This copy, so obtained, seems to have been the basis of the following note

in the _New York Journal_:

“A writer in the state of New-York, under the signature of

_Cesar_, came forward against the patriotic _Cato_ and endeavoured

to frighten him from starting any objections and threatened that

‘_Cato_ would be followed by _Cesar_ in all his marches;’ but we

find that as soon as ever _Cato_ came freely to discuss the merit

of the constitution _Cesar_ retreated and disappeared: and since

that a publication under the signature of Publius ... has appeared

in that state.”

Another evidence in confirmation is, that the last of this series was

printed on January 3, 1788, and the New York Assembly met on the 9th of

the same month, after which Governor Clinton was probably too occupied to

write more, though no conclusion was announced in the last essay, and it

is probable no such termination was intended. Following these are the two

essays of _Cæsar_ mentioned above.

Cato, I.

The New York Journal, (Number 2134)

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

The Convention, who sat at Philadelphia, have at last delivered to

Congress that system of general government, which they have declared best

calculated to promote your safety and happiness as citizens of the United

States. This system, though not handed to you formally by the authority of

government, has obtained an introduction through divers channels; and the

minds of you all, to whose observation it has come, have no doubt been

contemplating it; and alternate joy, hope, or fear have preponderated, as

it conformed to, or differed from, your various ideas of just government.

Government, to an American, is the science of his political safety; this

then is a moment to you the most important—and that in various points—to

your reputation as members of a great nation—to your immediate safety, and

to that of your posterity. In your private concerns and affairs of life

you deliberate with caution, and act with prudence; your public concerns

require a caution and prudence, in a ratio suited to the difference and

dignity of the subject. The disposal of your reputation, and of your lives

and property, is more momentous than a contract for a farm, or the sale of

a bale of goods; in the former, if you are negligent or inactive, the

ambitious and despotic will entrap you in their toils, and bind you with

the cord of power from which you, and your posterity may never be freed;

and if the possibility should exist, it carries along with it consequences

that will make your community totter to its center: in the latter, it is

the mere loss of a little property, which more circumspection or assiduity

may repair.

Without directly engaging as an advocate for this new form of national

government, or as an opponent—let me conjure you to consider this a very

important crisis of your safety and character. You have already, in common

with the rest of your countrymen, the citizens of the other states, given

to the world astonishing evidence of your greatness—you have fought under

peculiar circumstances, and were successful against a powerful nation on a

speculative question, you have established an original compact between you

and your governors, a fact heretofore unknown in the formation of the

governments of the world; your experience has informed you, that there are

defects in the federal system, and, to the astonishment of mankind, your

legislatures have concerted measures for an alteration, with as much ease

as an individual would make a disposition of his ordinary domestic

affairs: this alteration now lies before you, for your consideration; but

beware how you determine—do not, because you admit that something must be

done, adopt anything—teach the members of that convention that ye are

capable of a supervision of their conduct. The same medium that gave you

this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make

amendments, or give you another, if it is required. Your fate, and that of

your posterity, depends on your present conduct; do not give the latter

reason to curse you, nor yourselves cause of reprehension; as individuals

you are ambitious of leaving behind you a good name, and it is the

reflection that you have done right in this life, that blunts the

sharpness of death; the same principles would be a consolation to you, as

patriots, in the hour of dissolution, that you would leave to your

children a fair political inheritance, untouched by the vultures of power,

which you had acquired by an _unshaken perseverance_ in the cause of

liberty; but how miserable the alternative—you would deprecate the ruin

you had brought upon yourselves, be the curse of posterity, and the scorn

and scoff of nations.

Deliberate, therefore, on this new national government with coolness;

analize it with criticism; and reflect on it with candor: if you find that

the influence of a powerful few, or the exercise of a standing army, will

always be directed and exerted for your welfare alone, and not to the

aggrandizement of themselves, and that it will secure to you and your

posterity happiness at home, and national dignity and respect from abroad,

adopt it; if it will not, reject it with indignation—better to be where

you are for the present, than insecure forever afterwards. Turn your eyes

to the United Netherlands, at this moment, and view their situation;

compare it with what yours may be, under a government substantially

similar to theirs.

Beware of those who wish to influence your passions, and to make you dupes

to their resentments and little interests—personal invectives can never

persuade, but they always fix prejudices, which candor might have

removed—those who deal in them have not your happiness at heart. Attach

yourselves to measures, not to men.

This form of government is handed to you by the recommendations of a man

who merits the confidence of the public; but you ought to recollect that

the wisest and best of men may err, and their errors, if adopted, may be

fatal to the community; therefore, in principles of _politics_, as well as

in religious faith, every man ought to think for himself.

Hereafter, when it will be necessary, I shall make such observations on

this new constitution as will tend to promote your welfare and be

justified by reason and truth.

CATO.

_Sept. 26, 1787._

Cato, II.

The New York Journal, (Number 2136)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK:

“Remember, O my friends! the laws, the rights,

The generous plan of power deliver’d down,

By your renown’d Forefathers;

So dearly bought, the price of so much blood!

O let it never perish in your hands!

But piously transmit it to your children.”

The object of my last address to you was to engage your dispassionate

consideration of the new Federal government; to caution you against

precipitancy in the adoption of it; to recommend a correction of its

errors, if it contained any; to hint to you the danger of an easy

perversion of some of its powers; to solicit you to separate yourselves

from party, and to be independent of and uninfluenced by any in your

principles of politics; and that address was closed with a promise of

future observations on the same subject, which should be justified by

reason and truth. Here I intended to have rested the introduction; but a

writer under the signature of CÆSAR, in Mr. Child’s paper of the 1st

instant, who treats you with passion, insult, and threat, has anticipated

those observations which would otherwise have remained in silence until a

future period. It would be criminal in me to hesitate a moment to appear

as your advocate in so interesting a cause, and to resist the influence of

such doctrines as this Cæsar holds. I shall take no other cognizance of

his remarks on the _questionable_ shape of my future, or the _equivocal_

appearance of my past reflections, than to declare, that in my past, I did

not mean to be misunderstood (for Cæsar himself declares that it is

obviously the language of distrust), and that in my future there will not

be the semblance of doubt. But what is the language of Cæsar—he ridicules

your prerogative, power, and majesty—he talks of this _proffered

constitution_ as the tender mercy of a benevolent sovereign to deluded

subjects, or, as his tyrant name-sake, of his proffered grace to the

virtuous Cato:—he shuts the door of free deliberation and discussion, and

declares that you must receive this government in manner and form as it is

_proffered_—that you cannot revise or amend it, and lastly, to close the

scene, he insinuates that it will be more healthy for you that the

American Fabius should be induced to accept of the presidency of this new

government than that, in case you do not acquiesce, he should be solicited

to command an army to impose it on you. Is not your indignation roused at

this absolute, imperious style? For what did you open the veins of your

citizens and expend their treasure? For what did you throw off the yoke of

Britain and call yourselves independent? Was it from a disposition fond of

change, or to procure new masters?—if those were your motives, you have

reward before you—go, retire into silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that

scourges you, bury the prospects you had in store, that you and your

posterity would participate in the blessings of freedom, and the

employments of your country—let the rich and insolent alone be your

rulers. Perhaps you are designed by providence as an emphatic evidence of

the mutability of human affairs, to have the show of happiness only, that

your misery may seem the sharper, and if so, you must submit. But if you

had nobler views, and you are not designed by heaven as an example—are you

now to be derided and insulted? Is the power of thinking, on the only

subject important to you, to be taken away? and if per chance you should

happen to differ from Cæsar, are you to have Cæsar’s principles crammed

down your throats with an army? God forbid!

In democratic republics the people collectively are considered as the

sovereign—all legislative, judicial, and executive power, is inherent in

and derived from them. As a people, your power and authority have

sanctioned and established the present government—your executive,

legislative, and judicial acknowledge it by their public acts—you are

again solicited to sanction and establish the future one—yet this Cæsar

mocks your dignity and laughs at the majesty of the people. Cæsar, with

his usual dogmatism, enquires, if I had talents to throw light on the

subject of legislation, why did I not offer them when the Convention was

in session? He is answered in a moment—I thought with him and you, that

the wisdom of America, in that Convention, was drawn as it were to a

Focus. I placed an unbounded confidence in some of the characters who were

members of it, from the services they had rendered their country, without

adverting to the ambitious and interested views of others. I was willingly

led to expect a model of perfection and security that would have

astonished the world. Therefore to have offered observation, on the

subject of legislation, under these impressions, would have discovered no

less arrogance than Cæsar. The Convention, too, when in session, shut

their doors to the observations of the community, and their members were

under an obligation of secrecy. Nothing transpired. To have suggested

remarks on unknown and anticipated principles would have been like a man

groping in the dark, and folly in the extreme. I confess, however, I have

been disappointed, and Cæsar is candid enough to make the same

declaration, for he thinks it _might_ have been more perfect.

But to call in dispute, at this time, and in the manner Cæsar does, the

right of free deliberation on this subject, is like a man’s propounding a

question to another, and telling him at the same that if he does not

answer agreeable to the opinion of the propounder, he will exert force to

make him of the same sentiment: to exemplify this, it will be necessary to

give you a short history of the rise and progress of the Convention, and

the conduct of Congress thereon. The states in Congress suggested, that

the articles of confederation had provided for making alterations in the

confederation—that there were defects therein, and as a means to remedy

which, a Convention of delegates, appointed by the different states, was

resolved expedient to be held for the sole and express purpose of revising

it, and reporting to Congress and the different legislatures such

alterations and provisions therein as should (when agreed to in Congress

and confirmed by the several states) render the federal constitution

adequate to the exigencies of government. This resolution is sent to the

different states, and the legislature of this state, with others, appoint,

in conformity thereto, delegates for the purpose, and in the words

mentioned in that resolve, as by the resolution of Congress, and the

concurrent resolutions of the senate and assembly of this state,

subjoined, will appear. For the sole and express purpose aforesaid a

Convention of delegates is formed at Philadelphia: what have they done?

Have they revised the confederation, and has Congress agreed to their

report?—neither is the fact. This Convention have exceeded the authority

given to them, and have transmitted to Congress a new political fabric,

essentially and fundamentally distinct and different from it, in which the

different states do not retain separately their sovereignty and

independency, united by a confederate league—but one entire sovereignty, a

consolidation of them into one government—in which new provisions and

powers are not made and vested in Congress, but in an assembly, senate,

and president, who are not known in the articles of confederation.

