Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé

d'Affaires at Belgrade, to advise the Serbian Government, if it were

proved that any Serbian officials, however subordinate, were

accomplices in the murder of the archduke, to give Austria the

fullest satisfaction in the way of expressing concern with regret.

For the rest they must reply as they consider best in Serbian

interests. The only chance for Serbia is to reply favorably to as

many points in the note as the time limit allows.

"Serbian Minister here has begged that his majesty's Government

will express their views, but I cannot undertake responsibility

of saying more than I have said above, and I do not like to say

even that without knowing what is being said at Belgrade by

French and Russian Governments. You should therefore consult your

French and Russian colleagues as to repeating what my views are,

as expressed above, to Serbian Government.

"I have urged upon German Ambassador that Austria should not

precipitate military action."

_France._ M. Viviani, French Prime Minister, who had not yet seen

the note to Serbia, wrote from Reval, Russia, to M. Bienvenu-Martin,

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, to send on to M.

Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, the following information and

instructions:

In M. Viviani's conversation with M. Sazonof, Russian Minister of

Foreign Affairs, it was agreed to prevent Austrian intervention in

the internal affairs of Serbia of a kind which Serbia might consider

as an attack on her sovereignty and independence. This view should

be communicated to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister

for Foreign Affairs, and moderation counseled him, cooperation in

this should be secured from the Russian and British Ambassadors in

Vienna. The British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had informed M.

Sazonof that his Government might join in a _démarche_ (proceeding)

for removing any danger to general peace, and telegraphed his

Government to that effect. M. Sazonof has instructed Count

Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, to secure such

cooperation. M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, should be

instructed to back him up. M. Bienvenu-Martin sent to M. Viviani,

returning from Russia on _La France_, and to the French Ambassadors

at London, Berlin, Vienna, St. Petersburg, and Rome, and the French

Minister at Belgrade, the contents of the Austrian note to Serbia,

and an account of the circumstances of the delivery of the copy to

the French Government by Count Szécsen, the Austro-Hungarian

Ambassador. M. Berthelot, French Political Director, in obedience to

M. Bienvenu-Martin's instructions, had confined himself to stating

to the ambassador that painful feeling would be aroused in French

public opinion by the categorical nature of the note, and its short

time limit, and its presentation to Serbia at a time when the

President and Prime Minister of France were at sea, and could not

exert, in cooperation with statesmen of other powers not directly

interested, that soothing influence on Serbia and Austria which was

so desirable in the interest of general peace.

In a letter to these ambassadors and minister, and to the French

Minister at Stockholm (M. Thiébaut), M. Bienvenu-Martin said that M.

Berthelot, French Political Director, had advised M. Vesnitch,

Serbian Minister at Paris, that Serbia should play for delay by

asking that she be allowed time to verify the evidence, presumably

one sided, adduced by Austria in support of her note to Serbia, and,

above all, that Serbia should declare herself ready to submit to the

arbitration of Europe.

Italy had not been consulted by Austria in regard to the note, nor

even informed of it. M. Bienvenu-Martin informed these same

representatives at foreign courts (with exception of the Ambassador

at Vienna), that M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna had

reported that the chief fear of the Austro-Hungarian military party

was that Serbia would accede to the demands of Austria-Hungary; and

that M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna thought his

Government would give way on all points save the order to the army

dictated to King Peter, dismissal of officers suspected by Austria,

and interference by foreign officials in Serbia. M. Yovanovitch

hoped that a discussion on these points might be started which would

lead to arbitration by the powers.

The feeling in Germany was warlike. The tone of the press there was

intimidating, particularly toward Russia. Italy was exercising

moderating influence at Vienna.

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French representatives at the above

courts and at Vienna of the contents of the circular note of the

German Government delivered him that day by Baron von Schoen, the

German Ambassador. Said the Acting Foreign Secretary:

"I called the German Ambassador's attention to the fact that

while it might appear legitimate to demand the punishment of all

those who were implicated in the crime of Sarajevo, on the other

hand it seemed difficult to require measures which could not be

accepted, having regard to the dignity and sovereignty of Serbia;

the Serbian Government, even if it was willing to submit to them,

would risk being carried away by a revolution.

"I also pointed out to Herr von Schoen that his note only took

into account two hypotheses: that of a pure and simple refusal or

that of a provocative attitude on the part of Serbia. The third

hypothesis (which would leave the door open for an arrangement)

should also be taken into consideration; that of Serbia's

acceptance and of her agreeing at once to give full satisfaction

for the punishment of the accomplices and full guaranties for the

suppression of the anti-Austrian propaganda so far as they were

compatible with her sovereignty and dignity.

"I added that if within these limits the satisfaction desired by

Austria could be admitted, the means of obtaining it could be

examined; if Serbia gave obvious proof of good will it could not

be thought that Austria would refuse to take part in the

conversation.

"Perhaps they should not make it too difficult for third powers,

who could not either morally or sentimentally cease to take

interest in Serbia, to take an attitude which was in accord with

the wishes of Germany to localize the dispute.

"Herr von Schoen recognized the justice of these considerations

and vaguely stated that hope was always possible. When I asked

him if we should give to the Austrian note the character of a

simple _mise en demeure_, which permitted a discussion, or an

ultimatum, he answered that personally he had no views."

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin, that official German opinion supported Austria in

not abating her demands on Serbia. There was pessimism in diplomatic

circles. The Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Broniewsky, had bitterly

noted the presentation of the note to Serbia during the absence from

France of the French President and Prime Minister. He thought that

William II, in his desire to support the monarchic principle, was

becoming less inclined to show a conciliatory attitude.

In a second letter M. Cambon reported an interview he had just had

with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. The secretary

supported the Austrian note to Serbia. It was that country's

domestic affair, and he hoped that the dispute would be localized.

[Illustration: King Peter of Serbia.]

"I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely

ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated

to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my

surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims of whose

limit and scope he was ignorant.

"Herr von Jagow interrupted me, and said: 'It is only because we

are having a personal conversation that I allow you to say that

to me.'

"'Certainly,' I replied, 'but if Peter I humiliates himself,

domestic trouble will probably break out in Serbia; that will

open the door to fresh possibilities, and do you know where you

will be led by Vienna?' I added that the language of the German

newspapers was not the language of persons who were indifferent

to, and unacquainted with, the question, but betokened an active

support. Finally I remarked that the shortness of the time limit

given to Serbia for submission would make an unpleasant

impression in Europe.

"Herr von Jagow answered that he quite expected a little

excitement (_un peu d'émotion_) on the part of Serbia's friends,

but that he was counting on their giving her wise advice.

"'I have no doubt,' I then said to him, 'that Russia would

endeavor to persuade the Cabinet of Belgrade to make acceptable

concessions; but why not ask from one what is being asked from

the other, and if reliance is being placed on advice being given

at Belgrade, is it not also legitimate to rely on advice being

given at Vienna from another quarter?'

"The Secretary of State went so far as to say that that depended

on circumstances; but immediately checked himself; he repeated

that the difficulty must be localized. He asked me if I really

thought the situation serious. 'Certainly,' I answered, 'because

if what is happening is the result of due reflection, I do not

understand why all means of retreat have been cut off.'

"All the evidence shows that Germany is ready to support

Austria's attitude with unusual energy. The weakness which her

Austro-Hungarian ally has shown for some years past has weakened

the confidence that was placed in her here. She was found heavy

to drag along. Mischievous legal proceedings, such as the Agram

and the Friedjung affairs, brought odium on her police and

covered them with ridicule. All that was asked of the police was

that they should be strong; the conviction is that they were

violent.

"An article which appeared in the 'Lokal Anzeiger' this evening

shows also that at the German Chancellery there exists a state of

mind to which we in Paris are naturally not inclined to pay

sufficient attention, I mean the feeling that monarchies must

stand together. I am convinced that great weight must be attached

to this point of view in order to appreciate the attitude of the

Emperor William, whose impressionable nature must have been

affected by the assassination of a prince whose guest he had been

a few days previously.

"It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von

Jagow, and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to

everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the note sent by

Austria to Serbia."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin as follows:

"The intentions of the Emperor of Russia and his ministers could

not be more pacific, a fact of which the President of the

[French] Republic and the president of the council have been

able to satisfy themselves directly; but the ultimatum which the

Austro-Hungarian Government has just delivered to the Cabinet at

Belgrade introduces a new and disquieting element into the

situation.

"Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer

violence to Serbia. The shortness of the time limit fixed by the

ultimatum renders still more difficult the moderating influence

that the powers of the Triple Entente might exercise at Vienna.

"On the other hand, M. Sazonof [Russian Prime Minister] assumes

that Germany will desire to support her ally and I am afraid that

this impression is correct. Nothing but the assurance of the

solidarity of the Triple Entente can prevent the German powers

from emphasizing their provocative attitude."

M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at London, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin an interview with Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary

for Foreign Affairs. Cambon and Grey were agreed that everything

must be done to avert the crisis, and that the British Cabinet

should take the initiative in offering mediation by the four powers

not directly interested, Great Britain, France, Russia and Germany.

If Germany assented, time would be gained, and this was the

essential point.

"Sir Edward Grey told me that he would discuss with Prince

Lichnowsky the proposal. I mentioned the matter to my Russian

colleague [Count Benckendorff] who is afraid of a surprise from

Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have dispatched

her ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin.

"Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he

returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held

pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg

and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter

capital by the rumors of a naval entente between Russia and Great

Britain, by the czar's visit to Bucharest, and by the

strengthening of the Russian army. Count Benckendorff had

concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon

without disfavor in Germany.

"The Under-Secretary of State [Sir Arthur Nicholson] has been

struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince

Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if

Germany had wished to do so she could have stopped the dispatch

of the ultimatum.

"The situation, therefore, is as grave as it can be, and we see

no way of arresting the course of events.

"However, Count Benckendorff thinks it right to attempt the

démarche upon which I have agreed with Sir Edward Grey."

In a second letter M. Cambon reported receipt of the details of the

Austrian ultimatum.

"In consultation with my Russian colleague, who thinks it

extremely difficult for his Government not to support Serbia, we

have been asking ourselves what intervention could avert the

conflict.

"Sir Edward Grey having summoned me for this afternoon, I propose

to suggest that he should ask for the semiofficial intervention

of the German Government at Vienna to prevent a sudden attack."

M. Bienvenu-Martin informed the French Ambassadors at St.

Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna and Rome, and the Ministers at Stockholm

and Belgrade of M. Cambon's report, and his (Bienvenu-Martin's)

willingness to cooperate in the proposed conciliatory action at

Vienna.

_Belgium._ M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs,

notified the Belgian Ministers at Paris, London, Berlin, Vienna, and

St. Petersburg

"that the Government had under consideration an address to the

powers who guarantee Belgian independence and neutrality assuring

them of Belgium's determination to fulfill the international

obligations imposed upon her by treaty in the event of a war

breaking out on her frontiers.

"The Government have come to the conclusion that such a

communication would be premature at present, but that events

might move rapidly and not leave sufficient time to forward

suitable instructions at the desired moment to the Belgian

representatives abroad.

