that the Turks were delighted at the misfortunes of Serbia, and
thought that Russia will not intervene in her favor under
circumstances which would extend the war beyond Serbia and Austria.
"The unanimous feeling in Ottoman political circles is that
Austria, with the support of Germany, will attain her objects,
and that she will make Serbia follow Bulgaria and enter into the
orbit of the Triple Alliance."
M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported the interview
between Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and Prince
Lichnowsky, German Ambassador.
"The attitude of Great Britain is confirmed by the postponement
of the demobilization of the fleet. The First Lord of the
Admiralty [Winston Churchill] took this measure quietly on Friday
on his own initiative; to-night Sir Edward Grey and his
colleagues decided to make it public. This result is due to the
conciliatory attitude of Serbia and Russia."
M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported news from St.
Petersburg of the willingness of Russia to stand aside if Serbia
appealed to the powers. Accordingly Sir Edward Grey will proceed
with his plan of a conference, on the understanding that, pending
its results, Russia, Austria, and Serbia abstain from active
military operations. To this the German Ambassador, Prince
Lichnowsky is favorably disposed. Later M. de Fleuriau reported that
the Serbian Minister at London, M. Boschkovitch, had not yet
received instructions to ask for British mediation. Possibly
telegrams to that effect had been stopped on the way.
M. Bienvenu-Martin having received Sir Edward Grey's proposal for
the four-power conference, authorized M. de Fleuriau to represent
France in it. He repeated his conviction of failure of the
conference unless Germany's influence were first exercised
pacifically at Vienna.
"I have also noted, during Baron von Schoen's observations, that
the Austro-Hungarian Government was particularly susceptible when
the words 'mediation,' 'intervention,' 'conference' were used,
and was more willing to admit 'friendly advice' and
'conversations.'"
De Fleuriau reported that Italy had accepted intervention by the
powers to prevent military operations. Germany had not yet replied
to Italy's request for information as to procedure to be followed
with regard to Austria-Hungary.
M. Barrère, Ambassador at Rome, reported his interview with the
Marquis di San Giuliano, in which that Minister for Foreign Affairs
had repudiated his reported approval of the action of Austria-Hungary.
"He is convinced that Austria will not withdraw any of her
claims, and will maintain them, even at the risk of bringing
about a general conflagration; he doubts whether Germany is
disposed to lend herself to any pressure on her ally. He asserts,
however, that Germany at this moment attaches great importance to
her relations with London, and he believes that if any power can
determine Berlin in favor of peaceful action, it is England.
"As for Italy she will continue to make every effort in favor of
peace. It is with this end in view that he had adhered without
hesitation to Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a meeting in London
of the ambassadors of those powers which are not directly
interested in the Austro-Serbian dispute."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported the interview of Sir
Edward Goschen, the British Ambassador, with the German Secretary of
State, and said that Herr von Jagow's language confirmed that of
Baron von Schoen at Paris.
M. Bienvenu-Martin then notified the French Ambassadors at London,
St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of his interview with
Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and the memorandum
he had submitted criticizing the Serbian reply to the Austrian note.
_Belgium._ Baron Beyens, Minister at Berlin, reported to M.
Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, the diplomatic
situation at the German capital. Germany had not replied to the
British proposal. "The decision rests with the emperor."
TUESDAY, JULY 28, 1914
_Serbia._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, this day telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime
Minister, that Serbia's reply to the Austrian note being
unsatisfactory, the Austro-Hungarian Government
"was compelled to see to the safeguarding of their rights and
interests, and, with this object, to have recourse to force of
arms. Austria-Hungary consequently considers herself henceforward
in a state of war with Serbia."
M. Pashitch telegraphed this news from Nish to all the Serbian
Legations abroad.
Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at Petrograd, gave the
information officially to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs.
"I have the honor to inform your excellency of this regrettable
act, which a great power had the courage to commit against a
small Slav country which only recently emerged from a long series
of heroic but exhausting battles, and I beg leave on this
occasion of deep gravity for my country to express the hope that
this act, which disturbs the peace of Europe and revolts her
conscience, will be condemned by the whole civilized world and
severely punished by Russia, the protector of Serbia.
"I beg your excellency to be so kind as to lay this petition from
the whole Serbian nation before the throne of his majesty."
_Austria-Hungary._ An official communication was given to the press
at Vienna summarizing the Government's criticism of the Serbian
reply to the Austro-Hungarian note.
"Inasmuch as the Austro-Hungarian demands constitute the minimum
regarded as necessary for the reestablishment of a permanent
peace in the southeast of the [Dual] Monarchy, the Serbian reply
is considered to be insufficient.
"That the Serbian Government is aware of this appears from the
fact that they contemplate the settlement of the dispute by
arbitration, and also from the fact that on the day on which
their reply was due, and before it was in fact submitted, they
gave orders for mobilization."
Count Szögyény, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed
to Count Berchtold that Germany had declined to take part in the
four power-conference
"on the ground that it is impossible for Germany to bring her
ally before a European court in her settlement with Serbia."
Baron von Müller telegraphed to Count Berchtold from Tokyo, Japan,
that the semiofficial Japan "Times" concludes a leading article on
the Serbian question with the statement that Japan is on the best of
terms with the three great powers concerned, Austria-Hungary,
Germany, and Russia, while it is in no way interested in Serbia. He
infers that, in case of war, Japan would, as a matter of course,
maintain strict neutrality.
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin the report made
by Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at London, of his
interview on the 27th with Sir Edward Grey.
"I believe that I need not specially point out to your excellency
that Grey's proposal for a conference, in so far as it relates to
our conflict with Serbia, appears, in view of the state of war
which has arisen, to have been outstripped by events."
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Mensdorff in London to explain to
Sir Edward Grey in detail the _dossier_ of charges against Serbia
accompanying the Austrian note, and
"make clear to him that the offer of Serbia to meet points in our
note was only an apparent one, intended to deceive Europe without
giving any guaranty for the future.
"As the Serbian Government knew that only an unconditional
acceptance of our demands could satisfy us, the Serbian tactics
can easily be seen through: Serbia accepted a number of our
demands, with all sorts of reservations, in order to impress
public opinion in Europe, trusting that she would not be required
to fulfill her promises. In conversing with Sir Edward Grey, your
excellency should lay special emphasis on the circumstance that
the general mobilization of the Serbian army was ordered for the
afternoon of July 25 at three o'clock, while the answer to our
note was delivered just before the expiration of the time
fixed--that is to say, a few minutes before six o'clock. Up to
then we had made no military preparations, but by the Serbian
mobilization we were compelled to do so."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, an account of an interview with the Russian Ambassador at
Vienna. Count Berchtold had informed M. Schebeko of Austria-Hungary's
inability to concur in Russia's proposal to take the Serbian reply to
the Austrian note as a starting point for an understanding between the
disputants.
"No one in our country could understand, nor could anyone approve
negotiations with reference to the wording used in the answer
which we had designated as unsatisfactory. This was all the more
impossible because, as the ambassador knew, there was a deep
feeling of general excitement which had already mastered public
opinion. Moreover, on our side war had to-day been declared
against Serbia.
"In reply to the explanations of the ambassador, which culminated
in asserting that we should not in any way suppress the admitted
hostile opinion in Serbia by a warlike action, but that, on the
contrary, we should only increase it, I gave him some insight
into our present relations toward Serbia which made it necessary,
quite against our will, and without any selfish secondary object,
for us to show our restless neighbor, with the necessary
emphasis, our firm intention not to permit any longer a movement
which was allowed to exist by the Government, and which was
directed against the existence of the [Dual] Monarchy. The
attitude of Serbia after the receipt of our note had further not
been calculated to make a peaceful solution possible, because
Serbia, even before she transmitted to us her unsatisfactory
reply, had ordered a general mobilization, and in so doing had
already committed a hostile act against us. In spite of this,
however, we had waited for three days. Yesterday hostilities were
opened against us on the Hungarian frontier on the part of
Serbia. By this act we were deprived of the possibility of
maintaining any longer the patience which we had shown toward
Serbia. The establishment of a fundamental but peaceful
amelioration of our relations toward Serbia had now been made
impossible, and we were compelled to meet the Serbian provocation
in the only form which in the given circumstances was consistent
with the dignity of the monarchy."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff in London of his
interview with Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador in Vienna.
Bunsen had explained Sir Edward Grey's position.
Count Berchtold telegraphed Count Szögyény at Berlin to communicate
to the German Chancellor or Secretary of State the following
information:
"According to mutually consistent reports, received from St.
Petersburg, Kiev, Warsaw, Moscow, and Odessa, Russia is making
extensive military preparations. M. Sazonof has indeed given an
assurance on his word of honor, as has also the Russian Minister
of War, that mobilization has not up to now been ordered; the
latter has, however, told the German Military Attaché that the
military districts which border on Austria-Hungary--Kiev, Odessa,
Moscow, and Kazan--will be mobilized should our troops cross the
Serbian frontier.
"Under these circumstances I would urgently ask the Cabinet at
Berlin to take into immediate consideration the question whether
the attention of Russia should not be drawn, in a friendly
manner, to the fact that the mobilization of the above districts
amounts to a threat against Austria-Hungary, and that, therefore,
should these measures be carried out, they would be answered by
the most extensive military countermeasures, not only by the
[Dual] Monarchy but by our ally, the German Empire.
"In order to make it more easy for Russia to withdraw, it appears
to us appropriate that such a step should, in the first place, be
taken by Germany alone; nevertheless we are ready to take this
step in conjunction with Germany.
"Unambiguous language appears to me at the present moment to be
the most effective method of making Russia fully conscious of all
that is involved in a threatening attitude."
_Russia._ Consul General at Fiume telegraphed to M. Sazonof,
Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg, that a state of
siege had been proclaimed in Slavonia, in Croatia, and at Fiume, and
reservists of all classes called out.
M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M. Sazonof
that the local papers had not published _in extenso_ the Serbian
reply, evidently being well aware of the calming effect it would
have on German readers.
M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that the
Austro-Hungarian order for general mobilization had been signed.
M. Sazonof telegraphed the ambassadors at London, Paris, Berlin,
Vienna, and Rome:
"In face of the hostilities between Austria-Hungary and Serbia,
it is necessary that Great Britain should take instant mediatory
action, and that the military measures undertaken by Austria
against Serbia should be immediately suspended. Otherwise
mediation will only serve as an excuse to make the question drag
on, and will meanwhile make it possible for Austria to crush
Serbia completely and to acquire a dominant position in the
Balkans."
