Serbian territory; if, recognizing that the dispute between
Austria and Serbia has assumed a character of European interest,
she will allow the great powers to look into the matter and
determine whether Serbia could satisfy the Austro-Hungarian
Government without impairing her rights as a sovereign state of
her independence, Russia will undertake to maintain her waiting
attitude."
M. Sazonof adduced the latest telegram of Nicholas II to William II
as proof of sincerity of Russia's attitude. He proposed that the
conference of the powers be held in London. He was grateful to Great
Britain; if peace were secured, it would be due largely to her
efforts; Russia would never forget her firm attitude.
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin that he had spent an hour
with Secretary of State von Jagow, urging him to accept Grey's
proposal to make another effort to prevent the terrible catastrophe
of a European war.
"He appreciated your continued efforts to maintain peace, but
said it was impossible for the Imperial Government to consider
any proposal until they had received an answer from Russia to
their communication of to-day [the ultimatum].
"I asked his excellency why they had made their demand even more
difficult for Russia to accept by asking them to demobilize in
south as well. He replied that it was in order to prevent Russia
from saying all her mobilization was directed only against
Austria.
"His excellency said that if the answer from Russia was
satisfactory he thought personally that your proposal merited
favorable consideration, and in any case he would lay it before
the emperor and chancellor.
"He again assured me that both the Emperor William, at the
request of the Emperor of Russia, and the German Foreign Office
had even up till last night been urging Austria to show
willingness to continue discussions--and telegraphic and the
telephonic communications from Vienna had been of a promising
nature--but Russia's mobilization had spoilt everything."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that he had presented to M.
Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Grey's inquiry concerning
France respecting Belgian neutrality.
"He is urgently anxious as to what the attitude of England will
be in the circumstances [which may arise from Germany's ultimatum
to Russia.]"
The German Embassy is packing up.
In a supplementary telegram Bertie informed Grey:
"French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of
Belgium, and it would be only in the event of some other power
violating that neutrality that France might find herself under
the necessity, in order to assure defense of her own security, to
act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times.
President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the
Belgians, and the French Minister at Brussels has spontaneously
renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs
to-day."
_France._ Raymond Poincaré, President of France, informed George V
that Germany was pushing forward military preparations, especially
on the French frontier, while France had till now confined herself
to indispensable precautionary measures.
"We are, in spite of the moderation of the Government of the
Republic and the calm of public opinion, on the eve of the most
terrible events.
"From all the information which reaches us it would seem that war
would be inevitable if Germany were convinced that the British
Government would not intervene in a conflict in which France
might be engaged; if on the other hand, Germany were convinced
that the _entente cordiale_ would be affirmed, in case of need,
even to the extent of taking the field side by side, there would
be the greatest chance that peace would remain unbroken.
"It is true that our military and naval arrangements leave
complete liberty to your majesty's Government, and that, in the
letters exchanged in 1912 between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul
Cambon, Great Britain and France entered into nothing more than a
mutual agreement to consult one another in the event of European
tension, and to examine in concert whether common action were
advisable.
"But the character of close friendship which public feeling has
given in both countries to the _entente_ between Great Britain
and France, the confidence with which our two governments have
never ceased to work for the maintenance of peace, and the signs
of sympathy which your majesty has ever shown to France, justify
me in informing you quite frankly of the impressions of all
France.
"It is, I consider, on the language and the action of the British
Government that henceforward the last chances of a peaceful
settlement depend.
"We, ourselves, from the initial stages of the crisis, have
enjoined upon our ally [Russia] an attitude of moderation from
which they have not swerved. In concert with your majesty's
Government, and in conformity with Sir E. Grey's latest
suggestions, we will continue to act on the same lines.
"But if all efforts at conciliation emanate from one side, and if
Germany and Austria can speculate on the abstention of Great
Britain, Austria's demands will remain inflexible, and an
agreement between her and Russia will become impossible. I am
profoundly convinced that at the present moment, the more Great
Britain, France and Russia can give a deep impression that they
are united in their diplomatic action, the more possible will it
be to count upon the preservation of peace.
"I beg that your majesty will excuse a step which is inspired
only by the hope of seeing the European balance of power
definitely reaffirmed."
Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London of Grey's reply to
Germany on attitude of Great Britain in event of European war.
"The Cabinet Council took place this morning. After having
examined the situation, the Cabinet thought that for the moment
the British Government were unable to guarantee to us their
intervention; that they intended to take steps to obtain from
Germany and France an understanding to respect Belgian
neutrality; but that before considering intervention it was
necessary to wait for the situation to develop.
"I asked Sir E. Grey if, before intervening, the British
Government would await the invasion of French territory. I
insisted on the fact that the measures already taken on our
frontier by Germany showed an intention to attack in the near
future, and that, if a renewal of the mistake of Europe in 1870
was to be avoided, Great Britain should consider at once the
circumstances in which she would give France the help on which
she relied.
"Sir E. Grey replied that the opinion of the Cabinet on the
situation had been formed only at the moment; that the situation
might be modified; and that in that case a meeting of the Cabinet
would be called at once in order to consider it.
"I am informed that the Cabinet will meet again to-morrow, and
that the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will be certain
to renew the discussion.
"The letter which the President of the Republic has addressed to
the King of England should be given to the king this evening.
This step will, I am sure, be taken into serious consideration by
the British Cabinet."
M. Viviani notified the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, of France's agreement to the proposal of
Great Britain to Austria-Hungary not to proceed further against
Serbia after occupying Belgrade, and to await mediation by the
powers.
"Sir E. Grey made this suggestion in the hope that military
preparations would be suspended on all sides."
Russia had already agreed to stop military preparations if Austria
eliminated from her ultimatum to Serbia all points which endanger
Serbian sovereignty.
"Sir E. Grey thinks that, if Austria stops her advance after the
occupation of Belgrade, the Russian Government could agree to
change their formula in the following way:
"That the powers would examine how Serbia should give complete
satisfaction to Austria without endangering the sovereignty or
independence of the kingdom. In case Austria should declare
herself ready, in the interests of Europe, to stop her advance
and to discuss how an arrangement might be arrived at, Russia
could also consent to the discussion and suspend her military
preparations, provided that the other powers acted in the same
way."
M. Viviani telegraphed to the Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, and Constantinople that negotiations had begun
again between Austria and Russia, the latter having accepted the
formula advised by Great Britain.
"Nevertheless ... Germany ... has not ceased to encourage the
uncompromising attitude of Vienna; the German military
preparations continue; the immediate opposition of Germany to the
Russian formula was declared at Berlin inacceptable for Austria
before that power had even been consulted; in conclusion, all the
impressions derived from Berlin bring conviction that Germany has
sought to humiliate Russia, to disintegrate the Triple Entente,
and if these results can not be obtained, to make war."
Ambassador Dumaine telegraphed from Vienna:
"General mobilization for all men from nineteen to forty-two
years of age was declared by the Austro-Hungarian Government this
morning at one o'clock.
"My Russian colleague [M. Schebeko] still thinks that this step
is not entirely in contradiction to the declaration made
yesterday by Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs]."
Ambassador Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin that Secretary of
State von Jagow had informed him that, in the face of total
mobilization by Russia, Germany had declared _Kriegsgefahrzustand_
(imminence of war). German Ambassador Schoen had been instructed to
ask France what attitude she intended to adopt.
M. Viviani informed Ambassador Paléologue at St. Petersburg of the
Schoen interview and the ultimatum he had delivered, to be replied
to on the morrow (Saturday) at 1 p. m.
"I shall confine myself to telling him that France will have
regard to her interests. The Government of the Republic need not
indeed give any account of her intentions except to her ally.
"I ask you to inform M. Sazonof [Minister for Foreign Affairs] of
this immediately. As I have already told you, I have no doubt
that the Imperial Government, in the highest interests of peace,
will do everything on their part to avoid anything that might
render inevitable or precipitate the crisis."
Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels that _L'Agence Havas_
having announced the proclamation of "imminence of war" in Germany,
he had assured M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, that
France would respect Belgian neutrality.
"The Russian and British Ministers appeared much pleased that in
the circumstances I gave this assurance, which further, as the
British Minister told me, was in accordance with the declaration
of Sir E. Grey."
_Belgium._ M. Davignon reported the above interview to the Belgian
Ministers at Berlin, Paris, and London, giving the exact words of
the French Minister:
"No incursion of French troops into Belgium will take place, even
if considerable forces are massed upon the frontiers of your
country. France does not wish to incur the responsibility, so far
as Belgium is concerned, of taking the first hostile act.
"I thanked M. Klobukowski, and I felt bound to observe that we
had always had the greatest confidence in the loyal observance by
both our neighboring states of their engagements toward us. We
have also every reason to believe that the attitude of the German
Government will be the same as that of the Government of the
French Republic."
M. Davignon telegraphed to all the Belgian Legations abroad:
"The Minister of War informs me that [Belgian] mobilization has
been ordered, and that Saturday, August 1, will be the first
day."
He telegraphed to the Belgian Ministers at Berlin, London, and
Paris, that the British Minster had reported Sir Edward Grey's
inquiry to France and Germany if they would respect Belgian
neutrality, and now formally states that he presumes--
"that Belgium will do her utmost to maintain her neutrality, and
that she desires and expects that the other powers will respect
and maintain it.
"I thanked Sir Francis Villiers for this communication, which the
Belgian Government particularly appreciate, and I added that
Great Britain and the other nations guaranteeing our independence
could rest assured that we would neglect no effort to maintain
our neutrality, and that we were convinced that the other powers,
in view of the excellent relations of friendship and confidence
which had always existed between us, would respect and maintain
that neutrality.
"I stated that our military forces, which had been considerably
developed in consequence of our recent reorganization, were
sufficient to enable us to defend ourselves energetically in the
event of the violation of our territory.
"In the course of the ensuing conversation, Sir Francis seemed to
me somewhat surprised at the speed with which we had decided to
mobilize our army. I pointed out to him that the Netherlands had
come to a similar decision before we had done so, and that,
moreover, the recent date of our new military system, and the
temporary nature of the measures upon which we then had to
decide, made it necessary for us to take immediate and thorough
precautions. Our neighbors and guarantors should see in this
decision our strong desire to uphold our neutrality ourselves.
"Sir Francis seemed to be satisfied with my reply, and stated
that his Government were awaiting this reply before continuing
negotiations with France and Germany, the result of which would
be communicated to me."
He telegraphed to the same ministers that the German Minister, Herr
von Below Saleske, had been informed of Belgium's military measures,
and that it was explained to him
"a consequence of our desire to fulfill our international
obligations, and that they in no wise implied an attitude of
distrust toward our neighbors."
The German Minister was reminded of instructions his Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, had given to his predecessor, Herr von Flotow.
"In the course of the controversy which arose in 1911 as a
consequence of the Dutch scheme for the fortification of
Flushing, certain newspapers had maintained that in the case of a
Franco-German war Belgian neutrality would be violated by
Germany.
"The [Belgian] Department of Foreign Affairs had suggested that a
declaration in the German Parliament during a debate on foreign
affairs would serve to calm public opinion, and to dispel the
mistrust which was so regrettable from the point of view of the
relations between the two countries.
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg replied that he had fully appreciated
the feelings which had inspired our representations. He declared
that Germany had no intention of violating Belgian neutrality,
but he considered that in making a public declaration Germany
would weaken her military position in regard to France, who,
secured on the northern side, would concentrate all her energies
on the east.
"Since then, in 1913, Herr von Jagow [German Secretary of State]
had made reassuring declarations to the Budget Commission of the
Reichstag respecting the maintenance of Belgian neutrality.
"Herr von Below replied that he knew of the conversation with
Herr von Flotow, and that he was certain that the sentiments
expressed at that time had not changed."
SATURDAY, AUGUST 1, 1914
_Austria._ On the following day Count Szápáry, Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign
Affairs, an interview with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.
"I first warned M. Sazonof," said the count, "that in interpreting
my instructions to him I must leave out of account the new condition
of affairs in Vienna created by the general Russian mobilization. I
then said that it was a mistake that Austria had declined further
negotiations with Russia.
"Your excellency was not only quite prepared to deal with Russia
on the broadest basis possible, but was also especially inclined
to subject the text of our note to a discussion so far as its
interpretation was concerned.
"I could only hope that the course of events had not already
taken us too far; in any case, I regarded it as my duty in the
present moment of extreme anxiety to prove once again the good
will of the Imperial and Royal Government. M. Sazonof replied
that he took note with satisfaction of this proof of good will,
but he desired to draw my attention to the fact that negotiations
at St. Petersburg for obvious reasons appeared to promise less
prospect of success than negotiations on the neutral _terrain_ of
London. I replied that your excellency, started from the point of
view that direct contact should be maintained at St. Petersburg,
so that I was not in a position to commit myself with regard to
his suggestion as to London, but I would communicate on the
subject with your excellency."
_Germany._ The German White Book states:
"As the time limit given to Russia had expired without the
receipt of a reply to our inquiry, the kaiser ordered the
mobilization of the entire German army and navy on August 1, at 5
p. m.
"The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Count Pourtalès] was
instructed that, in the event of the Russian Government not
giving a satisfactory reply within the stipulated time he should
declare that we considered ourselves in a state of war after the
refusal of our demands. [He so declared at 5 p. m.] However,
before a confirmation of the execution of this order had been
received, that is to say, already in the afternoon of August 1,
Russian troops crossed our frontier and marched into German
territory.
"Thus Russia began the war against us.
"The French Prime Minister [M. Viviani] gave an equivocal and
unsatisfactory reply on August 1 at 1 p. m., which gave no clear
idea of the position of France, as he limited himself to the
explanation that France would do that which her interests
demanded. A few hours later, at 5 p. m., the mobilization of the
entire French army and navy was ordered.
"On the morning of the next day France opened hostilities."
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg telegraphed to Ambassador Lichnowsky
at London:
"Germany is ready to agree to the English proposal in the event
of England guaranteeing with all her forces the unconditional
neutrality of France in the conflict between Germany and Russia.
Owing to the Russian challenge German mobilization occurred
to-day before the English proposals were received. In consequence
our advance to the French frontier cannot now be altered. We
guarantee, however, that the French frontier will not be crossed
by our troops until Monday, August 3, at 7 p. m., in case
England's assent is received by that time."
Lichnowsky answered that Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, had asked him
"whether I thought I could declare that in the event of France
remaining neutral in a German-Russian war we would not attack the
French. I told him that I believed that I could assume
responsibility for this."
At 5.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed that Grey had just read to
him the following unanimous declaration of the British Cabinet:
"The reply of the German Government with regard to the neutrality
of Belgium is a matter of very great regret, because the
neutrality of Belgium does affect feeling in this country. If
Germany could see her way to give the same positive reply as that
which has been given by France, it would materially contribute to
relieve anxiety and tension here, while, on the other hand, if
there were a violation of the neutrality of Belgium by one
combatant while the other respected it, it would be extremely
difficult to restrain public feeling in this country.
"On my question whether, on condition that we would maintain the
neutrality of Belgium, he could give me a definite declaration
with regard to the neutrality of Great Britain, the minister
answered that that was impossible, but that this question would
play a great part in public opinion in this country. If we
violated Belgian neutrality in a war with France there would
certainly be a change in public opinion which would make it
difficult for the Cabinet here to maintain friendly neutrality.
For the time there was not the slightest intention to proceed in
a hostile manner against us. It would be their desire to avoid
this if there was any possibility of doing so. It was, however,
difficult to draw a line up to which we could go without
intervention on this side. He turned again and again to Belgian
neutrality, and was of opinion that this question would also play
a great part.
"He had also thought whether it was not possible that we and
France should, in case of a Russian war, stand armed opposite to
one another without attacking. I asked him if he would be in a
position to arrange that France would assent to an agreement of
this kind. As we wanted neither to destroy France nor to annex
portions of French territory, I could think that we would give
our assent to an arrangement of this kind which would secure for
us the neutrality of Great Britain. The minister said he would
make inquiries; he also recognized the difficulties of holding
back the military on both sides."
At 8.30 p. m. the ambassador telegraphed:
"My communication of this morning is canceled by my communication
of this evening. As there is no positive English proposal before
us, any further step in the sense of the message I sent is
superfluous."
At 7.10 p. m. Ambassador Pourtalès presented at St. Petersburg a
note repeating the ultimatum of July 31, and closing:
"Russia having refused to comply with [not having considered it
necessary to answer*] this demand, and having shown by this
refusal [this attitude*] that her action was directed against
Germany, I have the honor, on the instructions of my Government,
to inform your excellency as follows:
"His majesty the emperor, my august sovereign, in the name of the
German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at
war with Russia.
"* The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be
supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and
that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note."
_Russia._ A secret telegram was sent to Russian representatives
abroad announcing Germany's ultimatum delivered at midnight, and
stating the German Ambassador's reply to the inquiry if it meant
war: "No, but we are very near it."
Ambassador Benckendorff telegraphed from London that Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, hoped that no great power would
open hostilities before the formula for a peaceful settlement of the
disputes, accepted by Russia and offered to Germany, had been
considered. Later he telegraphed that France had agreed to respect
the neutrality of Belgium, but that Germany had stated she could
give no definite answer to the question.
Ambassador Isvolsky telegraphed from Paris:
"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] yesterday visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] and declared to him that
Austria, far from harboring any designs against the integrity of
Serbia, was in fact ready to discuss the grounds of her
grievances against Serbia with the other powers. The French
Government are much exercised at Germany's extraordinary
military activity on the French frontier, for they are convinced
that, under the guise of _Kriegszustand_, mobilization is in
reality being carried out."
Later he telegraphed that, hearing from St. Petersburg of the German
order of general mobilization, President Poincaré had signed the
order for French mobilization.
"The German Ambassador [Baron von Schoen] has just visited
Viviani [Minister for Foreign Affairs] but told him nothing
fresh, alleging the impossibility of deciphering the telegrams he
has received. Viviani informed him of the signature of the order
for mobilization issued in reply to that of Germany, and
expressed to him his amazement that Germany should have taken
such a step at a moment when a friendly exchange of views was
still in progress between Russia, Austria, and the powers. He
added that mobilization did not necessarily entail war, and that
the German Ambassador might stay in Paris as the Russian
Ambassador had remained in Vienna and the Austrian Ambassador in
St. Petersburg."
_Great Britain._ George V sent the following telegram to William II:
"Many thanks for your telegram of last night. I have sent an
urgent telegram to Nicholas, in which I have assured him of my
readiness to do everything in my power to further the resumption
of the negotiations between the powers concerned."
Upon receipt of the telegram from the German Kaiser of August 1,
King George replied that there must be a misunderstanding in regard
to the suggestion of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, made to the
German Ambassador, respecting avoidance of conflict between Germany
and France, while the possibility remained of an agreement being
arrived at between Austria and Russia.
"Sir Edward Grey will see Prince Lichnowsky early to-morrow
morning in order to ascertain whether there is any
misunderstanding on his side."
King George replied to the letter of President Poincaré of July 31,
assuring him of cooperation of their two Governments in the interest
of peace.
"I admire the restraint which you and your Government are
exercising in not adopting an attitude which could in any wise be
interpreted as a provocative one."
Grey sent a personal message from King George to Nicholas II in
which he appealed to the czar to remove the misunderstanding that
had evidently produced the deadlock between Russia and Germany, and
offered his assistance in reopening the conversations between Russia
and Austria.
The Czar replied to King George that attempts at peace had been that
afternoon rendered futile by Germany's declaration of war, which was
wholly unexpected by him, since he had given William II "most
categorical assurances that my troops would not move so long as
mediation negotiations continued."
"In this solemn hour I wish to assure you once more that I have
done all in my power to avert war. Now that it has been forced on
me, I trust your country will not fail to support France and
Russia. God bless and protect you."
Ambassador Bertie, telegraphing from Paris, reported an interview
that morning between the French Political Director and German
Ambassador Schoen.
"M. Berthelot pointed out that general mobilization in Russia had
not been ordered until after Austria had decreed a general
mobilization, and that the Russian Government were ready to
demobilize if all powers did likewise. It seemed strange to the
French Government that in view of this and of the fact that
Russia and Austria were ready to converse, the German Government
should have at that moment presented an ultimatum at St.
Petersburg requiring immediate demobilization by Russia. There
were no differences at issue between France and Germany, but the
German Ambassador had made a menacing communication to the French
Government and had requested an answer the next day, intimating
that he would have to break off relations and leave Paris if the
reply were not satisfactory. The French Government considered
that this was an extraordinary proceeding.
"The German Ambassador, who is to see the Minister for Foreign
Affairs again this evening, said nothing about demanding his
passports, but he stated that he had packed up."
Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed from Vienna that a general
mobilization of the Austro-Hungarian army and fleet had been
ordered. Minister Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:
"Belgium expects and desires that other powers will observe and
uphold her neutrality, which she intends to maintain to the
utmost of her power. In so informing me, Minister for Foreign
Affairs [Davignon] said that they believed that they were in a
position to defend themselves against intrusion. The relations
between Belgium and her neighbors were excellent, and there was
no reason to suspect their intentions; but he thought it well,
nevertheless, to be prepared against emergencies."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Goschen at Berlin that the Hamburg
authorities had detained British merchant ships on unknown grounds,
and instructed him to request the German Government to order their
release.
"The effect on public opinion here will be deplorable unless this
is done. His majesty's Government, on their side, are most
anxious to avoid any incident of an aggressive nature, and the
German Government will, I hope, be equally careful not to take
any step which would make the situation between us impossible."
Later Grey telegraphed Goschen that he still believed it possible to
secure peace if a little respite could be gained before any great
power began war. Russia and Austria had at last agreed to accept a
basis of mediation which is not open to objections raised to the
original Russian formula.
"Things ought not to be hopeless so long as Austria and Russia
are ready to converse, and I hope the German Government may be
able to make use of the Russian communications referred to, in
order to avoid tension. His majesty's Government are carefully
abstaining from any act which may precipitate matters."
In following telegrams Grey sent Goschen the Russian formula as
amended by himself, and the acceptance of the same by Russia.
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris information received from
President Poincaré of German mobilization, etc., and Russia's desire
to continue pacific conversations with Germany.
"The French Government, whose wishes are markedly pacific,
sincerely desire the preservation of peace and do not quite
despair, even now, of its being possible to avoid war."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Buchanan at St. Petersburg that
reliable news had come from Vienna that the Austro-Hungarian
Government,
"though the situation has been changed by the mobilization of
Russia, would, in full appreciation of the efforts of England for
the preservation of peace, be ready to consider favorably my
proposal for mediation between Austria and Serbia. The effect of
this acceptance would naturally be that the Austrian military
action against Serbia would continue for the present, and that
the British Government would urge upon Russian Government to stop
the mobilization of troops directed against Austria, in which
case Austria would naturally cancel those defensive military
countermeasures in Galicia, which have been forced upon Austria
by Russian mobilization.
"You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Sazonof] and
say that if, in the consideration of the acceptance of mediation
by Austria, Russia can agree to stop mobilization, it appears
still to be possible to preserve peace. Presumably the matter
should be discussed with German Government also by Russian
Government."
Ambassador Bertie telegraphed from Paris that orders for general
mobilization had been given at 3.30 p. m., in answer to the German
_Kriegsgefahrzustand_ (imminence of war), which, by calling out
troops up to war strength, is tantamount to mobilization.
"The Minister of War is anxious that it should be explained that
this act of mobilization is one for purely defensive purposes."
Grey telegraphed to Ambassador Bunsen at Vienna an account of
interviews with the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, in which Count
Mensdorff gave him assurances that Austria would not impair the
territorial integrity or sovereignty of Serbia, and said that,
contrary to report, Austria was willing to continue conversations
with Russia.
Ambassador Buchanan telegraphed Grey of an interview that morning
with the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which M. Sazonof
recounted his conversation with Count Szápáry, the Austrian
Ambassador, the evening before, in which he proposed the London
conference.
Ambassador Bunsen telegraphed Grey from Vienna that the Russian
Ambassador, Schebeko, thought that, as mobilization is too expensive
to be continued long, Germany will attack Russia at once. Tension
now is greater between Russia and Germany than between Russia and
Austria. Russia would be satisfied, says Schebeko, with Austria's
acceptance of the new formula.
"He is going again to-day to point out to the Minister for
Foreign Affairs [Count Berchtold] that most terrific consequences
must ensue from refusal to make this slight concession. This time
Russia would fight to the last extremity. I agree with his
excellency that the German Ambassador at Vienna desired war from
the first, and that his strong personal bias probably colored his
action here. The Russian Ambassador is convinced that the German
Government also desired war from the first.
"It is the intention of the French Ambassador [Dumaine] to speak
earnestly to the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day on the
extreme danger of the situation, and to ask whether proposals to
serve as a basis of mediation from any quarter are being
considered. There is great anxiety to know what England will do.
I fear that nothing can alter the determination of
Austro-Hungarian Government to proceed on their present course,
if they have made up their mind with the approval of Germany."
Ambassador Goschen telegraphed from Berlin:
"Orders have just been issued for the general mobilization of the
navy and army, the first day of mobilization to be August 2."
Later he telegraphed that Secretary of State von Jagow had expressed
annoyance at detention of British ships at Hamburg, and promised to
order their immediate release.
_France._ M. Viviani, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, informed the
ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome of
the two _démarches_ made on the previous evening at Paris and St.
Petersburg--"the one rather vague, the other precise and
conciliatory."
"Unfortunately these [latter] arrangements which allowed one to
hope for a peaceful solution appear, in fact, to have been
rendered useless by the attitude of Germany [in presenting her
ultimatum to Russia].
"The attitude of Germany proves that she wishes for war. And she
wishes for it against France. [Here he recounted the interview
with the German Ambassador Schoen at the French Foreign Office.]
"This attitude of breaking off diplomatic relations without any
direct dispute, and although he has not received any definitely
negative answer, is characteristic of the determination of
Germany to make war against France. The want of sincerity in her
peaceful protestations is shown by the rupture which she is
forcing upon Europe at a time when Austria had at last agreed
with Russia to begin negotiations."
M. Jules Cambon, Ambassador at Berlin, reported Austria's
willingness to continue conversations with Russia.
"The ultimatum to Russia can only do away with the last chances
of peace which these conversations still seemed to leave. The
question may be asked whether in such circumstances the
acceptance by Austria was serious, and had not the object of
throwing the responsibility of the conflict on to Russia."
He told of the interviews of the British Ambassador with Secretary
of State von Jagow, in which Mr. Goschen vainly pleaded that Germany
use her influence with Austria in the cause of peace.
"Germany's ultimatum coming at the very moment when an agreement
seemed about to be established between Vienna and St. Petersburg,
is characteristic of her warlike policy."
It looks as if she desired war on her own account.
M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the ambassadors
at London and Berlin and the Minister of Brussels of his pledge to
respect Belgian neutrality as given to Great Britain.
Ambassador Barrère reported from Rome an interview of the German
Ambassador with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, in which Herr von
Flotow had asked the intentions of Italy in the present crisis.
"The Marquis di San Giuliano answered that as the war undertaken
by Austria was aggressive and did not fall within the purely
defensive character of the Triple Alliance, particularly in view
of the consequences which might result from it according to the
declaration of the German Ambassador, Italy could not take part
in the war."
M. Viviani reported to the ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg,
Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and Constantinople the visit to him at
11 a. m. of German Ambassador Schoen.
"After having recalled all the efforts made by France toward an
honorable settlement of the Austro-Serbian conflict and the
difficulty between Austria and Russia which has resulted from it,
I put him in possession of the facts as to the _pourparlers_
which have been carried on since yesterday [in reference to
Austro-Russian dispute].
"I drew attention to the attitude of Germany who, abandoning all
_pourparlers_, presented an ultimatum to Russia at the very
moment when this power had just accepted the British formula
(which implies the cessation of military preparations by all the
countries which have mobilized) and regarded as imminent a
diplomatic rupture with France.
"Baron von Schoen answered that he did not know the developments
which had taken place in this matter for the last twenty-four
hours, that there was perhaps in them a 'glimmer of hope' for
some arrangement, that he had not received any fresh
communication from his Government, and that he was going to get
information. He gave renewed protestations of his sincere desire
to unite his efforts to those of France for arriving at a
solution of the conflict. I laid stress on the serious
responsibility which the Imperial Government would assume if, in
circumstances such as these, they took an initiative which was
not justified and of a kind which would irremediably compromise
peace.
"Baron von Schoen did not allude to his immediate departure and
did not make any fresh request for an answer to his question
concerning the attitude of France in case of an Austro-Russian
conflict. He confined himself to saying of his own accord that
the attitude of France was not doubtful.
"It would not do to exaggerate the possibilities which may result
from my conversation with the German Ambassador for, on their
side, the Imperial Government continue the most dangerous
preparations on our frontier. However, we must not neglect the
possibilities, and we should not cease to work toward an
agreement. On her side France is taking all military measures
required for protection against too great an advance in German
military preparations. She considers that her attempts at
solution will only have a chance of success so far as it is felt
that she will be ready and resolute if the conflict is forced on
her."
Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London the situation between
Great Britain and Germany, especially in regard to British
neutrality and Germany's attitude toward Belgian neutrality.
"Sir Edward Grey will ask the Cabinet to authorize him to state
on Monday in the House of Commons that the British Government
will not permit a violation of Belgian neutrality.
"In the second place, the British fleet is mobilized, and Sir
Edward Grey will propose to his colleagues that he should state
that it will oppose the passage of the Straits of Dover by the
German fleet, or, if the German fleet should pass through, will
oppose any demonstration on the French coasts. These two
questions will be dealt with at the meeting on Monday. I drew the
attention of the Secretary of State to the point that, if during
this intervening period any incident took place, it was necessary
not to allow a surprise, and that it would be desirable to think
of intervening in time."
Minister Mollard presented the request from Dr. Eyschen, Minister of
State of Luxemburg, for an assurance that France would respect the
neutrality of the Grand Duchy. A similar request has been made to
Germany.
M. Viviani returned the same assurance that he had given in the case
of Belgium.
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed to
the Ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St. Petersburg
to carry out the instructions [in case of war between France and
Germany becoming imminent] of July 24; and to the Ministers at Rome,
The Hague, and Luxemburg to carry out instructions [the same] of
July 25.
SUNDAY, AUGUST 2, 1914
_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day, Ambassador Szögyény
telegraphed from Berlin that no answer had been received from Russia
to Germany's demand that she demobilize; that Russian troops had
crossed the German frontier at Schwidden (southeast of Bialla); and
that Germany therefore regarded herself at war with Russia and had
that morning given Ambassador Swerbeiev his passports.
_Germany._ Ambassador Lichnowsky telegraphed from London to
Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg that Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had given up as impracticable his
suggestions as to the possibility of creating lasting British
neutrality, which were made without previous inquiry of France and
without knowledge of mobilization.
RUSSIA EXPLAINS HER EFFORTS FOR PEACE
_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, published an
announcement respecting recent events in correction of a "garbled
version" appearing in the foreign press. This recited the
circumstances of the Austrian note of July 23 to Serbia and Serbia's
reply of the 25th.
"Russia considered that the humiliation of Serbia, involved in
these demands, and equally the evident intention of
Austria-Hungary to secure her own hegemony in the Balkans, which
underlay her conditions, were inadmissible. The Russian
Government, therefore, pointed out to Austria-Hungary in the most
friendly manner that it would be desirable to re-examine the
points contained in the Austro-Hungarian note. The
Austro-Hungarian Government did not see their way to agree to a
discussion of the note. The moderating influence of the four
powers at Vienna was equally unsuccessful....
"The Austro-Hungarian Government proceeded to mobilize and
declared war officially against Serbia, and the following day
Belgrade was bombarded. The manifesto which accompanied the
declaration of war openly accuses Serbia of having prepared and
carried out the crime of Sarajevo. Such an accusation of a crime
at common law, launched against a whole people and a whole State,
aroused, by its evident inanity, widespread sympathy for Serbia
throughout all classes of European society.
"In consequence of this behavior of the Austro-Hungarian
Government, in spite of Russia's declaration that she could not
remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia, the Russian Government
considered it necessary to order mobilization in the military
districts of Kiev, Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan. This decision was
rendered necessary by the fact that since the date when the
Austro-Hungarian note was communicated to the Serbian Government,
and since the first steps taken by Russia, five days had elapsed,
and yet the Vienna Cabinet had not taken one step to meet Russia
halfway in her efforts towards peace. Indeed, quite the contrary;
for the mobilization of half of the Austro-Hungarian army had
been ordered.
"The German Government were kept informed of the steps taken by
Russia. At the same time it was explained to them that these
steps were only the result of the Austrian preparations, and that
they were not in any way aimed at Germany. Simultaneously, the
Russian Government declared that Russia was ready to continue
discussions with a view to a peaceful settlement of the dispute,
either in the form of direct negotiations with Vienna or, as
suggested by Great Britain, in the form of a conference of the
four great powers not directly interested, that is to say, Great
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.
"This attempt on the part of Russia was, however, equally
unsuccessful. Austria-Hungary declined a further exchange of
views with Russia, and the Vienna Cabinet was unwilling to join
the proposed conference of the powers.
"Nevertheless Russia did not abandon her efforts for peace. When
questioned by the German Ambassador as to the conditions on which
we would still agree to suspend our preparations, the Minister
for Foreign Affairs declared that these conditions were Austria's
recognition that the Austro-Serbian question had assumed a
European character, and a declaration by her that she agreed not
to insist upon such of her demands as were incompatible with the
sovereign rights of Serbia.
"Germany considered this Russian proposal unacceptable to
Austria-Hungary. At that very moment news of the proclamation of
general mobilization by Austria-Hungary reached St. Petersburg.
"All this time hostilities were continuing on Serbian territory,
and Belgrade was bombarded afresh.
"The failure of our proposals for peace compelled us to extend
the scope of our precautionary military measures.
"The Berlin Cabinet questioned us on this, and we replied that
Russia was compelled to begin preparations so as to be ready for
every emergency.
"But while taking this precautionary step, Russia did not on that
account abandon her strenuous efforts to find some solution of
the situation, and she announced that she was ready to accept any
proposed settlement of the problem that might be put forward,
provided it complied with the conditions laid down by her.
"In spite of this conciliatory communication, the German
Government on July 31 demanded of the Russian Government that
they should suspend their military measures by midday on August
1, and threatened, should they fail to comply, to proceed to
general mobilization.
"On the following day, August 1, the German Ambassador, on behalf
of his Government, forwarded a declaration of war to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs."
M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian representatives abroad
"that Germany is now doing her utmost to foist upon us the
responsibility for the rupture. We were forced to mobilize by the
immense responsibility which would have fallen upon our shoulders
if we had not taken all possible precautionary measures at a time
when Austria, while confining herself to discussions of a
dilatory nature, was bombarding Belgrade and was undertaking
general mobilization.
"The Emperor of Russia had promised the German Emperor that he
would take no aggressive action as long as the discussions with
Austria continued. With such a guarantee, and after so many
proofs of Russia's desire for peace, Germany neither could, nor
had the right to, doubt our declaration that we would joyfully
accept any peaceful settlement compatible with the dignity and
independence of Serbia. Any other solution, besides being
entirely incompatible with our own dignity, would assuredly have
upset the European balance of power by securing the hegemony of
Germany. The European--nay, the world-wide--character of this
dispute is infinitely more important than the pretext from which
it springs. By her decision to declare war upon us, at a moment
when negotiations were in progress between the powers, Germany
has assumed a heavy responsibility."
_Great Britain._ Ambassador Goschen sent from Berlin two telegrams
to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, one stating that
Secretary of State von Jagow had just informed him that, owing to
certain Russian troops having crossed the frontier, Germany and
Russia were in a state of war, and the other that the reason for the
detention of British ships on the day preceding was laying of mines
and taking other precautions.
Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that a German force
had entered Luxemburg. This was confirmed by a telegram from the
Minister of State for Luxemburg, who gave details, and added:
"These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary
to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty
of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to
address an energetic protest against this aggression to the
representatives of his majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg.
An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin. [Paris was also
informed.]"
Grey telegraphed Ambassador Bertie at Paris:
"After the Cabinet this morning I gave M. Cambon [French
Ambassador in London] the following memorandum:
"I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet
comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake
hostile operations against French coasts or shipping, the British
fleet will give all the protection in its power.
"This assurance is of course subject to the policy of his
majesty's Government receiving the support of Parliament, and
must not be taken as binding his majesty's Government to take any
action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet
takes place.
"I pointed out that we had very large questions and most
difficult issues to consider, and that our Government felt that
they could not bind themselves to declare war upon Germany
necessarily if war broke out between France and Germany
to-morrow, but it was essential to the French Government, whose
fleet had long been concentrated in the Mediterranean, to know
how to make their dispositions with their north coast entirely
undefended. We therefore thought it necessary to give them this
assurance. It did not bind us to go to war with Germany unless
the German fleet took the action indicated, but it did not give a
security to France that would enable her to settle the
disposition of her own Mediterranean fleet.
"M. Cambon asked me about the violation of Luxemburg. I told him
the doctrine on that point laid down by Lord Derby and Lord
Clarendon in 1867. He asked me what we should say about the
violation of the neutrality of Belgium. I said that was a much
more important matter; we were considering what statement we
should make in Parliament to-morrow--in effect, whether we should
declare violation of Belgian neutrality to be a _casus belli_. I
told him what had been said to the German Ambassador on this
point."
_France._ Ambassador Paléologue telegraphed from St. Petersburg that
the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés was leaving the Russian
capital that day, and that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count
Szápáry had not yet received instructions from Vienna as to the
declaration of war.
M. Viviani, Minister for Foreign Affairs, notified the Ambassadors
at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, Rome, Madrid, and
Constantinople:
"This morning, French territory was violated by German troops at
Ciry and near Longwy. They are marching on the fort which bears
the latter name. Elsewhere the Custom House at Delle has twice
been fired upon. Finally, German troops have also violated this
morning the neutral territory of Luxemburg.
"You will at once use this information to lay stress on the fact
that the German Government is committing itself to acts of war
against France without provocation on our part, or any previous
declaration of war, whilst we have scrupulously respected the
zone of ten kilometers which we have maintained, even since the
mobilization, between our troops and the frontier."
Ambassador Paul Cambon reported from London Sir Edward Grey's
declaration of the British Cabinet as to protection of France by the
British fleet.
"Afterwards in speaking to me of the neutrality of Belgium and
that of Luxemburg, the Secretary of State reminded me that the
Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from
the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that Great Britain was bound
to require the observance of this latter Convention without the
assistance of the other guaranteeing powers, while with regard to
Luxemburg all the guaranteeing powers were to act in concert.
"The protection of Belgian neutrality is here considered so
important that Great Britain will regard its violation by Germany
as a _casus belli_. It is a specially British interest and there
is no doubt that the British Government, faithful to the
traditions of their policy, will insist upon it, even if the
business world in which German influence is making tenacious
efforts, exercises pressure to prevent the Government committing
itself against Germany."
M. Viviani replied to M. Paul Cambon that the promise of the British
Cabinet was "a first assistance which is most valuable to us."
"The help which Great Britain intends to give to France for the
protection of the French coasts or the French merchant marine,
will be used in such a way that our navy will also, in case of a
Franco-German conflict, be supported by the British fleet in the
Atlantic as well as in the North Sea and Channel. I would note
that British ports could not serve as places for revictualling
for the German fleet."
M. Viviani telegraphed to Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to
protest to the German Government against the violation of the French
frontier by German armed forces, as "unjustified by anything in the
present situation."
"The Government of the Republic can only leave to the Imperial
Government the entire responsibility for these acts."
M. Marcellin Pellet, Minister at the Hague, telegraphed to M.
Viviani that the German Minister had called on M. Loudon, Dutch
Minister for Foreign Affairs, to explain the necessity for the
German violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg.
_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed
to the ministers at Paris, Berlin, London, Vienna, and St.
Petersburg, that he had warned the German Minister at Brussels, Herr
von Below Saleske, that the French Minister, M. Klobukowski, would
publish the formal declaration made by the German Minister on August
1, respecting Belgian neutrality.
"When I next met Herr von Below he thanked me for this attention,
and added that up to the present he had not been instructed to
make us an official communication, but that we knew his personal
opinion as to the feelings of security, which we had the right to
entertain toward our eastern neighbors. I at once replied that
all that we knew of their intentions, as indicated in numerous
previous conversations, did not allow us to doubt their perfect
correctness toward Belgium. I added, however, that we should
attach the greatest importance to the possession of a formal
declaration, which the Belgian nation would hear of with joy and
gratitude."
Later, the German Minister presented the following "very
confidential" note to Belgium.
GERMAN DECLARATION OF INTENTIONS TOWARD BELGIUM
"Reliable information has been received by the German Government
to the effect that French forces intend to march on the line of
the Meuse by Givet and Namur. This information leaves no doubt as
to the intention of France to march through Belgian territory
against Germany.
"The German Government cannot but fear that Belgium, in spite of
the utmost good will, will be unable, without assistance, to
repel so considerable a French invasion with sufficient prospect
of success to afford an adequate guaranty against danger to
Germany. It is essential for the self-defense of Germany that she
should anticipate any such hostile attack. The German Government
would, however, feel the deepest regret if Belgium regarded as an
act of hostility against herself the fact that the measures of
Germany's opponents force Germany, for her own protection, to
enter Belgian territory.
"In order to exclude any possibility of misunderstanding, the
German Government make the following declaration:
"1. Germany has in view no act of hostility against Belgium. In
the event of Belgium being prepared in the coming war to maintain
an attitude of friendly neutrality toward Germany, the German
Government bind themselves, at the conclusion of peace, to
guarantee the possessions and independence of the Belgian Kingdom
in full.
"2. Germany undertakes, under the above-mentioned condition, to
evacuate Belgian territory on the conclusion of peace.
"3. If Belgium adopts a friendly attitude, Germany is prepared,
in cooperation with the Belgian authorities, to purchase all
necessaries for her troops against a cash payment, and to pay an
indemnity for any damage that may have been caused by German
troops.
"4. Should Belgium oppose the German troops, and in particular
should she throw difficulties in the way of their march by a
resistance of the fortresses on the Meuse, or by destroying
railways, roads, tunnels, or other similar works, Germany will,
to her regret, be compelled to consider Belgium as an enemy.
"In this event Germany can undertake no obligations toward
Belgium, but the eventual adjustment of the relations between the
two States must be left to the decision of arms.
"The German Government, however, entertain the distinct hope that
this eventuality will not occur, and that the Belgian Government
will know how to take the necessary measures to prevent the
occurrence of incidents such as those mentioned. In this case the
friendly ties which bind the two neighboring States will grow
stronger and more enduring."
MONDAY, AUGUST 3, 1914
_Serbia._ On the following day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, former Minister
to Vienna, and now at Nish, the temporary capital of Serbia, made a
long report to M. N. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, of events at
Vienna from the days following the crime of Sarajevo to his
departure from the Austrian capital. The points in this are:
SERBIA'S POSITION EXPLAINED
1. Constant police surveillance of the Serbian legation and menacing
attitude of the public.
2. Sudden change early in July of Austro-Hungarian attitude to the
Sarajevo incident. Press begins to represent it as a manifestation
of Serbian intrigue which Austria must settle, and alone, with
Serbia--eventually by war.
3. Assistance given by German Embassy to this press agitation.
4. Austrian financiers declare that "a settlement with Serbia" is
the only way out of the general financial and economic crisis
prevailing in Austria-Hungary since annexation of Bosnia. Gold
secretly and gradually withdrawn from circulation.
5. Austrian Minister of War, Krobatin, and Chief of Staff,
Hetzendorf, break leave of absence to return to Vienna, the latter
having had a conversation at Carlsbad with German Chief of Staff,
Count Moltke.
6. Reserves retained after stipulated period for maneuvers had
expired and their numbers augmented.
7. Noncommittal answers of Count Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, to
interpolations concerning Serbia in Hungarian Diet.
8. Refusal at Foreign Office in Vienna to discuss Sarajevo incident
with foreign representatives, or if subject was mentioned,
assurances that nothing would be done against Serbia to give
uneasiness to the powers, in particular Russia. Foreign ambassadors,
thus assured, quit Vienna on long leaves of absence for watering
places. All this indicates that Austria-Hungary was contemplating
sudden action, which, when a _fait accompli_, would likely be
accepted by the powers in order to avoid a general war.
9. German Ambassador, Herr von Tschirschky, the only foreign
representative informed of note to Serbia. He knew its minutest
details, and there is reason to believe he helped draft it.
10. When note was published, French, British, and Russian
representatives at Vienna asked me if it were not better to accept
the demands and avoid war for the present.
"I said that the note, which amounted in fact to a declaration of
war upon Serbia, was worded in such a way that, even if Serbia
should accept all the conditions without reserve, Austria-Hungary
would still find an excuse for her army to march into Serbia at
any time. It was in the belief that the conflict would be limited
to Serbia and Austria-Hungary that Austria-Hungary had drafted
such a note.
"The Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko [then absent from Vienna,]
previously to the presentation of the note, had stated on several
occasions to his colleagues and the Austro-Hungarian Government
that Russia could not remain indifferent to any step taken by
Austria-Hungary, which might have as an object the humiliation of
Serbia. Hence the apprehension felt by the French and British
Ambassadors and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, who at once
foresaw the possibility of war between Russia and
Austria-Hungary."
11. Expressed intention of Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian
Minister of Foreign Affairs, to chastise Serbia by arms without
consent of European concert. Belief expressed by German Ambassador
that Russia would permit this, owing to troubles in Asia, and
assurances given by him that Germany would stand by her ally in the
matter.
"These statements of Herr von Tschirschky have induced many to
hold the opinion that Germany desired to provoke a European war,
on the ground that it was better to have war with Russia before
the latter had completed her military reorganization, _i.e._,
before the spring of 1917. This point of view had formerly been
freely discussed and even written about in Vienna. 'The longer
the matter is postponed, the smaller will become the chances of
success of the Triple Alliance.' On the other hand, rumors from
the most authoritative diplomatic sources in Berlin reached me in
Vienna, to the effect that the Wilhelmstrasse [German Foreign
Office] did not approve of Austria's policy on this question,
and that Herr von Tschirschky has exceeded the instructions given
to him."
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
made a statement in the House of Commons as to the diplomatic
situation, particularly of Great Britain. The chief points in it
were:
1. The peace of Europe cannot be preserved, despite Great Britain's
earnest and consistent efforts to that end.
2. Great Britain's good faith in this matter is proved by her
actions in the Balkan crisis, where it was generally admitted she
worked for peace.
3. Parliament is free to decide on attitude of Great Britain.
Here the secretary referred to the Moroccan crisis of 1906, and said
that then he had taken the same attitude with respect to France.
"That position was accepted by the French Government, but they
said to me at the time, and I think very reasonably, 'If you
think it possible that the public opinion of Great Britain might,
should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the
armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not
be able to give that support, even if you wish it, when the time
comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between
naval and military experts.' There was force in that. I agreed to
it, and authorized those conversations to take place, but on the
distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military
or naval experts should bind either Government or restrict in any
way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they
would give that support when the time arose.
"As I have told the House, upon that occasion a general election
was in prospect; I had to take the responsibility of doing that
without the Cabinet. It could not be summoned. An answer had to
be given. I consulted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, the Prime
Minister; I consulted Lord Haldane, who was then Secretary of
State for War; and the present Prime Minister [Henry Asquith] who
was then Chancellor of the Exchequer. They authorized that
[answer], on the distinct understanding that it left the hands of
the Government free whenever the crisis arose."
Here the secretary read his reply to the French Ambassador, dated
November 22, 1912, which was to the effect stated. It instanced the
disposition of the French and British fleets at the time as "not
based upon an engagement to cooperate in war," and went on to say
"that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an
unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened
the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other
whether both governments should act together to prevent
aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so what measures they
would be prepared to take in common."
The secretary said that the present crisis involved Great Britain's
obligations to France in a less formal fashion.
"While we were pledged to give nothing but diplomatic support to
France in the Morocco affairs, we were pledged to do so by a
definite public agreement [the Treaty of April 8, 1904]. But no
Government and no country has less desire to be involved in war
over a dispute with Austria and Serbia than the Government and
the country of France. France is involved in it because of her
obligation of honor under a definite alliance with Russia. It is
only fair to the House to say that that obligation cannot apply
in the same way to us. We are not parties to the Franco-Russian
alliance. We do not even know its terms.
"I now come to what we think the situation requires of us. We
have had a long-standing friendship with France. But how far that
friendship entails obligation, let every man look into his own
heart, and his own feelings, and construe for himself.
"The French coasts are absolutely undefended. The French fleet is
in the Mediterranean, and has for some years been concentrated
there because of the feeling of confidence and friendship which
has existed between the two countries. My own feeling is that if
a foreign fleet, engaged in a war which France had not sought,
and in which she had not been the aggressor, came down the
English Channel and bombarded and battered the undefended coasts
of France, we could not stand aside, and see this going on
practically within sight of our eyes, with our arms folded,
looking on dispassionately, doing nothing.
"Let us assume that out of the situation come consequences
unforeseen, which make it necessary at a sudden moment that, in
defense of vital British interests, we should go to war; and let
us assume--which is quite possible--that Italy, who is now
neutral, should depart from her attitude, what then will be the
position in the Mediterranean where our trade routes are vital to
our interests? We have not kept a fleet in the Mediterranean
which is equal to dealing alone with a combination of other
fleets in the Mediterranean. We would have exposed this country
from our negative attitude at the present moment to the most
appalling risk. We feel strongly that France was entitled to
know--and to know at once--whether or not in the event of attack
upon her unprotected northern and western coasts she could depend
upon British support. In these compelling circumstances,
yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the assurance
that if the German fleet undertakes hostile operations against
the French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the
protection in its power, subject to the ratification of
Parliament.
"I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we
would pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet
would not attack the northern coast of France. It is far too
narrow an engagement for us. And, Sir, there is the more serious
consideration--becoming more serious every hour--of the
neutrality of Belgium."
Here the secretary discussed the treaties of 1839 and of 1870
between the powers and Belgium respecting preservation of her
neutrality, and cited in particular the real and written recognition
by Prince Bismarck of the sacredness of this neutrality, and the
speech in Parliament by William E. Gladstone on Great Britain's
obligation to maintain it.
He then reported the promise he had just secured from France to
respect Belgian neutrality, the evasive answer that had been given
by Germany in regard to the same, and Belgium's promise to maintain
her neutrality.
He then recited Germany's ultimatum to Belgium, and Belgium's appeal
to King George.
"Diplomatic intervention took place last week on our part. What
can diplomatic intervention do now? We have great and vital
interests in the independence--and integrity is the least
part--of Belgium. The smaller States in that region of Europe ask
but one thing, to be left alone and independent. If in this war
which is before Europe the neutrality of one of those countries
is violated, and no action be taken [by the powers] to resent it,
at the end of the war, whatever the integrity may be, the
independence will be gone. Mr. Gladstone said:
"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is
wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the
guaranty. It is found in the answer to the question whether,
under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it
is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness
the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages
of history, and thus become participators in the sin.
"If Belgium's independence goes, the independence of Holland will
follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British
interests to consider what may be at stake. If France is beaten
in a struggle of life and death, loses her position as a great
power, becomes subordinate to the will and power of one greater
than herself--consequences which I do not anticipate, because I
am sure that France has the power to defend herself with all the
energy and ability and patriotism which she has shown so often,
and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence, and then
Holland, and then Denmark, then would not Mr. Gladstone's words
come true, that just opposite to us there would be a common
interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any power?
"It may be said, I suppose, that we might stand aside, husband
our strength, and that, whatever happened in the course of this
war, at the end of it to intervene with effect to put things
right, and to adjust them to our own point of view. If, in a
crisis like this, we run away from those obligations of honor and
interest as regards the Belgian treaty, I doubt whether,
whatever material force we might have at the end, it would be of
very much value in face of the respect that we should have lost.
And do not believe, whether a great power stands outside this war
or not, it is going to be in a position at the end of it to exert
its superior strength. For us, with a powerful fleet, which we
believe able to protect our commerce, to protect our shores, and
to protect our interests, if we are engaged in war, we shall
suffer but little more than we shall suffer even if we stand
aside.
"We are going to suffer terribly in this war, whether we are in
it or whether we stand aside. Foreign trade is going to stop, not
because the trade routes are closed, but because there is no
trade at the other end. I do not believe for a moment that at the
end of this war, even if we stood aside, we should be in a
material position, to use our force decisively to undo what had
happened in the course of the war, to prevent the whole of the
west of Europe opposite to us falling under the domination of a
single power, and I am quite sure that our moral position would
be such as to have lost us all respect.
"Mobilization of the fleet has taken place; mobilization of the
army is taking place; but we have as yet taken no engagement with
regard to sending an expeditionary armed force out of the
country, because I feel that--in the case of a European
conflagration such as this, unprecedented, with our enormous
responsibilities in India and other parts of the Empire, or in
countries in British occupation, with all the unknown factors--we
must take the question very carefully into consideration, until
we know how we stand.
"What other policy is there before the House? There is but one
way in which the Government could make certain at the present
moment of keeping outside this war, and that would be that it
should immediately issue a proclamation of unconditional
neutrality. We cannot do that. We should sacrifice our good name
and reputation before the world, and should not escape the most
serious and grave economic consequences.
"As far as the forces of the crown are concerned, we are ready. I
believe the Prime Minister and the First Lord of the Admiralty
[Winston Churchill] have no doubt whatever that the readiness and
the efficiency of those forces were never at a higher mark than
they are to-day, and never was there a time when confidence was
more justified in the power of the navy to protect our commerce
and to protect our shores.
"The most awful responsibility is resting upon the Government in
deciding what to advise the House of Commons to do. We have made
clear to the House, I trust, that we are prepared to face that
situation. We worked for peace up to the last moment, and beyond
the last moment. We believe we shall have the support of the
House at large in proceeding to whatever the consequences may be
and whatever measures may be forced upon us. The country has not
had time to realize the issue. It perhaps is still thinking of
the quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and not the complications
of this matter which have grown out of the quarrel between
Austria and Serbia. Russia and Germany we know are at war. We do
not yet know officially that Austria, the ally whom Germany is to
support, is yet at war with Russia. We know that a good deal has
been happening on the French frontier.
"I believe, when the country realizes what is at stake, what the
real issues are, the magnitude of the impending dangers in the
west of Europe, we shall be supported throughout, not only by the
House of Commons, but by the determination, the resolution, the
courage, and the endurance of the whole country."
_France._ Minister Klobukowski telegraphed from Brussels the answer
the Belgian Government had given on the evening of August 2 to the
German ultimatum:
"The information as to the French movements appeared to them to
be inaccurate in view of the formal assurances which had been
given by France, and were still quite recent; that Belgium, which
since the establishment of her kingdom, has taken every care to
assure the protection of her dignity and of her interests, and
has devoted all her efforts to peaceful development of progress,
strongly protests against any violation of her territory from
whatever quarter it may come: and that, supposing the violation
takes place, she will know how to defend with energy her
neutrality, which has been guaranteed by the powers, and notably
by the King of Prussia."
M. Klobukowski added in a supplementary telegram:
"To the assurance which I gave him that if Belgium appealed to
the guarantee of the powers against the violation of her
neutrality by Germany, France would at once respond to her
appeal, the Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Davignon] answered:
"It is with great sincerity that we thank the Government of the
Republic for the support which it would eventually be able to
offer us, but under present conditions we do not appeal to the
guarantee of the powers. At a later date the Government of the
king will weigh the measures which it may be necessary to take."
Ambassador Paul Cambon telegraphed from London:
"Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to inform you that he was
making explanations to the Commons as to the present attitude of
the British Government, and that the chief of these declarations
would be as follows:
"'In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the
North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object
of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of
harassing French merchant shipping, the British fleet would
intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete
protection, in such a way that from that moment Great Britain and
Germany would be in a state of war.'
"Sir Edward Grey explained to me that the mention of an operation
by way of the North Sea implied protection against a
demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean.
"The declaration concerning the intervention of the British fleet
must be considered as binding the British Government. Sir Edward
Grey has assured me of this and has added that the French
Government were thereby authorized to inform the Chambers of
this."
M. Paul Cambon supplemented this by a telegram stating:
"Just as Sir Edward Grey was starting this morning for the
meeting of the Cabinet, my German colleague [Prince Lichnowsky]
came to press him to say that the neutrality of Great Britain did
not depend upon respecting Belgian neutrality. Sir Edward Grey
refused all conversation on this matter.
"The German Ambassador has sent to the press a _communiqué_
saying that if Great Britain remained neutral Germany would give
up all naval operations and would not make use of the Belgian
coast as a _point d'appui_. My answer is that respecting the
coast is not respecting the neutrality of the territory, and that
the German ultimatum is already a violation of this neutrality."
Later M. Paul Cambon telegraphed:
"Sir Edward Grey has made the statement regarding the
intervention of the British fleet. He has explained, in
considering the situation, what he proposed to do with regard to
Belgian neutrality; and the reading of a letter from King Albert
asking for the support of Great Britain has deeply stirred the
House.
"The House will this evening vote the credit which is asked for;
from this moment its support is secured to the policy of the
Government, and it follows public opinion which is declaring
itself more and more in our favor."
M. Viviani warned M. Paul Cambon that the German Ambassador Schoen
was reported to have said at the Foreign Office that yesterday
eighty French officers in Prussian uniform had attempted to cross
the German frontier in twelve motor cars at Walbeck.
"Be good enough urgently to contradict this news which is pure
invention, and to draw the attention of the [British] Foreign
Office to the German campaign of false news which is beginning."
German Ambassador von Schoen had a farewell audience at the Foreign
Office at 6.45 p. m., at which he handed M. Viviani a letter stating
that French military aviators had committed "flagrantly hostile
acts" on German territory, one throwing bombs on the railway near
Karlsruhe and Nuremberg, and had openly violated the neutrality of
Belgium by flying over Belgian territory.
"I am instructed, and I have the honor to inform your excellency,
that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German
Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in
consequence of the acts of this latter power.
"At the same time I have the honor to bring to the knowledge of
your excellency that the German authorities will detain French
mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them
if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete
reciprocity."
M. Viviani formally challenged as inaccurate the allegations of the
ambassador.
M. Viviani instructed Ambassador Jules Cambon at Berlin to ask for
his passports.
"I request you at the same time to protest in writing against the
violation of the neutrality of Luxemburg by German troops, of
which notice has been given by the Prime Minister of Luxemburg;
against the ultimatum addressed to the Belgian Government by the
German Minister at Brussels to force upon them the violation of
Belgian neutrality and to require of that country that she should
facilitate military operations against France on Belgian
territory; finally against the false allegation of an alleged
projected invasion of these two countries by French armies, by
which he has attempted to justify the state of war which he
declares henceforth exists between Germany and France."
M. Allizé, Minister at Munich, was also instructed to ask for his
passports.
M. Viviani reported to the French representatives abroad that German
troops had violated Belgian territory at Gemmerich.
_Belgium._ Baron von der Elst, Secretary General, reported an
interview at 1.30 p. m. with Herr von Below Saleske, German
Minister.
"The minister officially informed the Belgian Government that
French dirigibles had thrown bombs, and that a French cavalry
patrol had crossed the frontier in violation of international
law, seeing that war had not been declared.
"The secretary general asked Herr von Below where these incidents
had happened, and was told that it was in Germany. Baron van der
Elst then observed that in that case he could not understand the
object of this communication. Herr von Below stated that these
acts, which were contrary to international law, were calculated
to lead to the supposition that other acts, contrary to
international law, would be committed by France."
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Herr von
Below Saleske Belgium's reply to the German note.
"This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the
Belgian Government.
"The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in
contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1,
in the name of the French Government.
"Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality
should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfill her
international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the
most vigorous resistance to the invader.
"The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870 vouch
for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guaranty
of the powers, and notably of the Government of his majesty the
King of Prussia.
"Belgium has always been faithful to her international
obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal
impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and
enforce respect for her neutrality.
"The attack upon her independence with which the German
Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of
international law. No strategic interest justifies such a
violation of law.
"The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals
submitted to them, would sacrifice the honor of the nation and
betray their duty toward Europe.
"Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than
eighty years in the civilization of the world, they refuse to
believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at
the price of the violation of her neutrality.
"If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly
resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack
upon their rights."
M. Davignon reported this action to the Ministers at St. Petersburg,
Berlin, London, Paris, Vienna, and The Hague. To the same
representatives, except the Minister at The Hague, he reported a
statement made to him by the French Minister at Brussels:
"Although I have received no instructions to make a declaration
from my Government, I feel justified, in view of their well-known
intentions, in saying that if the Belgian Government were to
appeal to the French Government as one of the powers guaranteeing
their neutrality, the French Government would at once respond to
Belgium's appeal; if such an appeal were not made it is probable,
that--unless of course exceptional measures were rendered
necessary in self-defence--the French Government would not
intervene until Belgium had taken some effective measure of
resistance.
"I thanked M. Klobukowski for the support which the French
Government had been good enough to offer us in case of need, and
I informed him that the Belgian Government were making no appeal
at present to the guaranty of the powers, and that they would
decide later what ought to be done."
Count Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed to M. Davignon that
Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed him
"that if our neutrality is violated it means war with Germany."
TUESDAY, AUGUST 4, 1914
_Serbia._ On the following day, August 4, 1914, M. Pashitch, Prime
Minister, recalled the legation and consulate from Germany.
_Austria-Hungary._ Ambassador Mensdorff telegraphed from Berlin that
Great Britain had sent to Germany its ultimatum concerning Belgium,
and expected an answer to-night at twelve o'clock.
"Sir E. Grey said to me that at present there was no reason why
he should make any communication to the Imperial and Royal
Government, and there was no cause why a conflict should arise
between us, so long as we were not in a condition of war with
France. In any case, he hoped that we would not begin hostilities
without the formality of a previous declaration of war. He does
not intend to recall Sir M. de Bunsen.
"Should we be at war with France, it would indeed be difficult
for Great Britain, as the ally of France, to cooperate with her
in the Atlantic, and not in the Mediterranean."
VON BETHMANN-HOLLWEG EXPLAINS GERMANY'S POSITION IN THE REICHSTAG
_Germany._ Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg spoke before the
Reichstag (Imperial Parliament). The points of his address were as
follows:
1. Germany has kept the peace and protected the peace of Europe for
forty-four years, yet, under the pretense that she was desirous of
war,
"enmity has been awakened against us in the East and the West and
chains have been fashioned for us. The wind then sown has brought
forth the whirlwind which has now broken loose. We wished to
continue our work of peace, and, like a silent vow, the feeling
that animated everyone from the emperor down to the youngest
soldier was this: Only in defence of a just cause shall our sword
fly from its scabbard.
"The day has now come when we must draw it, against our wish, and
in spite of our sincere endeavors. Russia has set fire to the
building. We are at war with Russia and France--a war that has
been forced upon us."
2. Germany has endeavored to localize the conflict between
Austria-Hungary and Serbia. All other European Governments
(particularly Great Britain) save one took the same attitude.
Russia alone asserted that she had to be heard in a settlement of
the matter.
"Thus the danger of a European crisis raised its threatening
head."
3. Russia began to mobilize. On this, Germany declared that Russian
military measures against Austria-Hungary would find her on the side
of her ally, and that she would take countermeasures, coming near to
actual war.
"Russia assured us in the most solemn manner of her desire for
peace, and declared that she was making no military preparations
against us.
"In the meantime, Great Britain, warmly supported by us, tried to
mediate between Vienna and St. Petersburg."
4. Kaiser William II telegraphed to Nicholas II asking for the
Czar's assistance in smoothing over difficulties between Russia and
Austria-Hungary. Before receipt of this telegram the Czar asked the
Kaiser to induce Austria-Hungary to aid him in inducing Vienna to
moderate her demands on Serbia. The Kaiser accepted the rôle of
mediator.
5. Germany influenced Austria-Hungary to resume the broken
conversations with Russia.
"But before the final decision was taken at Vienna, the news
arrived that Russia had mobilized her entire forces and that her
mobilization was therefore directed against us also. The Russian
Government, who knew from our repeated statements what
mobilization on our frontiers meant, did not notify us of this
mobilization, nor did they even offer any explanation. It was not
until the afternoon of July 31 that the emperor received a
telegram from the czar in which he guaranteed that his army would
not assume a provocative attitude toward us. But mobilization on
our frontiers had been in full swing since the night of July
30-31, and France, though indeed not actually mobilizing, was
admittedly making military preparations.
"What was our position? For the sake of the peace of Europe we
had, up till then, deliberately refrained from calling up a
single reservist. Were we now to wait further in patience until
the nations on either side of us chose the moment for their
attack? It would have been a crime to expose Germany to such
peril. Therefore, on July 31, we called upon Russia to demobilize
as the only measure which could still preserve the peace of
Europe, and informed her that in case our demand met with a
refusal, we should have to consider that a state of war existed.
"No answer was given, and we mobilized our forces on August 1, at
5 p. m."
6. France evaded our direct question as to whether she would remain
neutral in a Russo-German war.
"In spite of this, the kaiser ordered that the French frontier
was to be unconditionally respected. This order, with one single
exception[2], was strictly obeyed. France, who mobilized at the
same time as we did, assured us that she would respect a zone of
10 kilometers on the frontier. What really happened? Aviators
dropped bombs, and cavalry patrols and French infantry
detachments appeared on the territory of the empire! Though war
had not been declared, France thus broke the peace and actually
attacked us."
[Footnote 2: Against express orders, a patrol of the Fourteenth
Army Corps, apparently led by an officer, crossed the frontier
on August 2. They seem to have been shot down, only one man
having returned.]
After this recital the Chancellor entered upon his oration proper.
"Gentlemen, we are now in a state of necessity (_Notwehr_), and
necessity (_Not_) knows no law. Our troops have occupied
Luxemburg and perhaps have already entered Belgian territory.
"Gentlemen, that is a breach of international law. It is true
that the French Government declared at Brussels that France would
respect Belgian neutrality as long as her adversary respected it.
We knew, however, that France stood ready for an invasion. France
could wait, we could not. A French attack on our flank on the
lower Rhine might have been disastrous. Thus we were forced to
ignore the rightful protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and
Belgium. The wrong--I speak openly--the wrong we thereby commit
we will try to make good as soon as our military aims have been
attained.
"He who is menaced as we are and is fighting for his highest
possession can only consider how he is to hack his way through
(_durchhauen_).
"Gentlemen, we stand shoulder to shoulder with Austria-Hungary.
"As for Great Britain's attitude, the statements made by Sir
Edward Grey in the House of Commons yesterday show the standpoint
assumed by the British Government. We have informed the British
Government that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, our
fleet will not attack the northern coast of France, and that we
will not violate the territorial integrity and independence of
Belgium. These assurances I now repeat before the world, and I
may add that, as long as Great Britain remains neutral, we would
also be willing, upon reciprocity being assured, to take no
warlike measures against French commercial shipping.
"Gentlemen, so much for the facts. I repeat the words of the
emperor: 'With a clear conscience we enter the lists.' We are
fighting for the fruits of our works of peace, for the
inheritance of a great past and for our future. The fifty years
are not yet past during which Count Moltke said we should have to
remain armed to defend the inheritance that we won in 1870. Now
the great hour of trial has struck for our people. But with clear
confidence we go forward to meet it. Our army is in the field,
our navy is ready for battle--behind them stands the entire
German nation--the entire German nation united to the last man.
"Gentlemen, you know your duty and all that it means. The
proposed laws need no further explanation. I ask you to pass them
quickly."
Secretary of State von Jagow telegraphed Ambassador Lichnowsky at
London:
"Please dispel any mistrust that may subsist on the part of the
British Government with regard to our intentions, by repeating
most positively formal assurance that, even in the case of armed
conflict with Belgium, Germany will, under no pretence whatever,
annex Belgian territory. Sincerity of this declaration is borne
out by the fact that we solemnly pledged our word to Holland
strictly to respect her neutrality. It is obvious that we could
not profitably annex Belgian territory without making at the same
time territorial acquisitions at expense of Holland. Please
impress upon Sir E. Grey that the German army could not be
exposed to French attack across Belgium, which was planned
according to absolutely unimpeachable information. Germany had
consequently to disregard Belgian neutrality, it being for her a
question of life or death to prevent French advance."
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
telegraphed Ambassador Goschen at Berlin to protest to the German
Government against its violation of the treaty safeguarding Belgian
neutrality, and to request an immediate assurance that the demand
made upon Belgium would not be proceeded with.
Ambassador Villiers telegraphed from Brussels that the German
Minister, Von Below Saleske, had addressed a note to M. Davignon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs,
"stating that as Belgian Government have declined the
well-intentioned proposals submitted to them by the Imperial
Government, the latter will, deeply to their regret, be compelled
to carry out, if necessary by force of arms, the measures
considered indispensable in view of the French menaces."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed back that Great Britain expected the
Belgian Government to resist by any means in their power Germany's
invasion of their neutrality, and that the British Government were
prepared to join Russia and France in common action to resist the
German action and to guarantee to maintain Belgian independence and
integrity in future years.
Grey protested, through Ambassador Goschen, to the German Government
against the continued detention of British merchant ships at Hamburg
and other German ports, as in direct contravention of international
law and of the assurances given by Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg.
Villiers telegraphed from Brussels:
"German troops have entered Belgian territory, and Liege has been
summoned to surrender by small party of Germans who, however,
were repulsed."
Grey, on the basis of this information, telegraphed Ambassador
Goschen to ask the German Government that a satisfactory answer to
his morning telegram be received in London by twelve o'clock at
night.
"If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say
that his majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in
their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the
observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as
ourselves."
As reported to Sir Edward Grey on August 8, after his return to
London, Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, had an interview
with Herr von Jagow on this same day, August 4.
SIR EDWARD GOSCHEN'S INTERVIEW WITH VON JAGOW
"In accordance with your instructions of the 4th inst., I called
upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and inquired, in the
name of his majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government
would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow
at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be
'No,' as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the
frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already
violated. He again went into the reasons why the Imperial
Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they
had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as
to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavor
to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a
matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the
more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the
paucity of roads and the strength of the fortresses, to have got
through without formidable opposition entailing great loss of
time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the
Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier.
Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of
Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to
Herr von Jagow that this _fait accompli_ of the violation of the
Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the
situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was
not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences,
which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the
reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw
back.
"During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the
same date and, in compliance with the instructions therein
contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and
informed the Secretary of State that, unless the Imperial
Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night
that they would proceed no further with their violation of the
Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to
demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that his
majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power
to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a
treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.
"Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no
other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day,
namely, that the safety of the empire rendered it absolutely
necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through
Belgium. I asked him whether, in view of the terrible
consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible
even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered.
He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or
more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I
should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at
about seven o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr
von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his
entire policy and that of the chancellor, which had been to make
friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to
get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in
Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment,
but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in
view of our engagements, his majesty's Government could not
possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.
"I then said that I should like to go and see the chancellor, as
it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity
of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the chancellor very
agitated. His excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted
for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by his
majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a
word--'neutrality,' a word which in war time had so often been
disregarded--just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to
make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to
be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been
rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to
which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to
office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done
was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he
was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great
Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might
happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said
that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to
understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life
and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the
latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it
was, so to speak, a matter of 'life and death' for the honor of
Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do
her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That
solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could
anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future?
The chancellor said: 'But at what price will that compact have
been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?' I hinted
to his excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences
could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn
engagements, but his excellency was so excited, so evidently
overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to
hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by
further argument. As I was leaving he said that the blow of Great
Britain joining Germany's enemies was all the greater that almost
up to the last moment he and his Government had been working with
us and supporting our efforts to maintain peace between Austria
and Russia. I said that this was part of the tragedy which saw
the two nations fall apart just at the moment when the relations
between them had been more friendly and cordial than they had
been for years. Unfortunately, notwithstanding our efforts to
maintain peace between Russia and Austria, the war had spread and
had brought us face to face with a situation which, if we held to
our engagements, we could not possibly avoid, and which
unfortunately entailed our separation from our late
fellow-workers. He would readily understand that no one regretted
this more than I.
"After this somewhat painful interview I returned to the embassy
and drew up a telegraphic report of what had passed. This
telegram was handed in at the Central Telegraph Office a little
before 9 p. m. It was apparently never dispatched."[3]
[Footnote 3: This telegram never reached the British Foreign
Office.]
Mr. Goschen's report went on to relate the attack that evening on
the British Embassy by a mob excited by the report in a flying sheet
of the "Berliner Tageblatt" that Great Britain had declared war on
Germany. The German Government repudiated the report and did all it
could, by the personal apology of the secretary of state and by
police protection, to make amends for what Herr von Jagow termed
"the indelible stain on the reputation of Berlin."
"On the following morning, August 5, the emperor sent one of his
majesty's aides-de-camp to me with the following message:
"'The emperor has charged me to express to your excellency his
regret for the occurrences of last night, but to tell you at the
same time that you will gather from those occurrences an idea of
the feelings of his people respecting the action of Great Britain
in joining with other nations against her old Allies of Waterloo.
His majesty also begs that you will tell the king that he has
been proud of the titles of British field marshal and British
admiral, but that in consequence of what has occurred he must now
at once divest himself of those titles.'
"I would add that the above message lost none of its acerbity by
the manner of its delivery."
At 11 a. m., August 5, Ambassador Goschen received his passports. He
returned to London on the following day without molestation from the
crowd, although this could not be said of the departure of the
French and Russian Ambassadors. He closed his report with a
compliment to the American Ambassador, Mr. Gerard, for assistance
rendered by him in these trying times.
_France._ A message from President Poincaré was read at a
extraordinary session of Parliament, the members of which remained
standing during the reading. This announced the "violent and
premeditated" attack on France by Germany in "insolent defiance of
the law of nations" being delivered before any declaration of war,
and asking for passports by the German Ambassador at Paris. The
president recounted the pacific course of Frenchmen in "burying at
the bottom of their heart the desire for legitimate reparation, of
the wrong done their country by Germany in 1871, and in using their
rejuvenated strength in the interest of progress and for the good of
humanity." In particular he spoke of the efforts France had made for
peace since Austria's ultimatum to Serbia. He solemnly declared
"that France had made up to the last moment supreme efforts to
avert the war now about to break out, the crushing responsibility
for which the German Empire will have to bear before history.
(_Unanimous and repeated applause._)
"On the very morrow of the day when we and our allies were
publicly expressing our hope of seeing negotiations which had
been begun under the auspices of the London Cabinet carried to a
peaceful conclusion Germany suddenly declared war upon Russia;
she has invaded the territory of Luxemburg; she has outrageously
insulted the noble Belgian nation (_loud applause_), our neighbor
and our friend, and attempted treacherously to fall upon us while
we were in the midst of diplomatic conversation. (_Fresh and
repeated applause._)
"But France was watching. As alert as she was peaceful, she was
prepared; and our enemies will meet on their path our valiant
covering troops, who are at their post and will provide the
screen behind which the mobilization of our national forces will
be methodically completed....
"In the war which is beginning France will have right on her
side, the eternal power of which cannot with impunity be
disregarded by nations any more than by individuals. (_Loud
applause._)
"She will be heroically defended by all her sons; nothing will
break their sacred union before the enemy; to-day they are joined
together as brothers in a common indignation against the
aggressor, and in a common patriotic faith. (_Loud and prolonged
applause and cries of 'Vive la France.'_)
"She is faithfully helped by Russia, her ally (_loud applause_);
she is supported by the loyal friendship of Great Britain. (_Loud
applause._)
"And already from every part of the civilized world sympathy and
good wishes are coming to her. For to-day once again she stands
before the universe for liberty, justice, and reason (_loud and
repeated applause_) 'Haut les coeurs et vive la France!'[4]
(_Prolonged applause._)"
[Footnote 4: Lift up your hearts, and long live France!]
M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, spoke before the Chamber of
Deputies. He recounted those actions of Germany in relation to the
Austro-Serbian crisis on which the light of subsequent events cast a
sinister interpretation. He gave the fabricated complaints against
France for violating German territory presented by Ambassador von
Schoen plainly to offset the true charges made by France of German
violation of French territory, and declared:
"At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, nor
has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other
part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has
already done justice to these wretched inventions. (_Loud
applause._)
"Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and
all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the
necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly,
and with calmness.
"The mobilization of the Russian army also continues with
remarkable vigor and unrestrained enthusiasm. (_Prolonged
applause, all the deputies rising from their seats._) The Belgian
army, mobilized with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid
passion and magnificent ardor to defend the neutrality and
independence of their country. (_Renewed applause._)
"The entire British fleet is mobilized and orders have been given
to mobilize the land forces. (_Loud cheers, all the deputies
rising to their feet._)"
_Belgium._ Baron Fallon, Belgian Minister at The Hague, reported to
M. Davignon, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels, that Holland
intended to institute war buoying on the Scheldt (Dutch river
leading to Antwerp in Belgium). The river would be closed at night
only, and navigation by day would be under Dutch pilots. Belgian
lightships must be withdrawn from Dutch territory to facilitate
maintenance of its neutrality.
M. Davignon presented passports to German Minister von Below
Saleske. The minister intrusted the custody of the German Legation
to the American Minister, Brand Whitlock. The Belgian Minister,
Baron Beyens, at Berlin, asked for his passports. Before leaving he
telegraphed a report of the German Chancellor's speech to the
Reichstag on the "infamous" violation of Belgian neutrality.
"It is noteworthy that Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg recognizes
without the slightest disguise, that Germany is violating
international law by her invasion of Belgian territory, and that
she is committing a wrong against us."
Count de Lalaing, Minister at London, telegraphed that Sir Edward
Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had informed the British
Ministers in Norway, Holland, and Belgium
"that Great Britain expects that these three kingdoms will resist
German pressure and observe neutrality. Should they resist they
will have the support of Great Britain, who is ready in that
event, should the three above-mentioned Governments desire it, to
join France and Russia in offering an alliance to the said
Governments for the purpose of resisting the use of force by
Germany against them, and a guaranty to maintain the future
independence and integrity of the three kingdoms. I observed to
him that Belgium was neutral in perpetuity. The Minister for
Foreign Affairs answered: This is in case her neutrality is
violated."
M. Davignon reported to the ministers at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg all the important diplomatic happenings respecting
Belgium from July 31 to the appeal to the powers to guarantee
Belgian neutrality, which was under present deliberation.
M. Davignon appealed to Great Britain, France, and Russia to
cooperate as guarantors of her territory and independence, and to
employ concerted action to resist by force German violation of the
same, and at the same time
"to guarantee the future maintenance of the independence and
integrity of Belgium.
"Belgium is happy to be able to declare that she will undertake
the defense of her fortified places."
King Albert made an address to the Belgian Parliament which closed
as follows:
"The army is equal to its task. The Government and myself have
full confidence. The Government understands its responsibilities
and will maintain them till the end to safeguard the supreme good
of the country. If the stranger violates our territory he will
find all Belgians gathered round their sovereign, who will never
betray his constitutional oath.
"I have faith in our destinies. A country which defends itself
imposes respect on all and does not perish. God will be with us."
War was now on between Russia, France, Great Britain and Belgium on
the one side, and Germany, soon and certainly to be joined by
Austria-Hungary, on the other. While the diplomatic controversy
continued, it was over minor subjects, such as what understanding, if
any, had existed before the war between Great Britain and Belgium with
reference to the former landing an expeditionary force on the soil of
the latter in event of hostilities with Germany. By August 5, 1914,
all the main evidence which the belligerent powers chose to present
was before the court of the world's opinion. It has here been given in
as full a form as the exigency of space has permitted, and in that
impartial manner which a strict observance of editorial ethics
insures. The editor has refrained from cross-references indicating a
conflict of evidence, since this could not be made without exercising
a judicial function into which biased opinion might creep. It will be
easy for the reader to make these comparisons for himself, because of
the listing of the correspondence by countries and dates. A careful
study of the data here given should afford everyone an answer to the
solemn inquiry, the greatest ever put before the civilized world: Who
was responsible for the war?