was about to be committed, had sufficient wisdom never to err, and
sufficient goodness always to consult the true interest of the governed,
and if we could have a proper security that their successors should to the
end of time be possessed of the same qualifications, it would be
impossible that power could be lavished upon them with too liberal a hand.
Power absolute and unlimited, united with unerring wisdom and unbounded
goodness, is the government of the Deity of the universe. But remember, my
fellow citizens, that the persons to whom you are about to delegate
authority are and will be weak, erring mortals, subject to the same
passions, prejudices and infirmities with yourselves; and let it be deeply
engraven on your hearts, that from the first history of government to the
present time, if we begin with Nimrod and trace down the rulers of nations
to those who are now invested with supreme power, we shall find few, very
few, who have made the beneficent Governor of the universe the model of
their conduct, while many are they who, on the contrary, have imitated the
demons of the darkness. We have no right to expect that our rulers will be
more wise, more virtuous, or more perfect than those of other nations have
been, or that they will not be equally under the influence of ambition,
avarice and all that train of baleful passions, which have so generally
proved the curse of our unhappy race. We must consider mankind such as
they really are,—such as experience has shown them to be heretofore, and
bids us expect to find them hereafter,—and not suffer ourselves to be
misled by interested deceivers or enthusiastick visionaries; and therefore
in forming a system of government, to delegate no greater power than is
clearly and certainly necessary, ought to be the first principle with
every people who are influenced by reason and a regard for their safety,
and in doing this, they ought most solicitously to endeavour so to qualify
even that power, by such checks and restraints, as to produce a perfect
responsibility in those who are to exercise it, and prevent them from its
abuse with a chance of impunity;—since such is the nature of man, that he
has a propensity to abuse authority and to tyrannize over the rights of
his fellowmen;—and to whomsoever power is given, not content with the
actual deposit, they will ever strive to obtain an increase. Those who
would wish to excite and keep awake your jealousy and distrust are your
truest friends; while they who speak peace to you when there is no
peace—who would lull you into security, and wish you to repose blind
confidence in your future governors—are your most dangerous enemies;
jealousy and distrust are the guardian angels who watch over
liberty—security and confidence are the forerunners of slavery. But the
advocates of the system tell you that we who oppose it, endeavour to
terrify you with mere possibilities which may never be realized, that all
our objections consist in saying government may do this, and government
may do that—I will for argument sake admit the justice of this remark, and
yet maintain that the objections are insurmountable. I consider it an
incontrovertible truth, that whatever by the constitution government even
may do, if it relates to the abuse of power by acts tyrannical and
oppressive, it some time or other will do. Such is the ambition of man,
and his lust for domination, that no power less than that which fixed its
bounds to the ocean can say to them, “Thus far shall ye go and no
farther.” Ascertain the limits of the may with ever so much precision, and
let them be as extensive as you please, government will speedily reach
their utmost verge; nor will it stop there, but soon will overleap those
boundaries, and roam at large into the regions of the may not. Those who
tell you the government by this constitution may keep up a standing army,
abolish the trial by jury, oppress the citizens of the states by its
powers over the militia, destroy the freedom of the press, infringe the
liberty of conscience, and do a number of other acts injurious and
destructive of your rights, yet that it never will do so; and that you
safely may accept such a constitution and be perfectly at ease and secure
that your rulers will always be so good, so wise, and so virtuous—such
emanations of the Deity—that they will never use their power but for your
interest and your happiness, contradict the uniform experience of ages,
and betray a total ignorance of human nature, or a total want of
ingenuity. Look back, my fellow citizens, to your conduct but a few years
past, and let that instruct you what ought to be your conduct at this
time. Great Britain then claimed the right to pass laws to bind you in all
cases whatever. You were then told in all the soft insinuating language of
the present day, and with all the appearance of disinterested friendship
now used, that those who insisted this claim of power might be abused,
only wandered in the regions of fancy—that you need not be uneasy, but
might safely acquiesce in the claim—that you might have the utmost
possible confidence in your rulers, that they never would use that power
to your injury; but distrustful of government, and jealous of your
liberty, you rejected such counsel with disdain; the bare possibility that
Britain might abuse it, if once conceded, kindled a flame from one end of
this continent to the other, and roused you to arms. Weak and defenseless
as you were, unused to military exertions, and unsupplied with warlike
stores, you braved the strength of a nation the most powerful and best
provided—you chose to risk your lives and property rather than to risque
the possibility that the power claimed by the British government should be
exercised to your injury—a possibility which the minions of power at that
time, with as much confidence as those of the present day, declared to be
absolutely visionary. Heaven wrought a miracle in your favour, and your
efforts were crowned with success. You are not now called upon to make an
equal sacrifice, you are not now requested to beat your ploughshares into
swords, or your pruning hooks into spears, to leave your peaceful
habitations, and exchange domestic tranquillity for the horrors of war;
peaceably, quietly and orderly to give this system of slavery your
negative, is all that is asked by the advocates of freedom—to pronounce
the single monosyllable no, is all they entreat. Shall they entreat you in
vain? When by this it is to be determined, whether our independence, for
obtaining which we have been accustomed to bow the knee with reverential
gratitude to Heaven, shall be our greatest curse; and when on this it
depends whether we shall be subject to a government, of which the little
finger will be thicker than the loins of that of Great Britain. But there
are also persons who pretend that your situation is at present so bad that
it cannot be worse, and urge that as an argument why we should embrace any
remedy proposed, however desperate it may appear. Thus do the poor erring
children of mortality, suffering under the presence of real or imaginary
evils, have recourse to a pistol or halter for relief, and rashly launch
into the untried regions of eternity—nor wake from this delusion, until
they wake in endless woe. Should the citizens of America, in a fit
desperation, be induced to commit this fatal act of political suicide, to
which by such arguments they are stimulated, the day will come when
laboring under more than Egyptian bondage; compelled to finish their quota
of brick, though destitute of straw and of mortar; galled with your
chains, and worn down by oppression, you will, by sad experience, be
convinced (when that conviction shall be too late), that there is a
difference in evils, and that the buzzing of gnats is more supportable
than the sting of a serpent. From the wisdom of antiquity we might obtain
excellent instruction, if we were not too proud to profit by it. Æsop has
furnished us with a history of a nation of frogs, between which and our
own there is a striking resemblance—whether the catastrophe be the same,
rests with ourselves. Jupiter out of pure good nature, wishing to do them
as little injury as possible, on being asked for a king, had thrown down
into their pond a log to rule over them;—under whose government, had they
been wise enough to know their own interest and to pursue it, they might
to this day, have remained happy and prosperous. Terrified with the noise,
and affrighted by the violent undulations of the water, they for some time
kept an awful distance, and regarded their monarch with reverence; but the
first impression being in some measure worn off, and perceiving him to be
of a tame and peaceable disposition, they approached him with familiarity,
and soon entertained for him the utmost contempt. In a little time were
seen the leaders of the frogs croaking to their respective circles on the
weakness and feebleness of the government at home, and of its want of
dignity and respect abroad, till the sentiment being caught by their
auditors, the whole pond resounded with “Oh Jupiter, good Jupiter, hear
our prayers! Take away from us this vile log, and give us a ruler who
shall know how to support the dignity and splendor of government! Give us
any government you please, only let it be energetic and efficient.” The
Thunderer, in his wrath, sent them a crane. With what delight did they
gaze on their monarch, as he came majestically floating on the wings of
the wind. They admired his uncommon shape—it was such as they had never
before seen—his deformities were, in their eyes, the greatest of beauties,
and they were heard like Aristides to declare that, were they on the verge
of eternity, they would not wish a single alteration in his form. His
monstrous beak, his long neck, and his enormous poke, even these, the
future means of their destruction, were subjects of their warm
approbation. He took possession of his new dominions, and instantly began
to swallow down his subjects, and it is said that those who had been the
warmest zealots for crane administration, fared no better than the rest.