_Germany._ The Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, confidentially
reported to the Government of Germany that the evidence presented by
Austria-Hungary was conclusive of the complicity in the crime of
Sarajevo of members of the Serbian Government and army, and the
existence of organized Serb propaganda against the Dual Monarchy.
Austria-Hungary therefore was justified in her action as well as
demands against Serbia.
The Chancellor telegraphed to Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg:
"We continue in our endeavor to induce Vienna to elucidate in St.
Petersburg the object and scope of the Austrian action in Serbia
in a manner both convincing and satisfactory to Russia. The
declaration of war which has meanwhile ensued alters nothing in
this matter."
Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, telegraphed
to the German Chancellor that the British mediation proposal, "owing
to the opening of hostilities by Serbia," was "belated." William II
at 10. 45 p. m., sent the following message to Nicholas II:
"I have heard with the greatest anxiety of the impression which
is caused by the action of Austria-Hungary against Serbia. The
unscrupulous agitation which has been going on for years in
Serbia has led to the revolting crime of which Archduke Franz
Ferdinand has become a victim. The spirit which made the Serbians
murder their own king and his consort still dominates that
country. Doubtless you will agree with me that both of us, you as
well as I, and all other sovereigns, have a common interest to
insist that all those who are responsible for this horrible
murder shall suffer their deserved punishment.
"On the other hand, I by no means overlook the difficulty
encountered by you and your Government to stem the tide of public
opinion. In view of the cordial friendship which has joined us
both for a long time with firm ties, I shall use my entire
influence to induce Austria-Hungary to obtain a frank and
satisfactory understanding with Russia. I hope confidently that
you will support me in my efforts to overcome all difficulties
which may yet arise.
"Your most sincere and devoted friend and cousin."
_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, sent
to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at London, the
text of the Austro-Hungarian declaration of war against Serbia. This
was followed by the statements:
"Austria-Hungary, who has just addressed to Serbia a formal
declaration, in conformity with Article I of the convention of
October 18, 1907, relative to the opening of hostilities,
considers herself henceforward in a state of war with Serbia.
"In bringing the above to notice of his Britannic Majesty's
embassy, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honor to
declare that Austria-Hungary will act during the hostilities in
conformity with the terms of the conventions of the The Hague of
October 18, 1907, as also with those of the Declaration of London
of February 28, 1909, provided an analogous procedure is adopted
by Serbia."
The French Embassy informed Sir Edward Grey that France accepted his
four-power mediation proposal, and had appointed M. Paul Cambon her
representative in the conference.
Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, communicated to
Grey a telegram from M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, which stated that his interviews with the German
Ambassador, Count Pourtalès, confirmed his impression that Germany
would support Austria-Hungary's uncompromising attitude.
"The Berlin Cabinet, who could have prevented the whole of this
crisis developing, appear to be exerting no influence on their
ally....
"This attitude of the German Government is most alarming.
"It seems to me that Great Britain is in a better position than
any other power to make another attempt at Berlin to induce the
German Government to take the necessary action. There is no doubt
that the key of the situation is to be found at Berlin."
Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed Grey that M.
Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs, realized the
position of Great Britain.
"He quite appreciates the impossibility for his [British]
majesty's Government to declare themselves 'solidaires' with
Russia on a question between Austria and Serbia, which in its
present condition is not one affecting England. He also sees
that you cannot take up an attitude at Berlin and Vienna more
Serbian than that attributed in German and Austrian sources to
the Russian Government.
"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has stated that Austria
would respect the integrity of Serbia, but when asked whether her
independence also would be respected, he gave no assurance."
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed that, after
conference with his French and Italian colleagues, he had found that
the German Secretary of State von Jagow had, while refusing to take
part in the proposed conference, said to all of them that he desired
to work with their Governments for the maintenance of general peace.
"We therefore deduced that if he is sincere in this wish he can
be objecting only to the form of your proposal. Perhaps he
himself could be induced to suggest lines on which he would find
it possible to work with us."
Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed that Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs, declared Austria-Hungary
could not delay military proceedings against Serbia, and so declined
the mediation proposed.
"Prestige of [Dual] Monarchy was engaged, and nothing could now
prevent conflict."
The Ambassador supplemented this in a longer telegram, giving
details of his interview with Count Berchtold.
Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed an account of an
interview the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister, had just had
with the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires.
If explanations were given of mode in which Austrian agents would
intervene under Articles V and VI of the note to Serbia, Serbia
might still accept the whole note. This explanation could be
imparted, without loss of dignity to Austria, through the powers,
who might then advise Serbia to accept the note without conditions.
The Marquis pointed out a passage in the Austrian note which had
been misinterpreted by Serbia, and so might be used as a basis for
settlement, namely, that regarding cooperation of Austrian agents in
Serbia; this was to be only in investigation, not in judicial or
administrative measures.
Mr. Crackanthorpe, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed from
Nish that he was urging greatest moderation on the Serbian
Government pending mediatory efforts by the powers.
"Two Serbian steamers fired on and damaged, and two Serbian
merchant vessels have been captured by a Hungarian monitor at
Orsova."
This was supplemented by a telegram that war had been declared by
Austria.
Grey telegraphed to Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin,
explaining the nature of his proposed four-power conference. No
suggestion would be put forward that has not previously been
ascertained to be acceptable to Austria and Russia. A direct
exchange of views between these countries is preferable to all other
methods. This the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof,
is reported to have offered. If Austria accepts, the situation will
become less critical. Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at
London, reports that his Government has counseled moderation at
Vienna. This is very satisfactory.
A supplementary telegram read:
"German Government, having accepted principle of mediation
between Austria and Russia by the four powers, if necessary, I am
ready to propose that the German Secretary of State should
suggest the lines on which this principle should be applied. I
will, however, keep the idea in reserve until we see how the
conversations between Austria and Russia progress."
Grey telegraphed to Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, his satisfaction over prospect of direct exchange of
views between Russia and Austria, and readiness to facilitate this
if he knew what Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
proposes that the ministers at Belgrade do.
"Could he not first mention in an exchange of views with Austria
his willingness to cooperate in some such scheme? It might then
take more concrete shape."
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed report to Grey
on the 28th inst. of an interview with the German Chancellor, Dr.
von Bethmann-Hollweg. The Chancellor was most anxious for Germany
and Great Britain to work together for European peace, as they had
successfully done in last preceding crisis. He could not accept the
four-power proposal, since the conference would look like an
"Areopagus" of two groups of two powers, each sitting in judgment
on two other powers, but this refusal should not militate against
his strong desire for effective cooperation. He was doing his best
at Vienna and St. Petersburg to get both powers into friendly direct
discussion, but if, as reported, Russia had mobilized fourteen army
corps in the south, this would put it out of his power to continue
preaching moderation at Vienna. Austria, who was only partially
mobilizing, would have to take similar measures; so, if war results,
Russia will be responsible.
Goschen remarked that surely part of the responsibility rested on
Austria for refusing to accept the almost wholly compliant reply of
Serbia, or to admit it as a basis for discussion. The Chancellor
repeated his views about the Serbian question being wholly Austria's
affair, with which Russia had nothing to do.
"Austrian colleague said to me to-day that a general war was most
unlikely, as Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make
war. I think that that opinion is shared by many people here."
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg report of
interview with M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
who thanked Grey for his language to Prince Lichnowsky, the German
Ambassador. Sazonof was pessimistic. Buchanan asked him if he would
be satisfied with Austria's assurances to respect Serbia's integrity
and independence. He replied: Not if she attacked Serbia; that he
would order mobilization on the day that Austria crossed the Serbian
frontier.
"I told the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who appealed to
me to give moderating counsels to the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, that from the beginning I had not ceased to do so, and
that the German Ambassador at Vienna should now in his turn use
his restraining influence. I made it clear to his excellency
that, Russia being thoroughly in earnest, a general war could not
be averted if Serbia were attacked by Austria."
Ambassador de Bunsen at Vienna telegraphed news of Austria's
declaration of war against Serbia, and her declination of Russia's
suggestion of direct discussion with her. Russian Ambassador
Schebeko said that the London conference now offered the only
prospect of European peace, and he was sure Russia would agree to
it.
"So long as opposing armies have not actually come in contact,
all hope need not be abandoned."
_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, on board _La France_,
telegraphed to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs at Paris, approving his course. Russia was not responsible
for present situation, and Germany could not with grace refuse to
counsel Austria, provoker of the crisis. He approved Grey's
proposition of a four-power conference.
"The action of the four less interested powers cannot ... be
exerted only at Vienna and St. Petersburg. In proposing to exert
it also at Belgrade, which means, in fact, between Vienna and
Belgrade, Sir E. Grey grasps the logic of the situation; and, in
not excluding St. Petersburg, he offers, on the other hand, to
Germany a method of withdrawing with perfect dignity from the
_démarche_ by which the German Government have caused it to be
known at Paris and at London that the affair was looked upon by
them as purely Austro-Serbian and without any general character."
M. Bienvenu-Martin replied to M. Viviani that Germany had taken no
sincere action to hold back Austria, and was opposing Grey's plan of
mediation, thus dooming it to failure. Austria will take energetic
measures to-morrow, the 29th, to compel Serbia to give them the
satisfaction demanded, and has begun to mobilize.
M. Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, reported interviews of Sir
Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with Count Mensdorff,
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, and Prince Lichnowsky, German
Ambassador. The first continued to maintain that the Serbian reply
was unacceptable. The second talked like Baron von Schoen at Paris;
he desired Great Britain to use moderating influence at St.
Petersburg. Grey replied that this would be embarrassing, as Russia
had been moderate from the beginning, especially in her pacific
advice to Serbia. It was at Vienna that action was necessary, and
there Germany's help was indispensable. News had come from St.
Petersburg of the first direct conversations between Russia and
Austria, that of Prime Minister Sazonof and Ambassador Szápáry.
Secretary Grey and Under-Secretary Nicholson were doubtful of its
success, since M. Sazonof had not yet secured assent to a revision
of the Serbian note by the two cabinets.
"In any case, at a moment when the least delay might have serious
consequences, it would be very desirable that these direct
negotiations should be carried on in such a way as not to hamper
Sir E. Grey's action, and not to furnish Austria with a pretext
for slipping out of the friendly intervention of the four powers.