"In these circumstances I have proposed to the King [Albert] and

to my colleagues in the Cabinet, who have concurred, to give you

now exact instructions as to the steps to be taken by you if the

prospect of a Franco-German war became more threatening.

"I inclose herewith a note, signed but not dated, which you

should read to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of which you

should give him a copy, if circumstances render such a

communication necessary.

"I shall inform you by telegram when you are to act on these

instructions.

"This telegram will be dispatched when the order is given for the

mobilization of the Belgian army if, contrary to our earnest hope

and to the apparent prospect of a peaceful settlement, our

information leads us to take this extreme measure of precaution."

The note inclosed said that Belgium had "most scrupulously" observed

the obligations of neutrality imposed on her by the treaties of

April 19, 1839, and would "strive unflinchingly" to fulfill them

whatever the new circumstances might be.

"The friendly feelings of the powers toward her have been so

often reaffirmed that Belgium confidently expects that her

territory will remain free from any attack, should hostilities

break out upon her frontiers.

"All necessary steps to insure respect of Belgian neutrality have

nevertheless been taken by the Government. The Belgian army has

been mobilized and is taking up such strategic positions as have

been chosen to secure the defense of the country and the respect

of its neutrality. The forts of Antwerp and on the Meuse have

been put in a state of defense....

"These measures are intended solely to enable Belgium to fulfill

her international obligations; and it is obvious that they

neither have been nor can have been undertaken with any intention

of taking part in an armed struggle between the powers or from

any feeling of distrust of any of those powers."

On the following day this notification was also sent to the Belgian

Ministers at Rome, The Hague, and Luxemburg.

SATURDAY, JULY 25, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for

Foreign Affairs, telegraphed from Lembach to his Under-Secretary,

Baron von Macchio, that Russia through Prince Koudacheff, its Chargé

d'Affaires at Vienna, was pressing for an extension of the time

limit in the note to Serbia, and that he should tell the prince this

would not be granted, but that, even after the severance of

diplomatic relations, Serbia could have peace by complying

unconditionally with Austria-Hungary's demands--in which case,

however, she must pay the cost of Austro-Hungarian military

measures.

Later, Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry,

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that Prince

Koudacheff had based his request on the powers being taken by

surprise in the demands on Serbia, and therefore that Russia should

have time to consider the evidence in the case as presented in

Austria-Hungary's _dossier_. These grounds, said Count Berchtold,

rested on a mistaken hypothesis.

"Our note to the powers was in no way intended to invite them to

make known their own views on the subject, but merely bore the

character of a statement for information, the communication of

which we regarded as a duty laid on us by international

courtesy.... We regarded our action as concerning us and Serbia

alone."

Baron Giesl von Gieslingen, Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade,

telegraphed Count Berchtold that the Serbian Cabinet on the evening

of the 24th and morning of the 25th had been preparing its reply to

the note, and would deliver it before the time limit expired;

preparations were being made by the Serbian Government and army for

removal into the interior; foreign legations expected to have to

follow; the Russian Legation was already packing up; the

Austro-Hungarian Legation were ready to leave Belgrade by the 6.30

p. m. train.

Count Berchtold notified Count Szápáry at St. Petersburg, on the

same day, that, in case of Russia reconsidering her position, and

refusing to be swept away by the bellicose elements, he, with the

support of his German colleague, Count Pourtalès, a close

understanding with whom was presumed, should impress upon M.

Sazonof, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that

Austria-Hungary, in event of war with Russia, would not stand alone.

"That we had striven up till now, so far as in us lay, to

preserve the peace which we considered to be the most precious

possession of nations, was shown by the course of events during

the last forty years, and by the historical fact that our

gracious emperor has won for himself the glorious title of

'Protector of the Peace.'

"We should, therefore, most sincerely deplore the disturbance of

the European peace, because we also were of the opinion that the

strengthening of the Balkan States in a position of political and

national independence would prove to the advantage of our

relations with Russia, and would also remove all possibility of

antagonism between us and Russia; also because we have always

been ready, in the shaping of our own policy, to take into

consideration the dominant political interests of Russia.

"Any further toleration of Serbian intrigues would undermine our

existence as a state and our position as a great power, thus also

threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however,

convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful

leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of

power which is of such importance for the peace of the world,

should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it

takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the

necessary preservation of our position in Europe."

In a supplementary telegram Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry

to explain that point five in the note to Serbia was interpolated

merely out of practical considerations, and not to infringe on the

sovereignty of Serbia.

"By 'collaboration' in point five, we are thinking of the

establishment of a private 'Bureau de Sûreté' at Belgrade, which

would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian

establishments in Paris and in cooperation with the Serbian

police and administration."

Other ambassadors were similarly instructed.

_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin,

telegraphed to M. Sazonof reporting that he and the British

Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, had urged the German Secretary of

State, Herr von Jagow, to advise Vienna to extend the time limit in

the ultimatum to Serbia. Von Jagow had telegraphed the request to

Vienna, but, owing to the absence of Count Berchtold from the

capital, feared that it would have no result.

"Moreover, he has doubts as to the wisdom of Austria yielding at

the last moment, and he is inclined to think that such a step on

her part might increase the assurance of Serbia. I replied that a

great power such as Austria could give way without impairing her

prestige, and I adduced every other similar argument, but failed,

nevertheless, to obtain any more definite promise. Even when I

gave him to understand that action must be taken at Vienna if the

possibility of terrible consequences was to be avoided, the

Minister for Foreign Affairs answered each time in the negative."

M. Sevastipoulo, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M.

Sazonof that, at his instance, the French representative at Vienna

had been instructed to request extension of the time limit in the

note to Serbia.

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed that

the British representative at Vienna had been instructed to do the

same, and also to discuss the prevention of hostilities should the

request be refused.

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that in event of hostilities, Russia

counted on Great Britain siding at once and definitely with France

and Russia in order to maintain the European balance of power for

which Great Britain had constantly intervened in the past and which

would certainly be compromised by the triumph of Austria.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, handed a note

_verbale_ to M. Sazonof, denying the press report that the action of

Austria-Hungary was instigated by the German Government, and

declaring that this government "had no knowledge of the text" of the

note to Serbia before it was presented, and had "exercised no

influence upon its contents."

"Germany, as the ally of Austria, naturally supports the claims

made by the Vienna Cabinet against Serbia, which she considers

justified.

"Above all Germany wishes, as she has already declared from the

very beginning of the Austro-Serbian dispute, that this conflict

should be localized."

The same statement was made to the French Government by Baron von

Schoen, the German Ambassador, and to the British Government by

Count Benckendorff, the Russian Ambassador. The count asked Sir

Edward Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that the British

Government bring conciliatory pressure on Austria.

"Grey replied that this was quite impossible. He added that, as

long as complications existed between Austria and Serbia alone,

British interests were only indirectly affected; but he had to

look ahead to the fact that Austrian mobilization would lead to

Russian mobilization, and that from that moment a situation would

exist in which the interests of all the powers would be involved.

In that event Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of

action."

_Great Britain._ Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at Paris,

telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Bienvenu-Martin, French

Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, hoped that Serbia's reply to

Austra-Hungary's demands would be sufficiently conciliatory to

obviate extreme measures, but said that there would be revolution in

Serbia if she were to accept the demands in their entirety.

Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg,

telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for

Foreign Affairs, said that the explanations of the Austrian

Ambassador, Count Szápáry, did not quite correspond with information

received from German quarters, which information came too late to

affect negotiations at Vienna.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that Serbia was quite

ready to do as you had suggested and to punish those proved to be

guilty, but that no independent State could be expected to accept

the political demands which had been put forward. The Minister

for Foreign Affairs thought, from a conversation which he had

with the Serbian Minister [Dr. Spalaikovitch] yesterday, that, in

the event of the Austrians attacking Serbia, the Serbian

Government would abandon Belgrade, and withdraw their forces into

the interior, while they would at the same time appeal to the

powers to help them. His excellency was in favor of their making

this appeal. He would like to see the question placed on an

international footing, as the obligations taken by Serbia in

1908, to which reference is made in the Austrian ultimatum, were

given not to Austria, but to the powers.

"If Serbia should appeal to the powers, Russia would be quite

ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of

England, France, Germany, and Italy. It was possible, in his

opinion, that Serbia might propose to submit the question to

arbitration.

"On my expressing the earnest hope that Russia would not

precipitate war by mobilizing until you had had time to use your

influence in favor of peace, his excellency assured me that

Russia had no aggressive intentions, and she would take no action

until it was forced upon her. Austria's action was in reality

directed against Russia. She aimed at overthrowing the present

_status quo_ in the Balkans, and establishing her own hegemony

there. He did not believe that Germany really wanted war, but her

attitude was decided by ours. If we took our stand firmly with

France and Russia there would be no war. If we failed them now,

rivers of blood would flow, and we would in the end be dragged

into war.

"I said that England could play the rôle of mediator at Berlin

and Vienna to better purpose as friend who, if her counsels of

moderation were disregarded, might one day be converted into an

ally, than if she were to declare herself Russia's ally at once.

His excellency said that unfortunately Germany was convinced that

she could count upon our neutrality.

"I said all I could to impress prudence on the Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and warned him that if Russia mobilized, Germany

would not be content with mere mobilization, or give Russia time

to carry out hers, but would probably declare war at once. His

excellency replied that Russia could not allow Austria to crush

Serbia and become the predominant power in the Balkans, and, if

she feels secure of the support of France, she will face all the

risks of war."

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed

to Sir Edward Grey that Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State,

had instructed the German Ambassador at Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky,

to present to Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign

Affairs, Grey's suggestion of an extension of the time limit for

Serbia's reply, but that, owing to Berchtold's absence from the

capital, the extension would probably not be granted. Von Jagow did

not know what Austria-Hungary had ready on the spot, but admitted

that they meant to take military action. He also admitted that

Serbia "could not swallow" certain of Austria-Hungary's demands.

"I asked whether it was not to be feared that, in taking military

action against Serbia, Austria would dangerously excite public

opinion in Russia. He said he thought not. He remained of opinion

that crisis could be localized. I said that telegrams from Russia

in this morning's papers did not look very reassuring, but he

maintained his optimistic view with regard to Russia. He said

that he had given the Russian Government to understand that the

last thing Germany wanted was a general war, and he would do all

in his power to prevent such a calamity. If the relations between

Austria and Russia became threatening, he was quite ready to fall

in with your suggestion as to the four powers working in favor of

moderation at Vienna and St. Petersburg.

"Secretary of State confessed privately that he thought the note

left much to be desired as a diplomatic document. He repeated

very earnestly that, though he had been accused of knowing all

about the contents of that note, he had in fact had no such

knowledge."

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed to Sir

Edward Grey that the Italian Secretary General was of opinion that

Austria will only be restrained by Serbia's unconditional surrender,

and that there was reliable information she intended to seize the

Saloniki Railway.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed Sir

Edward Grey that the language of the Vienna press left the

impression that the surrender of Serbia was neither expected nor

desired, and that Minister for Foreign Affairs Berchtold would go to

Ischl to communicate Serbia's reply as soon as it was presented.

Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade,

telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey a forecast of the Serbian reply, and

said that the Serbian Government considered it would be fully

satisfactory unless Austria-Hungary was determined on war at any

cost. In a supplementary telegram he said that in view of his French

and Russian colleagues not having received instructions from their

governments and of the proposed conciliatory terms of the Serbian

reply, he had not offered advice to the Serbian Government. It was

highly probable the Russian Government had urged the utmost

moderation on Serbia.

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador

at St. Petersburg, that he could not promise to Russia more than he

had done.

"I do not consider that public opinion here would or ought to

sanction our going to war over a Serbian quarrel. If, however,

war does take place, the development of other issues may draw us

into it, and I am therefore anxious to prevent it.

"The sudden, brusque, and peremptory character of the Austrian

_démarche_ makes it almost inevitable that in a very short time

both Russia and Austria will have mobilized against each other.

In this event, the only chance of peace, in my opinion, is for

the other four powers to join in asking the Austrian and Russian

Governments not to cross the frontier, and to give time for the

four powers acting at Vienna and St. Petersburg to try and

arrange matters. If Germany will adopt this view, I feel strongly

that France and ourselves should act upon it. Italy would no

doubt gladly cooperate.

"No diplomatic intervention or mediation would be tolerated by

either Russia or Austria unless it was clearly impartial and

included the allies or friends of both. The cooperation of

Germany would, therefore, be essential."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé

d'Affaires at Berlin, to the same effect, and also that Prince

Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, was personally favorable to

the suggestion of mediation between Austria and Russia, which he

thought Austria might be able with dignity to accept.

"I impressed upon the ambassador that, in the event of Russian

and Austrian mobilization, the participation of Germany would be

essential to any diplomatic action for peace. Alone we could do

nothing. The French Government were traveling at the moment, and

I had had no time to consult them, and could not therefore be

sure of their views, but I was prepared, if the German Government

agreed with my suggestion, to tell the French Government that I

thought it the right thing to act upon it."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British

Ambassador at Vienna, the text of the Russian telegram sent to the

Russian Ambassador at Vienna asking the Austro-Hungarian Government

for extension of the time limit for the Serbian reply, and

protesting that a refusal would be "against international ethics."

Grey asked Bunsen to support the Russian position.

"I trust that if the Austro-Hungarian Government consider it too

late to prolong the time limit, they will at any rate give time

in the sense and for the reasons desired by Russia before taking

any irretrievable steps."

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé

d'Affaires at Belgrade, an account of an interview of M.

Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, with Sir Arthur Nicholson,

British Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs.

"He mentioned that both the assassins of the archduke were

Austrian subjects--Bosniaks; that one of them had been in Serbia,

and that the Serbian authorities, considering him suspect and

dangerous, had desired to expel him, but on applying to the

Austrian authorities found that the latter protected him, and

said that he was an innocent and harmless individual."

_France._--M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to

M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, an

interview with Baron Beyens, Belgian Minister at Berlin.

"The Belgian Minister appears very anxious.... He is of opinion

that Austria and Germany have desired to take advantage of the

fact that, owing to a combination of circumstances at the present

moment, Russia and England appear to them to be threatened by

domestic troubles, while in France the state of the army is under

discussion. Moreover, he does not believe in the pretended

ignorance of the Government of Berlin on the subject of Austria's

_démarche_.

"He thinks that, if the form of it has not been submitted to the

Cabinet at Berlin, the moment of its dispatch has been cleverly

chosen in consultation with that Cabinet, in order to surprise

the Triple Entente at a moment of disorganization.

"He has seen the Italian Ambassador, who has just interrupted his

holiday in order to return. It looks as if Italy would be

surprised, to put it no higher, at having been kept out of the

whole affair by her two Allies."

M. Bienvenu-Martin notified the French Legations at London, Berlin,

St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Stockholm of a visit made him by Baron

von Schoen, the German Ambassador, to protest against an article in

the _Écho de Paris_ calling his _démarche_ of yesterday a "German

threat." M. Berthelot, French Political Director, assured him that

no private information had been given out by the Foreign office of

the _démarche_, and that the article merely showed that the

proceeding was known elsewhere than at the Quai d'Orsay. The German

Ambassador did not take up the allusion.

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that M. Sazonof, Russian Secretary for Foreign

Affairs, had been unfavorably impressed by the evasive replies and

recriminations of Count de Pourtalès, the German Ambassador, over

the note to Serbia.

"The ministers will hold a council to-morrow with the czar

presiding. M. Sazonof preserves complete moderation. 'We must

avoid,' he said to me, 'everything which might precipitate the

crisis. I am of opinion that, even if the Austro-Hungarian

Government come to blows with Serbia, we ought not to break off

negotiations.'"

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin the interview with Herr von Jagow, German Secretary

of State, by Sir Horace Rumbold.

"The British Chargé d'Affaires inquired of Herr von Jagow, as I

had done yesterday, if Germany had had no knowledge of the

Austrian note before it was dispatched, and he received so clear

a reply in the negative that he was not able to carry the matter

further; but he could not refrain from expressing his surprise at

the blank cheque given by Germany to Austria.

"Herr von Jagow having replied to him that the matter was a

domestic one for Austria, he remarked that it had become

essentially an international one."

Later in the day M. Cambon reported the interview between Herr von

Jagow and M. Broniewski, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin.

"M. Broniewski, like myself, has heard the rumor that Austria,

while declaring that she did not desire an annexation of

territory, would occupy parts of Serbia until she had received

complete satisfaction. 'One knows,' he said to me, 'what this

word "satisfaction" means.' M. Broniewski's impressions of

Germany's ultimate intentions are very pessimistic."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires,

had sent his Government's request of an extension of the time limit

for the Serbian reply to Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian

Minister for Foreign Affairs, in two telegrams, one addressed to him

on his journey, and the other to Ischl, his destination. The prince

does not expect any result. Baron Macchio, General Secretary of the

Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office, had received "with icy coldness"

the prince's expostulation that the submission by Austria-Hungary of

grievances against Serbia without permitting time for their

examination was not consonant with international courtesy. The baron

replied that one's interests sometimes exempted one from being

courteous.

"The Austrian Government is determined to inflict humiliation on

Serbia: it will accept no intervention from any power until the

blow has been delivered and received full in the face by Serbia."

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that the request by the Russian Government for

Italy's cooperation in securing from Austria-Hungary an extension of

the time limit for the Serbian reply, came too late for action

thereon, owing to the absence from Rome of the Prime Minister, the

Marquis di San Giuliano.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, notified M.

Bienvenu-Martin that report had come from Vienna of rupture between

Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

"Large crowds consisting of several hundred persons are

collecting here before the newspaper offices and a demonstration

of numbers of young people has just passed through the

Pariser-platz shouting cries of 'Hurrah' for Germany, and singing

patriotic songs. The demonstrators are visiting the _Siegessaül_

[column of victory], the Austrian and then the Italian Embassy.

It is a significant outburst of chauvinism....

"In financial circles measures are already being taken to meet

every eventuality, for no means of averting the crisis is seen,

in view of the determined support which Germany is giving to

Austria.

"I, for my part, see in Great Britain the only power which might

be listened to at Berlin.

"Whatever happens, Paris, St. Petersburg, and London will not

succeed in maintaining peace with dignity unless they show a firm

and absolutely united front."

At the hour of expiration of the ultimatum to Serbia, M. Dumaine,

French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that

Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, had presented

alone his request for an extension of the time limit, it seeming to

the representatives of the other powers useless to support him when

there was no time to do so.

"At the last moment we are assured that the Austrian Minister has

just left Belgrade hurriedly; he must have thought the Serbian

Government's acceptance of the conditions imposed by his

Government inadequate."

SERBIA'S REPLY TO THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE

A few minutes before 6 p. m., July 25, 1914, the Serbian Government

made its reply to the Austrian note.

This declared that no attempts had been made, or declarations

uttered, by responsible representatives of Serbia, tending to

subvert Austro-Hungarian rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina, since March

31, 1909, when protests against the annexation of these countries

made in the Skupshtina (Serbian Parliament) were cut short by

declarations of the Serbian Government. It drew attention to the

fact that Austria-Hungary had since then made no complaint in this

connection save in regard to a school book, concerning which it had

received an entirely satisfactory explanation.

"Serbia has several times given proofs of her pacific and

moderate policy during the Balkan crisis, and it is thanks to

Serbia and to the sacrifice that she has made in the exclusive

interest of European peace that that peace has been preserved.

The Royal Government cannot be held responsible for

manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the

press and the peaceable work of societies--manifestations which

take place in nearly all countries in the ordinary course of

events, and which, as a general rule, escape official control.

The Royal Government are all the less responsible, in view of the

fact that at the time of the solution of a series of questions

which arose between Serbia and Austria-Hungary they gave proof of

a great readiness to oblige, and thus succeeded in settling the

majority of these questions to the advantage of the two

neighboring countries.

"For these reasons the Royal Government have been pained and

surprised at the statements, according to which members of the

Kingdom of Serbia are supposed to have participated in the

preparations for the crime committed at Sarajevo; the Royal

Government expected to be invited to collaborate in an

investigation of all that concerns this crime, and they were

ready, in order to prove the entire correctness of their

attitude, to take measures against any persons concerning whom

representations were made to them. Falling in, therefore, with

the desire of the Imperial and Royal Government, they are

prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject, without

regard to his situation or rank, of whose complicity in the crime

of Sarajevo proofs are forthcoming, and more especially they

undertake to cause to be published on the first page of the

'Journal officiel,' on the date of July 26, the following

declaration":

[Here follows the declaration required by Austria-Hungary, with

alterations intended to lessen the humiliation, which changes will

be noted in a following criticism by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign

Office.]

"This declaration will be brought to the knowledge of the Royal

army in an order of the day, in the name of his majesty the king,

by his Royal Highness the Crown Prince Alexander, and will be

published in the next official army bulletin.

"The Royal Government further undertake:

"1. To introduce at the first regular convocation of the

Skupshtina a provision into the press law providing for the most

severe punishment of incitement to hatred or contempt of the

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and for taking action against any

publication the general tendency of which is directed against

the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary. The Government

engage at the approaching revision of the Constitution to cause

an amendment to be introduced into Article XXII of the

Constitution of such a nature that such publication may be

confiscated, a proceeding at present impossible under the

categorical terms of Article XXII of the Constitution.

"2. The Government possess no proof, nor does the note of the

Imperial and Royal Government furnish them with any, that the

'Narodna Odbrana' and other similar societies have committed up

to the present any criminal act of this nature through the

proceedings of any of their members. Nevertheless, the Royal

Government will accept the demand of the Imperial and Royal

Government, and will dissolve the 'Narodna Odbrana" Society and

every other society which may be directing its efforts against

Austria-Hungary.

"3. The Royal Serbian Government undertake to remove without

delay from their public educational establishments in Serbia all

that serves or could serve to foment propaganda against

Austria-Hungary, whenever the Imperial and Royal Government

furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda.

"4. The Royal Government also agree to remove from military

service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved

to be guilty of acts directed against the integrity of the

territory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and they expect the

Imperial and Royal Government to communicate to them at a later

date the names and the acts of these officers and officials for

the purposes of the proceedings which are to be taken against

them.

