Mr. Mason was certainly wrong in telling the world that he acted a double

part—he ought not to have published two setts of reasons for his dissent

to the constitution. His New England reasons would have come better from

you. He ought to have contented himself with haranguing in the southern

states, that it was too popular, and was calculated too much for the

advantage of the eastern states. At the same time you might have come on,

and in the Coffee-House at New York you might have found an excellent sett

of objections ready made to your hand, a sett that with very little

alteration would have exactly suited the latitude of New England, the

whole of which district ought most clearly to have been submitted to your

protection and patronage. A Lamb, a Willet, a Smith, a Clinton, a

Yates,(38) or any other gentleman whose salary is paid by the state

impost, as they had six months the start of you in considering the

subject, would have furnished you with a good discourse upon the “liberty

of the press,” the “bill of rights,” the “blending of the executive and

legislative,” “internal taxation,” or any other topic which you did not

happen to think of while in convention.

It is evident that this mode of proceeding would have been well calculated

for the security of Mr. Mason; he there might have vented his antient

enmity against the independence of America, and his sore mortification for

the loss of his favorite motion respecting the navigation act, and all

under the mask of sentiments, which with a proper caution in expressing

them, might have gained many adherents in his own state. But, although Mr.

Mason’s conduct might have been easily guarded in this particular, your

character would not have been entirely safe even with the precaution above

mentioned. Your policy, Sir, ought to have led you one step farther back.

You have been so precipitate and unwary in your proceedings, that it will

be impossible to set you right, even in idea, without recurring to

previous transactions and recalling to your view the whole history of your

conduct in the convention, as well as the subsequent display of patriotism

contained in your publication. I undertake this business, not that I think

it possible to help you out of your present embarrassments; but, as those

transactions have evidently slipt your memory, the recollection of the

blunder into which your inexperience has betrayed you, may be of eminent

service in forming future schemes of popularity, should the public ever

give you another opportunity to traduce and deceive them.

You will doubtless recollect the following state of facts—if you do not,

every member of the convention will attest them—that almost the whole time

during the setting of the convention, and until the constitution had

received its present form, no man was more plausible and conciliating upon

every subject than Mr. Gerry—he was willing to sacrifice every private

feeling and opinion—to concede every state interest that should be in the

least incompatible with the most substantial and permanent system of

general government—that mutual concession and unanimity were the whole

burden of his song; and although he originated no idea himself, yet there

was nothing in the system as it now stands to which he had the least

objection—indeed, Mr. Gerry’s conduct was agreeably surprising to all his

acquaintance, and very unlike that turbulent obstinacy of spirit which

they had formerly affixed to his character. Thus stood Mr. Gerry, till

toward the close of the business, he introduced a motion respecting the

redemption of the old Continental Money—that it should be placed upon a

footing with other liquidated securities of the United States.(39) As Mr.

Gerry was supposed to be possessed of large quantities of this species of

paper, his motion appeared to be founded in such barefaced selfishness and

injustice, that it at once accounted for all his former plausibility and

concession, while the rejection of it by the convention inspired its

author with the utmost rage and intemperate opposition to the whole system

he had formerly praised. His resentment could no more than embarrass and

delay the completion of the business for a few days; when he refused

signing the constitution and was called upon for his reasons. These

reasons were committed to writing by one of his colleagues and likewise by

the Secretary, as Mr. Gerry delivered them.(40) These reasons were totally

different from those which he has published, neither was a single

objection which is contained in his letter to the legislature of

Massachusetts ever offered by him in convention.

Now, Mr. Gerry, as this is generally known to be the state of facts, and

as neither the reasons which you publish nor those retained on the

Secretary’s files can be supposed to have the least affinity to truth, or

to contain the real motives which induced you to withhold your name from

the constitution, it appears to me that your plan was not judiciously

contrived. When we act without principle, we ought to be prepared against

embarrassments. You might have expected some difficulties in realizing

your continental money; indeed the chance was rather against your motion,

even in the most artful shape in which it could have been proposed. An

experienced hand would therefore have laid the whole plan beforehand, and

have guarded against a disappointment. You should have begun the business

with doubts, and expressed your sentiments with great ambiguity upon every

subject as it passed. This method would have secured you many advantages.

Your doubts and ambiguities, if artfully managed, might have passed, like

those of the Delphic Oracle, for wisdom and deliberation; and at the close

of the business you might have acted either for or against the

constitution, according to the success of your motion, without appearing

dishonest or inconsistent with yourself. One farther precaution would have

brought you off clear.

Instead of waiting till the convention rose, before you consulted your

friends at New York, you ought to have applied to them at an earlier

period, to know what objections you should make. They could have

instructed you as well in August as October.

With these advantages you might have past for a complete politician, and

your duplicity might never have been detected.

The enemies of America have always been extremely unfortunate in

concerting their measures. They have generally betrayed great ignorance of

the true spirit and feeling of the country, and they have failed to act in

concert with each other. This is uniformly conspicuous, from the first

Bute Parliament in London to the last Shays Parliament at Pelham.

The conduct of the enemies of the new constitution compares with that of

the other enemies above mentioned only in two particulars, its object and

its tendency.

Its object was self interest built on the ruins of the country, and its

tendency is the disgrace of its authors and the final prosperity of the

same country they meant to depress. Whether the constitution will be

adopted at the first trial in the conventions of nine states is at present

doubtful. It is certain, however, that its enemies have great difficulties

to encounter arising from their disunion: in the different states where

the opposition rages the most, their principles are totally opposite to

each other, and their objections discordant and irreconcilable, so that no

regular system can be formed among you, and you will betray each other’s

motives.

In Massachusetts the opposition began with you, and from motives most

pitifully selfish and despicable, you addressed yourself to the feelings

of the Shays faction, and that faction will be your only support. In New

York the opposition is not to this constitution in particular, but to the

federal impost, it is confined wholly to salary-men and their connections,

men whose salary is paid by the state impost. This class of citizens are

endeavoring to convince the ignorant part of the community that an annual

income of fifty thousand pounds, extorted from the citizens of

Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, is a great blessing to the

state of New York. And although the regulation of trade and other

advantages of a federal government would secure more than five times that

sum to the people of that state, yet, as this would not come through the

same hands, these men find fault with the constitution. In Pennsylvania

the old quarrel respecting their state constitution has thrown the state

into parties for a number of years. One of these parties happened to

declare for the new federal constitution, and this was a sufficient motive

for the other to oppose it; the dispute there is not upon the merits of

the subject, but it is their old warfare carried on with different

weapons, and it was an even chance that the parties had taken different

sides from what they have taken, for there is no doubt but either party

would sacrifice the whole country to the destruction of their enemies. In

Virginia the opposition wholly originated in two principles; the madness

of Mason, and the enemity of the Lee faction to General Washington. Had

the General not attended the convention nor given his sentiments

respecting the constitution, the Lee party would undoubtedly have

supported it, and Col. Mason would have vented his rage to his own negroes

and to the winds. In Connecticut, our wrongheads are few in number and

feeble in their influence. The opposition here is not one-half so great to

the federal government as it was three years ago to the federal impost,

and the faction, such as it is, is from the same blindfold party.

I thought it my duty to give you these articles of information, for the

reasons above mentioned. Wishing you more caution and better success in

your future manœuvers, I have the honor to be, Sir, with great respect,

your very humble servant.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, IX.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1197)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 31, 1787.

TO THE HON. GENTLEMEN CHOSEN TO SERVE IN THE STATE CONVENTION.(41)

_Gentlemen_,

When the deputies of a free people are met to deliberate on a constitution

for their country; they must find themselves in a solemn situation. Few

persons realize the greatness of this business, and none can certainly

determine how it will terminate. A love of liberty in which we have all

been educated, and which your country expects on you to preserve sacred,

will doubtless make you careful not to lay such foundations as will

terminate in despotism. Oppression and a loss of liberty arise from very

different causes, and which at first blush appear totally different from

another.

If you had only to guard against vesting an undue power in certain great

officers of state your work would be comparatively easy. This some times

occasions a loss of liberty, but the history of nations teacheth us that

for one instance from this cause, there are ten from the contrary, a want

of necessary power in some public department to protect and to preserve

the true interests of the people. America is at this moment in ten-fold

greater danger of slavery than ever she was from the councils of a British

monarchy, or the triumph of British arms. She is in danger from herself

and her own citizens, not from giving too much, but from denying all power

to her rulers—not from a constitution on despotic principles, but from

having no constitution at all. Should this great effort to organize the

empire prove abortive, heaven only knows the situation in which we shall

find ourselves; but there is reason to fear it will be troublesome enough.

It is awful to meet the passions of a people who not only believe but feel

themselves uncontrouled—who not finding from government the expected

protection of their interests, tho’ otherwise honest, become desperate,

each man determining to share by the spoils of anarchy, what he would wish

to acquire by industry under an efficient national protection. It becomes

the deputies of the people to consider what will be the consequence of a

miscarriage in this business. Ardent expectation is waiting for its

issue—all allow something is necessary—thousands of sufferers have stifled

their rights in reverence to the public effort—the industrious classes of

men are waiting with patience for better times, and should that be

rejected on which they make dependance, will not the public convulsion be

great? Or if the civil state should survive the first effects of

disappointment, what will be the consequences of slower operations? The

men who have done their best to give relief, will despair of success, and

gloomily determine that greater sufferings must open the eyes of the

deluded—the men who oppose, tho’ they may claim a temporary triumph, will

find themselves totally unable to propose, and much less to adopt a better

system; the narrowness of policy that they have pursued will instantly

appear more ridiculous than at present, and the triumph will spoil that

importance, which nature designed them to receive not by succeeding, but

by impeding national councils. These men cannot, therefore, be the

saviours of their country. While those who have been foremost in the

political contention disappear either thro’ despondence or neglect, every

man will do what is right in his own eyes and his hand will be against his

neighbor—industry will cease—the states will be filled with jealousy—some

opposing and others endeavoring to retaliate—a thousand existing factions,

and acts of public injustice, thro’ the temporary influence of parties,

will prepare the way for chance to erect a government, which might now be

established by deliberate wisdom. When government thus arises, it carries

an iron hand.