"The British Ambassador at Berlin having made a determined effort
to obtain Herr von Jagow's adherence to Sir E. Grey's suggestion,
the German Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that it was best
to await the result of the conversation which had been begun
between St. Petersburg and Vienna. Sir E. Grey has, in
consequence, directed Sir E. Goschen to suspend his _démarche_
for the moment. In addition, the news that Austria has just
officially declared war against Serbia opens a new phase of the
question."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported an interview of Herr
von Jagow with M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in which
the German Secretary of State was hopeful that Austria-Hungary's
willingness to converse with Russia after the expiration of the
ultimatum to Serbia might discover an issue from present
difficulties. M. Cambon adds that perhaps Austria is seeking time to
make her preparations.
Von Jagow told Cambon that he could not accept the kind of
conference proposed by Grey, and that success depended on mediation
taking another form.
"I laid stress upon the danger of delay, which might bring on
war, and asked him if he wished for war. He protested, and added
that direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg were
in progress, and that from now on he expected a favorable
result."
Von Jagow had made the same suggestion to the British and Italian
Ambassadors.
"My colleagues and I thought that this was only a question of
form, and the British Ambassador is going to suggest to his
Government that they should change the wording of their proposal,
which might take the character of a diplomatic _démarche_ at
Vienna and St. Petersburg.
"In consequence of the repugnance shown by Herr von Jagow to any
démarche at Vienna, Sir Edward Grey could put him in a dilemma by
asking him to state himself precisely how diplomatic action by
the powers to avoid war could be brought about.
"We ought to associate ourselves with every effort in favor of
peace compatible with our engagements toward our ally; but to
place the responsibility in the proper quarter, we must take care
to ask Germany to state precisely what she wishes."
M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported that M.
Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had said "Austria is
unwilling to converse."
M. Dumaine, Ambassador to Vienna, reported the declaration of Count
Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to British
Ambassador Bunsen that discussion of the Serbian reply was useless,
war having been declared. M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, said that
his position from the beginning had been that the question was not
of localizing the war, but preventing it. The declaration of war
made _pourparlers_ by the four powers extremely difficult. The
German formula, "Mediation between Austria and Russia," is
unsuitable, since it assumes a dispute between the two empires which
does not exist.
WEDNESDAY, JULY 29, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, July 29, 1914, Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, telegraphed the
Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Paris, and Rome, copies of a
memorandum which he had handed Herr von Tschirscky that day in
answer to the _démarche_ made by the German Ambassador, namely that
the Austro-Hungarian Government should accept the Serbian reply
either as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion. The memorandum
declared that, contrary to the assumption of Sir Edward Grey,
British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, at whose instance the
proceeding was taken, the parts of the Serbian reply which were not
accepted by Austria-Hungary are the most vital in it, since they
contain the guarantees for Serbia's observance of the demands made
on her. So, too, it is an assumption that the action taken against
Serbia was directed against Russia and her influence in the Balkans.
Austria-Hungary does not charge Russia with instigating the Serbian
propaganda against the Dual Monarchy. Our feelings toward her are
entirely friendly.
Austria-Hungary cannot adopt the desired attitude toward the Serbian
reply since this has already been outstripped by events. Our
declaration of war was made after vainly waiting three days for
Serbia to abandon her point of view.
"If the British Cabinet is prepared to use its influence on the
Russian Government with a view to the maintenance of peace
between the great powers, and with a view to the localization of
the war which has been forced upon us by many years of Serbian
intrigues, the Imperial and Royal Government could only welcome
this."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that France was
unmistakably making military preparations.
"The German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen is commissioned to
discuss these preparations with M. Viviani [French Prime
Minister] to-day, and to point out that in these circumstances
Germany may be compelled to take similar measures which
necessarily could not be kept secret, and which could not fail to
cause great public excitement when they became known. In this way
the two countries, although they are only striving for peace,
will be compelled to at least a partial mobilization, which would
be dangerous.
"Further, in accordance with these instructions, Baron Schoen
will declare that Germany has a lively desire that the conflict
between us and Serbia should remain localized, and that in this
Germany relies on the support of France."
Ambassador Szögyény telegraphed from Berlin that as early as the
26th inst. the German Government had warned Russia that mobilization
by her would cause German mobilization.
"Another telegram has to-day been sent to St. Petersburg, stating
that owing to the further progress of the Russian measures of
mobilization Germany might be brought to mobilize."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that M. Sazonof,
Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, was greatly excited over the
alleged disinclination of Austria-Hungary to continue exchange of
ideas with Russia, and over her mobilization, which is supposed to
be more extensive than necessary, and therefore directed against
Russia.
I visited the minister to explain matters. I agreed that you (Count
Berchtold) had declined to discuss the wording of the Serbian reply,
but made it clear that we had no intention, if the conflict remained
localized, to annex Serbian territory or touch her sovereignty, and
would always be ready to keep in touch with St. Petersburg on
Austro-Hungarian and Russian interests.
M. Sazonof accepted the assurance in regard to territory, but on the
point of sovereignty said he must continue to believe that our
coercion of Serbia would result in her becoming our vassal, and that
this would upset equilibrium in the Balkans, and so involve Russian
interests. Russia recognized our legitimate interest there, but its
assertion must be acceptable to Serbia.
"I expressed the view that this was not a Russian but a Serbian
interest, whereupon M. Sazonof claimed that Russian interests
were in this case Serbian interests, so that I was obliged to
make an end of the vicious circle by going on to a new topic.
"I mentioned that I had heard that there was a feeling of anxiety
in Russia, because we had mobilized eight corps for action
against Serbia. M. Sazonof assured me that it was not he (who
knew nothing about this) but the Chief of the General Staff who
had expressed this anxiety. I endeavored to convince the minister
that any unprejudiced person could easily be persuaded that our
southern corps could not constitute a menace for Russia.
"I indicated to the minister that it would be well if his
Imperial Master were informed of the true situation, as it was
urgently necessary, if it was desired to maintain peace, that a
speedy end should be put to the military competition which now
threatened to ensue on account of false news.
"The minister further informed me that a ukase would be signed
to-day, which would give orders for a mobilization in a somewhat
extended form. He was able, however, to assure me in the most
official way that these troops were not intended to attack us.
They would only stand to arms in case Russian interests in the
Balkans should be in danger. An explanatory note would make it
clear that this was a measure of precaution, since we, who in any
case have the advantage of quicker mobilization, have now also
already so great a start. In earnest words I drew M. Sazonof's
attention to the impression which such a measure would make in
our country. I went on to express doubt whether the explanatory
note would be calculated to soften the impression, whereupon the
minister again gave expression to assurances regarding the
harmlessness (!) of this measure."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szögyény at Berlin that the
Russian military districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan were
being mobilized. The ambassador should notify the German Government
of this, and emphasize that if Russian mobilization were not stopped
without delay, Austria-Hungary would follow with general
mobilization. The representatives of Germany and Austria-Hungary at
St. Petersburg, and, if necessary, at Paris, will declare the same
to the Government there. We will not be diverted from our course
against Serbia.
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador
von Schoen at Paris to protest against the military measures France
was reported to be taking, and say that, in answer, Germany would
have to proclaim "a threatening state of war."
"While this would not mean a call for the reserves or
mobilization, yet the tension would be aggravated. We continue to
hope for the preservation of peace."
Count Pourtalès, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, had an interview with
M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, which he reported as
follows:
"The secretary tried to persuade me that I should urge my
Government to participate in a quadruple conference to find means
to induce Austria-Hungary to give up those demands which touch
upon the sovereignty of Serbia. I could merely promise to report
the conversation and took the position that, after Russia had
decided upon the baneful step of mobilization, every exchange of
ideas appeared now extremely difficult, if not impossible.
Besides, Russia now was demanding from us in regard to
Austria-Hungary the same which Austria-Hungary was being blamed
for with regard to Serbia, _i.e._, an infraction of sovereignty.
Austria-Hungary having promised to consider the Russian interests
by disclaiming any territorial aspiration--a great concession on
the part of a state engaged in war--should therefore be permitted
to attend to its affairs with Serbia alone. There would be time
at the peace conference to return to the matter of forbearance
toward the sovereignty of Serbia.
"I added very solemnly that at this moment the entire
Austro-Serbian affair was eclipsed by the danger of a general
European conflagration, and I endeavored to present to the
secretary the magnitude of this danger.
"It was impossible to dissuade Sazonof from the idea that Serbia
could not now be deserted by Russia."
THE KAISER AND CZAR EXCHANGE TELEGRAMS
William II received the following telegram from Nicholas II:
"I am glad that you are back in Germany. In this serious moment I
ask you earnestly to help me. An ignominious war has been
declared against a weak country and in Russia the indignation
which I fully share is tremendous. I fear that very soon I shall
be unable to resist the pressure exercised upon me and that I
shall be forced to take measures which will lead to war. To
prevent a calamity as a European war would be, I urge you in the
name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain
your ally from going too far."
The Kaiser replied at 6.30 p. m.:
"I have received your telegram and I share your desire for the
conservation of peace. However, I cannot--as I told you in my
first telegram--consider the action of Austria-Hungary as an
'ignominious war.' Austria-Hungary knows from experience that the
promises of Serbia as long as they are merely on paper are
entirely unreliable.
"According to my opinion the action of Austria-Hungary is to be
considered as an attempt to receive full guaranty that the
promises of Serbia are effectively translated into deeds. In this
opinion I am strengthened by the explanation of the Austrian
Cabinet that Austria-Hungary intended no territorial gain at the
expense of Serbia. I am therefore of opinion that it is perfectly
possible for Russia to remain a spectator in the Austro-Serbian
war without drawing Europe into the most terrible war it has ever
seen. I believe that a direct understanding is possible and
desirable between your Government and Vienna, an understanding
which--as I have already telegraphed you--my Government endeavors
to aid with all possible effort. Naturally military measures by
Russia, which might be construed as a menace by Austria-Hungary,
would accelerate a calamity which both of us desire to avoid and
would undermine my position as mediator which--upon your appeal
to my friendship and aid--I willingly accepted."
The Czar answered:
"Thanks for your telegram, which is conciliatory and friendly,
whereas the official message presented to-day by your ambassador
to my minister was conveyed in a very different tone. I beg you
to explain this divergency. It would be right to give over the
Austro-Serbian problem to the Hague Tribunal. I trust in your
wisdom and friendship."
_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed to
M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that Herr von Jagow,
German Secretary of State, had told him no news had been received
from Vienna as to acceptance of private discussions at St.