The poor wretches were now much more dissatisfied than before, and with
all possible humility applied to Jupiter again for his aid, but in vain—he
dismissed them with this reproof, “that the evil of which they complained
they had foolishly brought upon themselves, and that they had no other
remedy now, but to submit with patience.” Thus forsaken by the god, and
left to the mercy of the crane, they sought to escape his cruelty by
flight; but pursuing them to every place of retreat, and thrusting his
long neck through the water to the bottom, he drew them out with his beak
from their most secret hiding-places, and served them up as a regale for
his ravenous appetite. The present federal government is, my fellow
citizens, the log of the fable—the crane is the system now offered to your
acceptance—I wish you not to remain under the government of the one, nor
to become subjected to the tyranny of the other. If either of these events
take place, it must arise from your being greatly deficient to
yourselves—from your being, like the nation of Frogs, “a discontented,
variable race, weary of liberty and fond of change.” At the same time I
have no hesitation in declaring, that if the one or the other must be our
fate, I think the harmless, inoffensive, though contemptible Log,
infinitely to be preferred to the powerful, the efficient, but
all-devouring Crane.
LUTHER MARTIN.
_Baltimore, March 29, 1788._
LETTER OF A PLAIN DEALER, ACCREDITED TO SPENCER ROANE.
Printed In
The Virginia Independent Chronicle,
February, 1788.
Note.
In October, 1787, Governor Edmund Randolph, delegate to the Federal
Convention from Virginia, addressed to the Speaker of the House of
Delegates a letter on the Federal Constitution. This was published in
December, 1787, in both _The Virginia Gazette_ and _The Virginia
Independent Chronicle_, as well as in pamphlet form at the time, and
recently in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the Constitution_. Randolph had declined
to give his assent to the Constitution in the Convention, but had so far
altered his views in the intervening period as to make his letter on the
whole an argument in favor of rather than against its adoption. Uncertain
in exactly what light to regard his utterances, it was one of the few
writings of the time which did not receive replies from one party or the
other.
The essay of “A Plain Dealer” is the only notice I have found of this
letter, and deals rather more with the inconsistencies of Randolph’s
views, than with the arguments advanced in the letter. Of the author,
Randolph himself gives us a clue in his letter to Madison, of February 29,
1788, where he writes:
A writer calling himself Plain Dealer, who is bitter in principle
_vs._ the Constitution, has attacked me in the paper. I suspect
the author to be Mr. Spencer Roane; and the importunities of some
to me in public and private are designed to throw me unequivocally
and without condition into the opposition.
A Plain Dealer.
The Virginia Independent Chronicle, (Number 82)
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 13, 1788.
_Mans parturiens et ecce nascitur mus._
After a long and general expectancy of some dissertation on the subject of
the proposed Federal Constitution, worthy the first magistrate of the
respectable state of Virginia, a letter of his Excellency Governor
Randolph, of Oct. 10, 1787, is at length presented to the public. Previous
to the appearance of this letter, various opinions were prevailing in
different parts of this country respecting that gentleman’s _real_ opinion
on the subject of the said Constitution; and it became difficult for many
to conjecture how his Excellency would devise a middle course, so as to
catch the spirit of all his countrymen, and to reconcile himself to all
parties. It was not known to me, at least, that his Excellency felt an
“unwillingness to disturb the harmony of the legislature” on this
important subject; nor could I conceive that the sentiments of even the
ablest man among us could “excite a contest unfavorable” to the fairest
discussion of the question. On the other hand, I thought it right that the
adversaries of the Constitution, as well as its framers, should candidly
avow their real sentiments as early and decidedly as possible, for the
information of those who are to determine. It is true, his Excellency was
prevented declaring his opinion sooner, “by motives of delicacy arising
from two questions depending before the General Assembly, one respecting
the Constitution, the other respecting himself;” but I am of opinion that
during the pendency of a question concerning the Constitution, every
information on that subject is most properly to be adduced; and I did not
know that the being or not being Governor of Virginia, (an office in a
great degree nominal) was sufficient to deter a real patriot from speaking
the warning voice of opposition, in behalf of the liberties of his
country.
The letter above-mentioned can derive no aid from panegyric, as to the
brilliancy and elegance of its stile, for unlike the threadbare discourses
of other statesmen on the dry subject of government, it amuses us with a
number of fine words. But how shall I express my dislike of the ultimatum
of his Excellency’s letter, wherein he declares “that if after our best
efforts for amendments, they cannot be obtained, he will adopt the
Constitution as it is.” How is this declaration reconcilable to a former
opinion of his Excellency’s, expressed to the Honorable Richard Henry Lee,
and repeated by the latter gentleman in his letter,(62) as printed in the
public papers, “that either a monarchy or an aristocracy will be generated
from the proposed Constitution.” Good God! how can the first Magistrate
and Father of a free republican government, after a feeble parade of
opposition, and before his desired plan of amendments has been determined
upon, declare that he will accept a Constitution which is to beget a
monarchy or an aristocracy? How can such a determination be reconcilable
to the feelings of Virginia, and to the principles which have prevailed in
almost every legislature of the union, who looked no farther than the
amendment of our present republican confederation? I have charity to
believe that the respectable characters who signed this Constitution did
so, thinking that neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy would ensue, but
that they should thereby preserve and ameliorate the republic of America;
but never until now, that his Excellency has let the cat out of the bag,
did I suppose that any member of the Convention, at least from the
republican state of Virginia, would accept a Constitution, whereby the
republic of his constituents is to be sacrificed in its infancy, and
before it has had a fair trial. But his Excellency will adopt this
Constitution, “BECAUSE HE WOULD REGULATE HIMSELF BY THE SPIRIT OF
AMERICA.” But is his Excellency a prophet as well as a politician—can he
foretell future events? How else can he at this time discover what the
spirit of America is? But admitting his infallibility for a moment, how
far will his principle carry him?—why, that if the dominion of Shays,
instead of that of the new Constitution, should be generally accepted, and
become the spirit of America, his Excellency, too, would turn Shayite!—and
yet this question of the Constitution, is “ONE ON WHICH THE FATE OF
THOUSANDS YET UNBORN DEPENDS.” It is his Excellency’s opinion, as
expressed in the aforesaid letter, that the powers which are acknowledged
necessary for supporting the Union, cannot safely be entrusted to our
Congress as at present constituted; and his vain objection is “that the
representation of the states bears no proportion to their importance.”
This is literally true; but is equally true of the Senate of the proposed
Constitution, which is to be an essential part of the legislature; and yet
his Excellency will accept the latter, and not agree to invest the
necessary powers in the former, although the above objection equally
applies to both. Nay, I am inclined to believe that the injurious
consequences of this unequal representation will operate more strongly
under the new government—for under the present confederation the members
of Congress are removable at the pleasure of their constituents;—whereas
under the proposed Constitution, the only method of removing a wicked,
unskilful or treacherous senator, will be by impeachment before the senate
itself, of which he is a member.
These, Mr. Printer, are some of the inconsistencies which even a slight
observation of the above letter will suggest. It is not my purpose to
oppose now, or to investigate, the merits of the Constitution. This I
leave to abler pens, and to the common sense of my countrymen. The science
of government is _in itself_ simple and plain; and if in the history of
mankind no perfect government can be found, let it be attributed to the
chicane, perfidy and ambition of those who fabricate them; and who are
more or less, in common with all mankind, infected with a lust of power.
It is, however, certainly not consistent with sound sense to accept a
Constitution, knowing it to be imperfect; and his Excellency acknowledges
the proposed one to have radical objections. A Constitution ought to be
like Cæsar’s wife, not only good, but unsuspected, since it is the highest
compact which men are capable of forming, and involves the dearest rights
of life, liberty and property. I fear his Excellency has done no service
to his favorite scheme of amendments (and he too seems to be of the same
opinion) by his very candid declaration at the end of his letter. Subtlety
and chicane in politics, are equally odious and dishonorable; but when it
is considered that the present is not the golden age—the epoch of virtue,
candor and integrity—that the views of ambitious and designing men are
continually working to their own aggrandizement and to the overthrow of
liberty, and that the discordant interests of thirteen different
commonwealths are to be reconciled and promoted by one general government;
common reason will teach us that the utmost caution, secrecy, and
political sagacity is requisite to secure to each the important blessings
of a good government.
I shall now take my leave of his Excellency and the above-mentioned
letter, declaring my highest veneration for his character and abilities;
and it can be no impeachment of the talents of any man who has not served
a regular apprenticeship to politics, to say, that his opinions on an
intricate political question are erroneous. For if, as the celebrated Dr.