Should the states reject a union upon solid and efficient principles,

there needs but some daring genius to step forth, and impose an authority

which future deliberation never can correct. Anarchy, or a want of such

government as can protect the interests of the subjects against foreign

and domestic injustice, is the worst of all conditions. It is a condition

which mankind will not long endure. To avoid its distress they will resort

to any standard which is erected, and bless the ambitious usurper as a

messenger sent by heaven to save a miserable people. We must not depend

too much on the enlightened state of the country; in deliberation this may

preserve us, but when deliberation proves abortive, we are immediately to

calculate on other principles, and enquire to what may the passions of men

lead them, when they have deliberated to the utmost extent of patience,

and been foiled in every measure, by a set of men who think their

emoluments more safe upon a partial system, than upon one which regards

the national good.

Politics ought to be free from passion—we ought to have patience for a

certain time with those who oppose a federal system. But have they not

been indulged until the state is on the brink of ruin, and they appear

stubborn in error? Have they not been our scourge and the perplexers of

our councils for many years? Is it not thro’ their policy that the state

of New York draws an annual tribute of forty thousand pounds from the

citizens of Connecticut? Is it not by their means that our foreign trade

is ruined, and the farmer unable to command a just price for his

commodities? The enlightened part of the people have long seen their

measures to be destructive, and it is only the ignorant and jealous who

give them support. The men who oppose this constitution are the same who

have been unfederal from the beginning. They were as unfriendly to the old

confederation as to the system now proposed, but bore it with more

patience because it was wholly inefficacious. They talk of amendments—of

dangerous articles which must be corrected—that they will heartily join in

a safe plan of federal government; but when we look on their past conduct

can we think them sincere? Doubtless their design is to procrastinate, and

by this carry their own measures; but the artifice must not succeed. The

people are now ripe for a government which will do justice to their

interests, and if the honourable convention deny them, they will despair

of help. They have shewn a noble spirit in appointing their first citizens

for this business—when convened you will constitute the most august

assembly that were ever collected in the State, and your duty is the

greatest that can be expected from men, the salvation of your country. If

coolness and magnanimity of mind attend your deliberations, all little

objections will vanish, and the world will be more astonished by your

political wisdom than they were by the victory of your arms.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, X.

The Maryland Journal, (Number 1016)

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 1788.

For the Maryland Journal, etc.

TO THE HONOURABLE LUTHER MARTIN, ESQ.(42)

_Sir_,

I have just met with your performance in favour of the Honourable Mr.

Gerry, published in the Maryland Journal of the 18th January, 1788. As the

Public may be ignorant of the Sacrifice you have made of your resentments

on this occasion, you will excuse me for communicating what your extreme

modesty must have induced you to conceal. You, no doubt, remember that you

and Mr. Gerry never voted alike in Convention, except in the instances I

shall hereafter enumerate. He uniformly opposed your principles, and so

far did you carry your abhorrence of his politics, as to inform certain

members to be on their guard against his wiles, so that, he and Mr. Mason

held private meetings, where plans were concerted “to aggrandise, at the

expence of the small States, Old Massachusetts and the Ancient Dominion.”

After having thus opposed him and accused him, to appear his Champion and

intimate acquaintance, has placed you beyond the reach of ordinary

panegyric. Having done this justice to your magnanimity, I cannot resist

drawing the veil of the Convention a little farther aside; not, I assure

you, with any intention to give pain to your Constituents, but merely to

induce them to pity you for the many piercing mortifications you met with

in the discharge of your duty. The day you took your seat(43) must be long

remembered by those who were present; nor will it be possible for you to

forget the astonishment your behaviour almost instantaneously produced.

You had scarcely time to read the propositions which had been agreed to

after the fullest investigation, when, without requesting information, or

to be let into the reasons of the adoption of what you might not approve,

you opened against them in a speech which held during two days, and which

might have continued two months, but for those marks of fatigue and

disgust you saw strongly expressed on whichever side of the house you

turned your mortified eyes. There needed no other display to fix your

character and the rank of your abilities, which the Convention would have

confirmed by the most distinguished silence, had not a certain similarity

in genius provoked a sarcastic reply from the pleasant Mr. Gerry; in which

he admired the strength of your lungs and your profound knowledge in the

first principles of government; mixing and illustrating his little remarks

with a profusion of those hems, that never fail to lengthen out and

enliven his oratory. This reply (from your intimate acquaintance), the

match being so equal and the contrast so comic, had the happy effect to

put the house in good humor, and leave you a prey to the most humiliating

reflections. But this did not teach you to bound your future speeches by

the lines of moderation; for the very next day you exhibited without a

blush another specimen of eternal volubility. It was not, however, to the

duration of your speeches you owed the perfection of your reputation. You,

alone, advocated the political heresy, that the people ought not to be

trusted with the election of representatives.(44) You held the jargon,

that notwithstanding each state had an equal number of votes in the

Senate; yet the states were unequally represented in the Senate. You

espoused the tyrannic principle, that where a State refused to comply with

a requisition of Congress for money, that an army should be marched into

its bowels, to fall indiscriminately upon the property of the innocent and

the guilty, instead of having it collected as the Constitution proposed,

by the mild and equal operation of laws. One hour you sported the opinion

that Congress, afraid of the militia resisting their measures, would

neither arm nor organize them, and the next, as if men required no time to

breathe between such contradictions, that they would harass them by long

and unnecessary marches, till they wore down their spirit and rendered

them fit subjects for despotism. You, too, contended that the powers and

authorities of the new Constitution must destroy the liberties of the

people; but that the same powers and authorities might be safely trusted

with the Old Congress. You cannot have forgotten, that by such ignorance

in politics and contradictory opinions, you exhausted the politeness of

the Convention, which at length prepared to slumber when you rose to

speak; nor can you have forgotten, you were only twice appointed a member

of a Committee, or that these appointments were made merely to avoid your

endless garrulity, and if possible, lead you to reason, by the easy road

of familiar conversation. But lest you should say that I am a record only

of the bad, I shall faithfully recognize whatever occurred to your

advantage. You originated that clause in the Constitution which enacts,

that “This Constitution and the laws of the United States Which shall be

made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made or which shall be made,

under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the

land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in

the Constitution or the law of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.”

You voted that an appeal should lay to the Supreme Judiciary of the United

States, for the correction of all errors, both in law and fact. You also

agreed to the clause that declares nine States to be sufficient to put the

government in motion.(45) These are among the greater positive virtues you

exhibited in the Convention; but it would be doing you injustice were I to

omit those of a negative nature. Since the publication of the

Constitution, every topic of vulgar declamation has been employed to

persuade the people, that it will destroy the trial by jury, and is

defective for being without a bill of rights. You, sir, had more candour

in the Convention than we can allow to those declaimers out of it; there

you never signified by any motion or expression whatever, that it stood in

need of a bill of rights, or in any wise endangered the trial by jury. In

these respects the Constitution met your entire approbation; for had you

believed it defective in these essentials, you ought to have mentioned it

in Convention, or had you thought it wanted further guards, it was your

indispensable duty to have proposed them. I hope to hear that the same

candour that influenced you on this occasion, has induced you to obviate

any improper impressions such publications may have excited in your

constituents, when you had the honor to appear before the General

Assembly.(46) From such high instances of your approbation (for every

member, like you, had made objections to parts of the Constitution) the

Convention were led to conclude that you would have honored it with your

signature, had you not been called to Maryland upon some indispensable

business; nor ought it to be withheld from you, that your colleagues

informed many Gentlemen of the House, that you told them you intended to

return before its completion. Durst I proceed beyond these facts, to which

the whole Convention can witness, I would ask you why you changed your

opinion of the Constitution after leaving Philadelphia. I have it from

good authority that you complained to an intimate acquaintance, that

nothing grieved you so much as the apprehension of being detained in

Maryland longer than you could wish; for that you had rather lose one

hundred guineas, than not have your name appear to the Constitution. But

as this circumstance seems to have been overlooked when you composed your

defence of Mr. Gerry, you may have your recollection of it revived by

applying to Mr. Young, of Spruce street, Philadelphia, to whom you made

your complaint. But leaving this curious piece of human vanity to such

further investigation as you may think it deserves, let us come to those

matters more particularly between us. You have said, that you never heard

Mr. Gerry, or any other member, introduce a proposition for the redemption

of Continental money according to its nominal or any other value; nor did

you ever hear that such a proposition had been offered to the Convention,

or had been thought of. That the Public may clearly comprehend what degree

of credit ought to be given to this kind of evidence, they should know the

time you were absent from the Convention, as well as the time you

attended. If it should appear that you were only a few days absent, when

unimportant business was the object, they will conclude in your favour,

provided they entertain a good opinion of your veracity; on the other

hand, should it appear that you were absent nearly half the session,

however your veracity may be esteemed, they must reject your evidence. As

you have not stated this necessary information, I shall do it for you. The

Session of Convention commenced the 14th of May, and ended the 17th of

September, which makes 126 days. You took your seat the 10th of June,(47)

and left it the 4th of September, of which period you were absent at

Baltimore ten days, and as many at New York, so that you attended only 66

days out of 126. Now, sir, is it to be presumed that you could have been

minutely informed of all that happened in Convention, and committees of

Convention, during the 60 days of your absence? or does it follow by any

rule of reasoning or logic, that because a thing did not happen in the 66

days you were present, that it did not happen in the 60 days which you did

not attend? Is it anywise likely that you could have heard what passed,

especially during the last 13 days, within which period the Landholder has

fixed the apostacy of Mr. Gerry? or if it is likely that your particular

intimacy with Mr. Gerry would stimulate to inquiries respecting his

conduct, why is it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of your

assertion, who was of the Committee for considering a proposition for the

debts of the union? Your reply to my second charge against this gentleman

may be soon dismissed. Compare his letter to the Legislature of his State

with your defence, and you will find that you have put into his mouth

objections different from anything it contains, so that if your

representation be true, his must be false. But there is another

circumstance which militates against your new friend. Though he was face

to face with his colleagues at the State Convention of Massachusetts,(48)

he has not ventured to call upon them to clear him either of this charge,

or that respecting the Continental money. But as the Public seemed to

require that something should be said on this occasion, an anonymous

writer denies that he made such a motion, and endeavours to abate the

force of my second allegation, merely by supposing that “his colleagues

were men of too much honor to assert that his reasons in Convention were

totally different from those which he has published.”