Petersburg--that it was very difficult for him to produce any effect
at Vienna, especially openly.
"He even added, in speaking to Cambon, that were pressure brought
to bear too obviously, Austria would hasten to face Germany with
a _fait accompli_."
Von Jagow had heard from St. Petersburg that you were more
inclined than previously to find a compromise acceptable to all
parties. I replied that this had been your position from the
outset, provided the compromise were acceptable not only to
Austria, but equally to Russia. He then said that Russian
mobilization on the frontier, of which he had heard, would render
an understanding with Austria difficult as she was making no
preparations on the Russian frontier. I replied that I had
information in my possession that Austria was mobilizing there,
and that our mobilization was in reply to it. But our measures, I
assured him, were not directed against Germany.
Alexander, Crown Prince of Serbia, telegraphed to Nicholas II his
gratitude for the sympathy extended to Serbia by the Czar on the
28th inst.
"It fills our hearts with the belief that the future of Serbia is
secure now that it is the object of your majesty's gracious
solicitude. These painful moments cannot but strengthen the bonds
of deep attachment which bind Serbia to Holy Slav Russia."
M. Sazonof telegraphed Ambassador Isvolsky at Paris that Germany had
decided to mobilize if Russia did not cease her military
preparations.
"As we cannot comply with the wishes of Germany, we have no
alternative but to hasten on our own military preparations and to
assume that war is probably inevitable. Please inform the French
Government of this, and add that we are sincerely grateful to
them for the declaration which the French Ambassador made to me
on their behalf, that we could count fully upon the assistance of
our ally, France. In the existing circumstances that declaration
is especially valuable to us.
"[Communicated to the Russian Ambassadors in Great Britain,
Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Germany.]"
_Great Britain._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,
reported to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that
Russia would mobilize at Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan. This
information had been officially sent by Russia to Berlin on the 28th
inst., with assurances that there was no aggressive intention
against Germany. The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, was still
retained at Vienna. Direct communication between Austria and Russia
was, however, at an end, owing to Austria's declaration of war on
Serbia. Mediation by London Cabinet to end Austria's military
operations was therefore most urgent. If these continued Austria
would crush Serbia while the conference was continuing.
Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey a
report of his interview with Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.
He informed me that Austria-Hungary refused to act on your
suggestion to make the Serbian reply the basis of discussion. Von
Jagow had written to Vienna that, though Serbia had shown a certain
desire to meet the demands made on her, nevertheless he appreciated
Austria's requirement of guaranties which were absent in the Serbian
reply:
"The Chancellor then went on to say that the hostilities which
were about to be undertaken against Serbia had presumably the
exclusive object of securing such guaranties, seeing that the
Austrian Government already assured the Russian Government that
they had no territorial designs.
"He advised the Austro-Hungarian Government, should this view be
correct, to speak openly in this sense. The holding of such
language would, he hoped, eliminate all possible
misunderstandings.
"As yet, he told me, he had not received a reply from Vienna.
"From the fact that he had gone so far in the matter of giving
advice at Vienna, his excellency hoped that you would realize
that he was sincerely doing all in his power to prevent danger of
European complications."
Goschen reported an interview with the German Secretary of State.
Von Jagow was much depressed.
"He reminded me that he had told me the other day that he had to
be very careful in giving advice to Austria, as any idea that
they were being pressed would be likely to cause them to
precipitate matters and present a _fait accompli_. This had, in
fact, now happened, and he was not sure that his communication of
your suggestion that Serbia's reply offered a basis for
discussion had not hastened declaration of war. He was much
troubled by reports of mobilization in Russia, and of certain
military measures, which he did not specify, being taken in
France. He subsequently spoke of these measures to my French
colleague [M. Jules Cambon] who informed him that French
Government had done nothing more than the German Government had
done, namely, recalled officers on leave. His excellency denied
German Government had done this, but as a matter of fact it is
true. My French colleague said to under-Secretary of State [Herr
von Zimmermann] that, when Austria had entered Serbia, and so
satisfied her military prestige, the moment might then be
favorable for four disinterested powers to discuss situation and
come forward with suggestions for preventing graver
complications. Under-Secretary of State seemed to think idea
worthy of consideration, as he replied that would be a different
matter from conference proposed by you."
Grey replied to Goschen, stating his appreciation of the Dr. von
Bethmann-Hollweg's language, and assuring the Chancellor that Great
Britain would strain every effort for peace.
"If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia and to abstain from
going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all
join in deep gratitude to his excellency for having saved the
peace of Europe."
Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg telegraphed to Grey that
partial mobilization had been ordered. This said M. Sazonof,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, was against Austria-Hungary alone.
Direct conversation with St. Petersburg having been refused by
Vienna, he would urge Germany that a return be made to your proposal
of a four-power conference.
Ambassador Bunsen reported from Vienna that there was no step to be
taken at present to stop war with Serbia, to which the Austro-Hungarian
Government was fully committed by the declaration of war, and Kaiser
Francis Joseph's appeal to his people, published this morning. In the
opinion of Duke d'Avarans, the Italian Ambassador, Russia might be
quieted by Austria-Hungary making a binding engagement not to destroy
Serbian independence nor seize Serbian territory, but this she would
refuse to do.
Sir Rennell Rodd, Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed that the Marquis
di San Giuliano would urge in Berlin an exchange of views by the
powers in London, and suggest that the German Secretary of State
propose a formula acceptable to his Government.
"The Secretary for Foreign Affairs remarked that it was difficult
to make Germany believe that Russia was in earnest. As Germany,
however, was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if
she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France
he thought it would have a great effect."
Grey replied to Rodd that the London conference was now
impracticable owing to the attitude of Austria-Hungary, and that
Italy must now speak at Berlin and Vienna.
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the German
Chancellor, Von Bethmann-Hollweg, said he was endeavoring to make
Austria satisfactorily explain at St. Petersburg the scope of her
proceedings in Serbia, but information comes from Vienna that
Austria declines to discuss the Serbian issue. Germany opposes the
four-power conference. I asked her to present her plan to prevent
war between Russia and Austria, France and Italy joined with my
request.
"Let mediation come into operation by any method that Germany
thinks possible if only Germany will 'press the button' in the
interests of peace."
Goschen telegraphed back to Grey that he had had an interview with
Bethmann-Hollweg who had just returned from Potsdam. The Chancellor
feared Germany's being drawn into war by Russia attacking her ally.
"He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British
neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to
judge the main principle which governed British policy, that
Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed
in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object
at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain
were certain, every assurance would be given to the British
Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial
acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove
victorious in any war that might ensue.
"I questioned his excellency about the French colonies, and he
said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that
respect. As regards Holland, however, his excellency said that,
so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and
neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give his
majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It
depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might
be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over,
Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against
Germany.
"His excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been
Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware,
to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that
these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which
he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement
between England and Germany, though it was of course at the
present moment too early to discuss details, and an assurance of
British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might
possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realization
of his desire.
"In reply to his excellency's inquiry how I thought his request
would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that
at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any
course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire
to retain full liberty."
Grey informed Ambassador Bertie at Paris of a conversation he had
had with M. Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador.
I told Cambon that I would inform the German Ambassador Prince
Lichnowsky, to-day that he must not suppose by my friendly tone that
we should stand aside in event of a general war following failure of
efforts to maintain peace. However, I warned Cambon that the case of
Serbia was not like that of Morocco, in which we had made a special
agreement with France, but one in which we did not feel called to
take a hand.
"M. Cambon said that I had explained the situation very clearly.
He understood it to be that in a Balkan quarrel, and in a
struggle for supremacy between Teuton and Slav we should not feel
called to intervene; should other issues be raised, and Germany
and France become involved, so that the question became one of
the hegemony of Europe, we should then decide what it was
necessary for us to do. He seemed quite prepared for this
announcement, and made no criticism upon it.
"He said French opinion was calm, but decided. He anticipated a
demand from Germany that France would be neutral while Germany
attacked Russia. This assurance France, of course, could not
give; she was bound to help Russia if Russia was attacked."
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin of his conversation
with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he had pointed out
"that the Russian Government, while desirous of mediation,
regarded it as a condition that the military operations against
Serbia should be suspended, as otherwise a mediation would only
drag on matters, and give Austria time to crush Serbia. It was,
of course, too late for all military operations against Serbia to
be suspended. In a short time, I supposed, the Austrian forces
would be in Belgrade, and in occupation of some Serbian
territory. But even then it might be possible to bring some
mediation into existence, if Austria, while saying that she must
hold the occupied territory until she had complete satisfaction
from Serbia, stated that she would not advance further, pending
an effort of the powers to mediate between her and Russia."
In a following message Grey related to Goschen a second conversation
with Prince Lichnowsky, in which he told the German Ambassador that,
in event of a general war, the issues might be so great that it
would involve all European interests, and he should not think that
Great Britain would stand aside.
"He said that he quite understood this, but he asked whether I
meant that we should, under certain circumstances, intervene?
"I replied that I did not wish to say that, or to use anything
that was like a threat or an attempt to apply pressure by saying
that, if things became worse, we should intervene. There would be
no question of our intervening if Germany was not involved, or
even if France was not involved. But we knew very well, that if
the issue did become such that we thought British interests
required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the
decision would have to be very rapid, just as the decisions of
other powers had to be....
"The German Ambassador took no exception to what I had said;
indeed, he told me that it accorded with what he had already
given in Berlin as his view of the situation."
In still another message Grey informed Goschen that he had said to
the German Ambassador, in reference to the suggestion of San
Giuliano, the Italian Prime Minister of mediation between Russia and
Austria, that it would not be mediation to urge Russia to stand
aside and give Austria a free hand to go any length she pleased.
Grey informed Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna that Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador Mensdorff, had offered to submit him a long memorandum
justifying the action of his government toward Serbia. Grey refused
to discuss the Serbian question now that the peace of Europe was
imperilled. The greater question settled, the powers might be free
to obtain satisfaction for Austria in the lesser.
"In reply to some further remarks of mine, as to the effect that
the Austrian action might have upon the Russian position in the
Balkans, he said that, before the Balkan war, Serbia had always
been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence."
Bunsen reported to Grey that the news of Russian mobilization was
not generally known in Vienna.
_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,
notified the Ambassadors at St. Petersburg, London, Berlin, Rome,
Vienna, and Constantinople, and the Minister to Serbia, that the
Austro-German attitude was becoming clearer.