Blackstone observes, “in every art, occupation, or science, commercial or
mechanical, some method of instruction or apprenticeship is held
necessary, how much more requisite will such apprenticeship be found to
be, in the science of government, the noblest and most difficult of any!”
A PLAIN DEALER.
REMARKS ON THE NEW PLAN OF GOVERNMENT, BY HUGH WILLIAMSON.
Printed In
The State Gazette Of North Carolina.
1788.
Note.
No file of the _State Gazette of North Carolina_ is now known to exist, so
the date of publication of this essay is in doubt. It is printed from a
clipping from that paper, preserved by Williamson himself, which is in the
library of the New York Historical Society. A note states that:
“The following remarks on the new Plan of Government are handed us
as the substance of Dr. Williamson’s Address to the freemen of
Edenton and the County of Chowan when assembled to instruct their
representatives.”
Remarks.
State Gazette Of North Carolina.
Though I am conscious that a subject of the greatest magnitude must suffer
in the hands of such an advocate, I cannot refuse, at the request of my
fellow-citizens, to make some observations on the new plan of government.
It seems to be generally admitted, that the system of government which has
been proposed by the late convention, is well calculated to relieve us
from many of the grievances under which we have been laboring. If I might
express my particular sentiments on this subject, I should describe it as
more free and more perfect than any form of government that has ever been
adopted by any nation; but I would not say it has no faults. Imperfection
is inseparable from every device. Several objections were made to this
system by two or three very respectable characters in the convention,
which have been the subject of much conversation; and other objections, by
citizens of this state, have lately reached our ears. It is proper you
should consider of these objections. They are of two kinds; they respect
the things that are in the system, and the things that are not in it. We
are told that there should have been a section for securing the trial by
Jury in civil cases, and the liberty of the press: that there should also
have been a declaration of rights. In the new system, it is provided, that
“_the trial of all crimes_, except in cases of impeachment, _shall be by
jury_” but this provision could not possibly be extended to all _civil_
cases. For it is well known that the trial by jury is not general and
uniform throughout the United States, either in cases of admiralty or of
chancery; hence it becomes necessary to submit the question to the general
Legislature, who might accommodate their laws on this occasion to the
desires and habits of the nation. Surely there is no prohibition in a case
that is untouched.
We have been told that the liberty of the press is not secured by the new
Constitution. Be pleased to examine the Plan, and you will find that the
liberty of the press and the laws of Mahomet are equally affected by it.
The new government is to have the power of protecting literary property;
the very power which you have by a special act delegated to the present
congress. There was a time in England, when neither book, pamphlet, nor
paper could be published without a license from government. That restraint
was finally removed in the year 1694: and, by such removal, their press
became perfectly free, for it is not under the restraint of any license.
Certainly the new government can have no power to impose restraints. The
citizens of the United States have no more occasion for a second
declaration of rights, than they have for a section in favour of the
press. Their rights, in the several states, have long since been explained
and secured by particular declarations, which make a part of their several
constitutions. It is granted, and perfectly understood, that under the
government of the assemblies of the states, and under the government of
the congress, every right is reserved to the individual which he has not
expressly delegated to this, or that legislature. The other objections
that have been made to the new plan of government, are: That it absorbs
the powers of the several states; that the national judiciary is too
extensive; that a standing army is permitted; that congress is allowed to
regulate trade; that the several states are prevented from taxing exports
for their own benefit.
When Gentlemen are pleased to complain, that little power is left in the
hands of the separate states, they should be advised to cast an eye upon
the large code of laws, which have passed in this state since the peace.
Let them consider how few of those laws have been framed for the general
benefit of the nation. Nine out of ten of them are domestic; calculated
for the sole use of this state or of particular citizens. There must still
be use for such laws, though you should enable the congress to collect a
revenue for national purposes; and the collection of that revenue includes
the chief of the new powers, which are now to be committed to the
congress.
Hitherto you have delegated certain powers to the Congress, and other
powers to the Assemblies of the states. The portion that you have
delegated to Congress, is found to have been useless, because it is too
small: and the powers that are committed to the Assemblies of the several
states are also found to be absolutely ineffectual for national purposes,
because they can never be so managed as to operate in concert. Of what use
is that small portion of reserve powers? It neither makes you respectable
nor powerful. The consequence of such reservation is national contempt
abroad, and a state of dangerous weakness at home. What avails the claim
of power, which appears to be nothing better than the empty whistling of a
name? The Congress will be chosen by yourselves, as your members of
Assembly are. They will be creatures of your hands, and subject to your
advice. Protected and cherished by the small addition of power which you
shall put into their hands, you may become a great and respectable nation.
It is complained that the powers of the national judiciary are too
extensive. This objection appears to have the greatest weight in the eyes
of gentlemen who have not carefully compared the powers which are to be
delegated, with those that had been formerly delegated to Congress. The
powers now to be committed to the national legislature, as they are
detailed in the 8th section of the first article, have already been
chiefly delegated to the Congress, under one form or another, except those
which are contained in the first paragraph of that section. And the
objects that are now to be submitted to the supreme judiciary, or to the
inferior courts, are those which naturally arise from the constitutional
laws of Congress. If there is a single new case that can be exceptional,
it is that between a Foreigner and a Citizen, or that between the Citizens
of different States. These cases may come up by appeal. It is provided in
this system, that there shall be no fraudulent tender in the payments of
debts. Foreigners with whom we have treaties will trust our citizens on
the faith of this engagement; and the citizens of different states will do
the same. If the Congress had a negative on the laws of the several
states, they would certainly prevent all such laws as might endanger the
honor or peace of the nation, by making a tender of base money; but they
have no such power, and it is at least possible that some state may be
found in this union, disposed to break the constitution, and abolish
private debts by such tenders. In these cases the courts of the offending
state would probably decide according to its own laws. The foreigner would
complain, and the nation might be involved in war for the support of such
dishonest measures. Is it not better to have a court of appeals in which
the judges can only be determined by the laws of the nation? This court is
equally to be desired by the citizens of different states. But we are told
that justice will be delayed, and the poor will be drawn away by the rich
to a distant court. The authors of this remark have not fully considered
the question, else they must have recollected that the poor of this
country have little to do with foreigners or with the citizens of distant
states. They do not consider that there may be an inferior court in every
state; nor have they recollected that the appeals being with such
exceptions, and under such regulations as Congress shall make, will never
be permitted for trifling sums or under trivial pretences, unless we can
suppose that the national legislature shall be composed of knaves and
fools. The line that separates the powers of the national legislature from
those of the several states is clearly drawn. The several states reserve
every power that can be exercised for the particular use and comfort of
the state. They do not yield a single power which is not absolutely
necessary to the safety and prosperity of the nation, nor one that could
be employed to any effect in the hands of particular states. The powers of
judiciary naturally arise from those of the legislature. Questions that
are of a national concern, and those cases which are determinable by the
general laws of the nation, are to be referred to the national judiciary;
but they have not anything to do with a single case either civil or
criminal which respects the private and particular concerns of a state or
its citizens.
The possibility of keeping regular troops in the public service, has been
urged as another objection against the new constitution. It is very
remarkable that the same objection has not been made against the original
confederation, in which the same grievance obtains without the same
guards. It is now provided, that no appropriation of money for the use of
the army shall be for a longer time than two years. Provision is also made
for having a powerful militia, in which there never can be occasion for
many regular troops.
It has been objected in some of the southern states, that the Congress, by
a majority of votes, is to have the power to regulate trade. It is
universally admitted that Congress ought to have this power, else our
commerce, which is nearly ruined, can never be restored; but some
gentlemen think that the concurrence of two-thirds of the votes in
Congress should have been required. By the sundry regulations of commerce,
it will be in the power of government not only to collect a vast revenue
for the general benefit of the nation, but to secure the carrying trade in
the hands of citizens in preference to strangers. It has been alleged that
there are few ships belonging to the southern states; and that the price
of freight must rise in consequence of our excluding many foreign vessels:
but when we have not vessels of our own, it is certainly proper that we
should hire those of citizens in preference to strangers; and though the
price of freight should rise for two or three years, this advantage is
fully due to our brethren in the eastern and middle states, who, with
great and exemplary candour, have given us equal advantages in return. A
small increase in the price of freight would operate greatly in favour of
the southern states: it would promote the spirit of ship-building; it
would promote a nursery for native seamen, and would afford support to the
poor who live near the sea coast; it would increase the value of their
lands, and, at the same time, it would reduce their taxes.