But alas, his colleagues would not acquit him in this way, and he was of

too proud a spirit to ask them to do it in person.(49) Hence the charge

remains on its original grounds, while you, for want of proper concert,

have joined his accusers and reduced him to the humiliating necessity of

endeavouring to stifle your justification. These points being dismissed,

it remains only to reconcile the contradictory parts you have acted on the

great political stage. You entered the convention without a sufficient

knowledge in the science of government, where you committed a succession

of memorable blunders, as the work advanced. Some rays of light penetrated

your understanding, and enabled you (as has been shown) to assist in

raising some of its pillars, when the desire of having your name enrolled

with the other laborers drew from you that remarkable complaint so

expressive of vanity and conviction. But self-interest soon gained the

ascendant, you quickly comprehended the delicacy of your situation, and

this restored your first impressions in all their original force. You

thought the Deputy Attorney General of the United States for the state of

Maryland, destined for a different character, and that inspired you with

the hope that you might derive from a desperate opposition what you saw no

prospect of gaining by a contrary conduct. But I will venture to predict,

that though you were to double your efforts, you would fail in your

object. I leave you now to your own reflections, under a promise, however,

to give my name to the public, should you be able to procure any

indifferent testimony to contradict a single fact I have stated.

February, 1788.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, X.

[This number duplicates the preceding one, for an explanation of which see

the foot-note to the first Number X.—_Ed._]

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1206)

MONDAY, MARCH 3, 1788.

TO THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.(50)

The opposition in your state to the new federal constitution, is an event

surprising to your New England brethren, yet we are not disposed to

criminate a people, which made such gallant efforts in the establishment

of the American Empire. It is the prerogative of freemen to determine

their own form of government, and if this constitution is not addressed to

your interest, if it is not calculated to preserve your freedom and make

you glorious, we wish you not to accept it. We have fought by your side,

we have long been connected in interest, and with many of you by

consanguinity, and wish that you may share with us in all the benefits of

a great and free empire. Brethren who differ in their opinions how a

common interest may be best governed, ought to deliberate with coolness,

and not wantonly accuse each other, either of folly or design.

Massachusetts and Connecticut have decidedly judged the new government

well calculated not only for the whole but for the northern states. Either

you or these states have judged wrong. Your interests are similar to

theirs, and cannot be separated from them without counteracting nature.

If there be any one state more interested than the others in the adoption

of this system, it is New Hampshire. Your local situation, which can never

be altered, is a solemn argument in its favor. Tho’ separated from the

government of Britain at no less price than the blood of your bravest

sons, you border on her dominions. She is your enemy, and wishes nothing

more than your submission to her laws, and to the will of her proud

servants.

Her force may easily be pointed thro’ your whole territory and a few

regiments would effectually banish resistance. New Hampshire, tho’ growing

in population, and amongst the first states in personal bravery, cannot

yet stand alone. Should a disunion of the states tempt Britain to make

another effort for recovering her former greatness, you will be the first

to fall under her sway. In such case you will have nothing to expect from

the other states. Dispirited with a fruitless attempt to unite in some

plan of general government and protection, they will say, let the

dissenting states abide the consequence of their own false opinions.

Though such a reply might not be wise, it would be exactly comfortable to

what we have ever found in human nature; and nature will have its course,

let policy be what it may. You are the northern barrier of the United

States, and by your situation, must first meet any hostile animosity from

that quarter designed against any part of them. It is certainly for the

interest of a barrier country, to have a general government on such

efficient principles, as can point the force of the whole for its relief

when attacked. The old constitution could not do this; that now under

consideration, if accepted, we trust will produce a circulation of riches

and the powers of protection to the most extreme parts of the body. On

these principles it has generally been said that New Hampshire and Georgia

would be amongst the first in adopting. Georgia has done it, not, perhaps,

because they were more wise than New Hampshire, but being pressed with a

dangerous war in the very moment of decision, they felt its necessity; and

feeling is an argument none can resist. Trust not to any complaisance of

those British provinces on your northern borders, or those artful men who

govern them, who were selected on purpose to beguile your politicks, and

divide and weaken the union. When the hour for a permanent connection

between the states is past, the teeth of the lion will be again made bare,

and you must be either devoured, or become its jackal to hunt for prey in

the other states.

We believe those among you who are opposed to the system, as honest and

brave as any part of the community, and cannot suspect them of any design

against American Independence; but such persons ought to consider what

will be the probable consequence of their dissent; and whether this is not

the only hour in which this community can be saved from a condition, which

is, on all hands, allowed to be dangerous and unhappy. There are certain

critical periods in which nations, as well as individuals, who have fallen

into perplexity, by a wise exertion may save themselves and be glorious.

Such is the present era in American policy, but if we do not see the hour

of our salvation, there is no reason to expect that heaven will repeat it.

The unexpected harmony of the federal Convention—their mutual

condescension in the reconcilement of jarring interests and opposing

claims between the several States—the formation of a system so efficient

in appearance, at the same time so well guarded against an oppression of

the subject—the concurring sentiments of a vast majority thro’ the United

States, of those persons who have been most experienced in policy, and

most eminent in wisdom and virtue; are events which must be attributed to

the special influence of heaven.

To be jealous of our liberties is lawful, but jealously in excess is a

deliriam [sic] of the imagination, by no means favourable to liberty. If

you would be free and happy a power must be created to protect your

persons and properties; otherwise you are slaves to all mankind. Your

British neighbors have long known these truths, and will not fail by their

emissaries to seminate such jealousies as favor their own designs.

To prophesy evil is ungrateful business; but forgive me when I predict,

that the adoption of this Constitution is the only probable means of

saving the greatest part of your State from becoming an appendage of

Canada or Nova Scotia. In some future paper I shall assign other reasons

why New Hampshire, more than any other State, is interested in this event.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, XI.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1207)

MONDAY, MARCH 10, 1788.

TO THE CITIZENS OF NEW HAMPSHIRE.

Those who wish to enjoy the blessings of society must be willing to suffer

some restraint of personal liberty, and devote some part of their property

to the public that the remainder may be secured and protected. The

cheapest form of government is not always best, for parsimony, though it

spends little, generally gains nothing. Neither is that the best

government which imposes the least restraint on its subjects; for the

benefit of having others restrained may be greater than the disadvantage

of being restrained ourselves. That is the best form of government which

returns the greatest number of advantages in proportion to the

disadvantages with which it is attended.

Measured by this rule, the state of New Hampshire cannot expect a

Constitution preferable to that now proposed for the union. In point of

defence it gives you the whole force of the empire, so arranged as to act

speedily and in concert, which is an article of greatest importance to the

frontier states. With the present generation of men, national interest is

the measure by which war or peace are determined; and when we see the

British nation, by a late treaty, paying an enormous annual subsidy to the

little principality of Hesse-Cassel for the purpose of retaining her in

military alliance, it should teach us the necessity of those parts in the

Constitution which enable the efficient force of the whole to be opposed

to an invasion of any part.

A national revenue and the manner of collecting it is another very

interesting matter, and here the citizens of New Hampshire have better

terms offered them, than their local situation can ever enable them to

demand or enforce. Impost and duties on trade, which must be collected in

the great importing towns, are the means by which an American revenue will

be principally, and perhaps wholly raised. But a point of your state comes

near the sea, and that point so situated that it never can collect

commerce, and become an emporium for the whole state. Nineteen parts in

twenty of New Hampshire are greatly inland, so that local situation

necessitates you to be an agricultural people; and this is not a hard

necessity, if you now form such a political connection with other states,

as will entitle you to a just share in that revenue they raise on

commerce. New York, the trading towns on Connecticut River, and Boston,

are the sources from which a great part of your foreign supplies will be

obtained, and where your produce will be exposed for market.

In all these places an impost is collected, of which, as consumers, you

pay a share without deriving any public benefit. You cannot expect any

alteration in the private systems of these states, unless effected by the

proposed governments, neither to remedy the evil can you command trade

from the natural channels, but must sit down contented under the burden,

if the present hour of deliverance be not accepted. This argument alone,

if there were no other, ought to decide you in favour of adoption.

It has been said that you object to the number of inhabitants being a

ratio to determine your proportion of the national expence—that your lands

are poor, but the climate favourable to population, which will draw a

share of expence beyond your ability to pay. I do not think this objection

well founded. Long experience hath taught that the number of industrious

inhabitants in any climate is not only the strength, but the wealth of a

state, and very justly measures their ability of defraying public

expences, without encroaching on the necessary support of life.

If a great proportion of your lands are barren, you ought likewise to

remember another rule of nature; that the population and fertility in many

tracts of country will be proportioned to each other. Accidental causes

for a short time may interrupt the rule, but they cannot be of dangerous

continuance. Force may controul a despotic government, and commerce may

interrupt it in an advantageous situation for trade; but from the first of

these causes you have no reason to fear, and the last, should it happen,

will increase wealth with numbers.