"Austria, uneasy concerning the Slav propaganda, has seized the
opportunity of the crime of Sarajevo in order to punish the
Serbian intrigues, and to obtain in this quarter guaranties
which, according as events are allowed to develop or not, will
either affect only the Serbian Government and army, or become
territorial questions. Germany intervenes between her ally and
the other powers and declares that the question is a local one,
namely, punishment of a political crime committed in the past,
and sure guaranties for the future that the anti-Austrian
intrigues will be put an end to. The German Government thinks
that Russia should be content with the official and formal
assurances given by Austria that she does not seek territorial
aggrandizement and that she will respect the integrity of Serbia;
in these circumstances the danger of war can come only from
Russia, if she seeks to intervene in a question which is well
defined. In these circumstances any action for the maintenance of
peace must take place at St. Petersburg alone.
"The attitude at Berlin, as at Vienna, is still dilatory. In the
former capital, while protesting that the Germans desire to
safeguard general peace by common action between the four powers,
the idea of a conference is rejected without any other expedient
being suggested, and while they refuse to take any positive
action at Vienna. In the Austrian capital they would like to keep
St. Petersburg in play with the illusion of an _entente_ which
might result from direct conversations, while they are taking
action against Serbia.
"In these circumstances it seems essential that the St.
Petersburg Cabinet, whose desire to unravel this crisis
peacefully is manifest, should immediately give their adherence
to the British proposal. This proposal must be strongly supported
at Berlin in order to decide [Secretary of State] Von Jagow to
take real action at Vienna capable of stopping Austria and
preventing her from supplementing her diplomatic advantage by
military successes. The Austro-Hungarian Government would,
indeed, not be slow to take advantage of it in order to impose on
Serbia, under the elastic expression of 'guaranties' conditions
which, in spite of all assurances that no territorial
aggrandizement was being sought, would in effect modify the
status of eastern Europe, and would run the risk of gravely
compromising the general peace either at once or in the near
future."
[Illustration: Vittorio Emanuele III, King of Italy.]
Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russia
would acquiesce in any measures proposed by France and Great Britain
to maintain peace. Minister Klobukowski reported from Brussels that
the Belgian Government regarded Germany's attitude as enigmatical,
and justifying every apprehension.
"It seems improbable that the Austro-Hungarian Government would
have taken an initiative which would lead, according to a
preconceived plan, to a declaration of war, without previous
arrangement with the Emperor William.
"The German Government stand 'with rounded arms' ready to take
peaceful or warlike action as circumstances may require; a sudden
intervention against us would not surprise anybody here.
"The Belgian Government are taking steps which harmonize with the
statement made to me yesterday by M. Davignon that everything
will be put in readiness for the defence of the neutrality of the
country."
Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna:
"The French Consul at Prague confirms the mobilization of the
Eighth Army corps, and that of the Landwehr division of this army
corps. The cavalry divisions in Galicia are also mobilizing;
regiments and cavalry divisions from Vienna and Budapest have
already been transported to the Russian frontier. Reservists are
now being called together in this district.
"There is a rumor that the Austro-Hungarian Government, in order
to be in a position to meet any danger, and perhaps in order to
impress St. Petersburg, intend to decide on a general
mobilization of their forces on July 30, or August 1. The
Austrian Emperor will return from Ischl to Vienna to-morrow."
Ambassador Paléologue reported from Berlin that Austria-Hungary
refused direct conversation offered by Russia.
"Austria is hurrying on her military preparations against Russia,
and is pressing forward the mobilization which has begun on the
Galician frontier. As a result the order to mobilize will be
dispatched to-night to thirteen army corps, which are destined
to operate eventually against Austria."
Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin his interview with the
German Secretary of State. Von Jagow was awaiting reply from Vienna
to his request to hold direct conversation with Russia. He
considered that the Serbian reply afforded a basis for negotiation.
"I said that it was just on that account that I considered the
rupture by Austria, after she had received such a document,
inexplicable.
"The Secretary of State then remarked that with eastern nations
one could never obtain sufficient guaranties, and that Austria
wished to be able to supervise the carrying out of promises made
to her, a supervision which Serbia refused. This, in the eyes of
the Secretary of State, is the cardinal point. I answered Herr
von Jagow that Serbia, as she wished to remain independent, was
bound to reject the control of a single power, but that an
International Commission would not have the same character. The
Balkan States have more than one, for instance the Financial
Commission at Athens. One could imagine among other combinations,
a Provisional International Commission, charged with the duty of
controlling the police inquiry demanded by Austria; it was clear,
by this instance, that the reply of Serbia opened the door to
conversations and did not justify a rupture.
"I then asked the Secretary of State if, leaving aside direct
conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg to which Sir E.
Grey had given his adherence, he did not think that common action
could be exercised by the four powers by means of their
ambassadors. He answered in the affirmative, adding that at this
moment the London Cabinet were confining themselves to exercising
their influence in support of direct conversations."
He gave a summary of the interview between Bethmann-Hollweg and
British Ambassador Goschen.
"The attitude of the German Chancellor is very probably the
result of the last interview of Sir E. Grey with Ambassador
Lichnowsky. Up to quite the last days they flattered themselves
here that England would remain out of the question, and the
impression produced on the German Government and on the
financiers and business men by her attitude is profound."
Ambassador Dumaine reported from Vienna that he and his British,
Russian, and Italian colleagues agreed that war is now certain
between Austria and Serbia since all attempts to avoid it have
failed. The Italian Ambassador, Duke d'Avarna, said
"it is very probable that the imminence of a general insurrection
among the Southern Slav inhabitants precipitated the resolutions
of the [Dual] Monarchy. He still clings to the hope that, after a
first success of the Austro-Hungarian arms, but not before this,
mediation might be able to limit the conflict."
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed
the ambassadors at London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Rome, Vienna, and
Constantinople, and the minister to Serbia, of a semiofficial
communication made by the German Ambassador.
Germany, said Baron von Schoen, was continuing its efforts to induce
Austria-Hungary to hold direct conversations with Russia, being in
no way impeded by her ally's declaration of war on Serbia. Germany
did not know Austria's intentions.
A second message was sent to these French representatives abroad
reporting an interview of M. Bienvenu-Martin and the Russian
Ambassador at Paris.
M. Isvolsky communicated the telegram from Sazonof, Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs to Berlin, notifying Germany of Russian
mobilization in the southern provinces, and the telegrams from
Sazonof to London asking Great Britain to use her influence as
quickly as possible with Austria to secure cessation of military
operations, and stating that he believed Germany was favoring her
ally's uncompromising attitude.
Ambassador Barrère at Rome reported that the Italian Minister for
Foreign Affairs had been officially informed of the above telegrams.
M. Viviani, who had now reached Paris and resumed his office of
Minister for Foreign Affairs, instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at
London to request Sir Edward Grey to renew at Berlin his proposal of
four-power mediation, the principle of which had been accepted by
both Germany and Russia.
"I would ask you also to point out to the British Secretary of
State how important it would be for him to obtain from the
Italian Government the most whole-hearted continuance of their
support in cooperating in the action of the four powers in favor
of peace."
M. Paul Cambon reported that Grey had invited Germany to propose her
own formula for peace as acceptable to Great Britain, France, and
Italy.
"The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said to me that
Germany's reply to this communication and to that of Russia
concerning the mobilization of four army corps on the Austrian
frontier would allow us to realize the intentions of the German
Government.
"Sir E. Grey did not disguise the fact that he found the
situation very grave and that he had little hope of a peaceful
solution."
Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg of the
notification by the German Ambassador that Russia must stop
mobilization or Germany would mobilize.
"The tone in which Count Pourtalès delivered this communication
has decided the Russian Government this very night to order the
mobilization of the thirteen army corps which are to operate
against Austria."
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the
ministers at Berlin, Vienna, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, Rome,
The Hague, and Luxemburg that the Belgian Government had decided to
place the army upon a strengthened peace footing.
"This step should in no way be confused with mobilization.
"Owing to the small extent of her territory, all Belgium
consists, in some degree, of a frontier zone. Her army on the
ordinary peace footing consists of only one class of armed
militia; on the strengthened peace footing, owing to the recall
of three classes, her army divisions and her cavalry division
comprise effective units of the same strength as those of the
corps permanently maintained in the frontier zones of the
neighboring powers."
THURSDAY, JULY 30, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg
his answer to the ambassador's telegram of July 29:
"I am of course still ready to explain to M. Sazonof [Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs] the various points contained in our
note addressed to Serbia which, however, has already been
outstripped by recent events. I should also attach special
importance, in accordance with the suggestion made to me through
M. Schebeko [Russian Ambassador at Vienna], also, to discussing
on this occasion in a confidential and friendly manner the
questions which affect directly our relations toward Russia. From
this it might be hoped that it would be possible to remove the
ambiguities which have arisen and to secure the development in a
friendly manner of our relations toward our neighbors, which is
so desirable an object."
This was followed by another telegram. Count Berchtold said that he
had explained to Russian Ambassador Schebeko what seemed his flat
refusal to discuss matters directly with Russia, which had so hurt
the feelings of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"This must rest on a misunderstanding, as M. Schebeko and myself
had discussed the practical questions two days before, a fact
which the ambassador confirmed with the observation that he had
fully informed M. Sazonof of this conversation.
"M. Schebeko then explained why our action against Serbia was
regarded with such anxiety at St. Petersburg. He said that we
were a great power which was proceeding against the small Serbian
state, and it was not known at St. Petersburg what our intentions
in the matter were; whether we desired to encroach on its
sovereignty, whether we desired completely to overthrow it, or
even to crush it to the ground. Russia could not be indifferent
toward the future fate of Serbia, which was linked to Russia by
historical and other bonds. At St. Petersburg they had taken the
trouble to use all their influence at Belgrade to induce them to
accept all our conditions, though this was indeed at a time when
the conditions afterward imposed by us could not yet be known.
But even with reference to these demands they would do everything
they could in order to accomplish at any rate all that was
possible.
"I reminded the ambassador that we had repeatedly emphasized the
fact that we did not desire to follow any policy of conquest in
Serbia, also that we would not infringe her sovereignty, but we
only desired to establish a condition of affairs which would
offer us a guarantee against being disturbed by Serbia. To this I
added a somewhat lengthy discussion of our intolerable relations
with Serbia. I also gave M. Schebeko clearly to understand to how
large an extent Russian diplomacy was responsible for these
circumstances, even though this result might be contrary to the
wishes of the responsible authorities.