It has finally been objected that the several states are not permitted to
tax their exports for the benefit of their particular treasuries. This
strange objection has been occasionally repeated by citizens of this
state. They must have transplanted it from another state, for it could not
have been the growth of North Carolina.
Such have been the objections against the new constitution.
Whilst the honest patriot who guards with jealous eye the liberties of his
country, and apprehends danger under every form—the placeman in every
state, who fears lest his office should pass into other hands—the idle,
the fractious, and the dishonest, who live by plunder or speculation on
the miseries of their country—while these, assisted by a numerous body of
secret enemies, who never have been reconciled to our independence, are
seeking for objections to this constitution—it is a remarkable
circumstance, and a very high encomium on the plan, that nothing more
plausible has been offered against it; for it is an easy matter to find
faults.
Let us turn our eyes to a more fruitful subject; let us consider the
present condition of the United States, and the particular benefits that
North Carolina must reap by the proposed form of government. Without money
no government can be supported; and Congress can raise no money under the
present constitution. They have not the power to make commercial treaties,
because they cannot preserve them when made. Hence it is, that we are the
prey of every nation. We are indulged in such foreign commerce as must be
hurtful to us; we are prohibited from that which might be profitable; and
we are accordingly told, that in the last two years, the thirteen states
have hardly paid into the treasury as much as should have been paid by a
single state. Intestine commotions in some of the states—paper money in
others—a want of inclination in some, and a general suspicion throughout
the union that the burden is unequally laid—added to the general loss of
trade—have produced a general bankruptcy, and loss of honor. We have
borrowed money of Spain—she demands the principal, but we cannot pay the
interest. It is a circumstance perfectly humiliating, that we should
remain under obligations to that nation. We are considerably indebted to
France; but she is too generous to insist upon what she knows we cannot
pay, either the principal or interest. In the hour of distress, we
borrowed money in Holland; not from the government but from private
citizens. Those who were called the patriots, were our friends, and they
are oppressed in their turn by hosts of enemies. They will soon have need
of money. At this hour, we are not able to pay the interest of their loan.
What is to be done? Will you borrow money again from other citizens of
that oppressed republic, to pay the interest of what you borrowed from
their brethren? This would a painful expedient: but our want of government
may render it necessary. You have two or three ministers abroad; they must
soon return home, for they cannot be supported. You have four or five
hundred troops scattered along the Ohio to protect the frontier
inhabitants, and give some value to your lands; those troops are ill paid,
and in a fair way for being disbanded. There is hardly a circumstance
remaining—hardly one external mark—by which you can deserve to be called a
nation. You are not in a condition to resist the most contemptuous enemy.
What is there to prevent an Algerine pirate from landing on your coast,
and carrying your citizens into slavery? You have not a single sloop of
war. Does one of the states attempt to raise a little money by imposts or
other commercial regulations? A neighbouring state immediately alters her
laws, and defeats the revenue by throwing the trade into a different
channel. Instead of supporting or assisting, we are uniformly taking the
advantage of one another. Such an assemblage of people are not a nation.
Like a dark cloud, without cohesion or firmness, we are ready to be torn
asunder, and scattered abroad by every breeze of external violence, or
internal commotion.
Is there a man in this state, who believes it possible for us to continue
under such a government? Let us suppose but for a minute, that such a
measure should be attempted. Let us suppose that the several states shall
be required and obliged to pay their several quotas according to the
original plan. You know that North Carolina, in the last four years, has
not paid one dollar into the treasury for eight dollars that she ought to
have paid. We must increase our taxes exceedingly, and those taxes must be
of the most grievous kind; they must be taxes on land and heads, taxes
that cannot fail to grind the face of the poor; for it is clear that we
can raise little by imports and exports. Some foreign goods are imported
by water from the northern states: such goods pay a duty for the benefit
of those states, which is seldom drawn back. This operates as a tax upon
our citizens. On this side, Virginia promotes her revenue to the amount of
twenty-five thousand dollars every year, by a tax on our tobacco that she
exports. South Carolina, on the other side, may avail herself of similar
opportunities. Two-thirds of foreign goods that are consumed in this
state, are imported by land from Virginia or South Carolina. Such goods
pay a certain impost for the benefit of the importing states, but our
treasury is not profited by this commerce. By such means our citizens are
taxed more than one hundred thousand dollars every year; but the state
does not receive credit for a shilling of that money. Like a patient that
is bleeding at both arms, North Carolina must soon expire under such
wasteful operations. Unless I am greatly mistaken, we have seen enough of
the state of the union, and of North Carolina in particular, to be assured
that another form of government is become necessary. Is the form of
government now proposed well calculated to give relief? To this we must
answer in the affirmative. All foreign goods that shall be imported into
these states, are to pay a duty for the use of the nation. All the states
will be on a footing, whether they have bad ports or good ones. No duties
will be laid on exports; hence the planter will receive the true value for
his produce, wherever it may be shipped. If excises are laid on wine,
spirits, or other luxuries, they must be uniform throughout the states. By
a careful management of imposts and excises, the national expenses may be
discharged without any other species of tax; but if a poll tax or land tax
shall ever become necessary, the weight must press equally on every part
of the union. For in all cases such taxes must be according to the number
of inhabitants. Is it not a pleasing consideration that North Carolina,
under all her natural disadvantages, must have the same facility of paying
her share of the public debt, as the most favoured, or the most fortunate
state? She gains no advantage by this plan, but she recovers from her
misfortunes. She stands on the same footing with her sisters, and they are
too generous to desire that she should stand on lower ground. When you
consider those parts of the new system which are of the greatest
import—those which respect the general question of liberty and safety—you
will recollect that the states in convention were unanimous; and you must
remember, that some of the members of that body have risqued their lives
in defence of liberty: but the system does not require the help of such
arguments; it will bear the most scrupulous examination.
When you refer the proposed system to the particular circumstances of
North Carolina, and consider how she is to be affected by this plan, you
must find the utmost reason to rejoice in the prospect of better times.
This is a sentiment that I have ventured with the greater confidence,
because it is the general opinion of my late honourable colleagues,(63)
and I have the utmost reliance in their superior abilities. But if our
constituents shall discover faults where we could not see any—or if they
shall suppose that a plan is formed for abridging their liberties, when we
imagined that we had been securing both liberty and property on a more
stable foundation—if they perceive that they are to suffer a loss, where
we thought they must rise from a misfortune—they will, at least do us the
justice to charge those errors to the head, and not to the heart.
The proposed system is now in your hands, and with it the fate of your
country. We have a common interest for we are embarked in the same vessel.
At present she is in a sea of trouble, without sails, oars, or pilot;
ready to be dashed to pieces by every flaw of wind. You may secure a port,
unless you think it better to remain at sea. If there is any man among you
that wishes for troubled times and fluctuating measures, that he may live
by speculations, and thrive by the calamities of the state, this
government is not for him.
If there is any man who envies the prosperity of a native citizen—who
wishes that we should remain without native merchants or seamen, without
shipping, without manufactures, without commerce—poor and contemptible,
the tributaries of a sovereign country—this government is not for him.
And if there is any man who has never been reconciled to our independence,
who wishes to see us degraded and insulted abroad, oppressed by anarchy at
home, and torn into pieces by factions—incapable of resistance, and ready
to become a prey to the first invader—this government is not for him.
But it is a government, unless I am greatly mistaken, that gives the
fairest promise of being firm and honourable; safe from foreign invasion
or domestic sedition—a government by which our commerce must be protected
and enlarged; the value of our produce and of our lands must be increased;
the labourer and the mechanic must be encouraged and supported. It is a
form of government that is perfectly fitted for protecting liberty and
property, and for cherishing the good citizen and honest man.
LETTER OF A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN, WRITTEN BY CHARLES PINCKNEY.
