It is vain to tell us, that the proposed government guarantees to each

state a republican form. Republicks are divided into democraticks, and

aristocraticks. The establishment of an order of nobles, in whom should

reside all the power of the state, would be an aristocratick republick.

Such has been for five centuries the government of Venice, in which all

the energies of government, as well as of individuals, have been cramped

by a distressing jealousy that the rulers have of each other. There is

nothing of that generous, manly confidence that we see in the democratick

republicks of our own country. It is a government of force, attended with

perpetual fear of that force. In Great Britain, since the lengthening of

parliaments, all our accounts agree, that their elections are a continued

scene of bribery, riot and tumult; often a scene of murder. These are the

consequences of choosing seldom, and or extensive districts. When the term

is short nobody will give an high price for a seat. It is an insufficient

answer to these objections to say, that there is no power of government

but may sometimes be applied to bad purposes. Such a power is of no value

unless it is applied to a bad purpose. It ought always to remain with the

people. The framers of our state constitution were so jealous of this

right, that they fixed the days for election, meeting and dissolving of

the legislature, and of the other officers of government. In the proposed

constitution not one of these points is guarded, though more numerous and

extensive powers are given them than to any state legislature upon the

continent. For Congress is at present possessed of the direction of the

national force, and most other national powers, and in addition to them

are to be vested with all the powers of the individual states,

unrestrained by any declarations of right. If these things are for the

security of our constitutional liberty, I trust we shall soon see an

attempt to prove that the government by an army will be more friendly to

liberty than a system founded in consent, and that five states will make a

majority of thirteen. The powers of controuling elections, of creating

exclusive companies in trade, of internal legislation and taxations ought,

upon no account, to be surrendered. I know it is a common complaint, that

Congress want more power. But where is the limited government that does

not want it? Ambition is in a governour what money is to a misar

[sic]—.... he can never accumulate enough. But it is as true in politicks

as in morals, he that is unfaithful in little, will be unfaithful also in

much. He who will not exercise the powers he has, will never properly use

more extensive powers. The framing entirely new systems, is a work that

requires vast attention; and it is much easier to guard an old one. It is

infinitely better to reject one that is unfriendly to liberty, and rest

for a while satisfied with a system that is in some measure defective,

than to set up a government unfriendly to the rights of states, and to the

rights of individuals—one that is undefined in its powers and operations.

Such is the government proposed by the federal convention, and such, we

trust, you will have the wisdom and firmness to reject.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 403)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 25, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

That the new system, proposed for your adoption, is not founded in

argument, but in party spirit, is evident from the whole behaviour of that

party, who favour it. The following is a short, but genuine specimen of

their reasoning. The South Carolina legislature have established an

unequal representation, and will not alter it: therefore Congress should

be invested with an unrestrained power to alter the time, manner and place

of electing members into that body. Directly the contrary position should

have been inferred. An elected assembly made an improper use of their

right to controul elections, therefore such a right ought not to be lodged

with them. It will be abused in ten instances, for one in which it will

serve any valuable purpose. It is said also that the Rhode Island assembly

_intend_ to abuse their power in this respect, therefore we should put

Congress in a situation to abuse theirs. Surely this is not a kind of

reasoning that, in the opinion of any indifferent person, can vindicate

the fourth section. Yet we have heard it publickly advanced as being

conclusive.

The unlimited power over trade, domestick as well as foreign, is another

power that will more probably be applied to a bad than to a good purpose.

That our trade was for the last year much in favour of the commonwealth is

agreed by all parties. The freedom that every man, whether his capital is

large or small, enjoys of entering into any branch that pleases him,

rouses a spirit of industry and exertion, that is friendly to commerce. It

prevents that stagnation of business which generally precedes publick

commotions. Nothing ought to be done to restrain this spirit. The

unlimited power over trade, however, is exceedingly apt to injure it.

In most countries of Europe, trade has been more confined by exclusive

charters. Exclusive companies are, in trade, pretty much like an

aristocracy in government, and produce nearly as bad effects. An instance

of it we have ourselves experienced. Before the Revolution, we carried on

no direct trade to India. The goods imported from that country came to us

through the medium of an exclusive company. Our trade in that quarter is

now respectable, and we receive several kinds of their goods at about half

the former price. But the evil of such companies does not terminate there.

They always, by the greatness of their capital, have an undue influence on

the government.

In a republick, we ought to guard, as much as possible, against the

predominance of any particular interest. It is the object of government to

protect them all. When commerce is left to take its own course, the

advantage of every class will be nearly equal. But when exclusive

privileges are given to any class, it will operate to the weakening of

some other class connected with them.

AGRIPPA.

(_Remainder next Tuesday._)

Agrippa, XVII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 404)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 20, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

As it is essentially necessary to the happiness of a free people, that the

constitution of government should be established in principles of truth, I

have endeavoured, in a series of papers, to discuss the proposed form with

that degree of freedom which becomes a faithful citizen of the

commonwealth. It must be obvious to the most careless observer that the

friends of the new plan appear to have nothing more in view than to

establish it by a popular current, without any regard to the truth of its

principles. Propositions, novel, erroneous and dangerous, are boldly

advanced to support a system, which does not appear to be founded in, but

in every instance to contradict, the experience of mankind. We are told

that a constitution is in itself a bill of rights; that all power not

expressly given, is reserved; that no powers are given to the new

government which are not already vested in the state governments, and that

it is for the security of liberty that the persons elected should have the

absolute controul over the time, manner and place of election. These, and

an hundred other things of a like kind, though they have gained the hasty

assent of men, respectable for learning and ability, are false in

themselves and invented merely to serve a present purpose. This will, I

trust, clearly appear from the following considerations:

It is common to consider man at first as in a state of nature, separate

from all society. The only historical evidence, that the human species

ever actually existed in this state, is derived from the book of Gen.

There it is said, that Adam remained a while alone. While the whole

species was comprehended in his person was the only instance in which this

supposed state of nature really existed. Ever since the completion of the

first pair, mankind appear as natural to associate with their own species,

as animals of any other kind herd together. Wherever we meet with their

settlements, they are found in clans. We are therefore justified in

saying, that a state of society is the natural state of man. Wherever we

find a settlement of men, we find also some appearance of government. The

state of government is therefore as natural to mankind as a state of

society. Government and society appear to be co-eval. The most rude and

artless form of government is probably the most ancient. This we find to

be practised among the Indian tribes in America. With them the whole

authority of government is vested in the whole tribe. Individuals depend

upon their reputation of valour and wisdom to give them influence. Their

government is genuinely democratical. This was probably the first kind of

government among mankind, as we meet with no mention of any other kind,

till royalty was introduced in the person of Nimrod. Immediately after

that time, the Asiatick nations seem to have departed from the simple

democracy, which is still retained by their American brethren, and

universally adopted the kingly form. We do indeed meet with some vague

rumors of an aristocracy in India so late as the time of Alexander the

Great. But such stories are altogether uncertain and improbable. For in

the time of Abraham, who lived about sixteen hundred years before

Alexander, all the little nations mentioned in the Mosaick history appear

to be governed by kings. It does not appear from any accounts of the

Asiatick kingdoms that they have practised at all upon the idea of a

limited monarchy. The whole power of society has been delegated to the

kings; and though they may be said to have constitutions of government,

because the succession to the crown is limited by certain rules, yet the

people are not benefitted by their constitutions, and enjoy no share of

civil liberty. The first attempt to reduce republicanism to a system,

appears to be made by Moses when he led the Israelites out of Egypt. This

government stood a considerable time, about five centuries, till in a

frenzy the people demanded a king, that they might resemble the nations

about them. They were dissatisfied with their judges, and instead of

changing the administration, they madly changed their constitution.

However they might flatter themselves with the idea, that an high-spirited

people could get the power back again when they pleased; they never did

get it back, and they fared like the nations about them. Their kings

tyrannized over them for some centuries, till they fell under a foreign

yoke. This is the history of that nation. With a change of names, it

describes the progress of political changes in other countries. The people

are dazzled with the splendour of distant monarchies, and a desire to

share their glory induces them to sacrifice their domestick happiness.

From this general view of the state of mankind it appears that all the

powers of government originally reside in the body of the people; and that

when they appoint certain persons to administer the government, they

delegate all the powers of government not expressly reserved. Hence it

appears that a constitution does not in itself imply any more than a

declaration of the relation which the different parts of the government

bear to each other, but does not in any degree imply security to the

rights of individuals. This has been the uniform practice. In all doubtful

cases the decision is in favour of the government. It is therefore

impertinent to ask by what right government exercises powers not expressly

delegated. Mr. Wilson, the great oracle of federalism, acknowledges, in

his speech to the Philadelphians,(28) the truth of these remarks, as they

respect the state governments, but attempts to set up a distinction

between them and the continental government. To anybody who will be at the

trouble to read the new system, it is evidently in the same situation as

the state constitutions now possess. It is a compact among the _people_

for the purposes of government, and not a compact between states. It

begins in the name of the people, and not of the states.

It has been shown in the course of this paper, that when people institute

government, they of course delegate all rights not expressly reserved. In

our state constitution the bill of rights consists of thirty articles. It

is evident therefore that the new constitution proposes to delegate

greater powers than are granted to our own government, sanguine as the

person was who denied it. The complaints against the separate governments,

even by the friends of the new plan, are not that they have not power

enough, but that they are disposed to make a bad use of what power they

have. Surely then they reason badly, when they purpose to set up a

government possess’d of much more extensive powers than the present, and

subjected to much smaller checks.

Bills of rights, reserved by authority of the people, are, I believe,

peculiar to America. A careful observance of the abuse practised in other

countries has had its just effect by inducing our people to guard against

them. We find the happiest consequences to flow from it. The separate

governments know their powers, their objects, and operations. We are

therefore not perpetually tormented with new experiments. For a single

instance of abuse among us there are thousands in other countries. On the

other hand, the people know their rights, and feel happy in the possession

of their freedom, both civil and political. Active industry is the

consequence of their security, and within one year the circumstances of

the state and of individuals have improved to a degree never before known

in this commonwealth. Though our bill of rights does not, perhaps, contain

all the cases in which power might be safely reserved, yet it affords a

protection to the persons and possessions of individuals not known in any

foreign country. In some respects the power of government is a little too

confined. In many other countries we find the people resisting their

governours for exercising their power in an unaccustomed mode. But for

want of a bill of rights the resistance is always, by the principles of

their government, a rebellion which nothing but success can justify. In

our constitution we have aimed at delegating the necessary powers of

government and confining their operation to beneficial purposes. At

present we appear to have come very near the truth. Let us therefore have

wisdom and virtue enough to preserve it inviolate. It is a stale

contrivance, to get the people into a passion, in order to make them

sacrifice their liberty. Repentance always comes, but it comes too late.