"I referred to the Russian mobilization which had then come to my
knowledge. Since this was limited to the military districts of
Odessa, Kiev, Moscow, and Kazan it had an appearance of hostility
against the [Dual] Monarchy. I did not know what the grounds for
this might be, as there was no dispute between us and Russia.
Austria-Hungary had mobilized exclusively against Serbia; against
Russia not a single man; and this would be observed from the
single fact that the first, tenth, and eleventh corps had not
been mobilized. In view, however, of the fact that Russia was
openly mobilizing against us, we should have to extend our
mobilization too, and in this case I desired to mention expressly
that this measure did not, of course, imply any attitude of
hostility toward Russia."
_Germany._ Military Attaché Eggeling at St. Petersburg telegraphed
to William II that Prince Troubetzki had said to him yesterday:
"Thank God that a telegram from your emperor has come!"
"He has just told me the telegram has made a deep impression upon
the czar but as the mobilization against Austria had already been
ordered and Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] had convinced
his majesty that it was no longer possible to retreat, his
majesty was sorry he could not change it any more. I then told
him that the guilt for the measureless consequences lay at the
door of premature mobilization against Austria-Hungary which
after all was involved merely in a local war with Serbia, for
Germany's answer was clear and the responsibility rested upon
Russia which ignored Austria-Hungary's assurance that it had no
intentions of territorial gain in Serbia. Austria-Hungary
mobilized against Serbia and not against Russia and there was no
ground for an immediate action on the part of Russia. I further
added that in Germany one could not understand any more Russia's
phrase that 'she could not desert her brethren in Serbia' after
the horrible crime of Sarajevo. I told him finally he need not
wonder if Germany's army were to be mobilized."
At 1 a. m. the German Kaiser telegraphed to Nicholas II:
"My ambassador has instructions to direct the attention of your
Government to the dangers and serious consequences of a
mobilization. I have told you the same in my last telegram.
Austria-Hungary has mobilized only against Serbia, and only a
part of her army. If Russia, as seems to be the case, according
to your advice and that of your Government, mobilizes against
Austria-Hungary, the part of the mediator with which you have
intrusted me in such friendly manner and which I have accepted
upon your express desire, is threatened if not made impossible.
The entire weight of decision now rests upon your shoulders, you
have to bear the responsibility for war or peace."
HENRY OF PRUSSIA AND GEORGE V
The Czar at once replied:
"I thank you from my heart for your quick reply. I am sending
to-night Tatisheff (Russian honorary aide to the Kaiser) with
instructions. The military measures now taking form were decided
upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the
preparations of Austria. I hope with all my heart that these
measures will not influence in any manner your position as
mediator, which I appraise very highly. We need your strong
pressure upon Austria so that an understanding can be arrived at
with us."
Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, telegraphed to the
King of Great Britain from Berlin:
"I arrived here yesterday and have communicated what you were so
good as to say to me at Buckingham Palace last Sunday to William,
who was very thankful to receive your message.
"William, who is very anxious, is doing his utmost to comply with
the request of Nicholas to work for the maintenance of peace. He
is in continual telegraphic communication with Nicholas, who has
to-day confirmed the news that he has ordered military measures
which amount to mobilization, and that these measures were taken
five days ago.
"We have also received information that France is making military
preparations while we have not taken measures of any kind, but
may be obliged to do so at any moment if our neighbors continue
their preparations. This would then mean a European war.
"If you seriously and earnestly desire to prevent this terrible
misfortune, may I propose to you to use your influence on France
and also on Russia that they should remain neutral. In my view
this would be of the greatest use. I consider that this is a
certain and, perhaps, the only possible way of maintaining the
peace of Europe. I might add that Germany and England should now
more than ever give each other mutual support in order to prevent
a terrible disaster, which otherwise appears inevitable.
"Believe me that William is inspired by the greatest sincerity in
his efforts for the maintenance of peace. But the military
preparations of his two neighbors may end in compelling him to
follow their example for the safety of his own country, which
otherwise would remain defenseless."
George V replied:
"I am very glad to hear of William's efforts to act with Nicholas
for the maintenance of peace. I earnestly desire that such a
misfortune as a European war--the evil of which could not be
remedied--may be prevented. My Government is doing the utmost
possible in order to induce Russia and France to postpone further
military preparations, provided that Austria declares herself
satisfied with the occupation of Belgrade and the neighboring
Serbian territory as a pledge for a satisfactory settlement of
her demands, while at the same time the other countries suspend
their preparations for war. I rely on William applying his great
influence in order to induce Austria to accept this proposal. In
this way he will prove that Germany and England are working
together to prevent what would be an international catastrophe.
Please assure William that I am doing all I can, and will
continue to do all that lies in my power, to maintain the peace
of Europe."
_Russia._ M. Strandtman, Chargé d'Affaires in Serbia, telegraphed
from Nish to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.
Petersburg, that Prince Regent Alexander had yesterday published a
manifesto, signed by all the Serbian Ministers, on Austria's
declaration of war against Serbia.
M. Sazonof telegraphed to the ambassadors at Berlin, Vienna, Paris,
London, and Rome:
"The German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès], who has just left me,
has asked whether Russia would not be satisfied with the promise
which Austria might give--that she would not violate the
integrity of the Kingdom of Serbia--and whether we could not
indicate upon what conditions we would agree to suspend our
military preparations. I dictated to him the following
declaration to be forwarded to Berlin for immediate action:
"'If Austria, recognizing that the Austro-Serbian question has
assumed the character of a question of European interest,
declares herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points
which violate the sovereign rights of Serbia, Russia engages to
stop her military preparations.'
"Please inform me at once by telegraph what attitude the German
Government will adopt in face of this fresh proof of our desire
to do the utmost possible for a peaceful settlement of the
question, for we cannot allow such discussions to continue solely
in order that Germany and Austria may gain time for their
military preparations."
Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin that the order for the
mobilization of the German army and navy had just been issued. He
followed this with a telegram stating that Secretary of State von
Jagow had just telephoned him that the news was false:
"the news sheets had been printed in advance so as to be ready
for all eventualities, and they were put on sale in the
afternoon, but they have now been confiscated."
Ambassador Swerbeiev telegraphed from Berlin to M. Sazonof that he
had presented the minister's telegram of July 29 to Secretary of
State von Jagow, who "declared that he considered it impossible for
Austria to accept our proposal."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna to Sir
Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
"Russian Ambassador [Schebeko] hopes that Russian mobilization
will be regarded by Austria as what it is, viz., a clear
intimation that Russia must be consulted regarding the fate of
Serbia, but he does not know how the Austrian Government are
taking it. He says that Russia must have an assurance that Serbia
will not be crushed, but she would understand that
Austria-Hungary is compelled to exact from Serbia measures which
will secure her Slav provinces from the continuance of hostile
propaganda from Serbian territory.
"The French Ambassador [Dumaine] hears from Berlin that the
German Ambassador at Vienna [Tschirsky] is instructed to speak
seriously to the Austro-Hungarian Government against acting in a
manner calculated to provoke a European war.
"Unfortunately the German Ambassador is himself so identified
with extreme anti-Russian and anti-Serbian feeling prevalent in
Vienna that he is unlikely to plead the cause of peace with
entire sincerity.
"Although I am not able to verify it, I have private information
that the German Ambassador knew the text of the Austrian
ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and telegraphed it
to the German Emperor. I know from the German Ambassador himself
that he indorses every line of it."
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg to Grey of an
interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"M. Sazonof said that German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] had
told him yesterday afternoon that German Government were willing
to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by
Austria. To this he had replied that this might be so, but
nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in
similar circumstances Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. There
would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a
state of affairs.
"M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof was in possession of
Russian Government that Germany was making military and naval
preparations against Russia--more particularly in the direction
of the Gulf of Finland.
"German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for
Foreign Affairs at 2 a. m., when former completely broke down on
seeing that war was inevitable. He appealed to M. Sazonof to make
some suggestion which he could telegraph to German Government as
a last hope. M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and handed to German
Ambassador a formula.
"'If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has
assumed character of question of European interest, declares
herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum points which
violate principle of sovereignty of Serbia, Russia engages to
stop all military preparations.'
"Preparations for general mobilization will be proceeded with if
this proposal is rejected by Austria, and inevitable result will
be a European war. Excitement here has reached such a pitch that,
if Austria refuses to make a concession, Russia cannot hold back,
and now that she knows that Germany is arming, she can hardly
postpone, for strategical reasons, converting partial into
general mobilization."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Grey:
"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] informs me that immediately on
receipt of Prince Lichnowsky's [German Ambassador in London]
telegram recording his last conversation with you he asked
Austro-Hungarian Government whether they would be willing to
accept mediation on basis of occupation by Austrian troops of
Belgrade or some other point and issue their conditions from
here. He has up till now received no reply, but he fears Russian
mobilization against Austria will have increased difficulties, as
Austria-Hungary, who has as yet only mobilized against Serbia,
will probably find it necessary also against Russia. Secretary of
State says if you can succeed in getting Russia to agree to above
basis for an arrangement and in persuading her in the meantime to
take no steps which might be regarded as an act of aggression
against Austria he still sees some chance that European peace may
be preserved.
"He begged me to impress on you difficulty of Germany's position
in view of Russian mobilization and military measures which he
hears are being taken in France. Beyond recall of officers on
leave--a measure which had been officially taken after, and not
before, visit of French Ambassador [Jules Cambon]
yesterday--Imperial Government had done nothing special in way of
military preparations. Something, however, would have soon to be
done, for it might be too late, and when they mobilized they
would have to mobilize on three sides. He regretted this, as he
knew France did not desire war, but it would be a military
necessity.
"His excellency added that telegram received from Prince
Lichnowsky last night contains matter which he had heard with
regret, but not exactly with surprise, and at all events he
thoroughly appreciated frankness and loyalty with which you had
spoken.
"He also told me that this telegram had only reached Berlin very
late last night; had it been received earlier chancellor would,
of course, not have spoken to me in the way he had done."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris to Grey the report of
Germany's request to Russia to be informed on what conditions Russia
would consent to demobilization.
"The answer given is that she agrees to do so on condition that
Austria-Hungary gives an assurance that she will respect the
sovereignty of Serbia and submit certain of the demands of the
Austrian note, which Serbia has not accepted, to an international
discussion."
SIR EDWARD GREY REFUSES TERMS OF NEUTRALITY
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin in answer to his
telegram of July 29:
"His Majesty's Government cannot for a moment entertain the
Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to
neutrality on such terms.