Printed In
The State Gazette Of South Carolina,
May, 1788.
Note.
In the file of the _State Gazette of South Carolina_ in the possession of
the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, a slip is inserted opposite this
essay, on which is writing contemporary with the paper, stating that it
was written by Charles Pinckney. It is almost the only essay on this
subject contained in the file, which is not merely extracted from some
northern paper; and Pinckney was, indeed, almost the only South Carolinian
who had given any attention to the subject involved, or who wrote for the
press.
A Republican.
The State Gazette Of South Carolina, (Number 3610)
MONDAY, MAY 5, 1788.
MRS. TIMOTHY:
The enclosed,(64) copied from a paper sent me by a friend, seems so
peculiarly adapted to our present situation, that I cannot forbear
selecting it from the crowd of publications since the appearance of the
proposed Federal Constitution, and recommending it, thro’ your paper, to
the most serious attention of all our fellow-citizens; but previously a
few HINTS, by way of introduction, will not, I hope, be impertinent.
New Hampshire and Georgia are the two extreme barriers of the United
States, if the latter can with any propriety be called a barrier without
this state in conjunction; and both together, we know, are not, in point
of force, ready for any sudden emergency, to be compared to New Hampshire.
It cannot be doubted that Great Britain has her busy emissaries throughout
the states, and not a few amongst us; and should the Constitution be
rejected, how long can we flatter ourselves to be free from Indian
cruelties and depredations, some time since begun in Georgia, and if at
this moment warded off from us, ’tis principally owing to the dread of an
efficacious union of the states by the adoption of the Federal
Constitution. The three southern states particularly, we have had for
several years past, good grounds to think Great Britain wishes to separate
from the rest, and to have reverted to her if possible.
Mr. Martin’s(65) long mischievous detail of the opinions and proceedings
of the late general convention, (already occupying a large space in six of
your Gazettes, and still unfinished,) with all his colourings and uncandid
insinuations, in regard to General Washington and Doct. Franklin, may suit
the short-sighted selfish wishes of _an individual_ of a state situated
almost in the centre of the rest, and much safer by that means from sudden
alarms. But the generous, manly _and truly federal sentiments of Maryland_
are well known, and ’tis not doubted will be unequivocally shewn at her
convention very shortly to be held—and that New Hampshire, early in her
first meeting on that important subject, has only by consent taken farther
time to consider of it, and will at her next meeting adopt it, is the
general opinion.
What pity the salutary caution of Doct. Franklin, just previous to his
signing the constitution recommended by the convention, had not been
strictly attended to! If we split, it will in all probability happen in
running headlong on the dangerous rock he so prophetically (as it were)
warned us from, “That the opinions of the errors of the constitution born
within the walls of the convention, should die there, and not a syllable
be whispered abroad.” This Hint is full of that foresight and penetration
the Doctor has always been remarkable for.
When the general convention met, no citizen of the United States could
expect less from it than I did, so many jarring interests and prejudices
to reconcile! The variety of pressing dangers at our doors, even during
the war, were barely sufficient to force us to act in concert, and
necessarily give way at times to each other. But when the great work was
done and published, I was not only most agreeably disappointed, but struck
with amazement. Nothing less than that superintending hand of Providence,
that so miraculously carried us through the war (in my humble opinion),
could have brought it about so complete, upon the whole.
The constitution recommended, in all respects, takes its rise where it
ought, from the people; its President, Senate, and House of
Representatives, are sufficient and wholesome checks on each other, and at
proper periods are dissolved again into the common mass of the people:
longer periods would probably have produced danger; shorter, tumult,
instability and inefficacy. Every article of these and other essentials to
a republican government, are, in my opinion, well secured; were it
otherwise, not a citizen of the United States would have been more
alarmed, or more early in opposition to it, than
A STEADY AND OPEN REPUBLICAN.
_Charleston, May 2d, 1788._
BIBLIOGRAPHY.
[This list is only of those essays to which some clue of authorship has
been found. When written over a pen name the pseudonym is added.—_Ed._]
Brackenridge, Hugh Henry.
Pittsburg Gazette.
Bryan, Samuel. “Centinel.”
Independent Gazetteer.
Carroll, Daniel. “A Friend to the Constitution.”
Maryland Journal.
Chase, Samuel. “Caution.”
Maryland Journal.
Clinton, De Witt. “A Countryman.”
New York Journal.
Clinton, George. “Cato.”
New York Journal.
Coxe, Tench. “A Freeman.”
Pennsylvania Gazette.
Coxe, Tench. “An American.”
Independent Gazetteer.
Coxe, Tench. “A Pennsylvanian.”
Pennsylvania Gazette.
Duer, William. “Philo-Publius.”
Daily Advertiser.
Davie, William Richardson. “Publicola.”
North Carolina State Gazette.
Dickinson, John. “Fabius.”
Humphrey’s Mercury.
Ellsworth, Oliver. “A Landholder.”
Connecticut Courant.
Findley, William. “An Officer of the Continental Army.”
Independent Gazetteer.
Gerry, Elbridge.
Massachusetts Centinel.
Gerry, Elbridge.
American Herald.
Hamilton, Alexander. “Publius.”
Various papers.
Hamilton, Alexander. “Cæsar.”
Daily Advertiser.
Hanson, Alexander Contee. “Aristides.”
Maryland Journal.
Hopkinson, Francis. “A. B.”
Independent Gazetteer.
Iredell, James. “Marcus.”
North Carolina State Gazette.
Jay, John. “Publius.”
Various papers.
Lamb, John. “Conciliator.”
New York Journal.
McKnight, Dr. Charles. “The Examiner.”
Daily Advertiser.
Martin, Luther.
Maryland Journal.
Madison, James. “Publius.”
Various papers.
Nicholas, John. “Decius.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.
Pinckney, Charles. “A Steady and Open Republican.”
State Gazette of South Carolina.
Randolph, Thomas Mann. “A Republican Federalist.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.
Roane, Spencer. “A Plain Dealer.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.
Sherman, Roger. “A Countryman.”
New Haven Gazette.
Sherman, Roger. “A Citizen of New Haven.”
New Haven Gazette.
Sullivan, James. “Cassius.”
Massachusetts Gazette.
Tucker, St. George. “A State Soldier.”
Virginia Independent Chronicle.
Williams, William.
American Mercury.
Williamson, Hugh.
North Carolina State Gazette.
Winthrop, James. “Agrippa.”
Massachusetts Gazette.
Workman, Benjamin. “Philadelphiensis.”
Independent Gazetteer.
Yates, Robert. “Brutus.”
New York Journal.
Yates, Robert. “Sydney.”
New York Journal.
INDEX.
“A. B.,” pseudonym of, 416.
Adams, John, 117, 231.
“Agrippa,” pseudonym of, 22, 29, 49, 417.
“American,” pseudonym of, 415.
American Herald, 123, 416.
American Mercury, 417.
American Museum, 315.
Anarchy, danger of, 15, 165;
predicted, 18.
Anti-Federalists, character of, 25.
“Aristides,” pseudonym of, 372, 416.
Aristocracy, favorers of, 5;
small danger of, 165;
southern, 258;
causes of, 298;
tendencies to, 223.
Articles of Confederation, 238;
advantages of, 77;
amendment of, 80, 98;
defects in, 255;
ease of amendment of, 117;
proposed amendment to, 84.
Baldwin, Simeon, 213.
Ballot, 305.
Baltimore, 327, 333.
Bill of rights, 28, 95, 113, 117, 119, 163, 219, 299, 320, 325, 364.
Blair, John, 162.
Bowdoin, James, 3, 6.
Brackenridge, H. H., 315, 415.
“Brutus,” pseudonym of, 269, 295, 417.
Bryan, George, 221.
Bryan, Samuel, 415.
“Cæsar,” pseudonym of, 245, 250, 279, 416.
Canada, 191;
dangers from, 157.
Capital, 262;
place for, 73, 321.
Capitation tax, 272.
“Capt. M’Daniel,” pseudonym of, 122.
Carroll, Daniel, 325, 329, 415.
Carthage, 93.
“Cassius,” pseudonym of, 1, 51, 416.
“Cato,” pseudonym of, 243, 281, 415.
“Caution,” pseudonym of, 323, 415.