"5. The Royal Government must confess that they do not clearly

grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand made by the Imperial

and Royal Government that Serbia shall undertake to accept the

collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government

upon their territory, but they declare that they will admit such

collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law,

with criminal procedure, and with good neighborly relations.

"6. It goes without saying that the Royal Government consider it

their duty to open an inquiry against all such persons as are, or

eventually may be, implicated in the plot of June 28, and who

happen to be within the territory of the kingdom. As regards the

participation in this inquiry of Austro-Hungarian agents or

authorities appointed for this purpose by the Imperial and Royal

Government, the Royal Government cannot accept such an

arrangement, as it would be a violation of the constitution and

of the law of criminal procedure; nevertheless, in concrete cases

communications as to the results of the investigations in

question might be given to the Austro-Hungarian agents.

"7. The Royal Government proceeded, on the very evening of the

delivery of the note, to arrest Commandant Voislav Tankossitch.

As regards Milan Ziganovitch, who is a subject of the

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and who up to June 28 was employed (on

probation) by the directorate of railways, it has not yet been

possible to arrest him.

"The Austro-Hungarian Government are requested to be so good as

to supply as soon as possible, in the customary form, the

presumptive evidence of guilt, as well as the eventual proofs of

guilt which have been collected up to the present, at the inquiry

at Sarajevo for the purposes of the later inquiry.

"8. The Serbian Government will reinforce and extend the measures

which have been taken for preventing the illicit traffic of arms

and explosives across the frontier. It goes without saying that

they will immediately order an inquiry and will severely punish

the frontier officials on the Schabatz-Loznitza line who have

failed in their duty and allowed the authors of the crime of

Sarajevo to pass.

"9. The Royal Government will gladly give explanations of the

remarks made by their officials whether in Serbia or abroad, in

interviews after the crime which according to the statement of

the Imperial and Royal Government were hostile toward the [Dual]

Monarchy, as soon as the Imperial and Royal Government have

communicated to them the passages in question in these remarks,

and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually

made by the said officials, although the Royal Government will

itself take steps to collect evidence and proofs.

"10. The Royal Government will inform the Imperial and Royal

Government of the execution of the measures comprised under the

above heads, in so far as this has not already been done by the

present note, as soon as each measure has been ordered and

carried out.

"If the Imperial and Royal Government are not satisfied with this

reply, the Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the

common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, are

ready, as always, to accept a pacific understanding, either by

referring this question to the decision of the International

Tribunal of The Hague, or to the Great Powers which took part in

the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government

on March 31, 1909."

The Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade, Baron Giesl von

Gieslingen, to whom the reply was delivered, on comparing it with

his instructions, declared it unsatisfactory, and informed M.

Pashitch, the Serbian Prime Minister that he and his legation would

leave Belgrade that evening, turning over his Government's interests

in Serbia to the German Legation. Rupture in diplomatic relations

between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, he said, was a _fait accompli_.

These events M. Pashitch reported on the same day to all the Serbian

Legations abroad, and further announced:

"The Royal Serbian Government have summoned the Skupshtina to

meet on July 27 at Nish, whither all the ministries with their

staffs are proceeding this evening. The crown prince has issued,

in the name of the king, an order for the mobilization of the

army, while to-morrow or the day after a proclamation will be

made in which it will be announced that civilians who are not

liable to military service should remain peaceably at home, while

soldiers should proceed to their appointed posts and defend the

country to the best of their ability, in the event of Serbia

being attacked."

The Austrian Minister left Belgrade at 6.30 p. m. for Vienna. On the

same day the Serbian Minister at Vienna, M. Yov. Yovanovitch,

received his passports. On the same day the Serbian reply was

presented at Vienna, where it received the following commentaries by

the Foreign Office:

"The Royal Serbian Government limits itself to establishing that

since the declaration of March 31, 1909, there has been no

attempt on the part of the Serbian Government to alter the

position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

"With this she deliberately shifts the foundation of our note, as

we have not insisted that she and her officials have undertaken

anything official in this direction. Our gravamen is that in

spite of the obligation assumed in the cited note, she has

omitted to suppress the movement directed against the territorial

integrity of the monarchy.

"Her obligation consisted in changing her attitude and the entire

direction of her policies, and in entering into friendly and

neighborly relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and not

to interfere with the possession of Bosnia.

"The assertion of the Royal Serbian Government that the

expressions of the press and the activity of Serbian associations

possess a private character and thus escape governmental control,

stands in full contrast with the institutions of modern states

and even the most liberal of press and society laws, which nearly

everywhere subject the press and the societies to a certain

control of the state. This is also provided for by the Serbian

institutions. The rebuke against the Serbian Government consists

in the fact that it has totally omitted to supervise its press

and its societies, in so far as it knew their direction to be

hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy.

"The assertion [that the Serbian Government was ready to proceed

against all persons in regard to whom it would receive

information] is incorrect. The Serbian Government was accurately

informed about the suspicion resting upon quite definite

personalities and not only in the position, but also obliged by

its own laws to institute investigations spontaneously. The

Serbian Government has done nothing in this direction."

The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office objected to the alterations made

by Serbia in the declaration published in the official organ. This,

in the Serbian reply, began:

"The Royal Serbian Government condemns every propaganda which

should be directed against Austria-Hungary.

"The Austrian demand reads: 'The Royal Serbian Government

condemns the propaganda against Austria-Hungary....' The

alteration of the declaration as demanded by us, which has been

made by the Royal Serbian Government, is meant to imply that a

propaganda directed against Austria-Hungary does not exist, and

that it is not aware of such. This formula is insincere, and the

Serbian Government reserves itself the subterfuge for later

occasions that it had not disavowed by this declaration the

existing propaganda, nor recognized the same as hostile to the

[Dual] Monarchy, whence it could deduce further that it is not

obliged to suppress in the future a propaganda similar to the

present one."

Objection was similarly made to the alteration in the Serbian

apology for acts of Serbian officers. This apology began:

"The Royal Government regrets that according to a communication

of the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and

functionaries have participated in the propaganda.

"The formula as demanded by Austria reads: The Royal Government

regrets that Serbian officers and functionaries ... have

participated.... Also with this formula and the further addition

'according to the declaration of the Imperial and Royal

Government,' the Serbian Government pursues the object, already

indicated above, to preserve a free hand for the future.

"Austria had demanded:

"1. To suppress every publication which incites to hatred and

contempt for the [Dual] Monarchy, and whose tendency is directed

against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.

"We wanted to bring about the obligation for Serbia to take care

that such attacks of the press would cease in the future.

"Instead Serbia offers to pass certain laws which are meant as

means toward this end, viz:

"(_a_) A law according to which the expressions of the press

hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy can be individually punished, a

matter which is immaterial to us, all the more so, as the

individual prosecution of press intrigues is very rarely possible

and as, with a lax enforcement of such laws, the few cases of

this nature would not be punished. The proposition, therefore,

does not meet our demand in any way, and it offers not the least

guaranty for the desired success.

"(_b_) An amendment to article 22 of the constitution, which

would permit confiscation, a proposal which does not satisfy us,

as the existence of such a law in Serbia is of no use to us. For

we want the _obligation_ of the Government to _enforce_ it and

that has not been promised us.

"These proposals are therefore entirely unsatisfactory and

evasive as we are not told within what time these laws will be

passed, and as in the event of the not passing of these laws by

the Skupshtina everything would remain as it is, except in the

event of a possible resignation of the Government.

"2. The propaganda of the Narodna Odbrana and affiliated

societies hostile to the [Dual] Monarchy fills the entire public

life of Serbia; it is therefore an entirely inacceptable reserve

if the Serbian Government asserts that it knows nothing about it.

Aside from this, our demand is not completely fulfilled, as we

have asked besides:

"To confiscate the means of propaganda of these societies to

prevent the reformation of the dissolved societies under another

name and in another form.

"In these two directions the Belgrade Cabinet is perfectly

silent, so that through this semiconcession there is offered us

no guaranty for putting an end to the agitation of the

associations hostile to the monarchy, especially the Narodna

Odbrana.

"3. The Serbian Government first demands proofs for a propaganda

hostile to the monarchy in the public instruction of Serbia while

it must know that the textbooks introduced in the Serbian schools

contain objectionable matter in this direction and that a large

portion of the teachers are in the camp of the Narodna Odbrana

and affiliated societies.

"Furthermore the Serbian Government has not fulfilled a part of

our demands, as we have requested, as it omitted in its text the

addition desired by us: 'as far as the body of instructors is

concerned, as well as the means of instruction'--a sentence which

shows clearly where the propaganda hostile to the monarchy is to

be found in the Serbian schools.

"4. By promising the dismissal from the military and civil

services of those officers and officials who are found guilty by

judicial procedure, the Serbian Government limits its assent to

those cases, in which these persons have been charged with a

crime according to the statutory code. As, however, we demand the

removal of such officers and officials as indulge in a propaganda

hostile to the monarchy, which is generally not punishable in

Serbia, our demands have not been fulfilled in this point."

5. The Serbian reply declared that Serbia was willing to permit that

cooperation of officials of the [Dual] Monarchy on Serbian territory

which does not run counter to international law and criminal law.

"The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing

to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of

state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement.

The reserved attitude of Serbia is therefore incomprehensible and

on account of its vague general form it would lead to

unbridgeable difficulties.

"6. The Austrian demand was clear and unmistakable:

"1. To institute a criminal procedure against the participants in

the outrage.

"2. Participation by Imperial and Royal Government officials in

the examinations ('recherche' in contrast with 'enquête

judiciaire').

"3. It did not occur to us to let Imperial and Royal Government

officials participate in the Serbian court procedure; they were

to cooperate only in the police researches which had to furnish

and fix the material for the investigation.

"If the Serbian Government misunderstands us here, this is done

deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between

'enquête judiciaire' and simple police researches. As it desired

to escape from every control of the investigation which would

yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for

it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner

the cooperation of our officials (precedents for such police

intervention exist in great numbers) it tries to justify its

refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.

"(In reference to arrest of conspirators).

"7. This reply is disingenuous. According to our investigation,

Ciganowic, by order of the police prefect in Belgrade, left three

days after the outrage for Ribari, after it had become known that

Ciganowic had participated in the outrage. In the first place, it

is therefore incorrect that Ciganowic left the Serbian service on

June 28. In the second place, we add that the prefect of police

at Belgrade, who had himself caused the departure of this

Ciganowic and who knew his whereabout, declared in an interview

that a man by the name of Milan Ciganowic did not exist in

Belgrade.

"9. (In reference to expressions made against Austria-Hungary by

Serbian officials in interviews.)

"The Royal Serbian Government must be aware of the interviews in

question. If it demands of the Imperial and Royal Government that

it should furnish all kinds of detail about the said interviews

and if it reserves for itself the right of a formal

investigation, it shows that it is not its intention seriously to

fulfill the demand.

"10. (In reference to referring the dispute to arbitration of the

powers.)

"The Serbian Note, therefore, is entirely a play for time."