"What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French
colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does
not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.
"From the material point of view such a proposal is unacceptable,
for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from
her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a great
power, and become subordinate to German policy.
"Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to
make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a
disgrace from which the good name of this country would never
recover.
"The chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever
obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of
Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.
"Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the
prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England
and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate
us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to
act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such
unfavorable and regrettable development of the present crisis as
the chancellor contemplates.
"You should speak to the chancellor in the above sense, and add
most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations
between England and Germany is that they should continue to work
together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeeded in this
object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I
believe, be _ipso facto_ improved and strengthened. For that
object his majesty's Government will work in that way with all
sincerity and good will.
"And I will say this: If the peace of Europe can be preserved,
and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to
promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by
which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy
would be pursued against her or her Allies by France, Russia, and
ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked
for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and,
Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly
improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the
subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so
much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for
generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and
reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite
rapprochement between the powers than has been possible
hitherto."
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg:
"German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] informs me that German
Government would endeavor to influence Austria, after taking
Belgrade and Serbian territory in region of frontier, to promise
not to advance further, while powers endeavored to arrange that
Serbia should give satisfaction sufficient to pacify Austria.
Territory occupied would of course be evacuated when Austria was
satisfied. I suggested this yesterday as a possible relief to the
situation, and, if it can be obtained, I would earnestly hope
that it might be agreed to suspend further military preparations
on all sides.
"Russian Ambassador [Count Benckendorff] has told me of condition
laid down by M. Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs],
as quoted in your telegram of July 30, and fears it cannot be
modified; but if Austrian advance were stopped after occupation
of Belgrade, I think Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs'
formula might be changed to read that the powers would examine
how Serbia could fully satisfy Austria without impairing Serbian
sovereign rights or independence.
"If Austria, having occupied Belgrade and neighboring Serbian
territory declares herself ready, in the interest of European
peace, to cease her advance and to discuss how a complete
settlement can be arrived at, I hope that Russia would also
consent to discussion and suspension of further military
preparations, provided that other powers did the same.
"It is a slender chance of preserving peace, but the only one I
can suggest if Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs can come to
no agreement at Berlin. You should inform Minister for Foreign
Affairs"
Grey wrote Ambassador Bertie at Paris enclosing a copy of a letter
he had written to Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, on
November 22, 1912, and of the agreement of which M. Cambon had just
reminded him. The letter was as follows:
"From time to time in recent years the French and British naval
and military experts have consulted together. It has always been
understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom
of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not
to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that
consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded
as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a
contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The
disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets
respectively at the present moment is not based upon an
engagement to cooperate in war.
"You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had
grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it
might become essential to know whether it could in that event
depend upon the armed assistance of the other.
"I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both Governments should act together to prevent
aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they
would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved
action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken
into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what
effect should be given to them."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin to Sir Edward Grey:
"The Chancellor [Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg] told me last night
that he was 'pressing the button' as hard as he could, and that
he was not sure whether he had not gone so far in urging
moderation at Vienna that matters had been precipitated rather
than otherwise."
_France._ M. Viviani, Prime Minister, informed the Ambassadors at
St. Petersburg and London that Germany had notified Russia of her
decision to mobilize unless Russia ceased her military preparations.
"M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, declares that
in these circumstances Russia can only expedite her arming and
consider war as imminent; that she counts on the help of France
as an ally; and that she considers it desirable that England
should join Russia and France without loss of time.
"France is resolved to fulfill all the obligations of her
alliance.
"She will not neglect, however, any effort toward a solution of
the conflict in the interests of universal peace. The
conversation entered into between the powers which are less
directly interested still allows of the hope that peace may be
preserved; I therefore think it would be well that, in taking any
precautionary measures of defense, which Russia thinks must go
on, she should not immediately take any step which may offer to
Germany a pretext for a total or partial mobilization of her
forces.
"Yesterday, in the late afternoon, the German Ambassador [Baron
von Schoen] spoke to me of the military measures which the
Government of the republic were taking, adding that France was
able to act in this way, but that in Germany preparations could
not be secret and that French opinion should not be alarmed if
Germany decided on them.
"I answered that the French Government had not taken any step
which could give their neighbors any cause for disquietude, and
that their wish to lend themselves to any negotiations for the
purpose of maintaining peace could not be doubted."
Ambassador Paléologue reported from St. Petersburg that, in
deference to the desire of M. Viviani, no pretext be offered Germany
for general mobilization, the Russian General Staff had suspended
all measures of military precaution.
"Yesterday the chief of the staff sent for the Military Attaché
of the German Embassy and gave him his word of honor that the
mobilization ordered this morning was exclusively directed
against Austria.
"Nevertheless, from an interview which he had this afternoon with
Count Pourtalès [German Ambassador], M. Sazonof was forced to the
conclusion that Germany does not wish to pronounce at Vienna the
decisive word which would safeguard peace. The Emperor Nicholas
has received the same impression from an exchange of telegrams
which he has just had personally with the Emperor William.
"Moreover, the Russian General Staff and Admiralty have received
disquieting information concerning the preparations of the German
army and navy.
"In giving me this information Mr. Sazonof added that the Russian
Government are continuing none the less their efforts toward
conciliation. He repeated to me: 'I shall continue to negotiate
until the last moment.'"
Ambassador Jules Cambon reported from Berlin of the official recall
of the press announcement of German mobilization, but added that his
apprehension of the plans of Germany was not diminished thereby.
"It seems certain that the Extraordinary Council held yesterday
evening at Potsdam with the military authorities under the
presidency of the emperor decided on mobilization, and this
explains the preparation of the special edition of the 'Lokal
Anzeiger,' but that from various causes (the declaration of Great
Britain that she reserved her entire liberty of action, the
exchange of telegrams between the czar and William II) the
serious measures which had been decided upon were suspended.
"One of the ambassadors with whom I have very close relations saw
Herr von Zimmermann at two o'clock. According to the
Under-Secretary of State, the military authorities are very
anxious that mobilization should be ordered, because every delay
makes Germany lose some of her advantages. Nevertheless, up to
the present time the haste of the General Staff, which sees war
in mobilization, had been successfully prevented. In any case
mobilization may be decided upon at any moment. I do not know who
has issued in the 'Lokal Anzeiger,' a paper which is usually
semiofficial, premature news calculated to cause excitement in
France.
"Further, I have the strongest reasons to believe that all the
measures for mobilization which can be taken before the
publication of the general order have already been taken here,
and that they are anxious here to make us publish our
mobilization first in order to attribute the responsibility to
us."
M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Paul Cambon at London to inform Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, of the following
facts of French and German military preparations, to show that, "if
France is resolved, it is not she who is taking aggressive steps."
"Although Germany has made her covering dispositions a few
hundred meters from the frontier, along the whole front from
Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has transported her covering troops
to their war positions, we have kept our troops ten kilometers
from the frontier and forbidden them to approach nearer.
"By leaving a strip of territory undefended against sudden
aggression of the enemy, the Government of the republic hopes to
prove that France does not bear, any more than Russia, the
responsibility for the attack.
"In order to be convinced of this, it is sufficient to compare
the steps taken on the two sides of our frontier; in France
soldiers who were on leave were not recalled until we were
certain that Germany had done so five days before.
"In Germany, not only have the garrison troops of Metz been
pushed up to the frontier, but they have been reenforced by units
transported by train from garrisons of the interior such as
Trèves or Cologne; nothing like this has been done in France.
"The arming of the frontier defenses (clearing of trees, placing
of armament, construction of batteries, and strengthening of wire
entanglements) was begun in Germany on Saturday, the 25th; with
us it is going to be begun, for France can no longer refrain from
taking similar measures.
"The railway stations were occupied by the military in Germany on
Saturday, the 25th; in France on Tuesday, the 28th.
"Finally, in Germany the reservists by tens of thousands have
been recalled by individual summons, those living abroad (the
classes of 1903 to 1911) have been recalled, the officers of
reserve have been summoned; in the interior the roads are closed,
motor cars only circulate with permits. It is the last stage
before mobilization. None of these measures has been taken in
France.
"The German army has its outposts on our frontier; on two
occasions yesterday German patrols penetrated our territory. The
whole Sixteenth Army Corps from Metz, reenforced by part of the
Eighth from Trèves and Cologne, occupies the frontier from Metz
to Luxemburg; the Fifteenth Army Corps from Strassburg is massed
on the frontier.
"Under penalty of being shot, the inhabitants of the annexed
parts of Alsace-Lorraine are forbidden to cross the frontier."
FRIDAY, JULY 31, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Berchtold, Minister
for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the ambassador at Berlin, Count
Szögyény, an account of the discussion on the 30th inst. between Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the German
Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky.
The ambassador was instructed to thank Secretary of State von Jagow
for communications made to Austria-Hungary
"and to declare to him that in spite of the change in the
situation which has since arisen through the mobilization of
Russia, we are quite prepared to entertain the proposal of Sir
Edward Grey to negotiate between us and Serbia.
"The conditions of our acceptance are, nevertheless, that our
military action against Serbia should continue to take its
course, and that the British Cabinet should move the Russian
Government to bring to a standstill the Russian mobilization
which is directed against us, in which case, of course, we will
also at once cancel the defensive military countermeasures in
Galicia, which are occasioned by the Russian attitude."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg:
"The order for the general mobilization of the entire [Russian]
army and fleet was issued early to-day."
Count Berchtold notified the Austro-Hungarian representatives
abroad:
"As mobilization has been ordered by the Russian Government on
our frontier, we find ourselves obliged to take military measures
in Galicia.
"These measures are purely of a defensive character and arise
exclusively under the pressure of the Russian measures, which we
regret exceedingly, as we ourselves have no aggressive intentions
of any kind against Russia, and desire the continuation of the
former neighborly relations.
"_Pourparlers_ between the Cabinets at Vienna and St. Petersburg
appropriate to the situation are meanwhile being continued, and
from these we hope that things will quiet down all around."
Ambassador Szécsen telegraphed from Paris that the German Ambassador
had officially declared to France
"that if the general mobilization ordered by the Russian
Government is not stopped within twelve hours, Germany also will
mobilize. At the same time Baron Schoen has asked whether France
will remain neutral in the event of a war between Germany and
Russia. An answer to this is requested within eighteen hours. The
time limit expires to-morrow (Saturday) at one o'clock in the
afternoon."