“Centinel, The,” pseudonym of, 218, 415.
“Charles James Fox,” pseudonym of, 51.
Chase, Samuel, 323, 415;
promises of, 333;
speech of, 325.
Childs, Francis, 250.
“Citizen of New Haven,” pseudonym of, 229, 416.
Citizenship, 270;
rights of, 42.
Clinton, De Witt, 415.
Clinton, George, 173, 243, 281, 415.
Coinage, uniformity of, 35.
Coke, 266.
Commerce of America, 95;
inter-state, congressional power over, 118;
regulation of, 97.
Commercial treaties, power to make, 234.
“Conciliator,” pseudonym of, 416.
Congress, Continental, action on the Constitution, 253, 289;
retrospective view of, 298;
inadequate powers of, 34.
Congress, difference between state legislature and, 224;
length of session of, 239;
members of, 225;
character of, 227;
character from South, 258;
election of, 86;
privileges of, 33;
restriction on, 234;
interest of, 220;
journal of, 33;
nature of, 267;
powers of, 27, 32, 34, 41, 98;
to alienate territory, 80;
to coerce the states, 184;
over delinquent states, 358;
over citizens, 80;
over elections, 30, 37, 118, 276;
over inter-state commerce, 118;
over judiciary, 66;
over militia, 184;
law-making powers of, 45;
of taxation, 235;
over territories, 43;
over trade, 61;
representation in, 151.
Connecticut, 183, 355;
address to, 215;
constitution of, 148;
Courant, 135, 415;
convention, 178, 207;
legislature of, 219;
manufactures of, 202;
taxation in, 74, 148;
tribute to New York from, 180.
Constituents, instructions from, 28.
Constitution, a creation of power, 145, 147;
adequacy of, 35;
adopting clause of, 131, 184, 362;
advantages of, 21;
amendment of, 44, 100, 118, 200, 233, 251, 284, 334;
attempts to surprise the people with, 327;
character of opposers of, 11, 143;
comparison of, 339;
with constitution of N. Y., 297;
with English, 381;
consolidating tendencies of, 65, 69, 70, 158, 258, 297;
construction of, 43;
objections to, 25, 53, 132, 151;
definition of, 116;
despotic power of, 28;
effect of, 95;
excellence of language of, 156;
expense of, 60;
general clauses of, 83, 96, 119;
importance of, 248;
judicial power under, 39;
laws made under, 360;
merits of, 27;
new powers granted by, 238;
powers under, 153, 156, 163, 220;
opposition to, 39;
preamble of, 208;
reasons for not submitting to state legislature, 139;
reception of, 9;
rejection of, 100;
remarks on, 237, 395;
supreme law of the land, 184;
want of explicitness in, 155, 260, 265;
should be tried before amending, 235;
writers against, 12.
Convention, Federal, 238, 247, 284, 287;
appeals to the people, 140;
character of the members of, 20;
committees of, 348;
dissenting members of, 104;
harmony of, 191;
ignorance of the members of, 22;
illegal action of, 104;
irritated condition of, 367;
journals of, 347;
large vs. small states in, 355;
meetings of, 345;
meetings of members of, 355;
object of, 35;
powers of, 252, 290;
proceedings in, 130, 174, 183, 341;
secrecy of, 252, 298;
spirit of, 167;
wisdom of, 252.
Convention, second, 62, 235, 375.
Council, lack of, 162.
“Countryman, A,” pseudonym of, 211, 415, 416.
Courts, Federal, 36, 40, 83.
Courts, State, 54.
Coxe, Tench, 415.
Credit, public, 73, 197.
Creditors, public, 60;
justice to, 35.
Criminal prosecution, laws for, 67.
Daily Advertiser, 250, 279, 415, 416.
Davie, William Richardson, 415.
Debt, Continental, 60, 73, 77, 95, 97, 127.
Debtors, opposition of, to constitution, 144.
“Decius,” pseudonym of, 416.
Delaware, 163, 355.
Dickinson, John, 415.
Duer, William, 415.
Duties, 77;
Massachusetts’ share of, 84;
paid by consumers, 271;
uniformity of, 35.
Eastern states, carrying trade of, 162.
Elections, 116;
frequency of, 227;
power of Congress over, 30, 118, 276;
provisions for, 37.
Ellsworth, Oliver, 135, 415.
England, laws of, against treason, 42;
religious freedom in, 168.
Europe, governments of, 256;
treaties with, 89.
“Examiner,” pseudonym of, 18, 416.
Excise forbidden, 118.
Executive, 158, 260, 310;
advice of, 38;
blended with legislative, 240, 275;
council for, 163;
impeachment of, 39;
ineligible, after service, 234;
may be a woman, 319;
method of electing, 263;
not specified, 319;
objections to, 162;
powers of, 39, 261;
power over pardon, 234, 240;
power to convene Congress, 275;
re-eligibility of, 354, 374;
to be elected annually, 119;
under constitution, 37;
vote of, 38;
veto power of, 34.
Ex post facto law, 163.
“Fabius,” pseudonym of, 415.
Federal Government, necessity for, 141.
Federalists, aristocratic tendencies of, 89.
Findley, William, 100, 321, 415.
Fisheries, 194;
power over, 234.
Flax, 202.
Foreign influence, 103.
Foreign nations, intercourse with, 80.
Forests, value of, 194.
France, public debt to, 73.
Franchise, 226.
Frankland, 258.
Franklin, Benjamin, 23, 26, 218, 321, 370.
“Freeman,” pseudonym of, 415.
“Friend to the Constitution,” 329, 415.
Georgia, 164, 190, 259, 355.
Gerry, Elbridge, 25, 51, 53, 104, 123, 127, 130, 137, 161, 172, 182, 186,
339, 341, 350, 416;
conciliating conduct of, 174;
hypocrisy of, 174;
objections to constitutions, 132;
remarks on, 150.
Goddard, William, 341.
Government, divisions of, 116;
encroaching tendencies of, 376;
General and State linked, 153;
Greek and Roman, 55;
importance, 247;
necessity of, to society, 111;
opposition to, 24;
a strong one necessary for liberty, 147.
Great Britain, dangers from, 190;
resentment of, 89.
Habeas corpus, suspension of, 36.
Hamilton, Alexander, 245, 279, 416.
Hampshire Gazette, 5.
Hancock, John, 3, 5, 10.
Hanson, Alexander Contee, 372, 416.
Hartford, 216.
Harvard College Library, 40.
Holland, public debt due, 73.
Hopkinson, Francis, 416.
Humphrey’s Mercury, 415.
Impeachment, 39, 233, 312, 391;
in Massachusetts, 41;
methods of, 30;
powers of Senate in, 29.
Independent Chronicle, 5.
Independent Gazetteer, 218, 415, 416, 417.
India, trade with, 109.
Indian affairs, 301;
lands, 300.
Iredell, James, 416.
Jay, John, 416.
Judiciary, 54, 159, 235, 241;
appeals to, 130, 184, 361;
appointment of, 69;
dangers from, 66, 164;
federal, 83;
limits of 67, 118;
national, 309;
oppressiveness of, 159;
powers of, 96;
restrictions on federal, 119;
state, 241.
“Junius,” pseudonym of, 51.
Jury, trial by, 41, 131, 308.
“Kempis, O’Flanagan,” pseudonym of, 51.
Lamb, John, 173, 245, 416.
“Landholder, A,” 129, 135, 205, 339, 344, 415;
replies to, 123.
Land grants, power of courts over, 75.
Lands, western, 60, 63, 73.
Lansing, John, Jr., 104.
Lee, Gen. Charles, 161.
Lee, Henry, 162.
Lee, Richard Henry, 161, 177, 390.
Liberty of the press, 365.
Locke, 257.
Loyalists, opposition of, to constitution, 143.
M’Henry, James, 131, 187, 347, 350.
McKean, Thomas, 90, 100.
McKnight, Dr. Charles, 416.
MacLaughlin, Neil, 321.
Madison, 162, 231, 325, 387, 416.
Magna Charta, 219.
Maine, secession of, 257.
Manufactures in America, 201.
“Marcus,” pseudonym of, 416.
Martin, Luther, 104, 130, 137, 182, 185, 337, 416.
