Section 4, of article IV. says, The United States shall guarantee to every

state in the Union a Republican Form of Government; and shall protect each

of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the

executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic

violence.—At the perusal of this clause, anti-federalism must blush, and

opposition hide its head. Could anything have more openly, or more plainly

evinced to the world, the noble motives which influenced the conduct of

the delegates of America, than the clause aforementioned? it provides,

that a republican form of government shall be guaranteed to each state in

the Union. The inhabitants of America are surely acquainted with the

principles of republicanism, and will certainly demand the establishment

of them, in their fullest extent.

The section just mentioned, secures to us the full enjoyment of every

thing which freemen hold dear, and provides for protecting us against

every thing which they can dread.

This article, my countrymen, is sufficient to convince you of the

excellency of that constitution which the federal convention have formed;

a constitution founded on the broad basis of liberty, and, should the

citizens of America happily concur in adopting it, its pillars may be as

fixed as the foundations of created nature.

Say, ye mighty cavillers, ye inconsistent opposers of the new plan of

government, of what avail, to the thinking part of the community, do you

suppose will be all your clamours about a bill of rights? Does not the

abovementioned section provide for the establishment of a free government

in all the states? and if that freedom is encroached upon, will not the

constitution be violated? It certainly will; and its violators be hurled

from the seat of power, and arraigned before a tribunal where impartial

justice will no doubt preside, to answer for their high-handed crime.

Article V. of the new constitution, says, That Congress, whenever

two-thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose

amendments to this constitution; or on the application of the legislatures

of two-thirds of the states, shall call a convention for proposing

amendments, which in either case shall be valid to all intents and

purposes, as part of the constitution, when ratified by the legislatures

of three-fourths of the states, or by conventions in three-fourths

thereof; as one or the other modes of ratification may be proposed by

Congress; provided that no amendments which may be made prior to the year

one thousand eight hundred and eight, shall in any manner affect the first

and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article, and that no

state, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the

senate.—

On what grounds can the opposers to the new plan found their assertions

that Congress will have it in their power to make what laws they please,

and what alterations they think proper in the constitution, after the

people have adopted it? The constitution expressly says, that any

alterations in the constitution must be ratified by three-fourths of the

states. The 5th article also provides, that the states may propose any

alterations which they see fit, and that Congress shall take measures for

having them carried into effect.

If this article does not clearly demonstrate that all power is in the

hands of the people, then the language by which we convey our ideas, is

shockingly inadequate to its intended purposes, and as little to be

understood by us, as Hebrew to the most illiterate.

The 6th section provides, that this constitution, and the laws which shall

be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be

made, in pursuance thereof, under the authority of the United States,

shall be the supreme law of the land, and the judges in every state shall

be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the

contrary notwithstanding.

This is the article, my countrymen, which knaves and blockheads have so

often dressed up in false colours, and requested your attention to the

construction of it. Adopt not a constitution, say they, which stipulates

that the laws of Congress shall be the supreme law of the land—or, in

other words, they request of you not to obey laws of your own making. This

is the article which they say is so arbitrary and tyrannical, that unless

you have a bill of rights to secure you, you are ruined forever.

But in the name of common sense I would ask, of what use would be a bill

of rights, in the present case?... It can only be to resort to when it is

supposed that Congress have infringed the unalienable rights of the

people: but would it not be much easier to resort to the federal

constitution, to see if therein power is given to Congress to make the law

in question? If such power is not given, the law is in fact a nullity, and

the people will not be bound thereby. For let it be remembered, that such

laws, and such only, as are founded on this constitution, are to be the

supreme law of the land;—and it would be absurd indeed, if the laws which

are granted in the constitution, were not to be, without reserve, the

supreme law of the land. To give Congress power to make laws for the

Union, and then to say they should not have force throughout the Union,

would be glaringly inconsistent:—Such an inconsistency, however, has

hitherto been the evil which the whole continent have complained of, and

which the new constitution is designed to remedy.—Let us reverse the

proposition, and see how it will then stand.—This constitution, and the

laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and

all treaties made, or which shall be made under their authority, shall not

be the supreme law of the land—and the judges in the several states shall

not be bound thereby.—This is exactly what the anti-federalists wish to be

the case; this, and in this alone would they glory.—But, fellow citizens,

you will discern the excellency of the aforementioned clause; you will

perceive that it is calculated, wisely calculated, to support the dignity

of this mighty empire, to restore publick and private credit, and national

confidence.

Article IV. further provides, That the senators and representatives before

mentioned, and the members of the several state legislatures and all

executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the

several states, shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to support this

constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a

qualification to any office or publick trust under the United States.

Thus, my fellow-citizens, we see that our rulers are to be bound by the

most sacred ties, to support our rights and liberties, to secure to us the

full enjoyment of every privilege which we can wish for; they are bound by

the constitution to guarantee to us a republican form of government in its

fullest extent; and what is there more that we can wish for?

Thus the people of the United States, “in order to form a more perfect

Union, establish justice, insure domestick tranquillity, provide for the

common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of

liberty to ourselves and our posterity,” have appointed a federal

convention to “ordain and establish,” with the concurrence of the people,

a constitution for the United States of America. That federal convention

have assembled together, and after a full investigation of the different

concerns of the Union, have proposed a form of government, calculated to

support, and transmit, inviolate, to the latest posterity, all the

blessings of civil and religious liberty.

Citizens of Massachusetts! consider, O consider well, these important

matters, and weigh them deliberately in the scale of reason! Consider at

what a vast expense of toil, difficulty, treasure and blood, you have

emancipated yourselves from the yoke of bondage, and established

yourselves an independent people! Consider that those immortal characters,

who first planned the event of the revolution, and with arms in their

hands stepped forth in the glorious cause of human nature, have now

devised a plan for supporting your freedom, and increasing your strength,

your power and happiness.

Will you then, O my countrymen! listen to the mad dictates of men, who are

aiming, by every artifice and falsehood, which the emissaries of hell can

invent, to effect your total destruction and overthrow? who wish to ascend

the chariot of anarchy, and ride triumphant over your smoking ruins, which

they hope to effect, by their more than hellish arts: in your misery they

hope to glory, and establish their own greatness “on their country’s

ruin.”

If they can effect this, they will laugh at your calamity, and mock your

misfortunes—the language of each brother in iniquity, when they meet, will

be, “hail damn’d associates,” see our high success!

Think, O my countrymen! think, before it is too late!—The important moment

approaches, when these states must, by the most wise of all conduct,

forever establish their glory and happiness, on the firmest basis, by

adopting the constitution, or by the most foolish and inconsistent of all

conduct, in rejecting it, entail on themselves and on their posterity,

endless infamy.

“There is a tide in the affairs of men,

Which taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;

Omitted, all the voyage of their life

Is bound in shallowness.”——

If you embrace not the golden moment now before you, and refuse to receive

that which only can establish the dignity of your towering Eagle, this and

generations yet unborn, will curse, with an anathema, your dying fame, and

breathe, with imprecations and just indignation, vengeance and insults on

your sleeping ashes! But should you, on the contrary, with energy and

vigour, push your fortune, and, with earnestness and gratitude, clasp to

your arms this great blessing which Heaven has pointed to your view,

posterity, made happy by your wisdom and exertions, will honour and revere

your memories. Secure in their prosperity, they will weep for joy, that

Heaven had given them—Fathers!

CASSIUS.

THE LETTERS OF AGRIPPA, ACCREDITED TO JAMES WINTHROP.

Printed In The Massachusetts Gazette,

November, 1787-January, 1788.

Note.

The letters of Agrippa were the ablest anti-federal publications printed

in Massachusetts, and showed especial ability in arguing the dangers and

defects of a plan of government which was both so peculiarly needed, and

so specially advantageous to the State of Massachusetts, that its adoption

was only endangered by certain questions of local politics, which could

not even enter into the discussion. They were noticed, or replied to, in

the Massachusetts Gazette, Dec. 21, 1787, by “Charles James Fox;” Dec. 28,

1787, and Jan. 4, 1788, by “Kempis O’Flanagan,” Jan. 22, and 25, 1788, by

“Junius,” and in the letters of Cassius, printed in this volume.

At the time of publication they were accredited to the pen of James

Winthrop, of Cambridge, and he was repeatedly attacked as the author,

without denying it; while his supposed authorship and general opposition

to the Constitution contributed to defeat his election by Cambridge to the

Massachusetts Convention for considering the proposed government,

receiving only one vote in the whole town. On the contrary, the writer, in

his tenth letter, states that the surmises as to the authorship are not

correct, and in the Massachusetts Gazette of Dec. 21, 1787, the following

appeared:

I feel myself _greatly hurt_ at the liberties lately taken by

certain _scribblers_ with the characters of the _hon._ E. Gerry

and James Winthrop, _esquire_, of Cambridge, two gentlemen, no

less distinguished for their _honesty_, _patriotism_, and

_extensive abilities_, than a Washington or a Franklin.

... In regard to J. Winthrop, _esquire_, (of said Cambridge) it

has been insinuated, that that gentleman is the author of the

pieces in the Massachusetts Gazette, signed Agrippa—but every one

who can _boast the pleasure of his acquaintance_, must _know that

insinuation_ is grounded on _falsehood_.

The heterogenous compound of nonsense and absurdity with which the

compositions of _Agrippa_ are so replete, are certainly not the

productions of a man so celebrated for his superior knowledge and

_understanding_.

In short, Mr. Printer, I hope you and your brother typographers

will be very careful how you are _guilty_ of _exposing_ such

_exalted characters_ in future.

OCRICO.

Agrippa, I.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 385)

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 23, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

Many inconveniences and difficulties in the new plan of government have

been mentioned by different writers on that subject. Mr. Gerry has given

the publick his objections against it, with a manly freedom.(16) The

seceding members from the Pennsylvania Assembly also published theirs.(17)

Various anonymous writers have mentioned reasons of great weight. Among

the many objections have been stated the unlimited right of taxation—a

standing army—an inadequate representation of the people—a right to

destroy the constitution of the separate states, and all the barriers that

have been set up in defence of liberty—the right to try causes between

private persons in many cases without a jury; without trying in the

vicinity of either party; and without any limitation of the value which is

to be tried. To none of these or any other objections has any answer been

given, but such as have acknowledged the truth of the objection while they

insulted the objector. This conduct has much the appearance of trying to

force a general sentiment upon the people.

The idea of promoting the happiness of the people by opposing all their

habits of business, and by subverting the laws to which they are

habituated, appears to me to be at least a mistaken proceeding. If to this

we add the limitations of trade, restraints on its freedom, and the

alteration of its course, and _transfer of the market_, all under the

pretence of regulation for _federal purposes_, we shall not find any

additional reason to be pleased with the plan.

It is now conceded on all sides that the laws relating to civil causes

were never better executed than at present. It is confessed by a warm

federalist in answer to Mr. Gerry’s sensible letter, that the courts are

so arranged at present that no inconvenience is found, and that if the new

plan takes place great difficulties may arise. With this confession before

him, can any reasonable man doubt whether he shall exchange a system,

found by experience to be convenient, for one that is in many respects

inconvenient and dangerous? The expense of the new plan is terrifying, if

there was no other objection. But they are multiplied. Let us consider

that of the representation.

There is to be one representative for every thirty thousand people. Boston

would nearly send one, but with regard to another there is hardly a county

in the state which would have one. The representatives are to be chosen

for two years. In this space, when it is considered that their residence

is from two hundred to five hundred miles from their constituents, it is

difficult to suppose that they will retain any great affection for the

welfare of the people. They will have an army to support them, and may bid

defiance to the clamours of their subjects. Should the people cry aloud

the representative may avail himself of the right to alter the _time of

election_ and postpone it for another year. In truth, the question before

the people is, _whether they will have a limited government or an absolute

one_!

It is a fact justified by the experience of all mankind from the earliest

antiquity down to the present time, that freedom is necessary to industry.

We accordingly find that in absolute governments, the people, be the

climate what it may, are general [sic] lazy, cowardly, turbulent, and

vicious to an extreme. On the other hand, in free countries are found in

general, activity, industry, arts, courage, generosity, and all the manly

virtues.

Can there be any doubt which to choose? He that Hesitates must be base

indeed.

A favourite objection against a free government is drawn from the

irregularities of the Greek and Roman republicks. But it is to be

considered that war was the employment which they considered as most

becoming freemen. Agriculture, arts, and most domestick employment were

committed chiefly to slaves. But Carthage, the great commercial republick

of antiquity, though resembling Rome in the form of its government, and

her rival for power, retained her freedom longer than Rome, and was never

disturbed by sedition during the long period of her duration. This is a

striking proof that the fault of the Greek and Roman republicks was not

owing to the form of their government, and that the spirit of commerce is

the great bond of union among citizens. This furnishes employment for

their activity, supplies their mutual wants, defends the rights of

property, and producing reciprocal dependencies, renders the whole system

harmonious and energetick. Our great object therefore ought to be to

encourage this spirit. If we examine the present state of the world we

shall find that most of the business is done in the freest states, and

that industry decreases in proportion to the rigour of government.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, II.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 386)

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 27, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETTS.

In the Gazette of the 23d instant, I ascertained from the state of other

countries and the experience of mankind, that free countries are most

friendly to commerce and to the rights of property. This produces greater

internal tranquility. For every man, finding sufficient employment for his

active powers in the way of trade, agriculture and manufactures, feels no

disposition to quarrel with his neighbour, nor with the government which

protects him, and of which he is a constituent part. Of the truth of these

positions we have abundant evidence in the history of our own country.

Soon after the settlement of Massachusetts, and its formation into a

commonwealth, in the earlier part of the last century, there was a

sedition at Hingham and Weymouth. The governour passing by at that time

with his guard, seized some of the mutineers and imprisoned them. This was

complained of as a violation of their rights, and the governour lost his

election the next year; but the year afterwards was restored and continued

to be re-elected for several years. The government does not appear to have

been disturbed again till the revocation of the charter in 1686, being a

period of about half a century.

Connecticut set out originally on the same principles, and has continued

uniformly to exercise the powers of government to this time.

During the last year,(18) we had decisive evidences of the vigour of this

kind of government. In Connecticut, the treason was restrained while it

existed only in the form of conspiracy. In Vermont, the conspirators

assembled in arms, but were suppressed by the exertions of the militia,

under the direction of their sheriffs. In New-Hampshire, the attack was

made on the legislature, but the insurrection was in a very few hours

suppressed, and has never been renewed. In Massachusetts, the danger was

by delay suffered to increase. One judicial court after another was

stopped, and even the capital trembled. Still, however, when the supreme

executive gave the signal, a force of many thousands of active, resolute

men, took the field, during the severities of winter, and every difficulty

vanished before them. Since that time we have been continually coalescing.

The people have applied with diligence to their several occupations, and

the whole country wears one face of improvement. Agriculture has been

improved, manufactures multiplied, and trade prodigiously enlarged. These

are the advantages of freedom in a growing country. While our resources

have been thus rapidly increasing, the courts have set in every part of

the commonwealth, without any guard to defend them; have tried causes of

every kind, whether civil or criminal, and the sheriffs, have in no case

been interrupted in the execution of their office. In those cases indeed,

where the government was more particularly interested, mercy has been

extended; but in civil causes, and in the case of moral offences, the law

has been punctually executed. Damage done to individuals, during the

tumults, has been repaired, by judgment of the courts of law, and the

award has been carried into effect. This is the present state of affairs,

when we are asked to relinquish that freedom which produces such happy

effects.

The attempt has been made to deprive us of such a beneficial system, and

to substitute a rigid one in its stead, by criminally alarming our fears,

exalting certain characters on one side, and vilifying them on the other.

I wish to say nothing of the merits or demerits of individuals; such

arguments always do hurt. But assuredly my countrymen cannot fail to

consider and determine who are the most worthy of confidence in a business

of this magnitude.

Whether they will trust persons, who have from their cradles been

incapable of comprehending any other principles of government, than those

of absolute power, and who have, in this very affair, tried to deprive

them of their constitutional liberty, by a pitiful trick. They cannot

avoid prefering those who have uniformly exerted themselves to establish a

limited government, and to secure to individuals all the liberty that is

consistent with justice, between man and man, and whose efforts, by the

smiles of Providence, have hitherto been crowned with the most splendid

success. After the treatment we have received, we have a right to be

jealous, and to guard our present constitution with the strictest care. It

is the right of the people to judge, and they will do wisely to give an

explicit instruction to their delegates in the proposed convention, not to

agree to any proposition that will in any degree militate with that happy

system of government under which Heaven has placed them.

AGRIPPA.

_November 24, 1787._

Agrippa, III.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 387)

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 30, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

It has been proved from the clearest evidence, in two former papers, that

a free government, I mean one in which the power frequently returns to the

body of the people, is in principle the most stable and efficient of any

kind; that such a government affords the most ready and effectual remedy

for all injuries done to persons and the rights of property. It is true we

have had a tender act.(19) But what government has not some law in favour

of debtors? The difficulty consists in finding one that is not more

unfriendly to the creditors than ours. I am far from justifying such

things. On the contrary, I believe that it is universally true, that acts

made to favour a part of the community are wrong in principle. All that is

now intended is, to remark that we are not worse than other people in that

respect which we most condemn. Probably the inquiry will be made, whence

the complaints arise. This is easily answered. Let any man look round his

own neighbourhood, and see if the people are not, with a very few

exceptions, peaceable and attached to the government; if the country had

ever within their knowledge more appearance of industry, improvement and

tranquillity; if there was ever more of the produce of all kinds together

for the market; if their stock does not rapidly increase; if there was

ever a more ready vent for their surplus; and if the average of prices is

not about as high as was usual in a plentiful year before the war. These

circumstances all denote a general prosperity. Some classes of citizens

indeed suffer greatly. Two descriptions I at present recollect. The

publick creditors form the first of these classes, and they ought to, and

will be provided for.

Let us for a moment consider their situation and prospects. The

embarrassments consequent upon a war, and the usual reduction of prices

immediately after a war, necessarily occasioned a want of punctuality in

publick payments. Still, however, the publick debt has been very

considerably reduced, not by the dirty and delusive scheme of

depreciation, but the nominal sum. Applications are continually making for

purchases in our eastern and western lands. Great exertions are making for

clearing off the arrears of outstanding taxes, so that the

certificates(20) for interest on the state debt have considerably

increased in value. This is a certain indication of returning credit.

Congress this year disposed of a large tract of their lands towards paying

the principal of their debt.(21) Pennsylvania has discharged the whole of

their part of the continental debt. New York has nearly cleared its state

debt, and has located a large part of their new lands towards paying the

continental demands.(22) Other states have made considerable payments.

Every day from these considerations the publick ability and inclination to

satisfy their creditors increases. The exertions of last winter were as

much to support public as private credit. The prospect therefore of the

publick creditors is brightening under the present system. If the new

system should take effect without amendments, which however is hardly

probable, the increase of expense will be death to the hopes of all

creditors, both of the continental and of the state. With respect,

however, to our publick delays of payment we have the precedent of the

best established countries in Europe.

The other class of citizens to which I alluded was the ship-carpenters.

All agree that their business is dull; but as nobody objects against a

system of commercial regulations for the whole continent, that business

may be relieved without subverting all the ancient foundations and laws

which have the respect of the people. It is a very serious question

whether giving to Congress the unlimited right to regulate trade would not

injure them still further. It is evidently for the interest of the state

to encourage our own trade as much as possible. But in a very large

empire, as the whole states consolidated must be, there will always be a

desire of the government to increase the trade of the capital, and to

weaken the extremes. We should in that case be one of the extremes, and

should feel all the impoverishment incident to that situation. Besides, a

jealousy of our enterprising spirit, would always be an inducement to

cramp our exertions. We must then be impoverished or we must rebel. The

alternative is dreadful.

At present this state is one of the most respectable and one of the most

influential in the union. If we alone should object to receiving the

system without amendments, there is no doubt but it would be amended. But

the case is not quite so bad. New York appears to have no disposition even

to call a convention. If they should neglect, are we to lend our

assistance to compel them by arms, and thus to kindle a civil war without

any provocation on their part? Virginia has put off their convention till

May, and appears to have no disposition to receive the new plan without

amendments. Pennsylvania does not seem to be disposed to receive it as it

is. The same objections are made in all the states, that the civil

government which they have adopted and which secures their rights will be

subverted. All the defenders of this system undertake to prove that the

rights of the states and of the citizens are kept safe. The opposers of it

agree that they will receive the least burdensome system which shall

defend those rights.

Both parties therefore found their arguments on the idea that these rights

ought to be held sacred. With this disposition is it not in every man’s

mind better to recommit it to a new convention, or to Congress, which is a

regular convention for the purpose, and to instruct our delegates to

confine the system to the general purposes of the union, than the

endeavour to force it through in its present form, and with so many

opposers as it must have in every state on the continent? The case is not

of such pressing necessity as some have represented. Europe is engaged,

and we are tranquil. Never therefore was an happier time for deliberation.

The supporters of the measure are by no means afraid of insurrections

taking place, but they are afraid that the present government will prove

superiour to their assaults.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, IV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 388)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1787.

TO THE PEOPLE.

Having considered some of the principal advantages of the happy form of

government under which it is our peculiar good fortune to live, we find by

experience, that it is the best calculated of any form hitherto invented,

to secure to us the rights of our persons and of our property, and that

the general circumstances of the people shew an advanced state of

improvement never before known. We have found the shock given by the war,

in a great measure obliterated, and the public debt contracted at that

time to be considerably reduced in the nominal sum. The Congress lands are

full adequate to the redemption of the principal of their debt, and are

selling and populating very fast. The lands of this state, at the west,

are, at the moderate price of eighteen pence an acre, worth near half a

million pounds in our money. They ought, therefore, to be sold as quick as

possible. An application was made lately for a large tract at that price,

and continual applications are made for other lands in the eastern part of

the state. Our resources are daily augmenting.

We find, then, that after the experience of near two centuries our

separate governments are in full vigor. They discover, for all the

purposes of internal regulation, every symptom of strength, and none of

decay. The new system is, therefore, for such purposes, useless and

burdensome.

Let us now consider how far it is practicable consistent with the

happiness of the people and their freedom. It is the opinion of the ablest

writers on the subject, that no extensive empire can be governed upon

republican principles, and that such a government will degenerate to a

despotism, unless it be made up of a confederacy of smaller states, each

having the full powers of internal regulation. This is precisely the

principle which has hitherto preserved our freedom. No instance can be

found of any free government of considerable extent which has been

supported upon any other plan. Large and consolidated empires may indeed

dazzle the eyes of a distant spectator with their splendour, but if

examined more nearly are always found to be full of misery. The reason is

obvious. In large states the same principles of legislation will not apply

to all the parts. The inhabitants of warmer climates are more dissolute in

their manners, and less industrious, than in colder countries. A degree of

severity is, therefore, necessary with one which would cramp the spirit of

the other. We accordingly find that the very great empires have always

been despotick. They have indeed tried to remedy the inconveniences to

which the people were exposed by local regulations; but these contrivances

have never answered the end. The laws not being made by the people, who

felt the inconveniences, did not suit their circumstances. It is under

such tyranny that the Spanish provinces languish, and such would be our

misfortune and degradation, if we should submit to have the concerns of

the whole empire managed by one legislature. To promote the happiness of

the people it is necessary that there should be local laws; and it is

necessary that those laws should be made by the representatives of those

who are immediately subject to the want of them. By endeavouring to suit

both extremes, both are injured.

It is impossible for one code of laws to suit Georgia and Massachusetts.

They must, therefore, legislate for themselves. Yet there is, I believe,

not one point of legislation that is not surrendered in the proposed plan.

Questions of every kind respecting property are determinable in a

continental court, and so are all kinds of criminal causes. The

continental legislature has, therefore, a right to make rules in all cases

by which their judicial courts shall proceed and decide causes. No rights

are reserved to the citizens. The laws of Congress are in all cases to be

the supreme law of the land, and paramount to the constitutions of the

individual states. The Congress may institute what modes of trial they

please, and no plea drawn from the constitution of any state can avail.

This new system is, therefore, a consolidation of all the states into one

large mass, however diverse the parts may be of which it is to be

composed. The idea of an uncompounded republick, on an average one

thousand miles in length, and eight hundred in breadth, and containing six

millions of white inhabitants all reduced to the same standard of morals,

of habits, and of laws, is in itself an absurdity, and contrary to the

whole experience of mankind. The attempt made by Great Britain to

introduce such a system, struck us with horrour, and when it was proposed

by some theorist that we should be represented in parliament, we uniformly

declared that one legislature could not represent so many different

interests for the purposes of legislation and taxation. This was the

leading principle of the revolution, and makes an essential article in our

creed. All that part, therefore, of the new system, which relates to the

internal government of the states, ought at once to be rejected.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, V.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 390)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

In the course of inquiry it has appeared, that for the purposes of

internal regulation and domestick tranquillity, our small and separate

governments are not only admirably suited in theory, but have been

remarkably successful in practice. It is also found, that the direct

tendency of the proposed system, is to consolidate the whole empire into

one mass, and, like the tyrant’s bed, to reduce all to one standard.

Though this idea has been started in different parts of the continent, and

is the most important trait of this draft, the reasoning ought to be

extensively understood. I therefore hope to be indulged in a particular

statement of it.

Causes of all kinds, between citizens of different states, are to be tried

before a continental court. This court is not bound to try it according to

the local laws where the controversies happen; for in that case it may as

well be tried in a state court. The rule which is to govern the new

courts, must, therefore, be made by the court itself, or by its employers,

the Congress. If by the former, the legislative and judicial departments

will be blended; and if by the Congress, though these departments will be

kept separate, still the power of legislation departs from the state in

all those cases. The Congress, therefore, have the right to make rules for

trying all kinds of questions relating to property between citizens of

different states. The sixth article of the new constitution provides, that

the continental laws shall be the supreme law of the land, and that all

judges in the separate states shall be bound thereby, anything in the

constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding. All the

state officers are also bound by oath to support this constitution. These

provisions cannot be understood otherwise than as binding the state judges

and other officers, to execute the continental laws in their own proper

departments within the state. For all questions, other than those between

citizens of the same state, are at once put within the jurisdiction of the

continental courts. As no authority remains to the state judges, but to

decide questions between citizens of the same state, and those judges are

to be bound by the laws of Congress, it clearly follows, that all

questions between citizens of the same state are to be decided by the

general laws and not by the local ones.

Authority is also given to the continental courts, to try all causes

between a state and its own citizens. A question of property between these

parties rarely occurs. But if such questions were more frequent than they

are, the proper process is not to sue the state before an higher

authority; but to apply to the supreme authority of the state, by way of

petition. This is the universal practice of all states, and any other mode

of redress destroys the sovereignty of the state over its own subjects.

The only case of the kind in which the state would probably be sued, would

be upon the state notes. The endless confusion that would arise from

making the estates of individuals answerable, must be obvious to every

one.

There is another sense in which the clause relating to causes between the

state and individuals is to be understood, and it is more probable than

the other, as it will be eternal in its duration, and increasing in its

extent. This is the whole branch of the law relating to criminal

prosecutions. In all such cases, the state is plaintiff, and the person

accused is defendant. The process, therefore, will be, for the

attorney-general of the state to commence his suit before a continental

court. Considering the state as a party, the cause must be tried in

another, and all the expense of transporting witnesses incurred. The

individual is to take his trial among strangers, friendless and

unsupported, without its being known whether he is habitually a good or a

bad man; and consequently with one essential circumstance wanting by which

to determine whether the action was performed maliciously or accidentally.

All these inconveniences are avoided by the present important restriction,

that the cause shall be tried by a jury of the vicinity, and tried in the

county where the offence was committed. But by the proposed _derangement_,

I can call it by no softer name, a man must be ruined to prove his

innocence. This is far from being a forced construction of the proposed

form. The words appear to me not intelligible, upon the idea that it is to

be a _system_ of government, unless the construction now given, both for

civil and criminal processes, be admitted. I do not say that it is

intended that all these changes should take place within one year, but

they probably will in the course of half a dozen years, if this system is

adopted. In the meantime we shall be subject to all the horrors of a

divided sovereignty, not knowing whether to obey the Congress or the

State. We shall find it impossible to please two masters. In such a state

frequent broils will ensue. Advantage will be taken of a popular

commotion, and even the venerable forms of the state be done away, while

the new system will be enforced in its utmost rigour by an army.—I am the

more apprehensive of a standing army, on account of a clause in the new

constitution which empowers Congress to keep one at all times; but this

constitution is evidently such that it cannot stand any considerable time

without an army. Upon this principle one is very wisely provided. Our

present government knows of no such thing.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, VI.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 391)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

To prevent any mistakes, or misapprehensions of the argument, stated in my

last paper, to prove that the proposed constitution is an actual

consolidation of the separate states into one extensive commonwealth, the

reader is desired to observe, that in the course of the argument, the new

plan is considered as an entire system. It is not dependent on any other

book for an explanation, and contains no references to any other book. All

the defences of it, therefore, so far as they are drawn from the state

constitutions, or from maxims of the common law, are foreign to the

purpose. It is only by comparing the different parts of it together, that

the meaning of the whole is to be understood. For instance—

We find in it, that there is to be a legislative assembly, with authority

to constitute courts for the trial of all kinds of civil causes, between

citizens of different states. The right to appoint such courts necessarily

involves in it the right of defining their powers, and determining the

rules by which their judgment shall be regulated; and the grant of the

former of those rights is nugatory without the latter. It is vain to tell

us, that a maxim of common law requires contracts to be determined by the

law existing where the contract was made: for it is also a maxim, that the

legislature has a right to alter the common law. Such a power forms an

essential part of legislation. Here, then, a declaration of rights is of

inestimable value. It contains those principles which the government never

can invade without an open violation of the compact between them and the

citizens. Such a declaration ought to have come to the new constitution in

favour of the legislative rights of the several states, by which their

sovereignty over their own citizens within the state should be secured.

Without such an express declaration the states are annihilated in reality

upon receiving this constitution—the forms will be preserved only during

the pleasure of Congress.

The idea of consolidation is further kept up in the right given to

regulate trade. Though this power under certain limitations would be a

proper one for the department of Congress; it is in this system carried

much too far, and much farther than is necessary. This is, without

exception, the most commercial state upon the continent. Our extensive

coasts, cold climate, small estates, and equality of rights, with a

variety of subordinate and concurring circumstances, place us in this

respect at the head of the Union. We must, therefore, be indulged if a

point which so nearly relates to our welfare be rigidly examined. The new

constitution not only prohibits vessels, bound from one state to another,

from paying any duties, but even from entering and clearing. The only use

of such a regulation is, to keep each state in complete ignorance of its

own resources. It certainly is no hardship to enter and clear at the

custom house, and the expense is too small to be an object.

The unlimited right to regulate trade, includes the right of granting

exclusive charters. This, in all old countries, is considered as one

principal branch of prerogative. We find hardly a country in Europe which

has not felt the ill effects of such a power. Holland has carried the

exercise of it farther than any other state, and the reason why that

country has felt less evil from it is, that the territory is very small,

and they have drawn large revenues from their colonies in the East and

West Indies. In this respect, the whole country is to be considered as a

trading company, having exclusive privileges. The colonies are large in

proportion to the parent state; so that, upon the whole, the latter may

gain by such a system. We are also to take into consideration the industry

which the genius of a free government inspires. But in the British islands

all these circumstances together have not prevented them from being

injured by the monopolies created there. Individuals have been enriched,

but the country at large has been hurt. Some valuable branches of trade

being granted to companies, who transact their business in London, that

city is, perhaps, the place of the greatest trade in the world. But

Ireland, under such influence, suffers exceedingly, and is impoverished;

and Scotland is a mere bye-word. Bristol, the second city in England,

ranks not much above this town in population. These things must be

accounted for by the incorporation of trading companies; and if they are

felt so severely in countries of small extent, they will operate with

ten-fold severity upon us, who inhabit an immense tract; and living

towards one extreme of an extensive empire, shall feel the evil, without

retaining that influence in government, which may enable us to procure

redress. There ought, then, to have been inserted a restraining clause

which might prevent the Congress from making any such grant, because they

consequentially defeat the trade of the out-ports, and are also injurious

to the general commerce, by enhancing prices and destroying that rivalship

which is the great stimulus to industry.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, VII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 392)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 18, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

There cannot be a doubt, that, while the trade of this continent remains

free, the activity of our countrymen will secure their full share. All the

estimates for the present year, let them be made by what party they may,

suppose the balance of trade to be largely in our favour. The credit of

our merchants is, therefore, fully established in foreign countries. This

is a sufficient proof, that when business is unshackled, it will find out

that channel which is most friendly to its course. We ought, therefore, to

be exceedingly cautious about diverting or restraining it. Every day

produces fresh proofs, that people, under the immediate pressure of

difficulties, do not, at first glance, discover the proper relief. The

last year, a desire to get rid of embarrassments induced many honest

people to agree to a tender act, and many others, of a different

description, to obstruct the courts of justice. Both these methods only

increased the evil they were intended to cure. Experience has since shown

that, instead of trying to lessen an evil by altering the present course

of things, that every endeavor should have been applied to facilitate the

course of law, and thus to encourage a mutual confidence among the

citizens, which increases the resources of them all, and renders easy the

payment of debts. By this means one does not grow rich at the expense of

another, but all are benefited. The case is the same with the States.

Pennsylvania, with one port and a large territory, is less favourably

situated for trade than the Massachusetts, which has an extensive coast in

proportion to its limits of jurisdiction. Accordingly a much larger

proportion of our people are engaged in maritime affairs. We ought

therefore to be particularly attentive to securing so great an interest.

It is vain to tell us that we ought to overlook local interests. It is

only by protecting local concerns that the interest of the whole is

preserved. No man when he enters into society does it from a view to

promote the good of others, but he does it for his own good. All men

having the same view are bound equally to promote the welfare of the

whole. To recur then to such a principle as that local interests must be

disregarded, is requiring of one man to do more than another, and is

subverting the foundation of a free government. The Philadelphians would

be shocked with a proposition to place the seat of general government and

the unlimited right to regulate trade in the Massachusetts. There can be

no greater reason for our surrendering the preference to them. Such

sacrifices, however we may delude ourselves with the form of words, always

originate in folly, and not in generosity.

Let me now request your attention a little while to the actual state of

publick credit, that we may see whether it has not been as much

misrepresented as the state of our trade.

At the beginning of the present year, the whole continental debt was about

twelve millions of pounds in our money. About one-quarter part of this sum

was due to our foreign creditors. Of these France was the principal, and

called for the arrears of interest. A new loan of one hundred and twenty

thousand pounds was negotiated in Holland, at five per cent., to pay the

arrears due to France. At first sight this has the appearance of bad

economy, and has been used for the villainous purpose of disaffecting the

people. But in the course of this same year, Congress have negotiated the

sale of as much of their western lands on the Ohio and Mississippi, as

amount nearly to the whole sum of the foreign debt; and instead of a dead

loss by borrowing money at five per cent. to the amount of an hundred and

twenty thousand pounds in one sum, they make a saving of the interest at

six per cent. on three millions of their domestick debt, which is an

annual saving of an hundred and eighty thousand pounds. It is easy to see

how such an immense fund as the western territory may be applied to the

payment of the foreign debt. Purchasers of the land would as willingly

procure any kind of the produce of the United States as they would buy

loan office certificates to pay for the land. The produce thus procured

would easily be negotiated for the benefit of our foreign creditors. I do

not mean to insinuate that no other provision should be made for our

creditors, but only to shew that our credit is not so bad in other

countries as has been represented, and that our resources are fully equal

to the pressure.

The perfection of government depends on the equality of its operation, as

far as human affairs will admit, upon all parts of the empire, and upon

all the citizens. Some inequalities indeed will necessarily take place.

One man will be obliged to travel a few miles further than another man to

procure justice. But when he has travelled, the poor man ought to have the

same measure of justice as the rich one. Small enqualities [sic] may be

easily compensated. There ought, however, to be no inequality in the law

itself, and the government ought to have the same authority in one place

as in another. Evident as this truth is, the most plausible argument in

favour of the new plan is drawn from the inequality of its operation in

different states. In Connecticut, they have been told that the bulk of the

revenue will be raised by impost and excise, and, therefore, they need not

be afraid to trust Congress with the power of levying a dry tax at

pleasure. New York and Massachusetts are both more commercial states than

Connecticut. The latter, therefore, hopes that the other two will pay the

bulk of the continental expense. The argument is, in itself, delusive. If

the trade is not over-taxed, the consumer pays it. If the trade is

over-taxed, it languishes, and by the ruin of trade the farmer loses his

market. The farmer has, in truth, no other advantage from imposts than

that they save him the trouble of collecting money for the government. He

neither gets nor loses money by changing the mode of taxation. The

government indeed finds it the easiest way to raise the revenue; and the

reason is that the tax is by this means collected where the money

circulates most freely. But if the argument was not delusive, it ought to

conclude against the plan, because it would prove the unequal operation of

it; and if any saving is to be made by the mode of taxing, the saving

should be applied towards our own debt, and not to the payment of that

part of the continental burden which Connecticut ought to discharge. It

would be impossible to refute in writing all the delusions made use of to

force this system through. Those respecting the publick debt, and the

benefit of imposts, are the most important, and these I have taken pains

to explain. In one instance, indeed, the impost does raise money at the

direct expense of the seaports. This is when goods are imported subject to

a duty, and re-exported without a drawback. Whatever benefit is derived

from this source, surely should not be transferred to another state, at

least till our own debts are cleared.

Another instance of unequal operation is, that it establishes different

degrees of authority in different states, and thus creates different

interests. The lands in New Hampshire having been formerly granted by this

state, and afterwards by that state, to private persons, the whole

authority of trying titles becomes vested in a continental court, and that

state loses a branch of authority, which the others retain, over their own

citizens.

I have now gone through two parts of my argument, and have proved the

efficiency of the state governments for internal regulation, and the

disadvantages of the new system, at least some of the principal. The

argument has been much longer than I at first apprehended, or possibly I

should have been deterred from it. The importance of the question has,

however, prevented me from relinquishing it.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, VIII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 394)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 25, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

It has been proved, by indisputable evidence, that power is not the grand

principle of union among the parts of a very extensive empire; and that

when this principle is pushed beyond the degree necessary for rendering

justice between man and man, it debases the character of individuals, and

renders them less secure in their persons and property. Civil liberty

consists in the consciousness of that security, and is best guarded by

political liberty, which is the share that every citizen has in the

government. Accordingly all our accounts agree, that in those empires

which are commonly called despotick, and which comprehend by far the

greatest part of the world, the government is most fluctuating, and

property least secure. In those countries insults are borne by the

sovereign, which, if offered to one of our governours, would fill us with

horrour, and we should think the government dissolving.

The common conclusion from this reasoning is an exceedingly unfair one,

that we must then separate, and form distinct confederacies. This would be

true if there was no principle to substitute in the room of power.

Fortunately there is one. This is commerce. All the states have local

advantages, and in a considerable degree separate interests. They are,

therefore, in a situation to supply each other’s wants. Carolina, for

instance, is inhabited by planters, while the Massachusetts is more

engaged in commerce and manufactures. Congress has the power of deciding

their differences. The most friendly intercourse may therefore be

established between them. A diversity of produce, wants and interests,

produces commerce; and commerce, where there is a common, equal and

moderate authority to preside, produces friendship.

The same principles apply to the connection with the new settlers in the

west. Many supplies they want for which they must look to the older

settlements, and the greatness of their crops enables them to make

payments. Here, then, we have a bond of union which applies to all parts

of the empire, and would continue to operate if the empire comprehended

all America.

We are now, in the strictest sense of the terms, a federal republick. Each

part has within its own limits the sovereignty over its citizens, while

some of the general concerns are committed to Congress. The complaints of

the deficiency of the Congressional powers are confined to two articles.

They are not able to raise a revenue by taxation, and they have not a

complete regulation of the intercourse between us and foreigners. For each

of these complaints there is some foundation, but not enough to justify

the clamour which has been raised. Congress, it is true, owes a debt which

ought to be paid. A considerable part of it has been paid. Our share of

what remains would annually amount to about sixty or seventy thousand

pounds. If, therefore, Congress were put in possession of such branches of

the impost as would raise this sum in our state, we should fairly be

considered as having done our part towards their debt; and our remaining

resources, whether arising from impost, excise, or dry tax, might be

applied to the reduction of our own debt. The principal of this last

amounts to about thirteen hundred thousand pounds, and the interest to

between seventy or eighty thousand. This is, surely, too much property to

be sacrificed; and it is as reasonable that it should be paid as the

continental debt. But if the new system should be adopted, the whole

impost, with an unlimited claim to excise and dry tax, will be given to

Congress. There will remain no adequate found for the state debt, and the

state will still be subject to be sued on their notes. This is, then, an

article which ought to be limited. We can, without difficulty, pay as much

annually as shall clear the interest of our state debt, and our share of

the interest on the continental one. But if we surrender the impost, we

shall still, by this new constitution, be held to pay our full proportion

of the remaining debt, as if nothing had been done. The impost will not be

considered as being paid by this state, but by the continent. The

federalists, indeed, tell us that the state debts will all be incorporated

with the continental debt, and all paid out of one fund. In this as in all

other instances, they endeavour to support their scheme of consolidation

by delusion. Not one word is said in the book in favour of such a scheme,

and there is no reason to think it true. Assurances of that sort are

easily given, and as easily forgotten. There is an interest in forgetting

what is false. No man can expect town debts to be united with that of the

state; and there will be as little reason to expect that the state and

continental debts will be united together.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, IX.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 395)

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

We come now to the second and last article of complaint against the

present confederation, which is, that Congress has not the sole power to

regulate the intercourse between us and foreigners. Such a power extends

not only to war and peace, but to trade and naturalization. This last

article ought never to be given them; for though most of the states may be

willing for certain reasons to receive foreigners as citizens, yet reasons

of equal weight may induce other states, differently circumstanced, to

keep their blood pure. Pennsylvania has chosen to receive all that would

come there. Let any indifferent person judge whether that state in point

of morals, education, energy is equal to any of the eastern states; the

small state of Rhode Island only excepted. Pennsylvania in the course of a

century has acquired her present extent and population at the expense of

religion and good morals. The eastern states have, by keeping separate

from the foreign mixtures, acquired their present greatness in the course

of a century and an half, and have preserved their religion and morals.

They have also preserved that manly virtue which is equally fitted for

rendering them respectable in war, and industrious in peace.

The remaining power for peace and trade might perhaps be safely enough

lodged with Congress under some limitations. Three restrictions appear to

me to be essentially necessary to preserve that equality of rights to the

states, which it is the object of the state governments to secure to each

citizen. 1st. It ought not to be in the power of Congress, either by

treaty or otherwise, to alienate part of any state without the consent of

the legislature. 2d. They ought not to be able, by treaty or other law, to

give any legal preference to one part above another. 3d. They ought to be

restrained from creating any monopolies. Perhaps others may propose

different regulations and restrictions. One of these is to be found in the

old confederation, and another in the newly proposed plan. The third

scenes [sic] to be equally necessary.

After all that has been said and written on this subject, and on the

difficulty of amending our old constitution so as to render it adequate to

national purposes, it does not appear that any thing more was necessary to

be done, than framing two new articles. By one a limited revenue would be

given to Congress with a right to collect it, and by the other a limited

right to regulate our intercourse with foreign nations. By such an

addition we should have preserved to each state its power to defend the

rights of the citizens, and the whole empire would be capable of expanding

and receiving additions without altering its former constitution.

Congress, at the same time, by the extent of their jurisdiction, and the

number of their officers, would have acquired more respectability at home,

and a sufficient influence abroad. If any state was in such a case to

invade the rights of the Union, the other states would join in defence of

those rights, and it would be in the power of Congress to direct the

national force to that object. But it is certain that the powers of

Congress over the citizens should be small in proportion as the empire is

extended; that, in order to preserve the balance, each state may supply by

energy what is wanting in numbers. Congress would be able by such a system

as we have proposed to regulate trade with foreigners by such duties as

should effectually give the preference to the produce and manufactures of

our own country. We should then have a friendly intercourse established

between the states, upon the principles of mutual interest. A moderate

duty upon foreign vessels would give an advantage to our own people, while

it would avoid all the disadvantages arising from a prohibition, and the

consequent deficiency of vessels to transport the produce of the southern

states.

Our country is at present upon an average a thousand miles long from north

to south, and eight hundred broad from the Mississippi to the Ocean. We

have at least six millions of white inhabitants, and the annual increase

is about two hundred and fifty thousand souls, exclusive of emigrants from

Europe. The greater part of our increase is employed in settling the new

lands, while the older settlements are entering largely into manufactures

of various kinds. It is probable that the extraordinary exertions of this

state in the way of industry for the present year only, exceed in value

five hundred thousand pounds. The new settlements, if all made in the same

tract of country, would form a large state annually; and the time seems to

be literally accomplished when a nation shall be born in a day. Such an

immense country is not only capable of yielding all the produce of Europe,

but actually does produce by far the greater part of the raw materials.

The restrictions on our trade in Europe, necessarily oblige us to make use

of those materials, and the high price of labour operates as an

encouragement to mechanical improvements. In this way we daily make rapid

advancements towards independence in resources as well as in empire. If we

adopt the new system of government we shall, by one rash vote, lose the

fruit of the toil and expense of thirteen years, at the time when the

benefits of that toil and expense are rapidly increasing. Though the

imposts of Congress on foreign trade may tend to encourage manufactures,

the excise and dry tax will destroy all the beneficial effects of the

impost, at the same time that they diminish our capital. Be careful then

to give only a limited revenue, and the limited power of managing foreign

concerns. Once surrender the rights of internal legislation and taxation,

and instead of being respected abroad, foreigners will laugh at us, and

posterity will lament our folly.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, X.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 396)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 1, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

_Friends and Brethren_,

It is a duty incumbent on every man, who has had opportunities for

inquiry, to lay the result of his researches on any matter of publick

importance before the publick eye. No further apology will be necessary

with the generality of my readers, for having so often appeared before

them on the subject of the lately proposed form of government. It has been

treated with that freedom which is necessary for the investigation of

truth, and with no greater freedom. On such a subject, extensive in its

nature, and important in its consequences, the examination has necessarily

been long, and the topicks treated of have been various. We have been

obliged to take a cursory, but not inaccurate view of the circumstances of

mankind under the different forms of government to support the different

parts of our argument. Permit me now to bring into one view the principal

propositions on which the reasoning depends.

It is shewn from the example of the most commercial republick of

antiquity, which was never disturbed by a sedition for above seven hundred

years, and at last yielded after a violent struggle to a foreign enemy, as

well as from the experience of our own country for a century and an half,

that the republican, more than any other form of government is made of

durable materials. It is shewn from a variety of proof, that one

consolidated government is inapplicable to a great extent of country; is

unfriendly to the rights both of persons and property, which rights always

adhere together; and that being contrary to the interest of the extreme of

an empire, such a government can be supported only by power, and that

commerce is the true bond of union for a free state. It is shewn from a

comparison of the different parts of the proposed plan, that it is such a

consolidated government.

By article 3, section 2, Congress are empowered to appoint courts with

authority to try civil causes of every kind, and even offences against

particular states. By the last clause of Article 1, section 8, which

defines their legislative powers, they are authorised to make laws for

carrying into execution all the “powers vested by this constitution in the

government of the United States, or in _any department_ or officer

thereof;” and by article 6, the judges in every state are to be bound by

the laws of Congress. It is therefore a complete consolidation of all the

states into one, however diverse the parts of it may be. It is also shewn

that it will operate unequally in the different states, taking from some

of them a greater share of wealth; that in this last respect it will

operate more to the injury of this commonwealth than of any state in the

union; and that by reason of its inequality it is subversive of the

principles of a free government, which requires every part to contribute

an equal proportion. For all these reasons this system ought to be

rejected, even if no better plan was proposed in the room of it. In case

of a rejection we must remain as we are, with trade extending, resources

opening, settlements enlarging, manufactures increasing, and publick debts

diminishing by fair payment. These are mighty blessings, and not to be

lost by the hasty adoption of a new system. But great as these benefits

are, which we derive from our present system, it has been shewn, that they

may be increased by giving Congress a limited power to regulate trade, and

assigning to them those branches of the impost on our foreign trade only,

which shall be equal to our proportion of their present annual demands.

While the interest is thus provided for, the sale of our lands in a very

few years will pay the principal, and the other resources of the state

will pay our own debt. The present mode of assessing the continental tax

is regulated by the extent of landed property in each state. By this rule

the Massachusetts [sic] has to pay one eighth. If we adopt the new system,

we shall surrender the whole of our impost and excise, which probably

amount to a third of those duties of the whole continent, and must come in

for about a sixth part of the remaining debt. By this means we shall be

deprived of the benefit arising from the largeness of our loans to the

continent, shall lose our ability to satisfy the just demands on the

state. Under the limitations of revenue and commercial regulation

contained in these papers, the balance will be largely in our favour; the

importance of the great states will be preserved, and the publick

creditors both of the continent and state will be satisfied without

burdening the people. For a more concise view of my proposal, I have

thrown it into the form of a resolve, supposed to be passed by the

convention which is shortly to set in this town.

“Commonwealth of Massachusetts. _Resolved_, That the form of government

lately proposed by a federal convention, held in the city of Philadelphia,

is so far injurious to the interests of this commonwealth, that we are

constrained by fidelity to our constituents to reject it; and we do hereby

reject the said proposed form and every part thereof. But in order that

the union of these states may, as far as possible, be promoted, and the

federal business as little obstructed as may be, we do agree on the part

of this commonwealth, that the following addition be made to the present

articles of confederation:

“XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate the intercourse

between these states and foreign dominions, under the following

restrictions; viz.: 1st. No treaty, ordinance, or law shall alienate the

whole or part of any state, without the consent of the legislature of such

state. 2d. The United States shall not by treaty or otherwise give a

preference to the ports of one state over those of another; nor, 3d,

create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor, 4th, extend the

privileges of citizenship to any foreigner. And for the more convenient

exercise of the powers hereby and by the former articles given, the United

States shall have authority to constitute judicatories, whether supreme or

subordinate, with power to try all piracies and felonies done on the high

seas, and also all civil causes in which a foreign state, or subject

thereof, actually resident in a foreign country and not being British

absentees, shall be one of the parties. They shall also have authority to

try all causes in which ambassadors shall be concerned. All these trials

shall be by jury and in some sea-port town. All imposts levied by Congress

on trade shall be confined to foreign produce or foreign manufactures

imported, and to foreign ships trading in our harbours, and all their

absolute prohibitions shall be confined to the same articles. All imposts

and confiscations shall be to the use of the state in which they shall

accrue, excepting in such branches as shall be assigned by any state as a

fund for defraying their proportion of the continental. And no powers

shall be exercised by Congress but such as are expressly given by this and

the former articles. And we hereby authorize our delegates in Congress to

sign and ratify an article in the foregoing form and words, without any

further act of this state for that purpose, provided the other states

shall accede to this proposition on their part on or before the first day

of January, which will be in the year of our Lord 1790. All matters of

revenue being under the controul of the legislature, we recommend to the

general court of this commonwealth, to devise, as early as may be, such

funds arising from such branches of foreign commerce, as shall be equal to

our part of the current charges of the continent, and to put Congress in

possession of the revenue arising therefrom, with a right to collect it,

during such term as shall appear to be necessary for the payment of the

principal of their debt, by the sale of the western lands.”(23)

By such an explicit declaration of the powers given to Congress, we shall

provide for all federal purposes, and shall at the same time secure our

rights. It is easier to amend the old confederation, defective as it has

been represented, than it is to correct the new form. For with whatever

view it was framed, truth constrains me to say, that it is insidious in

its form, and ruinous in its tendency. Under the pretence of different

branches of the legislature, the members will in fact be chosen from the

same general description of citizens. The advantages of a check will be

lost, while we shall be continually exposed to the cabals and corruption

of a British election. There cannot be a more eligible mode than the

present, for appointing members of Congress, nor more effectual checks

provided than our separate state governments, nor any system so little

expensive, in case of our adopting the resolve just stated, or even

continuing as we are. We shall in that case avoid all the inconvenience of

concurrent jurisdictions, we shall avoid the expensive and useless

establishments of the Philadelphia proposition, we shall preserve our

constitution and liberty, and we shall provide for all such institutions

as will be useful. Surely then you cannot hesitate, whether you will chuse

freedom or servitude. The object is now well defined. By adopting the form

proposed by the convention, you will have the derision of foreigners,

internal misery, and the anathemas of posterity. By amending the present

confederation, and granting limited powers to Congress, you secure the

admiration of strangers, internal happiness, and the blessings and

prosperity of all succeeding generations. Be wise, then, and by preserving

your freedom, prove, that Heaven bestowed it not in vain. Many will be the

efforts to delude the convention. The mode of judging is itself

suspicious, as being contrary to the antient and established usage of the

commonwealth. But since the mode is adopted, we trust, that the members of

that venerable assembly will not so much regard the greatness of their

power, as the sense and interest of their constituents. And they will do

well to remember that even a mistake in adopting it, will be destructive,

while no evils can arise from a total, and much less, probably, from such

a partial rejection as we have proposed.

I have now gone through my reasonings on this momentous subject, and have

stated the facts and deductions from them, which you will verify for

yourselves. Personal interest was not my object, or I should have pursued

a different line of conduct. Though I conceived that a man who owes

allegiance to the state is bound, on all important occasions, to propose

such inquiries as tend to promote the publick good; yet I did not imagine

it to be any part of my duty to present myself to the fury of those who

appear to have other ends in view. For this cause, and for this only, I

have chosen a feigned signature. At present all the reports concerning the

writer of these papers are merely conjectural. I should have been ashamed

of my system if it had needed such feeble support as the character of

individuals. It stands on the firm ground of the experience of mankind. I

cannot conclude this long disquisition better than with a caution derived

from the words of inspiration—_Discern the things of your peace now in the

days thereof, before they be hidden from your eyes_.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XI.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 398)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE PEOPLE.

My last address contained the outlines of a system fully adequate to all

the useful purposes of the union. Its object is to raise a sufficient

revenue from the foreign trade, and the sale of our publick lands, to

satisfy all the publick exigencies, and to encourage, at the same time,

our internal industry and manufactures. It also secures each state in its

own separate rights, while the continental concerns are thrown into the

general department. The only deficiencies that I have been able to

discover in the plan, and in the view of federalists they are very great

ones, are, that it does not allow the interference of Congress in the

domestick concerns of the state, and that it does not render our national

councils so liable to foreign influence. The first of these articles tends

to guard us from that infinite multiplication of officers which the report

of the Convention of Philadelphia proposes. With regard to the second, it

is evidently not of much importance to any foreign nation to purchase, at

a very high price, a majority of votes in an assembly, whose members are

continually exposed to a recall. But give those members a right to sit

six, or even two years, with such extensive powers as the new system

proposes, and their friendship will be well worth a purchase. This is the

only sense in which the Philadelphia system will render us more

respectable in the eyes of foreigners. In every other view they lose their

respect for us, as it will render us more like their own degraded models.

It is a maxim with them, that every man has his price. If, therefore, we

were to judge of what passes in the hearts of the federalists when they

urge us, as they continually do, _to be like other nations_, and when they

assign mercenary motives to the opposers of their plan, we should conclude

very fairly they themselves wish to be provided for at the publick

expense. However that may be, if we look upon the men we shall find some

of their leaders to have formed pretty strong attachments to foreign

nations. Whether those attachments arose from their being educated under a

royal government, from a former unfortunate mistake in politicks, or from

the agencies for foreigners, or any other cause, is not in my province to

determine. But certain it is that some of the principal fomenters of this

plan have never shown themselves capable of that generous system of policy

which is founded in the affections of freemen. Power and high life are

their idols, and national funds are necessary to support them.

Some of the principal powers of Europe have already entered into treaties

with us, and that some of the rest have not done it, is not owing, as is

falsely pretended, to the want of power in Congress. Holland never found

any difficulty of this kind from the multitude of sovereignties in that

country, which must all be consulted on such an occasion. The resentment

of Great Britain for our victories in the late war has induced that power

to restrain our intercourse with their subjects. Probably an hope, the

only solace of the wretched, that their affairs would take a more

favourable turn on this continent, has had some influence on their

proceedings. All their restrictions have answered the end of securing our

independence, by driving us into many valuable manufactures. Their own

colonies in the mean time have languished for want of an intercourse with

these states. The new settlement in Nova Scotia has miserably decayed, and

the West India Islands have suffered for want of our supplies, and by the

loss of our market. This has affected the revenue; and, however

contemptuously some men may affect to speak of our trade, the supply of

six millions of people is an object worth the attention of any nation upon

earth. Interest in such a nation as Britain will surmount their

resentment. However their pride may be stung, they will pursue after

wealth. Increase of revenue to a nation overwhelmed with a debt of near

_two hundred and ninety millions_ sterling is an object to which little

piques must give way; and there is no doubt that their interest consists

in securing as much of our trade as they can.

These are the topicks from which are drawn some of the most plausible

reasons that have been given by the federalists in favour of their plan,

as derived from the sentiments of foreigners. We have weighed them and

found them wanting. That they had not themselves full confidence in their

own reasons at Philadelphia is evident from the method they took to bias

the State Convention. Messrs. Wilson and M’Kean, two Scottish names, were

repeatedly worsted in the argument. To make amends for their own

incapacity, the gallery was filled with a rabble,(24) who shouted their

applause, and these heroes of aristocracy were not ashamed, though modesty

is their national virtue, to vindicate such a violation of decency. Means

not less criminal, but not so flagrantly indecent, have been frequently

mentioned among us to secure a majority. But those who vote for a price

can never sanctify wrong, and treason will still retain its deformity.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 399)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 11, 1788.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

Suffer an individual to lay before you his contemplations on the great

subject that now engages your attention. To you it belongs, and may Heaven

direct your judgment to decide on the happiness of all future generations,

as well as the present.

It is universally agreed that the object of every just government is to

render the people happy, by securing their persons and possessions from

wrong. To this end it is necessary that there should be local laws and

institutions; for a people inhabiting various climates will unavoidably

have local habits and different modes of life, and these must be consulted

in making the laws. It is much easier to adapt the laws to the manners of

the people, than to make manners conform to laws. The idle and dissolute

inhabitants of the south require a different regimen from the sober and

active people of the north. Hence, among other reasons, is derived the

necessity of local governments, who may enact, repeal, or alter

regulations as the circumstances of each part of the empire may require.

This would be the case, even if a very great state was to be settled at

once. But it becomes still more needful when the local manners are formed,

and usages sanctified, by the practice of a century and a half. In such a

case, to attempt to reduce all to one standard is absurd in itself and

cannot be done but upon the principle of power, which debases the people

and renders them unhappy till all dignity of character is put away. Many

circumstances render us an essentially different people from the

inhabitants of the southern states. The unequal distribution of property,

the toleration of slavery, the ignorance and poverty of the lower classes,

the softness of the climate and dissoluteness of manners, mark their

character. Among us, the care that is taken of education, small and nearly

equal estates, equality of rights, and the severity of the climate,

renders the people active, industrious and sober. Attention to religion

and good morals is a distinguishing trait in our character. It is plain,

therefore, that we require for our regulation laws which will not suit the

circumstances of our southern brethren, and that laws made for them would

not apply to us. Unhappiness would be the uniform product of such laws;

for no state can be happy when the laws contradict the general habits of

the people, nor can any state retain its freedom while there is a power to

make and enforce such laws. We may go further, and say, that it is

impossible for any single legislature so fully to comprehend the

circumstances of the different parts of a very extensive dominion as to

make laws adapted to those circumstances.

Hence arises in most nations of extensive territory, the necessity of

armies, to cure the defect of the laws. It is actually under the pressure

of such an absurd government, that the Spanish provinces have groaned for

near three centuries; and such will be our misfortune and degradation, if

we ever submit to have all the business of the empire done by one

legislature. The contrary principle of local legislation by the

representatives of the people, who alone are to be governed by the laws,

has raised us to our present greatness; and an attempt on the part of

Great Britain to invade this right, brought on the revolution, which gave

us a separate rank among the nations. We even declared, that we would not

be represented in the national legislature, because one assembly was not

adequate to the purposes of internal legislation and taxation.

AGRIPPA.

[_Remainder next Tuesday._]

Agrippa, XIII.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 400)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1788.

(_Concluded from our last._)

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

The question then arises, what is the kind of government best adapted to

the object of securing our persons and possessions from violence? I

answer, a _Federal Republick_. By this kind of government each state

reserves to itself the right of making and altering its laws for internal

regulation, and the right of executing those laws without any external

restraint, while the general concerns of the empire are committed to an

assembly of delegates, each accountable to his own constituents. This is

the happy form under which we live, and which seems to mark us out as a

people chosen of God. No instance can be produced of any other kind of

government so stable and energetick as the republican. The objection drawn

from the Greek and Roman states does not apply to the question.

Republicanism appears there in its most disadvantageous form. Arts and

domestic employments were generally committed to slaves, while war was

almost the only business worthy of a citizen. Hence arose their internal

dissensions. Still they exhibited proofs of legislative wisdom and

judicial integrity hardly to be found among their monarchick neighbors. On

the other hand we find Carthage cultivating commerce, and extending her

dominions for the long space of seven centuries, during which term the

internal tranquillity was never disturbed by her citizens. Her national

power was so respectable, that for a long time it was doubtful whether

Carthage or Rome should rule. In the form of their government they bore a

strong resemblance to each other. Rome might be reckoned a free state for

about four hundred and fifty years. We have then the true line of

distinction between those two nations, and a strong proof of the hardy

materials which compose a republican government. If there was no other

proof, we might with impartial judges risk the issue upon this alone. But

our proof rests not here. The present state of Europe, and the vigour and

tranquillity of our own governments, after experiencing this form for a

century and an half, are decided proofs in favour of those governments

which encourage commerce. A comparison of our own country, first with

Europe and then with the other parts of the world, will prove, beyond a

doubt, that the greatest share of freedom is enjoyed by the citizens, so

much more does commerce flourish. The reason is, that every citizen has an

influence in making the laws, and thus they are conformed to the general

interests of the state; but in every other kind of government they are

frequently made in favour of a part of the community at the expense of the

rest.

The argument against republicks, as it is derived from the Greek and Roman

states, is unfair. It goes on the idea that no other government is subject

to be disturbed. As well might we conclude, that a limited monarchy is

unstable, because that under the feudal system the nobles frequently made

war upon their king, and disturbed the publick peace. We find, however, in

practice, that limited monarchy is more friendly to commerce, because more

friendly to the rights of the subject, than an absolute government; and

that it is more liable to be disturbed than a republick, because less

friendly to trade and the rights of individuals. There cannot, from the

history of mankind, be produced an instance of rapid growth in extent, in

numbers, in arts, and in trade, that will bear any comparison with our

country. This is owing to what the friends of the new system, and the

enemies of the revolution, for I take them to be nearly the same, would

term _our extreme liberty_. Already, have our ships visited every part of

the world, and brought us their commodities in greater perfection, and at

a more moderate price, than we ever before experienced. The ships of other

nations crowd to our ports, seeking an intercourse with us. All the

estimates of every party make the balance of trade for the present year to

be largely in our favour. Already have some very useful, and some elegant

manufactures got established among us, so that our country every day is

becoming independent in her resources. Two-thirds of the continental debt

has been paid since the war, and we are in alliance with some of the most

respectable powers of Europe. The western lands, won from Britain by the

sword, are an ample fund for the principal of all our public debts; and

every new sale excites that manly pride which is essential to national

virtue. All this happiness arises from the freedom of our institutions and

the limited nature of our government; a government that is respected from

principles of affection, and obeyed with alacrity. The sovereigns of the

old world are frequently, though surrounded with armies, treated with

insult; and the despotick monarchies of the east, are the most

fluctuating, oppressive and uncertain governments of any form hitherto

invented. These considerations are sufficient to establish the excellence

of our own form, and the goodness of our prospects.

Let us now consider the probable effects of a consolidation of the

separate states into one mass; for the new system extends so far. Many

ingenious explanations have been given of it; but there is this defect,

that they are drawn from maxims of the common law, while the system itself

cannot be bound by any such maxims. A legislative assembly has an inherent

right to alter the common law, and to abolish any of its principles, which

are not particularly guarded in the constitution. Any system therefore

which appoints a legislature, without any reservation of the rights of

individuals, surrenders all power in every branch of legislation to the

government. The universal practice of every government proves the justness

of this remark; for in every doubtful case it is an established rule to

decide in favour of authority. The new system is, therefore, in one

respect at least, essentially inferior to our state constitutions. There

is no bill of rights, and consequently a continental law may controul any

of those principles, which we consider at present as sacred; while not one

of those points, in which it is said that the separate governments

misapply their power, is guarded. Tender acts and the coinage of money

stand on the same footing of a consolidation of power. It is a mere

fallacy, invented by the deceptive powers of Mr. Wilson, that what rights

are not given are reserved. The contrary has already been shewn. But to

put this matter of legislation out of all doubt, let us compare together

some parts of the book; for being an independent system, this is the only

way to ascertain its meaning.

In article III, section 2, it is declared, that “the judicial power shall

extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the

laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be made under

their authority.” Among the cases arising under this new constitution are

reckoned, “all controversies between citizens of different states,” which

include all kinds of civil causes between those parties. The giving

Congress a power to appoint courts for such a purpose is as much, there

being no stipulation to the contrary, giving them power to legislate for

such causes, as giving them a right to raise an army, is giving them a

right to direct the operations of the army when raised. But it is not left

to implication. The last clause of article I, section 8, expressly gives

them power “to make all laws which shall be needful and proper for

carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested

by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any

department or officer thereof.” It is, therefore, as plain as words can

make it, that they have a right by this proposed form to legislate for all

kinds of causes respecting property between citizens of different states.

That this power extends to all cases between citizens of the same state,

is evident from the sixth article, which declares all continental laws and

treaties to be the _supreme law_ of the land, and that all state judges

are bound thereby, “_anything in the constitution or laws of any state to

the contrary notwithstanding_.” If this is not binding the judges of the

separate states in their own office, by continental rules, it is perfect

nonsense.

There is then a complete consolidation of the legislative powers in all

cases respecting property. This power extends to all cases between a state

and citizens of another state. Hence a citizen, possessed of the notes of

another state, may bring his action, and there is no limitation that the

execution shall be levied on the publick property of the state; but the

property of individuals is liable. This is a foundation for endless

confusion and discord. This right to try causes between a state and

citizens of another state, involves in it all criminal causes; and a man

who has accidentally transgressed the laws of another state, must be

transported, with all his witnesses, to a third state, to be tried. He

must be ruined to prove his innocence. These are necessary parts of the

new system, and it will never be complete till they are reduced to

practice. They effectually prove a consolidation of the states, and we

have before shewn the ruinous tendency of such a measure.

By sect. 8 of article I, Congress are to have the unlimited right to

regulate commerce, external and _internal_, and may therefore create

monopolies which have been universally injurious to all the subjects of

the countries that have adopted them, excepting the monopolists

themselves. They have also the unlimited right to imposts and all kinds of

taxes, as well to levy as to collect them. They have indeed very nearly

the same powers claimed formerly by the British parliament. Can we have so

soon forgot our glorious struggle with that power, as to think a moment of

surrendering it now? It makes no difference in principle whether the

national assembly was elected for seven years or for six. In both cases we

should vote to great disadvantage, and therefore ought never to agree to

such an article. Let us make provision for the payment of the interest of

our part of the debt, and we shall be fairly acquitted. Let the fund be an

impost on our foreign trade, and we shall encourage our manufactures. But

if we surrender the unlimited right to regulate trade, and levy taxes,

imposts will oppress our foreign trade for the benefit of other states,

while excises and taxes will discourage our internal industry. The right

to regulate trade, without any limitations, will, as certainly as it is

granted, transfer the trade of this state to Pennsylvania. That will be

the seat of business and of wealth, while the extremes of the empire will,

like Ireland and Scotland, be drained to fatten an overgrown capital.

Under our present equal advantages, the citizens of this state come in for

their full share of commercial profits. Surrender the rights of taxation

and commercial regulation, and the landed states at the southward will all

be interested in draining our resources; for whatever can be got by impost

on our trade and excises on our manufactures, will be considered as so

much saved to a state inhabited by planters. All savings of this sort

ought surely to be made in favour of our own state; and we ought never to

surrender the unlimited powers of revenue and trade to uncommercial

people. If we do, the glory of the state from that moment departs, never

to return.

The safety of our constitutional rights consists in having the business of

governments lodged in different departments, and in having each part well

defined. By this means each branch is kept within the constitutional

limits. Never was a fairer line of distinction than what may be easily

drawn between the continental and state governments. The latter provide

for all cases, whether civil or criminal, that can happen ashore, because

all such causes must arise within the limits of some state. Transactions

between citizens may all be fairly included in this idea, even although

they should arise in passing by water from one state to another. But the

intercourse between us and foreign nations properly forms the department

of Congress. They should have the power of regulating trade under such

limitations as should render their laws equal. They should have the right

of war and peace, saving the equality of rights, and the territory of each

state. But the power of naturalization and internal regulation should not

be given them. To give my scheme a more systematick appearance, I have

thrown it into the form of a resolve, which is submitted to your wisdom

for amendment, but not as being perfect.

“Resolved, that the form of government proposed by the federal convention,

lately held in Philadelphia, be rejected on the part of this commonwealth;

and that our delegates in Congress are hereby authorised to propose on the

part of this commonwealth, and, if the other states for themselves agree

thereto, to sign an article of confederation, as an addition to the

present articles, in the form following, provided such agreement be made

on or before the first day of January, which will be in the year of our

Lord 1790; the said article shall have the same force and effect as if it

had been inserted in the original confederation, and is to be construed

consistently with the clause in the former articles, which restrains the

United States from exercising such powers as are not expressly given.

“XIV. The United States shall have power to regulate, whether by treaty,

ordinance or law, the intercourse between these states and foreign

dominions and countries, under the following restrictions. No treaty,

ordinance, or law shall give a preference to the ports of one state over

those of another; nor 2d. impair the territory or internal authority of

any state; nor 3d. create any monopolies or exclusive companies; nor 4th.

naturalize any foreigners. All their imposts and prohibitions shall be

confined to foreign produce and manufactures imported, and to foreign

ships trading in our harbours. All imposts and confiscations shall be to

the use of the state where they shall accrue, excepting only such branches

of impost as shall be assigned by the separate states to Congress for a

fund to defray the interest of their debt, and their current charges. In

order the more effectually to execute this and the former articles,

Congress shall have authority to appoint courts, supreme and subordinate,

with power to try all crimes, not relating to state securities, between

any foreign state, or subject of such state, actually residing in a

foreign country, and not being an absentee or person who has alienated

himself from these states on the one part, and any of the United States or

citizens thereof on the other part; also all causes in which foreign

ambassadours or other foreign ministers resident here shall be immediately

concerned, respecting the jurisdiction or immunities only. And the

Congress shall have authority to execute the judgment of such courts by

their own affairs. Piracies and felonies committed on the high seas shall

also belong to the department of Congress for them to define, try, and

punish, in the same manner as the other causes shall be defined, tried,

and determined. All the before-mentioned causes shall be tried by jury and

in some sea-port town. And it is recommended to the general court at their

next meeting to provide and put Congress in possession of funds arising

from foreign imports and ships sufficient to defray our share of the

present annual expenses of the continent.”(25)

Such a resolve, explicitly limiting the powers granted, is the farthest we

can proceed with safety. The scheme of accepting the report of the

Convention, and amending it afterwards, is merely delusive. There is no

intention among those who make the proposition to amend it at all.

Besides, if they have influence enough to get it accepted in its present

form, there is no probability that they will consent to an alteration when

possessed of an unlimited revenue. It is an excellence in our present

confederation, that it is extremely difficult to alter it. An unanimous

vote of the states is required. But this newly proposed form is founded in

injustice, as it proposes that a fictitious consent of only nine states

shall be sufficient to establish it. Nobody can suppose that the consent

of a state is any thing more than a fiction, in the view of the

federalists, after the mobbish influence used over the Pennsylvania

convention. The two great leaders of the plan, with a modesty of Scotsmen,

placed a rabble in the gallery to applaud their speeches, and thus

supplied their want of capacity in the argument. Repeatedly were Wilson

and M’Kean worsted in the argument by the plain good sense of Findly and

Smilie. But reasoning or knowledge had little to do with the federal

party. Votes were all they wanted, by whatever means obtained. Means not

less criminal have been mentioned among us. But votes that are bought can

never justify a treasonable conspiracy. Better, far better, would it be to

reject the whole, and remain in possession of present advantages. The

authority of Congress to decide disputes between states is sufficient to

prevent their recurring to hostility: and their different situation, wants

and produce is a sufficient foundation for the most friendly intercourse.

All the arts of delusion and legal chicanery will be used to elude your

vigilance, and obtain a majority. But keeping the constitution of the

state and the publick interest in view, will be your safety.

[We are obliged, contrary to our intention, to postpone the remainder of

Agrippa till our next.]

Agrippa, XIV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 401)

FRIDAY, JANUARY 18, 1788.

(_Concluded from our last._)

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

To tell us that we ought to look beyond local interests, and judge for the

good of the empire, is sapping the foundation of a free state. The first

principle of a just government is, that it shall operate equally. The

report of the convention is extremely unequal. It takes a larger share of

power from some, and from others, a larger share of wealth. The

Massachusetts will be obliged to pay near three times their present

proportion towards continental charges. The proportion is now ascertained

by the quantity of landed property, then it will be by the number of

persons. After taking the whole of our standing revenue, by impost and

excise, we must still be held to pay a sixth part of the remaining debt.

It is evidently a contrivance to help the other states at our expense. Let

us then be upon our guard, and do no more than the present confederation

obliges. While we make that our beacon we are safe. It was framed by men

of extensive knowledge and enlarged ability, at a time when some of the

framers of the new plan were hiding in the forests to secure their

precious persons. It was framed by men who were always in favor of a

limited government, and whose endeavours Heaven has crowned with success.

It was framed by men whose idols were not power and high life, but

industry and constitutional liberty, and who are now in opposition to this

new scheme of oppression. Let us then cherish the old confederation like

the apple of our eye. Let us confirm it by such limited powers to

Congress, and such an enlarged intercourse, founded on commercial and

mutual want, with the other states, that our union shall outlast time

itself. It is easier to prevent an evil than to cure it. We ought

therefore to be cautious of innovations. The intrigues of interested

politicians will be used to seduce even the elect. If the vote passes in

favour of the plan, the constitutional liberty of our country is gone

forever. If the plan should be rejected, we always have it in our power,

by a fair vote of the people at large, to extend the authority of

Congress. This ought to have been the mode pursued. But our antagonists

were afraid to risk it. They knew that the plan would not bear examining.

Hence we have seen them insulting all who were in opposition to it, and

answering arguments only with abuse. They have threatened and they have

insulted the body of the people. But I may venture to appeal to any man of

unbiassed judgment, whether his feelings tell him, that there is any

danger at all in rejecting the plan. I ask not the palsied or the

jaundiced, nor men troubled with bilious or nervous affections, for they

can see danger in every thing. But I apply to men who have no personal

expectations from a change, and to men in full health. The answer of all

such men will be, that never was a better time for deliberation. Let us

then, while we have it in our power, secure the happiness and freedom of

the present and future ages. To accept of the report of the convention,

under the idea that we can alter it when we please, will be sporting with

fire-brands, arrows and death. It is a system which must have an army to

support it, and there can be no redress but by a civil war. If, as the

federalists say, there is a necessity of our receiving it, for heaven’s

sake let our liberties go without our making a formal surrender. Let us at

least have the satisfaction of protesting against it, that our own hearts

may not reproach us for the meanness of deserting our dearest interests.

Our present system is attended with the inestimable advantage of

preventing unnecessary wars. Foreign influence is assuredly smaller in our

publick councils, in proportion as the members are subject to be recalled.

At present, their right to sit continues no longer than their endeavours

to secure the publick interest. It is therefore not an object for any

foreign power to give a large price for the friendship of a delegate in

Congress. If we adopt the new system, every member will depend upon thirty

thousand people, mostly scattered over a large extent of country, for his

election. Their distance from the seat of government will make it

extremely difficult for the electors to get information of his conduct. If

he is faithful to his constituents, his conduct will be misrepresented, in

order to defeat his influence at home. Of this we have a recent instance,

in the treatment of the dissenting members of the late federal

convention.(26) Their fidelity to their constituents was their whole

fault. We may reasonably expect similar conduct to be adopted, when we

shall have rendered the friendship of the members valuable to foreign

powers, by giving them a secure seat in Congress. We shall too have all

the intrigues, cabals and bribery practiced, which are usual at elections

in Great Britain. We shall see and lament the want of publick virtue; and

we shall see ourselves bought at a publick market, in order to be sold

again to the highest bidder. We must be involved in all the quarrels of

European powers, and oppressed with expense, merely for the sake of being

like the nations round about us. Let us then, with the spirit of freemen,

reject the offered system, and treat as it deserves the proposition of men

who have departed from their commission; and let us deliver to the rising

generation the liberty purchased with our blood.

AGRIPPA.

Agrippa, XV.

The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 402)

TUESDAY, JANUARY 22, 1788.

TO THE MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION.

_Gentlemen_,

Truly deplorable, in point of argument, must be that cause, in whose

defence persons of acknowledged learning and ability can say nothing

pertinent. When they undertake to prove that the person elected is the

safest person in the world to control the exercise of the elective powers

of his constituents, we know what dependence is to be had upon their

reasonings. Yet we have seen attempts to shew, that the fourth section of

the proposed constitution is an additional security to our rights. It may

be such in the view of a Rhode Island family (I think that state is

quoted) who have been of some time in the minority: but it is

extraordinary that an enlightened character(27) in the Massachusetts

[convention] should undertake to prove, that, from a single instance of

abuse in one state, another state ought to resign its liberty. Can an

[sic] man, in the free exercise of his reason, suppose, that he is

perfectly represented in the legislature, when that legislature may at

pleasure alter the time, manner and place of election? By altering the

time they may continue a representive during his whole life; by altering

the manner, they may fill up the vacancies by their own votes without the

consent of the people; and by altering the place, all the elections may be

made at the seat of the federal government. Of all the powers of

government perhaps this is the most improper to be surrendered. Such an

article at once destroys the whole check which the constituents have upon

their rulers. I should be less zealous upon this subject, if the power had

not been often abused. The senate of Venice, the regencies of Holland, and

the British Parliament have all abused it. The last have not yet

perpetuated themselves; but they have availed themselves repeatedly of

popular commotions to continue in power. Even at this day we find attempts

to vindicate the usurpation by which they continued themselves from three

to seven years. All the attempts, and many have been made, to return to

triennial elections, have proved abortive. These instances are abundantly

sufficient to shew with what jealousy this right ought to be guarded. No

sovereign on earth need be afraid to declare his crown elective, while the

possessor has the right to regulate the time, manner, and place of

election.