Ambassador Szápáry telegraphed from St. Petersburg that he had
resumed conversations with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, but that the "points of view on the two sides had not
materially approximated to each other."
"Meanwhile, however, it has appeared from the conversations
between the German Ambassador [Count Pourtalès] and M. Sazonof
that Russia will not accept as satisfactory the formal
declaration that Austria-Hungary will neither diminish the
territory of the Serbian Kingdom nor infringe on Serbian
sovereignty, nor injure Russian interests in the Balkans or
elsewhere; since then, moreover, a general mobilization has been
ordered on the part of Russia."
FURTHER EXCHANGES BETWEEN WILLIAM AND NICHOLAS
_Germany._ The Czar sent the following telegram to William II:
"I thank you cordially for your mediation, which permits the hope
that everything may yet end peaceably. It is technically
impossible to discontinue our military preparations, which have
been made necessary by the Austrian mobilization. It is far from
us to want war. As long as the negotiations between Austria and
Serbia continue, my troops will undertake no provocative action.
I give you my solemn word thereon. I confide with all my faith in
the grace of God, and I hope for the success of your mediation in
Vienna for the welfare of our countries and the peace of Europe."
This telegram of the Czar crossed with the following sent by the
Kaiser, at 2 p. m.:
"Upon your appeal to my friendship and your request for my aid, I
have engaged in mediation between your Government and the
Government of Austria-Hungary. While this action was taking place
your troops were being mobilized against my ally,
Austria-Hungary, whereby, as I have already communicated to you,
my mediation has become almost illusory. In spite of this I have
continued it, and now I receive reliable news that serious
preparations for war are going on on my eastern frontier. The
responsibility for the security of my country forces me to
measures of defense. I have gone to the extreme limit of the
possible in my efforts for the preservation of the peace of the
world. It is not I who bear the responsibility for the misfortune
which now threatens the entire civilized world. It rests in your
hand to avert it. No one threatens the honor and peace of Russia
which might well have awaited the success of my mediation. The
friendship for you and your country, bequeathed to me by my
grandfather on his deathbed, has always been sacred to me, and I
have stood faithfully by Russia while it was in serious
affliction, especially during its last war. The peace of Europe
can still be preserved by you if Russia decides to discontinue
those military preparations which menace Germany and
Austria-Hungary."
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador
Von Flotow at Rome:
"We have continued to negotiate between Russia and
Austria-Hungary through a direct exchange of telegrams between
his Majesty the Kaiser and his Majesty the Czar, as well as in
conjunction with Sir Edward Grey. Through the mobilization of
Russia all our efforts have been greatly handicapped, if they
have not become impossible. In spite of pacifying assurances
Russia is taking such far-reaching measures against us that the
situation is becoming continually menacing."
The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Pourtalès at St.
Petersburg:
"In spite of negotiations still pending, and although we have up
to this hour made no preparations for mobilization, Russia has
mobilized her _entire_ army and navy, hence also against us. On
account of these Russian measures we have been forced, for the
safety of the country, to proclaim the threatening state of war,
which does not yet imply mobilization. Mobilization, however, is
bound to follow if Russia does not stop every measure of war
against us and against Austria-Hungary within twelve hours, and
notifies us definitely to this effect. Please to communicate this
at once to M. Sazonof and wire hour of communication."
The German White Book states that Count Pourtalès delivered the note
at midnight of this day (July 31).
"The reply of the Russian Government has _never_ reached us.
"_Two hours after the expiration of the time limit_ the czar
telegraphed the kaiser as follows:
"I have received your telegram. I comprehend that you are forced
to mobilize, but I should like to have from you the same guaranty
which I have given to you, viz., that these measures do not mean
war, and that we shall continue to negotiate for the welfare of
our two countries and the universal peace which is so dear to our
hearts. With the aid of God it must be possible to our
long-tried friendship to prevent the shedding of blood. I expect
with full confidence your urgent reply."
The Chancellor telegraphed to Ambassador Schoen at Paris:
"Russia has ordered mobilization of her entire army and fleet,
therefore also against us in spite of our still pending
mediation. We have, therefore, declared the threatening state of
war which is bound to be followed by mobilization unless Russia
stops within twelve hours all measures of war against us and
Austria. Mobilization inevitably implies war. Please ask French
Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German
war. Reply must be made in eighteen hours. Wire at once hour of
inquiry. Utmost speed necessary."
William II telegraphed to George V of Great Britain:
"Many thanks for your friendly communication. Your proposals
coincide with my ideas and with the communication which I have
this evening received from Vienna, and which I have passed on to
London. I have just heard from the chancellor that intelligence
has just reached him that Nicholas this evening has ordered the
mobilization of his entire army and fleet. He has not even
awaited the result of the mediation in which I am engaged, and he
has left me completely without information. I am traveling to
Berlin to assure the safety of my eastern frontier, where strong
Russian forces have already taken up their position."
_Russia._ M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M.
Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St. Petersburg:
"In spite of the general mobilization, my exchange of views with
Count Berchtold and his colleagues continues. They all dwell upon
the absence on Austria's part of any hostile intentions
whatsoever against Russia, and of any designs of conquest at the
expense of Serbia, but they are all equally insistent that
Austria is bound to carry through the action which she has begun
and to give Serbia a serious lesson, which would constitute a
sure guaranty for the future."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey,
Secretary for Foreign Affairs:
"The [German] Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] informs me that his
efforts to preach peace and moderation at Vienna have been
seriously handicapped by the Russian mobilization against
Austria. He has done everything possible to attain his object at
Vienna, perhaps even rather more than was altogether palatable at
the Ballplatz. He could not, however, leave his country
defenseless while time was being utilized by other powers; and
if, as he learns the case, military measures are now being taken
by Russia against Germany also, it would be impossible for him to
remain quiet. He wished to tell me that it was quite possible
that in a very short time, to-day perhaps, the German Government
would take some very serious step; he was, in fact, just on the
point of going to have an audience with the emperor.
"His excellency added that the news of the active preparations on
the Russo-German frontier had reached him just when the czar had
appealed to the emperor, in the name of their old friendship, to
mediate at Vienna, and when the emperor was actually conforming
to that request."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that a
conversation had taken place between Austria and Russia at Vienna,
and that one at St. Petersburg had been authorized by the Austrian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, in which Austria
would explain the ultimatum to Serbia and discuss any questions
directly affecting Austro-Russian relations.
"I informed the German Ambassador that, as regards military
preparations, I did not see how Russia could be urged to suspend
them unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance of her
troops into Serbia."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin his hope for a
satisfactory result from the Austro-Russian conversations.
"The stumblingblock hitherto has been Austrian mistrust of
Serbian assurances, and Russian mistrust of Austrian intentions
with regard to the independence and integrity of Serbia. It has
occurred to me that, in the event of this mistrust preventing a
solution being found by Vienna and St. Petersburg, Germany might
sound Vienna, and I would undertake to sound St. Petersburg,
whether it would be possible for the four disinterested powers to
offer to Austria that they would undertake to see that she
obtained full satisfaction of her demands on Serbia, provided
that they did not impair Serbian sovereignty and the integrity of
Serbian territory. As your excellency is aware, Austria has
already declared her willingness to respect them. Russia might be
informed by the four powers that they would undertake to prevent
Austrian demands going the length of impairing Serbian
sovereignty and integrity. All powers would of course suspend
further military operations or preparations.
"You may sound the Secretary of State [Von Jagow] about this
proposal.
"I said to German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] this morning
that if Germany could get any reasonable proposal put forward
which made it clear that Germany and Austria were striving to
preserve European peace, and that Russia and France would be
unreasonable if they rejected it, I would support it at St.
Petersburg and Paris, and go the length of saying that if Russia
and France would not accept it his majesty's Government would
have nothing more to do with the consequences; but, otherwise, I
told German Ambassador that if France became involved we should
be drawn in.
"You can add this when sounding Chancellor [Bethmann-Hollweg] or
Secretary of State as to proposal above."
Goschen telegraphed Grey that the whole Russian army and fleet were
mobilizing, and that _Kriegsgefahr_ (imminence of war) will be
proclaimed at once by Germany, as it can be only against her that
Russian general mobilization is directed. German mobilization would
follow almost immediately.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg that Russian
general mobilization had been ordered because of news from Vienna
"that Austria is determined not to yield to intervention of
powers, and that she is moving troops against Russia as well as
against Serbia.
"Russia has also reason to believe that Germany is making active
military preparations, and she cannot afford to let her get a
start."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"I still trust that situation is not irretrievable, but in view
of mobilization in Germany it becomes essential to his majesty's
Government, in view of existing treaties, to ask whether French
Government are prepared to engage to respect neutrality of
Belgium so long as no other power violates it."
The same telegram, with change of words, "French Government" to
"German Government," was sent to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin. Grey
asked Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Brussels, to inform M.
Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, of these telegrams,
and to say:
"I assume that the Belgian Government will maintain to the utmost
of their power their neutrality, which I desire and expect other
powers to uphold and observe."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"Nobody here feels that in this dispute, so far as it has yet
gone, British treaties or obligations are involved. Feeling is
quite different from what it was during the Morocco question.
That crisis involved a dispute directly involving France, whereas
in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which is not
hers.
"I believe it to be quite untrue that our attitude has been a
decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our
neutrality.
"We cannot undertake a definite pledge to intervene in a war. I
have so told the French Ambassador, who has urged his majesty's
Government to reconsider this decision.
"I have told him that we should not be justified in giving any
pledge at the present moment, but that we will certainly consider
the situation again directly there is a new development."
Bertie telegraphed to Grey that German Ambassador von Schoen had
just informed M. Viviani, French Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
Germany had addressed an ultimatum to Russia to demobilize, saying
that, if it were not complied with within twenty-four hours,
Germany would order complete mobilization on Russian and French
frontiers. Viviani wishes to know what, in these circumstances, will
be Great Britain's attitude.
"German Ambassador is going to call at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to-morrow at 1 p. m. in order to receive the French
Government's answer as to their attitude."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bertie at Paris that French
Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin had reported to M. Paul Cambon,
French Ambassador at London, that uncertainty of Great Britain's
intervention was encouraging Germany in her warlike attitude, and
that a definite declaration by Great Britain on the side of Russia
and France would decide the German attitude in favor of peace.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed from St. Petersburg the following
proposition (sent also to France), made by M. Sazonof, Russian
Minister for Foreign Affairs: