d directs that the treasurer shall be appointed by act of the
legislature to originate with the assembly. The 23d establishes a council
to appoint the officers.
The 24th directs that the military officers shall be, during the pleasure
of the council, the chancellor, judges of the supreme court, the first
judge in every county until the age of 60.
Twenty-five and 28, which offices are incompatible, and the tenure and
duration of such officers.
Twenty-six, that sheriffs and coroners be annually appointed, and shall
not continue more than four years.
Twenty-seven, that the officers of the court be appointed by the
respective courts, except the attorneys, by the first judge of every
court.
Twenty-nine, provides that town clerks, supervisors, assessors, constables
and collectors, and all other officers heretofore elegible by the people,
shall always continue to be so elegible.
Thirty, directs the mode how the delegates to represent this state in the
general Congress of the United States shall be elected.
I apprehend that the paragraphs aforesaid will be compleatly rendered
unoperative by the following articles in the new constitution:
Second article, second section, second clause, the president “shall have
power, and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint
embassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the supreme
court, and all officers of the United States where appointments are not
herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law; but
the Congress may by law vest the power of such inferior officers as they
think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the
heads of departments.” By the 1st art., 8 section, 9, 18 clauses, Congress
have power “to constitute tribunals inferior to the supreme court, to make
all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in
the government of the United States, or in any department or officer
thereof.”
By the third article, 2d section, there is an extensive federal power as
above-mentioned.
By the 2d article, 2d section, the president “shall take care that the
laws be faithfully executed, and shall commission all the officers of the
United States.”
From these powers lodged in Congress and the powers vested in the states,
it is clear that there must be a government within a government, two
legislative, executive and judicial powers. The power of raising an army
in time of peace, and to command the militia, will give the president
ample means to enforce the Supreme laws of the land.
XXIII, SEC. 21; XXIV, SEC. 21; XXV, SEC. 21; XXVI, SEC. 21; XXVII, SEC.
21; XXVIII, SEC. 21; XXIX, SEC. 21; XXX, SEC. 21; XXXI, SEC. 2; XXXII,
XXXIII, XXXIV.
The 32d paragraph orders, “That a court shall be instituted for the trial
of impeachments and the correction of errors under the regulations which
shall be established by the legislature, and to consist of the president
of the senate for the time being, and the senators, chancellors and judges
of the supreme court.”
The 33d vests the power of impeaching all officers of the state for mal
and corrupt practice in the representatives of the people in assembly.
The 34th allows the parties impeached or indicted for crimes and
misdemeanors to have counsel.
This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 6th and 7th
clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have the trial and
judgment on all impeachments.
By 3d art., 2d sec, 3d clause, the trial of all crimes is regulated.
By the 3d art., 3d sec., it is defined what shall be treason, the proof
required, the punishment, and how the judgment in attainder shall operate.
XXXIII, SEC. 32; XXXIV, SEC. 32; XXXV, SEC. 13; XXXVII, SEC. 1; XXXVIII,
XXXIX.
The 38th paragraph provides “that the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious procession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever hereafter be allowed within this State to all mankind,
provided that the liberty of conscience hereby granted shall not excuse
acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or
safety of the State.”
The 39th provides that “no minister of the gospel, or priest of any
denomination whatsoever, shall at any time hereafter, under any pretence
or description whatever, be eligible to or capable of holding any civil or
military office or place within this state.”
The first of those articles protects us from persecution in religious
matters. The other excludes the clergy from enjoying any office, civil or
military. Two provisions passed by in silence by the framers of the new
constitution; and although possibly the leaders in both have been equally
averse to a democratic system, and have had the same object, the ruin of
state government, in view.
XLII.
This paragraph provides “that it shall be in the discretion of the
legislature to naturalize all such persons and in such manner as they
shall think proper.”
The 1st art., 8 sec., 4th clause, give to the new government power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization.
And by the 4th art., 2d sec., “the citizens of each state shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several
states,” whereby the clause is rendered entirely nugatory.
From this contrast it appears that the general government, when compleatly
organized, will absorb all those powers of the state which the framers of
its constitution had declared should be only exercised by the
representatives of the people of the state; that the burthens and expence
of supporting a state establishment will be perpetuated; but its
operations to ensure or contribute to any essential measures promotive of
the happiness of the people may be totally prostrated, the general
government arrogating to itself the right of interfering in the most
minute objects of internal police, and the most trifling domestic concerns
of every state, by possessing a power of passing laws “to provide for the
general welfare of the United States,” which may affect life, liberty and
property in every modification they may think expedient, unchecked by
cautionary reservations, and unrestrained by a declaration of any of those
rights which the wisdom and prudence of America in the year 1776 held
ought to be at all events protected from violation.
In a word, the new constitution will prove finally to dissolve all the
power of the several state legislatures, and destroy the rights and
liberties of the people; for the power of the first will be all in all,
and of the latter a mere shadow and form without substance, and if adopted
we may (in imitation of the Carthagenians) say, Delenda vit Americæ.
SYDNEY.
CURSORY REMARKS BY HUGH HENRY BRACKENRIDGE.
Printed In
The American Museum,
April, 1788.
Note.
This article first appeared in _The Pittsburgh Gazette_, but as I have not
been able to find a file of that paper, I have been compelled to reprint
it from _The American Museum_. It was anonymous, but its authorship is
settled by its republication in Brackenridge’s “_Gazette Publications_,”
printed in book form in 1806.
Cursory Remarks.
The American Museum, (Number 4)
APRIL, 1788.
It is not my intention to enter largely into a consideration of this plan
of government, but to suggest some ideas in addition to, and of the same
nature with, those already made, showing the imperfections and the danger
of it.
The first thing that strikes a diligent observer, is the want of
precaution with regard to the _sex_ of the president. Is it provided that
he shall be of the male gender? The Salii, a tribe of the Burgundians, in
the 11th century, excluded females from the sovereignty. Without a similar
exclusion, what shall we think, if, in progress of time, we should come to
have an _old woman_ at the head of our affairs? But what security have we
that he shall be a _white man_? What would be the national disgrace if he
should be elected from one of the southern states, and a _vile negro_
should come to rule over us? Treaties would then be formed with the tribes
of Congo and Loango, instead of the civilized nations of Europe. But is
there any security that he shall be a _freeman_? Who knows but the
electors at a future period, in days of corruption, may pick up a
man-servant, a convict perhaps, and give him the dominion? Is any care
taken that he shall be of _perfect parts_? Shall we, in affairs of a civil
nature, leave a door open to lame men, bastards, eunuchs, and the devil
knows what?
A senate is the next great constituent part of the government; and yet
there is not a word said with regard to the ancestry of any of them;
whether they should be altogether Irish, or only Scots Irish. If any of
them have been in the war of the White Boys, the Heart of Oak, or the
like, they may overturn all authority, and make Shilelah the supreme law
of the land.
The house of representatives is to be so large, that it can never be
built. They may begin it, but it can never be finished. Ten miles square!
Babylon itself, unless the suburbs are taken into view, was not of greater
extent.
But what avails it to dwell on these things? The want of a _bill of
rights_ is the great evil. There was no occasion for a bill of _wrongs_;
for there will be wrongs enough. But oh! a _bill of rights_! What is the
nature of a bill of rights? “It is a schedule or inventory of those powers
which Congress do not possess.” But if it is clearly ascertained what
powers they have, what need of a catalogue of those powers they have not?
Ah! there is the mistake. A minister preaching, undertook, first, to show
what was in his text; second, what was not in it. When it is specified
what powers are given, why not also what powers are not given? A bill of
rights is wanting, and all those things which are usually secured under
it—
1. The _rights of conscience_ are swept away. The Confession of Faith, the
Prayer-Book, the Manual and Pilgrim’s Progress are to go. The psalms of
Watts, I am told, are the only thing of the kind that is to have any
quarter at all.
2. The _liberty of the press_—that is gone at the first stroke. Not so
much as an advertisement for a stray horse, or a runaway negro, can be put
in any of the gazettes.
3. The _trial by jury_—that is knocked in the head, and all that worthy
class of men, the lawyers, who live by haranguing and bending the juries,
are demolished.
I would submit it to any candid man, if in this constitution there is the
least provision for the privilege of shaving the beard? or is there any
mode laid down to take the measure of a pair of breeches? Whence is it
then, that men of learning seem so much to approve, while the ignorant are
against it? The cause is perfectly apparent, viz., that reason is an
erring guide, while instinct, which is the governing principle of the
untaught, is certain. Put a pig in a poke, carry it half a day’s journey
through woods and by-ways, let it out, and it will run home without
deviation. Could Dr. Franklin do this? What reason have we then to suppose
that his judgment, or that of Washington, could be equal to that of Mr.
Smilie(55) in state affairs?
Were it not on this principle that we are able to account for it, it might
be thought strange that old Livingston,(56) of the Jersies, could be so
hoodwinked as to give his sanction to such a diabolical scheme of tyranny
amongst men—a constitution which may well be called hell-born. For if all
the devils in Pandemonium had been employed about it, they could not have
made a worse.
Neil MacLaughlin, a neighbor of mine, who has been talking with Mr.
Findley, says that under this constitution all weavers are to be put to
death. What have these innocent manufacturers done that they should be
proscribed?
Let other states think what they will of it, there is one reason why every
Pennsylvanian should execrate this imposition upon mankind. It will make
his state most probably the seat of government, and bring all the
officers, and cause a great part of the revenue to be expended here. This
must make the people rich, enable them to pay their debts, and corrupt
their morals. Any citizen, therefore, on the Delaware and Susquehannah
waters, ought to be hanged and quartered, that would give it countenance.
I shall content myself at present with these strictures, but shall
continue them from time to time as occasion may require.
LETTER OF CAUTION, WRITTEN BY SAMUEL CHASE.