The fishery is a source of wealth and an object of immense consequence to

all the eastern coasts. The jealousy of European nations ought to teach us

its value. So far as you become a navigating people, the fishery should be

an object of your first attention. It cannot flourish until patronized and

protected by the general government. All the interests of navigation and

commerce must be protected by the union or come to ruin, and in our

present system where is the power to do it?

When Americans are debarred the fishery, as will soon be the case unless a

remedy is provided, all the eastern shores will become miserably poor.

Your forests embosom an immense quantity of timber for ship-building and

the lumber trade, but of how little value at present you cannot be

ignorant, and the value cannot increase until American navigation and

commerce are placed on a respectable footing, which no single state can do

for itself. The embarrassments of trade lower the price of your produce,

which with the distance of transportation almost absorbs the value; and

when by a long journey we have arrived at the place of market, even the

finest of your grain will not command cash, at that season of the year

most convenient for you to transport. Hence arises that scarcity of specie

of which you complain. Your interest is intimately connected with that of

the most commercial states, and you cannot separate it. When trade is

embarrassed the merchant is the first to complain, but the farmer in event

bears more than his share of the loss.

Let the citizens of New Hampshire candidly consider these facts, and they

must be convinced that no other state is so much interested in adopting

that system of government now under consideration.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder presents his most respectful compliments to Hon W.

Williams,(51) and begs leave to remind him that many dispensations in this

world, which have the appearance of judgment, are designed in goodness.

Such was the short address to you, and though at first it might excite an

exquisite sensibility of injury, will in its consequence prove to your

advantage, by giving you an honorable opportunity to come out and declare

your sentiments to the people. It had been represented in several parts of

the state, to the great surprise of your friends, that you wished some

religious test as an introduction to office, but as you have explained the

matter, it is only a religious preamble which you wish—against preambles

we have no animosity. Every man hath a sovereign right to use words in his

own sense, and when he hath explained himself, it ought to be believed

that he uses them conscientiously. The Landholder, for the sake of his

honourable friend, regrets that he denies his having used his name

publicly as a writer, for, though the honourable gentleman doubtless

asserts the truth, there are a great number of those odd people who really

think they were present on that occasion, and have such a strong habit of

believing their senses, that they will not be convinced even by evidence

which is superior to all sense. But it must be so in this imperfect world.

P. S. The Landholder begs his honourable friend not to be surprised at his

former address, as he can assure him most seriously, that he does not even

conjecture by whom it was written.

The Landholder, XII.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1208)

MONDAY, MARCH 17, 1788.

TO THE RHODE ISLAND FRIENDS OF PAPER MONEY, TENDER ACTS AND

ANTI-FEDERALISM.

The singular system of policy adopted by your state, no longer excites

either the surprise or indignation of mankind. There are certain extremes

of iniquity, which are beheld with patience, from a fixed conviction that

the transgressor is inveterate, and that his example from its great

injustice hath no longer a seducing influence. Milton’s lapse of the

angels and their expulsion from Heaven, produces deeper regret in a

benevolent mind than all the evil tricks they have played or torments they

have suffered since the bottomless pit became their proper home. Something

similar to this is excited in beholding the progress of human depravity.

Our minds cannot bear to be always pained; the Creator hath, therefore

wisely provided that our tender sentiments should subside, in those

desperate cases where there is no longer a probability that any effort to

which we may be excited, will have a power to reclaim. But though our

benevolence is no longer distressed with the injustice of your measures,

as philosophers above the feelings of passion, we can speculate on them to

our advantage. The sentiment thrown out by some of our adventurous

divines, that the permission of sin is the highest display of supreme

wisdom, and the greatest blessing to the universe, is most successfully

illustrated by the effects of your general policy.

In point of magnitude, your little state bears much the same proportion to

the united American empire, as the little world doth to the immense

intelligent universe; and if the apostacy of man hath conveyed such solemn

warning and instruction to the whole, as your councils have to every part

of the union, no one will doubt the usefulness of Adam’s fall. At the

commencement of peace, America was placed in a singular situation. Fear of

a common danger could no longer bind us together; patriotism had done its

best and was wearied with exertion rewarded only by ingratitude—our

federal system was inadequate for national government and justice, and

from inexperience the great body of the people were ignorant what

consequences should flow from the want of them. Experiments in public

credit, though ruinous to thousands, and a disregard to the promises of

government had been pardoned in the moment of extreme necessity, and many

honest men did not realize that a repetition of them in an hour less

critical would shake the existence of society. Men full of evil and

desperate fortune were ready to propose every method of public fraud that

can be effected by a violation of public faith and depreciating promises.

This poison of the community was their only preservation from deferred

poverty, and from prisons appointed to be the reward of indolence and

knavery. An easement of the poor and necessitous was plead as a reason for

measures which have reduced them to more extreme necessity. Most of the

states have had their prejudices against an efficient and just government,

and have made their experiments in a false policy; but it was done with a

timorous mind, and seeing the evil they have receded. A sense of

subordination and moral right was their check. Most of the people were

convinced, and but few remained who wished to establish iniquity by law.

To silence such opposition as might be made to the new constitution, it

was fit that public injustice should be exhibited in its greatest degree

and most extreme effects. For this end Heaven permitted your apostacy from

all the principles of good and just government. By your system we see

unrighteousness in the essence, in effects, and in its native miseries.

The rogues of every other state blush at the exhibition, and say you have

betrayed them by carrying the matter too far. The very naming of your

measures is a complete refutation of anti-federalism, paper money and

tender acts, for no man chooses such company in argument.

The distress to which many of your best citizens are reduced—the groans of

ruined creditors, of widows and orphans, demonstrates that unhappiness

follows vice by the unalterable laws of nature and society. I did not

mention the stings of conscience, but the authors of public distress ought

to remember that there is a world where conscience will not sleep.

Is it now at length time to consider. The great end for which your

infatuation was permitted is now become complete. The whole union has seen

and fears, and while history gives true information, no other people will

ever repeat the studied process of fraud. You may again shew the distorted

features of injustice, but never in more lively colors, or by more able

hands than has been done already. As virtue and good government has

derived all possible advantage from your experiment, and every other state

thanks you for putting their own rogues and fools out of countenance,

begin to have mercy on yourselves. You may not expect to exist in this

course any longer than is necessary for public good; and there is no need

that such a kind of warning as you set before us should be eternal. Secure

as you may feel in prosecuting what all the rest of mankind condemn, the

hour of your political revolution is at hand. The cause is within to

yourselves, and needs but the permission of your neighbors to take its

full effect. Every moral and social law calls for a review, and a volume

of penal statutes cannot prevent it. They are in the first instance

nullified by injustice, and five years hence not a man in your territories

will presume their vindication. Passion and obstinacy, which were called

in to aid injustice, have had their reign, and can support you no longer.

By a change of policy give us evidence that you are returned to manhood

and honour. The inventors of such councils can never be forgiven in this

world, but the people at large who acted by their guidance may break from

the connection and restore themselves to virtue.

There are among you legislators eminent, through the union for their

wisdom and integrity. Penetrated with grief and astonishment they stand in

silence, waiting the return of your reason. They are the only men who can

remove the impassable gulph that is between you and the rest of mankind.

In your situation there must be some sacrifice. It is required by the

necessity of the case, and for the dignity of government. You have guilty

victims enough for whom even benevolence will not plead; let them make the

atonement and save your state. The large body of a people are rarely

guilty of any crime greater than indiscretion, in following those who have

no qualification to lead but an unblushing assurance infraud. Acknowledge

the indiscretion, and leave those whom you have followed into the

quicksands of death to the infamy prepared for them, and from which they

cannot be reserved. Your situation admits no compounding of opposite

systems, or halving with justice, but to make the cure there must be an

entire change of measures. The Creator of nature and its laws made justice

as necessary for nations as for individuals, and this necessity hath been

sealed by the fate of all obstinate offenders. If you will not hear your

own groans, nor feel the pangs of your own torture, it must continue until

removed by a political annihilation. Such as do not pity themselves cannot

be long be pitied.

Determined that our feelings shall be no longer wounded by any thing to

which despair may lead you, with philosophic coolness we wait to continue

our speculations on the event.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, XIII.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1209)

MONDAY, MARCH 24, 1788.

The attempt to amend our federal Constitution, which for some time past

hath engrossed the public regard, is doubtless become an old and unwelcome

topic to many readers, whose opinions are fixed, or who are concerned for

the event. There are other subjects which claim a share of attention, both

from the public and from private citizens. It is good government which

secures the fruits of industry and virtue; but the best system of

government cannot produce general happiness unless the people are

virtuous, industrious and economical.

The love of wealth is a passion common to men, and when justly regulated

it is conducive to human happiness. Industry may be encouraged by good

laws; wealth may be protected by civil regulations; but we are not to

depend on these to create it for us, while we are indolent and luxurious.

Industry is most favourable to the moral virtue of the world; it is

therefore wisely ordered by the Author of Nature, that the blessings of

this world should be acquired by our own application in some business

useful to society; so that we have no reason to expect any climate or soil

will be found, or any age take place, in which plenty and wealth will be

spontaneously produced. The industry and labour of a people furnish a

general rule to measure their wealth, and if we use the means we may

promise ourselves the reward. The present state of America will limit the

greatest part of its inhabitants to agriculture; for as the art of tilling

the earth is easily acquired, the price of land low, and the produce

immediately necessary for life, greater encouragement to this is offered

here than in any country on earth. But still suffer me to enquire whether

we are not happily circumstanced and actually able to manage some

principal manufactories with success, and increase our wealth by

increasing the labour of the people, and saving the surplus of our

earnings for a better purpose than to purchase the labour of the European

nations. It is a remark often made, and generally believed, that in a

country so new as this, where the price of land is low and the price of

labour high, manufactories cannot be conducted with profit. This may be

true of some manufactures, but of others it is grossly false. It is now in

the power of New England to make itself more formidable to Great Britain

by rivaling some of her principal manufactures, than ever it was by

separating from her government. Woolen cloaths, the principal English

manufacture, may more easily be rivaled than any other. Purchasing all the

materials and labour at the common price of the country, cloths of

three-quarters width, may be fabricated for six shillings per yard, of

fineness and beauty equal to English cloths of six quarters width, which

fell at twenty shillings. The cost of our own manufacture is little more

than half of the imported, and for service it is allowed to be much

preferable. It is found that our wool is of equal quality with the

English, and that what we once supposed the defect in our wool, is only a

deficiency in cleaning, sorting and dressing it.