BEGINNING OF MOBILIZATION

The diplomatic issue now became that over mobilization by Russia:

whether it was a threat of war against Austria-Hungary alone, or

against Germany as well.

On the day of Serbia's reply to the Austro-Hungarian note, July 25,

1914, General von Chelius, German honorary aide to the Czar, sent a

telegram to Kaiser William II through the German Foreign Office,

which stated:

"The maneuvers of the troops in the Krasnoe camp were suddenly

interrupted and the regiments returned to their garrisons at

once. The maneuvers have been cancelled. The military pupils were

raised to-day to the rank of officers instead of next fall. At

headquarters there obtains great excitement over the procedure of

Austria. I have the impression that complete preparations for

mobilization against Austria are being made."

On the same day Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,

telegraphed M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs:

"Grey has told the German Ambassador [Prince Lichnowsky] that in

his opinion Austrian mobilization must lead to Russian

mobilization, that grave danger of a general war will thereupon

arise, and that he sees only one means of reaching a peaceful

settlement, namely, that, in view of the Austrian and Russian

mobilizations, Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain should

abstain from immediate mobilization, and should at once offer

their good offices. Grey told me that the first essential of this

plan was the consent of Germany and her promise not to mobilize.

He has therefore, as a first step, made an inquiry on this point

at Berlin."

On the same day the German Chancellor, Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg,

telegraphed to Prince Lichnowsky:

"The distinction made by Sir Edward Grey between an

Austro-Serbian and an Austro-Russian conflict is perfectly

correct. We do not wish to interpose in the former any more than

England, and as heretofore we take the position that this

question must be localized by virtue of all powers refraining

from intervention. It is therefore our hope that Russia will

refrain from any action in view of her responsibility and the

seriousness of the situation. We are prepared, in the event of an

Austro-Russian controversy, quite apart from our known duties as

Allies, to intercede between Russia and Austria jointly with the

other powers."

SUNDAY, JULY 26, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St.

Petersburg, Count Szápáry, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Secretary

for Foreign Affairs in Vienna, that Count Pourtalès the German

Ambassador, upon hearing reports of measures for Russian

mobilization, had called the attention of M. Sazonof, the Russian

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the fact that nowadays mobilization

was a highly dangerous form of diplomatic pressure.

"For, in that event, the purely military consideration of the

question by the general staffs would find expression, and if that

button were once touched in Germany, the situation would get out

of control.

"M. Sazonof assured the German Ambassador on his word of honor

that the reports on the subject were incorrect; that up to that

time not a single horse and not a single reservist had been

called up, and that all the measures that were being taken were

merely measures of preparation in the military districts of Kiev,

Odessa, and perhaps Kazan and Moscow."

M. Suchomlinoff, Russian Minister for War, had immediately after

this, summoned Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché and

confirmed M. Sazonof's assurance in detail. As reported by the

major, he said:

"For the present merely preparatory measures would be taken, not

a horse would be taken, not a reservist called up. If Austria

crossed the Serbian frontier, the military districts of Kiev,

Odessa, Moscow, and Kazan, which face Austria, would be

mobilized. In no circumstances will mobilization take place on

the German front, Warsaw, Vilna, and St. Petersburg. Peace with

Germany is earnestly desired.... I gave the Minister for War to

understand that his friendly intentions would be appreciated by

us, but that we should also consider mobilization against Austria

to be in itself extremely threatening."

_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, telegraphed the

Ambassador at Rome to persuade the Italian Government to act in the

interests of peace by bringing influence to bear on her ally,

Austria-Hungary, and by opposing the view that the dispute with

Serbia could be localized. Russia cannot possibly avoid coming to

the help of Serbia. M. Kasansky, Acting Consul at Prague,

telegraphed that Austro-Hungarian mobilization had been ordered. M.

Sazonof reported to M. Schebeko, Ambassador at Vienna, an interview

just held with Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador.

"After discussing the ten demands addressed to Serbia, I drew his

attention to the fact that, quite apart from the clumsy form in

which they were presented, some of them were quite impracticable,

even if the Serbian Government agreed to accept them. Thus, for

example, points one and two could not be carried out without

recasting the Serbian press law and associations law, and to that

it might be difficult to obtain the consent of the Skupshtina. As

for enforcing points four and five, this might lead to most

dangerous consequences, and even to the risk of acts of terrorism

directed against the Royal Family and against Pashitch, which

clearly could not be the intention of Austria. With regard to the

other points it seemed to me that, with certain changes of

detail, it would not be difficult to find a basis of mutual

agreement, if the accusations contained in them were confirmed by

sufficient proof.

"In the interest of the maintenance of peace, which, according to

the statements of Szápáry, is as much desired by Austria as by

all the powers, it was necessary to end the tension of the

present moment as soon as possible. With this object in view it

seemed to me most desirable that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

should be authorized to enter into a private exchange of views in

order to redraft certain articles of the Austrian note of July 23

in consultation with me. This method of procedure would perhaps

enable us to find a formula which would prove acceptable to

Serbia, while giving satisfaction to Austria in respect of the

chief of her demands. Please convey the substance of this

telegram to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in a judicious and

friendly manner."

Communicated to Russian Ambassadors in Germany, France, Great

Britain, and Italy. The Ambassador at Berlin was requested to

communicate the contents of the telegram to Secretary of State von

Jagow, and express to him the hope that he would advise Vienna to

meet Russia's proposal in a friendly spirit.

M. Sevastopoulo, Chargé d'Affaires at Paris, telegraphed M. Sazonof

that, when M. Berthelot, French Political Director, informed Count

Szécen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, of the Serbian reply to the

ultimatum, the count did not conceal his surprise that it was not

accepted.

In a supplementary telegram he said M. Berthelot was convinced that

Germany's aim, in her negotiations at Paris, was to intimidate

France to mediate with Russia.

M. Broniewsky, Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, reported noisy

demonstrations there by a crowd largely composed of Austrians on

news of Austrian mobilization, and anti-Russian shouting by the

crowd before the Russian Embassy. No precautions were taken by the

police.

_Germany._ Major von Eggeling telegraphed to the German Chancellor,

Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that it was certain mobilization had been

ordered for Kiev and Odessa; it was doubtful at Warsaw and Moscow,

and improbable elsewhere in Russia.

The Chancellor telegraphed to Baron von Schoen, German Ambassador at

Paris, after Austria-Hungary's official declaration to Russia, that

she had no intention to annex the territory of Serbia or to impair

her sovereignty, the responsibility for a European war rested on

Russia.

"We depend upon France, with which we are at one in the desire

for the preservation of the peace of Europe, that it will

exercise its influence at St. Petersburg in favor of peace."

This telegram, without the final sentence, the Chancellor sent also

to Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, and to

Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at London, adding in the latter

case that a call was expected for the several classes of Russian

reserves, which would be equivalent to mobilization, and, in this

case, Germany would be forced to mobilize, much against her wish.

"We ask [Great Britain] to act on this understanding at St.

Petersburg with all possible emphasis."

Count Pourtalès was directed to make the following declaration to

the Russian Government:

"Preparatory military measures by Russia will force us to

countermeasures which must consist in mobilizing the army.

"But mobilization means war.

"As we know the obligations of France toward Russia, this

mobilization would be directed against both Russia and France. We

cannot assume that Russia desires to unchain such a European war.

Since Austria-Hungary will not touch the existence of the Serbian

Kingdom, we are of the opinion that Russia can afford to assume

an attitude of waiting. We can all the more support the desire of

Russia to protect the integrity of Serbia as Austria-Hungary does

not intend to question the latter. It will be easy in the further

development of the affair to find a basis for an understanding."

_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at

Vienna, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign

Affairs at London, that it was the belief of the German Ambassador,

Herr von Tschirscky, that Russia would keep quiet during the

chastisement of Serbia. Everything, said Von Tschirscky, depended on

the personality of the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who

could resist easily the pressure of a few newspapers; pan-Slav

agitation in Russia was over; intervention in behalf of Serbia would

open up Swedish, Polish, Ruthenian, Rumanian, and Persian questions;

France, too, was not in a condition for war. Von Tschirscky doubted

that Russia, who had no right to assume a protectorate over Serbia,

would assert it by action; Germany knew what she was about in

backing up Austria-Hungary; the Serbian concessions were all a sham,

as proved by the Government previously ordering mobilization and

preparing to retire from Belgrade.

Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, telegraphed

Sir Edward Grey that Kaiser William was returning suddenly that

night (from a sea trip to Norway) on his own initiative, and that

the Foreign Office regretted it, owing to the speculation and

excitement which it would cause. Herr von Zimmermann, German

Under-Secretary of State, had inferred from Russia's statement that

she would intervene in case of annexation of Serbian territory; that

she would not do so if no territory were taken.

In a supplementary telegram Sir Horace informed Sir Edward that Von

Zimmermann considered that the communication by Germany to

Austria-Hungary of his (Grey's) hope for a favorable view of the

Serbian reply implied that the German Government associated itself

to a certain extent with Grey's hope. It did not, however, go beyond

this.

Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, telegraphed Sir Edward

Grey that Austria-Hungary had informed the Italian Government that

the Austro-Hungarian Minister to Belgrade had been recalled, but

that this did not imply a declaration of war.

Sir Edward telegraphed to Sir Rennell Rodd, Sir Francis Bertie,

Ambassador at Paris, and Sir Horace Rumbold, Chargé d'Affaires at

Berlin, to ask if the ministers of foreign affairs at their courts

would instruct their ambassadors at London to meet with him in

conference "to discover an issue which would prevent complications,"

and to suggest that the ministers should instruct their

representatives at Belgrade, Vienna, and St. Petersburg to request a

suspension of military operations pending results of the conference.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to

Sir Edward Grey that the Russian Ambassador, M. Schebeko, just

returned from leave of absence, thinks Austria-Hungary determined on

war, and that it will be impossible for Russia to remain

indifferent. He and the French Ambassador, M. Dumaine, doubt whether

the principle of Grey's suggestion that Russia, being an interested

party, is entitled to have a say in a purely Austro-Serbian dispute,

would be accepted by either Austria-Hungary or Germany.

_France._ M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs,

notified M. Viviani, Prime Minister on board _La France_, and the

French Ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and

Rome, of the events at Belgrade on Saturday, July 25, ending with

the order for mobilization given by the Serbian Government, which

had retired to Kragoujewatz, whither it was followed by the French

and Russian Ministers. At Vienna people "soothe themselves with the

illusion that Russia 'will not hold firm.'"

"It must not be forgotten that Italy is bound by the engagements

of the Triple Alliance only if she has been consulted beforehand.

"From St. Petersburg we learn that M. Sazonof [Minister for

Foreign Affairs] has advised Serbia to ask for British mediation.

At the Council of Ministers on the 25th, which was held in

presence of the emperor, the mobilization of thirteen army corps

intended eventually to operate against Austria was considered;

this mobilization, however, would only be made effective if

Austria were to bring armed pressure to bear upon Serbia, and not

till after notice had been given by the Minister for Foreign

Affairs, upon whom falls the duty of fixing the day, liberty

being left to him to go on with negotiations even if Belgrade

should be occupied. Russian opinion makes clear that it is both

politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to

be crushed.