Congress, without agreeing to, or approving of, this system _proffered_ by

the Convention, have sent it to the different legislatures, not for their

confirmation, but to submit it to the people; not in conformity to their

own resolution, but in conformity to the resolution of the Convention made

and provided in that case.(53) Was it, then, from the face of the

foregoing facts, the intention of Congress, and of this and the other

states, that the essence of our present national government should be

annihilated, or that it should be retained and only have an increase of

substantial necessary powers? Congress, sensible of this latter principle,

and that the Convention had taken on themselves a power which neither they

nor the other states had a right to delegate to them, and that they could

not agree to and approve of this consolidated system, nor the states

confirm it—have been silent on its character; and although many have dwelt

on their unanimity, it is no less than the unanimity of opinion that it

originated in an assumption of power, which your voice alone can sanctify.

This new government, therefore, founded in usurpation, is referred to your

opinion as the origin of power not heretofore delegated, and, to this end,

the exercise of the prerogative of free examination is essentially

necessary; and yet you are unhesitatingly to acquiesce, and if you do not,

the American Fabius, if we may believe Cæsar is to command an army to

impose it. It is not my view to rouse your passions. I only wish to excite

you to, and assist you in, a cool and deliberate discussion of the

subject, to urge you to behave like sensible freemen. Think, speak, act,

and assert your opinions and rights—let the same good sense govern you

with respect to the adoption of a future system for the administration of

your public affairs that influenced you in the formation of the present.

Hereafter I do not intend to be diverted by Cæsar, or any other. My object

is to take up this new form of national government—compare it with the

experience and opinions of the most sensible and approved political

authors—and to show that its principles, and the exercise of them, will be

dangerous to your liberty and happiness.

CATO.

Cato, III.

The New York Journal, (Number 2138)

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 25, 1787.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

In the close of my last introductory address, I told you that my object in

the future would be to take up this new form of national government, to

compare it with the experience and opinions of the most sensible and

approved political authors, and to show you that its principles, and the

exercise of them, will be dangerous to your liberty and happiness.

Although I am conscious that this is an arduous undertaking, yet I will

perform it to the best of my ability.

The freedom, equality and independence which you enjoyed by nature,

induced you to consent to a political power. The same principles led you

to examine the errors and vices of a British superintendence, to divest

yourselves of it, and to reassume a new political shape. It is

acknowledged that there are defects in this, and another is tendered to

you for acceptance; the great question then, that arises on this new

political principle, is, whether it will answer the ends for which it is

said to be offered to you, and for which all men engage in political

society, to wit, the preservation of their lives, liberties, and estates.

The recital, or premises on which the new form of government is erected,

declares a consolidation or union of all the thirteen parts, or states,

into one great whole, under the firm of the United States, for all the

various and important purposes therein set forth. But whoever seriously

considers the immense extent of territory comprehended within the limits

of the United States, together with the variety of its climates,

productions, and commerce, the difference of extent, and number of

inhabitants in all; the dissimilitude of interest, morals, and politics,

in almost every one, will receive it as an intuitive truth, that a

consolidated republican form of government therein, can never _form a

perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, promote the

general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to you and your

posterity_, for to these objects it must be directed: this unkindred

legislature therefore, composed of interests opposite and dissimilar in

their nature, will in its exercise, emphatically be like a house divided

against itself.

The governments of Europe have taken their limits and form from

adventitious circumstances, and nothing can be argued on the motive of

agreement from them; but these adventitious political principles, have

nevertheless produced effects that have attracted the attention of

philosophy, which have established axioms in the science of politics

therefrom, as irrefragable as any in Euclid. It is natural, says

Montesquieu, _to a republic to have only a small territory, otherwise it

cannot long subsist: in a large one, there are men of large fortunes, and

consequently of less moderation; there are too great deposits to trust in

the hands of a single subject; an ambitious person soon becomes sensible

that he may be happy, great, and glorious by oppressing his fellow

citizens, and that he might raise himself to grandeur, on the ruins of his

country. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a thousand

views; in a small one, the interest of the public is easily perceived,

better understood, and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have

a less extent, and of course are less protected_—he also shows you, that

the duration of the republic of Sparta was owing to its having continued

with the same extent of territory after all its wars; and that the

ambition of Athens and Lacedemon to command and direct the union, lost

them their liberties, and gave them a monarchy.

From this picture, what can you promise yourselves, on the score of

consolidation of the United States into one government? Impracticability

in the just exercise of it, your freedom insecure, even this form of

government limited in its continuance, the employments of your country

disposed of to the opulent, to whose contumely you will continually be an

object—you must risk much, by indispensably placing trusts of the greatest

magnitude, into the hands of individuals whose ambition for power, and

aggrandizement, will oppress and grind you—where from the vast extent of

your territory, and the complication of interests, the science of

government will become intricate and perplexed, and too mysterious for you

to understand and observe; and by which you are to be conducted into a

monarchy, either limited or despotic; the latter, Mr. Locke remarks, _is a

government derived from neither nature nor compact_.

_Political liberty_, the great Montesquieu again observes, _consists in

security, or at least in the opinion we have of security_; and this

_security_, therefore, or the _opinion_, is best obtained in moderate

governments, where the mildness of the laws, and the equality of the

manners, beget a confidence in the people, which produces this security,

or the opinion. This moderation in governments depends in a great measure

on their limits, connected with their political distribution.

The extent of many of the states of the Union, is at this time almost too

great for the superintendence of a republican form of government, and must

one day or other revolve into more vigorous ones, or by separation be

reduced into smaller and more useful, as well as moderate ones. You have

already observed the feeble efforts of Massachusetts against their

insurgents; with what difficulty did they quell that insurrection; and is

not the province of Maine at this moment on the eve of separation from

her? The reason of these things is, that for the security of the

_property_ of the community, in which expressive term Mr. Locke makes

life, liberty, and estate, to consist—the wheels of a republic are

necessarily slow in their operation; hence in large free republics, the

evil sometimes is not only begun, but almost completed, before they are in

a situation to turn the current into a contrary progression: the extremes

are also too remote from the usual seat of government, and the laws,

therefore, too feeble to afford protection to all its parts, and insure

_domestic tranquility_ without the aid of another principle. If,

therefore, this state, and that of North Carolina, had an army under their

control, they never would have lost Vermont, and Frankland, nor the state

of Massachusetts suffer an insurrection, or the dismemberment of her

fairest district, but the exercise of a principle which would have

prevented these things, if we may believe the experience of ages, would

have ended in the destruction of their liberties.

Will this consolidated republic, if established, in its exercise beget

such confidence and compliance, among the citizens of these states, as to

do without the aid of a standing army? I deny that it will. The

malcontents in each state, who will not be a few, nor the least important,

will be exciting factions against it—the fear of a dismemberment of some

of its parts, and the necessity to enforce the execution of revenue laws

(a fruitful source of oppression) on the extremes and in the other

districts of the government, will incidentally and necessarily require a

permanent force, to be kept on foot: will not political security, and even

the opinion of it, be extinguished? Can mildness and moderation exist in a

government where the primary incident in its exercise must be force? Will

not violence destroy confidence, and can equality subsist where the

extent, policy, and practice of it will naturally lead to make odious

distinctions among citizens?

The people who may compose this national legislature from the southern

states, in which, from the mildness of the climate, the fertility of the

soil, and the value of its productions, wealth is rapidly acquired, and

where the same causes naturally lead to luxury, dissipation, and a passion

for aristocratic distinction; where slavery is encouraged, and liberty of

course less respected and protected; who know not what it is to acquire

property by their own toil, nor to economize with the savings of

industry—will these men, therefore, be as tenacious of the liberties and

interests of the more northern states, where freedom, independence,

industry, equality and frugality are natural to the climate and soil, as

men who are your own citizens, legislating in your own state, under your

inspection, and whose manners and fortunes bear a more equal resemblance

to your own?

It may be suggested, in answer to this, that whoever is a citizen of one

state is a citizen of each, and that therefore he will be as interested in

the happiness and interest of all, as the one he is delegated from; but

the argument is fallacious, and, whoever has attended to the history of

mankind, and the principles which bind them together as parents, citizens,

or men, will readily perceive it. These principles are, in their exercise,

like a pebble cast on the calm surface of a river—the circles begin in the

center, and are small, active, and forcible, but as they depart from that

point, they lose their force, and vanish into calmness.

The strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls. The

ties of the parent exceed that of any other; as we depart from home, the

next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state,

where acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and

attachment; enlarge the circle still further, and, as citizens of

different states, though we acknowledge the same national denomination, we

lose in the ties of acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, and thus by

degrees we lessen in our attachments, till, at length, we no more than

acknowledge a sameness of species. Is it, therefore, from certainty like

this, reasonable to believe, that inhabitants of Georgia, or New

Hampshire, will have the same obligations towards you as your own, and

preside over your lives, liberties, and property, with the same care and

attachment? Intuitive reason answers in the negative.

In the course of my examination of the principles of consolidation of the

states into one general government, many other reasons against it have

occurred, but I flatter myself, from those herein offered to your

consideration, I have convinced you that it is both presumptuous and

impracticable, consistent with your safety. To detain you with further

remarks would be useless. I shall, however, continue in my following

numbers to analyse this new government, pursuant to my promise.

CATO.

Cato, IV.

The New York Journal, (Number 2140)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1787.

For the New York Journal.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK:

Admitting, however, that the vast extent of America, together with the

various other reasons which I offered you in my last number, against the

practicability of the just exercise of the new government are insufficient

to convince; still it is an undesirable truth, that its several parts are

either possessed of principles, which you have heretofore considered as

ruinous and that others are omitted which you have established as

fundamental to your political security, and must in their operation, I

will venture to assert, fetter your tongues and minds, enchain your

bodies, and ultimately extinguish all that is great and noble in man.

In pursuance of my plan I shall begin with observations on the executive

branch of this new system; and though it is not the first in order, as

arranged therein, yet being the _chief_, is perhaps entitled by the rules

of rank to the first consideration. The executive power as described in

the 2d article, consists of a president and vice-president, who are to

hold their offices during the term of four years; the same article has

marked the manner and time of their election, and established the

qualifications of the president; it also provides against the removal,

death, or inability of the president and vice-president—regulates the

salary of the president, delineates his duties and powers; and, lastly,

declares the causes for which the president and vice-president shall be

removed from office.