Printed In
THE MARYLAND JOURNAL,
October, 1788.
Note.
The authorship of this essay is fixed upon Chase by a letter of Daniel
Carroll, who in writing to Madison, alludes to both this, and his reply,
printed _post_. Chase was the leader of the Anti-Federalists in Maryland,
but was at first compelled by popular feeling to temporize, as is shown by
the following extracts, taken from the Maryland Journal for September 28,
1787:
The following is the conclusion of the speech of Samuel Chase,
Esq., delivered this day, at the Court House, before a numerous
and respectable body of citizens.
(Published by request of many electors of Baltimore Town.)
The Constitution proposed by the late Convention, for the United
States, will alter, and in some instances, abolish our Bill of
Rights and Form of Government. The Legislature of this State have
no right to alter our Form of Government, but in the mode
prescribed by the Constitution. The only question for the General
Assembly to determine is this, whether they will recommend to the
people to elect delegates to meet in convention, to consider and
decide on the plan proposed. I have always maintained the Union,
and the increase of powers in Congress. I think the Federal
Government must be greatly altered. I have not formed my opinion,
whether the plan proposed ought to be accepted as it stands,
without any amendment or alteration. The subject is very
momentous, and involves the greatest consequences. If elected, I
will vote for, and use my endeavours to procure a recommendation
by the Legislature to call a convention, as soon as it can
conveniently be done, unless otherways directed by this town.
_September 26, 1787._
Having been informed that my engagements of yesterday, to the
meeting at the Court House, “to vote for, and use my endeavours to
procure a recommendation by the Legislature, to call a convention
as soon as it can conveniently be done,” is not understood; from a
desire, if possible, to remove all misunderstanding, I take the
liberty to declare, that by the promise I meant to engage, and
therefore do promise, if elected, that I will use my endeavours to
procure, at the next session of Assembly, and as soon in the
session as the necessary business of the State will permit, a
recommendation by the General Assembly to call a convention, to
consider and decide on the Constitution proposed by the late
Convention for the United States, and to appoint the election of
delegates to the Convention as soon as the convenience of the
people will permit. I further beg leave to add as my opinion, that
the election of delegates to the Convention ought to be as early
in the spring as may be.
SAMUEL CHASE.
_Baltimore, September 27, 1787._
There are attacks on Chase, by “Steady” in the _Maryland Journal_ of
September 28, 1787, and by “Spectator,” in the _Maryland Journal_ of
October 9, 1787.
Caution.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 976)
FRIDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1787.
TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN,
An attempt to _surprise_ you into any _public_ measure, ought to meet your
indignation and contempt. When violence or cunning is substituted for
argument and reason, suspicion should take the alarm, and prudence should
dictate the propriety of deliberation. Questions of consequence in private
life ought not to be _hastily_ decided, and with greater reason,
determinations that involve the future felicity of a whole people, ought
not to be taken before the most mature and deliberate consideration, and a
free and full examination of the subject and all its consequences. These
reflections occurred on being informed that some gentlemen of this Town
employ themselves in carrying about and soliciting subscribers to a
petition, addressed to the General Assembly, requesting them to call a
Convention to ratify the new system of government, proposed for the United
States by the late Convention at Philadelphia. If this petition contained
no more, it would not have been worthy of notice; but it publishes to the
world your entire approbation of the New Federal Government, and your
desire that it should be adopted and confirmed by this State, as it
stands, _without any amendment or alteration_.
The ostensible cause for offering you the petition to sign is, that you
may express your sentiments to the legislature, that they ought to call a
Convention to ratify the new form of government for the United States; but
the real design of the promoters of the petition is to draw you into a
declaration in favour of the _whole_ system, and to bind you hereafter to
support it, which you must do, or allege deception and surprise, if, on
further reflection, you should discover that you rashly gave an opinion
against your real interests. If the _real_ intention of the promoters and
carriers of this petition was _only_ to obtain your opinion in favour of
calling a Convention, it might have been expressed in a _few_ lines; and
no one would oppose such a petition, although improper and unnecessary,
because your Delegates will certainly move for, and exert themselves to
procure, the calling a Convention; and no member of the General Assembly
will deny that, in so doing, your Delegates speak your sentiments.
In my opinion, it is not necessary or proper for you, _at this time_, to
express your approbation, or disapprobation, of the new constitution for
the United States, for the following reasons:
First—because the decision, _for_ or _against_ the plan, is of the
greatest consequence, as it involves no less than the happiness or misery
of you and all your posterity forever; and therefore, I think, requires
your dispassionate and most deliberate consideration. Secondly—because you
want information, and have not had time yourselves to examine the proposed
system, and to consider the consequences that may flow from rejecting or
adopting it. Thirdly—because time is not given for your countrymen in
this, and the other States, to consider the subject, and to lay their
sentiments and reasons for or against the measure before you.
Fourthly—because you ought to hear _both_ sides, as the man who determines
on hearing one part only, will almost always be mistaken in his judgment.
He may be in the right, but it will be by _chance_ and not by _reason_.
Fifthly—because you are not pressed in point of time to determine on the
subject; you have at least three months for deliberation; to decide,
therefore, in a few days will be rashness and folly. Sixthly—when men urge
you to determine in _haste_, on so momentous a subject, it is not
_unreasonable_ to require their motives; and it is not _uncharitable_ to
suspect that they are improper; and no possible mischief or inconvenience
can happen from delay.
_October 11, 1787._
CAUTION.
LETTER OF A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION, WRITTEN BY DANIEL CARROLL.
Printed In
The Maryland Journal,
October, 1787.
Note.
Daniel Carroll wrote Madison that he had replied to Chase’s “Caution,” and
as this is the only direct reply to that article I have been able to find,
I have ventured to ascribe this to him. The letter is in the Madison
Papers in the Department of State, which at present are restricted from
use, so I am unable to print it here.
A Friend To The Constitution.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 977)
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 1787.
TO THE INHABITANTS OF BALTIMORE TOWN.
You have been addressed in the last Friday’s paper, by a writer under the
signature of _Caution_, who would persuade you that you ought to withhold
your approbation, at this time, from the Federal Constitution recommended
by the Convention.
This writer may have the best intentions in the world towards the _public
welfare_, and the _prosperity of Baltimore_; but every one must perceive
that he is an enemy to the proposed Constitution, and wishes to prevent
you from expressing yourselves in its favour, not only _at this time_, but
at any _future time_.
Mr. C—— is said to be the author of this admonition; but that this is a
malicious insinuation, aimed at his sincerity, will appear by considering
his _recent promise_ on this subject, signed and published by himself, in
reference with the resolution of the Convention, upon which that promise
is founded. I shall state both the resolution and promise, that you may
judge for yourselves.
The resolve of the Convention declares, that the Constitution should be
submitted to a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the
people, under the recommendation of its legislature, _for their assent and
ratification_.
Mr. C—— being called upon, before his election, to declare himself on this
point, promises to the people, “that he will use his endeavours, if
elected, to call a Convention.”
I would just observe on this resolve and promise: First—that the resolve
makes it an _absolute condition_ that the legislature recommend a
Convention _to assent to, and ratify, the Constitution_. Secondly—that the
_promise_ made by Mr. C—— is obligatory upon him, to use his endeavors to
procure a Convention _for this purpose_.
Another remark, which occurs on this occasion, is, that Mr. C—— could not
mean that a Convention ought to be called _for any other purpose_ than to
assent to, and ratify, the Constitution; for it is absurd to suppose he
meant the Convention should be authorized by the legislature to propose
amendments or alterations, that being _contrary_ to the declared intention
of the resolution, and the sense which his friends entertained of his
engagement at the time he entered into it. Mr. C——, therefore (without
presuming him capable of doing the greatest violence to his promise),
cannot be considered as the _author of Caution_, who argues strenuously,
though indirectly, _against adopting the Constitution_.
From this brief view of the nature and intention of the resolve, I think
it is evident that the people ought, _without delay_, to signify their
approbation of the Constitution by _a petition to the legislature_, to the
end that the legislature, which is called upon by the Convention and
Congress to recommend to the people to choose Delegates to ratify it, may
have the _authority of the largest and most promising commercial and
manufacturing Town in the State_ to countenance so _important a
recommendation_. But _Caution_ thinks a petition _improper_ and
_unnecessary_; because, says he, “your Delegates will move for, and exert
themselves to procure, the calling a Convention.” Admitting your Delegates
to move to have a Convention called, does it follow that they will add to
their motion these _essential words, to confirm and ratify the
Constitution_? Does it not rather appear, from the tenor of this writer’s
remarks, that your Delegates ought to leave these words out of their
motion? But the _propriety_ and _necessity_ of a petition does not depend
on what your Delegates may, or may not do. It is _proper_ at this time,
because the Constitution meets your approbation. It is _necessary_ at this
time, because wanted as an inducement to the legislature to call upon the
people to appoint a Convention to carry into effect the object of the
resolution. In other words, as the recommendation for a Convention
_involves the legislature in a complete approbation of the Constitution_,
there is the greatest _propriety_ and _necessity_ for your telling the
legislature _that it meets your approbation_.
I am sorry to find, by _Caution’s_ publication and insinuations, which I
am told are circulated with great industry, that an opposition is opened
against the Constitution. I did not, I confess, expect to see it adopted
without some opposition; but I could not bring myself to believe, that
this opposition could have originated in Baltimore, which is _so
peculiarly interested in its speedy adoption_. But what I intended to say
on this point, is so well expressed in a late speech of Mr. Wilson, to the
people of Philadelphia, previous to their election for representatives,
that I shall take the liberty of closing with it.
“After all, my fellow-citizens, (says this excellent politician) it is
neither extraordinary nor unexpected, that the Constitution offered to
your consideration should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to
pursue his own interest in preference to the _public good_; and I do not
mean to make any personal reflection, when I add, that it is _the interest
of a very numerous, powerful and respectable body to counteract and
destroy the excellent work produced by the late Convention_. All the
offices of government, and all the appointments for the administration of
justice, and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred
from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the States, will
necessarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel.
_Every person, therefore, who either enjoys, or expects to enjoy, a place
of profit under the present establishment, will object to the proposed
innovations, not, in truth, because it is injurious to the liberties of
his country; but because it affects his schemes of wealth and
consequence._ I will confess, indeed, that I am not a blind admirer of
this plan of government, and _that there are some parts of it_, which, if
my wish had prevailed, would certainly have been altered. But, when I
reflect how widely men differ in their opinions, and that every man (and
the observation applies likewise to every state) has an equal pretension
to assert his own, I am satisfied that anything _nearer to perfection_
could not have been accomplished. If there are errors, _it should be
remembered_, that the seeds of reformation are sown in the work itself,
and the concurrence of two-thirds of the Congress may, at any time,
introduce _alterations and amendments_. Regarding it, then, in every point
of view, with a candid and disinterested mind, I am bold to assert, that
is the _best form of government which has ever been offered to the
world_.”
A FRIEND TO THE CONSTITUTION.
_Baltimore, October 13, 1787._
THE LETTERS OF LUTHER MARTIN.
Printed In
The Maryland Journal,
January-March, 1788.
Note.
Luther Martin, afterwards nick-named the “bull-dog of federalism,” was at
this time the leading Anti-federalist in Maryland. From his pen came the
pamphlet entitled _Genuine Information ... Relative to the Proceedings of
the General Convention_; and when the “Landholder,” (see _Ante_, page
135), attacked Elbridge Gerry, he began this series of articles in defense
of that gentleman, but eventually, by the replies, was compelled to
continue the series as a personal vindication. According to a letter of
Daniel Carrol, Daniel of St. Thomas Jenifer replied in the newspapers to
Martin, but I have not been able to identify this.
In the _New York Journal_ for June 17, 1788, is a comparison of the
constitution as agreed upon early in the convention, with that finally
framed, which was probably written by Martin.
Luther Martin, I.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1004)
FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788.
MR. WILLIAM GODDARD:
_Sir_,
As the Publication under the Signature of the Connecticut Landholder is
circulating remote from the place of Mr. Gerry’s residence, and is
calculated not only to injure the honourable gentleman in his private
character, but also to weaken the effect of his opposition to the
government proposed by the late convention, and thereby promote the
adoption of a System which I consider destructive of the rights and
liberties of the respective states and of their citizens, I beg leave,
through the channel of your Paper, to declare to the Public that from the
time I took my seat in convention, which was early in June, until the
fourth day of September, when I left Philadelphia, I am satisfied I was
not ten minutes absent from convention while sitting (excepting only five
days in the beginning of August, immediately after the committee of detail
had reported, during which but little business was done). That during my
attendance I never heard Mr. Gerry or any other member introduce a
proposition for the redemption of continental money according to its
nominal or any other value, nor did I ever hear that such a proposition
had been offered to consideration or had been thought of. I was intimate
with Mr. Gerry, and never heard him express, in private conversation or
otherwise, a wish for the redemption of continental money, or assign the
want of such a provision as a defect. Nor did I ever hear in Convention,
or anywhere else, such a motive of conduct attributed to Mr. Gerry. I also
declare to the Public that a considerable time before I left the
convention Mr. Gerry’s opposition to the System was warm and decided; that
in a particular manner he strenuously opposed that provision by which the
power and authority over the militia is taken away from the States and
given to the general government; that in the debate he declared if that
measure was adopted it would be the most convincing proof that the
destruction of the State governments and the introduction of a king was
designed, and that no declarations to the contrary ought to be credited,
since it was giving the states the last coup de grace by taking from them
the only means of self preservation. The conduct of the advocates and
framers of this system towards the thirteen States, in pretending that it
was designed for their advantage, and gradually obtaining power after
power to the general government, which could not but end in their slavery,
he compared to the conduct of a number of jockeys who had thirteen young
colts to break; they begin with the appearance of kindness, giving them a
lock of hay, or a handful of oats, and stroaking them while they eat,
until being rendered sufficiently gentle they suffer a halter to be put
round their necks; obtaining a further degree of their confidence, the
jockeys slip a curb bridle on their heads and the bit into their mouths,
after which the saddle follows of course, and well booted and spurred,
with good whips in their hands, they mount and ride them at their
pleasure, and although they may kick and flounce a little at first, nor
being able to get rid of their riders, they soon become as tame and
passive as their masters could wish them. In the course of public debate
in the convention Mr. Gerry applied to the system of government, as then
under discussion, the words of Pope with respect to vice, “that it was a
monster of such horrid mien, as to be hated need but to be seen.” And some
time before I left Philadelphia, he in the same public manner declared in
convention that he should consider himself a traitor to his country if he
did not oppose the system there, and also when he left the convention.
These, sir, are facts which I do not fear being contradicted by any member
of the convention, and will, I apprehend, satisfactorily shew that Mr.
Gerry’s opposition proceeded from a conviction in his own mind that the
government, if adopted, would terminate in the destruction of the States
and in the introduction of a kingly government.
I am, sir, your very obedient servant,
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, January 13, 1788._
Luther Martin, II.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1018)
FRIDAY, MARCH 7, 1788.
MR. GODDARD:
_Sir_,
In consequence of the justice I did Mr. Gerry, on a former occasion, I
find myself complimented with an Address in your last Paper. Whether the
Landholder of the Connecticut Courant, and of the Maryland Journal,(57) is
the same person, or different, is not very material; I however incline to
the former opinion, as I hope for the honour of human nature, it would be
difficult to find more than one individual who could be capable of so
total a disregard to the principles of truth and honour. After having made
the most unjust and illiberal attack on Mr. Gerry, and stigmatized him as
an enemy to his country, and the basest of mankind, for no other reason
than a firm and conscientious discharge of an important trust reposed in
that gentleman, had I not come in for a share of his censure, I confess I
should have been both disappointed and mortified. It would have had at
least the appearance, that the Landholder had discovered something in my
principles, which he considered congenial with his own. However great may
be my political sins, to be cursed with his approbation and applause,
would be a punishment much beyond their demerit. But, Sir, at present I
mean to confine myself to the original subject of controversy, the
injustice of the charges made against Mr. Gerry. That my veracity will not
be questioned when giving my negative to anonymous slander, I have the
fullest confidence. I have equal confidence that it will be as little
questioned by any who know me, even should the Landholder vouchsafe to
give the Public his name—a respectable name I am sure it cannot be. His
absolute want of truth and candour in assertions meant to injure the
reputation of individuals, whose names are given to the public, and to
hold them up to the indignation of their fellow citizens, will ever
justify this assertion, even should the name belong to one decorated with
wealth, or dignified by station. But the Landholder wishes it to be
supposed, that though my veracity should not be doubted, yet my evidence
ought to be rejected, and observes, that to comprehend what credit ought
to be given to it, by which I suppose he means its sufficiency if
credited, it ought to be known how long I was absent from Convention, as
well as the time I attended. I believe Sir, whoever will read my former
publication will in a moment perceive, that I there “stated” all the
“information” on this subject that was necessary or material, and that I
left no defect for the Landholder to supply. I there mentioned that “I
took my seat early in June, that I left Philadelphia on the fourth of
September, and during that period was not absent from the convention while
sitting, except only five days in the beginning of August, immediately
after the Committee of Detail had reported.” I did not state the precise
day of June when I took my seat—it was the ninth, not the tenth—a very
inconsiderable mistake of the Landholder. But between that day and the
fourth of September he says that I was absent ten days at Baltimore, and
as many at New York, and thereby insinuates that an absence of twenty days
from the Convention intervened during that period, in which time Mr. Gerry
might have made and failed in his motion concerning continental money. A
short state of facts is all that is necessary to shew the disingenuity of
the Landholder, and that it is very possible to convey a falsehood, or
something very much like it, almost in the words of truth. On the
twenty-fifth of July the Convention adjourned, to meet again on the sixth
of August. I embraced that opportunity to come to Baltimore, and left
Philadelphia on the twenty-seventh; I returned on the fourth of August,
and on the sixth attended the Convention, with such members as were in
town, at which time the Committee of Detail made their report, and many of
the members being yet absent, we adjourned to the next day. Mr. Gerry left
Philadelphia to go to New York the day before I left there to come to
Baltimore; he had not returned on Tuesday, the seventh of August, when I
set out for New York, from whence I returned and took my seat in
Convention on Monday, the thirteenth. It is true that from the
twenty-fifth of July to the thirteenth of August eighteen (not twenty)
days had elapsed, but on one of those days I attended, and on twelve of
them the Convention did not meet. I was, therefore, perfectly correct in
my original statement that from early in June to the fourth of September I
was absent but five days from the Convention while sitting, and in that
statement omitted no “necessary information.” It is also true that of
those eighteen days Mr. Gerry was absent twelve or thirteen, and that one
of those days when he was not absent was Sunday, on which day the
Convention did not meet. Thus, Sir, by relating facts as they really
occurred, we find the only time between early in June and the fourth of
September when such a motion could have been made by Mr. Gerry without my
being present is narrowed down to four, or at most five days, as I
originally stated it, although Landholder wishes it should be supposed
there were twenty days during that period when it might have taken place
without my knowledge, to wit, ten while I was at Baltimore, and as many
more while at New York. The Landholder also states that the Convention
commenced the fourteenth day of May, and that I did not take my seat till
the tenth day of June, by which, if he means anything, I presume he means
to insinuate that within that portion of time Mr. Gerry’s motion might
have been made and rejected. He is here, Sir, equally unfortunate and
disingenuous. Though the Convention was to have met by appointment on the
fourteenth of May, yet no material business was entered upon till on or
about the thirtieth of that month. It was on that day that the Convention,
having had certain propositions laid before them by the Honourable
Governor of Virginia, resolved to go into a consideration of these
propositions. In this fact I am confident I am not mistaken, as I state
the day not merely from my own recollection but from minutes which I
believe to be very correct, in my possession, of the information given by
the Honourable Mr. McHenry to the assembly. The truth is, Sir, that very
little progress had been made by the Convention before I arrived, and that
they had not been more than ten days, or about that time, seriously
engaged in business. The first thing I did after I took my seat was
carefully to examine the journals for information of what had already been
done or proposed. I was also furnished with notes of the debates which had
taken place, and can with truth say that I made myself “minutely informed”
of what had happened before that period. In the same manner, after my
return from New York, I consulted the journals (for we were permitted to
read them, although we were not always permitted to take copies). If the
motion attributed to Mr. Gerry had been made and rejected, either before I
first took my seat or while at New York, it would have there appeared, and
that no such motion was made and rejected during either of these periods I
appeal to the highest possible authority. I appeal to those very journals,
which ought to have been published, and which we are informed are placed
in the possession of our late Honourable President. But why, Sir, should I
appeal to these journals, or to any other authority? Let the Landholder
turn to his eighth number, addressed to the Honourable Mr. Gerry; let him
blush, unless incapable of that sensation, while he reads the following
passage: “Almost the whole time during the sitting of the Convention, and
until the Constitution had received its present form, no man was more
plausible and conciliating on every subject than Mr. Gerry,” &c. Thus
stood Mr. Gerry, till towards the close of the business he introduced a
motion respecting the redemption of paper money. The whole time of the
sitting of the Convention was not almost past. The Constitution had not
received its present form, nor was the business drawing towards a close,
until long after I took my seat in Convention. It is therefore proved by
the Landholder himself that Mr. Gerry did not make this motion at any time
before the ninth day of June. Nay more, in the paper now before me he
acknowledges that in his eighth number he meant (and surely no one ought
to know his meaning better than himself) to fix Mr. Gerry’s apostacy to a
period within the last thirteen days. Why then all this misrepresentation
of my absence at Baltimore and New York? Why the attempt to induce a
belief that the Convention had been engaged in business from the
fourteenth of May, and the insinuation that it might have happened in
those periods? And why the charge that in not stating those facts I had
withheld from the public information necessary to its forming a right
judgment of the credit which ought to be given to my evidence. But, Sir, I
am really at a loss which most to admire—the depravity of this writer’s
heart, or the weakness of his head. Is it possible he should not perceive
that the moment he fixes the time of Mr. Gerry’s motion to the last
thirteen days of the Convention, he proves incontestably the falsehood and
malice of his charges against that gentleman—for he has expressly stated
that this motion and the rejection it received was the cause, and the sole
cause, of his apostacy; that “before, there was nothing in the system, as
it now stands, to which he had any objection, but that afterwards he was
inspired with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole
system he had formerly praised;” whereas I have shown to the clearest
demonstration, that a considerable time before the last thirteen days, Mr.
Gerry had given the most decided opposition to the system. I have shown
this by recital of facts, which if credited, incontestibly prove it—facts
which, I again repeat, will never be contradicted by any member of the
Convention. I ground this assertion upon the fullest conviction that it is
impossible to find a single person in that number so wicked, as publicly
and deliberately to prostitute his name in support of falsehood, and at
the same time so weak as to do this when he must be sure of detection. But
the Landholder is willing to have it supposed that Mr. Gerry might have
made the motion in a “committee,” and that there it might have happened
without my knowledge; to such wretched subterfuges is he driven. This
evasion, however, will be equally unavailing. The business of the
committees were not of a secret nature, nor were they conducted in a
secret manner; I mean as to the members of the Convention. I am satisfied
that there was no committee while I was there, of whose proceedings I was
not at least “so minutely informed,” that an attempt of so extraordinary a
nature as that attributed to Mr. Gerry, and attended with such an
immediate and remarkable revolution in his conduct, could not have taken
place without my having heard something concerning it. The non-adoption of
a measure by a committee did not preclude its being proposed to the
Convention, and being there adopted. Can it be presumed that a question in
which Mr. Gerry is represented to have been so deeply interested, and by
the fate of which his conduct was entirely influenced, would for want of
success in a committee have been totally relinquished by him, without a
single effort to carry it in Convention! If any other proof is wanting, I
appeal again to the Landholder himself. In his eighth number he states
that the motion was rejected “by the Convention.” Let it be remembered
also, as I have before observed, in the paper now before me, he declares
it was his intention in that number to fix Mr. Gerry’s apostacy to a
period within the last thirteen days; and in the same number he observes
that Mr. Gerry’s resentment could only embarrass and delay the completion
of the business for a few days; all which equally militate against every
idea of the motion being made before he left Philadelphia, whether in
Committee or in Convention. The Landholder hath also asserted, that I have
“put into Mr. Gerry’s mouth, objections different from any thing his
letter to the legislature of his State contains, so that if my
representation is true, his must be false.” In this charge he is just as
well founded as in those I have already noticed. Mr. Gerry has more than
once published to the world, under the sanction of his name, that he
opposed the system from a firm persuasion that it would endanger the
liberties of America, and destroy the freedom of the States and their
citizens. Every word which I have stated as coming from his mouth, so far
from being inconsistent with those declarations, are perfectly
correspondent thereto and direct proofs of their truth. When the
Landholder informed us that Mr. Gerry was “face to face with his
colleagues in the Convention of Massachusetts,” why did he not, unless he
wished to mislead the public, also inform us for what purpose he was
there?
That it was only to answer questions; that might be proposed to him, not
himself to ask questions that he could not consistently interfere in any
manner in the debates, and that he was even prohibited an opportunity of
explaining such parts of his conduct as were censured in his presence? By
the anonymous publication alluded to by the Landholder, and inserted in
the note, Mr. Gerry’s colleagues are not called upon to acquit him: it
only declares “that he believes them to be men of too much honour to
assert that his reasons in Convention were totally different from those he
published;” and in this I presume he was not disappointed for the
Landholder otherwise would have published it with triumph; but if Mr.
Gerry, as it is insinuated, was only prevented by pride, from, in person,
requesting them to acquit him, it amounts to a proof of his consciousness
that, as men of honour, they could not have refused it, had he made the
request. No person who views the absurdities and inconsistencies of the
Landholder, can I think, have a very respectable opinion of his
understanding, but I who am not much prejudiced in his favour, could
scarcely have conceived him so superlatively weak as to expect to deceive
the public and obtain credit to himself by asking “if charges against Mr.
Gerry are not true why do not his colleagues contradict them?” and “why is
it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of your assertions?” If
these Gentlemen were to do Mr. Gerry that justice, he might as well
inquire “why is it we do not also see the verification of A, B, C and D
and so on to the last letter of the Conventional alphabet.” When the
Landholder in his eighth number addressed himself to Mr. Gerry he
introduces his charges by saying “you doubtless will recollect the
following state of facts; if you do not every member of the Convention
will attest them.” One member of the Convention has had firmness
sufficient to contradict them with his name, although he was well apprised
that he thereby exposed himself as a mark for the arrows of his political
adversaries, and as to some of them, he was not unacquainted with what
kind of men he had to deal. But of all the members who composed that body,
not one has yet stepped forward to make good the Landholder’s prediction;
nor has one been found to “attest” his statement of facts. Many reasons
may be assigned why the members of the Convention should not think
themselves under a moral obligations of involving themselves in
controversy by giving their names in vindication of Mr. Gerry; and I do
not believe any of those who signed the proposed Constitution would
consider themselves bound to do this by any political obligation: But,
Sir, I can hardly suppose that Mr. Gerry is so perfectly esteemed and
respected by every person who had a seat in that body, that not a single
individual could possibly be procured to give his sanction to the
Landholder’s charges, if it could be done with justice and as to myself, I
much question whether it would be easy to convince any person, who was
present at our information to the assembly,(58) that every one of my
honourable colleagues, (to each of whose merit I cordially subscribe,
though compelled to differ from them in political sentiments) would be
prevented by motives of personal delicacy to myself, from contradicting
the facts I have stated relative to Mr. Gerry, if it could be done
consistent with truth. If the Landholder was a member of the Convention,
to facilitate the adoption of a favourite system, or to gratify his
resentment against its opposers, he has originally invented and is now
labouring to support, charges the most unjust and ungenerous, contrary to
his own knowledge of facts. If he was not a member, he is acting the same
part, without any knowledge of the subject, and in this has the merit of
either following his own invention, of dealing out the information he
receives from some person of whom he is the wretched tool and dupe, at the
same time expressing himself with a decision, and making such professions
of being perfectly in every secret, as naturally tends, unless
contradicted, to deceive and delude the unsuspecting multitude. In one of
these predicaments the Landholder must stand, he is welcome to take his
choice, in either case he only wants to be known to be despised. Now sir,
let the Landholder come forward and give his name to the public. It is the
only thing necessary to finish his character, and to convince the world
that he is as dead to shame, as he is lost to truth and destitute of
honour. If I sir, can be instrumental in procuring him to disclose
himself; even in this I shall consider myself as rendering a service to my
country. I flatter myself for the dignity of human kind, there are few
such characters; but there is no situation in life, in which they may not
prove the bane and curse of society; they therefore ought to be known,
that they may be guarded against.
I am, sir, your very humble servant,
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, March 3, 1788._
Luther Martin, III.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1021)
TUESDAY, MARCH 18, 1788.
Number I.
TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.
To you my fellow citizens, I hold myself in a particular manner
accountable for every part of my conduct in the exercise of a trust
reposed in me by you, and should consider myself highly culpable if I was
to withhold from you any information in my possession, the knowledge of
which may be material to enable you to form a right judgment on questions
wherein the happiness of yourselves and your posterity are involved. Nor
shall I ever consider it an act of condescention when impeached in my
public conduct, or character, to vindicate myself at your bar, and to
submit myself to your decision. In conformity to these sentiments, which
have regulated my conduct since my return from the Convention, and which
will be the rule of my actions in the sequel, I shall at this time beg
your indulgence, while I make some observations on a publication which the
Landholder has done me the honour to address to me, in the Maryland
Journal of the 29th of February last. In my controversy with that writer,
on the subject of Mr. Gerry, I have already enabled you to decide, without
difficulty, on the credit which ought to be given to his most positive
assertions and should scarce think it worth my time to notice his charges
against myself, was it not for the opportunity it affords me of stating
certain facts and transactions, of which you ought to be informed, some of
which were undesignedly omitted by me when I had the honour of being
called before the House of Delegates. No “extreme modesty” on my part was
requisite to induce me to conceal the “sacrifice of resentments” against
Mr. Gerry, since no such sacrifice had ever been made, nor had any such
resentments ever existed. The principal opposition in sentiment between
Mr. Gerry and myself, was on the subject of representation; but even on
that subject, he was much more conceding than his colleagues, two of whom
obstinately persisted in voting against the equality of representation in
the senate, when the question was taken in Convention upon the adoption of
the conciliatory propositions, on the fate of which depended, I believe,
the continuance of the Convention. In many important questions we
perfectly harmonized in opinion, and where we differed, it never was
attended with warmth or animosity, nor did it in any respect interfere
with a friendly intercourse and interchange of attention and civilities.
We both opposed the extraordinary powers over the militia, given to the
general government. We were both against the re-eligibility of the
president. We both concurred in the attempt to prevent members of each
branch of the legislature from being appointable to offices, and in many
other instances, although the Landholder, with his usual regard to truth
and his usual imposing effrontery, tells me, that I “doubtless must
remember Mr. Gerry and myself never voted alike, except in the instances”
he has mentioned. As little foundation is there in his assertion, that I
“cautioned certain members to be on their guard against his wiles, for
that he and Mr. Mason held private meetings, where the plans were
concerted to aggrandize, at the expence of the small States, old
Massachusetts and the ancient dominion.” I need only state facts to refute
the assertion. Some time in the month of August, a number of members who
considered the system, as then under consideration and likely to be
adopted, extremely exceptionable, and of a tendency to destroy the rights
and liberties of the United States, thought it advisable to meet together
in the evenings, in order to have a communication of sentiments, and to
concert a plan of conventional opposition to, and amendment of that
system, so as, if possible, to render it less dangerous. Mr. Gerry was the
first who proposed this measure to me, and that before any meeting had
taken place, and wished we might assemble at my lodgings, but not having a
room convenient, we fixed upon another place. There Mr. Gerry and Mr.
Mason did hold meetings, but with them also met the Delegates from New
Jersey and Connecticut, a part of the Delegation from Delaware, an
honorable member from South Carolina, one other from Georgia, and myself.
These were the only “private meetings” that ever I knew or heard to be
held by Mr. Gerry and Mr. Mason, meetings at which I myself attended until
I left the Convention, and of which the sole object was not to aggrandize
the great at the expense of the small, but to protect and preserve, if
possible, the existence and essential rights of all the states, and the
liberty and freedom of their citizens. Thus, my fellow citizens, I am
obliged, unless I could accept the compliment at an expence of truth equal
to the Landholder’s, to give up all claim to being “placed beyond the
reach of ordinary panegyrick,” and to that “magnanimity” which he was so
solicitous to bestow upon me, that he has wandered [into] the regions of
falsehood to seek the occasion. When we find such disregard of truth, even
in the introduction, while only on the threshold, we may form judgment
what respect is to be paid to the information he shall give us of what
passed in the Convention when he “draws aside the veil,” a veil which was
interposed between our proceedings and the Public, in my opinion, for the
most dangerous of purposes, and which was never designed by the advocates
of the system to be drawn aside, or if it was, not till it should be too
late for any beneficial purpose, which as far as it is done, or pretended
to be done, on the present occasion, is only for the purpose of deception
and misrepresentation. It was on Saturday that I first took my seat. I
obtained that day a copy of the propositions that had been laid before the
Convention, and which were then the subject of discussion in a committee
of the whole. The Secretary was so polite as, at my request, to wait upon
me at the State House the next day (being Sunday), and there gave me an
opportunity of examining the journals and making myself acquainted with
the little that had been done before my arrival. I was not a little
surprised at the system brought forward, and was solicitous to learn the
reasons which had been assigned in its support; for this purpose the
journals could be of no service; I therefore conversed on the subject with
different members of the Convention, and was favoured with minutes of the
debates which had taken place before my arrival. I applied to history for
what lights it could afford me, and I procured everything the most
valuable I could find in Philadelphia on the subject of governments in
general, and on the American revolution and governments in particular. I
devoted my whole time and attention to the business in which we were
engaged, and made use of all the opportunities I had, and abilities I
possessed, conscientiously to decide what part I ought to adopt in the
discharge of that sacred duty I owed to my country, in the exercise of the
trust you had reposed in me. I attended the Convention many days without
taking any share in the debates, listening in silence to the eloquence of
others, and offering no other proof that I possessed the powers of speech,
than giving my yea or nay when a question was taken, and notwithstanding
my propensity to “endless garrulity,” should have been extremely happy if
I could have continued that line of conduct, without making a sacrifice of
your rights and political happiness. The committee of the whole house had
made but small progress, at the time I arrived, in the discussion of the
propositions which had been referred to them; they completed that
discussion, and made their report. The propositions of the minority were
then brought forward and rejected. The Convention had resumed the report
of the committee, and had employed some days in its consideration. Thirty
days, I believe, or more, had elapsed from my taking my seat before in the
language of the Landholder, I “opened in a speech which held during two
days.” Such, my fellow citizens, is the true state of the conduct I
pursued when I took my seat in Convention, and which the Landholder, to
whom falsehood appears more familiar than truth, with his usual
effrontery, has misrepresented by a positive declaration, that without
obtaining or endeavouring to obtain any information on the subject, I
hastily and insolently obtruded my sentiments on the Convention, and to
the astonishment of every member present, on the very day I took my seat,
began a speech, which continued two days, in opposition to those measures
which, on mature deliberation, had been adopted by the Convention. But I
“alone advocated the political heresy, that the people ought not to be
trusted with the election of representatives.” On this subject, as I would
wish to be on every other, my fellow citizens, I have been perfectly
explicit in the information I gave to the House of Delegates, and which
has since been published. In a state government, I consider all power
flowing immediately from the people in their individual capacity, and that
the people, in their individual capacity, have, and ever ought to have the
right of choosing delegates in a state legislature, the business of which
is to make laws, regulating their concerns, as individuals, and operating
upon them as such; but in a federal government, formed over free states,
the power flows from the people, and the right of choosing delegates
belongs to them only mediately through their respective state governments
which are the members composing the federal government, and from whom all
its power immediately proceeds; to which state governments, the choice of
the federal delegates immediately belongs. I should blush indeed for my
ignorance of the first elements of government, was I to entertain
different sentiments on the subject; and if this is “political heresy,” I
have no ambition to be ranked with those who are orthodox. Let me here, my
fellow citizens, by way of caution, add an observation, which will prove
to be founded in truth: those who are the most liberal in complimenting
you with powers which do not belong to you, act commonly from improper and
interested motives, and most generally have in view thereby to prepare the
way for depriving you of those rights to which you are justly entitled.
Every thing that weakens and impairs the bands of legitimate authority
smooths the road of ambition; nor can there be a surer method of
supporting and preserving the just rights of the people, than by
supporting and protecting the just rights of government. As to the
“jargon” attributed to me of maintaining that “notwithstanding each state
had an equal number of votes in the senate, yet the states were unequally
represented in the senate,” the Landholder has all the merit of its
absurdity; nor can I conceive what sentiment it is that I ever have
expressed, to which he, with his usual perversion and misrepresentation,
could give such a colouring. That I ever suggested the idea of letting
loose an army indiscriminately on the innocent and guilty, in a state
refusing to comply with the requisitions of Congress, or that such an idea
ever had place in my mind, is a falsehood so groundless, so base and
malignant, that it could only have originated or been devised by a heart
which would dishonour the midnight assassin. My sentiments on this subject
are well known; it was only in the case where a state refused to comply
with the requisitions of Congress, that I was willing to grant the general
government those powers which the proposed constitution gives it in every
case.(59) Had I been a greater friend to a standing army, and not quite so
averse to expose your liberties to a soldiery, I do not believe the
Landholder would have chose me for the object on whom to expend his
artillery of falsehood.
That a system may enable government wantonly to exercise power over the
militia, to call out an unreasonable number from any particular state
without its permission, and to march them upon, and continue them in,
remote and improper services; that the same system should enable the
government totally to discard, render useless, and even disarm, the
militia, when it would remove them out of the way of opposing its
ambitious views, is by no means inconsistent, and is really the case in
the proposed constitution. In both these respects it is, in my opinion,
highly faulty, and ought to be amended. In the proposed system the general
government has a power not only without the consent, but contrary to the
will of the state government, to call out the whole of its militia,
without regard to religious scruples, or any other consideration, and to
continue them in service as long as it pleases, thereby subjecting the
freemen of a whole state to martial law and reducing them to the situation
of slaves. It has also, by another clause, the powers by which only the
militia can be organized and armed, and by the neglect of which they may
be rendered utterly useless and insignificant, when it suits the ambitious
purposes of government. Nor is the suggestion unreasonable, even if it had
been made, that the government might improperly oppress and harass the
militia, the better to reconcile them to the idea of regular troops, who
might relieve them from the burthen, and to render them less opposed to
the measures it might be disposed to adopt for the purpose of reducing
them to that state of insignificancy and uselessness. When the Landholder
declared that “I contended the powers and authorities of the new
constitution must destroy the liberties of the people,” he for once
stumbled on the truth, but even this he could not avoid coupling with an
assertion utterly false. I never suggested that “the same powers could be
safely entrusted to the old Congress;” on the contrary, I opposed many of
the powers as being of that nature that, in my opinion, they could not be
entrusted to any government whatever consistent with the freedom of the
states and their citizens, and I earnestly recommended, what I wish my
fellow citizens deeply to impress on your minds, that in altering or
amending our federal government no greater powers ought to be given than
experience has shown to be necessary, since it will be easy to delegate
further power when time shall dictate the expediency or necessity, but
powers once bestowed upon a government, should they be found ever so
dangerous or destructive to freedom, cannot be resumed or wrested from
government but by another revolution.
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, March 14, 1788._
Luther Martin, IV.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1022)
FRIDAY, MARCH 21, 1788.
Number II.
TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.
In the recognition which the Landholder professes to make “of what
occurred to my advantage,” he equally deals in the arts of
misrepresentation, as while he was “only the record of the bad,” and I am
equally obliged from a regard to truth to disclaim his pretended
approbation as his avowed censure. He declares that I originated the
clause which enacts that “this Constitution and the laws of the United
States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be
the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or the laws of any state to the
contrary notwithstanding.” To place this matter in a proper point of view,
it will be necessary to state, that as the propositions were reported by
the committee of the whole house, a power was given to the general
government to negative the laws passed by the state legislatures, a power
which I considered as totally inadmissible; in substitution of this I
proposed the following clause, which you will find very materially
different from the clause adopted by the Constitution, “that the
legislative acts of the United States, made by virtue and in pursuance of
the articles of the union, and all treaties made and ratified under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the respective
states, so far as those acts or treaties shall relate to the said states
or their citizens, and that the judiciaries of the several states shall be
bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the
individual states to the contrary notwithstanding.” When this clause was
introduced, it was not established that inferior continental courts should
be appointed for trial of all questions arising on treaties and on the
laws of the general government, and it was my wish and hope that every
question of that kind would have been determined in the first instance in
the courts of the respective states; had this been the case, the propriety
and the necessity that treaties duly made and ratified, and the laws of
the general government, should be binding on the state judiciaries which
were to decide upon them, must be evident to every capacity, while at the
same time, if such treaties or laws were inconsistent with our
constitution and bill of rights, the judiciaries of this state would be
bound to reject the first and abide by the last, since in the form I
introduced the clause, notwithstanding treaties and the laws of the
general government were intended to be superior to the laws of our state
government, where they should be opposed to each other, yet that they were
not proposed nor meant to be superior to our constitution and bill of
rights. It was afterwards altered and amended (if it can be called an
amendment) to the form in which it stands in the system now published, and
as inferior continental, and not state courts, are originally to decide on
those questions, it is now worse than useless, for being so altered as to
render the treaties and laws made under the general government superior to
our constitution, if the system is adopted it will amount to a total and
unconditional surrender to that government, by the citizens of this state,
of every right and privilege secured to them by our constitution, and an
express compact and stipulation with the general government that it may,
at its discretion, make laws in direct violation of those rights. But on
this subject I shall enlarge in a future number.
That I “voted an appeal should lay to the supreme judiciary of the United
States, for the correction of all errors both in law and fact,” in
rendering judgment is most true, and it is equally true that if it had
been so ordained by the Constitution, the supreme judiciary would only
have had an appellate jurisdiction, of the same nature with that possessed
by our high court of appeals, and could not in any respect intermeddle
with any fact decided by a jury; but as the clause now stands, an appeal
being given in general terms from the inferior courts, both as to law and
fact, it not only doth, but is avowedly intended, to give a power very
different from what our court of appeals, or any court of appeals in the
United States or in England enjoys, a power of the most dangerous and
alarming nature, that of setting at nought the verdict of a jury, and
having the same facts which they had determined, without any regard or
respect to their determination, examined and ultimately decided by the
judges themselves, and that by judges immediately appointed by the
government. But the Landholder also says that “I agreed to the clause that
declares nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion.” I
cannot take to myself the merit even of this without too great a sacrifice
of truth. It was proposed that if seven states agreed that should be
sufficient; by a rule of Convention in filling up blanks, if different
numbers were mentioned, the question was always to be taken on the
highest. It was my opinion, that to agree upon a ratification of the
constitution by any less number than the whole thirteen states, is so
directly repugnant to our present articles of confederation, and the mode
therein prescribed for their alteration, and such a violation of the
compact which the states, in the most solemn manner, have entered into
with each other, that those who could advocate a contrary proposition,
ought never to be confided in, and entrusted in public life. I availed
myself of this rule, and had the question taken on thirteen, which was
rejected. Twelve, eleven, ten and nine were proposed in succession; the
last was adopted by a majority of the members. I voted successively for
each of these members, to prevent a less number being agreed on. Had nine
not been adopted, I should on the same principle have voted for eight. But
so far was I from giving my approbation that the assent of a less number
of states than thirteen should be sufficient to put the government in
motion, that I most explicitly expressed my sentiments to the contrary,
and always intended, had I been present when the ultimate vote was taken
on the constitution, to have given it my decided negative, accompanied
with a solemn protest against it, assigning this reason among others for
my dissent. Thus, my fellow citizens, that candour with which I have
conducted myself through the whole of this business obliges me, however
reluctantly, and however “mortifying it may be to my vanity,” to disavow
all “those greater positive virtues” which the Landholder has so
obligingly attributed to me in Convention, and which he was so desirous of
conferring upon me as to consider the guilt of misrepresentation and
falsehood but a trifling sacrifice for that purpose, and to increase my
mortification, you will find I am equally compelled to yield up every
pretence even to those of a negative nature, which a regard to justice
has, as he says, obliged him not to omit. These consist, as he tells us,
in giving my entire approbation to the system as to those parts which are
said to endanger a trial by jury, and as to its want of a bill of rights,
and in having too much candour there to signify that I thought it
deficient in either of these respects. But how, I pray, can the Landholder
be certain that I deserve this encomium? Is it not possible, as I so
frequently exhausted the politeness of the Convention, that some of those
marks of fatigue and disgust, with which he intimates I was mortified as
oft as I attempted to speak, might at that time have taken place, and have
been of such a nature as to attract his attention; or, perhaps, as the
Convention was prepared to slumber whenever I rose, the Landholder, among
others, might have sunk into sleep, and at that very moment might have
been feasting his imagination with the completion of his ambitious views,
and dreams of future greatness. But supposing I never did declare in
Convention that I thought the system defective in those essential points,
will it amount to a positive proof that I approved the system in those
respects, or that I culpably neglected an indispensable duty? Is it not
possible, whatever might have been my insolence and assurance when I first
took my seat, and however fond I might be at that time of obtruding my
sentiments, that the many rebuffs with which I met, the repeated
mortifications I experienced, the marks of fatigue and disgust with which
my eyes were sure to be assailed wherever I turned them—one gaping here,
another yawning there, a third slumbering in this place, and a fourth
snoring in that—might so effectually have put to flight all my original
arrogance, that, as we are apt to run into extremes, having at length
become convinced of my comparative nothingness, in so august an assembly
and one in which the science of government was so perfectly understood, I
might sink into such a state of modesty and diffidence as not to be able
to muster up resolution enough to break the seal of silence and open my
lips even after the rays of light had begun to penetrate my understanding,
and in some measure to chase away those clouds of error and ignorance in
which it was enveloped on my first arrival? Perhaps had I been treated
with a more forbearing indulgence while committing those memorable
blunders, for a want of a sufficient knowledge in the science of
government, I might, after the rays of light had illuminated my mind, have
rendered my country much more important services, and not only assisted in
raising some of the pillars, but have furnished the edifice with a new
roof of my own construction, rather better calculated for the convenience
and security of those who might wish to take shelter beneath it, than that
which it at present enjoys. Or even admitting I was not mortified, as I
certainly ought to have been, from the Landholder’s account of the matter,
into a total loss of speech, was it in me, who considered the system, for
a variety of reasons, absolutely inconsistent with your political welfare
and happiness, a culpable neglect of duty in not endeavouring, and that
against every chance of success, to remove one or two defects, when I had
before ineffectually endeavoured to clear it of the others, which
therefore, I knew must remain? But to be serious, as to what relates to
the appellate jurisdiction in the extent given by the system proposed, I
am positive there were objections made to it, and as far as my memory will
serve me, I think I was in the number of those who actually objected; but
I am sure that the objections met with my approbation. With respect to a
bill of rights, had the government been formed upon principles truly
federal, as I wished it, legislating over and acting upon the states only
in their collective or political capacity, and not on individuals, there
would have been no need of a bill of rights, as far as related to the
rights of individuals, but only as to the rights of states. But the
proposed constitution being intended and empowered to act not only on
states, but also immediately on individuals, it renders a recognition and
a stipulation in favour of the rights both of states and of men, not only
proper, but in my opinion absolutely necessary. I endeavoured to obtain a
restraint on the powers of the general government, as to standing armies,
but it was rejected. It was my wish that the general government should not
have the power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
as it appears to me altogether unnecessary, and that the power given to it
may and will be used as a dangerous engine of oppression, but I could not
succeed. An honorable member from South Carolina most anxiously sought to
have a clause inserted securing the liberty of the Press, and repeatedly
brought this subject before the Convention, but could not obtain it. I am
almost positive he made the same attempt to have a stipulation in favour
of liberty of conscience, but in vain. The more the system advanced the
more was I impressed with the necessity of not merely attempting to secure
a few rights, but of digesting and forming a complete bill of rights,
including those of states and of individuals, which should be assented to,
and prefixed to the Constitution, to serve as a barrier between the
general government and the respective states and their citizens; because
the more the system advanced the more clearly it appeared to me that the
framers of it did not consider that either states or men had any rights at
all, or that they meant to secure the enjoyment of any to either the one
or the other; accordingly, I devoted a part of my time to the actually
preparing and draughting such a bill of rights, and had it in readiness
before I left the Convention, to have laid it before a committee. I
conversed with several members on the subject; they agreed with me on the
propriety of the measure, but at the same time expressed their sentiments
that it would be impossible to procure its adoption if attempted. A very
few days before I left the Convention, I shewed to an honorable member
sitting by me a proposition, which I then had in my hand, couched in the
following words: “Resolved that a committee be appointed to prepare and
report a bill of rights, to be prefixed to the proposed Constitution,” and
I then would instantly have moved for the appointment of a committee for
that purpose, if he would have agreed to second the motion, to do which he
hesitated, not as I understand from any objection to the measure, but from
a conviction in his own mind that the motion would be in vain.
Thus my fellow citizens, you see that so far from having no objections to
the system on this account, while I was at Convention, I not only then
thought a bill of rights necessary, but I took some pains to have the
subject brought forward, which would have been done, had it not been for
the difficulties I have stated. At the same time I declare that when I
drew up the motion, and was about to have proposed it to the Convention, I
had not the most distant hope it would meet with success. The rejection of
the clauses attempted in favour of particular rights, and to check and
restrain the dangerous and exorbitant powers of the general government
from being abused, had sufficiently taught me what to expect. And from the
best judgment I could form while in Convention, I then was, and yet
remained, decidedly of the opinion that ambition and interest had so far
blinded the understanding of some of the principal framers of the
Constitution, that while they were labouring to erect a fabrick by which
they themselves might be exalted and benefited, they were rendered
insensible to the sacrifice of the freedom and happiness of the states and
their citizens, which must, inevitably be the consequence. I most sacredly
believe their object is the total abolition and destruction of all state
governments, and the erection on their ruins of one great and extensive
empire, calculated to aggrandize and elevate its rulers and chief officers
far above the common herd of mankind, to enrich them with wealth, and to
encircle them with honours and glory, and which according to my judgment
on the maturest reflection, must inevitably be attended with the most
humiliating and abject slavery of their fellow citizens, by the sweat of
whose brows, and by the toil of whose bodies, it can only be effected.
And so anxious were its zealous promoters to hasten to a birth this
misshapened heterogenous monster of ambition and interest, that, for some
time before the Convention rose, upon the least attempt to alter its form,
or modify its powers, the most fretful impatience was shown, such as would
not have done much honour to a State Assembly, had they been sitting as
long a time, and their treasury empty; while it was repeatedly urged on
the contrary, but urged in vain, that in so momentous an undertaking, in
forming a system for such an extensive continent, on which the political
happiness of so many millions, even to the latest ages, may depend, no
time could be too long—no thoughts and reflections too great—and that if
by continuing six months, or even as many years, we could free the system
from all its errors and defects, it would be the best use to which we
could possibly devote our time. Thus my fellow citizens am I under
necessity of resigning again into the hands of the Landholder, all those
virtues both of a positive and negative kind, which from an excess of
goodness he bestowed upon me, and give him my full permission to dispose
of them hereafter in favour of some other person, who may be more
deserving, and to whom they will be more acceptable: at the same time, I
must frankly acknowledge, however it may operate as a proof of my dullness
and stupidity, that the “ignorance in the science of government” under
which I laboured at first was not removed by more than two months close
application under those august and enlightened masters of the science with
which the Convention abounded, nor was I able to discover during that
time, either by my own researches, or by any light borrowed from those
luminaries, anything in the history of mankind or in the sentiments of
those who have favoured the world with their ideas on government, to
warrant or countenance the motley mixture of a system proposed: a system
which is an innovation in government of the most extraordinary kind; a
system neither wholly federal, nor wholly national—but a strange
hotch-potch of both—just so much federal in appearance as to give its
advocates in some measure, an opportunity of passing it as such upon the
unsuspecting multitude, before they had time and opportunity to examine
it, and yet so predominantly national as to put it in the power of its
movers, whenever the machine shall be set agoing, to strike out every part
that has the appearance of being federal, and to render it wholly and
entirely a national government: And if the framing and approving the
Constitution now offered to our acceptance, is a proof of knowledge in the
science of government, I not only admit, but I glory in my ignorance; and
if my rising to speak had such a somnific influence on the Convention as
the Landholder represents, I have no doubt the time will come, should this
system be adopted, when my countrymen will ardently wish I had never left
the Convention, but remained there to the last, daily administering to my
associates the salutary opiate. Happy, thrice happy, would it have been
for my country, if the whole of that time had been devoted to sleep, or
been a blank in our lives, rather than employed in forging its chains. As
I fully intended to have returned to the Convention before the completion
of its business, my colleagues very probably might, and were certainly
well warranted to, give that information the Landholder mentions; but
whether the Convention was led to conclude that I “would have honoured the
Constitution with my signature had not indispensable business called me
away,” may be easily determined after stating a few facts. The Landholder
admits I was at first against the system—when the compromise took place on
the subject of representation, I in the most explicit manner declared in
Convention, that though I had concurred in the report, so far as to
consent to proceed upon it that we might see what kind of a system might
be formed, yet I disclaimed every idea of being bound to give it my
assent, but reserved to myself the full liberty of finally giving it my
negative, if it appeared to me inconsistent with the happiness of my
country. In a desultory conversation which long after took place in
Convention, one morning before our honourable president took the chair, he
was observing how unhappy it would be should there be such a diversity of
sentiment as to cause any of the members to oppose the system when they
returned to their states; on that occasion I replied that I was confident
no state in the union would more readily accede to a proper system of
government than Maryland, but that the system under consideration was of
such a nature, that I never could recommend it for acceptance; that I
thought the state never ought to adopt it, and expressed my firm belief
that it never would.
An honourable member from Pennsylvania objected against that part of the
sixth article which requires an oath to be taken by the persons there
mentioned, in support of the constitution, observing (as he justly might
from the conduct the convention was then pursuing) how little such oaths
were regarded. I immediately joined in the objection, but declared my
reason to be, that I thought it such a constitution as no friend of his
country ought to bind himself to support. And not more than two days
before I left Philadelphia, another honourable member from the same state
urged most strenuously that the Convention ought to hasten their
deliberations to a conclusion, assigning as a reason that the Assembly of
Pennsylvania was just then about to meet, and that it would be of the
greatest importance to bring the system before that session of the
legislature, in order that a Convention of the State might be immediately
called to ratify it, before the enemies of the system should have an
opportunity of making the people acquainted with their objections, at the
same time declaring that if the matter should be delayed and the people
have time to hear the variety of objections which would be made to it by
its opposers, he thought it doubtful whether that state or any other state
in the union would adopt it.(60) As soon as the honourable member took his
seat, I rose and observed, that I was precisely of the same opinion, that
the people of America never would, nor did I think they ought to, adopt
the system, if they had time to consider and understand it; whereas a
proneness for novelty and change—a conviction that some alteration was
necessary, and a confidence in the members who composed the
Convention—might possibly procure its adoption, if brought hastily before
them, but that these sentiments induced me to wish that a very different
line of conduct should be pursued from that recommended by the honourable
member. I wished the people to have every opportunity of information, as I
thought it much preferable that a bad system should be rejected at first,
than hastily adopted and afterwards be unavailingly repented of. If these
were instances of my “high approbation,” I gave them in abundance as all
the Convention can testify, and continued so to do till I left them. That
I expressed great regret at being obliged to leave Philadelphia, and a
fixed determination to return if possible before the Convention rose, is
certain. That I might declare that I had rather lose an hundred guineas
than not to be there at the close of the business is very probable—and it
is possible that some who heard me say this, not knowing my reasons, which
could not be expressed without a breach of that secrecy to which we were
enjoined, might erroneously have concluded that my motive was the
gratification of vanity, in having my name enrolled with those of a
Franklin and a Washington. As to the first, I cordially join in the
tribute of praise so justly paid to the enlightened philosopher and
statesman, while the polite, friendly and affectionate treatment myself
and my family received from that venerable sage and the worthy family in
which he is embosomed, will ever endear him to my heart. The name of
Washington is far above my praise. I would to Heaven that on this occasion
one more wreath had been added to the number of those which are twined
around his amiable brow—that those with which it is already surrounded may
flourish with immortal verdure, nor wither or fade till time shall be no
more, is my fervent prayer, and may that glory which encircles his head
ever shine with undiminished rays. To find myself under the necessity of
opposing such illustrious characters, whom I venerated and loved, filled
me with regret; but viewing the system in the light I then did, and yet do
view it, to have hesitated would have been criminal; complaisance would
have been guilt. If it was the idea of my state that whatever a Washington
or Franklin approved, was to be blindly adopted, she ought to have spared
herself the expence of sending any members to the Convention, or to have
instructed them implicitly to follow where they led the way. It was not to
have my “name enrolled with the other labourers,” that I wished to return
to Philadelphia—that sacrifice which I must have made of my principles by
putting my name to the Constitution, could not have been effaced by any
derivative lustre it could possibly receive from the bright constellation
with which it would have been surrounded. My object was in truth the very
reverse; as I had uniformly opposed the system in its progress, I wished
to have been present at the conclusion, to have then given it my solemn
negative, which I certainly should have done, even had I stood single and
alone, being perfectly willing to leave it to the cool and impartial
investigation both of the present and of future ages to decide who best
understood the science of government—who best knew the rights of men and
of states, who best consulted the true interest of America, and who most
faithfully discharged the trust reposed in them, those who agreed to or
those who opposed the new Constitution—and so fully have I made up my own
mind on this subject, that as long as the history of mankind shall record
the appointment of the late Convention, and the system which has been
proposed by them, it is my highest ambition that my name may also be
recorded as one who considered the system injurious to my country, and as
such opposed it. Having shown that I did not “alter my opinion after I
left Philadelphia,” and that I acted no “contradictory parts on the great
political stage,” and therefore that there are none such to reconcile, the
reason assigned by the Landholder for that purpose doth not deserve my
notice, except only to observe that he shrewdly intimates there is already
a Junto established, who are to share in and deal out the offices of this
new government at their will and pleasure, and that they have already
fixed upon the character who is to be “Deputy Attorney General of the
United States for the State of Maryland.” If this is true, it is worth
while to inquire of whom this Junto consists, as it might lead to a
discovery of the persons for the gratification of whose ambition and
interest this system is prepared, and is, if possible, to be enforced, and
from the disposition of offices already allotted in the various and
numerous departments, we possibly might discover whence proceeds the
conviction and zeal of some of its advocates.