"In London the German _démarche_ was made on the 25th, in the

same terms as those used by Baron von Schoen at Paris. Sir Edward

Grey has replied to Prince Lichnowsky that if the war were to

break out no power in Europe could take up a detached attitude.

He did not express himself more definitely and used very reserved

language to the Serbian Minister [M. Boschkovitch]. The

communication made on the evening of the 25th by the Austrian

Ambassador makes Sir Edward Grey more optimistic; since the

diplomatic rupture does not necessarily involve immediate

military operations, the Secretary of State is still willing to

hope that the powers will have time to intervene.

"At Berlin the language used by the Secretary of State [Von

Jagow] to the Russian Chargé d'Affaires [Broniewsky] is

unsatisfactory and dilatory; when the latter asked him to

associate himself with a _démarche_ at Vienna for an extension of

the time limit, he replied that he had already taken action in

this sense but that it was too late; to the request for an

extension of the time limit before active measures were taken, he

replied that this had to do with a domestic matter, and not with

a war but with local operations. Herr von Jagow pretends not to

believe that the Austrian action could lead to general

consequences.

"A real explosion of chauvinism has taken place at Berlin. The

German Emperor returns direct to Kiel. M. Jules Cambon thinks

that, at the first military steps taken by Russia, Germany would

immediately reply, and probably would not wait for a pretext

before attacking us.

"At Vienna, the French Ambassador [Dumaine] has not had time to

join in the _démarche_ of his Russian colleague [Schebeko] for

obtaining an extension of the time limit fixed for Serbia; he

does not regret it, this _démarche_ having been categorically

rejected, and England not having had time to give instructions to

her representative about it.

"A note from the British Embassy has been delivered to me: it

gives an account of the conversation between the British

Ambassador at St. Petersburg [Buchanan] and M. Sazonof and M.

Paléologue. Sir Edward Grey thinks that the four powers who are

not directly interested ought to press both on Russia and Austria

that their armies should not cross the frontier, and that they

should give time to England, France, Germany, and Italy to bring

their mediation into play. If Germany accepts, the British

Government has reason to think that Italy also would be glad to

be associated in the joint action of England and France; the

adherence of Germany is essential, for neither Austria nor Russia

would tolerate any intervention except that of impartial friends

or Allies."

M. Barrère, French Ambassador at Rome, informed M. Bienvenu-Martin

that a telegram from Vienna stated that diplomatic rupture between

Austria and Serbia had taken place, and Austria was proceeding to

military measures. Marquis di San Giuliano, the Prime Minister,

would return in two days to Rome. The president of the council had

given Barrère the impression that Italy would be neutral in case of

war, maintaining "an attitude of observation." M. Salandra

[afterward Prime Minister] had said that:

"'We shall make the greatest efforts to prevent peace being

broken; our situation is somewhat analogous to that of England.

Perhaps we could do something in a pacific sense together with

the English.' M. Salandra stated definitely to me that the

Austrian note had been communicated to Rome at the last moment."

M. Barrère, in a second telegram, said that the greater part of

Italian public opinion was hostile to Austria "in this serious

business."

M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that

M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, had advised Serbia to ask

for British mediation. M. Bienvenu-Martin thereupon telegraphed M.

de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires, London, that France desired British

mediation. M. Paléologue reported at greater length M. Sazonof's

determination to secure a peaceful solution to the Serbian question.

"'Up to the last moment,' he declared to me, 'I shall show myself

ready to negotiate.'

"It is in this spirit that he has just sent for Count Szápáry to

come to a 'frank and loyal explanation.' M. Sazonof commented in

his presence on the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, article by

article, making clear the insulting character of the principal

clauses. 'The intention which inspired this document,' he said,

'is legitimate if you pursued no aim other than the protection of

your territory against the intrigues of Serbian anarchists; but

the procedure to which you have had recourse is not defensible.'

He concluded: 'Take back your ultimatum, modify its form, and I

will guarantee you the result.'

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador showed himself moved by this

language; however, while awaiting instructions, he reserves the

opinion of his Government. Without being discouraged M. Sazonof

has decided to propose this evening to Count Berchtold the

opening of direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg

on the changes to be introduced into the ultimatum.

"This friendly and semiofficial interposition of Russia between

Austria and Serbia has the advantage of being expeditious. I

therefore believe it to be preferable to any other procedure and

likely to succeed."

M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador, had returned

in haste from Russia, whither he had gone on the assurance of Count

Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that the

demands on Serbia would be acceptable. Other Austrian officials had

taken the same attitude, which is quite usual in Austro-Hungarian

diplomacy, and this procedure has greatly increased the irritation

of the Russian Government.

M. Schebeko, seizing advantage of the delay of mobilization, will

make a proposal calculated to test the value of the pacific

declarations of Germany. This is for a conference of the British,

French, Italian, and German Ambassadors, to refuse concurrence in

which the German Ambassador, M. Tschirsky, will almost certainly

have to plead the principle of "localizing the conflict."

"My impression is that the Austro-Hungarian Government, although

surprised and perhaps regretting the vigor with which they have

been inspired, will believe themselves obliged to commence

military action."

M. Bienvenu-Martin reported to M. Viviani on _La France_ and to the

ambassadors at London, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome the

rupture of diplomatic relations with Serbia made by Austria-Hungary.

"According to a telegram from M. Jules Cambon [at Berlin], the

British Ambassador [Sir Edward Goschen] thinks that there is a

slight yielding; when he observed to Herr von Jagow that Sir

Edward Grey did not ask him to intervene between Austria and

Serbia, but, as this question ceased to be localized, to

intervene with England, France, and Italy at Vienna and St.

Petersburg, the Secretary of State declared that he would do his

best to maintain peace."

M. Bienvenu-Martin also reported that Italy, not having been

consulted about the note to Serbia, felt herself relieved from all

responsibility in the grave step taken by her ally. He also told of

his answer to the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, who sought

France's influence to keep Russia from war, that Germany ought, on

her side, to influence Austria-Hungary to avoid military operations

leading to the occupation of Serbia, and the consequent intervention

of Russia.

"The ambassador having observed to me that this could not be

reconciled with the position taken up by Germany 'that the

question concerned only Austria and Serbia,' I told him that

mediation at Vienna and St. Petersburg would be the act of the

four other powers less interested in the question.

"Herr von Schoen then intrenched himself behind his lack of

instructions in this respect, and I told him that in these

conditions I did not feel myself in a position to take any action

at St. Petersburg alone."

After his visit to M. Bienvenu-Martin at 5 p. m. Baron von Schoen

went to see M. Berthelot, the Political Director, to have an account

of the interview officially published in the press. The article he

proposed indicated the most amicable cooperation between France and

Germany in the furtherance of European peace.

"The Political Director replied at once, 'Then, in your opinion,

every thing is settled, and you bring us the assurance that

Austria accepts the Serbian note or will enter into conversations

with the powers on this matter?' The ambassador having ...

vigorously denied the suggestion, it was explained to him that if

there was no modification in Germany's negative attitude, the

terms of the suggested 'note to the press' were exaggerated, and

of a nature to give a false security to French opinion by

creating illusion on the real situation, the dangers of which

were only too evident.

"To the assurances lavished by the German Ambassador as to the

optimistic impressions which he had formed, the Acting Political

Director replied by asking if he might speak to him in a manner

quite personal and private, as man to man, quite freely and

without regard to their respective functions. Baron von Schoen

asked him to do so.

"M. Berthelot then said that to any simple mind Germany's

attitude was inexplicable if it did not aim at war; a purely

objective analysis of the facts and the psychology of the

Austro-German relations led logically to this conclusion. In the

face of the repeated statement that Germany was ignorant of the

contents of the Austrian note, it was no longer permissible to

raise any doubt on that point; but was it probable that Germany

would have arrayed herself on the side of Austria in such an

adventure with her eyes closed? Did the psychology of all the

past relations of Vienna and Berlin allow one to admit that

Austria could have taken up a position without any possible

retreat, before having weighed with her ally all the consequences

of her uncompromising attitude? How surprising appeared the

refusal by Germany to exercise mediating influence at Vienna now

that she knew the extraordinary text of the Austrian note! What

responsibility was the German Government assuming and what

suspicions would rest upon them if they persisted in interposing

between Austria and the powers, after what might be called the

absolute submission of Serbia, and when the slightest advice

given by them to Vienna would put an end to the nightmare which

weighed on Europe!

"The breaking off of diplomatic relations by Austria, her threats

of war, and the mobilization which she was undertaking make

peculiarly urgent pacific action on the part of Germany, for from

the day when Austrian troops crossed the Serbian frontier, one

would be faced by an act which without doubt would oblige the St.

Petersburg Cabinet to intervene, and would risk the unloosing of

a war which Germany declares that she wishes to avoid.

"Herr von Schoen, who listened smiling, once more affirmed that

Germany had been ignorant of the text of the Austrian note, and

had approved it only after its delivery; she thought, however,

that Serbia had need of a lesson severe enough for her not to be

able to forget it, and that Austria owed it to herself to put an

end to a situation which was dangerous and intolerable for a

great power. He declared besides that he did not know the text of

the Serbian reply, and showed his personal surprise that it had

not satisfied Austria, if indeed it was such as the papers, which

are often ill informed, represented it to be.

"He insisted again on Germany's peaceful intentions and gave his

impressions as to the effect that might arise from good advice

given, for instance, at Vienna, by England in a friendly tone.

According to him Austria was not uncompromising; what she rejects

is the idea of a formal mediation, the 'spectre' of a conference:

a peaceful word coming from St. Petersburg, good words said in a

conciliatory tone by the powers of the Triple Entente, would have

a chance of being well received. He added, finally, that he did

not say that Germany on her side would not give some advice at

Vienna.

"In these conditions the Political Director announced that he

would ask the minister if it appeared to him opportune to

communicate to the press a short note in a moderate tone."

M. Chevalley, French Minister at Christiania, telegraphed to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that the whole German fleet in Norway was returning

to Germany. M. d'Annoville, French Chargé d'Affaires at Luxemburg,

telegraphed that the last four classes of [German] reservists set at

liberty had been forbidden to leave their places of residence, and

were ordered to hold themselves at the disposition of the

_Kommandutur_ at any moment.

MONDAY, JULY 27, 1914

_Austria-Hungary._ On the following day Count Szápáry,

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Count

Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of a conversation

he had just had with M. Sazonof.

Mistaken impressions, he told the Russian Minister for Foreign

Affairs, were abroad in Russia as to Austria-Hungary's intentions.

"We were credited with wishing to push forward into Balkan

territory, and to begin a march to Salonica or even to

Constantinople. Others, again, went so far as to describe our

action merely as the starting point of a preventive war against

Russia. I said that all this was erroneous, and that parts of it

were absolutely unreasonable. The goal of our action was

self-preservation and self-defense against hostile propaganda by

word, in writing, and in action, which threatened our integrity.