Maryland, 188;
convention, 327;
Legislature, petition to, 334.
Maryland Journal, 182, 323, 329, 337, 415, 416.
Mason, George, 104, 161, 164, 165, 172, 355.
Massachusetts, 258;
Constitution of, 16;
convention, 105, 187, 349;
proposed resolution for, 84;
debt of, 60;
delegates from, 29;
disadvantages of government for, 102;
early history of, 56;
feebleness of, 257;
impeachment in, 30, 41;
Legislature, action on constitution of, 17;
means of taxation of, 13;
origin of opposition in, 176;
plan to aggrandize, 182;
position of, 61;
public lands of, 63;
share of the Continental debt, 77;
taxation in, 74;
tender law of, 36, 59;
warning to, 10.
Massachusetts Centinel, 3, 123, 416.
Massachusetts Gazette, 1, 12, 18, 49, 51, 416, 417.
Mercer, James Francis, 104.
Militia, 358;
powers of Congress over, 184;
power over, 342, 354;
State control of, 118.
Minority, powers of, 33.
Monarchy, small danger of, 165.
Money, receipts and expenditures of public, 36.
Monopolies, power of Congress to create, 70;
prevention of, 80.
Montesquieu, 256, 261.
Nails, manufacture of, 202.
Naturalization, 313;
powers of Congress over, 79.
Navigation act, 161;
motion against, 173;
right to make, 234.
Netherlands, condition of, 249.
New England, manufactures of, 201.
New Hampshire, 189, 259;
interest of, 190, 192;
lands in, 75.
New Haven, 216.
New Haven Gazette, 211, 229, 416.
New Jersey, 183, 355.
New Spain, dangers from, 157.
Newspapers, scribblers in, 25.
New York against constitution, 61;
Assembly, 245;
colonial parties, 306;
constitution of, 297, 299;
violation of, 301;
draft of a constitution for, 307;
impost of, 173;
opposition in, 176;
proposed property qualification in, 307;
State convention of 1776, 298;
State debt of, 60;
Executive, 310;
taxation in, 74;
tribute from Connecticut to, 180.
New York Journal, 125, 243, 269, 293, 415, 416, 417.
Nicholas, John, 416.
North Carolina, 258.
North Carolina, State Gazette of, 395, 415, 416, 417.
Northern States, character of people of, 92.
Nova Scotia, 191;
condition of, 89.
“Numa,” pseudonym of, 5, 10.
Oath, 207, 369;
character of, 17, 168;
of President, 38.
“Ocrico,” pseudonym of, 52.
Officers, federal, privileges of, 119.
Office holders, 145;
multiplication of, 88.
“Officer of the Continental Army,” pseudonym of, 415.
“Old Fog,” pseudonym of, 3.
Paper money, 127, 131, 196, 341, 348;
motion to redeem, 174, 186;
states to emit, 119.
Parties, colonial, 306.
People, dangers from, 179;
not to elect representatives, 183;
rights of, 115.
Pennsylvania, 369;
Assembly, 53, 369;
Convention of, 90, 100;
future seat of government, 98;
naturalization in, 79;
opposition in, 176.
Pennsylvania Gazette, 415.
“Pennsylvanian,” pseudonym of, 415.
“Philadelphiensis,” pseudonym of, 417.
“Philo-Publius,” pseudonym of, 415.
Pinckney, C. C., 183.
Pinckney, Charles, 416.
Pittsburg Gazette, 317, 415.
“Plain Dealer, A,” pseudonym of, 385, 416.
Poll tax, 272;
forbidden, 118.
Population, destiny of, 193.
Press, liberty of, 164, 239.
Prices, depressed state of, 142.
Private opinion, freedom of, 170.
“Publicola,” pseudonym of, 415.
“Publius,” pseudonym of, 145, 416.
Quorum, dangers from, 32;
powers of, 33.
Randolph, Edmund, 104, 231, 346, 387.
Randolph, Thomas Mann, 416.
Religion, freedom of, 168, 313;
misuse of, 8.
Religious test, 207, 235;
nature of, 169;
necessity of, 168.
Representation, 54, 269, 391;
best mode of, 151;
difference of opinion concerning, 354;
smallness of, 236, 240;
want of, 151.
Representatives, House of, 54;
electors of, 28;
insufficiency of, 29;
length of residence necessary, 28;
method of choosing, 152;
method of electing, 27, 357;
people should not elect, 183;
term of, 28;
weakness of, 273.
Republics, Greek and Roman, 94.
“Republican Federalist,” pseudonym of, 416.
Republican government, guarantee of, 43, 106.
Revenue bills, origination of, 34.
Revenue, method of collecting, 193;
Massachusetts’ share of, 102;
sources of, 239.
Revolution, the American, 146.
Rhode Island, 105, 108, 115, 159, 196;
junto in, 153;
legislature of, 31, 36.
Rights, delegated, 113.
Roane, Spencer, 385, 416.
Russell, Benjamin, 127.
Scotland, union with England, 216.
Senate, 29, 273;
blended with Executive, 275;
method of choosing, 153;
officers of, 29;
powers of impeachment, 29;
treaty power of, 165, 274;
unspecified character of, 319.
Shay’s Rebellion, 5, 13, 57, 72, 157, 159, 257, 391.
Sheep raising, 201.
Sherman, Roger, 183, 211, 229, 416.
Shipbuilding, 61, 194;
carpenters, 61.
Slavery, 258;
responsibility for, 163.
Slaves, importation of, 163.
Smilie, John, 100, 321.
Smith, Melancthon, 173.
South Carolina, 164, 183, 265, 355;
amendment of, 235;
representation in, 108.
Southern States, character of people of 92;
objections to commercial powers, 162.
“Spectator,” pseudonym of, 326.
States, coercion of, 184;
influences, 297;
courts, 54, 159;
absorption of, 297;
dangers to, 153;
destruction of, 342;
powers of, 98;
negative on laws, 360;
legislatures, action of, on constitution, 25;
Congress a check on, 31;
differences between Congress and, 224;
powers of, 152;
power over elections, 31;
representation in, 152;
officers, dangers from, 289;
restrictions on, 36;
rights, 68, 113, 118, 147, 184;
admission of new, 42;
advantages of, 66;
bills of right valid in federal courts, 119;
consolidation of, 97, 255;
destruction of, 375;
disputes between, 64, 100;
equality of, in Senate, 29;
interest of, 215;
large vs. small, 216, 355;
number to organize government, 184;
rights to enforce laws of, 118.
State Gazette of North Carolina, 395.
State Gazette of South Carolina, 416.
State house, 355.
“State Soldier,” pseudonym of, 417.
“Steady and Open Republican,” pseudonym of, 416.
“Steady,” pseudonym of, 326.
Strong, Caleb, 105.
Sullivan, James, 1, 416.
“Sydney,” pseudonym of, 269, 293, 417.
Tax, poll, 273.
Taxation, 156, 193;
dangers of, 81;
direct, 235, 270;
importance of, 271;
in Connecticut, 148, 226;
method of, 77, 358;
powers of Congress over, 97.
Tender acts, 36, 59, 196.
Territory, right to alienate, 80, 118, 234.
Test law, 169, 171, 207, 235.
Town meetings, 226.
Trade, 61;
condition of, 140;
congressional control over, 161;
foreign, 95;
limitations of, 54;
Massachusetts’ advantage for, 73;
powers of Congress over, 79;
regulation of, 70.
Trading companies, 70, 109;
forbidden, 118.
Treason, punishment of, 41.
Treaty power, dangers from, 165.
Treaties, law of the land, 24;
with Europe, 89.
Tucker, St. George, 417.
United States, an agricultural country, 200;
condition of, 81, 121, 158;
dangers to, 178;
differences between the inhabitants of, 91;
too large for government, 257;
tranquillity of, 59.
Vermont, 258.
Vice-president, 240, 263;
duties of, 158.
Virginia, 162, 390;
house of delegates of, 166;
plan to aggrandize, 182;
qualifications of, 306;
method of, 305;
opposition in, 176.
Virginia Gazette, 387.
Virginia Independent Chronicle, 385, 416, 417.
“Vox Populi,” pseudonym of, 12, 16, 18.
Washington, George, 23, 26, 161, 177, 218, 251, 254, 285, 321, 347, 370.
West Indies, condition of, 89.
Western territory, 239.
Willetts, Marinus, 173.
Williams, William, 137, 168, 195, 202, 417.
Williamson, Hugh, 395, 417.
Wilson, James, 90, 96, 100, 112, 218, 335.
Winthrop, James, 40, 49, 417.
Woolen manufactures, 201.
Workman, Benjamin, 417.
Yates, Robert, 104, 173, 269, 293, 417.
FOOTNOTES
1 A writer then attacking the Hancock party. See _The Independent
Chronicle_ for Aug. 23, and Sept. 15, 20, 1787. _Ed._
2 Shay’s Rebellion. _Ed._
3 Massachusetts newspapers published in Northampton and Boston. _Ed._
4 The administration of Governor Bowdoin. _Ed._
5 The author of the productions under the signature of Numa, it is
said, is a gentleman of the cloth, in one of the Western counties.
6 John Hancock. _Ed._
7 A writer in the _Massachusetts Gazette_, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 16,
and 23. _Ed._
8 The Legislature of Massachusetts was then so styled. _Ed._
9 In the _Massachusetts Gazette_, for Nov. 2, 9, and 20, 1787. _Ed._
10 See the letters of Agrippa in this work. _Ed._
11 Probably Elbridge Gerry, delegate from Massachusetts to the Federal
Convention. _Ed._
12 Anti-federal scribblers in the Mass. Gazette.
13 Referring to Rhode Island. _Ed._
14 Harvard University Library, of which James Winthrop was
librarian.—_Ed._
15 Said to be by James Winthrop. See the letters, printed herein.—_Ed._
16 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.—_Ed._
17 “An Address of the subscribers, members of the late Houses of
Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, to their
constituents,” printed in the _Pennsylvania Packet_, Oct. 4,
1787.—_Ed._
18 Referring to Shay’s rebellion.—_Ed._
19 Act of 1786, providing that executions issued for private debt may
be satisfied by articles particularly enumerated, at an appraised
value from impartial men.—_Ed._
20 No attempt had been made by Massachusetts for several years to pay
the interest on its debt, except by the State Treasurer’s issuing
“consolidated notes” or “certificates” of indebtedness, bearing 6
per cent. interest. Though these were by law receivable for taxes,
they had sold as low as 4/ in the pound.—_Ed._
21 The sales to the Ohio Company.—_Ed._
22 By Act of July 5, 1786.—_Ed._
23 Probably an allusion to the Phelps and Gorham purchase.—_Ed._
24 An allusion to the proceedings in the Convention of
Pennsylvania.—_Ed._
25 Cf. with page 85.—_Ed._
26 Robert Yates, John Lansing, Jr., Luther Martin, James Francis
Mercer, Edmund Randolph, George Mason, and Elbridge Gerry.—_Ed._
27 The speech of Caleb Strong in the State Convention, Jan. 16,
1788.—_Ed._
28 Delivered Oct. 6, 1787. Printed in _Ford’s Pamphlets on the
Constitution_, p. 155.—_Ed._
29 No record of this is given in the _Debates in the Massachusetts
Convention_.—_Ed._
30 Printed in _Elliot_, I, 492.—_Ed._
31 Printed in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the Constitution_, p. 327.
32 Richard Henry Lee.
33 Saturday, September 15. See _Papers of James Madison_, III., 1593.
34 The paragraph containing Mason’s objection to the mere majority
power of Congress to regulate commerce, was included in all the
southern papers, but omitted in copies furnished to the papers north
of Maryland.—_Ed._
35 Mason proposed in the convention that the President should have a
privy council of six.—_Ed._
36 This is an error. It was moved by Mason and seconded by Gerry. Cf.
_Papers of James Madison, III._, 1578.
37 See letter of William Williams in this collection.—_Ed._
38 John Lamb, Marinus Willetts, Melancthon Smith, George Clinton and
Robert or Abraham Yates, the principal anti-federalists of New
York.—_Ed._
39 See counter-statements of Gerry and Martin in their answers.—_Ed._
40 Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, III, 1595.
41 The Convention of Connecticut, which was to meet Jan. 4.—_Ed._
42 The Landholder, IV-VIII, were reprinted in _The Maryland Journal_,
and the attack on Gerry in them, drew from Luther Martin a defence
of that gentleman, which is printed in this collection. To that the
Landholder replied as above, but this one of the series was not
printed in _The Connecticut Courant_, its place being taken by the
number X., printed immediately after this letter.—_Ed._
43 June 9.—_Ed._
44 This is a misstatement. The motion to elect representatives as the
state legislature should direct was made by C. C. Pinckney, was
seconded by Martin, and approved of by Sherman, and on being put to
a vote was favored by Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware and South
Carolina. Cf. _Papers of James Madison_, II., 925.—_Ed._
45 Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions.
46 By direction of the General Assembly of Maryland, Martin reported
the proceedings of the federal Convention to them, and this was
afterwards printed in pamphlet form under the title of _Genuine
Information_.—_Ed._
47 June 9, according to Madison, the _Journal_ and Martin’s _Genuine
Information_.—_Ed._
48 Gerry, though defeated in an election to the Massachusetts
Convention, was invited by them to attend, in order to furnish
information to the members.—_Ed._
49 To prevent any misconstruction the following is the publication
entire:
(This note is by the Landholder, and is followed by the article
already printed at p. 127. It therefore seems unnecessary to add it
here.—_Ed._)
I will not say this writer makes a distinction between a thing done
in convention and a thing done in committee. Be this as it may, he
confesses more than Mr. Martin; for it seems that Mr. Gerry proposed
that “the public debt should stand on the same ground it now stands
on by the articles of confederation.” He might have subjoined that
Mr. Gerry prefaced this motion by observing that it was the same in
substance as his first, in as much as it included his first. But
notwithstanding this motion was readily agreed to without his
explanation being contradicted, yet he never afterwards favoured the
convention with a look of peace, or a word of reconcilement.
50 The convention of New Hampshire had met on the 13 of June, and after
a discussion of seven days, had adjourned without voting upon the
constitution.—_Ed._
51 See Letter of William Williams in this Collection.—_Ed._
52 This is a paraphrase of the arguments of “The Centinel” in _The
Independent Gazetteer_.—ED.
53 An attempt had been made in Congress, by the friends of the new
government, for Congress to recommend its acceptance, but this
produced protest from those opposed to it, and threats of an appeal
to the people, so in order to prevent such action a compromise was
eventually made, by which it was merely unanimously “transmitted to
the several legislatures.”—_Ed._
54 A series of articles in the _New York Journal_, written by Robert
Yates.—_Ed._
55 John Smilie, a prominent Anti-Federalist.—_Ed._
56 William Livingston.—_Ed._
57 See _Ante_, pages 182 and 189.—_Ed._
58 The Maryland Delegates to the Federal Convention were required by
the legislature to report the proceedings of that body to them, and
it was in this connection that Martin’s _Genuine Information_ was
prepared.—_Ed._
59 According to this idea, I endeavored to obtain as an amendment to
the system the following clause: “And whenever the legislature of
the United States shall find it necessary that revenue shall be
raised by direct taxation, having apportioned the same by the above
rule, requisitions shall be made of the respective states to pay
into the continental treasury their respective quotas within a time
in the said requisition to be specified, and in case of any of the
states failing to comply with such requisition, then, and then only,
to have power to devise and pass acts directing the mode, and
authorizing the same in the state failing therein.” This was
rejected, and that power, which I wished to have given the
government only in this particular instance, is given to it without
any restraint or limitation in every case.
60 How exactly agreeable to the sentiments of that honourable member
has been the conduct of the friends of the Constitution in
Pennsylvania and some other states, I need not mention.
61 A reference to Alexander Contee Hanson’s pamphlet, written under the
pseudonym of Aristides. It is reprinted in Ford’s _Pamphlets on the
Constitution_.—_Ed._
62 Printed in _Elliot_, 1, 503.—_Ed._
63 Williamson was a member of the Federal Convention.—_Ed._
64 Following this article was an essay from a New York paper.—_Ed._
65 See page 339.—_Ed._