It gives me pleasure to hear that a number of gentlemen in Hartford and

the neighboring towns are forming a fund for the establishment of a great

woolen manufactory. The plan will doubtless succeed; and be more

profitable to the stockholders that money deposited in trade. As the

manufacture of cloths is introduced, the raising of wool and flax, the raw

materials, will become an object of the farmer’s attention.

Sheep are the most profitable part of our stock, and the breed is much

sooner multiplied than horses or cattle. Why do not our opulent farmers

avail themselves of the profit? An experience would soon convince them

there is no better method of advancing property, and their country would

thank them for the trial. Sheep are found to thrive and the wool to be of

good quality in every part of New England, but as this animal delights in

grazing, and is made healthy by coming often to the earth, our sea-coasts

with the adjacent country, where snow is of short continuance, are

particularly favourable to their propagation. Our hilly coasts were

designed by nature for this, and every part of the country that abounds in

hills ought to make an experiment by which they will be enriched.

In Connecticut, the eastern and southern counties, with the highlands on

Connecticut river towards the sea, ought to produce more wool than would

cloath the inhabitants of the state. At present the quantity falls short

of what is needed by our own consumption; if a surplusage could be

produced, it would find a ready market and the best pay.

The culture of flax, another principal material for manufacturing, affords

great profit to the farmer. The seed of this crop when it succeeds will

pay the husbandman for his labour, and return a better ground-rent than

many other crops which are cultivated. The seed is one of our best

articles for remittance and exportation abroad. Dressing and preparing the

flax for use is done in the most leisure part of the year, when labour is

cheap, and we had better work for sixpence a day and become wealthy, than

to be idle and poor.

It is not probable the market can be overstocked, or if it should chance

for a single season to be the case, no article is more meliorated by time,

or will better pay for keeping by an increase of quality. A large flax

crop is one most certain sign of a thrifty husbandman. The present method

of agriculture in a course of different crops is well calculated to give

the husbandman a sufficiency of flax ground, as it is well known that this

vegetable will not thrive when sown successively in the same place.

The nail manufacture might be another source of wealth to the northern

states. Why should we twice transport our own iron, and pay other nations

for labour which our boys might perform as well? The art of nail-making is

easily acquired. Remittances have actually been made from some parts of

the state in this article; the example is laudable, and ought to be

imitated. The sources of wealth are open to us, and there needs but

industry to become as rich as we are free.

A LANDHOLDER.

A LETTER TO THE LANDHOLDER. BY WILLIAM WILLIAMS.

Printed In

The American Mercury,

February 1788.

Note.

This letter was occasioned by the following communication, which was

printed in the _Connecticut Courant_ for Monday, February 4, 1788, (number

1202):

TO THE HON. WILLIAM WILLIAMS, ESQ.

_Sir_:—Whenever one man makes a charge against another, reason and justice

require that he should be able to support the charge. In some late

publications, I have offered my sentiments on the new constitution, have

adduced some arguments in favour of it, and answered objections to it. I

did not wish to enter into a controversy with any man. But I am unwilling

to have accusations publickly thrown out against me, without an

opportunity to answer them. In the late convention, when a _religious

test_ was the subject of debate, you took the liberty of saying _that the

Landholder_ (in treating of the same subject) _had missed the point; that

he had raised up a man of straw, and kicked it over again_. Now, Sir, I

wish this matter may be fairly cleared up. I wish to know, what is the

real point? Who and what the _real_ man is? Or in other words, what a

religious test is? I certainly have a right to expect that you will answer

these questions, and let me know wherein I am in the wrong. Perhaps you

may show that my ideas on the subject are erroneous. In order to do this,

it would not be amiss to offer a few reasons and arguments. You doubtless

had such as were convincing, at least to yourself, though you happen to

omit them at the time of the debate. If you will shew that I am in the

wrong, I will candidly acknowledge my mistake. If on the contrary you

should be unable to prove your assertions, the public will judge, whether

_you or I have missed the point_; and which of us has _committed the crime

of making a man of straw_.

Not doubting but you will have the candour to come to an explanation on

this subject,

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

THE LANDHOLDER.

From The Landholder’s statement printed at page 195 of this volume, it

appears that this signature was employed by another man, in this instance.

Letter Of William Williams.

The American Mercury, (Number 88)

MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11TH, 1788.

MR. BABCOCK:

Since the Federal Constitution has had so calm, dispassionate and so happy

an issue, in the late worthy Convention of this State; I did not expect

any members of that hon. body to be challenged in a News-paper, and

especially by name, and by anonymous writers, on account of their opinion,

or decently expressing their sentiments relative to the great subject then

under consideration, or any part of it. Nor do I yet see the propriety, or

happy issue of such a proceeding. However as a gentleman in your Paper

feels uneasy, that every sentiment contained in his publications, (tho’ in

general they are well written) is not received with perfect acquiescence

and submission, I will endeavour to satisfy him, or the candid reader, by

the same channel, that I am not so reprehensible as he supposes, in the

matter refer’d to. When the clause in the 6th article, which provides that

“no religious test should ever be required as a qualification to any

office or trust, &c.” came under consideration, I observed I should have

chose that sentence and anything relating to a religious test, had been

totally omitted rather than stand as it did, but still more wished

something of the kind should have been inserted, but with a reverse sense,

so far as to require an explicit acknowledgment of the being of a God, his

perfections and his providence, and to have been prefixed to, and stand

as, the first introductory words of the Constitution, in the following or

similar terms, viz. _We the people of the United States, in a firm belief

of the being and perfections of the one living and true God, the creator

and supreme Governour of the world, in his universal providence and the

authority of his laws; that he will require of all moral agents an account

of their conduct; that all rightful powers among men are ordained of, and

mediately derived from God; therefore in a dependence on his blessing and

acknowledgment of his efficient protection in establishing our

Independence, whereby it is become necessary to agree upon and settle a

Constitution of federal government for ourselves_, and in order to form a

more perfect union &c., as it is expressed in the present introduction, do

ordain &c., and instead of none, that no other religious test should ever

be required &c., and that supposing, but not granting, this would _be no

security at all_, that it would make hypocrites, &c. yet this would not be

a sufficient reason against it; as it would be a public declaration

against, and disapprobation of men, who did not, even with sincerity, make

such a profession, and they must be left to the searcher of hearts; that

it would however, be the voice of the great body of the people, and an

acknowledgment proper and highly becoming them to express on this great

and only occasion, and according to the course of Providence, one mean of

obtaining blessings from the most high. But that since it was not, and so

difficult and dubious to get inserted, I would not wish to make it a

capital objection; that I had no more idea of a religious test, which

should restrain offices to any particular sect, class, or denomination of

men or Christians in the long list of diversity, than to regulate their

bestowments by the stature or dress of the candidate, nor did I believe

one sensible catholic man in the state wished for such a limitation; and

that therefore the News-Paper observations, and reasonings (I named no

author) against a test, in favour of any one denomination of Christians,

and the sacrilegious injunctions of the test laws of England &c.,

combatted objections which did not exist, and _was building up a man of

straw and knocking him down again_. These are the same and only ideas and

sentiments I endeavoured to communicate on that subject, tho’ perhaps not

precisely in the same terms; as I had not written, nor preconceived them,

except the proposed test, and whether there is any reason in them or not,

I submit to the public.

I freely confess such a test and acknowledgment would have given me great

additional satisfaction; and I conceive the arguments against it, on the

score of hypocrisy, would apply with equal force against requiring an oath

from any officer of the united or individual states; and with little

abatement, to any oath in any case whatever; but divine and human wisdom,

with universal experience, have approved and established them as useful,

and a security to mankind.

I thought it was my duty to make the observations, in this behalf, which I

did, and to bear my testimony for God; and that it was also my duty to say

_the Constitution_, with this, and some other faults of another kind, was

yet too wise and too necessary to be rejected.

W. WILLIAMS.

P. S.—I could not have suspected the Landholder (if I know him) to be the

author of the piece referred to; but if he or any other is pleased to

reply, without the signature of his proper name, he will receive no

further answer or notice from me.

Feb. 2d, 1788.

THE LETTERS OF A COUNTRYMAN. WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN.

Printed In

The New Haven Gazette,

November-December, 1787.

Note.

In the file of The New Haven Gazette formerly owned by Simeon Baldwin, an

intimate friend, and afterwards executor of Roger Sherman, it is noted by

the former that the essays of A Countryman were written by the latter.

Following this series are two essays written by Sherman under a different

signature, after the adoption of the Constitution, which are an

interesting contrast to these. It will be noted in the first of these,

that Sherman alludes to what he “had endeavored to show in a former

piece.”

A Countryman, I.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 39)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 14, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

You are now called on to make important alterations in your government, by

ratifying the new federal constitution.

There are, undoubtedly, such advantages to be expected from this measure,

as will be sufficient inducement to adopt the proposal, provided it can be

done without sacrificing more important advantages, which we now do or may

possess. By a wise provision in the constitution of man, whenever a

proposal is made to change any present habit or practice, he much more

minutely considers what he is to _lose_ by the alterations, what effect it

is to have on what he at present possesses, than what is to be _hoped_ for

in the proposed expedient.

Thus people are justly cautious how they exchange present advantages for

the hope of others in a system not yet experienced.

Hence all large states have dreaded a division into smaller parts, as

being nearly the same thing as ruin; and all smaller states have predicted

endless embarrassment from every attempt to unite them into larger. It is

no more than probable that if any corner of this State of ten miles

square, was now, and long had been independent of the residue of the

State, that they would consider a proposal to unite them to the other

parts of the State, as a violent attempt to wrest from them the only

security for their persons or property. They would lament how little

security they should derive from sending one or two members to the

legislature at Hartford & New Haven, and all the evils that the Scots

predicted from the proposed union with England, in the beginning of the

present century, would be thundered with all the vehemence of American

politics, from the little ten miles district. But surely no man believes

that the inhabitants of this district would be less secure when united to

the residue of the State, than when independent. Does any person suppose

that the people would be more safe, more happy, or more respectable, if

every town in this State was independent, and had no State government?

Is it not certain that government would be weak and irregular, and that

the people would be poor and contemptible? And still it must be allowed,

that each town would entirely surrender its boasted independence if they

should unite in State government, and would retain only about

one-eightieth part of the administration of their own affairs.

Has it ever been found, that people’s property or persons were less

regarded and less protected in large states than in small?

Have not the Legislature in large states been as careful not to

over-burden the people with taxes as in small? But still it must be

admitted, that a single town in a small state holds a greater proportion

of the authority than in a large.

If the United States were one single government, provided the constitution

of this extensive government was as good as the constitution of this State

now is, would this part of it be really in greater danger of oppression or

tyranny, than at present? It is true that many people who are _great men_

because they go to Hartford to make laws for us once or twice in a year,

would then be no greater than their neighbours, as much fewer

representatives would be chosen. But would not the people be as safe,

governed by their representatives assembled in New York or Philadelphia,

as by their representatives assembled in Hartford or New Haven? Many

instances can be quoted, where people have been unsafe, poor and

contemptible, because they were governed only in small bodies; but can any

instance be found where they were less safe for uniting? Has not every

instance proved somewhat similar to the so much dreaded union between

England and Scotland, where the Scots, instead of becoming a poor,

despicable, dependent people, have become much more secure, happy, and

respectable? If then, the constitution is a good one, why should we be

afraid of uniting, even if the Union was to be much more complete and

entire than is proposed?

A Countryman, II.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 40)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

It is fortunate that you have been but little distressed with that torrent

of impertinence and folly, with which the newspaper politicians have over

whelmed many parts of our country.

It is enough that you should have heard, that one party has seriously

urged, that we should adopt the _New Constitution_ because it has been

approved by _Washington_ and _Franklin_: and the other, with all the

solemnity of apostolic address to _Men_, _Brethren_, _Fathers_, _Friends

and Countryman_, have urged that we should reject, as dangerous, every

clause thereof, because that _Washington_ is more used to command as a

soldier, than to reason as a politician—_Franklin is old_, others are

_young_—and _Wilson_ is _haughty_.(52) You are too well informed to decide

by the opinion of others, and too independent to need a caution against

undue influence.

Of a very different nature, tho’ only one degree better than the other

reasoning, is all that sublimity of _nonsense_ and _alarm_, that has been

thundered against it in every shape of _metaphoric terror_, on the subject

of a _bill of rights_, the _liberty of the press_, _rights of conscience_,

_rights of taxation and election_, _trials in the vicinity_, _freedom of

speech_, _trial by jury_, and a _standing army_. These last are

undoubtedly important points, much too important to depend on mere paper

protection. For, guard such privileges by the strongest expressions, still

if you leave the legislative and executive power in the hands of those who

are or may be disposed to deprive you of them—you are but slaves. Make an

absolute monarch—give him the supreme authority, and guard as much as you

will by bills of rights, your liberty of the press, and trial by jury;—he

will find means either to take them from you, or to render them useless.

The only real security that you can have for all your important rights

must be in the nature of your government. If you suffer any man to govern

you who is not strongly interested in supporting your privileges, you will

certainly lose them. If you are about to trust your liberties with people

whom it is necessary to bind by stipulation, that they shall not keep a

standing army, your stipulation is not worth even the trouble of writing.

No bill of rights ever yet bound the supreme power longer than the

_honeymoon_ of a new married couple, unless the _rulers were interested_

in preserving the rights; and in that case they have always been ready

enough to declare the rights, and to preserve them when they were

declared.—The famous English _Magna Charta_ is but an act of parliament,

which every subsequent parliament has had just as much constitutional

power to repeal and annul, as the parliament which made it had to pass it

at first. But the security of the nation has always been, that their

government was so formed, that at least _one branch_ of their legislature

must be strongly interested to preserve the rights of the nation.

You have a bill of rights in Connecticut (i. e.) your legislature many

years since enacted that the subjects of this state should enjoy certain

privileges. Every assembly since that time, could, by the same authority,

enact that the subjects should enjoy none of those privileges; and the

only reason that it has not long since been so enacted, is that your

legislature were as strongly interested in preserving those rights as any

of the subjects; and this is your only security that it shall not be so

enacted at the next session of assembly: and it is security enough.

Your General Assembly under your present constitution are supreme. They

may keep troops on foot in the most profound peace, if they think proper.

They have heretofore abridged the trial by jury in some cases, and they

can again in all. They can restrain the press, and may lay the most

burdensome taxes if they please, and who can forbid? But still the people

are perfectly safe that not one of these events shall take place so long

as the members of the General Assembly are as much interested, and

interested in the same manner, as the other subjects.

On examining the new proposed constitution, there can be no question but

that there is authority enough lodged in the proposed Federal Congress, if

abused, to do the greatest injury. And it is perfectly idle to object to

it, that there is no bill of rights, or to propose to add to it a

provision that a trial by jury shall in no case be omitted, or to patch it

up by adding a stipulation in favor of the press, or to guard it by

removing the paltry objection to the right of Congress to regulate the

time and manner of elections.

If you cannot prove by the best of all evidence, viz., by the _interest of

the rulers_, that this authority will not be abused, or at least that

those powers are not more likely to be abused by the Congress, than by

those who now have the same powers, you must by no means adopt the

constitution:—No, not with all the bills of rights and with all the

stipulations in favor of the people that can be made.

But if the members of Congress are to be interested just as you and I are,

and just as the members of our present legislatures are interested, we

shall be just as safe, with even supreme power (if that were granted) in

Congress, as in the General Assembly. If the members of Congress can take

no improper step which will not affect them as much as it does us, we need

not apprehend that they will usurp authorities not given them to injure

that society of which they are a part.

The sole question, (so far as any apprehension of tyranny and oppression

is concerned) ought to be, how are Congress formed? how far have you a

control over them? Decide this, and then all the questions about their

power may be dismissed for the amusement of those politicians whose

business it is to catch flies, or may occasionally furnish subjects for

_George Bryan’s_ Pomposity, or the declamations of _Cato_—_An Old

Whig_—_Son of Liberty_—_Brutus_—_Brutus junior_—_An Officer of the

Continental Army_,—the more contemptible _Timoleon_, and the residue of

that rabble of writers.

A Countryman, III.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 41)

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 29, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

The same thing once more—I am a plain man, of few words; for this reason

perhaps it is, that when I have said a thing I love to repeat it. Last

week I endeavored to evince, that the only surety you could have for your

liberties must be in the nature of your government; that you could derive

no security from bills of rights, or stipulations, on the subject of a

standing army, the liberty of the press, trial by jury, or on any other

subject. Did you ever hear of an absolute monarchy, where those rights

which are proposed by the pigmy politicians of this day, to be secured by

stipulation, were ever preserved? Would it not be mere trifling to make

any such stipulations, in any absolute monarchy?

On the other hand, if your interest and that of your rulers are the same,

your liberties are abundantly secure. Perhaps the most secure when their

power is most complete. Perhaps a provision that they should never raise

troops in time of peace, might at some period embarrass the public

concerns and endanger the liberties of the people. It is possible that in

the infinite variety of events, it might become improper strictly to

adhere to any one provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated.

At all events, the people have always been perfectly safe without any

stipulation of the kind, when the rulers were interested to make them

safe; and never otherwise.

No people can be more secure against any oppression in their rulers than

you are at present; and no rulers can have more supreme and unlimited

authority than your general assembly have.

When you consult on the subject of adopting the new constitution, you do

not enquire whether the powers therein contained can be safely lodged in

any hands whatever. For not only those very powers, but all other powers,

are already in the general assembly.—The enquiry is, whether Congress is

by this new constitution so formed that a part of the power now in the

general assembly would be as well lodged in Congress. Or, as was before

said, it depends on how far the members are under your control; and how

far their interest and yours are the same; to which careful attention must

be given.

A Countryman, IV.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 42)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

If the propriety of trusting your government in the hands of your

representatives was now a perfectly new question, the expediency of the

measure might be doubted. A very great portion of the objections which we

daily find made against adopting the new constitution (and which are just

as weighty objections against our present government, or against any

government in existence) would doubtless have their influence; and perhaps

would determine you against trusting the powers of sovereignty out of your

own hands.

The best theory, the best philosophy on the subject, would be too

uncertain for you to hazard your freedom upon.

But your freedom, in that sense of the expression (if it could be called

sense), is already totally gone. Your Legislature is not only supreme in

the usual sense of the word, but they have _literally, all the powers of

society_. Can you—can you _possibly_ grant anything new? Have you any

power which is not already granted to your General Assembly? You are

indeed called on to say whether a part of the powers now exercised by the

General Assembly, shall not, in future, be exercised by Congress. And it

is clearly much better for your interest, that Congress should experience

those powers than that they should continue in the General Assembly,

provided you can trust Congress as safely as the General Assembly.