It would occur to no one in Austria-Hungary to threaten Russian

interests, or indeed to pick a quarrel with Russia. And yet we

were absolutely determined to reach the goal which we had set

before us, and the path which we had chosen seemed to us the most

suitable. As, however, the action under discussion was action in

self-defense, I could not conceal from him that we could not

allow ourselves to be diverted from it by any consequences, of

whatever kind they might be.

"M. Sazonof agreed with me. Our goal, as I had described it to

him, was an entirely legitimate one, but he considered that the

path which we were pursuing with a view to attaining it was not

the surest. He said that the note which we had delivered was not

happy in its form. He had since been studying it, and if I had

time, he would like to look it through once more with me. I

remarked that I was at his service, but was not authorized either

to discuss the text of the note with him or to interpret it. Of

course, however, his remarks were of interest. The minister then

took all the points of the note in order, and on this occasion

found seven of the ten points admissible without very great

difficulty; only the two points dealing with the collaboration of

the Imperial and Royal officials in Serbia and the point dealing

with the removal of officers and civil servants to be designated

by us, seemed to him to be unacceptable in their present form.

With regard, to the first two points, I was in a position to give

an authentic interpretation in the sense of your excellency's

telegram of the 25th instant; with regard to the third, I

expressed the opinion that it was a necessary demand. Moreover,

matters had already been set in motion. The Serbians had

mobilized on the previous day, and I did not know what had

happened since then."

Count Berchtold instructed Count Szápáry by telegraph to declare to

M. Sazonof that, so long as the war between Austria-Hungary and

Serbia remained localized, the [Dual] Monarchy did not aim in any

way at territorial acquisitions of any sort.

Count Szögyény, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Count Berchtold

that M. Sazonof had explained to Count Pourtalès, the German

Ambassador at St. Petersburg, that he could not guarantee that

Russia had not begun mobilization, and confessed that certain

necessary military measures were being taken.

"Major von Eggeling, German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg,

reports that the Russian Minister for War, M. Suchomlinof, has

given him his word of honor that not a man or a horse has been

mobilized; however, naturally, certain military precautions have

been taken; precautions which, as the German military attaché

adds ... 'are to be sure pretty far-reaching.'"

Count Berchtold informed the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors at Berlin,

Rome, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg of the annotations of his

Government to the Serbian reply.

_Germany._ The Austro-Hungarian Consulate at Kovno, Russia,

telegraphed to the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, that

Kovno had been declared to be in a state of war.

The German Minister at Berne, Switzerland, telegraphed to the

Chancellor that the French Fourteenth Corps had discontinued

maneuvers.

Count Pourtalès, German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to

the Chancellor at Berlin:

"The Secretary of War [Suchomlinof] has given me his word of

honor that no order to mobilize has as yet been issued. Though

general preparations are being made, no reserves were called and

no horses mustered. If Austria crossed the Serbian frontier, such

military districts as are directed toward Austria, viz Kiev,

Odessa, Moscow, Kazan, are to be mobilized. Under no

circumstances those on the German frontier, Warsaw, Vilni, St.

Petersburg. Peace with Germany was desired very much. Upon my

inquiry into the object of mobilization against Austria he

shrugged his shoulders and referred to the diplomats. I told the

secretary that we appreciated the friendly intentions, but

considered mobilization even against Austria as very menacing."

The Chancellor telegraphed Prince Lichnowsky, German Ambassador at

London:

"We know as yet nothing of a suggestion of Sir Edward Grey's to

hold a quadruple conference in London. It is impossible for us to

place our ally in his dispute with Serbia before a European

tribunal. Our mediation must be limited to the danger of an

Austro-Russian conflict."

This was supplemented by a telegram:

"We have at once started the mediation proposal in Vienna in the

sense as desired by Sir Edward Grey. We have communicated besides

to Count Berchtold the desire of M. Sazonof for a direct parley

with Vienna."

_Russia._ Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London,

telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.

Petersburg, to know if his views on direct discussions with the

Vienna Cabinet harmonized with Grey's scheme for mediation by the

four powers, Great Britain, France, Italy, and Germany.

"Having heard from the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg that

you would be prepared to accept such a combination, Grey decided

to turn it into an official proposal, which he communicated

yesterday to Berlin, Paris, and Rome."

M. Sazonof replied by telegraph that the British Ambassador at St.

Petersburg, Sir George Buchanan, had asked him if the Russian

Government thought it desirable for Great Britain to take the

initiative in convoking a conference in London of the four powers.

"I replied that I have begun conversations with the

Austro-Hungarian Ambassador under conditions which, I hope, may

be favorable. I have not, however, received as yet any reply to

the proposal made by me for revising the note between the two

Cabinets.

"If direct explanations with the Vienna Cabinet were to prove

impossible, I am ready to accept the British proposal, or any

other proposal of a kind that would bring about a favorable

solution of the conflict.

"I wish, however, to put an end from this day forth to a

misunderstanding which might arise from the answer given by the

French Minister of Justice to the German Ambassador, regarding

counsels of moderation to be given to the Imperial [Russian]

Cabinet."

This telegram Benckendorff communicated to Grey on the following

day.

M. Sazonof telegraphed to the Russian Ambassadors at Paris, London,

Berlin, Vienna, and Rome that the Serbian reply exceeded

expectations in its moderation and desire to afford the fullest

satisfaction.

"We do not see what further demands could be made by Austria,

unless the Vienna Cabinet is seeking for a pretext for war with

Serbia."

M. Isvolsky, Russian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to M. Sazonof

that the German Ambassador, Baron von Schoen, had confirmed his

declaration of yesterday in writing, i.e.:

"1. That Austria has declared to Russia that she seeks no

territorial acquisitions and that she harbors no designs against

the integrity of Serbia. Her sole object is to secure her own

peace and quiet.

"2. That consequently it rests with Russia to avoid war.

"3. That Germany and France, entirely at one in their ardent

desire to preserve peace, should exercise their moderating

influence upon Russia.

"Baron von Schoen laid special emphasis on the expression of

solidarity of Germany and France. The Minister of Justice is

convinced that these steps on the part of Germany are taken with

the evident object of alienating Russia and France, of inducing

the French Government to make representations at St. Petersburg,

and of thus compromising our ally in our eyes; and finally, in

the event of war, of throwing the responsibility not on Germany,

who is ostensibly making every effort to maintain peace, but on

Russia and France."

In a supplementary telegram M. Isvolsky stated that the telegram

from Belgrade to Paris, giving the Serbian reply to the Austrian

note was delayed twenty hours, and that the telegram from the French

Foreign Office containing instructions to support Russia's

representations, which had been sent at the special urgent rate at

11 a. m., July 25, 1914, only reached its destination at 6 p. m.

"There is no doubt that this telegram was intentionally delayed

by the Austrian telegraph office."

M. Isvolsky telegraphed to M. Sazonof:

"The Austrian Ambassador [Count Szécsen] has informed the Acting

Minister for Foreign Affairs [M. Bienvenu-Martin] that to-morrow,

Tuesday, Austria will proceed to take 'energetic action' with the

object of forcing Serbia to give the necessary guaranties. The

minister having asked what form such action would take, the

ambassador replied that he had no exact information on the

subject, but it might mean either the crossing of the Serbian

frontier, or an ultimatum, or even a declaration of war."

M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, telegraphed M.

Sazonof:

"I begged the Minister for Foreign Affairs [Von Jagow] to support

your proposal in Vienna that Szápáry [Austro-Hungarian Ambassador

at St. Petersburg] should be authorized to draw up, by means of a

private exchange of views with you, a wording of the

Austro-Hungarian demands which would be acceptable to both

parties. Jagow answered that he was aware of this proposal and

that he agreed with Pourtalès [German Ambassador at St.

Petersburg] that, as Szápáry had begun this conversation, he

might as well go on with it. He will telegraph in this sense to

the German Ambassador at Vienna. I begged him to press Vienna

with greater insistence to adopt this conciliatory line; Jagow

answered that he could not advise Austria to give way."

In a second telegram M. Broniewsky gave an account of an interview

just held between Von Jagow and the French Ambassador, M. Jules

Cambon:

"Cambon endeavored to induce Von Jagow to accept the British

proposal for action in favor of peace to be taken simultaneously

at St. Petersburg and at Vienna by Great Britain, Germany, Italy,

and France. Cambon suggested that these powers should give their

advice to Vienna in the following terms: 'To abstain from all

action which might aggravate the existing situation.' By adopting

this vague formula, all mention of the necessity of refraining

from invading Serbia might be avoided. Jagow refused point blank

to accept this suggestion in spite of the entreaties of the

ambassador, who emphasized, as a good feature of the suggestion,

the mixed grouping of the powers, thanks to which the opposition

between the Alliance and the Entente--a matter of which Jagow

himself had often complained--was avoided."

Nicholas II telegraphed his reply to the appeal for Russian aid made

by Prince Alexander of Serbia on July 25, 1914. It assured the

prince of the Czar's cordial sympathy with the Serbian people.

"The existing situation is engaging my most serious attention,

and my government are using their utmost endeavor to smooth away

the present difficulties. I have no doubt that your highness and

the Royal Serbian Government wish to render that task easy by

neglecting no step which might lead to a settlement, and thus

both prevent the horrors of a new war and safeguard the dignity

of Serbia.

"So long as the slightest hope exists of avoiding bloodshed, all

our efforts must be directed to that end; but if in spite of our

earnest wish we are not successful, your highness may rest

assured that Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the

fate of Serbia."

M. Schebeko, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Sazonof

of a conversation he had had in the absence of Count Berchtold,

Minister for Foreign Affairs, with Baron Macchio, the Under-Secretary.

"I drew his attention to the unfavorable impression produced in

Russia by the presentation of demands by Austria to Serbia, which

it was quite impossible for any independent state, however small,

to accept. I added that this method of procedure might lead to

the most undesirable complications, and that it had aroused

profound surprise and general condemnation in Russia. We can only

suppose that Austria, influenced by the assurances given by the

German representative at Vienna, who has egged her on throughout

this crisis, has counted on the probable localization of the

dispute with Serbia, and on the possibility of inflicting with

impunity a serious blow upon that country. The declaration by the

Russian Government that Russia could not possibly remain

indifferent in the face of such conduct has caused a great

sensation here."

Count Benckendorff, Russian Ambassador at London, telegraphed to M.

Sazonof:

"Grey has just informed the German Ambassador, who came to

question him as to the possibility of taking action at St.

Petersburg, that such action ought rather to be taken at Vienna,

and that the Berlin Cabinet were the best qualified to do so.

Grey also pointed out that the Serbian reply to the Austrian note

had exceeded anything that could have been expected in moderation

and in its spirit of conciliation. Grey added that he had

therefore come to the conclusion that Russia must have advised

Belgrade to return a moderate reply, and that he thought the

Serbian reply could form the basis of a peaceful and acceptable

solution of the question.

"In these circumstances, continued Grey, if Austria were to begin

hostilities in spite of that reply, she would prove her intention

of crushing Serbia. Looked at in this light, the question might

give rise to a situation which might lead to a war in which all

the powers would be involved.

"Grey finally declared that the British Government were sincerely

anxious to act with the German Government as long as the

preservation of peace was in question; but, in the contrary

event, Great Britain reserved to herself full liberty of action."