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, March 19, 1788._
Luther Martin, V.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1024)
FRIDAY, MARCH 28, 1788.
Number III.
TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.
There is, my fellow citizens, scarcely an individual of common
understanding, I believe, in this state, who is any ways acquainted with
the proposed Constitution, who doth not allow it to be, in many instances,
extremely censurable, and that a variety of alterations and amendments are
essentially requisite, to render it consistent with a reasonable security
for the liberty of the respective states, and their citizens.
Aristides,(61) it is true, is an exception from this observation; he
declares, that “if the whole matter was left to his discretion, he would
not change any part of the proposed Constitution,” whether he meant this
declaration as a proof of his discretion, I will not say; it will however,
readily be admitted, by most, as a proof of his enthusiastic zeal in
favour of the system. But it would be injustice to that writer not to
observe, that if he is as much mistaken in the other parts of the
Constitution, as in that which relates to the judicial department, the
Constitution which he is so earnestly recommending to his countrymen, and
on which he is lavishing so liberally his commendations, is a thing of his
own creation and totally different from that which is offered for your
acceptance.—He has given us an explanation of the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the judiciary of the general government, and of the manner
in which he supposes it is to operate—an explanation so inconsistent with
the intention of its framers, and so different from its true construction
and from the effect which it will have, should the system be adopted, that
I could scarce restrain my astonishment at the error, although I was in
some measure prepared for it, by his previous acknowledgment that he did
not very well understand that part of the system; a circumstance I
apprehended he did not recollect at the time when he was bestowing upon it
his dying benediction. And if one of our judges, possessed of no common
share of understanding, and of extensive acquired knowledge, who, as he
informs us, has long made the science of government his peculiar study, so
little understands the true import and construction of this Constitution,
and that too in a part more particularly within his own province, can it
be wondered at that the people in general, whose knowledge in subjects of
this nature is much more limited and circumscribed, should but imperfectly
comprehend the extent, operation and consequences of so complex and
intricate a system; and is not this of itself a strong proof of the
necessity that it should be corrected and amended, at least so as to
render it more clear and comprehensible to those who are to decide upon
it, or to be affected by it. But although almost every one agrees the
Constitution, as it is, to be both defective and dangerous, we are not
wanting in characters who earnestly advise us to adopt it, in its present
form, with all its faults, and assure us we may safely rely on obtaining
hereafter the amendments that are necessary. But why, I pray you, my
fellow citizens, should we not insist upon the necessary amendments being
made now, while we have the liberty of acting for ourselves, before the
Constitution becomes binding upon us by our assent, as every principle of
reason, common sense and safety would dictate? Because, say they, the
sentiments of men are so different, and the interests of the different
states are so jarring and dissonant, that there is no probability they
would agree if alterations and amendments were attempted. Thus with one
breath they tell us that the obstacles to any alterations and amendments
being agreed to by the states are so insuperable, that it is vain to make
the experiment, while in the next they would persuade us it is so certain
the states will accede to those which shall be necessary, and that they
may be procured even after the system shall be ratified, that we need not
hesitate swallowing the poison, from the ease and security of instantly
obtaining the antidote—and they seem to think it astonishing that any
person should find a difficulty in reconciling the absurdity and
contradiction. If it is easy to obtain proper amendments, do not let us
sacrifice everything that ought to be dear to freemen, for want of
insisting upon its being done, while we have the power. If the obtaining
them will be difficult and improbable, for God’s sake do not accept of
such a form of government as without amendments cannot fail of rendering
you mere beasts of burthen, and reducing you to a level with your own
slaves, with this aggravating distinction, that you once tasted the
blessings of freedom. Those who would wish you to believe that the faults
in the system proposed are wholly or principally owing to the difference
of state interests, and proceed from that cause, are either imposed upon
themselves, or mean to impose upon you. The principal questions, in which
the state interests had any material effect, were those which related to
representation, and the number in each branch of the legislature, whose
concurrence should be necessary for passing navigation acts, or making
commercial regulations. But what state is there in the union whose
interest would prompt it to give the general government the extensive and
unlimited powers it possesses in the executive, legislative and judicial
departments, together with the powers over the militia, and the liberty of
establishing a standing army without any restriction? What state in the
union considers it advantageous to its interest that the President should
be re-eligible—the members of both houses appointable to offices—the
judges capable of holding other offices at the will and pleasure of the
government, and that there should be no real responsibility either in the
President or in the members of either branch of the Legislature? Or what
state is there that would have been averse to a bill of rights, or that
would have wished for the destruction of jury trial in a great variety of
cases, and in a particular manner in every case without exception where
the government itself is interested? These parts of the system, so far
from promoting the interest of any state, or states, have an immediate
tendency to annihilate all the state governments indiscriminately, and to
subvert their rights and the rights of their citizens. To oppose these,
and to procure their alteration, is equally the interest of every state in
the union. The introduction of these parts of the system must not be
attributed to the jarring interests of states, but to a very different
source, the pride, the ambition and the interest of individuals. This
being the case, we may be enabled to form some judgment of the probability
of obtaining a safe and proper system, should we have firmness and wisdom
to reject that which is now offered; and also of the great improbability
of procuring any amendments to the present system, if we should weakly and
inconsiderately adopt it. The bold and daring attempt that has been made
to use, for the total annihilation of the states, that power that was
delegated for their preservation, will put the different states on their
guard. The votaries of ambition and interest being totally defeated in
their attempt to establish themselves on the ruins of the States, which
they will be if this Constitution is rejected, an attempt in which they
had more probability of success from the total want of suspicion in their
countrymen than they can have hereafter, they will not hazard a second
attempt of the same nature, in which they will have much less chance of
success; besides, being once discovered they will not be confided in. The
true interest and happiness of the states and their citizens will,
therefore, most probably be the object which will be principally sought
for by a second Convention, should a second be appointed, which if really
aimed at, I cannot think very difficult to accomplish, by giving to the
federal government sufficient power for every salutary purpose, while the
rights of the states and their citizens should be secure from any imminent
danger. But if the arts and influence of ambitious and interested men,
even in their present situation, while more on a level with yourselves,
and unarmed with any extraordinary powers, should procure you to adopt
this system, dangerous as it is admitted to be to your rights, I will
appeal to the understanding of every one of you, who will on this occasion
give his reason fair play, whether there is not every cause to believe
they will, should this government be adopted, with that additional power,
consequence and influence it will give them, most easily prevent the
necessary alterations which might be wished for, the purpose of which
would be directly opposite to their views, and defeat every attempt to
procure them. Be assured, whatever obstacles or difficulties may be at
this time in the way of obtaining a proper system of government, they will
be increased an hundred fold after this system is adopted. Reflect also, I
entreat you, my fellow citizens, that the alterations and amendments which
are wanted in the present system are of such a nature as to diminish and
lessen, to check and restrain the powers of the general government, not to
increase and enlarge those powers. If they were of the last kind, we might
safely adopt it, and trust to giving greater powers hereafter, like a
physician who administers an emetic ex re nata, giving a moderate dose at
first, and increasing it afterwards as the constitution of the patient may
require. But I appeal to the history of mankind for this truth, that when
once power and authority are delegated to a government, it knows how to
keep it, and is sufficiently and successfully fertile in expedients for
that purpose. Nay more, the whole history of mankind proves that so far
from parting with the powers actually delegated to it, government is
constantly encroaching on the small pittance of rights reserved by the
people to themselves, and gradually wresting them out of their hands until
it either terminates in their slavery or forces them to arms, and brings
about a revolution. From these observations it appears to me, my fellow
citizens, that nothing can be more weak and absurd than to accept of a
system that is admitted to stand in need of immediate amendments to render
your rights secure—for remember, if you fail in obtaining them, you cannot
free yourselves from the yoke you will have placed on your necks, and
servitude must, therefore, be your portion. Let me ask you my fellow
citizens what you would think of a physician who, because you were
slightly indisposed, should bring you a dose which properly corrected with
other ingredients might be a salutary remedy, but of itself was a deadly
poison, and with great appearance of friendship and zeal, should advise
you to swallow it immediately, and trust to accident for those requisites
necessary to qualify its malignity, and prevent its destructive effects?
Would not you reject the advice, in however friendly a manner it might
appear to be given, with indignation, and insist that he should first
procure, and properly attempt, the necessary ingredients, since after the
fatal draught was once received into your bowels, it would be too late
should the antidote prove unattainable, and death must ensue. With the
same indignation ought you, my fellow citizens, to reject the advice of
those political quacks, who under pretence of healing the disorders of our
present government, would urge you rashly to gulp down a constitution,
which in its present form, unaltered and unamended, would be as certain
death to your liberty, as arsenic could be to your bodies.
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, March 25, 1788._
Luther Martin, VI.
The Maryland Journal, (Number 1026)
FRIDAY, APRIL 4, 1788.
Number IV.
TO THE CITIZENS OF MARYLAND.