Notwithstanding the great learning and abilities of the gentlemen who

composed the convention, it may be here remarked with deference, that the

construction of the first paragraph of the first section of the second

article is vague and inexplicit, and leaves the mind in doubt as to the

election of a president and vice-president, after the expiration of the

election for the first term of four years; in every other case, the

election of these great officers is expressly provided for; but there is

no explicit provision for their election in case of expiration of their

offices, subsequent to the election which is to set this political machine

in motion; no certain and express terms as in your state constitution,

that _statedly_ once in every four years, and as often as these offices

shall become vacant, by expiration or otherwise, as is therein expressed,

an election shall be held as follows, &c., this inexplicitness perhaps may

lead to an establishment for life.

It is remarked by Montesquieu, in treating of republics, that _in all

magistracies, the greatness of the power must be compensated by the

brevity of the duration, and that a longer time than a year would be

dangerous_. It is, therefore, obvious to the least intelligent mind to

account why great power in the hands of a magistrate, and that power

connected with considerable duration, may be dangerous to the liberties of

a republic, the deposit of vast trusts in the hands of a single

magistrate, enables him in their exercise to create a numerous train of

dependents; this tempts his _ambition_, which in a republican magistrate

is also remarked, _to be pernicious_, and the duration of his office for

any considerable time favors his views, gives him the means and time to

perfect and execute his designs, _he therefore fancies that he may be

great and glorious by oppressing his fellow-citizens, and raising himself

to permanent grandeur on the ruins of his country_. And here it may be

necessary to compare the vast and important powers of the president,

together with his continuance in office, with the foregoing doctrine—his

eminent magisterial situation will attach many adherents to him, and he

will be surrounded by expectants and courtiers, his power of nomination

and influence on all appointments, the strong posts in each state

comprised within his superintendence, and garrisoned by troops under his

direction, his control over the army, militia, and navy, the unrestrained

power of granting pardons for treason, which may be used to screen from

punishment those whom he had secretly instigated to commit the crime, and

thereby prevent a discovery of his own guilt, his duration in office for

four years: these, and various other principles evidently prove the truth

of the position, that if the president is possessed of ambition, he has

power and time sufficient to ruin his country.

Though the president, during the sitting of the legislature, is assisted

by the senate, yet he is without a constitutional council in their recess;

he will therefore be unsupported by proper information and advice, and

will generally be directed by minions and favorites, or a council of state

will grow out of the principal officers of the great departments, the most

dangerous council in a free country.

The ten miles square, which is to become the seat of government, will of

course be the place of residence for the president and the great officers

of state; the same observations of a great man will apply to the court of

a president possessing the powers of a monarch, that is observed of that

of a monarch—_ambition with idleness_—_baseness with pride_—_the thirst of

riches without labor_—_aversion to

truth_—_flattery_—_treason_—_perfidy_—_violation of engagements_—_contempt

of civil duties_—_hope from the magistrate’s weakness_; _but above all,

the perpetual ridicule of virtue_—these, he remarks, are the

characteristics by which the courts in all ages have been distinguished.

The language and the manners of this court will be what distinguishes them

from the rest of the community, not what assimilates them to it; and in

being remarked for a behavior that shows they are not _meanly born_, and

in adulation to people of fortune and power.

The establishment of a vice-president is as unnecessary as it is

dangerous. This officer, for want of other employment, is made president

of the senate, thereby blending the executive and legislative powers,

besides always giving to some one state, from which he is to come, an

unjust pre-eminence.

It is a maxim in republics that the representative of the people should be

of their immediate choice; but by the manner in which the president is

chosen, he arrives to this office at the fourth or fifth hand, nor does

the highest vote, in the way he is elected, determine the choice, for it

is only necessary that he should be taken from the highest of five, who

may have a plurality of votes.

Compare your past opinions and sentiments with the present proposed

establishment, and you will find, that if you adopt it, that it will lead

you into a system which you heretofore reprobated as odious. Every

American Whig, not long since, bore his emphatic testimony against a

monarchical government, though limited, because of the dangerous

inequality that it created among citizens as relative to their rights and

property; and wherein does this president, invested with his powers and

prerogatives, essentially differ from the king of Great Britain (save as

to name, the creation of nobility, and some immaterial incidents, the

offspring of absurdity and locality). The direct prerogatives of the

president, as springing from his political character, are among the

following: It is necessary, in order to distinguish him from the rest of

the community, and enable him to keep, and maintain his court, that the

compensation for his services, or in other words, his revenue, should be

such as to enable him to appear with the splendor of a prince; he has the

power of receiving ambassadors from, and a great influence on their

appointments to foreign courts; as also to make treaties, leagues, and

alliances with foreign states, assisted by the Senate, which when made

become the supreme law of land: he is a constituent part of the

legislative power, for every bill which shall pass the House of

Representatives and Senate is to be presented to him for approbation; if

he approves of it he is to sign it, if he disapproves he is to return it

with objections, which in many cases will amount to a complete negative;

and in this view he will have a great share in the power of making peace,

coining money, etc., and all the various objects of legislation, expressed

or implied in this Constitution: for though it may be asserted that the

king of Great Britain has the express power of making peace or war, yet he

never thinks it prudent to do so without the advice of his Parliament,

from whom he is to derive his support, and therefore these powers, in both

president and king, are substantially the same: he is the generalissimo of

the nation, and of course has the command and control of the army, navy

and militia; he is the general conservator of the peace of the union—he

may pardon all offences, except in cases of impeachment, and the principal

fountain of all offices and employments. Will not the exercise of these

powers therefore tend either to the establishment of a vile and arbitrary

aristocracy or monarchy? The safety of the people in a republic depends on

the share or proportion they have in the government; but experience ought

to teach you, that when a man is at the head of an elective government

invested with great powers, and interested in his re-election, in what

circle appointments will be made; by which means an _imperfect

aristocracy_ bordering on monarchy may be established.

You must, however, my countrymen, beware that the advocates of this new

system do not deceive you by a fallacious resemblance between it and your

own state government which you so much prize; and, if you examine, you

will perceive that the chief magistrate of this state is your immediate

choice, controlled and checked by a just and full representation of the

people, divested of the prerogative of influencing war and peace, making

treaties, receiving and sending embassies, and commanding standing armies

and navies, which belong to the power of the confederation, and will be

convinced that this government is no more like a true picture of your own

than an Angel of Darkness resembles an Angel of Light.

CATO.

Cato, V.

The New York Journal, (Number 2145)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787.

For the New York Journal, &c.

_To the_ CITIZENS _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK.

In my last number I endeavored to prove that the language of the article

relative to the establishment of the executive of this new government was

vague and inexplicit; that the great powers of the president, connected

with his duration in office, would lead to oppression and ruin; that he

would be governed by favorites and flatterers, or that a dangerous council

would be collected from the great officers of state; that the ten miles

square, if the remarks of one of the wisest men, drawn from the experience

of mankind, may be credited, would be the asylum of the base, idle,

avaricious and ambitious, and that the court would possess a language and

manners different from yours; that a vice-president is as unnecessary as

he is dangerous in his influence; that the president cannot represent you

because he is not of your own immediate choice; that if you adopt this

government you will incline to an arbitrary and odious aristocracy or

monarchy; that the president, possessed of the power given him by this

frame of government, differs but very immaterially from the establishment

of monarchy in Great Britain; and I warned you to beware of the fallacious

resemblance that is held out to you by the advocates of this new system

between it and your own state governments.

And here I cannot help remarking that inexplicitness seems to pervade this

whole political fabric; certainly in political compacts, which Mr. Coke

calls _the mother and nurse of repose and quietness_ the want of which

induced men to engage in political society, has ever been held by a wise

and free people as essential to their security; as on the one hand it

fixes barriers which the ambitious and tyrannically disposed magistrate

dare not overleap, and on the other, becomes a wall of safety to the

community—otherwise stipulations between the governors and governed are

nugatory; and you might as well deposit the important powers of

legislation and execution in one or a few and permit them to govern

according to their disposition and will; but the world is too full of

examples, which prove that _to live by one man’s will became the cause of

all men’s misery_. Before the existence of express political compacts it

was reasonably implied that the magistrate should govern with wisdom and

justice; but mere implication was too feeble to restrain the unbridled

ambition of a bad man, or afford security against negligence, cruelty or

any other defect of mind. It is alleged that the opinions and manners of

the people of America are capable to resist and prevent an extension of

prerogative or oppression, but you must recollect that opinion and manners

are mutable, and may not always be a permanent obstruction against the

encroachments of government; that the progress of a commercial society

begets luxury, the parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy

to restraint; and that ambition and voluptuousness, aided by flattery,

will teach magistrates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have

separate and distinct interests from the people; besides, it will not be

denied that government assimilates the manners and opinions of the

community to it. Therefore, a general presumption that rulers will govern

well is not a sufficient security. You are then under a sacred obligation

to provide for the safety of your posterity, and would you now basely

desert their interests, when by a small share of prudence you may transmit

to them a beautiful political patrimony, which will prevent the necessity

of their travelling through seas of blood to obtain that which your wisdom

might have secured? It is a duty you owe likewise to your own reputation,

for you have a great name to lose; you are characterized as cautious,

prudent and jealous in politics; whence is it therefore that you are about

to precipitate yourselves into a sea of uncertainty, and adopt a system so

vague, and which has discarded so many of your valuable rights? Is it

because you do not believe that an American can be a tyrant? If this be

the case, you rest on a weak basis: Americans are like other men in

similar situations, when the manners and opinions of the community are

changed by the causes I mentioned before; and your political compact

inexplicit, your posterity will find that great power connected with

ambition, luxury and flattery, will as readily produce a Cæsar, Caligula,

Nero and Domitian in America, as the same causes did in the Roman Empire.