_Great Britain._ Sir Maurice de Bunsen, Ambassador at Vienna,

telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary for Foreign Affairs at

London, that he had consulted with his colleagues about the

mediation of the four powers, and the impression was that the note

to Serbia was intentionally drawn to make war inevitable, and, until

Serbia had been punished, no proposals for mediation would be

listened to.

"This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with

Serbia, and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a

great disappointment.

"I propose, subject to any special directions you desire to send

me, to express to the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs the

hope of his majesty's Government that it may yet be possible to

avoid war, and to ask his excellency whether he cannot suggest a

way out even now."

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Grey that

France had accepted his proposal for the four-power mediation, and

sent the necessary instructions to her representatives at Belgrade,

Vienna, and St. Petersburg.

"Instructions have been sent to the French Ambassador at Berlin

to concert with his British colleague as to the advisability of

their speaking jointly to the German Government. Until it is

known that the Germans have spoken at Vienna with some success,

it would, in the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, be

dangerous for the French, Russian, and British Ambassadors to do

so."

Sir Edward Goschen, Ambassador at Berlin, telegraphed to Grey:

"Secretary of State [Von Jagow] says that conference you suggest

would practically amount to a court of arbitration and could not,

in his opinion, be called together except at the request of

Austria and Russia. He could not therefore fall in with your

suggestion, desirous though he was to cooperate for the

maintenance of peace. I said I was sure that your idea had

nothing to do with arbitration, but meant that representatives of

the four nations not directly interested should discuss and

suggest means for avoiding a dangerous situation. He maintained,

however, that such a conference as you proposed was not

practicable. He added that news he had just received from St.

Petersburg showed that there was an intention on the part of M.

de Sazonof [Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs] to exchange

views with Count Berchtold [Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign

Affairs]. He thought that this method of procedure might lead to

a satisfactory result, and that it would be best, before doing

anything else, to await outcome of the exchange of views between

the Austrian and Russian Governments.

"In the course of a short conversation Secretary of State said

that as yet Austria was only partially mobilizing, but that if

Russia mobilized against Germany latter would have to follow

suit. I asked him what he meant by 'mobilizing against Germany.'

He said that if Russia only mobilized in south, Germany would not

mobilize, but if she mobilized in north, Germany would have to do

so too, and Russian system of mobilization was so complicated

that it might be difficult exactly to locate her mobilization.

Germany would therefore have to be very careful not to be taken

by surprise.

"Finally, Secretary of State said that news from St. Petersburg

had caused him to take more hopeful view of the general

situation."

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed Grey

an account of the interview between M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for

Foreign Affairs, and Count Szápáry, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador,

in which Sazonof had pointed out that Austria's demands entailed

entire revision of existing Serbian laws, and were moreover

incompatible with Serbia's dignity as an independent state; and that

it would be useless for Russia, being an object of suspicion in

Austria, to offer her good offices.

"In order, however, to put an end to the present tension, he

thought that England and Italy might be willing to collaborate

with Austria."

Sir George told M. Sazonof that Grey could do nothing more than he

had promised on the 24th inst., and that the Russian Minister was

mistaken if he believed that peace would be promoted by Great

Britain telling Germany it would have to deal with her as well as

with Russia and France if it supported Austria by force of arms.

"Their attitude would merely be stiffened by such a menace, and

we could only induce Germany to use her influence at Vienna to

avert war by approaching her in the capacity of a friend who was

anxious to preserve peace. His excellency must not, if our

efforts were to be successful, do anything to precipitate a

conflict. I trusted that the Russian Government would defer

mobilization ukase for as long as possible, and that troops would

not be allowed to cross the frontier even when it was issued.

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that, until the issue

of the imperial ukase, no effective steps toward mobilization

could be taken, and the Austro-Hungarian Government would profit

by delay in order to complete her military preparations if it

were deferred too long."

In a supplementary telegram Buchanan reported that M. Sazonof had

proposed

"that the modifications to be introduced into Austrian demands

should be the subject of direct conversation between Vienna and

St. Petersburg."

Grey telegraphed to Sir Eward Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin,

that Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador at London, had

informed him that Germany accepted in principle the four-power

mediation, reserving its right as ally to help Austria if attacked.

"He has also been instructed to request me to use influence in

St. Petersburg to localize the war and to keep up the peace of

Europe.

"I have replied that the Serbian reply went further than could

have been expected to meet the Austrian demands. German Secretary

of State [Von Jagow] has himself said that there were some things

in the Austrian note that Serbia could hardly be expected to

accept. I assumed that Serbian reply could not have gone as far

as it did unless Russia had exercised conciliatory influence at

Belgrade, and it was really at Vienna that moderating influence

was now required. If Austria put the Serbian reply aside as being

worth nothing and marched into Serbia, it meant that she was

determined to crush Serbia at all costs, being reckless of the

consequences that might be involved. Serbian reply should at

least be treated as a basis for discussion and pause. I said

German Government should urge this at Vienna.

"I recalled what German Government had said as to the gravity of

the situation if the war could not be localized, and observed

that if Germany assisted Austria against Russia it would be

because, without any reference to the merits of the dispute,

Germany could not afford to see Austria crushed. Just so other

issues might be raised that would supersede the dispute between

Austria and Serbia, and would bring other powers in, and the war

would be the biggest ever known; but as long as Germany would

work to keep the peace I would keep closely in touch. I repeated

that after the Serbian reply it was at Vienna that some

moderation must be urged."

Grey telegraphed Buchanan at St. Petersburg, referring him to the

above, and informing him that the Russian Ambassador at London,

Count Benckendorff had told him [Grey] that the impression prevailed

in German and Austrian circles that Great Britain would stand aside

in event of war. This the Ambassador deplored for its adverse effect

on peace.

Grey informed Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna,

of his interview just held with Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian

Ambassador at London.

"Mensdorff said that the Austrian Government, very reluctantly

and against their wish, were compelled to take more severe

measures to enforce a fundamental change of the attitude of

enmity pursued up to now by Serbia.... We would understand that

the Austrian Government must consider that the moment had arrived

to obtain, by means of the strongest pressure, guaranties for the

definite suppression of the Serbian aspirations and for the

security of peace and order on the southeastern frontier of

Austria.

"As the peaceable means to this effect were exhausted, the

Austrian Government must at last appeal to force. Their action,

which had no sort of aggressive tendency, could not be

represented otherwise than as self-defense. Also they thought

that they would serve a European interest if they prevented

Serbia from being henceforth an element of general unrest such as

she had been for the last ten years. The high sense of justice of

the British nation and of British statesmen could not blame the

Austrian Government if the latter defended by the sword what was

theirs, and cleared up their position with a country whose

hostile policy had forced upon them for years measures so costly

as to have gravely injured Austrian national prosperity. Finally,

the Austrian Government, confiding in their amicable relations

with us, felt that they could count on our sympathy in a fight

that was forced on them, and on our assistance in localizing the

fight, if necessary.

"Count Mensdorff added on his own account that, as long as Serbia

was confronted with Turkey, Austria never took very severe

measures because of her adherence to the policy of the free

development of the Balkan States. Now that Serbia had doubled her

territory and population without any Austrian interference, the

repression of Serbian subversive aims was a matter of

self-defense and self-preservation on Austria's part. He

reiterated that Austria had no intention of taking Serbian

territory or aggressive designs against Serbian territory.

"I said that I could not understand the construction put by the

Austrian Government upon the Serbian reply, and I told Count

Mensdorff the substance of the conversation that I had had with

the German Ambassador this morning about that reply.

"Count Mensdorff admitted that, on paper, the Serbian reply might

seem to be satisfactory; but the Serbians had refused the one

thing--the cooperation of Austrian officials and police--which

would be a real guaranty that in practice the Serbians would not

carry on their subversive campaign against Austria.

"I said that it seemed to me as if the Austrian Government

believed that, even after the Serbian reply, they could make war

upon Serbia anyhow, without risk of bringing Russia into the

dispute. If they could make war on Serbia and at the same time

satisfy Russia, well and good; but, if not, the consequences

would be incalculable. I pointed out to him that I quoted this

phrase from an expression of the views of the German Government.

I feared that it would be expected in St. Petersburg that the

Serbian reply would diminish the tension, and now, when Russia

found that there was increased tension, the situation would

become increasingly serious. Already the effect on Europe was one

of anxiety. I pointed out [as an instance of this] that our fleet

was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to let it

disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this

moment, and there was no menace in what we had done about our

fleet; but, owing to the possibility of a European conflagration,

it was impossible for us to disperse our forces at this moment.

It seemed to me that the Serbian reply already involved the

greatest humiliation to Serbia that I had ever seen a country

undergo, and it was disappointing to me that the reply was

treated by the Austrian Government as if it were as

unsatisfactory as a blank negative."

Grey informed Sir Rennell Rodd, British Ambassador at Rome, that the

Italian Ambassador at London had stated to Sir Arthur Nicholson,

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that Italy agreed to the

four-power conference, and that the Marquis di San Giuliano, Italian

Minister for Foreign Affairs, would recommend to Germany the

suggestion that Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Serbia should suspend

military operations pending result of the conference, and would

inquire what procedure Germany proposed to be followed at Vienna.

Sir Francis Bertie, Ambassador at Paris, sent Grey a memorandum of

M. Bienvenu-Martin's, French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, as

to steps to be taken to prevent hostilities between Austria-Hungary

and Serbia.

M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, has been requested to

act in concert with the British Ambassador there in Grey's plan. M.

Paul Cambon, Ambassador at London, has been appointed France's

representative in the four-power conference. France is ready to

instruct her representatives at St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Belgrade

to induce these governments to abstain from hostilities pending the

results of the conference.

But M. Bienvenu-Martin considers success of the conference depends

on the action Berlin is willing to take at Vienna beforehand.

Sir George Buchanan, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed to

Grey an account of an interview just had with M. Sazonof, Minister

for Foreign Affairs. Sazonof was conciliatory and optimistic.

"Sazonof said he was perfectly ready to stand aside if the powers

accepted the proposal for a conference, but he trusted that you

would keep in touch with the Russian Ambassador in the event of

its taking place."

_France._ M. Farges, Consul General at Basle, Switzerland, reported

to M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris,

that German officers on leave in this district had been ordered to

return to Germany, and that owners of motor cars in Baden had been

ordered to be ready to place them at the disposal of the Government,

and secrecy enjoined as to the order under penalty of fine. People

at Basle are uneasy, and banking facilities restricted.

M. de Fleuriau, Chargé d'Affaires at London, reported to M.

Bienvenu-Martin that the German and Austrian Ambassadors there were

letting it appear that they were sure Great Britain would preserve

neutrality in case of war. Sir Arthur Nicholson, Under-Secretary for

Foreign Affairs, had, however, assured Prince Lichnowsky, the German

Ambassador, that Great Britain was free to intervene if she judged

it expedient. To make this understood in Germany, nevertheless, that

Government should be made to know for certain that they will find

Great Britain by the side of France and Russia.

M. Paléologue, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, telegraphed that M.

Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was using conciliatory

language to the ambassadors, and was restraining the press,

particularly in recommending great moderation toward Germany.