Let us not flatter ourselves that we shall always have good men to govern

us. If we endeavour to be like other nations we shall have more bad men

than good ones to exercise extensive powers. That circumstance alone will

corrupt them. While they fancy themselves the viceregents of God, they

will resemble him only in power, but will always depart from his wisdom

and goodness.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XVIII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 406)

TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

In my last address I ascertained, from historical records, the following

principles: that, in the original state of government, the whole power

resides in the whole body of the nation, that when a people appoint

certain persons to govern them, they delegate their whole power; that a

constitution is not in itself a bill of rights; and that, whatever is the

form of government, a bill of rights is essential to the security of the

persons and property of the people. It is an idea favourable to the

interest of mankind at large, that government is founded in compact.

Several instances may be produced of it, but none is more remarkable than

our own. In general, I have chosen to apply to such facts as are in the

reach of my readers. For this purpose I have chiefly confined myself to

examples drawn from the history of our own country, and to the Old

Testament. It is in the power of every reader to verify examples thus

substantiated. Even in the remarkable arguments on the fourth section,

relative to the power over election I was far from stating the worst of

it, as it respects the adverse party. A gentleman, respectable in many

points, but more especially for his systematick and perspicuous reasoning

in his profession, has repeatedly stated to the Convention, among his

reasons in favour of that section, that _the Rhode Island assembly have

for a considerable time past had a bill lying on their __ table for

altering the manner of elections for representatives in that state_.(29)

He has stated it with all the zeal of a person who believed his argument

to be a good one. But surely a _bill lying on a table_ can never be

considered as any more than an _intention_ to pass it, and nobody pretends

that it ever actually did pass. It is in strictness only the intention of

a part of the assembly, for nobody can aver that it ever will pass. I

write not with an intention to deceive, but that the whole argument may be

stated fairly. Much eloquence and ingenuity have been employed in shewing

that side of the argument in favor of the proposed constitution, but it

ought to be considered that if we accept it upon mere verbal explanations,

we shall find ourselves deceived. I appeal to the knowledge of every one,

if it does not frequently happen, that a law is interpreted in practice

very differently from the intention of the legislature. Hence arises the

necessity of acts to amend and explain former acts. This is not an

inconvenience in the common and ordinary business of legislation, but is a

great one in a constitution. A constitution is a legislative act of the

whole people. It is an excellence that it should be permanent, otherwise

we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of government.

We should be in the same situation as under absolute government, sometimes

exposed to the pressure of greater, and sometimes unprotected by the

weaker power in the sovereign.

It is now generally understood that it is for the security of the people

that the powers of the government should be lodged in different branches.

By this means publick business will go on when they all agree, and stop

when they disagree. The advantage of checks in government is thus

manifested where the concurrence of different branches is necessary to the

same act, but the advantage of a division of business is advantageous in

other respects. As in every extensive empire, local laws are necessary to

suit the different interests, no single legislature is adequate to the

business. All human capacities are limited to a narrow space, and as no

individual is capable of practising a great variety of trades, no single

legislature is capable of managing all the variety of national and state

concerns. Even if a legislature was capable of it, the business of the

judicial department must, from the same cause, be slovenly done. Hence

arises the necessity of a division of the business into national and

local. Each department ought to have all the powers necessary for

executing its own business, under such limitations as tend to secure us

from any inequality in the operations of government. I know it is often

asked against whom in a government by representation is a bill of rights

to secure us? I answer, that such a government is indeed a government by

ourselves; but as a just government protects all alike, it is necessary

that the sober and industrious part of the community should be defended

from the rapacity and violence of the vicious and idle. A bill of rights,

therefore, ought to set forth the purposes for which the compact is made,

and serves to secure the minority against the usurpation and tyranny of

the majority. It is a just observation of his excellency, doctor Adams, in

his learned defence of the American constitutions that unbridled passions

produce the same effect, whether in a king, nobility, or a mob. The

experience of all mankind has proved the prevalence of a disposition to

use power wantonly. It is therefore as necessary to defend an individual

against the majority in a republick as against the king in a monarchy. Our

state constitution has wisely guarded this point. The present

confederation has also done it.

I confess that I have yet seen no sufficient reason for not amending the

confederation, though I have weighed the argument with candour; I think it

would be much easier to amend it than the new constitution. But this is a

point on which men of very respectable character differ. There is another

point in which nearly all agree, and that is, that the new constitution

would be better in many respects if it had been differently framed. Here

the question is not so much what the amendments ought to be, as in what

manner they shall be made; whether they shall be made as conditions of our

accepting the constitution, or whether we shall first accept it, and then

try to amend it. I can hardly conceive that it should seriously be made a

question. If the first question, whether we will receive it as it stands,

be negatived, as it undoubtedly ought to be, while the conviction remains

that amendments are necessary; the next question will be, what amendments

shall be made? Here permit an individual, who glories in being a citizen

of Massachusetts, and who is anxious that her character may remain

undiminished, to propose such articles as appear to him necessary for

preserving the rights of the state. He means not to retract anything with

regard to the expediency of amending the old confederation, and rejecting

the new one totally; but only to make a proposition which he thinks

comprehends the general idea of all parties. If the new constitution means

no more than the friends of it acknowledge, they certainly can have no

objection to affixing a declaration in favor of the rights of states and

of citizens, especially as a majority of the states have not yet voted

upon it.

“Resolved, that the constitution lately proposed for the United States be

received only upon the following conditions:

“1. Congress shall have no power to alter the time, place or manner of

elections, nor any authority over elections, otherwise than by fining such

state as shall neglect to send its representatives or senators, a sum not

exceeding the expense of supporting its representatives or senators one

year.

“2. Congress shall not have the power of regulating the intercourse

between the states, nor to levy any direct tax on polls or estates, or any

excise.

“3. Congress shall not have power to try causes between a state and

citizens of another state, nor between citizens of different states; nor

to make any laws relative to the transfer of property between those

parties, nor any other matter which shall originate in the body of any

state.

“4. It shall be left to every state to make and execute its own laws,

except laws impairing contracts, which shall not be made at all.

“5. Congress shall not incorporate any trading companies, nor alienate the

territory of any state. And no treaty, ordinance or law of the United

States shall be valid for these purposes.

“6. Each state shall have the command of its own militia.

“7. No continental army shall come within the limits of any state, other

than garrison to guard the publick stores, without the consent of such

states in time of peace.

“8. The president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but one year,

and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every

year.

“9. The judicial department shall be confined to cases in which

ambassadours are concerned, to cases depending upon treaties, to offences

committed upon the high seas, to the capture of prizes, and to cases in

which a foreigner residing in some foreign country shall be a party, and

an American state or citizen shall be the other party, provided no suit

shall be brought upon a state note.

“10. Every state may emit bills of credit without making them a tender,

and may coin money, of silver, gold or copper, according to the

continental standard.

“11. No powers shall be exercised by Congress or the president but such as

are expressly given by this constitution and not excepted against by this

declaration. And any officer of the United States offending against an

individual state shall be held accountable to such state, as any other

citizen would be.

“12. No officer of Congress shall be free from arrest for debt [but] by

authority of the state in which the debt shall be due.

“13. Nothing in this constitution shall deprive a citizen of any state of

the benefit of the bill of rights established by the constitution of the

state in which he shall reside, and such bill of rights shall be

considered as valid in any court of the United States where they shall be

pleaded.

“14. In all those causes which are triable before the continental courts,

the trial by jury shall be held sacred.”

These at present appear to me the most important points to be guarded. I

have mentioned a reservation of excise to the separate states, because it

is necessary, that they should have some way to discharge their own debts,

and because it is placing them in an humiliating & disgraceful situation

to depute them to transact the business of international government

without the means to carry it on. It is necessary also, as a check on the

national government, for it has hardly been known that any government

having the powers of war, peace, and revenue, has failed to engage in

needless and wanton expense. A reservation of this kind is therefore

necessary to preserve the importance of the state governments: without

this the extremes of the empire will in a very short time sink into the

same degradation and contempt with respect to the middle state as Ireland,

Scotland, & Wales, are in with regard to England. All the men of genius

and wealth will resort to the seat of government, that will be center of

revenue, and of business, which the extremes will be drained to supply.

This is not mere vision, it is justified by the whole course of things. We

shall, therefore, if we neglect the present opportunity to secure

ourselves, only increase the number of proofs already too many, that

mankind are incapable of enjoying their liberty. I have been the more

particular in stating the amendments to be made, because many gentlemen

think it would be preferable to receive the new system with corrections. I

have by this means brought the corrections into one view, and shown

several of the principal points in which it is unguarded. As it is agreed,

at least professedly, on all sides, that those rights should be guarded,

it is among the inferior questions in what manner it is done, provided it

is absolutely and effectually done. For my own part, I am fully of opinion

that it would be best to reject this plan, and pass an explicit resolve,

defining the powers of Congress to regulate the intercourse between us and

foreign nations, under such restrictions as shall render their regulations

equal in all parts of the empire. The impost, if well collected, would be

fully equal to the interest of the foreign debt, and the current charges

of the national government. It is evidently for our interest that the

charges should be as small as possible. It is also for our interest that

the western lands should, as fast as possible, be applied to the purpose

of paying the home debt. Internal taxation and that fund have already paid

two-thirds of the whole debt, notwithstanding the embarrassments usual at

the end of a war.

We are now rising fast above our difficulties; everything at home has the

appearance of improvement, government is well established, manufactures

increasing rapidly, and trade expanding. Till since the peace we never

sent a ship to India, and the present year, it is said, sends above a

dozen vessels from this state only, to the countries round the Indian

ocean. Vast quantities of our produce are exported to those countries. It

has been so much the practice of European nations to farm out this branch

of trade, that we ought to be exceedingly jealous of our right. The

manufactures of the state probably exceed in value one million pounds for

the last year. Most of the useful and some ornamental fabricks are

established. There is great danger of these improvements being injured

unless we practice extreme caution at setting out. It will always be for

the interest of the southern states to raise a revenue from the more

commercial ones. It is said that the consumer pays it. But does not a

commercial state consume more foreign goods than a landed one? The people

are more crowded, and of consequence the land is less able to support

them. We know it is to be a favourite system to raise the money where it

is. But the money is to be expended at another place, and is therefore so

much withdrawn annually from our stock. This is a single instance of the

difference of interest; it would be very easy to produce others.

Innumerable as the differences of manners, and these produce differences

in the laws. Uniformity in legislation is of no more importance than in

religion. Yet the framers of this new constitution did not even think it

necessary that the president should believe that there is a God, although

they require an oath of him. It would be easy to shew the propriety of a

general declaration upon that subject. But this paper is already extended

to so far [sic].

Another reason which I had in stating the amendments to be made, was to

shew how nearly those who are for admitting the system with the necessary

alterations, agree with those who are for rejecting this system and

amending the confederation. In point of convenience, the confederation

amended would be infinitely preferable to the proposed constitution. In

amending the former, we know the powers granted, and are subject to no

perplexity; but in reforming the latter, the business is excessively

intricate, and great part of the checks on Congress are lost. It is to be

remembered too, that if you are so far charmed with eloquence, and misled

by fair representations and charitable constructions, as to adopt an

undefined system, there will be no saying afterwards that you were

mistaken, and wish to correct it. _It will then be the constitution of our

country, and entitled to defence._ If Congress should chuse to avail

themselves of a popular commotion to continue in being, as the fourth

section justifies, and as the British parliament has repeatedly done, the

only answer will be, that it is the constitution of our country, and the

people chose it. It is therefore necessary to be exceedingly critical.

Whatsoever way shall be chosen to secure our rights, the same resolve

ought to contain the whole system of amendment. If it is rejected, the

resolve should contain the amendations of the old system; and if accepted,

it should contain the corrections of the new one.

AGRIPPA.

‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐

_A writer in the Gazette of 29th January, under the signature of Captain

M__c__Daniel, having with civility and apparent candour, called for an

explanation of what was said in one of my former papers, I have chosen to

mention him with respect, as the only one of my reviewers who deserves an

answer._

REPLIES TO THE STRICTURES OF A LANDHOLDER, BY ELBRIDGE GERRY.

Printed In The Massachusetts Centinel,

And

The American Herald,

January-April 1788.

Note.

The refusal of Gerry to sign or support the Constitution, being the only

northern member of the federal convention to do so, made him the general

target of attack by the federal writers of New England. To most of these

Gerry paid no attention, but the charges of “A Landholder” were so

positive, and so evidently written by a fellow member of the federal

convention, that an answer was necessary.

To neither of the two pieces here printed did Gerry put his name, but the

subject and internal evidence are both conclusive that they were written

by him. Not being able to find a copy of the _American Herald_, I have

been compelled to reprint the second article from the _New York Journal_.

For more on this subject see the letters of A Landholder and of Luther

Martin in this collection.

Reply To A Landholder, I.

The Massachusetts Centinel, (Number 32 of Volume VIII)

SATURDAY, JANUARY 5, 1788.

MR. RUSSELL:

You are desired to inform the publick from good authority, that Mr. GERRY,

by giving his dissent to the proposed Constitution, could have no motives

for preserving an office, for he holds none under the United States, or

any of them; that he has not, as has been asserted, exchanged Continental

for State Securities, and if he had, it would have been for his interest

to have supported the new system, because thereby the states are

restrained from impairing the obligation of contracts, and by a transfer

of such securities, they may be recovered in the new federal court; that

he never heard, in the Convention, a motion made, much less did make any,

“for the redemption of the old continental money;” but that he proposed

the public debt should be made neither better nor worse by the new system,

but stand precisely on the same ground by the Articles of Confederation;

that had there been such a motion, he was not interested in it, as he did

not then, neither does he now, own the value of ten pounds in continental

money; that he neither was called on for his reasons for not signing, but

stated them fully in the progress of the business. His objections are

chiefly contained in his letter to the Legislature; that he believes his

colleagues men of too much honour to assert what is not truth; that his

reasons in the Convention “were totally different from those which he

published,” that his only motive for dissenting from the Constitution, was

a firm persuasion that it would endanger the liberties of America; that if

the people are of a different opinion, they have a right to adopt; but he

was not authorized to an act, which appeared to him was a surrender of

their liberties; that a representative of a free state, he was bound in

honour to vote according to his idea of her true interest, and that he

should do the same in similar circumstances.

_Cambridge, January 3, 1788._

Reply To A Landholder, II.

The New York Journal, (Number 2282)

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 30, 1788.

From the American Herald, printed at Boston.

MR. GREENLEAF,

As the Connecticut Landholder’s publications are dispersed throughout the

state, it will be useful for the sake of truth to publish the following.

TO THE PUBLIC.

An elegant writer, under the signature of “A Landholder,” having in a

series of publications, with a modesty and delicacy peculiar to himself,

undertaken to instruct members of legislatures, executives, and

conventions, in their duty respecting the new constitution, is, in stating

facts, unfortunate, in being repeatedly detected in errors; but his

perseverance therein does honor “to his magnanimity,” and reminds me of

Dr. Sangerado (in Gil Blas) who being advised to alter his practice, as it

was founded on false principles and destructive to his patients, firmly

determined to pursue it, because he had written a book in support of it.

Had our learned author, the modern Sangerado, confined himself to facts

and to reasoning on the constitution, he might have continued to write

without interruption from its opposers, until by instructing others, he

had obtained that instruction which he seems to need, or a temporary

relief from the inenviable malady, the cacoethes scribendi; but his

frequent misrepresentations having exposed him to suspicions that as a

disciple of Mandeville he was an advocate for vice, or that to correct his

curiosity some humourist has palmed on him a spurious history of the

proceedings of the federal convention, and exhibited his credulity as a

subject of ridicule, it is proper to set him right in facts, which, in

almost every instance he has misstated.

In a late address to the honorable Luther Martin, Esquire, the Landholder

has asserted, that Mr. Gerry “uniformly opposed Mr. Martin’s principles,”

but this is a circumstance wholly unknown to Mr. Gerry, until he was

informed of it by the Connecticut Landholder; indeed Mr. Gerry from the

first acquaintance with Mr. Martin, has “uniformly had a friendship for

him.”

This writer has also asserted, “that the day Mr. Martin took his seat in

convention, without requesting information, or to be let into the reasons

of the adoption of what he might not approve, he opened against them in a

speech which held during two days.” But the facts are, that Mr. Martin had

been a considerable time in convention before he spoke; that when he

entered into the debates he appeared not to need “information,” as he was

fully possessed of the subject; and that his speech, if published, would

do him great honor.

Another assertion of this famous writer is, that Mr. Gerry in “a

sarcastical reply, admired the strength of Mr. Martin’s lungs, and his

profound knowledge in the first principles of government;” that “this

reply” “left him a prey to the most humiliating reflections; but these did

not teach him to bound his future speeches by the lines of moderation; for

the very next day he exhibited, without a blush, another specimen of

eternal volubility.” This is so remote from the truth, that no such reply

was made by Mr. Gerry to Mr. Martin, or to any member of the convention;

on the contrary, Mr. Martin, on the first day he spoke, about the time of

adjournment, signified to the convention that the heat of the season, and

his indisposition prevented his proceeding, and the house adjourned

without further debate, or a reply to Mr. Martin from any member whatever.

Again, the Landholder has asserted that Mr. Martin voted “an appeal should

lay to the supreme judiciary of the United States for the correction of

all errors both in law and fact,” and “agreed to the clause that declares

nine states to be sufficient to put the government in motion;” and in a

note says, “Mr. Gerry agreed with Mr. Martin on these questions.” Whether

there is any truth in the assertions as they relate to Mr. Martin, he can

best determine; but as they respect Mr. Gerry, they reverse the facts; for

he not only voted against the first proposition (which is not stated by

the Landholder, with the accuracy requisite for a writer on government)

but contended for jury trials in civil cases, and declared his opinion,

that a federal judiciary with the powers above mentioned, would be as

oppressive and dangerous, as the establishment of a star-chamber, and as

to the clause that “declares nine states to be sufficient to put the

government in motion,” Mr. Gerry was so much opposed to it, as to vote

against it in the first instance, and afterwards to move for a

reconsideration of it.

The Landholder having in a former publication asserted “that Mr. Gerry

introduced a motion, respecting the redemption of old continental money”

and the public having been informed by a paragraph in the Massachusetts

Centinel, No. 32, of vol. 8, as well as by the honorable Mr. Martin, that

neither Mr. Gerry, or any other member, had introduced such a proposition,

the Landholder now says that “out of 126 days, Mr. Martin attended only

66,” and then enquires “whether it is to be presumed that Mr. Martin could

have been minutely informed, of all that happened in convention, and

committees of convention, during the sixty days of absence?” and “Why is

it that we do not see Mr. McHenry’s verification of his assertion, who was

of the committee for considering a provision for the debts of the union?”

But if these enquiries were intended for subterfuges, unfortunately for

the Landholder, they will not avail him: for, had Mr. Martin not been

present at the debates on this subject, the fact is, that Mr. Gerry was

not on a committee with Mr. McHenry, or with any other person, for

considering a provision for the debts of the union, or any provision that

related to the subject of old continental money; neither did he make any

proposition, in convention, committee, or on any occasion, to any member

of convention or other person, respecting the redemption of such money;

and the assertions of the Landholder to the contrary, are altogether

destitute of the shadow of truth.

The Landholder addressing Mr. Martin, further says, “Your reply to my

second charge against Mr. Gerry, may be soon dismissed: compare his letter

to the legislature of his state, with your defence, and you will find,

that you have put into his mouth, objections different from anything it

contains, so that if your representation be true, his must be false.” The

objections referred to, are those mentioned by Mr. Martin, as being made

by Mr. Gerry, against the supreme power of Congress over the militia. Mr.

Gerry, in his letter to the legislature, states as an objection, “That

some of the powers of the federal legislature are ambiguous, and others

(meaning the unlimited power of Congress, to keep up a standing army, in

time of peace, and their entire controul of the militia) are indefinite

and dangerous.” Against both these did Mr. Gerry warmly contend, and why

his representations must be false, if Mr. Martin’s are true, which

particularized what Mr. Gerry’s stated generally, can only be discovered

by such a profound reasoner, as the Connecticut Landholder.

The vanity of this writer, in supposing that his charges would be the

subject of constitutional investigation, can only be equalled by his

impertinence, in interfering with the politics of other states, or by his

ignorance, in supposing a state convention could take cognizance of such

matters as he calls charges, and that Mr. Gerry required a formal defence,

or the assistance of his colleagues, to defeat the unprovoked and

libellous attacks of the Landholder, or any other unprincipled reviler.

The landholder says: “That Mr. Martin thought the deputy attorney-general

of the United States, for the state of Maryland, destined for a different

character, and that inspired him with the hope that he might derive from a

desperate opposition, what he saw no prospect of gaining by a contrary

conduct;” but the landholder ventures to predict, “that though Mr. Martin

was to double his efforts he would fail in his object.” By this we may

form some estimate of the patriotism of the landholder, for, whilst he so

readily resolves Mr. Martin’s conduct into a manœuvre for office, he gives

too much reason to suppose, that he himself has no idea of any other

motive in conducting politicks. But how can the landholder ascertain, that

“Mr. Martin thought” the office mentioned “destined for a different

character?” Was the landholder present at the destination? If so, it was

natural for him, knowing there was a combination against Mr. Martin

(however remote this gentleman was from discovering it) to suppose his

accidental opposition to the complotters, proceeded from a discovery of

the plot. Surely the landholder must have some reason for his conjecture

respecting the motives of Mr. Martin’s conduct, or to be subject to the

charge of publishing calumny, knowing it to be such. If then, this great

statesman was in a secret, which has been long impenetrable, he is now

entitled to the honor of giving the public the most important information

they have received, concerning the origin of the new constitution, and

having candidly informed them who is not, he ought to inform who is to

fill that office, and all others of the new federal government. It may

then, in some measure be ascertained, what individuals have supported the

constitution on principles of patriotism, and who under this guise have

been only squabbling for office. Perhaps we shall find that the landholder

is to have the contract for supplying the standing army under the new

government, and that many others, who have recurred to abuse on this

occasion, have some such happy prospects; indeed the landholder puts it

beyond a doubt, if we can believe him, that it was determined in the privy

council of this federal convention, that however Mr. Martin might advocate

the new constitution, he should not have the office mentioned; for if this

was not the case, how can the landholder so roundly assert that Mr. Martin

could have no prospect by a contrary conduct of gaining the office, and so

remarkably sanguine is the landholder, that the members of the privy

council would be senators of the new Congress, in which case the elections

would undoubtedly be made according to the conventional list of

nominations, as that he ventures to predict, though Mr. Martin was to

double his efforts, he would fail in his object. Thus whilst this blazing

star of federalism is taking great pains to hold up Mr. Gerry and Mr.

Mason, as having held private meetings “to aggrandize old Massachusetts

and the antient dominion” he has confessed enough to shew that his private

meetings were solely to aggrandize himself.

THE LETTERS OF A LANDHOLDER, WRITTEN BY OLIVER ELLSWORTH.

Printed In

The Connecticut Courant

And

The American Mercury,

November, 1787-March, 1788.

Note.

The letters of a Landholder were so obviously written by a a member of the

federal convention, that their authorship could not long remain a secret.

They were published simultaneously in the _Connecticut Courant_ at

Hartford and the _American Mercury_ at Litchfield, and this so clearly

indicated Oliver Ellsworth as the writer that they were at once credited

to his pen.

The letters had a very wide circulation, numbers being reprinted as far

north as New Hampshire, and as far south as Maryland. They called out

several replies, three of which, by Gerry, Williams and Martin, are

printed in this collection.

A Landholder, I.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1189)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 5, 1787.

TO THE HOLDERS AND TILLERS OF LAND.

The writer of the following passed the first part of his life in

mercantile employments, and by industry and economy acquired a sufficient

sum on retiring from trade to purchase and stock a decent plantation, on

which he now lives in the state of a farmer. By his present employment he

is interested in the prosperity of agriculture, and those who derive a

support from cultivating the earth. An acquaintance with business has

freed him from many prejudices and jealousies, which he sees in his

neighbors, who have not intermingled with mankind, nor learned by

experience the method of managing an extensive circulating property.

Conscious of an honest intention he wishes to address his brethren on some

political subjects which now engage the public attention, and will in the

sequel greatly influence the value of landed property. The new

constitution for the United States is now before the public, the people

are to determine, and the people at large generally determine right, when

they have had means of information.

It proves the honesty and patriotism of the gentlemen who composed the

general Convention, that they chose to submit their system to the people

rather than the legislatures, whose decisions are often influenced by men

in the higher departments of government, who have provided well for

themselves and dread any change least they should be injured by its

operation. I would not wish to exclude from a State Convention those

gentlemen who compose the higher branches of the assemblies in the several

states, but choose to see them stand on an even floor with their brethren,

where the artifice of a small number cannot negative a vast majority of

the people.

This danger was foreseen by the Federal Convention, and they have wisely

avoided it by appealing directly to the people. The landholders and

farmers are more than any other men concerned in the present decision

whether the proposed alteration is best they are to determine; but that an

alteration is necessary an individual may assert. It may be assumed as a

fixed truth that the prosperity and riches of the farmer must depend on

the prosperity, and good national regulation of trade. Artful men may

insinuate the contrary—tell you let trade take care of itself, and excite

your jealousy against the merchant because his business leads him to wear

a gayer coat, than your economy directs. But let your own experience

refute such insinuations. Your property and riches depend on a ready

demand and generous price for the produce you can annually spare. When and

where do you find this? Is it not where trade flourishes, and when the

merchant can freely export the produce of the country to such parts of the

world as will bring the richest return? When the merchant doth not

purchase, your produce is low, finds a dull market—in vexation you call

the trader a jocky, and curse the men whom you ought to pity. A desire of

gain is common to mankind, and the general motive to business and

industry. You cannot expect many purchases when trade is restricted, and

your merchants are shut out from nine-tenths of the ports in the world.

While you depend on the mercy of foreign nations, you are the first

persons who will be humbled. Confined to a few foreign ports they must

sell low, or not at all; and can you expect they will greedily buy in at a

high price, the very articles which they must sell under every

restriction.

Every foreign prohibition on American trade is aimed in the most deadly

manner against the holders and tillers of the land, and they are the men

made poor. Your only remedy is such a national government as will make the

country respectable; such a supreme government as can boldly meet the

supremacy of proud and self-interested nations. The regulation of trade

ever was and ever will be a national matter. A single state in the

American union cannot direct much less control it. This must be a work of

the whole, and requires all the wisdom and force of the continent, and

until it is effected our commerce may be insulted by every overgrown

merchant in Europe. Think not the evil will rest on your merchants alone;

it may distress them, but it will destroy those who cultivate the earth.

Their produce will bear a low price, and require bad pay; the laborer will

not find employment; the value of lands will fall, and the landholder

become poor.

While our shipping rots at home by being prohibited from ports abroad,

foreigners will bring you such articles and at such price as they please.

Even the necessary article of salt has the present year, been chiefly

imported in foreign bottoms, and you already feel the consequence, your

flax-seed in barter has not returned you more than two-thirds of the usual

quantity. From this beginning learn what is to come.

Blame not our merchants, the fault is not in them but in the public. A

Federal government of energy is the only means which will deliver us, and

now or never is your opportunity to establish it, on such a basis as will

preserve your liberty and riches. Think not that time without your own

exertions will remedy the disorder. Other nations will be pleased with

your poverty; they know the advantage of commanding trade, and carrying in

their own bottoms. By these means they can govern prices and breed up a

hardy race of seamen, to man their ships of war when they wish again to

conquer you by arms. It is strange the holders and tillers of the land

have had patience so long. They are men of resolution as well as patience,

and will I presume be no longer deluded by British emissaries, and those

men who think their own offices will be hazarded by any change in the

constitution. Having opportunity, they will coolly demand a government

which can protect what they have bravely defended in war.

A LANDHOLDER.

A Landholder, II.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1190)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1787.

TO THE HOLDER AND TILLERS OF LAND.

_Gentlemen_,

You were told in the late war that peace and Independence would reward

your toil, and that riches would accompany the establishment of your

liberties, by opening a wider market, and consequently raising the price

of such commodities as America produces for exportation.

Such a conclusion appeared just and natural. We had been restrained by the

British to trade only with themselves, who often re-exported to other

nations, at a high advance, the raw materials they have procured from us.

This advance we designed to realize, but our expectation has been

disappointed. The produce of the country is in general down to the old

price, and bids fair to fall much lower. It is time for those who till the

earth in the sweat of their brow to enquire the cause. And we shall find

it neither in the merchant or farmer, but in a bad system of policy and

government, or rather in having no system at all. When we call ourselves

an independent nation it is false, we are neither a nation, nor are we

independent. Like thirteen contentious neighbors we devour and take every

advantage of each other, and are without that system of policy which gives

safety and strength, and constitutes a national structure. Once we were

dependent only on Great Britain, now we are dependent on every petty state

in the world and on every custom house officer of foreign ports. If the

injured apply for redress to the assemblies of the several states, it is

in vain, for they are not, and cannot be known abroad. If they apply to

Congress, it is also vain, for however wise and good that body may be,

they have not power to vindicate either themselves or their subjects.

Do not my countrymen fall into a passion on hearing these truths, nor

think your treatment unexampled. From the beginning it hath been the case

that people without policy will find enough to take advantage of their

weakness, and you are not the first who have been devoured by their wiser

neighbours, but perhaps it is not too late for a remedy, we ought at least

to make a trial, and if we still die shall have this consolation in our

last hours, that we tried to live.

I can foresee that several classes of men will try to alarm your fears,

and however selfish their motives, we may expect that liberty, the

encroachments of power, and the inestimable privileges of dear posterity

will with them be fruitful topicks of argument. As holy scripture is used

in the exorcisms of Romish priests to expel imaginary demons; so the most

sacred words will be conjured together to oppose evils which have no

existence in the new constitution, and which no man dare attempt to carry

into execution, among a people of so free a spirit as the Americans. The

first to oppose a federal government will be the old friends Great

Britain, who in their hearts cursed the prosperity of your arms, and have

ever since delighted in the perplexity of your councils. Many of these men

are still among us, and for several years their hopes of a reunion with

Britain have been high. They rightly judge that nothing will so soon

effect their wishes as the deranged state we are now in, if it should

continue. They see that the merchant is weary of a government which cannot

protect his property, and that the farmer finding no benefit from the

revolution, begins to dread much evil; and they hope the people will soon

supplicate the protection of their old masters. We may therefore expect

that all the policy of these men will center in defeating those measures

which will protect the people, and give system and force to American

councils. I was lately in a circle where the new constitution was

discussed. All but one man approved. He was full of trembling for the

liberties of poor America. It was strange! It was wondorous strange to see

his concern! After several of his arguments had been refuted by an

ingenious farmer in the company, but, says he, it is against the treaty of

peace, we received independence from Great Britain on condition of our

keeping the old constitution. Here the man came out! We had beat the

British with a bad frame of government, and with a good one he feared we

should eat them up. Debtors in desperate circumstances, who have not

resolution to be either honest or industrious, will be the next men to

take the alarm. They have long been upheld by the property of their

creditors and the mercy of the public, and daily destroy a thousand honest

men who are unsuspicious. Paper money and tender acts, is the only

atmosphere in which they can breathe, and live. This is now so generally

known that by being a friend to such measures a man effectually advertises

himself as a bankrupt. The opposition of these we expect, but for the sake

of all honest and industrious debtors, we most earnestly wish the proposed

constitution may pass, for whatever gives a new spring to business will

extricate them from their difficulties.

There is another kind of people will be found in the opposition. Men of

much self importance and supposed skill in politics, who are not of

sufficient consequence to obtain public employment, but can spread

jealousies in the little districts of country where they are placed. These

are always jealous of men in place and of public measures, and aim at

making themselves consequential by distrusting every one in the higher

offices of society.

It is a strange madness of some persons, immediately to distrust those who

are raised by the free suffrages of the people, to sustain powers which

are absolutely necessary for public safety. Why were they elevated but for

a general reputation of wisdom and integrity; and why should they be

distrusted, until by ignorance or some base action they have forfeited a

right to our confidence?

To fear a general government or energetic principles least it should

create tyrants, when without such a government all have an opportunity to

become tyrants and avoid punishment, is fearing the possibility of one act

of oppression, more than the real exercise of a thousand. But in the

present case, men who have lucrative and influential state offices, if

they act from principles of self-interest, will be tempted to oppose an

alteration, which would doubtless be beneficial to the people. To sink

from a controlment of finance, or any other great department of the state,

thro’ want of ability or opportunity to act a part in the federal system,

must be a terrifying consideration. Believe not those who insinuate that

this is a scheme of great men to grasp more power. The temptation is on

the other side. Those in great offices never wish to hazard their places

by such a change. This is the scheme of the people, and those high and

worthy characters who in obedience to the public voice offer the proposed

amendment of our federal constitution thus esteemed it, or they would have

determined state Conventions as the tribunal of ultimate decision. This is

the last opportunity you may have to adopt a government which gives all

protection to personal liberty, and at the same time promises fair to

afford you all the advantages of a sovereign empire. While you deliberate

with coolness, be not duped by the artful surmises of such as from their

own interest or prejudice are blind to the public good.

A LANDHOLDER.

A Landholder, III.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1191)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1787.

TO THE HOLDERS AND TILLERS OF LAND.

_Gentlemen_,

When we rushed to arms for preventing British usurpation, liberty was the

argument of every tongue.

This word would open all the resources of the country and draw out a

brigade of militia rapidly as the most decisive orders of a despotic

government. Liberty is a word which, according as it is used, comprehends

the most good and the most evil of any in the world. Justly understood it

is sacred next to those which we appropriate in divine adoration; but in

the mouths of some it means anything, which enervate a necessary

government; excite a jealousy of the rulers who are our own choice, and

keep society in confusion for want of a power sufficiently concentered to

promote its good. It is not strange that the licentious should tell us a

government of energy is inconsistent with liberty, for being inconsistent

with their wishes and their vices, they would have us think it contrary to

human happiness. In the state this country was left by the war, with want

of experience in sovereignty, and the feelings which the people then had;

nothing but the scene we had passed thro’ could give a general conviction

that an internal government of strength is the only means of repressing

external violence, and preserving the national rights of the people

against the injustice of their own brethren. Even the common duties of

humanity will gradually go out of use, when the constitution and laws of a

country do not insure justice from the public and between individuals.

American experience, in our present deranged state, hath again proved

these great truths, which have been verified in every age since men were

made and became sufficiently numerous to form into public bodies. A

government capable of controlling the whole, and bringing its force to a

point, is one of the prerequisites for national liberty. We combine in

society, with an expectation to have our persons and properties defended

against unreasonable exactions either at home or abroad. If the public are

unable to protest against the unjust impositions of foreigners, in this

case we do not enjoy our natural rights, and a weakness of government is

the cause. If we mean to have our natural rights and properties protected,

we must first create a power which is able to do it, and in our case there

is no want of resources, but a civil constitution which may draw them out

and point their force.

The present question is, shall we have such a constitution or not? We

allow it to be a creation of power; but power when necessary for our good

is as much to be desired as the food we eat or the air we breathe. Some

men are mightily afraid of giving power lest it should be improved for

oppression; this is doubtless possible, but where is the probability? The

same objection may be made against the constitution of every state in the

union, and against every possible mode of government; because a power of

doing good always implies a power to do evil if the person or party be

disposed.

The right of the legislature to ordain laws binding on the people, gives

them a power to make bad laws.

The right of the judge to inflict punishment, gives him both power and

opportunity to oppress the innocent; yet none but crazy men will from

thence determine that it is best to have neither a legislature nor judges.

If a power to promote the best interest of the people, necessarily implies

a power to do evil, we must never expect such a constitution in theory as

will not be open in some respects to the objections of carping and jealous

men. The new Constitution is perhaps more cautiously guarded than any

other in the world, and at the same time creates a power which will be

able to protect the subject; yet doubtless objections may be raised, and

so they may against the constitution of each state in the union. In

Connecticut the laws are the constitution by which the people are

governed, and it is generally allowed to be the most free and popular in

the thirteen states. As this is the state in which I live and write, I

will instance several things which with a proper coloring and a spice of

jealousy appear most dangerous to the natural rights of the people, yet

they have never been dangerous in practice, and are absolutely necessary

at some times to prevent much greater evil.

The right of taxation or of assessing and collecting money out of the

people, is one of those powers which may prove dangerous in the exercise,

and which by the new constitution is vested solely in representatives

chosen for that purpose. But by the laws of Connecticut, this power called

so dangerous may be exercised by selectmen of each town, and this not only

without their consent but against their express will, where they have

considered the matter, and judge it improper. This power they may exercise

when and so often as they judge necessary! Three justices of the quorum

may tax a whole county in such sums as they think meet, against the

express will of all the inhabitants. Here we see the dangerous power of

taxation vested in the justices of the quorum and even in selectmen, men

whom we should suppose as likely to err and tyrannize as the

representatives of three millions of people in solemn deliberation, and

amenable to the vengeance of their constituents, for every act of

injustice. The same town officers have equal authority where personal

liberty is concerned, in a matter more sacred than all the property in the

world, the disposal of your children. When they judge fit, with the advice

of one justice of the peace, they may tear them from the parent’s embrace,

and place them under the absolute control of such masters as they please;

and if the parent’s reluctance excites their resentment, they may place

him and his property under overseers. Fifty other instances fearfull as

these might be collected from the laws of the state, but I will not repeat

them lest my readers should be alarmed where there is no danger. These

regulations are doubtless best; we have seen much good and no evil come

from them. I adduce these instances to shew, that the most free

constitution when made the subject of criticism may be exhibited in

frightful colors, and such attempts we must expect against that now

proposed. If, my countrymen, you wait for a constitution which absolutely

bars a power of doing evil, you must wait long, and when obtained it will

have no power of doing good. I allow you are oppressed, but not from the

quarter that jealous and wrongheaded men would insinuate. You are

oppressed by the men, who to serve their own purposes would prefer the

shadow of government to the reality. You are oppressed for the want of

power which can protect commerce, encourage business, and create a ready

demand for the productions of your farms. You are become poor; oppression

continued will make wise men mad. The landholders and farmers have long

borne this oppression, we have been patient and groaned in secret, but can

promise for ourselves no longer; unless relieved, madness may excite us to

actions we now dread.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, IV.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1192)

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 26, 1787.

_Remarks on the objections made by the Hon. Elbridge Gerry, to the new

Constitution._(30)

TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS.

To censure a man for an opinion in which he declares himself honest, and

in a matter of which all men have a right to judge, is highly injurious;

at the same time, when the opinions even of honorable men are submitted to

the people, a tribunal before which the meanest citizen hath a right to

speak, they must abide the consequence of public stricture. We are

ignorant whether the honorable gentlemen possesses state dignities or

emoluments which will be endangered by the new system, or hath motives of

personality to prejudice his mind and throw him into the opposition; or if

it be so, do not wish to evade the objections by such a charge. As a

member of the General Convention, and deputy from a great state, this

honorable person hath a right to speak and be heard. It gives pleasure to

know the extent of what may be objected or even surmised, by one whose

situation was the best to espy danger, and mark the defective parts of the

constitution if any such there be. Mr. Gerry, tho’ in the character of an

objector, tells us “he was fully convinced that to preserve the union an

efficient government was indispensibly necessary, and that it would be

difficult to make proper amendments to the old articles of confederation,”

therefore by his own confession there was an indispensible necessity of a

system, in many particulars entirely new. He tells us further “that if the

people reject this altogether, anarchy may ensue,” and what situation can

be pictured more awful than a total dissolution of all government? Many

defects in the constitution had better be risked than to fall back into

that state of rude violence, in which every man’s hand is against his

neighbor, and there is no judge to decide between them, or power of

justice to control. But we hope to shew that there are no alarming defects

in the proposed structure of government, and that while a public force is

created, the liberties of the people have every possible guard.

Several of the honourable Gentlemen’s objections are expressed in such

vague and indecisive terms, that they rather deserve the name of

insinuations, and we know not against what particular parts of the system

they are pointed. Others are explicit, and if real deserve serious

attention. His first objection is “that there is no adequate provision for

representation of the people.” This must have respect either to the number

of representatives, or to the manner in which they are chosen. The proper

number to constitute a safe representation is a matter of judgment, in

which honest and wise men often disagree. Were it possible for all the

people to convene and give their personal assent, some would think this

the best mode of making laws, but in the present instance it is

impracticable. In towns and smaller districts where all the people may

meet conveniently and without expense this is doubtless preferable. The

state representation is composed of one or two from every town and

district, which composes an assembly not so large as to be unwieldy in

acting, nor so expensive as to burden the people. But if so numerous a

representation were made from every part of the United States, with our

present population, the new Congress would consist of three thousand men;

with the population of Great Britain, to which we may arrive in half a

century, of ten thousand; and with the population of France, which we

shall probably equal in a century and a half, of thirty thousand.

Such a body of men might be an army to defend the country in case of

foreign invasion, but not a legislature, and the expense to support them

would equal the whole national revenue. By the proposed constitution the

new Congress will consist of nearly one hundred men; when our population

is equal to Great Britain of three hundred men, and when equal to France

of nine hundred. Plenty of Lawgivers! why any gentlemen should wish for

more is not conceivable.

Considering the immense territory of America, the objection with many will

be on the other side; that when the whole is populated it will constitute

a legislature unmanageable by its numbers. Convention foreseeing this

danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any

future time judge necessary, they may diminish the representation.

As the state legislatures have to regulate the internal policy of every

town and neighborhood, it is convenient enough to have one or two men,

particularly acquainted with every small district of country, its

interests, parties and passions. But the federal legislature can take

cognizance only of national questions and interests which in their very

nature are general, and for this purpose five or ten honest and wise men

chosen from each state; men who have had previous experience in state

legislation, will be more competent than an hundred. From an acquaintance

with their own state legislatures, they will always know the sense of the

people at large, and the expense of supporting such a number will be as

much as we ought to incur.

If the Hon. gentleman, in saying “there is not adequate provision for the

representation of the people,” refers to the manner of choosing them, a

reply to this is naturally blended with its second objection, that “they

would have no security for the right of election.” It is impossible to

conceive what greater security can be given, by any form of words, than we

here find.

The federal representatives are to be chosen by the votes of the people.

Every freeman is an elector. The same qualification which enables you to

vote for state representatives, gives you a federal voice. It is a right

you cannot lose, unless you first annihilate the state legislature, and

declare yourself incapable of electing, which is a degree of infatuation

improbable as a second deluge to drown the world.

Your own assemblies are to regulate the formalities of this choice, and

unless they betray you, you cannot be betrayed. But perhaps it may be

said, Congress have a power to control this formality as to the time and

places of electing, and we allow they have: but this objection which at

first looks frightful was designed as a guard to the privileges of the

electors. Even state assemblies may have their fits of madness and

passion, this tho’ not probable is possible.

We have a recent instance in the state of Rhode Island, where a desperate

junto are governing contrary to the sense of a great majority of the

people. It may be the case in any other state, and should it happen, that

the ignorance or rashness of the state assemblies, in a fit of jealousy,

should deny you this sacred right, the deliberate justice of the continent

is enabled to interpose and restore you a federal voice. This right is

therefore more inviolably guarded than it can be by the government of your

state, for it is guaranteed by the whole empire. Tho’ out of the order in

which the Hon. gentleman proposes his doubts, I wish here to notice some

questions which he makes. The proposed plan among others he tells us

involves these questions: “Whether the several state governments, shall be

so altered as in effect to be dissolved? Whether in lieu of the state

governments the national constitution now proposed shall be substituted?”

I wish for sagacity to see on what these questions are founded. No

alteration in the state governments is even now proposed, but they are to

remain identically the same that they are now. Some powers are to be given

into the hands of your federal representatives, but these powers are all

in their nature general, such as must be exercised by the whole or not at

all, and such as are absolutely necessary; or your commerce, the price of

your commodities, your riches and your safety, will be the sport of every

foreign adventurer. Why are we told of the dissolution of our state

governments, when by this plan they are indissolubly linked? They must

stand or fall, live or die together. The national legislature consists of

two houses, a senate and house of representatives. The senate is to be

chosen by the assemblies of the particular states; so that if the

assemblies are dissolved, the senate dissolves with them. The national

representatives are to be chosen by the same electors, and under the same

qualifications, as choose the state representatives; so that if the state

representation be dissolved, the national representation is gone of

course.

State representation and government is the very basis of the congressional

power proposed. This is the most valuable link in the chain of connection,

and affords double security for the rights of the people. Your liberties

are pledged to you by your own state, and by the power of the whole

empire. You have a voice in the government of your own state, and in the

government of the whole. Were not the gentleman on whom the remarks are

made very honorable, and by the eminence of office raised above a

suspicion of cunning, we should think he had, in this instance, insinuated

merely to alarm the fears of the people. His other objections will be

mentioned in some future number of the:

LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, V.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1193)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787.

_Continuation of Remarks on the Hon. Elbridge Gerry’s Objections to the

new Constitution._

TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS.

It is unhappy both for Mr. Gerry and the public, that he was not more

explicit in publishing his doubts. Certainly this must have been from

inattention, and not thro’ any want of ability; as all his honorable

friends allow him to be a politician even of metaphysical nicety.

In a question of such magnitude, every candid man will consent to discuss

objections, which are stated with perspicuity; but to follow the honorable

writer into the field of conjecture, and combat phantoms, uncertain

whether or not they are the same which terrified him, is a task too

laborious for patience itself. Such must be the writer’s situation in

replying to the next objection, “that some of the powers of the

legislature are ambiguous, and others indefinite and dangerous.” There are

many powers given to the legislature; if any of them are dangerous, the

people have a right to know which they are, and how they will operate,

that we may guard against the evil. The charge of being ambiguous and

indefinite may be brought against every human composition, and necessarily

arises from the imperfection of language. Perhaps no two men will express

the same sentiment in the same manner, and by the same words; neither do

they connect precisely the same ideas with the same words. From hence

arises an ambiguity in all language, with which the most perspicuous and

precise writers are in a degree chargeable. Some persons never attain to

the happy art of perspicuous expression, and it is equally true that some

persons thro’ a mental defect of their own, will judge the most correct

and certain language of others to be indefinite and ambiguous. As Mr.

Gerry is the first and only man who has charged the new Constitution with

ambiguousness, is there not room to suspect that his understanding is

different from other men’s, and whether it be better or worse, the

Landholder presumes not to decide.

It is an excellency of this Constitution that it is expressed with

brevity, and in the plain, common language of mankind.

Had it swelled into the magnitude of a volume, there would have been more

room to entrap the unwary, and the people who are to be its judges would

have had neither patience nor opportunity to understand it. Had it been

expressed in the scientific language of law, or those terms of art which

we often find in political compositions, to the honorable gentleman it

might have appeared more definite and less ambiguous; but to the great

body of the people altogether obscure, and to accept it they must leap

into the dark.

The people to whom in this case the great appeal is made, best understand

those compositions which are concise and in their own language. Had the

powers given to the legislature been loaded with provisos, and such

qualifications as a lawyer who is so cunning as even to suspect himself,

would probably have intermingled; there would have been much more of a

deception in the case. It would not be difficult to shew that every power

given to the legislature is necessary for national defence and justice,

and to protect the rights of the people who create this authority for

their own advantage; but to consider each one particularly would exceed

the limits of my design.

I shall, therefore, select two powers given them, which have been more

abused to oppress and enslave mankind, than all the others with which this

or any legislature on earth is cloathed—the right of taxation or of

collecting money from the people; and of raising and supporting armies.

These are the powers which enable tyrants to scourge their subjects; and

they are also the very powers by which good rulers protect the people

against the violence of wicked and overgrown citizens, and invasion by the

rest of mankind. Judge candidly what a wretched figure the American empire

will exhibit in the eye of other nations, without a power to array and

support a military force for its own protection. Half a dozen regiments

from Canada or New-Spain, might lay whole provinces under contribution,

while we were disputing who has power to pay and raise an army. This power

is also necessary to restrain the violence of seditious citizens. A

concurrence of circumstances frequently enables a few disaffected persons

to make great revolutions, unless government is vested with the most

extensive powers of self-defence. Had Shays, the malcontent of

Massachusetts, been a man of genius, fortune and address, he might have

conquered that state, and by the aid of a little sedition in the other

states, and an army proud by victory, become the monarch and tyrant of

America. Fortunately he was checked; but should jealousy prevent vesting

these powers in the hands of men chosen by yourselves, and who are under

every constitutional restraint, accident or design will in all probability

raise up some future Shays to be the tyrant of your children.

A people cannot long retain their freedom, whose government is incapable

of protecting them.

The power of collecting money from the people, is not to be rejected

because it has sometimes been oppressive.

Public credit is as necessary for the prosperity of a nation as private

credit is for the support and wealth of a family.

We are this day many millions poorer than we should have been had a well

arranged government taken place at the conclusion of the war. All have

shared in this loss, but none in so great proportion as the landholders

and farmers.

The public must be served in various departments. Who will serve them

without a meet recompense? Who will go to war and pay the charges of his

own warfare? What man will any longer take empty promises of reward from

those, who have no constitutional power to reward or means of fulfilling

them? Promises have done their utmost, more than they ever did in any

other age or country. The delusive bubble has broke, and in breaking has

beggared thousands, and left you an unprotected people; numerous without

force, and full of resources but unable to command one of them. For these

purposes there must be a general treasury, with a power to replenish it as

often as necessity requires. And where can this power be more safely

vested, than in the common legislature, men chosen by yourselves from

every part of the union, and who have the confidence of their several

states; men who must share in the burdens they impose on others; men who

by a seat in Congress are incapable of holding any office under the

states, which might prove a temptation to spoil the people for increasing

their own income?

We find another objection to be “that the executive is blended with and

will have an undue influence over the legislature.” On examination you

will find this objection unfounded. The supreme executive is vested in a

President of the United States; every bill that hath passed the senate and

representatives, must be presented to the president, and if he approve it

becomes law. If he disapproves, but makes no return within ten days, it

still becomes law. If he returns the bill with his objections, the senate

and representatives consider it a second time, and if two-thirds of them

adhere to the first resolution it becomes law notwithstanding the

president’s dissent. We allow the president hath an influence, tho’

strictly speaking he hath not a legislative voice; and think such an

influence must be salutary. In the president all the executive departments

meet, and he will be a channel of communication between those who make and

those who execute the laws. Many things look fair in theory which in

practice are impossible. If lawmakers, in every instance, before their

final decree, had the opinion of those who are to execute them, it would

prevent a thousand absurd ordinances, which are solemnly made, only to be

repealed, and lessen the dignity of legislation in the eyes of mankind.

The vice-president is not an executive officer while the president is in

discharge of his duty, and when he is called to preside his legislative

voice ceases. In no other instance is there even the shadow of blending or

influence between the two departments.

We are further told “that the judicial departments, or those courts of

law, to be instituted by Congress, will be oppressive.” We allow it to be

possible, but from whence arises the probability of this event? State

judges may be corrupt, and juries may be prejudiced and ignorant, but

these instances are not common; and why shall we suppose they will be more

frequent under a national appointment and influence, when the eyes of a

whole empire are watching for their detection?

Their courts are not to intermeddle with your internal policy, and will

have cognizance only of those subjects which are placed under the control

of a national legislature. It is as necessary there should be courts of

law and executive officers, to carry into effect the laws of the nation,

as that there be courts and officers to execute the laws made by your

state assemblies. There are many reasons why their decisions ought not to

be left to courts instituted by particular states.

A perfect uniformity must be observed thro’ the whole union, or jealousy

and unrighteousness will take place; and for a uniformity one judiciary

must pervade the whole. The inhabitants of one state will not have

confidence in judges appointed by the legislature of another state, in

which they have no voice. Judges who owe their appointment and support to

one state, will be unduly influenced, and not reverence the laws of the

union. It will at any time be in the power of the smallest state, by

interdicting their own judiciary, to defeat the measures, defraud the

revenue, and annul the most sacred laws of the whole empire. A legislative

power, without a judicial and executive under their own control, is in the

nature of things a nullity. Congress under the old confederation had power

to ordain and resolve, but having no judicial or executive of their own,

their most solemn resolves were totally disregarded. The little state of

Rhode Island was purposely left by Heaven to its present madness, for a

general conviction in the other states, that such a system as is now

proposed is our only preservation from ruin. What respect can any one

think would be paid to national laws, by judicial and executive officers

who are amenable only to the present assembly of Rhode Island? The

rebellion of Shays and the present measures of Rhode Island ought to

convince us that a national legislature, judiciary and executive, must be

united, or the whole is but a name; and that we must have these, or soon

be hewers of wood and drawers of water for all other people.

In all these matters and powers given to Congress, their ordinances must

be the supreme law of the land, or they are nothing. They must have

authority to enact any laws for executing their own powers, or those

powers will be evaded by the artful and unjust, and the dishonest trader

will defraud the public of its revenue. As we have every reason to think

this system was honestly planned, we ought to hope it may be honestly and

justly executed. I am sensible that speculation is always liable to error.

If there be any capital defects in this constitution, it is most probable

that experience alone will discover them. Provision is made for an

alteration if, on trial, it be found necessary.

When your children see the candor and greatness of mind, with which you

lay the foundation, they will be inspired with equity to furnish and adorn

the superstructure.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, VI.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1194)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1787.

He that is first in his own cause seemeth just; but his neighbor

cometh and searcheth him.

TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS:

The publication of Col. Mason’s(31) reasons for not signing the new

Constitution, has extorted some truths that would otherwise in all

probability have remained unknown to us all. His reasons, like Mr.

Gerry’s, are most of them _ex post facto_, have been revised in New Y——k

by R. H. L.(32) and by him brought into their present artful and insidious

form. The factious spirit of R. H. L., his implacable hatred to General

Washington, his well-known intrigues against him in the late war, his

attempts to displace him and give the command of the American army to

General Lee, is so recent in your minds it is not necessary to repeat

them. He is supposed to be the author of most of the scurrility poured out

in the New-York papers against the new constitution.

Just at the close of the Convention, whose proceedings in general were

zealously supported by Mr. Mason, he moved for a clause that no navigation

act should ever be passed but with the consent of two thirds of both

branches;(33) urging that a navigation act might otherwise be passed

excluding foreign bottoms from carrying American produce to market, and

throw a monopoly of the carrying business into the hands of the eastern

states who attend to navigation, and that such an exclusion of foreigners

would raise the freight of the produce of the southern states, and for

these reasons Mr. Mason would have it in the power of the southern states

to prevent any navigation act. This clause, as unequal and partial in the

extreme to the southern states, was rejected; because it ought to be left

on the same footing with other national concerns, and because no state

would have a right to complain of a navigation act which should leave the

carrying business equally open to them all. Those who preferred

cultivating their lands would do so; those who chose to navigate and

become carriers would do that. The loss of this question determined Mr.

Mason against the signing the doings of the convention, and is undoubtedly

among his reasons as drawn for the southern states; but for the eastern

states this reason would not do.(34) It would convince us that Mr. Mason

preferred the subjects of every foreign power to the subjects of the

United States who live in New-England; even the British who lately ravaged

Virginia—that Virginia, my countrymen, where your relations lavished their

blood—where your sons laid down their lives to secure to her and us the

freedom and independence in which we now rejoice, and which can only be

continued to us by a firm, equal and effective union. But do not believe

that the people of Virginia are all thus selfish: No, there is a

Washington, a Blair, a Madison and a Lee, (not R. H. L.) and I am

persuaded there is a majority of liberal, just and federal men in

Virginia, who, whatever their sentiments may be of the new constitution,

will despise the artful injustice contained in Col. Mason’s reasons as

published in the Connecticut papers.

_The President of the United States has no council, etc._, says Col.

Mason. His proposed council(35) would have been expensive—they must

constantly attend the president, because the president constantly acts.

This council must have been composed of great characters, who could not be

kept attending without great salaries, and if their opinions were binding

on the president his responsibility would be destroyed—if divided, prevent

vigor and dispatch—if not binding, they would be no security. The states

who have had such councils have found them useless, and complain of them

as a dead weight. In others, as in England, the supreme executive advises

when and with whom he pleases; if any information is wanted, the heads of

the departments who are always at hand can best give it, and from the

manner of their appointment will be trustworthy. Secrecy, vigor, dispatch

and responsibility, require that the supreme executive should be one

person, and unfettered otherwise than by the laws he is to execute.

_There is no Declaration of Rights._ Bills of Rights were introduced in

England when its kings claimed all power and jurisdiction, and were

considered by them as grants to the people. They are insignificant since

government is considered as originating from the people, and all the power

government now has is a grant from the people. The constitution they

establish with powers limited and defined, becomes now to the legislator

and magistrate, what originally a bill of rights was to the people. To

have inserted in this constitution a bill of rights for the states, would

suppose them to derive and hold their rights from the federal government,

when the reverse is the case.

_There is to be no ex post facto laws._ This was moved by Mr. Gerry and

supported by Mr. Mason,(36) and is exceptional only as being unnecessary;

for it ought not to be presumed that government will be so tyrannical, and

opposed to the sense of all modern civilians, as to pass such laws: if

they should, they would be void.

_The general legislature is restrained from prohibiting the further

importation of slaves for twenty odd years._ But every state legislature

may restrain its own subjects; but if they should not, shall we refuse to

confederate with them? their consciences are their own, tho’ their wealth

and strength are blended with ours. Mr. Mason has himself about three

hundred slaves, and lives in Virginia, where it is found by prudent

management they can breed and raise slaves faster than they want them for

their own use, and could supply the deficiency in Georgia and South

Carolina; and perhaps Col. Mason may suppose it more humane to breed than

import slaves—those imported having been bred and born free, may not so

tamely bear slavery as those born slaves, and from their infancy inured to

it; but his objections are not on the side of freedom, nor in compassion

to the human race who are slaves, but that such importations render the

United States weaker, more vulnerable, and less capable of defence. To

this I readily agree, and all good men wish the entire abolition of

slavery, as soon as it can take place with safety to the public, and for

the lasting good of the present wretched race of slaves. The only possible

step that could be taken towards it by the convention was to fix a period

after which they should not be imported.

_There is no declaration of any kind to preserve the liberty of the press,

etc._ Nor is liberty of conscience, or of matrimony, or of burial of the

dead; it is enough that congress have no power to prohibit either, and can

have no temptation. This objection is answered in that the states have all

the power originally, and congress have only what the states grant them.

_The judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to

absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several states; thereby

rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as

unattainable by a great part of the community, as in England; and enable

the rich to oppress and ruin the poor._ It extends only to objects and

cases specified, and wherein the national peace or rights, or the harmony

of the states is concerned, and not to controversies between citizens of

the same state (except where they claim under grants of different states);

and nothing hinders but the supreme federal court may be held in different

districts, or in all the states, and that all the cases, except the few in

which it has original and not appellate jurisdiction, may in the first

instance be had in the state courts and those trials be final except in

cases of great magnitude; and the trials be by jury also in most or all

the causes which were wont to be tried by them, as congress shall provide,

whose appointment is security enough for their attention to the wishes and

convenience of the people. In chancery courts juries are never used, nor

are they proper in admiralty courts, which proceed not by municipal laws,

which they may be supposed to understand, but by the civil law and law of

nations.