But the next thing to be considered, in conformity to my plan, is the

first article of this new government, which comprises the erection of the

house of representatives and the senate, and prescribes their various

powers and objects of legislation. The most general objections to the

first article, that biennial elections for representatives are a departure

from the safe democratic principles of annual ones—that the number of

representatives are too few; that the apportionment and principles of

increase are unjust; that no attention has been paid to either the numbers

or property in each state in forming the senate; that the mode in which

they are appointed and their duration will lead to the establishment of an

aristocracy; that the senate and president are improperly connected, both

as to appointments and the making of treaties, which are to become the

supreme law of the land; that the judicial, in some measure, to wit, as to

the trial of impeachments, is placed in the senate, a branch of the

legislative, and sometimes a branch of the executive; that Congress have

the improper power of making or altering the regulations prescribed by the

different legislatures, respecting the time, place and manner of holding

elections for representatives, and the time and manner of choosing

senators; that standing armies may be established, and appropriation of

money made for their support for two years; that the militia of the most

remote state may be marched into those states situated at the opposite

extreme of this continent; that the slave trade is, to all intents and

purposes, permanently established, and a slavish capitation or poll-tax

may at any time be levied; these are some of the many evils that will

attend the adoption of this government.

But, with respect to the first objection, it may be remarked that a

well-digested democracy has this advantage over all others, to wit: that

it affords to many the opportunity to be advanced to the supreme command,

and the honors they thereby enjoy fill them with a desire of rendering

themselves worthy of them; hence this desire becomes part of their

education, is matured in manhood, and produces an ardent affection for

their country, and it is the opinion of the great Sidney and Montesquieu

that this is, in a great measure, produced by annual election of

magistrates.

If annual elections were to exist in this government, and learning and

information to become more prevalent, you never would want men to execute

whatever you could design. Sidney observes _that a well-governed state is

as fruitful to all good purposes as the seven-headed serpent is said to

have been in evil; when one head is cut off, many rise up in the place of

it_. He remarks further that _it was also thought that free cities, by

frequent election of magistrates, became nurseries of great and able men,

every man endeavoring to excel others, that he might be advanced to the

honor he had no other title to, than what might arise from his merit or

reputation_; but the framers of this _perfect government_, as it is

called, have departed from this democratical principle, and established

biennial elections for the house of representatives, who are to be chosen

by the people, and sextennial for the senate, who are to be chosen by the

legislatures of the different states, and have given to the executive the

unprecedented power of making temporary senators, in case of vacancies by

resignation or otherwise, and so far forth establishing a precedent for

virtual representation (though, in fact, their original appointment is

virtual), thereby influencing the choice of the legislatures, or if they

should not be so complaisant as to conform to his appointment, offence

will be given to the executive, and the temporary members will appear

ridiculous by rejection; this temporary member, during his time of

appointment, will of course act by a power derived from the executive, and

for, and under his immediate influence.

It is a very important objection to this government, that the

representation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of

corruption, and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments

ought to take precautions—how guarded you have been on this head, in your

own state constitution, and yet the number of senators and representatives

proposed for this vast continent does not equal those of your own state;

how great the disparity, if you compare them with the aggregate numbers in

the United States. The history of representation in England, from which we

have taken our model of legislation, is briefly this: before the

institution of legislating by deputies, the whole free part of the

community usually met for that purpose; when this became impossible, by

the increase of numbers, the community was divided into districts, from

each of which was sent such a number of deputies as was a complete

representation of the various numbers and orders of citizens within them;

but can it be asserted with truth, that six men can be a complete and full

representation of the numbers and various orders of the people in this

state? Another thing that may be suggested against the small number of

representatives is, that but few of you will have a chance of sharing even

in this branch of the legislature; and that the choice will be confined to

a very few. The more complete it is, the better will your interests be

preserved, and the greater the opportunity you will have to participate in

government, one of the principal securities of a free people; but this

subject has been so ably and fully treated by a writer under the signature

of Brutus,(54) that I shall content myself with referring you to him

thereon, reserving further observations on the other objections I have

mentioned, for my future numbers.

CATO.

Cato, VI.

The New York Journal, (Number 2163)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 16, 1787.

For the New York Journal, &c.

_To the_ PEOPLE _of the_ STATE _of_ NEW YORK.

The next objection that arises against this proffered constitution is,

that the apportionment of representatives and direct taxes are unjust. The

words, as expressed in this article, are “representatives and direct taxes

shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included in

this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be

determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those

bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed,

three-fifths of all other persons.” In order to elucidate this, it will be

necessary to repeat the remark in my last number, that the mode of

legislation in the infancy of free communities was by the collective body,

and this consisted of free persons, or those whose age admitted them to

the right of mankind and citizenship, whose sex made them capable of

protecting the state, and whose birth may be denominated Free Born; and no

traces can be found that ever women, children, and slaves, or those who

were not sui juris, in the early days of legislation, meeting with the

free members of the community to deliberate on public measures; hence is

derived this maxim in free governments, that representation ought to bear

a proportion to the number of free inhabitants in a community; this

principle your own state constitution, and others, have observed in the

establishment of a future census, in order to apportion the

representatives, and to increase or diminish the representation to the

ratio of the increase or diminution of electors. But, what aid can the

community derive from the assistance of women, infants and slaves, in

their deliberation, or in their defence? and what motives, therefore,

could the convention have in departing from the just and rational

principle of representation, which is the governing principle of this

state and of all America?

The doctrine of taxation is a very important one, and nothing requires

more wisdom and prudence than the regulation of that portion, which is

taken from, and of that which is left to the subject—and if you anticipate

what will be the enormous expense of this new government added also to

your own, little will that portion be which will be left to you. I know

there are politicians who believe that you should be loaded with taxes, in

order to make you industrious, and, perhaps, there are some of this

opinion in the convention, but it is an erroneous principle. For, what can

inspire you with industry, if the greatest measure of your labors are to

be swallowed up in taxes? The advocates for this new system hold out an

idea, that you will have but little to pay, for that the revenues will be

so managed as to be almost wholly drawn from the source of trade or duties

on imports, but this is delusive—for this government to discharge all its

incidental expenses, besides paying the interest on the home and foreign

debts, will require more money than its commerce can afford; and if you

reflect one moment, you will find, that if heavy duties are laid on

merchandise, as must be the case if government intends to make this the

prime medium to lighten the people of taxes, that the price of the

commodities, useful as well as luxurious, must be increased; the consumers

will be fewer; the merchants must import less; trade will languish, and

this source of revenue in a great measure be dried up; but if you examine

this a little further you will find that this revenue, managed in this

way, will come out of you, and be a very heavy and ruinous one, at least.

The merchant no more than advances the money for you to the public and

will not, nor cannot pay any part of it himself; and if he pays more

duties, he will sell his commodities at a price portionably raised. Thus

the laborer, mechanic, and farmer must feel it in the purchase of their

utensils and clothing—wages, etc., must rise with the price of things or

they must be ruined; and that must be the case with the farmer, whose

produce will not increase, in the ratio, with labor, utensils and

clothing; for that he must sell at the usual price or lower perhaps,

caused by the decrease of trade; the consequence will be that he must

mortgage his farm, and then comes inevitable bankruptcy.

In what manner then will you be eased, if the expenses of government are

to be raised solely out of the commerce of this country; do you not

readily apprehend the fallacy of this argument? But government will find

that to press so heavily on commerce will not do, and therefore must have

recourse to other objects; these will be a capitation or poll-tax, window

lights, etc., etc., and a long train of impositions which their ingenuity

will suggest; but will you submit to be numbered like the slaves of an

arbitrary despot; and what will be your reflections when the tax-master

thunders at your door for the duty on that light which is the bounty of

heaven. It will be the policy of the great landholders who will chiefly

compose this senate, and perhaps a majority of this house of

representatives, to keep their lands free from taxes; and this is

confirmed by the failure of every attempt to lay a land-tax in this state;

hence recourse must and will be had to the sources I mentioned before. The

burdens on you will be insupportable—your complaints will be

inefficacious—this will beget public disturbances; and I will venture to

predict, without the spirit of prophecy, that you and the government, if

it is adopted, will one day be at issue on this point. The force of

government will be exerted, this will call for an increase of revenue, and

will add fuel to the fire. The result will be that either you will revolve

to some other form, or that government will give peace to the country by

destroying the opposition. If government therefore can, notwithstanding

every opposition, raise a revenue on such things as are odious and

burdensome to you, they can do anything.

But why should the number of individuals be the principle to apportion the

taxes in each state, and to include in that number women, children and

slaves? The most natural and equitable principle of apportioning taxes

would be in a ratio to their property, and a reasonable impost in a ratio

to their trade; but you are told to look for the reason of these things in

accommodation; but this much-admired principle, when stripped of its

mystery, will in this case appear to be no less than a basis for an odious

poll-tax—the offspring of despotic governments, a thing so detestable that

the state of Maryland, in their bill of rights, declares “that the levying

taxes by the poll is grievous and oppressive, and ought to be abolished.”

A poll-tax is at all times oppressive to the poor, and their greatest

misfortune will consist in having more prolific wives than the rich.

In every civilized community, even in those of the most democratic kind,

there are principles which lead to an aristocracy—these are superior

talents, fortunes and public employments. But in free governments the

influence of the two former is resisted by the equality of the laws, and

the latter by the frequency of elections, and the chance that every one

has in sharing in public business; but when this natural and artificial

eminence is assisted by principles interwoven in this government; when the

senate, so important a branch of the legislature, is so far removed from

the people as to have little or no connection with them; when their

duration in office is such as to have the resemblance to perpetuity; when

they are connected with the executive, by the appointment of all officers,

and also to become a judiciary for the trial of officers of their own

appointments; added to all this, when none but men of opulence will hold a

seat, what is there left to resist and repel this host of influence and

power? Will the feeble efforts of the house of representatives, in whom

your security ought to subsist, consisting of about seventy-three, be able

to hold the balance against them, when, from the fewness of members in

this house, the senate will have in their power to poison even a majority

of that body by douceurs of office for themselves or friends? From causes

like this both Montesquieu and Hume have predicted the decline of the

British government into that of an absolute one; but the liberties of this

country, it is probable, if this system is adopted, will be strangled in

their birth; for whenever the executive and senate can destroy the

independence of the majority in the house of representatives, then where

is your security? They are so intimately connected, that their interests

will be one and the same; and will the slow increase of numbers be able to

afford a repelling principle? But you are told to adopt this government

first, and you will always be able to alter it afterwards; this would

first be submitting to be slaves and then taking care of your liberty; and

when your chains are on, then to act like freemen.