What forms your security under the General Assembly? Nothing save that the

interest of the members is the same as yours. Will it be the same with

Congress? There are essentially only two differences between the formation

of Congress and of your General Assembly. One is,—that Congress are to

govern a much larger tract of country, and a much greater number of

people, consequently your proportion of the government will be much

smaller than at present. The other difference is—that the members of

Congress when elected, hold their places for two, four and six years, and

the members of Assembly only six and twelve months.

The first of these differences was discussed pretty fully in the first

number, (when there was no idea of proceeding thus far on the subject),

and has all the force as an objection against the powers of Congress, that

it would have if applied to a proposal to give up the sovereignty of the

several towns of the state, (if such sovereignty had existed,) and unite

in state government.

It would be only a repetition to enter into a consideration of this

difference between Congress and your Assembly.

It has been suggested that the six or eight members which we shall send to

Congress will be men of property, who can little feel any burthens they

may lay on society. How far is this idea supported by experience? As the

members are to pay their proportion, will they not be as careful of laying

too great burthens as poorer people? Are they less careful of their money

than the poor? This objection would be much stronger against trusting the

power out of your hands at all. If the several towns were now independent,

this objection would be much more forcible against uniting in state

government, and sending one or two of your most wealthy men to Hartford or

New Haven, to vote away your money. But this you have tried, and found

that assemblies of representatives are less willing to vote away money

than even their constituents. An individual of any tolerable economy, pays

all his debts, and perhaps has money beforehand. A small school district,

or a small parish, will see what sum they want, and usually provide

sufficiently for their wants, and often have a little money at interest.

Town voters are partly representatives, i. e. many people pay town taxes

who have no right to vote, but the money they vote away is principally

their own. The towns in this state tax themselves less willingly than

smaller bodies. They generally however tax themselves sufficiently to

nearly pay the demands against them within the year, very seldom raise

money beforehand by taxes. The General Assembly of this state could never

be induced to _attempt_ to do more than pay the annual interest of what

they owe, and occasionally sink very small parts of the principal, and

they never in fact did thus much, and we are all witnesses that they are

full as careful of the public money as we can wish. It never was a

complaint that they were too ready to allow individuals large sums. A man

who has a claim against a town, and applies to a town-meeting, is very

likely to obtain justice: but he who has a claim against the state, and

applies to the General Assembly, stands but a poor chance to obtain

justice. Some rule will be found to exclude his claim,—or to lessen it,—or

he will be paid in a security—not worth half the money.

You have uniformly experienced that your representatives are as careful,

if not more so, of your money, than you yourselves are in your

town-meetings; but still your representatives are generally men of

property, and those of them who are most independent, and those whom you

have sent to Congress, have not been by any means the least careful.

A Countryman, V.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 44)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 20, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE OF CONNECTICUT.

You do not hate to read Newspaper Essays on the new constitution, more

than I hate to write them. Then _we will be short_—which I have often

found the _best_ expression in a dull sermon, except the _last_.

Whether the mode of election pointed out in the proposed constitution is

well calculated to support the principles which were designed to be

established in the different branches of the legislature, may perhaps be

justly doubted:—and may perhaps in some future day be discussed.

The design undoubtedly was, that the house of representatives should be a

_popular_ assembly,—that the senate should, in its nature, be somewhat

more permanent, and that the two houses should be completely independent

of each other. These _principles_ are right—for the present we will

suppose they will be supported—there then remains to be considered no

considerable difference between the constitutional government which is

proposed, and your present government, except that the time for which you

choose your present rulers is only for six and twelve months, and the time

for which you are to choose your continental rulers is for two, four and

six years.

The convention were mistaken if they supposed they should lessen the evils

of tumultuous elections by making elections less frequent. But are your

liberties endangered by this measure? Philosophy may mislead you. Ask

experience. Are not the liberties of the people of England as safe as

yours?—They are not as free as yours, because much of their government is

in the hands of _hereditary majesty_ and _nobility_. But is not that part

of the government which is under the control of the commons exceedingly

well guarded? But still the house of commons is only a third branch—the

_only_ branch who are appointed by the people—and they are chosen but once

in _seven years_. Is there then any danger to be apprehended from the

length of time that your rulers are to serve? when none are to serve more

than six years—one whole house but two years, and your President but four.

The great power and influence of an hereditary monarch of Britain has

spread many alarms, from an apprehension that the commons would sacrifice

the liberties of the people to the money or influence of the crown: but

the influence of a powerful _hereditary_ monarch, with the national

Treasury—Army—and fleet at his command—and the whole executive

government—and one-third of the legislative in his hands constantly

operating on a house of commons, whose duration is never less than _seven

years_, unless this same monarch should _end_ it, (which he can do in an

hour,) has never yet been sufficient to obtain one vote of the house of

commons which has taken from the people the _liberty of the press_,—_trial

by jury_,—_the rights of conscience, or of private property_.

Can you then apprehend danger of oppression and tyranny from the too great

duration of the power of _your_ rulers?

THE LETTERS OF A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN, WRITTEN BY ROGER SHERMAN.

Printed In

The New Haven Gazette,

December, 1789.

Note.

These letters are ascribed to Sherman on the authority mentioned at page

213.

In a letter from James Madison to Edmund Randolph, (_Correspondence_, 1,

63), he says:

On the subject of amendments, nothing has been publickly, and very little

privately, said. Such as I am known to have espoused will, as far as I can

gather, be attainable from the federalists, who sufficiently predominate

in both branches, though with some the concurrence will proceed from a

spirit of conciliation rather than conviction. Connecticut is least

inclined, though I presume not inflexibly opposed, to a moderate revision.

A paper, which will probably be republished in the Virginia gazettes,

under the signature of a citizen of New Haven, unfolds Mr. Sherman’s

opinions.

In the _Writings of John Adams_, (VI, 427), is a correspondence between

Adams and Sherman, produced by these articles, which should be studied in

connection with them.

A Citizen Of New Haven, I.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 48)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1788.

_Observations on the Alterations Proposed as Amendments to the new Federal

Constitution._

Six of the states have adopted the new constitution without proposing any

alteration, and the most of those proposed by the conventions of other

states may be provided for by congress in a code of laws without altering

the constitution. If congress may be safely trusted with the affairs of

the Union, and have sufficient powers for that purpose, and possess no

powers but such as respect the common interest of the states (as I have

endeavored to show in a former piece), then all the matters that can be

regulated by law may safely be left to their discretion, and those will

include all that I have noticed except the following, which I think on due

consideration will appear to be improper or unnecessary.

1. It is proposed that the consent of two-thirds or three-fourths of the

members present in this branch of the congress shall be required for

passing certain acts.

On which I would observe, that this would give a minority in congress

power to controul the majority, joined with the concurrent voice of the

president, for if the president dissents, no act can pass without the

consent of two-thirds of the members in each branch of congress; and would

not that be contrary to the general principles of republican government?

2. That impeachments ought not to be tried by the senate, or not by the

senate alone.

But what good reason can be assigned why the senate is not the most proper

tribunal for that purpose? The members are to be chosen by the

legislatures of the several states, who will doubtless appoint persons of

wisdom and probity, and from their office can have no interested motives

to partiality. The house of peers in Great Britain try impeachments and

are also a branch of the legislature.

3. It is said that the president ought not to have power to grant pardons

in cases of high treason, but the congress.

It does not appear that any great mischief can arise from the exercise of

this power by the president (though perhaps it might as well have been

lodged in congress). The president cannot pardon in case of impeachment,

so that such offenders may be excluded from office notwithstanding his

pardon.

4. It is proposed that members of congress be rendered ineligible to any

other office during the time for which they are elected members of that

body.

This is an objection that will admit of something plausible to be said on

both sides, and it was settled in convention on full discussion and

deliberation. There are some offices which a member of congress may be

best qualified to fill, from his knowledge of public affairs acquired by

being a member, such as minister to foreign courts, &c., and on accepting

any other office his seat in congress will be vacated, and no member is

eligible to any office that shall have been instituted or the emoluments

increased while he was a member.

5. It is proposed to make the president and senators ineligible after

certain periods.

But this would abridge the privilege of the people, and remove one great

motive to fidelity in office, and render persons incapable of serving in

offices, on account of their experience, which would best qualify them for

usefulness in office—but if their services are not acceptable they may be

left out at any new election.

6. It is proposed that no commercial treaty should be made without the

consent of two-thirds of the senators, nor any cession of territory, right

of navigation or fishery, without the consent of three-fourths of the

members present in each branch of congress.

It is provided by the constitution that no commercial treaty shall be made

by the president without the consent of two-thirds of the senators

present, and as each state has an equal representation and suffrage in the

senate, the rights of the state will be as well secured under the new

constitution as under the old; and it is not probable that they would ever

make a cession of territory or any important national right without the

consent of congress. The king of Great Britain has by the constitution a

power to make treaties, yet in matters of great importance he consults the

parliament.

7. There is one amendment proposed by the convention of South Carolina

respecting religious tests, by inserting the word _other_, between the

words _no_ and _religious_ in that article, which is an ingenious thought,

and had that word been inserted, it would probably have prevented any

objection on that head. But it may be considered as a clerical omission

and be inserted without calling a convention; as it now stands the effect

will be the same.

On the whole it is hoped that all the states will consent to make a fair

trial of the constitution before they attempt to alter it; experience will

best show whether it is deficient or not, on trial it may appear that the

alterations that have been proposed are not necessary, or that others not

yet thought of may be necessary; everything that tends to disunion ought

to be avoided. Instability in government and laws tends to weaken a state

and render the rights of the people precarious.

If another convention should be called to revise the constitution, ’tis

not likely they would be more unanimous than the former; they might judge

differently in some things, but is it certain that they would judge

better? When experience has convinced the states and people in general

that alterations are necessary, they may be easily made, but attempting it

at present may be detrimental if not fatal to the union of the states.