Mr. Mason deems the president and senate’s power to make treaties

dangerous, because they become laws of the land. If the president and his

proposed council had this power, or the president alone, as in England and

other nations is the case, could the danger be less?—or is the

representative branch suited to the making of treaties, which are often

intricate, and require much negotiation and secrecy? The senate is

objected to as having too much power, and bold unfounded assertions that

they will destroy any balance in the government, and accomplish what

usurpation they please upon the rights and liberties of the people; to

which it may be answered, they are elective and rotative, to the mass of

the people; the populace can as well balance the senatorial branch there

as in the states, and much better than in England, where the lords are

hereditary, and yet the commons preserve their weight; but the state

governments on which the constitution is built will forever be security

enough to the people against aristocratic usurpations:—The danger of the

constitution is not aristocracy or monarchy, but anarchy.

I intreat you, my fellow citizens, to read and examine the new

constitution with candor—examine it for yourselves: you are, most of you,

as learned as the objector, and certainly as able to judge of its virtues

or vices as he is. To make the objections the more plausible, they are

called _The objections of the Hon. George Mason, etc._—They may possibly

be his, but be assured they were not those made in convention, and being

directly against what he there supported in one instance ought to caution

you against giving any credit to the rest; his violent opposition to the

powers given congress to regulate trade, was an open decided preference of

all the world to you. A man governed by such narrow views and local

prejudices, can never be trusted; and his pompous declaration in the House

of Delegates in Virginia that no man was more federal than himself,

amounts to no more than this, “Make a federal government that will secure

Virginia all her natural advantages, promote all her interests regardless

of every disadvantage to the other states, and I will subscribe to it.”

It may be asked how I came by my information respecting Col. Mason’s

conduct in convention, as the doors were shut? To this I answer, no

delegate of the late convention will contradict my assertions, as I have

repeatedly heard them made by others in presence of several of them, who

could not deny their truth. Whether the constitution in question will be

adopted by the United States in our day is uncertain; but it is neither

aristocracy or monarchy can grow out of it, so long as the present descent

of landed estates last, and the mass of the people have, as at present, a

tolerable education; and were it ever so perfect a scheme of freedom, when

we become ignorant, vicious, idle, and regardless of the education of our

children, our liberties will be lost—we shall be fitted for slavery, and

it will be an easy business to reduce us to obey one or more tyrants.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, VII.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1195)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1787.

TO THE LANDHOLDERS AND FARMERS.

I have often admired the spirit of candour, liberality, and justice, with

which the Convention began and completed the important object of their

mission. “In all our deliberation on this subject,” say they, “we kept

steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of

every true American, the consolidation of our union, in which is involved

our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This

important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led

each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior

magnitude, than might otherwise have been expected; and thus the

Constitution which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and

of that mutual deference and concession, which the peculiarity of our

political situation rendered indispensible.”

Let us, my fellow citizens, take up this constitution with the same spirit

of candour and liberality; consider it in all its parts; consider the

important advantages which may be derived from it; let us obtain full

information on the subject, and then weigh these objections in the balance

of cool impartial reason. Let us see if they be not wholly groundless; but

if upon the whole they appear to have some weight, let us consider well,

whether they be so important, that we ought on account of them to reject

the whole constitution. Perfection is not the lot of human institutions;

that which has the most excellencies and fewest faults, is the best that

we can expect.

Some very worthy persons, who have not had great advantages for

information, have objected against that clause in the constitution which

provides, that no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification

to any office or public trust under the United States.(37) They have been

afraid that this clause is unfavorable to religion. But my countrymen, the

sole purpose and effect of it is to exclude persecution, and to secure to

you the important right of religious liberty. We are almost the only

people in the world, who have a full enjoyment of this important right of

human nature. In our country every man has a right to worship God in that

way which is most agreeable to his conscience. If he be a good and

peaceable person he is liable to no penalties or incapacities on account

of his religious sentiments; or in other words, he is not subject to

persecution.

But in other parts of the world, it has been, and still is, far different.

Systems of religious error have been adopted, in times of ignorance. It

has been the interest of tyrannical kings, popes, and prelates, to

maintain these errors. When the clouds of ignorance began to vanish, and

the people grew more enlightened, there was no other way to keep them in

error, but to prohibit their altering their religious opinions by severe

persecuting laws. In this way persecution became general throughout

Europe. It was the universal opinion that one religion must be established

by law; and that all who differed in their religious opinions, must suffer

the vengeance of persecution. In pursuance of this opinion, when popery

was abolished in England, and the Church of England was established in its

stead, severe penalties were inflicted upon all who dissented from the

established church. In the time of the civil wars, in the reign of Charles

I., the presbyterians got the upper hand, and inflicted legal penalties

upon all who differed from them in their sentiments respecting religious

doctrines and discipline. When Charles II. was restored, the Church of

England was likewise restored, and the presbyterians and other dissenters

were laid under legal penalties and incapacities. It was in this reign,

that a religious test was established as a qualification for office; that

is, a law was made requiring all officers civil and military (among other

things) to receive the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper, according to the

usage of the Church of England, written [within?] six months after their

admission to office under the penalty of 500£ and disability to hold the

office. And by another statute of the same reign, no person was capable of

being elected to any office relating to the government of any city or

corporation, unless, within a twelvemonth before, he had received the

sacrament according to the rites of the Church of England. The pretence

for making these severe laws, by which all but churchmen were made

incapable of any office civil or military, was to exclude the papists; but

the real design was to exclude the protestant dissenters. From this

account of test-laws, there arises an unfavorable presumption against

them. But if we consider the nature of them and the effects which they are

calculated to produce, we shall find that they are useless, tyrannical,

and peculiarly unfit for the people of this country.

A religious test is an act to be done, or profession to be made, relating

to religion (such as partaking of the sacrament according to certain rites

and forms, or declaring one’s belief of certain doctrines,) for the

purpose of determining whether his religious opinions are such, that he is

admissable to a publick office. A test in favour of any one denomination

of Christians would be to the last degree absurd in the United States. If

it were in favour of either congregationalists, presbyterians,

episcopalians, baptists, or quakers, it would incapacitate more than

three-fourths of the American citizens for any publick office; and thus

degrade them from the rank of freemen. There need no argument to prove

that the majority of our citizens would never submit to this indignity.

If any test-act were to be made, perhaps the least exceptionable would be

one, requiring all persons appointed to office to declare, at the time of

their admission, their belief in the being of a God, and in the divine

authority of the scriptures. In favour of such a test, it may be said,

that one who believes these great truths, will not be so likely to violate

his obligations to his country, as one who disbelieves them; we may have

greater confidence in his integrity. But I answer: His making a

declaration of such a belief is no security at all. For suppose him to be

an unprincipled man, who believes neither the word nor the being of God;

and to be governed merely by selfish motives; how easy is it for him to

dissemble! how easy is it for him to make a public declaration of his

belief in the creed which the law prescribes; and excuse himself by

calling it a mere formality. This is the case with the test-laws and

creeds in England. The most abandoned characters partake of the sacrament,

in order to qualify themselves for public employments. The clergy are

obliged by law to administer the ordinance unto them, and thus prostitute

the most sacred office of religion, for it is a civil right in the party

to receive the sacrament. In that country, subscribing to the thirty-nine

articles is a test for administration into holy orders. And it is a fact,

that many of the clergy do this, when at the same time they totally

disbelieve several of the doctrines contained in them. In short, test-laws

are utterly ineffectual: they are no security at all; because men of loose

principles will, by an external compliance, evade them. If they exclude

any persons, it will be honest men, men of principle, who will rather

suffer an injury, than act contrary to the dictates of their consciences.

If we mean to have those appointed to public offices, who are sincere

friends to religion, we, the people who appoint them, must take care to

choose such characters; and not rely upon such cob-web barriers as

test-laws are.

But to come to the true principle by which this question ought to be

determined: The business of a civil government is to protect the citizen

in his rights, to defend the community from hostile powers, and to promote

the general welfare. Civil government has no business to meddle with the

private opinions of the people. If I demean myself as a good citizen, I am

accountable, not to man, but to God, for the religious opinions which I

embrace, and the manner in which I worship the supreme being. If such had

been the universal sentiments of mankind, and they had acted accordingly,

persecution, the bane of truth and nurse of error, with her bloody axe and

flaming hand, would never have turned so great a part of the world into a

field of blood.

But while I assert the rights of religious liberty, I would not deny that

the civil power has a right, in some cases, to interfere in matters of

religion. It has a right to prohibit and punish gross immoralities and

impieties; because the open practice of these is of evil example and

detriment. For this reason, I heartily approve of our laws against

drunkenness, profane swearing, blasphemy, and professed atheism. But in

this state, we have never thought it expedient to adopt a test-law; and

yet I sincerely believe we have as great a proportion of religion and

morality, as they have in England, where every person who holds a public

office, must either be a saint by law, or a hypocrite by practice. A

test-law is the parent of hypocrisy, and the offspring of error and the

spirit of persecution. Legislatures have no right to set up an

inquisition, and examine into the private opinions of men. Test-laws are

useless and ineffectual, unjust and tyrannical; therefore the Convention

have done wisely in excluding this engine of persecution, and providing

that no religious test shall ever be required.

A LANDHOLDER.

The Landholder, VIII.

The Connecticut Courant, (Number 1196)

MONDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1787.

TO THE HON. ELBRIDGE GERRY, ESQUIRE.

_Sir_,

When a man in public life first deviates from the line of truth and

rectitude, an uncommon degree of art and attention becomes necessary to

secure him from detection. Duplicity of conduct in him requires more than

double caution, a caution which his former habits of simplicity have never

furnished him the means of calculating; and his first leap into the region

of treachery and falsehood is often as fatal to himself as it was designed

to be to his country. Whether you and Mr. Mason may be ranked in this

class of transgressors I pretend not to determine. Certain it is, that

both your management and his for a short time before and after the rising

of the federal convention impress us with a favorable opinion, that you

are great novices in the arts of dissimulation. A small degree of

forethought would have taught you both a much more successful method of

directing the rage of resentment which you caught at the close of the

business at Philadelphia, than the one you took. You ought to have

considered that you reside in regions very distant from each other, where

different parts were to be acted, and then made your cast accordingly.