Complete acts of legislation, which are to become the supreme law of the

land, ought to be the united act of all the branches of government; but

there is one of the most important duties may be managed by the Senate and

executive alone, and to have all the force of the law paramount without

the aid or interference of the House of Representatives; that is the power

of making treaties. This power is a very important one, and may be

exercised in various ways, so as to affect your person and property, and

even the domain of the nation. By treaties you may defalcate part of the

empire; engagements may be made to raise an army, and you may be

transported to Europe, to fight the wars of ambitious princes; money may

be contracted for, and you must pay it; and a thousand other obligations

may be entered into; all which will become the supreme law of the land,

and you are bound by it. If treaties are erroneously or wickedly made who

is there to punish,—the executive can always cover himself with the plea

that he was advised by the senate, and the senate being a collective body

are not easily made accountable for mal-administration. On this account we

are in a worse situation than Great Britain, where they have secured by a

ridiculous fiction, the king from accountability, by declaring that he can

do no wrong, by which means the nation can have redress against his

minister; but with us infallibility pervades every part of the system, and

neither the executive nor his council, who are a collective body, and his

advisers, can be brought to punishment for mal-administration.

CATO.

Cato, VII.

The New York Journal, (Number 2181)

THURSDAY, JANUARY 3, 1788.

For the New York Journal, &c.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

That the president and senate are further improperly connected will

appear, if it is considered that their dependence on each other will

prevent either from being a check upon the other; they must act in

concert, and whether the power and influence of the one or the other is to

prevail, will depend on the character and abilities of the men who hold

those offices at the time. The senate is vested with such a proportion of

the executive that it would be found necessary that they should be

constantly sitting. This circumstance did not escape the convention, and

they have provided for the event, in the 2d article, which declares that

the executive may, on extraordinary occasions, _convene both houses or

either of them_. No occasion can exist for calling the assembly without

the senate; the words _or either of them_ must have been intended to apply

only to the senate. Their wages are already provided for, and it will be

therefore readily observed that the partition between a perpetuation of

their sessions, and a perpetuation of offices in the progress of the

government, will be found to be but thin and feeble. Besides, the senate,

who have the sole power to try all impeachments, in case of the

impeachment of the president are to determine, as judges, the propriety of

the advice they gave him as senators. Can the senate in this, therefore,

be an impartial judicature? And will they not rather serve as a screen to

great public defaulters?

Among the many evils that are incorporated in this new system of

government is that of congress having the power of making or altering the

regulations prescribed by the different legislatures respecting the time,

place and manner of holding elections for representatives, and the time

and manner of choosing senators. If it is enquired in what manner this

regulation may be exercised to your injury, the answer is easy. By the

first article the house of representatives shall consist of members,

chosen every second year by the people of the several states who are

qualified to vote for members of their several state assemblies; it can

therefore readily be believed, that the different state legislatures,

provided such can exist after the adoption of this government, will

continue those easy and convenient modes for the election of

representatives for the national legislature that are in use for the

election of members of assembly for their own states; but the congress

have, by the constitution, a power to make other regulations or alter

those in practice, prescribed by your own state legislatures; hence,

instead of having the places of elections in the precincts and brought

home almost to your own doors, congress may establish a place, or places,

at either the extremes, center or outer parts of the states; at a time and

season, too, when it may be very inconvenient to attend; and by these

means destroy the rights of election. But in opposition to this reasoning,

it is asserted, that it is a necessary power, because the states might

omit making rules for the purpose, and thereby defeat the existence of

that branch of the government; this is what logicians call _argumentum

absurdum_; for the different states, if they will have any security at all

in this government, will find it in the house of representatives, and

they, therefore, would be very ready to eradicate a principle in which it

dwells, or involve their country in an instantaneous revolution. Besides,

if this was the apprehension of the framers, and the ground of that

provision, why did not they extend this controlling power to the other

duties of the several state legislatures? To exemplify this, the states

are to appoint senators and electors for choosing of a president; but the

time is to be under the direction of congress. Now, suppose they were to

omit the appointment of senators and electors, though congress was to

appoint the time, which might well be apprehended, as the omission of

regulations for the election of members of the house of representatives,

provided they had that power; or suppose they were not to meet at all; of

course, the government cannot proceed in its exercise. And from this

motive or apprehension, congress ought to have taken these duties entirely

in their own hands, and, by a decisive declaration, annihilated them,

which they in fact have done by leaving them without the means of support,

or at least resting on their bounty. To this the advocates for this system

oppose the common, empty declamation, that there is no danger that

congress will abuse this power; but such language, as relative to so

important a subject, is mere vapor, and formed without sense. Is it not in

their power, however, to make such regulations as may be inconvenient to

you? It must be admitted, because the words are unlimited in their sense.

It is a good rule, in the construction of a contract, to suppose that what

may be done will be; therefore, in considering this subject, you are to

suppose that in the exercise of this government, a regulation of congress

will be made for holding an election for the whole state at Poughkeepsie,

at New York, or, perhaps, at Fort Stanwix; who will then be the actual

electors for the house of representatives? You ought certainly to have as

much or more distrust with respect to the exercise of these powers by

congress, than congress ought to have with respect to the exercise of

those duties which ought to be entrusted to the several states, because

over them congress can have a legislative controlling power.

Hitherto we have tied up our rulers in the exercise of their duties by

positive restrictions; if the cord has been drawn too tight, loosen it to

the necessary extent, but do not entirely unbind them. I am no enemy to

placing a reasonable confidence in them, but such an unbounded one as the

advocates and framers of this new system advise you to, would be dangerous

to your liberties; it has been the ruin of other governments, and will be

yours, if you adopt with all its latitudinal power. Unlimited power in

governors as well as individuals is frequently the parent of deception.

What facilitated the corrupt designs of Philip of Macedon and caused the

ruin of Athens, but the unbounded confidence in their statesmen and

rulers? Such improper confidence Demosthenes was so well convinced had

ruined his country, that in his second Philippic oration he remarks “that

there is one common bulwark with which men of prudence are naturally

provided, the guard and security of all people, particularly of free

states, against the assaults of tyrants. What is this? Distrust. Of this

be mindful; to this adhere; preserve this carefully, and no calamity can

affect you.” Montesquieu observes that “the course of government is

attended with an insensible descent to evil, and there is no reascending

to good without very great efforts.” The plain influence from this

doctrine is, that rulers in all governments will erect an interest

separate from the ruled, which will have a tendency to enslave them. There

is, therefore, no other way of interrupting this insensible descent and

warding off the evil as long as possible, than by establishing principles

of distrust on your constituents, and cultivating the sentiment among

yourselves. But let me inquire of you, my countrymen, whether the freedom

and independence of elections is a point of magnitude? If it is, what kind

of a spirit of amity, deference and concession is that which has put in

the power of congress, at one stroke, to prevent your interference in

government, and do away your liberties forever? Does either the situation

or circumstances of things warrant it?

CATO.

THE LETTERS OF CÆSAR, WRITTEN BY ALEXANDER HAMILTON.

Printed In

The Daily Advertiser,

October, 1787.

Note.

These letters, from what has already been quoted on page 245, were

evidently written by Alexander Hamilton. He had just finished a newspaper

controversy of a very acrimonious character with George Clinton, which

probably caused these letters to be an attack on the writer of _Cato_,

rather than a defense of the new government. They are further evidence of

the great want of political tact and sympathy with the masses, of which

Hamilton gave so many specimens in his short life, and which alone

prevented his political success. That he himself realized this mistake is

shown by his prompt abandonment of _Cæsar_ and his beginning again anew in

_The Federalist_; the latter being a singular and interesting contrast in

both tone and argument to these earlier writings, which, it should be also

considered, were undoubtedly written in great haste.

Cæsar, I.

The Daily Advertiser, (Number 812)

MONDAY, OCTOBER 1, 1787.

The citizens of the State of New York have received yesterday, from _Cato_

(an ally of _Pompey_, no doubt), an introductory discourse on the

appearance of the new system for the government of the United States:

this, we are told, will be followed by such observations, on the

constitution proposed to the union, “as will promote our welfare and be

justified by reason and truth.” There is, in this preparatory lecture,

little that is necessary to be dwelt on just now; and if Cato had not

possessed his future investigations in such terms as wore a _questionable

shape_, they should have passed unheeded.

Cato tells us that he will not _directly engage as an advocate_ for this

new form of government, or as an _opponent_. Here Cato, without any

dispute, acts prudently. It will be wise in him to rest awhile; since he

has given a _preface_, which, with small address, can easily be made to

work on either side. When the sentiments of the confederate states come to

be generally known it will be time enough to proceed. Cato will then

_start fair_. A little caution, however, he thinks necessary to be given

the meantime. “Do not,” says this prudent censor, in addressing the

citizens, “because you will admit that _something_ must be done, adopt

_anything_.” What, in the name of common sense, does this injunction

import? I appeal to men of understanding, whether it is not obviously the

language of distrust, calculated, as far as such a thing can influence, to

prejudice the public opinion against the new constitution; and, in effect,

by a periphrastic mode of speech, recommending the rejection of it?

“_Teach_ the members of the Convention (Cato _very modestly_ goes on) that

you are capable of supervision of their conduct; the same medium that gave

you this system, if it is erroneous, while the door is now open, can make

amendments _or give you another_.” O excellent thought, and happily

advised! Be clamorous, my friends—be discontented—assert your

prerogative—forever assert the power and _majesty of the people_. I am not

willing to suspect any man’s intentions, when they aim at giving

information; but when they come abroad, couched in such _magisterial_

terms, I own I feel some indignation. If this demagogue had talents to

throw light on the subject of legislation, why did he not offer them when

the Convention was in session? If they had been judged useful, no doubt

they would have been attended to. But is this _now a time_ for such

insinuations? Has not the wisdom of America been drawn, as it were, into a

focus, and the proffered constitution sent forth with a unanimity that is

unequalled in ancient or modern story? And shall we now wrangle and find

fault with the _excellent whole_, because, perhaps some of its parts

_might have been_ more perfect? There is neither virtue or patriotism in

such conduct. Besides, how can Cato say, “that the door is now open to

receive any amendments, or give us _another constitution_, if required?” I

believe he has advanced this without proper authority. I am inclined to

believe that the _door of recommendation is shut and cannot be opened by

the same men_; that the Convention, in one word, is dissolved; if so we

must reject IN TOTO, or _vice versa_; just take it as it is and be

thankful. I deny the similarity betwixt the present constitution and that

of the United Netherlands. Cato would have drawn a very melancholy

picture, but it won’t apply. In my most humble opinion, it has a much

greater affinity with the government, which, in all human probability,

will remain when the history of the Seven Provinces shall be forgotten.

Cato tells us (what all America knows by this time) that the new

constitution comes sanctioned with the approbation of General Washington;

and, though he appears to have some reverence for that great patriot

chief, yet he very sagaciously observes, that the _best and wisest man may

err_; and thence asserts, that every man in _politics_, as well as in

religion, ought to judge for himself. This paragraph needs no comment,

and, for that reason, I shall not touch it; but with all deference to

Cato’s penetration, I would recommend to him, instead of entering into

fruitless discussion of what has come from so many _clear heads_ and _good

hearts_, to join his fellow-citizens, and endeavor to reconcile this

_excellent constitution_ to the _weak_, the _suspicious_, and the

_interested_, who will be chiefly opposed to it, as soon as possible. I

would also advise him to give his vote (as he will probably be one of the

Electors) to the American Fabius; it will be more healthy for this

country, and _this state_, that he should be induced to accept of the

presidency of the new government, than that he should be solicited again

to accept of the command of _an army_.

Cato, it appears, intends to adventure on perilous grounds; it will

therefore become him to be cautious on what terms he takes the field. “He

advises us to attach ourselves to measures, and not to men.” In this

instance he advises well; and I heartily recommend it to _himself_, and

not to forget the force of that important admonition; for Cato, in his

future marches, will very probably be _followed_ by

CÆSAR.

Friday.

Cæsar, II.

The Daily Advertiser, (Number 826)

WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 17, 1787.

For the Daily Advertiser.

“The great source of all the evils which afflict Republics, is,

that the people are too apt to make choice of rulers, who are

either Politicians without being Patriots, or Patriots without

being Politicians.”

MR. CHILDS:

When I took notice of Cato’s prefatory address to the Citizens of the

State of New York, in your paper of the first instant, I had no serious

intention of becoming a controversial defendant of the new constitution.

Indeed, if the system required defence, I was neither so weak nor so vain

as to suppose myself competent to the task. To obviate difficulties which

may arise, when such weighty affairs as the principles of legislation are

under discussion, I am sensible requires talents far beyond my limited

abilities. When I offered a few remarks on Cato’s introduction, I was

strongly impressed with the idea that even the most substantial

criticisms, promulgated by the most influential _avowed Citizens_, could

have no good tendency at _this time_. I viewed the public mind as wound up

to a great pitch of dissatisfaction, by the inadequacy of the powers of

the present Congress to the general good and conversation of the union. I

believed then, as I do now, that the people were determined and prepared

for a _change_. I conceived, therefore, that the wish of every good man

would be, that _this change might be peaceably effected_. With this view I

opposed myself to Cato. I asserted, in my last, _that the __ door of

recommendation was shut, and cannot be opened by the same men—that the

Convention was dissolved._ If I am wrong, it will be of great importance

to Cato’s future remarks that he make it appear. If he will declare from

sufficient authority, that the members of the late Convention have only

adjourned to give time to hear the sentiments of every political

disputant, that after the numerous presses of America have groaned with

the heavy productions of speculative politicians, they will _again meet_,

weigh their respective merits, and accommodate accordingly—I say, if Cato

can do this, I make no hesitation in acknowledging the utility of his

plan. In the mean time, I positively deny having any, the most distant

desire of shutting the door of free discussion, on any subject which may

benefit the people; but I maintain (until Cato’s better information

refutes me) that the door, as far as relates to _this subject_, is already

shut, not by me, but by the highest possible authority which the case

admits, even by those great Patriots who were delegated by the people of

the United States to _open such a door_, as might enable them to escape

from impending calamities and political shipwreck. This distinction is

clear, I conceive, and ought to have some weight even with Cato, as well

as those for whom he writes. I am not one of those who gain an influence

by cajoling the unthinking mass (tho’ I pity their delusions), and ringing

in their ears the gracious sound of their _absolute Sovereignty_. I

despise the trick of such dirty policy. I know there are Citizens, who, to

gain their own private ends, enflame the minds of the well-meaning, tho’

less intelligent parts of the community, by sating their vanity with that

cordial and unfailing specific, that _all power is seated in the people_.

For my part, I am not much attached to the _majesty of the multitude_, and

therefore waive all pretensions (founded on such conduct), to their

countenance. I consider them in general as very ill qualified to judge for

themselves what government will best suit their peculiar situations; nor

is this to be wondered at. The science of government is not easily

understood. Cato will admit, I presume, that men of good education and

deep reflection, only, are judges of the _form_ of a government; whether

it is constituted on such principles as will restrain arbitrary power, on

the one hand, and equal to the exclusion of corruption and the destruction

of licentiousness on the other; whether the New Constitution, if adopted,

will prove adequate to such desirable ends, time, the mother of events,

will show. For my own part, I sincerely esteem it a system, which, without

the finger of _God_, never could have been suggested and agreed upon by

such a diversity of interests. I will not presume to say that a more

perfect system might not have been fabricated; but who expects perfection

at once? And it may be asked, _who are judges of it_? Few, I believe, who

have leisure to study the nature of Government scientifically, but will

frequently disagree about the quantum of power to be delegated to Rulers,

and the different modifications of it. Ingenious men will give every

plausible, and, it may be, pretty substantial reasons, for the adoption of

two plans of Government, which shall be fundamentally different in their

construction, and not less so in their operation; yet both, if honestly

administered, might operate with safety and advantage. When a new form of

government is fabricated, it lies with the people at large to receive or

reject it—that is, their _inherent rights_. Now, I would ask (without

intending to triumph over the weaknesses or follies of any men), how are

the people to profit by this inherent right? By what conduct do they

discover that they are sensible of their own interests in this situation?

Is it by the exercise of a well-disciplined reason, and a correspondent

education? I believe not. How then? As I humbly conceive, by a tractable

and docile disposition, and by honest men endeavoring to keep their minds

easy, while others, of the same disposition, with the advantages of genius

and learning, are constructing the bark that may, by the blessing of

Heaven, carry them to the port of rest and happiness, if they will embark

without diffidence and proceed without mutiny. I know this is blunt and

ungracious reasoning; it is the best, however, which I am prepared to

offer on this momentous business; and, since my own heart does not

reproach me, I shall not be very solicitous about its reception. If truth,

then, is permitted to speak, the mass of the people of America (any more

than the mass of other countries) cannot judge with any degree of

precision concerning the fitness of this New Constitution to the peculiar

situation of America; they have, however, done wisely in delegating the

power of framing a government to those every way worthy and

well-qualified; and, if this Government is snatched, untasted, from them,

it may not be amiss to inquire into the causes which will probably

occasion their disappointment. Out of several, which present to my mind, I

shall venture to select _one_, baneful enough, in my opinion, to work this

dreadful evil. There are always men in society of some talents, but more

ambition, in quest of _that_ which it would be impossible for them to

obtain in any other way than by working on the passions and prejudices of

the less discerning classes of citizens and yeomanry. It is the plan of

men of this stamp to frighten the people with ideal bugbears, in order to

mould them to their own purposes. The unceasing cry of these designing

croakers is, My friends, your liberty is invaded! Have you thrown off the

yoke of one tyrant to invest yourselves with that of another? Have you

fought, bled and conquered for _such a change_? If you have—go—retire into

silent obscurity, and kiss the rod that scourges you.

To be serious: These state empirics leave no species of deceit untried to

convince the unthinking people that they have power to do—what? Why truly

to do much mischief, and to occasion anarchy and wild uproar. And for what

reason do these political jugglers incite the peaceably disposed to such

extravagant commotions? Because until the people really discover that they

have _power_, by some outrageous act, they never can become of any

importance. The misguided people never reflect during this frenzy, that

the moment they become riotous, they renounce, from that moment, their

independence, and commence vassals to their ambitious leaders, who

instantly, and with a high hand, rob them of their consequence, and apply

it to their own present or future aggrandisement; nor will these tyrants

over the people stick at sacrificing _their_ good, if an advantageous

compromise can be effected for _themselves_.

Before I conclude, I cannot refrain from observing that Cato states very

disingenuously the manner in which the Federal System came abroad. He

tells us, Congress were sensible that the late Convention exercised a

power which no authority could delegate to them. The Convention, says

Cato, have taken upon them to make a perfectly new system, which by its

operations will absorb the sovereignties of the individual States; this

new government founded on _usurpation_, (Cato, this expression is very

indecent—but I will rouse no passions against you) this consolidated

system Congress did not approve and _therefore_ have been _silent_ on its

character. That Congress was silent on its character is true, but could

Cato find no other reason for their silence than that of disapprobation? I

believe Congress were by no means dissatisfied with the freedom the

Convention took with the Articles of Confederation; I believe further that

with very few exceptions, that honorable body approves of the New

Constitution; and that they did not accompany it to the States with a

recommendatory capitation or circular letter, proceeded from a delicate

attention to the members of the late Convention, to a few of their own

body, and to the people of America at large. That the Convention went so

earnestly into the business committed to their care ought, instead of

being matter of chagrin, to occasion the liveliest expressions of

approbation and gratitude—as matters stand just now. I think it may be

fairly said, that no _generous plan of government_ for the _United States_

has ever been constructed, (the plan only excepted which is under

consideration) so that it seems quite unnecessary in Cato to disturb the

peace of society by a bombast appeal to their feelings, on the _generous

plan of power delivered down by their renowned forefathers_. I venerate

the memory of the slaughtered patriots of America, and rejoice as much as

Cato that they did not bleed in vain, but I would have America profit by

their death in a different manner from him. I believe they sought to

obtain liberty for no particular State, but for the whole Union,

indissolubly connected under one controlling and supreme head.

Cato complains of my anticipating parts of his subject which he intended

for future periods. I shall break in no more upon his _arrangements_. All

he can say against the New Constitution has been already disseminated in a

neighboring State by the glorious defenders of _Shayism_. I shall

therefore leave Cato to the wicked influences of his own heart, in the

fullest persuasion that all good citizens will combine their influence to

establish the fair fabric of American liberty beyond the reach of

suspicion, violence, anarchy, and tyranny. When this glorious work is

accomplished, what may America not hope to arrive at? I will venture to

prophesy that the day on which the Union under the new government shall be

ratified by the American States, that _that day_ will begin an era which

will be recorded and observed by future ages as a day which the Americans

had marked by their wisdom in circumscribing the _power_ and ascertaining

the _decline_ of the ancient nations in Christendom.

CÆSAR.

October 15.

THE LETTERS OF SYDNEY. WRITTEN BY ROBERT YATES.

Printed In

The New York Journal,

June, 1788.

Note.

_Sydney_ was a favorite pseudonym of Robert Yates, and was so well known

as his pen name by his contemporaries that it was hardly intended as a

mask. He had already contributed to the New York Journal a very able

series of papers on the Constitution over the signature of _Brutus_,

written to influence the people, but the elections had taken place before

the appearance of _Sydney_, which were therefore intended for the

delegates to the State Convention, soon to assemble. A year later, when

Yates was nominated for governor by the Federalists, quotation from these

articles was one of the favorite modes of attacking him used by the

anti-federalists.

Sydney, I.

The New York Journal, (Number 2320)

Friday, June 13, 1788.

For the Daily Patriotic Register.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

Although a variety of objections to the proposed new constitution for the

government of the United States have been laid before the public by men of

the best abilities, I am led to believe that representing it in a point of

view which has escaped their observation may be of use, that is, by

comparing it with the constitution of the State of New York.

The following contrast is therefore submitted to the public, to show in

what instances the powers of the state government will be either totally

or partially absorbed, and enable us to determine whether the remaining

powers will, from those kind of pillars, be capable of supporting the

mutilated fabric of a government, which even the advocates for the new

constitution admit excels “the boasted models of Greece or Rome, and those

of all other nations, in having precisely marked out the power of the

government and the rights of the people.”

It may be proper to premise that the pressure of necessity and distress

(and not corruption) had a principal tendency to induce the adoption of

the state constitutions and the existing confederation, that power was

even then vested in the rulers with the greatest caution, and that, as

from every circumstance we have reason to infer that the new constitution

does not originate from a pure source, we ought deliberately to trace the

extent and tendency of the trust we are about to repose, under the

conviction that a reassumption of that trust will at least be difficult,

if not impracticable. If we take a retrospective view of the measures of

Congress who have their secret journals, the conduct of their officers, at

home and abroad, acting under an oath of secrecy, as well as of

individuals who were intimately connected with them, from the year 1780 to

the last convention, who also acted under an injunction of secrecy (and

whose journals have not been published even to this day, but will no doubt

continue buried in the dark womb of suspicious secrecy), we can scarcely

entertain a doubt but that a plan has long since been framed to subvert

the confederation; that that plan has been matured with the most

persevering industry and unremitted attention, and that the objects

expressed in the preamble to the constitution, that is “to promote the

general welfare and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our

posterity,” were merely the ostensible, and not the real reasons of its

framers. That necessity and danger have been the moving causes to the

establishment of the confederation will appear from the words of Congress

recommending its formation to the several legislatures which are “under a

conviction of the absolute necessity of uniting all our councils and all

our strength to maintain our common liberties. Let them be examined with

liberality becoming brethren and fellow-citizens, surrounded by the same

iminent dangers, contending for the same illustrious prize, and deeply

interested in being forever bound and connected together by the ties the

most intimate and indissoluble.”

That these principles equally applied to the formation of our state

constitution no person can seriously doubt who recollects the rapid

progress of the British troops in this state and in Jersey in the year

1776, and the despondence which prevailed among the people on that

occasion. The convention of this state, about that period, in explaining

to the people the justice of the American cause, addressed them as

follows: “You and all men were created free and authorised to establish

civil government for the preservation of our rights against civil

oppression, and the security of that freedom which God had given you,

against the rapacious hand of tyranny and lawless power. If then God hath

given us freedom, are we not responsible to him for that as well as other

talents? If it is our birth-right, let us not sell it for a mess of

pottage, nor suffer it to be torn from us by the hand of violence.”

The omission of a bill of rights in this State has given occasion to an

inference that the omission was equally warrantable in the constitution

for the United States. On this it may be necessary to observe that while

the constitution of this State was in agitation, there appeared doubts

upon the propriety of the measure, from the peculiar situation in which

the country then was; our connection with Britain dissolved, and her

government formally renounced—no substitute devised—all the powers of

government avowedly temporary, and solely calculated for defence; it was

urged by those in favor of a bill of rights that the power of the rulers

ought to be circumscribed, the better to protect the people at large from

the oppression and usurpation of their rulers. The English petition of

rights, in the reign of Charles the First, and the bill of rights in the

reign of king William, were mentioned as examples to support their

opinions. Those in opposition admitted that in established governments,

which had an implied constitution, a declaration of rights might be

necessary to prevent the usurpation of ambitious men, but that was not our

situation, for upon the declaration of independence it had become

necessary that the exercise of every kind of authority “under the former

government should be totally suppressed, and all the power of government

exerted under the authority of the people of the colonies;” that we could

not suppose that we had an existing constitution or form of government,

express or implied, and therefore our situation resembled a people in a

state of nature, who are preparing “to institute a government, laying its

foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as

to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,” and

as such, the constitution to be formed would operate as a bill of rights.

These and the like considerations operated to induce the convention of New

York to dismiss the idea of a bill of rights, and the more especially as

the legislative state officers being elected by the people at short

periods, and thereby rendered from time to time liable to be displaced in

case of mal-conduct. But these reasons will not apply to the general

government, because it will appear in the sequel that the state

governments are considered in it as mere dependencies, existing solely by

its toleration, and possessing powers of which they may be deprived

whenever the general government is disposed so to do. If then the powers

of the state governments are to be totally absorbed, in which all agree,

and only differ as to the mode, whether it will be effected by a rapid

progression, or by as certain, but slower, operations: what is to limit

the oppression of the general government? Where are the rights, which are

declared to be incapable of violation? And what security have people

against the wanton oppression of unprincipled governors? No constitutional

redress is pointed out, and no express declaration is contained in it, to

limit the boundaries of their rulers; beside which the mode and period of

their being elected tends to take away their responsibility to the people

over whom they may, by the power of the purse and the sword, domineer at

discretion; nor is there a power on earth to tell them, What dost thou?

or, Why dost thou so?

I shall now proceed to compare the constitution of the state of New York

with the proposed federal government, distinguishing the paragraphs in the

former, which are rendered nugatory by the latter; those which are in a

great measure enervated, and such as are in the discretion of the general

government to permit or not.

The 1st and 37th paragraphs of the constitution of the state of New York.

The 1st “Ordains, determines, and declares that no authority shall on any

pretence whatever be exercised over the people or members of this State,

but such as shall be derived from and granted by them.”

The 37th, “That no purchases or contracts for the sale of lands with or of

the Indians within the limits of this state, shall be binding on the

Indians, or deemed valid, unless made under the authority and with the

consent of the legislature of this state.”

I beg here to observe that the whole history of this spurious constitution

for the government of the United States, from its origin to the present

day, and the measures taken by Congress respecting the Indian affairs in

this state, are a series of violations of these paragraphs, and of the

13th article of the confederation.

It was a violation of the state constitution for the senate and assembly,

on the 19th of February, 1787, to instruct their members to move in

Congress for an act recommending a convention; and it was also a violation

of the 13th article of the confederation for Congress, on the 21st day

February, to recommend a convention to the several legislatures. It was a

further violation of the constitution of this state, by the senate and

assembly, on the 27th day of March, to join and to appoint delegates to

meet in convention, and it being done in that hasty, if not surreptitious

manner, by joint resolutions, when acts of the least consequence, even for

the yoking of hogs, require to be passed under the formalities of a law,

makes it more glaringly so.

It was an outrageous violation in the convention on the 17th of September,

1787, to attempt a consolidation of the union, and utterly destroy the

confederation and the sovereignty of particular states, when their powers

were restricted “to the sole and express purpose of revising and amending

the confederation.”

It was again an infringement of the 13th article in the confederation, for

Congress, on the 28th of September, not to arrest and prevent its being

transmitted to the several legislatures; nor was the legislature of this

state less culpable, in the beginning of February, 1788, who, in the

course of three hours, took up and concluded the measure of calling a

convention without apprising their constituents of the danger.

It is notorious that the right of regulating Indian affairs, especially

with the five nations, has been in the colony of New York since the year

1664, and before that period, from the year 1614, whilst it was called New

Nederland under the Dutch. That by the confederation, although Congress

are invested with the power of regulating the trade and managing all

affairs with the Indians, that they are restricted to those Indians “not

members of any of the states, and a special proviso that the legislative

rights of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated.”

It therefore was a violation of the confederation and of the rights of the

state for the congressional commissioners of Indian affairs to treat, at

fort Stanwix, with and thereat to make a purchase from the five nations

without the authority or consent of the legislature of this state. It was

an infraction of the rights of the citizens of this state, and an insult

on their government, for those commissioners to wrest private property

from individuals, imprison their persons, set at defiance the civil

authority of the county of Montgomery, and violently to resist the

execution of legal process. Nor was the ordinance of the 7th of August,

1786, for the regulation of Indian affairs, less so, namely, that “the

Indian department be divided into two districts, viz.: the southern, which

shall comprehend within its limits all the nations in the territory of the

United States, who reside to the southward of the Ohio; and the northern,

which shall comprehend all the nations within the said territory, and

westward, not of lake Ontario, but of Hudson’s river; that a

superintendent for the northern districts shall have authority to appoint

two deputies to reside in such places as shall best facilitate the

regulation of the Indian trade; that no person, citizen or other, under

the penalty of five hundred dollars, shall reside among or trade with any

Indian or Indian nations within the territory of the United States,

without a licence for that purpose first obtained from the superintendent

of the district, or of one of the deputies, who is hereby directed to give

such licence to every person who shall produce from the supreme executive

of any state a certificate under the seal of the state, that he is of good

character and suitably qualified and provided for that employment, for

which licence he shall pay for one year the sum of fifty dollars to the

said superintendent for the use of the United States.” If this was the

conduct of Congress and their officers, when possessed of powers which

were declared by them to be insufficient for the purposes of government,

what have we reasonably to expect will be their conduct when possessed of

the powers “to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the

several states, and with the Indian tribes,” when they are armed with

legislative, executive and judicial powers, and their laws the supreme

laws of the land—and when the states are prohibited, without the consent

of Congress, to lay any “imposts or duties on imports,” and if they do

they shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States—and all

such laws subject to the revision and controul of Congress.

It is therefore evident that this state, by adopting the new government,

will enervate their legislative rights, and totally surrender into the

hands of Congress the management and regulation of the Indian trade to an

improper government, and the traders to be fleeced by iniquitous

impositions, operating at one and the same time as a monopoly and a

poll-tax. The deputy by the above ordinance, has a right to exact yearly

fifty dollars from every trader, which Congress may increase to any

amount, and give it all the operation of a monopoly; fifty dollars on a

cargo of 10,000 dollars’ value will be inconsiderable, on a cargo of 1000

dollars burthensome, but on a cargo of 100 dollars will be intolerable,

and amount to a total prohibition, as to small adventurers.

II, III, IX, XII, AND XXXI.

The second paragraph provides “that the supreme legislative power within

this state shall be vested in two separate and distinct bodies of men, the

one to be called the assembly, and the other to be called the senate of

the state of New York, who together shall form the legislature.”

The ninth provides “that the assembly shall be the judge of their own

members, and enjoy the same privileges, and proceed in doing business in

like manner as the assembly of the colony of New York of right formerly

did.”

The twelfth paragraph provides “that the senate shall, in like manner, be

judges of their own members,” etc.

The 31st describes even the stile of laws—that the stile of all laws shall

be as follows: “Be it enacted by the people of the state of New York

represented in senate and assembly,” and that all writs and proceedings

shall run in the name of the people of the state of New York, and tested

in the name of the chancellor or the chief judge from whence they shall

issue.

The third provides against laws that may be hastily and inadvertently

passed, inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution and the public

good, and that “the governor, the chancellor and judges of the supreme

court, shall revise all bills about to be passed into laws, by the

legislature.”

The powers vested in the legislature of this state by these paragraphs

will be weakened, for the proposed new government declares that “all

legislative powers therein granted shall be vested in a congress of the

United States, which shall consist of a senate and a house of

representatives,” and it further prescribes, that “this constitution and

the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof;

and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of the

United States, shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in

every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws

of any state to the contrary notwithstanding; and the members of the

several state legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both

of the United States and of the several states, shall be bound by oath or

affirmation to support this constitution.”

Those who are full of faith, suppose that the words in pursuance thereof

are restrictive, but if they reflect a moment and take into consideration

the comprehensive expressions of the instrument, they will find that their

restrictive construction is unavailing, and this is evinced by 1st art., 8

sect., where this government has a power “to lay and collect all taxes,

duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common

defence and general welfare of the United States,” and also “to make all

laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the

foregoing powers vested by this constitution in the government of the

United States, or in any department or office thereof.”

Art. 1st, sect. 7, provides a qualified negative, that is, that “every

bill which shall be passed [by] the house of representatives and the

senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the president of

the United States.”

To conclude my observations on this head, it appears to me as impossible

that these powers in the state constitution and those in the general

government can exist and operate together, as it would be for a man to

serve two masters whose interests clash, and secure the approbation of

both. Can there at the same time and place be and operate two supreme

legislatures, executives, and judicials? Will a “guarantee of a republican

form of government to every state in the union” be of any avail, or secure

the establishment and retention of state rights?

If this guarantee had remained, as it was first reported by the committee

of the whole house, to wit, ... “that a republican constitution, and its

existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each state by the United States,”

it would have been substantial; but the changing the word _constitution_

into the word _form_ bears no favorable appearance.

IV, V, XII, XVI.

The fourth provides, “that the assembly of the state of New York shall

consist of at least seventy members, to be annually chosen in the several

counties in certain proportions.” The 5th, 12th and 16th, declare that a

census shall be taken every seven years, to regulate the augmentation of

the number seventy, so as not to exceed three hundred. Here seventy

members are divided among the several counties, and consequently into at

least as many poles and sets of members to be annually chosen. If this is

contrasted with the constitution for the federal government—the

constitutional assembly or house of representatives will be found to

consist of sixty-five members divided among thirteen states, to be chosen

every second year. Six for the state of New York; not distributed among

the counties, but by all the counties. And, although “the times, places

and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives shall be

prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof,” yet, as it provides

that “Congress may at any time by law, make or alter those regulations,

except as to places of chusing senators”—the power in the state government

to prescribe rules in those cases will be superseded by the executive of

the general government, perhaps to the great inconvenience of the people.

FROM THE VITH TO THE XIITH.

The sixth paragraph recites that an opinion hath long prevailed among

divers of the good people of this state that the voting at the election by

ballot would tend more to preserve the liberty and equal freedom of the

people than voting viva voce; to the end, therefore, that a fair

experiment be made which of these two methods of voting is to be

preferred, it declares that after the war elections shall be by ballot.

The seventh and eighth regulate the freeholds, and what property shall

entitle a man to vote; the ninth, the mode of conducting business in the

assembly, and their privileges; the tenth, eleventh, and twelfth, the

number of the senate, and how and by whom they shall be elected.

As these clauses regulate the mode of elections and qualifications of the

voters of senate and assembly, a relation of what gave rise to the

provisions for voting by ballot and that of the value of the freehold,

will help to unravel what otherwise may appear mysterious.

In respect to the first it may be necessary to observe that under the

colonial government there existed violent parties, not known by the name

of whig or tory—republicans and aristocrats. Those who were in the

employments of government, or the _ins_, were for extending the

prerogative of the crown, while the _outs_ were checks to it. Many of the

leaders on both sides were under strong expectations that sooner or later

that branch of colonial government called the king’s council would be

erected into a hereditary house of lords. The _ins_ being nearest to the

disposition of the offices of honor and profit, and in the way of

obtaining patents for vacant lands, and being from time to time joined by

other crown officers and dependents, who flocked to and settled in this

colony since the year 1763, had the means of making use of undue influence

to retain their situations, which made the _outs_ at last dispair of ever

having a turn, unless the elections were by ballot. This opinion was

propagated in every part of the colony before and at the time of the

revolution, and so strongly did it operate upon the committee that were

ordered to consider of and report the constitution, that at one time they

had the whole system interwoven in the draft; but either because it would

have made it too lengthy, or that one of the parties were then reduced,

and not likely to rise again into importance, about the time the draft was

reported, it was struck out and was left by the constitution to the

legislature to decide, as experience on the exercise of both principles

should suggest.

SYDNEY.

Sydney, II.

The New York Journal, (Number 2321)

SATURDAY, JUNE 14, 1788.

For the Daily Patriotic Register.

TO THE CITIZENS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK.

(Concluded from yesterday’s paper.)

As to the value of the freeholds, there has been great diversity of

opinions, for notwithstanding all agreed that the rights and liberties of

a country were ever in danger from the rich and poor, and their safety in

the middle sort or yeomanry of the country, still the difficulty occurred

in establishing the mean.

While the convention, in 1776, was setting at Harlem, the outlines of a

constitution were handed about, to try, it was supposed, the temper of the

members, in which it was proposed to have a governor, lieutenant governor,

senate, and assembly; the qualification of the governor, lieutenant

governor, and senate, to be that each should possess real estate to the

value of 10,000 pounds, and to be elected by freeholders possessing

freeholds to the value of 1,000 pounds. Although this was not attended

with bad effects, yet the qualifications of the electors gave rise to

various arguments, and, among others, that as taxation and representation

ought to go together, so the right of electing shall be in proportion to

the value of each man’s estate. To exemplify this, a man of £100 estate

had one vote; a man of £1000 should have ten, and a man of ten thousand

pounds a hundred, and so on in the same ratio. Others on the contrary

supposed that there ought to be no other criterion than the age of

twenty-one, a citizen born and resident in this country; out of the two

extremes was produced the present system of election and qualification,

both admitted to be as secure and consistent rights as any that have been

contrived.

It is apprehended, from the duplicity in the wording of 1st art., 4th

sec., that seemingly to leave in the power of the respective legislatures

to regulate the elections, and still, that Congress may at any time by law

make or alter such regulations; and the undesigned wording of the sixth

article, that the constitution and laws of the United States which shall

be made in pursuance thereof shall be the law of the land, anything in the

constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding, will

render the whole system ineffectual, if not nugatory, and a new system as

destructive to the liberties of the citizens as that of the ratio of

voices to the ratio of property introduced. Besides being liable to have

the whole State erected into one district, and consequently may give rise

to the inconveniences I mentioned before.

VII, SEC. 6; VIII, SEC. 6; IX, SEC. 6; X, SECTION 6; XI, SEC. 6; XII, SEC.

2, 6; XVI, SEC. 6; XIII, XXXV, XLI.

By the 13th paragraph “no member of this State shall be disfranchised, or

deprived of any of the rights or privileges secured to the subjects of the

State by this constitution, unless by the law of the land, or judgment of

its peers.”

The 35th adopts, under certain exceptions and modifications, the common

law of England, the statute law of England and Great Britain, and the acts

of the legislature of the colony, which together formed the law on the

19th of April, 1775.

The 41st provides that the trial by jury remain inviolate forever; that no

acts of attainder shall be passed by the legislature of this State for

crimes other than those committed before the termination of the present

war. And that the legislature shall at no time hereafter institute any new

courts but such as shall proceed according to the course of the common

law.

There can be no doubt that if the new government be adopted in all its

latitude, every one of these paragraphs will become a dead letter: nor

will it solve any difficulties, if the United States guarantee “to every

state in the union a republican form of government;” we may be allowed the

form and not the substance, and that it was so intended will appear from

the changing the word _constitution_ to the word _form_ and the omission

of the words, _and its existing laws_. And I do not even think it

uncharitable to suppose that it was designedly done; but whether it was so

or not, by leaving out these words the jurisprudence of each state is left

to the mercy of the new government. By 1st art., 8th sec., 1st clause,

“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts

and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and

general welfare of the United States.”

By the 9th clause of the same section, “To constitute tribunals inferior

to the court.”

By the 18th clause, “To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper

for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers

vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in

any department thereof.”

The 3d art., 1st sec., “The judicial power of the United States shall be

vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress

may from time to time ordain and establish.”