The judiciary department is perhaps the most difficult to be precisely

limited by the constitution, but congress have full power to regulate it

by law, and it may be found necessary to vary the regulations at different

times as circumstances may differ.

Congress may make requisitions for supplies previous to direct taxation,

if it should be thought to be expedient, but if requisitions be made and

some states comply and others not, the non-complying states must be

considered and treated as delinquents, which will tend to excite

disaffection and disunion among the states, besides occasioning delay; but

if congress lay the taxes in the first instance these evils will be

prevented, and they will doubtless accommodate the taxes to the customs

and convenience of the several states.

Some suppose that the representation will be too small, but I think it is

in the power of congress to make it too large, but I believe that it may

be safely trusted with them. Great Britain contains about three times the

number of the inhabitants in the United States, and according to Burgh’s

account in his political disquisitions, the members of parliament in that

kingdom do not exceed 131, and if 69 more be added from the principal

cities and towns the number would be 200; and strike off those who are

elected by the small boroughs, which are called the rotten part of the

constitution by their best patriots and politicians, that nation would be

more equally and better represented than at present; and if that would be

a sufficient number for their national legislature, one-third of that

number will be more than sufficient for our federal legislature who will

have few general matters to transact. But these and other objections have

been considered in a former paper, before referred to. I shall therefore

conclude this with my best wishes for the continuance of the peace,

liberty and union of these states.

A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN.

A Citizen Of New Haven, II.

The New Haven Gazette, (Number 51)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1788.

_Observations on the New Federal Constitution._

In order to form a good Constitution of Government, the legislature should

be properly organized, and be vested with plenary powers for all the

purposes for which the government was instituted, to be exercised for the

public good as occasion may require.

The greatest security that a people can have for the enjoyment of their

rights and liberties, is that no laws can be made to bind them nor any

taxes imposed upon them, without their consent by representatives of their

own chusing, who will participate with them in the public burthens and

benefits; this was the great point contended for in our controversy with

Great Britain, and this will be fully secured to us by the new

constitution. The rights of the people will be secured by a representation

in proportion to their numbers in one branch of the legislature, and the

rights of the particular states by their equal representation in the other

branch.

The President and Vice-President as well as the members of Congress will

be eligible for fixed periods, and may be re-elected as often as the

electors shall think fit, which will be a great security for their

fidelity in office, and give greater stability and energy to government

than an exclusion by rotation, and will be an operative and effectual

security against arbitrary government, either monarchical or aristocratic.

The immediate security of the civil and domestic rights of the people will

be in the government of the particular states. And as the different states

have different local interests and customs which can be best regulated by

their own laws, it should not be expedient to admit the federal government

to interfere with them, any farther than may be necessary for the good of

the whole. The great end of the federal government is to protect the

several states in the enjoyment of those rights, against foreign invasion,

and to preserve peace and a beneficial intercourse among themselves; and

to regulate and protect our commerce with foreign nations.

These were not sufficiently provided for by the former articles of

confederation, which was the occasion of calling the late Convention to

make amendments. This they have done by forming a new constitution

containing the powers vested in the federal government, under the former,

with such additional powers as they deemed necessary to attain the ends

the states had in view, in their appointment. And to carry those powers

into effect, they thought it necessary to make some alterations in the

organization of the government: this they supposed to be warranted by

their commission.

The powers vested in the federal government are clearly defined, so that

each state still retain its sovereignty in what concerns its own internal

government, and a right to exercise every power of a sovereign state not

particularly delegated to the government of the United States. The new

powers vested in the United States, are, to regulate commerce; provide for

a uniform practice respecting naturalization, bankruptcies, and

organizing, arming and training the militia; and for the punishment of

certain crimes against the United States; and for promoting the progress

of science in the mode therein pointed out. There are some other matters

which Congress has power under the present confederation to require to be

done by the particular states, which they will be authorized to carry into

effect themselves under the new constitution; these powers appear to be

necessary for the common benefit of the states, and could not be

effectually provided for by the particular states.

The objects of expenditure will be the same under the new constitution, as

under the old; nor need the administration of government be more

expensive; the number of members of Congress will be the same, nor will it

be necessary to increase the number of officers in the executive

department or their salaries; the supreme executive will be in a single

person, who must have an honourable support; which perhaps will not exceed

the present allowance to the President of Congress, and the expence of

supporting a committee of the states in the recess of Congress.

It is not probable that Congress will have occasion to sit longer than two

or three months in a year, after the first session, which may perhaps be

something longer. Nor will it be necessary for the Senate to sit longer

than the other branch. The appointment of officers may be made during the

session of Congress, and trials on impeachment will not often occur, and

will require but little time to attend to them. The security against

keeping up armies in time of peace will be greater under the new

constitution than under the present, because it can’t be done without the

concurrence of two branches of the legislature, nor can any appropriation

of money for that purpose be in force more than two years; whereas there

is no restriction under the present confederation.

The liberty of the press can be in no danger, because that is not put

under the direction of the new government.

If the federal government keeps within its proper jurisdiction, it will be

the interest of the state legislatures to support it, and they will be a

powerful and effectual check to its interfering with their jurisdiction.

But the objects of federal government will be so obvious that there will

be no great danger of any interference.

The principal sources of revenue will be imposts on goods imported, and

sale of the western lands, which will probably be sufficient to pay the

debts and expences of the United States while peace continues; but if

there should be occasion to resort to direct taxation, each state’s quota

will be ascertained according to a rule which has been approved by the

legislatures of eleven of the states, and should any state neglect to

furnish its quota, Congress may raise it in the same manner that the state

ought to have done; and what remedy more easy and equitable could be

devised, to obtain the supplies from a delinquent state?

Some object, that the representation will be too small; but the states

have not thought fit to keep half the number of representatives in

Congress that they are entitled to under the present confederation; and of

what advantage can it be to have a large assembly to transact the few

general matters that will come under the direction of Congress.—The

regulating of time, place and manner of elections seems to be as well

secured as possible; the legislature of each state may do it, and if they

neglect to do it in the best manner, it may be done by Congress;—and what

motive can either have to injure the people in the exercise of that right?

The qualifications of the electors are to remain as fixed by the

constitutions and laws of the several states.

It is by some objected, that the executive is blended with the

legislature, and that those powers ought to be entirely distinct and

unconnected, but is not this a gross error in politics? The united wisdom

and various interests of a nation should be combined in framing the laws.

But the execution of them should not be in the whole legislature; that

would be too troublesome and expensive; but it will not thence follow that

the executive should have no voice or influence in legislation. The

executive in Great Britain is one branch of the legislature, and has a

negative on all laws; perhaps that is an extreme not to be imitated by a

republic, but the partial negative vested in the President by the new

Constitution on the acts of Congress and the subsequent revision, may be

very useful to prevent laws being passed without mature deliberation.

The Vice-President while he acts as President of the Senate will have

nothing to do in the executive department; his being elected by all the

states will incline him to regard the interests of the whole, and when the

members of the senate are equally divided on any question, who so proper

to give a casting vote as one who represents all the states?

The power of the President to grant pardons extends only to offences

committed against the United States, which can’t be productive of much

mischief, especially as those on Impeachment are excepted, which will

exclude offenders from office.

It was thought necessary in order to carry into effect the laws of the

Union, to promote justice, and preserve harmony among the states, to

extend the judicial powers of the United States to the enumerated cases,

under such regulations and with such exceptions as shall be provided by

law, which will doubtless reduce them to cases of such magnitude and

importance as cannot safely be trusted to the final decision of the courts

of particular states; and the constitution does not make it necessary that

any inferior tribunals should be instituted, but it may be done if found

necessary; ’tis probable that the courts of particular states will be

authorized by the laws of the union, as has been heretofore done in cases

of piracy, &c., and the Supreme Court may have a circuit to make trials as

convenient, and as little expensive as possible to the parties; nor is

there anything in the constitution to deprive them of trial by jury in

cases where that mode of trial has been heretofore used. All cases in the

courts of common law between citizens of the same state, except those

claiming lands under grants of different states, must be finally decided

by courts of the state to which they belong, so that it is not probable

that more than one citizen to a thousand will ever have a cause that can

come before a federal court.

Every department and officer of the federal government will be subject to

the regulation and control of the laws, and the people will have all

possible securities against oppression. Upon the whole, the constitution

appears to be well framed to secure the rights and liberties of the people

and for preserving the governments of the individual states, and if well

administered, to restore and secure public and private credit, and to give

respectability to the states both abroad and at home. Perhaps a more

perfect one could not be formed on mere speculation; and if upon

experience it shall be found deficient, it provides an easy and peaceable

mode to make amendments. Is it not much better to adopt it than to

continue in present circumstances? Its being agreed to by all the states

present in Convention, is a circumstance in its favour, so far as any

respect is due to their opinions.

A CITIZEN OF NEW HAVEN.

THE LETTERS OF CATO, WRITTEN BY GEORGE CLINTON.

Printed In

The New York Journal,

September-January, 1787-8.

Note.

These letters were commonly ascribed to the pen of George Clinton in the

press of the day, and that this ascription was right seems to be proved by

the following letter. Though signed by Hamilton, it is in the handwriting

of John Lamb, a leading anti-federalist of New York, and is in the George

Clinton MSS. in the New York State Library. It thus seems apparent that it

is a copy secured in some way by Hamilton’s political opponents:

OCTOBER 18, 1787.

_Dear Sir_:

Since my last the chief of the state party has declared his

opposition to the government proposed, both in private

conversation and in print. That you may judge of the _reason_ and

_fairness_ of his views, I send you the two essays, with a reply

by Cæsar. On further consideration it was concluded to abandon

this personal form, and to take up the principles of the whole

subject. These will be sent you as published, and might with

advantage be republished in your gazettes.

A. HAMILTON.