we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against
France, and thus protecting our flank.
"As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small
states on our northwestern frontier cannot be viewed in quite the
same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim
must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the
first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate
a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which
will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain
inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them
in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states
to organize their system of fortification in such a manner as to
constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon
the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganization,
particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it
might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the
contrary, their defensive organization was established against
us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the West,
we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guaranty for the
security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to
our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our
interests.
"The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope
that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after
the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An
ultimatum with a short-time limit, to be followed immediately by
invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action
in international law.
"Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a
striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us,
or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a
hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his
flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him
harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient
German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of
Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of
brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the
Slav yoke. It is a national question that Germany's former
possessions should be restored to her."
REPORT OF M. CAMBON IN 1913
On May 6, 1913, M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, wrote
to M. Stephen Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, giving
an account of an interview with the German Secretary of State, Herr
von Jagow, concerning the conference of ambassadors in London on May
5th, and the results there obtained. It was agreed by Cambon and Von
Jagow that the immediate crisis was over. Cambon submitted proofs of
the anxiety of the German Government over the crisis.
"1. Von Jagow had questioned a colleague of Cambon about Russia's
situation in the Far East, whether there was cause for Russia to
fear difficulties in that quarter which would cause her to retain
troops there. The ambassador answered him that he knew of
absolutely no trouble in the Far East, and that Russia had her
hands free for Europe.
"2. The mobilization of the German army is not restricted to the
recall of reservists to their barracks. There is in Germany a
preliminary measure which we have not got, and which consists in
warning officers and men of the reserve to hold themselves ready
for the call, in order that they may make the necessary
arrangements. It is a general call to 'attention' and it requires
an incredible spirit of submission, discipline, and secrecy such
as exists in this country, to make a step of this kind possible.
If such a warning were given in France, a thrill would run
through the whole country, and it would be in the papers the next
day....
"The intention of the General Staff is to act by surprise. 'We
must put on one side,' said General von Moltke, 'all commonplaces
as to the responsibility of the aggressor. When war has become
necessary it is essential to carry it on in such a way as to
place all the chances in one's own favor. Success alone justifies
war. Germany cannot and ought not to leave Russia time to
mobilize, for she would then be obliged to maintain on her
eastern frontier so large an army that she would be placed in a
position of equality, if not of inferiority, to that of France.
Accordingly,' added the general, 'we must anticipate our
principal adversary as soon as there are nine chances to one of
going to war, and begin it without delay in order ruthlessly to
crush all resistance.'
"This represents exactly the attitude of military circles and it
corresponds to that of political circles; the latter, however, do
not consider Russia, in contradistinction to us, as a necessary
enemy....
"From these events the following conclusions may be drawn ...
these people are not afraid of war, they fully accept its
possibility and they have consequently taken the necessary steps.
_They wish to be always ready._
"As I said, this demands qualities of secrecy, discipline and of
persistence; enthusiasm alone is not sufficient. This lesson may
form a useful subject of meditation when the Government of the
[French] Republic ask Parliament for the means of strengthening
the defenses of the country."
On July 30, 1913, M. Pichon, French Minister for Foreign Affairs,
made an official report on the state of German public opinion, as
derived from French diplomatic and consular agents. It said that:
"1. The treaty of November 4, 1912, is considered a
disappointment for Germany.
"2. France--a new France--undreamed of prior to the summer of
1911, is considered ... to want war.
"Members of all the parties in the Reichstag, from the
Conservatives to the Socialists [and of all classes of the
people] are unanimous on these two points, with very slight
differences corresponding to their position in society or their
political party. Here is a synthesis of all these opinions:
"The treaty of November 4 is a diplomatic defeat, a proof of the
incapacity of German diplomacy and the carelessness of the
Government (so often denounced), a proof that the future of the
empire is not safe without a new Bismarck; it is a national
humiliation, a lowering in the eyes of Europe, a blow to German
prestige, all the more serious because up to 1911 the military
supremacy of Germany was unchallenged, and French anarchy and the
powerlessness of the Republic were a sort of German dogma....
"And the attitude of France, her calmness, her reborn spiritual
unity, her resolution to make good her rights right up to the
end, the fact that she has the audacity not to be afraid of war,
these things are the most persistent and the gravest cause of
anxiety and bad temper on the part of German public opinion....
"German public opinion is divided into two currents on the
question of the possibility and proximity of war.
"There are in the country forces making for peace, but they are
unorganized and have no popular leaders. They consider that war
would be a social misfortune for Germany, and that caste pride,
Prussian domination, and the manufacturers of guns and armor
plate would get the greatest benefit, but above all that war
would profit Great Britain.
"The forces consist of the following elements:
"The bulk of the workmen, artisans, and peasants, who are peace
loving by instinct.
"Those members of the nobility detached from military interests
and engaged in business, such as the _grands seigneurs_ of
Silesia and a few other personages very influential at court who
are sufficiently enlightened to realize the disastrous political
and social consequences of war, even if successful.
"Numerous manufacturers, merchants and financiers in a moderate
way of business, to whom war, even if successful, would mean
bankruptcy, because their enterprises depend on credit, and are
chiefly supported by foreign capital.
"Poles, inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine, and
Schleswig-Holstein--conquered, but not assimilated and suddenly
hostile to Prussian policy. There are about 7,000,000 of these
annexed Germans.
"Finally, the governments and the governing classes in the large
southern states--Saxony, Bavaria, Württemburg, and the Grand
Duchy of Baden--are divided by these two opinions: an
unsuccessful war would compromise the Federation from which they
have derived great economic advantages; a successful war would
profit only Prussia and Prussianization, against which they have
difficulty in defending their political independence and
administrative autonomy.
"These classes of people either consciously or instinctively
prefer peace to war; but they are only a sort of makeweight in
political matters, with limited influence on public opinion, or
they are silent social forces, passive, and defenseless against
the infection of a wave of warlike feeling.
"An example will make this idea clear: The 110 Socialist members
of the Reichstag are in favor of peace. They would be unable to
prevent war, for war does not depend upon a vote of the
Reichstag, and in the presence of such an eventuality the greater
part of their number would join the rest of the country in a
chorus of angry excitement and enthusiasm.
"Finally it must be observed that these supporters of peace
believe in war in the mass because they do not see any other
solution for the present situation. In certain contracts,
especially in publishers' contracts, a clause has been introduced
cancelling the contract in the case of war. They hope, however,
that the will of the emperor on the one side, France's
difficulties in Morocco on the other, will be for some time a
guaranty of peace. Be that as it may, their pessimism gives free
play to those who favor war....
"On the other hand there is a war party with leaders and
followers, a press either convinced or subsidized for the purpose
of creating public opinion; it has means both varied and
formidable for the intimidation of the Government. It goes to
work in the country with clear ideas, burning aspirations, and a
determination that is at once thrilling and fixed.
"Those in favor of war are divided into several categories; each
of these derives from its social caste, its class, its
intellectual and moral education, its interests, its hates,
special arguments which create a general attitude of mind and
increase the strength and rapidity of the stream of warlike
desire.
"Some want war because in the present circumstances they think it
is _inevitable_. And, as far as Germany is concerned, the sooner
the better.
"Others regard war as necessary for economic reasons based on
overpopulation, overproduction, the need for markets and outlets;
or for social reasons, i. e., to provide the outside interests
that alone can prevent or retard the rise to power of the
democratic and socialist masses.
"Others, uneasy for the safety of the empire, and believing that
time is on the side of France, think that events should be
brought to an immediate head. It is not unusual to meet, in the
course of conversation or in the pages of patriotic pamphlets,
the vague but deeply rooted conviction that a free Germany and a
regenerated France are two historical facts mutually
incompatible.
"Others are bellicose from 'Bismarckism,' as it may be termed.
They feel themselves humiliated at having to enter into
discussions with France, at being obliged to talk in terms of
law and right in negotiations and conferences where they have not
always found it easy to get right on their side, even when they
have a preponderating force. From their still recent past they
derive a sense of pride ever fed by personal memories of former
exploits, by oral traditions, and by books, and irritated by the
events of recent years. Angry disappointment is the unifying
force of the _Wehrvereine_ [defense leagues] and other
associations of Young Germany.
"Others again want war from a mystic hatred of revolutionary
France; others, finally, from a feeling of rancor. These last the
people who heap up pretexts for war.
"Coming to actual facts, these feelings take concrete form as
follows: The country squires, represented in the Reichstag by the
Conservative party, want at all costs to escape the death duties,
which are bound to come if peace continues. In the last sitting
of the session which has just closed the Reichstag agreed to
these duties in principle. It is a serious attack on the
interests and privileges of the landed gentry. On the other hand,
this aristocracy is military in character, and it is instructive
to compare the Army List with the Year Book of the nobility. War
alone can prolong its prestige and support its family interest.
During the discussions on the Army Bill a Conservative speaker
put forward the need for promotion among officers as an argument
in its favor. Finally this social class, which forms a hierarchy
with the King of Prussia as its supreme head, realizes with dread
the democratization of Germany and the increasing power of the
Socialist party, and considers its own days numbered. Not only
does a formidable movement hostile to agrarian protection
threaten its material interests, but in addition the number of
its political representatives decreases with each legislative
period. In the Reichstag of 1878, out of 397 members, 162
belonged to the aristocracy; in 1898, 83; in 1912, 57. Out of
this number 27 alone belong to the Right, 14 to the Center, 7 to
the Left, and 1 sits among the Socialists.
"The higher bourgeoisie, represented by the National Liberal
party, the party of the contented spirits, have not the same
reasons as the squires for wanting war. With a few exceptions,
however, they are bellicose. They have their reasons, social in
character.
"The higher bourgeoisie is no less troubled than the aristocracy
at the democratization of Germany. In 1871 they had 125 members
in the Reichstag; in 1874, 55; in 1887, 99; in 1912, 45. They do
not forget that in the years succeeding the war they played the
leading rôle in Parliament, helping Bismarck in his schemes
against the country squires. Uneasily balanced to-day between
Conservative instincts and Liberal ideas they look to war to
settle problems which their parliamentary representatives are
painfully incapable of solving. In addition, doctrinaire
manufacturers declare that the difficulties between themselves
and their workmen originate in France, the home of revolutionary
ideas of freedom--without France industrial unrest would be
unknown.
"Lastly, there are the manufacturers of guns and armor plate, big
merchants who demand bigger markets, bankers who are speculating
on the coming of the golden age and the next war indemnity--all
these regard war as good business.
"Among the 'Bismarckians' must be reckoned officials of all
kinds, represented fairly closely in the Reichstag by the Free
Conservatives or Imperial party. This is the party of the
'pensioned,' whose impetuous sentiments are poured out in the
'Post.' They find disciples and political sympathizers in the
various groups of young men whose minds have been trained and
formed in the public schools and universities.
"The universities, if we except a few distinguished spirits,
develop a warlike philosophy. Economists demonstrate by
statistics Germany's need for a colonial and commercial empire
commensurate with the industrial output of the empire. There are
sociological fanatics who go even further. The armed peace, so
they say, is a crushing burden on the nations; it checks
improvement in the lot of the masses and assists the growth of
Socialism. France, by clinging obstinately to her desire for
revenge, opposes disarmament. Once for all she must be reduced
for a century to a state of impotence; that is the best and
speediest way of solving the social problem.
"Historians, philosophers, political pamphleteers, and other
apologists of German _Kultur_ wish to impose upon the world a way
of thinking and feeling specifically German. They wish to wrest
from France that intellectual supremacy which, according to the
clearest thinkers, is still her possession. From this source is
derived the phraseology of the Pan-Germans and the ideas and
adherents of the _Kriegsvereine_ [war leagues], _Wehrvereine_,
and other similar associations too well known to need particular
description. It is enough to note that the dissatisfaction caused
by the treaty of November 4 has considerably swelled the
membership of colonial societies.
"We come finally to those whose support of the war policy is
inspired by rancor and resentment. These are the most dangerous.
They are recruited chiefly among diplomatists. German
diplomatists are now in very bad odor in public opinion. The most
bitter are those who since 1905 have been engaged in the
negotiations between France and Germany; they are heaping
together and reckoning up their grievances against us, and one
day they will present their accounts in the war press....
"During the discussion on the Army Bill one of these warlike
diplomatists exclaimed: 'Germany will not be able to have any
serious conversation with France until she has every sound man
under arms.'
"In what terms will this conversation be couched? The opinion is
fairly widely spread, even in Pan-German circles, that Germany
will not declare war in view of the system of defensive alliances
and the tendencies of the emperor. But when the moment comes she
will have to try in every possible way to force France to attack
her. Offense will be given if necessary. That is the Prussian
tradition.
"Must war, then, be considered as inevitable?
"It is hardly likely that Germany will take the risk if France
can make it clear to the world that the _Entente Cordiale_ and
the Russian alliance are not mere diplomatic fictions but
realities which exist and will make themselves felt. The British
fleet inspires a wholesome terror. It is well known, however,
that victory on sea will leave everything in suspense. On land
alone can a decisive issue be obtained.
"As for Russia, even though she carries greater weight in
political and military circles than was the case three or four
years ago, it is not believed that her cooperation will be
sufficiently rapid and energetic to be effective.
"People's minds are thus getting used to consider the next war as
a duel between France and Germany."
On November 22, 1913, M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,
reported to M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, an
account of a recent conversation between the Kaiser and the King of
the Belgians in the presence of General von Moltke, Chief of the
General German Staff, which gravely impressed King Albert. It showed
that German enmity against France was increasing, and that the
Kaiser had ceased to be the friend of peace. The Kaiser had come to
believe that war with France was inevitable; and, when it did come,
that German success was certain. General von Moltke strengthened his
sovereign in these opinions:
"This time the matter must be settled, and your majesty can have
no conception of the irresistible enthusiasm with which the whole
German people will be carried away when that day comes.
"The king of the Belgians protested that it was a travesty of the
intentions of the French Government to interpret them in that
sense, and to let oneself be misled as to the sentiments of the
French nation by the ebullitions of a few irresponsible spirits
or the intrigues of unscrupulous agitators.
"The emperor and his chief of the General Staff nevertheless
persisted in their point of view.
"During the course of this conversation the emperor seemed
overstrained and irritable. As William II advances in years,
family traditions, the reactionary tendencies of the court, and
especially the impatience of the soldiers, obtain a greater
empire over his mind. Perhaps he feels some slight jealousy of
the popularity acquired by his son, who flatters the passions of
the Pan-Germans and who does not regard the position occupied by
the empire in the world as commensurate with its power. Perhaps
the reply of France to the last increase of the Germany army, the
object of which was to establish the incontestable supremacy of
Germany is, to a certain extent, responsible for his bitterness,
for, whatever may be said, it is realized that Germany cannot go
much further.
"One may well ponder over the significance of this conversation.
The emperor and his chief of the General Staff may have wished to
impress the king of the Belgians and induce him not to make any
opposition in the event of a conflict between us....
"The Emperor William is less master of his impatience than is
usually supposed. I have known him more than once to allow his
real thoughts escape him....
"If I may be allowed to draw a conclusion I would submit that it
would be well to take account of this new factor, namely, that
the emperor is becoming used to an order of ideas which were
formerly repugnant to him, and that, to borrow from him a phrase
which he likes to use, 'we must keep our powder dry.'"
[See also letter of M. Allizé, French Minister at Munich, of July
10, 1914, in pages following.]
The next evidence presented before the court of the world is that by
Serbia and her witnesses, the nations thus far, to all appearances,
interested solely in maintaining the peace of Europe, as to Serbia's
non-responsibility for the assassination of the hereditary Archduke
of Austria at Sarajevo, Bosnia, on June 28, 1914, and as to her
sincere desire to do all she could, short of impairing her
sovereignty and suffering national humiliation; and that by
Austria-Hungary and the same witnesses that were brought forward by
Serbia as to Serbia's complicity in the assassination, and to
Austria-Hungary's right to fix this, and to exact guaranties that
Serbia should not in the future prosecute her evil designs against
Austria-Hungary.
THE ASSASSINATION OF THE AUSTRIAN ARCHDUKE
On June 28, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported
to M. René Viviani, President of the Council and Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Paris, the assassination that day of the
hereditary Archduke of Austria and his wife at Sarajevo, Bosnia.
On June 29, 1914, Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
telegraphed to M. N. Pashitch, Prime Minister and Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Belgrade, that the Vienna press asserted that
magisterial inquiry had already shown that the Sarajevo outrage was
prepared at Belgrade; that the whole conspiracy in its wider issues
was organized there among youths inspired with the great Serbian
idea; and that the Belgrade press was exciting public opinion by
articles about the intolerable conditions in Bosnia, papers
containing which were being smuggled in large quantities into
Bosnia.
On the same day, June 29, 1914, Ritter von Storck, Secretary of the
German Legation at Belgrade, the Austro-Hungarian Minister, Baron
Giesl von Gieslingen being absent from his post on leave, reported
to Count Berchtold, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in
Vienna, the following facts:
"Yesterday the anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld was
celebrated with greater ceremony than usual, and there were
celebrations in honor of the Serbian patriot, Milos Obilic, who
in 1389 with two companions treacherously stabbed the victorious
Murad.
"Among all Serbians, Obilic is regarded as the national hero. In
place of the Turks, however, we are now looked on as the
hereditary enemy, thanks to the propaganda which has been
nourished under the aegis of the royal Government and the
agitation which for many years has been carried on in the press.
"A repetition of the drama on the field of Kossovo seems,
therefore, to have hovered before the minds of the three young
criminals of Sarajevo, Princip, Cabrinovic, and the third person
still unknown, who also threw a bomb. They also shot down an
innocent woman and may, therefore, think that they have surpassed
their model.
"For many years hatred against the [Dual] Monarchy has been sown
in Serbia. The crop has sprung up and the harvest is murder.
"The news arrived at about five o'clock; the Serbian Government
at about ten o'clock caused the Obilic festivities to be
officially stopped. They continued, however, unofficially for a
considerable time after it was dark. The accounts of
eye-witnesses say that people fell into one another's arms in
delight, and remarks were heard such as: 'It serves them right;
we have been expecting this for a long time,' or 'This is revenge
for the annexation [of Bosnia].'"
On the following day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, warned M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
by telegraph, that the tendency in Vienna was becoming more and more
apparent to represent, in the eyes of Europe, the assassination as
the act of a conspiracy engineered in Serbia.
The idea was to use this as a political weapon against Serbia. Great
attention should therefore be paid to the tone of the Serbian
press.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Chargé
d'Affaires in Berlin, in two telegrams informed M. Pashitch that the
Berlin press was misleading German public opinion on the outrage;
that German hostility toward Serbia was growing, being fostered by
false reports from Vienna and Budapest, which were diligently spread
in spite of contradictions by some newspapers and news agencies.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at
Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a
conversation he had held, in the absence of Count Berchtold,
Austro-Hungarian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, with Baron
Macchia, Under-Secretary of the Foreign Department. In this the
Serbian Minister adopted the following line of argument:
"The Royal Serbian Government condemn most energetically the
Sarajevo outrage and on their part will certainly most loyally do
everything to prove that they will not tolerate within their
territory the fostering of any agitation or illegal proceedings
calculated to disturb our already delicate relations with
Austria-Hungary. I am of opinion that the Government are prepared
also to submit to trial any persons implicated in the plot in the
event of its being proved that there are any in Serbia. The Royal
Serbian Government, notwithstanding all the obstacles hitherto
placed in their way by Austro-Hungarian diplomacy (creation of an
independent Albania, opposition to Serbian access to the
Adriatic, demand for revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, the
September ultimatum, etc.) remained loyal in their desire to
establish a sound basis for our good neighborly relations. You
know that in this direction something has been done and achieved.
Serbia intends to continue to work for this object, convinced
that it is practicable and ought to be continued. The Sarajevo
outrage ought not to and cannot stultify this work."
M. Yovanovitch said that he had communicated the substance of this
conversation to the French and Russian Ambassadors.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), the Serbian Prime Minister received
from M. Georgevitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Constantinople,
the information that the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador there had told
him that, in recent conversations, Count Berchtold, the
Austro-Hungarian Prime Minister and Secretary for Foreign Affairs,
had expressed himself as satisfied with the attitude of the Serbian
Government, and desired friendly relations with it.
On the same day (June 30, 1914), Herr von Storck, Secretary of the
German Legation at Belgrade, telegraphed to Count Berchtold that he
had asked Herr Gruic, General Secretary of the Serbian Foreign
Office, what measures the Royal Serbian police had taken, or
proposed to take, to follow up clues to the crime which notoriously
were partly to be found in Serbia, and that the reply was that the
matter had not yet engaged the attention of the police.
On July 1, 1914, M. Pashitch, Serbian Prime Minister was informed by
telegraph from the Serbian Minister in London, M. S. Boschkovitch,
that, basing their conclusion on Austrian reports, the English press
attributed the Sarajevo outrages to Serbian revolutionaries. He was
informed by telegraph on the same day, by M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, of popular hostile demonstrations in front of
the Serbian Legation, which were quelled by the police. A Serbian
flag was said to have been burned.
"Hatred against Serbians and Serbia is being spread among the
people, especially by the lower Catholic circles, the Vienna
press, and military circles. Please do what is possible to
prevent demonstrations taking place in Serbia, and to induce the
Belgrade press to be as moderate as possible in tone.... It is
expected that decision as to the attitude to be adopted toward
Serbia and the Serbians will be taken after the funeral [of the
archduke]."
Thereupon, on the same day (July 1, 1914), M. Pashitch warned all
the Serbian legations at foreign courts of the evident purpose of
the Austrian and Hungarian press to take political advantage of the
act of a "young and ill-balanced fanatic." All ranks of Serbian
society, official and unofficial, he said, condemned the act,
recognizing that it would be most prejudicial not only to good
relations with Austria-Hungary, but to their coreligionists in that
country.
"At a moment when Serbia is doing everything in her power to
improve her relations with the neighboring monarchy it is absurd
to think that Serbia could have directly or indirectly inspired
acts of this kind. On the contrary, it was of the greatest
interest to Serbia to prevent the perpetration of this outrage.
Unfortunately this did not lie within Serbia's power, as both
assassins are Austrian subjects. Hitherto Serbia has been careful
to suppress anarchic elements, and after recent events she will
redouble her vigilance, and in the event of such elements
existing within her borders will take the severest measures
against them. Moreover, Serbia will do everything in her power
and use all the means at her disposal in order to restrain the
feelings of ill-balanced people within her frontiers. But Serbia
can on no account permit the Vienna and Hungarian press to
mislead European public opinion and lay the heavy responsibility
for a crime committed by an Austrian subject at the door of the
whole Serbian nation and on Serbia, who can suffer only harm from
such acts....
"Please ... use all available channels in order to put an end as
soon as possible to the anti-Serbian campaign in the European
press."
On the same day (July 1, 1914), Herr Jehlitschka, Austrian Consul
General to Turkey, wrote from Uskub, in European Turkey, to Count
Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs at Vienna, of the actions at
Prestina on the 525th anniversary of the battle of the Amselfeld
(1389), for the first time officially celebrated as the "Festival of
the Liberation" of the Serbian nation, and carefully prepared to
make it an especially solemn and magnificent demonstration of
Serbian nationality.
"The propaganda connected with this at the same time extended to
Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia, but especially to Hungary; those
who took part in it received free passes on the Serbian state
railways; food and lodging at low prices, maintenance by public
bodies, etc., were promised....
"The various speeches ... dealt ... with the well-known theme of
the union of all Serbia and the 'liberation of our brethren in
bondage' beyond the Danube and the Save, even as far as Bosnia
and Dalmatia.
"When, during the course of the evening, the news of the horrible
crime of which Sarajevo had been the scene was circulated, the
feeling which animated the fanatical crowd was, to judge by the
numerous expressions of applause reported to me by authorities in
whom I have absolute confidence, one that I can only characterize
as inhuman.
"In view of this attitude of the population, which was also
displayed at Uskub, all attempts of the Serbian press to divest
Serbia of the moral responsibility for a deed which was received
by a representative gathering with such unvarnished satisfaction
collapse miserably."
On July 2, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at Vienna, reported
to M. Viviani, Prime Minister in Paris, the resentment against
Serbia in Austrian military circles and by those persons opposed to
Serbia's maintenance of the position she had acquired in the
Balkans. If the Serbian Government refused as intolerable to its
dignity the demand of Austria-Hungary that the Serbian Government
investigate into the origin of the archduke's assassination, he
feared that this would furnish Austria-Hungary a ground for resort
to military measures.
On the same day (July 2, 1914), Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister
at Paris, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
that the French Government advised Serbia to remain calm, in
official circles as well as in public opinion.
On July 3, 1914, M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, sent
two reports to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, the first
containing an account of a mob which gathered before the Serbian
Legation on July 2, on account of his having hoisted the national
flag at half-mast as a sign of mourning; the bodies of the victims
of the Sarajevo tragedy having been brought that day to the Austrian
capital. The police dispersed the mob. The papers of July 3, under
the heading of "Provocation by the Serbian Minister," falsely
described the incident. The minister mentioned by name leading
instigators of attacks in the Austrian and German press on Serbia as
haranguing the crowd. In the second letter he reported a
conversation he had had with Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian
Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, in which the Baron severely
censured the Belgrade press for its antimonarchical propaganda, and,
implicitly, the Serbian Government for not controlling the press.
The Serbian Minister had replied that the press was free, and that
there was no means of curbing it except by going to law; and, in
rejoinder, he censured the Austro-Hungarian Government, which could
control the press of its empire, for permitting it shamefully to
attack Serbia by accusing the whole nation of being an accomplice in
the Sarajevo crime. Baron Macchio had replied: "We accuse only those
who encourage the Great Serbian scheme, and work for the realization
of its object." Yovanovitch had rejoined that, till the
assassination, Bosnia Serbs had been uniformly called "Bosniaks,"
yet the assassin was now described as "a Serb," and no mention was
made that he was a Bosnian and an Austrian subject. This was
evidently to cast odium upon Serbia.
On July 4, 1914, Dr. M. R. Vesnitch, Serbian Minister at Paris,
reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, a recent
conversation with M. Viviani, the new French Minister for Foreign
Affairs, on the Sarajevo incident.
"I described to him briefly the causes which had led to the
outrage and which were to be found, in the first place, in the
irksome system of Government in force in the annexed provinces,
and especially in the attitude of the officials, as well as in
the whole policy of the monarchy toward anything orthodox. He
understood the situation, but at the same time expressed the hope
that we should preserve an attitude of calm and dignity in order
to avoid giving cause for fresh accusations in Vienna.
"After the first moment of excitement public opinion here has
quieted down to such an extent that the minister-president
himself considered it advisable in the Palais de Bourbon to
soften the expressions used in the statement which he had made
earlier on the subject in the Senate."
On the same day (July 4, 1914), Dr. M. Spalaikovitch, Serbian
Minister at Petrograd,[1] telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister
at Belgrade, that the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, M.
Sazonof, had expressed his opinion that the outrages upon the Serbs
in Bosnia would increase the sympathy of Europe for Serbia; that the
accusations made in Vienna would not obtain credence and that
therefore Serbia should remain calm.
[Footnote 1: Although the name St. Petersburg was not changed
officially to Petrograd until after the outbreak of the war, the
latter name is used uniformly in the Serbian Blue Book and
Russian Orange Book.]
On the same day (July 4, 1914), Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for
Foreign Affairs at Vienna, that, in officially thanking M. Poincaré
for his sympathy over the Sarajevo tragedy, the President had
excused the hostile demonstrations against Serbia by citing those
against all Italians in France after the assassination of President
Carnot.
"I drew his attention to the fact that that crime had no
connection with any anti-French agitation in Italy, while in the
present case it must be admitted that for years past there has
been an agitation in Serbia against the [Dual] Monarchy fomented
by every means, legitimate and illegitimate.
"In conclusion, M. Poincaré expressed his conviction that the
Serbian Government would meet us with the greatest willingness in
the judicial investigation and the prosecution of the
accomplices. No state could divest itself of this duty."
On the same day (July 4, 1914), M. de Manneville, French Chargé
d'Affaires at Berlin, reported to M. Viviani, President of the
Council in Paris, a conversation with Herr von Zimmermann, German
Under-Secretary of State, in which von Zimmermann had expressed the
hope that Serbia would satisfy Austria's demands with regard to the
investigation and prosecution of the accomplices in the crime of
Sarajevo. Otherwise she would be condemned by the whole civilized
world.
"The German Government do not then appear to share the anxiety
which is shown by a part of the German press as to possible
tension in the relations between the Governments of Vienna and
Belgrade, or at least they do not wish to seem to do so."
Two days later (July 6, 1914), M. Paléologue, French Ambassador at
St. Petersburg, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, a
recent interview which M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, had had with Count Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian Chargé
d'Affaires at the request of the latter. The Count intimated that
the Austro-Hungarian Government would perhaps be compelled to search
for the instigators of the crime of Sarajevo on Serbian soil. M.
Sazonof interjected:
"No country has had to suffer more than Russia from crimes
prepared on foreign territory. Have we ever claimed to employ in
any country whatsoever the procedure with which your papers
threaten Serbia? Do not embark on such a course."
On the same day (July 6, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that the excitement in military and government circles
against Serbia was growing, owing to the tone of the press, which
was diligently exploited by the Austro-Hungarian Legation at
Belgrade. On the same date he informed the Prime Minister in detail
of the press agitation against Serbia. By headlines the people were
led to infer, on the date of the crime of Sarajevo, that the two
perpetrators were Serbs from Serbia proper. In later reports there
was a marked tendency to connect the crime with Serbia. Belgrade was
indicated as the place of its origin by the visit to that capital of
the assassins, and by the bombs originating there, which facts had
been elucidated at the trial of the assassins in Sarajevo. The
Hungarian press claimed that there was evidence to show:
"1. That the perpetrators while in Belgrade associated with the
_comitadji_ [revolutionist] Mihaylo Ciganovitch; and (2) that the
organizer and instigator of the outrage was Major
Pribitchevitch....
"Further ... the latest announcement which the Hungarian
_Korrespondenzbureau_ made to the newspapers stated:
"'The inquiries made up to the present prove conclusively that
this outrage is the work of a conspiracy. Besides the two
perpetrators, a large number of persons have been arrested,
mostly young men, who are also, like the perpetrators, proved to
have been employed by the Belgrade Narodna Odbrana in order to
commit the outrage, and who were supplied in Belgrade with bombs
and revolvers.' [This item was later recalled.]
"At the same time the Vienna _Korrespondenzbureau_ published the
following official statement:
"'We learn from authoritative quarters that the inquiries
relating to the outrage are being kept absolutely secret. All the
details, therefore, which have appeared in the public press
should be accepted with reserve.'
"Nevertheless the Budapest newspapers continued to publish
alleged reports on the inquiry. In the last 'report' of the
Budapest newspaper 'A Nap,' which was reprinted in yesterday's
Vienna papers, the tendency to lay the responsibility for the
outrage on the Narodna Odbrana is still further emphasized.
According to this report the accused Gabrinovitch had stated that
General Yankovitch is the chief instigator of the outrage."
On the same day Herr Hoflehner, Austro-Hungarian Consular Agent at
Nish, Serbia, wrote to Count Berchtold, Minister of Foreign Affairs
at Vienna, of the satisfaction and even joy expressed, especially in
the leading circles, over the crime at Sarajevo.
On the next day (July 7, 1914), M. Yov. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, wrote to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that, though Emperor Francis Joseph had appealed to the
Prime Ministers of Austria (Count Berchtold) and of Hungary (Count
Tisza), and to the Minister of Finance (Herr Bilinski) for calmness,
it was impossible to tell what attitude toward Serbia the Government
would take.
"For them one thing is obvious; whether it is proved or not that
the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must
sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian
agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will
do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as
yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high
Catholic and military circles. The ultimate decision will be
taken only after it has been definitely ascertained what the
inquiry at Sarajevo has brought to light....
"Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses:
either to regard the Sarajevo outrage as a national misfortune
and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the
evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's cooperation ... will be
requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the
extreme penalty; or, to treat the Sarajevo outrage as a
Pan-Serbian, South-Slav, and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every
manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom.
There are many indications that influential circles are being
urged to adopt the latter course: it is, therefore, advisable to
be ready for defense. Should the former and wiser course be
adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this
respect."
On July 9, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed to all the foreign Serbian
Legations that the Austro-Hungarian Crown Prince Alexander was
receiving daily threatening letters from Austro-Hungarians, and that
they should make use of this information with other foreign
ministers and journalists.
On July 10, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister In Munich, wrote to M.
Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris, that the Bavarians
were asking the object of the new German armaments.
"Recognizing that no one threatens Germany, they consider that
German diplomacy had already at its disposal forces sufficiently
large and alliances sufficiently powerful to protect German
interests with success."
Nevertheless, public opinion will support the Imperial Government in
any enterprise in which they might energetically embark, even at the
risk of conflict.
"The state of war to which all the events in the East have
accustomed people's minds for the last two years appears no
longer like some distant catastrophe, but as a solution of the
political and economic difficulties which will continue to
increase."
On July 11, 1914, M. d'Apchier-le-Maugin, French Consul General at
Budapest, reported to M. Vivian, Prime Minister at Paris, that Count
Tisza, Hungarian Prime Minister, had refused to make to the
Hungarian Chamber any disclosures on the Sarajevo incident until the
judicial inquiry was closed. The chamber approved.
"He did not give any indication whether the project of a
_démarche_ [proceeding] at Belgrade, with which all the papers of
both hemispheres are full, would be followed up."
The virulence of the Hungarian press has diminished, and the papers
are unanimous in advising against this step, which might be
dangerous.
"The semiofficial press especially would desire that for the word
'_démarche_,' with its appearance of a threat, there should be
substituted the expression '_pourparlers_' [conversations],
which appears to them more friendly.
"The general public, however, fears war. It is said that every
day cannon and ammunition were being sent in large quantities
toward the frontier.... The Government, whether it is sincerely
desirous of peace, or whether it is _preparing a coup_, is now
doing all that it can to allay these anxieties.... Their optimism
to order is, in fact, without an echo; the nervousness of the
Bourse, a barometer which cannot be neglected, is a sure proof of
this; without exception, stocks have fallen to an unaccountably
low level."
On July 14, 1914, Dr. M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that
Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State, had told him that
Austria-Hungary, as a great power, could not tolerate the
provocative attitude of the Serbian press.
On the same day M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
wrote M. Pashitch that the Literary Bureau of the Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Office, which supplied the press with material and set its
tone, was exciting opinion against Serbia. Official German circles
in Vienna were especially ill disposed toward Serbia. The "Neue
Freie Presse," under instructions from the Vienna Press Bureau,
summarized the feeling:
"We have to settle matters with Serbia by war; it is evident that
peaceable means are of no avail. And if it must come to war
sooner or later, then it is better to see the matter through now.
"The Bourse is very depressed. There has not been such a fall in
prices In Vienna for a long time."
On the same day, July 14, 1914, M. Pashitch sent two letters to all
the foreign Serbian Legations.
In the first letter he gave specific illustrations of misinformation
by the Austro-Hungarian press such as that Austro-Hungarian subjects
were maltreated in Belgrade, and were now panic-stricken, and that
there had been a demonstration against the Austrian Minister at the
funeral of Dr. Hartwig, the Russian Minister. There was no
foundation whatever for these statements.
In the second letter he notified the Legations that the
Austro-Hungarian news bureaus, the channel of Serbian news to the
world, misrepresented, through garbling extracts, the tone of the
Belgrade press, and that all Serbian papers were forbidden entry
into Austria-Hungary.
"With us the press is absolutely free. Newspapers can be
confiscated only for _lèse-majesté_ or for revolutionary
propaganda; in all other cases confiscation is illegal. There is
no censorship of newspapers."
Accordingly the Serbian foreign ministers were instructed to give
out information that the Serbian Government lacked the power to
control the newspapers, and further to spread knowledge of the fact
that it was Austro-Hungarian papers which originated all the
controversies, while the Serbian ones only replied. There was no
desire in Serbia to provoke Austria-Hungary.
On July 15, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna,
reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade, that the
Ministers of the Dual Monarchy had been consulting about the
Sarajevo incident, and that it appeared nothing was decided. Count
Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had
gone to Ischl, where Emperor Francis Joseph was recovering from the
shock of the assassination, to report to him. Count Tisza, the
Hungarian Prime Minister, had replied evasively to interpellations
made in the Hungarian Parliament by the Opposition. Owing to the
absence on leave from his post of the War Minister and his chief of
staff, the Bourse had recovered.
"One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will take diplomatic steps
at Belgrade as soon as the magisterial inquiry at Sarajevo is
completed and the matter submitted to the court."
In a second letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch reported to M.
Pashitch that it was thought that the inquiry had not produced
sufficient evidence to justify officially accusing Serbia more than
for tolerating in her borders certain revolutionary elements.
Austro-Hungarian methods were criticized in diplomatic circles and
the Serbian attitude was commended as in accord with the dignity of
a nation.
"In spite of the fact that it appears that the German Foreign
Office does not approve of the anti-Serbian policy of Vienna, the
German Embassy here is at this very moment encouraging such a
policy."
In a third letter of the same date M. Yovanovitch informed the Prime
Minister that it appeared that Austria-Hungary would not invite the
Serbian Government to assist her in discovering and punishing the
culprits of the Sarajevo crime, but would make it a case against
Serbia and the Serbians, or even against the Jugo-Slavs (on her own
border), looking in this for the approval of Europe, which would
prepare the way for the sharp reactionary measures she contemplated
to take internally to suppress the great Serbian propaganda and the
Jugo-Slav idea. The Government must take some action for the sake of
its prestige at home as well as abroad....
The accusation against Serbia will extend from April, 1909, to the
present. Austria-Hungary will claim to the powers that the facts
developed therein give her the right to take diplomatic steps at
Belgrade, and demand that Serbia in future act as a loyal neighbor.
Austria-Hungary will ask Serbia to accept unconditionally her
demands.
On the same day, July 15, 1914, M. Dumaine, French Ambassador at
Vienna, reported to M. Viviani, Prime Minister at Paris, that
certain press organs in Vienna, specifically the "Militärische
Rundschau," represented France and Russia as incapable of holding
their own in European affairs, and that Austria-Hungary, with the
support of Germany, could therefore subject Serbia to any treatment
she pleased. The "Rundschau" argued that now was the most propitious
time for the war in which Austria-Hungary would have to engage in
two or three years at the latest.
"At this moment the initiative rests with us: Russia is not
ready, moral factors and right are on our side, as well as might.
Since we shall have to accept the contest some day, let us
provoke it at once. Our prestige, our position as a great power,
our honor, are in question; and yet more, for it would seem that
our very existence is concerned....
"Surpassing itself, the 'Neue Freie Presse' of to-day reproaches
Count Tisza for the moderation of his second speech, in which he
said: 'Our relations with Serbia require, however, to be made
clear.' These words rouse its indignation. For it tranquillity
and security can result only from a _war to the knife_ against
Pan-Serbism, and it is in the name of humanity that it demands
the extermination of the cursed Serbian race."
On July 16, 1914, Dr. Yovanovitch, Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at Belgrade,
that Secretary of State Von Jagow had informed him that reports of
the German Minister at Belgrade pointed to the existence of a great
Serbian propaganda, which should be energetically suppressed by the
Serbian Government in the interest of good relations with
Austria-Hungary.
On July 17 M. Boschkovitch, Serbian Minister at London, telegraphed
to M. Pashitch that the Austrian Embassy there was endeavoring to
favor the idea that Austria must give a good lesson to Serbia.
Despite peaceable official statements by Austria-Hungary the way was
preparing for diplomatic pressure upon Serbia which might develop
into an armed attack.
On the same day, July 17, M. Ljub Michailovitch, Serbian Minister at
Rome, telegraphed to M. Pashitch that the Marquis di San Giuliano,
Prime Minister of Italy, had stated to the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador:
"Any step undertaken by Austria against Serbia which failed to
take into account international considerations would meet with
the disapproval of public opinion in Italy, and that the Italian
Government desire to see the complete independence of Serbia
maintained."
On July 19, 1914, M. Pashitch telegraphed a long notice to the
foreign Serbian legations, telling of the accusation of the Austrian
press from the time of the Sarajevo outrage that the crime was the
direct result of the great Serbian idea, propagated by various
associations such as the Narodna Odbrana, which were tolerated by
the Serbian Government. The notice detailed the attitude of the
Serbian Government toward the Serbian press, presented in the
preceding correspondence. In regard to its attitude toward
Austria-Hungary it said:
"The Serbian Government at once expressed their readiness to hand
over to justice any of their subjects who might be proved to have
played a part in the Sarajevo outrage. The Serbian Government
further stated that they had prepared a more drastic law against
the misuse of explosives. The draft of a new law in that sense
had already been laid before the State Council, but could not be
submitted to the Skupshtina [Serbian Parliament], as the latter
was not sitting at the time. Finally, the Serbian Government
stated that they were ready, as heretofore, to observe all those
good neighborly obligations to which Serbia was bound by her
position as a European state.
"From the date of the perpetration of the outrage until to-day
not once did the Austro-Hungarian Government apply to the Serbian
Government for their assistance in the matter. They did not
demand that any of the accomplices should be subjected to an
inquiry, or that they should be handed over to trial. In one
instance only did the Austrian Government ask for information;
this was as to the whereabouts of certain students who had been
expelled from the Pakratz Teachers' Seminary and had crossed over
to Serbia to continue their studies. All available information on
this point was supplied."
The notice related the anti-Serbian propaganda conducted by the
Austro-Hungarian press, the interpellations in the Hungarian
Parliament, etc., and the probable intention of the Austro-Hungarian
Government to demand a categorical reply from Serbia, which, if not
satisfactory, would be followed by war.
That Austria-Hungary was picking a quarrel had been evidenced by her
use of an exploded rumor of a contemplated attack on the Austrian
Legation in Belgrade to prove how excited public opinion was in
Serbia, and to what lengths she was ready to go.
"There is reason for apprehension that some step is being
prepared against us [in the evident intention] that the inquiry
which is being made is not to be limited to the perpetrators and
their possible accomplices in the crime, but is most probably to
be extended to Serbia and the Great Serbian idea....
"On the other hand the Serbian Government have given their
particular attention to the improvement and strengthening of
their relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, which had
lately become strained as a result of the Balkan wars and of the
questions which arose therefrom. With that object in view the
Serbian Government proceeded to settle the question of the
Oriental Railway, the new railway connections, and the transit
through Serbia of Austro-Hungarian goods for Constantinople,
Sofia, Saloniki, and Athens.
"The Serbian Government consider that their vital interests
require that peace and tranquillity in the Balkans should be
firmly and lastingly established. And for this very reason they
fear lest the excited state of public opinion in Austria-Hungary
may induce the Austro-Hungarian Government to make a _démarche_
which may humiliate the dignity of Serbia as a state, and to put
forward demands which could not be accepted.
"I have the honor, therefore, to request you to impress upon the
Government to which you are accredited our desire to maintain
friendly relations with Austria-Hungary, and to suppress every
attempt directed against the peace and public safety of the
neighboring monarchy. We will likewise meet the wishes of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire in the event of our being requested to
subject to trial in our independent courts any accomplices in the
outrage who are in Serbia--should such, of course, exist.
"But we can never comply with demands which may be directed
against the dignity of Serbia, and which would be inacceptable to
any country which respects and maintains its independence.
"Actuated by the desire that good neighborly relations may be
firmly established and maintained, we beg the friendly
Governments to take note of these declarations and to act in a
conciliatory sense should occasion or necessity arise."
ATTEMPTS AT MEDIATION
With Serbia's case now fully before the courts of Europe, there
began a movement among the powers desiring to keep the peace of the
continent for mediation between the disputants. This was begun by
Germany and Great Britain.
On July 20, 1914, Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, wrote to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé
d'Affaires at Berlin, recounting a conversation with the German
Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky. The prince said that Austria was
certainly going to take some step in the Serbian matter; that the
situation was uncomfortable, and that it would be desirable if
Russia could act as a mediator with regard to Russia. Sir Edward
Grey presumed that the Austrian Government would not do anything
until they had first disclosed to the public their case against
Serbia, founded upon what they had discovered at the trial of the
Sarajevo assassins. This would make it easier for other powers, such
as Russia, to counsel moderation in Belgrade. The more reasonable
the demands of Austria, the easier it would be to smooth things
over.
"I hated the idea of a war between any of the great powers, and
that any of them should be dragged into a war by Serbia would be
detestable.
"The ambassador agreed whole-heartedly in this sentiment."
On the same day, July 20, 1914, M. Yov. Yovanovitch, Serbian
Minister at Vienna, reported to M. Pashitch, Prime Minister at
Belgrade, that the word had been passed round in Vienna to maintain
absolute secrecy about what was being done in the Serbian matter.
There was no room for the optimism reported to exist in Belgrade. It
was highly probable Austria-Hungary was preparing for war against
Serbia.
"The general conviction that prevails here is that it would be
nothing short of suicide for Austria-Hungary once more to fail to
take advantage of the opportunity to act against Serbia. It is
believed that the two opportunities previously missed--the
annexation of Bosnia and the Balkan War--have been extremely
injurious to Austria-Hungary. In addition, the conviction is
steadily growing that Serbia, after her two wars, is completely
exhausted, and that a war against Serbia would, in fact, merely
mean a military expedition to be concluded by a speedy
occupation. It is also believed that such a war could be brought
to an end before Europe could intervene.
"The seriousness of Austrian intentions is further emphasized by
the military preparations which are being made, especially in the
vicinity of the Serbian frontier."
On the same day, July 20, 1914, a French consular report was made
from Vienna to the Government at Paris, which referred to the
diplomatic situation.
"Much will be demanded of Serbia; she will be required to
dissolve several propagandist societies, she will be summoned to
repress nationalism, to guard the frontier in cooperation with
Austrian officials, to keep strict control over anti-Austrian
tendencies in the schools; and it is a very difficult matter for
a government to consent to become in this way a policeman for a
foreign government. They foresee the subterfuges by which Serbia
will doubtless wish to avoid giving a clear and direct reply;
that is why a short interval will perhaps be fixed for her to
declare whether she accepts or not. The tenor of the note and its
imperious tone almost certainly insure that Belgrade will refuse.
Then military operations will begin.
"There is here, and equally in Berlin, a party which accepts the
idea of a conflict of widespread dimensions; in other words, a
conflagration. The leading idea is probably that it would be
necessary to start before Russia has completed the great
improvements of her army and railways, and before France has
brought her military organization to perfection. But on this
point there is no unanimity in high circles; Count Berchtold and
the diplomatists desire at the most localized operations against
Serbia. But everything must be regarded as possible."
The report commented on the departure from usage by the
Austro-Hungarian press in prominently reporting the remarks of the
most obscure Serbian newspapers,
"which, just on account of their obscurity, employ language
freer, bolder, more aggressive, and often insulting. This work of
the official agency has obviously for its aim the excitement of
public feeling and the creation of opinion favorable to war. The
fact is significant."
On July 21 M. Jules Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin, reported to
M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris,
that M. Yovanovitch, Serbian Minister to Germany, had declared to
the German Government that Serbia was willing to entertain Austria's
requirements arising out of the Sarajevo outrage, provided that she
asked only for
"judicial cooperation in the punishment and prevention of
political crimes, but that he was charged to warn the German
Government that it would be dangerous to attempt, through that
investigation, to lower the prestige of Serbia.
"M. Browniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, mentioned
this subject to Herr von Jagow, German Secretary of State. Von
Jagow said that he supposed the German Government now had full
knowledge of the note prepared by Austria, and were therefore
willing to give the assurance that the Austro-Serbian
difficulties would be localized. The Secretary of State protested
that he was in complete ignorance of the contents of that note,
and expressed himself in the same way to me. I could not help
showing my astonishment at a statement which agreed so little
with what circumstances lead one to expect.
"I have also been assured that from now on the preliminary
notices for mobilization, the object of which is to place Germany
in a kind of 'attention' attitude in times of tension, have been
sent out here to those classes which would receive them in
similar circumstances. That is a measure to which the Germans,
constituted as they are, can have recourse without indiscretion
and without exciting the people. It is not a sensational measure,
and is not necessarily followed by full mobilization, as we have
already seen, but it is none the less significant."
On the same day, July 21, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the French Legations at
London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Rome that the Berlin Bourse was
extremely weak on the 20th, probably on account of anxiety over the
Serbian question, and that M. Cambon, French Ambassador at Berlin,
had grave reason that Germany would support Austria-Hungary in her
contemplated _démarche_ at Belgrade without seeking to play the part
of mediator.
On the same day, July 21, 1914, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen,
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, wrote a long letter to Count
Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs at Vienna, reviewing the
situation. Most of his statements have been given in more moderate
language in the preceding correspondence. He describes how the
relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been "poisoned" by
Serbian national aspirations, due to the great Serbian propaganda
(carried on in Austria-Hungary as well as in Serbia), and to Serbian
success in the Balkan wars. This chauvinism has increased to a
paroxysm, bordering on insanity. The policy is to separate from
Austria-Hungary the southern Slav provinces, and so abolish the Dual
Monarchy as a great power. Bosnia and Herzegovina are expected to
revolt, and the Slav regiments in the Austro-Hungarian army to
mutiny. Out of the ruins will be builded the great Serbian Empire,
and that in the immediate future.
Serbian newspapers without fear of reprimand discuss the decrepitude
of the Dual Monarchy and insult her officials, and even "the exalted
person of our ruler." The press is the educator of the Serbian
people; it promoted the great Serbian propaganda, from which sprang
the crime of Sarajevo. Political parties and governmental policy are
wholly subservient to it. Its accusations that the sudden death of
the Russian Minister, Dr. Hartwig, was due to poison are on the
verge of insanity--the London "Times" called them ravings. The
people, in gratitude for the past, and in anxiety for the future,
outbid one another in servility to Russia. They despise
Austria-Hungary as powerless, for internal and external reasons. The
serious words of our statesmen are regarded as "bluff."
"This picture leads up to the conclusion that a reckoning with
Serbia, a war for the position of the [Dual] Monarchy as a great
power, even for its existence as such, cannot be permanently
avoided.
"If we delay in clearing up our relations with Serbia we shall
share the responsibility for the difficulties and the unfavorable
situation in any future war which must, however, sooner or later
be carried through....
"Should we therefore ... put forward far-reaching requirements
joined to effective control--for this alone could clear the
Augean stable of great Serbian intrigues--then all possible
consequences must be considered, and from the beginning there
must be a strong and firm determination to carry through the
matter to the end.
"Half measures, the presentation of demands, followed by long
discussions and ending only in an unsound compromise, would be
the hardest blow which could be directed against
Austria-Hungary's reputation in Serbia and her position in
Europe."
On July 22, 1914, Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of Foreign Affairs
at London, that he had had an interview with the German Secretary of
State, Herr von Jagow, who insisted that the question at issue
between Serbia and Austria-Hungary was for these alone to settle,
without interference from outside, and said that it was inadvisable
for the German Government to approach the Austro-Hungarian
Government on the matter. The German Secretary had frequently
emphasized to the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin, M.
Yovanovitch, that Austro-Serbian relations should be put on a proper
footing. He thought that Austria had acted toward Serbia with great
forbearance.
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister
for Foreign Affairs at Paris, notified the foreign French legations
of the information in M. Cambon's report of the 21st, and said that
the Marquis di San Giuliano, Prime Minister at Rome, was interceding
with Austria-Hungary that nothing impracticable be demanded of
Serbia; thus, that the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana be
required, and not a judicial inquiry into the causes of the crime of
Sarajevo. Evidently the Cabinet at Vienna, under pressure of the
press and military party, is trying to intimidate Serbia by extreme
demands, expecting German support in this policy.
"I have asked the French Ambassador at Vienna [M. Dumaine] to use
all his influence with Count Berchtold [the Austrian Minister for
Foreign Affairs] and to represent to him in a friendly
conversation how much Europe would appreciate moderation on the
part of the Austrian Government, and what consequences would be
likely to be entailed by violent pressure on Serbia."
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Dumaine reported to M.
Bienvenu-Martin that Count Berchtold was still at Ischl evidently
waiting for the decision of Kaiser Francis Joseph on the Serbian
question.
"The intention of proceeding against Serbia with the greatest
severity ... of 'treating her like another Poland,' is attributed
to the Government. Eight army corps are said to be ready to start
on the campaign, but M. Tisza [Hungarian Prime Minister], who is
very disturbed about the excitement in Croatia, is said to have
intervened actively in order to exercise a moderating influence.
"In any case it is believed that the _démarche_ will be made at
Belgrade this week. The requirements of the Austro-Hungarian
Government with regard to the punishment of the outrage, and to
guarantees of control and police supervision, seem to be
acceptable to the dignity of the Serbians; M. Yovanovitch
[Serbian Minister at Vienna] believes they will be accepted. M.
Pashitch [Serbian Prime Minister] wishes for a peaceful solution,
but says that he is ready for a full resistance. He has
confidence in the strength of the Serbian army, besides, he
counts on the union of all the Slavs in the [Dual] Monarchy to
paralyze the effort directed against his country.
"Unless people are absolutely blinded, it must be recognized here
that a violent blow has every chance of being fatal both to the
Austro-Hungarian army and to the cohesion of the nationalities
governed by the emperor, which has already been so much
compromised.
"Herr von Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, is showing himself
a supporter of violent measures, while at the same time he is
willing to let it be understood that the Imperial Chancellery
would not be in entire agreement with him on this point. The
Russian Ambassador [M. Schebeko], who left yesterday for the
country in consequence of reassuring explanations made to him at
the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, has confided to me that his
Government will not raise any objection to steps directed toward
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the societies
which are notoriously revolutionary, but could not accept
requirements which would humiliate Serbian national feeling."
On the same day, July 22, 1914, M. Paul Cambon, French Ambassador at
London, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, had told him that Prince Lichnowsky,
had stated that a _démarche_ of Austria-Hungary against Serbia was
expected at Berlin, and that the German Government was endeavoring
to hold back the Austro-Hungarians, but thus far had been
unsuccessful. Sir Edward Grey had answered that he would like to
believe that Austria-Hungary, before intervening at Belgrade, were
assured that the Serbian Government had been cognizant of the
conspiracy resulting in the crime of Sarajevo, and had not done all
in their power to prevent the crime.
"For if it could not be proved that the Serbian Government were
responsible and implicated to a certain degree, the intervention
of Austria-Hungary would not be justified and would arouse
against them the opinion of Europe."
The Italian Ambassador and Serbian Minister, M. Boschkovitch, share
Sir Edward Grey's apprehensions. M. Boschkovitch fears that demands
will be made on the Serbian Government which their dignity and
public opinion may not allow them to accept without protest.
"Notwithstanding the sacrifices which Serbia has made for her
recent victories she can still put 400,000 men in the field, and
public opinion, which knows this, is not inclined to put up with
any humiliation.
"Sir Edward Grey, in an interview with the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador [Count Mensdorff], asked him to recommend his
Government not to depart from the prudence and moderation
necessary for avoiding new complications, not to demand from
Serbia any measures to which she could not reasonably submit, and
not to allow themselves to be carried away too far."
THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN NOTE TO SERBIA
The expected blow now fell on Serbia. On the same day, July 22,
1914, Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, sent out to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors in Berlin,
Rome, Paris, London, St. Petersburg, and Constantinople, the
contents of the note which was to be presented on the morrow to the
Serbian Government.
A justification of the demands in it were given. All of the
complaints here made against Serbia have already been given, except
the charge that
"individuals belonging formerly to bands employed in Macedonia
had come to place themselves at the disposal of the terrorist
propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
"The patience of the Imperial and Royal Government, in the face
of the provocative attitude of Serbia, was inspired by the
territorial disinterestedness of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
and the hope that the Serbian Government would end in spite of
everything by appreciating Austria-Hungary's friendship at its
true value. By observing a benevolent attitude toward the
political interests of Serbia, the Imperial and Royal Government
hoped that the kingdom would finally decide to follow an
analogous line of conduct on its own side. In particular,
Austria-Hungary expected a development of this kind in the
political ideas of Serbia, when, after the events of 1912, the
Imperial and Royal Government, by its disinterested and
ungrudging attitude, made such a considerable aggrandizement of
Serbia possible."
This benevolence, however, was repaid by the Serbian Government
tolerating the propaganda which ended in the crime of Sarajevo.
"In the presence of this state of things the Imperial and Royal
Government have felt compelled to take new and urgent steps at
Belgrade with a view to inducing the Serbian Government to stop
the incendiary movement that is threatening the security and
integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.
"The Imperial and Royal Government are convinced that in taking
this step they will find themselves in full agreement with the
sentiments of all civilized nations, who cannot permit regicide
to become a weapon that can be employed with impunity in
political strife and the peace of Europe to be continually
disturbed by movements emanating from Belgrade."
The ambassadors were instructed each to submit a copy of the note to
the Government to which he was accredited, together with a _dossier_
"elucidating the Serbian intrigues and the connection between
these intrigues and the murder of the 28th of June."
On the following day, Thursday, July 23, 1914, Count Berchtold
telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
London, that, as Great Britain of all the powers might be most
easily led to form an impartial judgment on the action taken, in
presenting the copy of the note, he should point out that Serbia
might have rendered less acute the serious steps she must expect
from Austria-Hungary by spontaneously investigating the conspiracy
tending to the crime of Sarajevo, and that on the contrary she had
endeavored to wipe out all its traces, for example, in the case of
the Serbian civil servant Ciganovic, who was compromised by the
independent testimony of both of the assassins, and who was in
Belgrade on the day of the crime, yet whom the director of the
Serbian press declared to be completely unknown in that city.
"The short time limit attached to our demand must be attributed
to our long experience of the dilatory arts of Serbia.
"The requirements which we demand that Serbia should fulfill, and
which indeed contain nothing which is not a matter of course in
the intercourse between states which are to live in peace and
friendship, cannot be made the subject of negotiations and
compromise; and, having regard to our economic interests, we
cannot take the risk of a method of political action by which it
would be open to Serbia at pleasure to prolong the crisis which
has arisen."
Later in the day Count Mensdorff had an interview with Sir Edward
Grey, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, the substance of which
Sir Edward communicated on the same date to Sir Maurice de Bunsen,
British Ambassador at Vienna.
Count Mensdorff intimated the general nature of the note. Sir Edward
regretted the time limit set as akin to an ultimatum, and so likely
to inflame opinion in Russia, and render difficult securing a
satisfactory reply from Serbia. If it later developed that
proceedings were unduly protracted, a time limit could then be set.
By that time Russian opinion would be less excited, and, if the case
appeared strong against Serbia, the Russian Government would be in
a position to influence Serbia to reply satisfactorily to the
demands of the note. A time limit was generally a thing used only as
a last resort, when all other means had failed.
Count Mensdorff instanced the bad faith of Serbia in not fulfilling
her promise of 1909 to live on neighborly terms with Austria-Hungary,
and said that, on the contrary, she had conducted an agitation to
disintegrate that country, which made it absolute for Austria to
protect herself. On this Sir Edward did not comment. He said that the
French Ambassador, M. Cambon, and the Russian, Count Benckendorff, and
others were agreed that those who had influence at St. Petersburg
should exert it on behalf of patience and moderation.
"I had replied that the amount of influence that could be used in
this sense would depend upon how reasonable were the Austrian
demands and how strong the justification that Austria might have
discovered for making her demands. The possible consequences of
the present situation were terrible. If as many as four great
powers of Europe--let us say, Austria, France, Russia, and
Germany--were engaged in war, it seemed to me that it must
involve the expenditure of so vast a sum of money, and such an
interference with trade, that a war would be accompanied or
followed by a complete collapse of European credit and industry.
In these days, in great industrial states, this would mean a
state of things worse than that of 1848, and, irrespective of who
were victors in the war, many things might be completely swept
away.
"Count Mensdorff did not demur to this statement of the possible
consequences of the present situation, but he said that all would
depend upon Russia.
"I made the remark that, in a time of difficulties such as this,
it was just as true to say that it required two to keep the peace
as it was to say ordinarily that it took two to make a quarrel. I
hoped very much that, if there were difficulties, Austria and
Russia would be able in the first instance to discuss them
directly with each other.
"Count Mensdorff said that he hoped this would be possible, but
he was under the impression that the attitude in Petrograd had
not been very favorable recently."
On the same day, July 23, 1914, before the copy of the note had been
presented to him, M. Bienvenu-Martin, Acting Minister for Foreign
Affairs at Paris, notified the French Ambassadors at London, Berlin,
St. Petersburg, and Rome, that it was reported by M. Dumaine, French
Ambassador at Vienna, that the intention of Austria-Hungary was to
proceed with the greatest severity against Serbia, while keeping
eight army corps ready to start operations.
Nevertheless Baron Macchio, Austro-Hungarian Under-Secretary for
Foreign Affairs, had assured M. Dumaine that the tone and demands of
the note were such as to allow us to count on a peaceful result.
"In view of the customary procedure of the Imperial Chancellery,
I do not know what confidence ought to be placed in these
assurances....
"The Serbian Minister [M. Vesnitch] holds that as M. Pashitch
[Serbian Prime Minister] wishes to come to an understanding, he
will accept those demands which relate to the punishment of the
outrage and to the guaranties for control and police supervision,
but that he will resist everything which might affect the
sovereignty and dignity of his country.
"In diplomatic circles at Vienna the German Ambassador [Von
Tschirschky] is in favor of violent measures, while at the same
time he confesses that the Imperial Chancellery is perhaps not
entirely in agreement with him on this point; the Russian
Ambassador [Schebeko], trusting to assurances which have been
given him, has left Vienna, and before his departure confided to
M. Dumaine that his Government will not raise any objection to
the punishment of the guilty and the dissolution of the
revolutionary associations, but that they could not accept
requirements which were humiliating to the national sentiment of
Serbia."
On the same day, July 23, 1914, M. Allizé, French Minister at
Munich, reported to M. Bienvenu-Martin that the Bavarian press were
optimistic over a peaceful solution of the Serbian question, but
that official circles were pessimistic.
The note was presented at 6 p. m., Thursday, July 23, 1914, by the
Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade, Baron Giesl von Gieslingen,
to the Serbian Minister of Finance, M. Laza Patchou, in the absence
of M. Pashitch, the Prime Minister, who was away electioneering. The
time limit for acceptance of its demands was forty-eight hours.
Giesl added verbally that, if the demands were not accepted within
that period, the Austro-Hungarian Legation would leave Belgrade on
the morrow, Friday, at 10 a. m. This information was telegraphed
that evening to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Petrograd, M.
Sazonof, by the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Belgrade, M.
Strandtman. Through him M. Patchou solicited the help of Russia,
declaring that no Serbian Government could accept the demands of
Austria-Hungary. M. Patchou at the same time telegraphed to the
foreign Serbian Legations the news of the delivery of the note, and
informed them that he was in a position to state that no Serbian
Government could accept its demands in their entirety.
TEXT OF THE NOTE
The following are the contents of the note:
"On March 31, 1909, the Royal Serbian Minister to the court of
Vienna made the following statement, by order of his Government:
"'Serbia declares that she is not affected in her rights by the
situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore
adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to
arrive at in reference to Article XXV of the Berlin Treaty. By
following the councils of the powers, Serbia binds herself to
cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has
assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she
binds herself further to change the direction of her present
policies toward Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with
the latter in friendly and neighborly relations.'"
Here follow the charges with which the reader is already familiar:
That there is in Serbia a movement to separate certain territories
from the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which, developed under the eyes
of the Government of Serbia, has found expression beyond that
kingdom in a series of acts of terrorism and assassination.
The Serbian Government has done nothing to suppress the movement,
its violent propaganda in public education and the press, or the
participation in its intrigues by public officials.
"It becomes plain from the evidence and confessions of the
criminal authors of the outrage of June 28 that the murder at
Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade, that the murderers received
the arms and bombs with which they were equipped from Serbian
officers and officials who belonged to the Narodna Odbrana, and
that, lastly, the transportation of the criminals and their arms
to Bosnia was arranged and carried out by leading Serbian
frontier officials.
"These results impose upon the Imperial and Royal Government the
duty to terminate intrigues which constitute a permanent menace
for the peace of the monarchy.
"In order to obtain this purpose, the Imperial and Royal
Government is forced to demand official assurance from the
Serbian Government that it condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i. e., the entirety of the machinations
whose aim it is to separate parts from the monarchy which belong
to it, and that Serbia binds herself to suppress with all means
this criminal and terrorizing propaganda.
"In order to give to these obligations a solemn character, the
Royal Serbian Government will publish on the first page of its
official organ of July 26, 1914, the following declaration:
"'The Royal Serbian Government condemns the propaganda directed
against Austria-Hungary, i.e., the entirety of those machinations
whose aim it is to separate from the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy
territories belonging thereto, and she regrets sincerely the
ghastly consequences of these criminal actions.
"'The Royal Serbian Government regrets that Serbian officers and
officials have participated in the propaganda, cited above, and
have thus threatened the friendly and neighborly relations which
the Royal Government was solemnly bound to cultivate by its
declaration of March 31, 1909.
"'The Royal Government, which disapproves and rejects every
thought or every attempt at influencing the destinations of the
inhabitants of any part of Austria-Hungary, considers it its duty
to call most emphatically to the attention of its officers and
officials, and of the entire population of the kingdom, that it
will henceforward proceed with the utmost severity against any
persons guilty of similar actions, to prevent and suppress which
it will make every effort.'
"This explanation is to be brought simultaneously to the
cognizance of the royal army through an order of his majesty the
king, and it is to be published in the official organ of the
army.
"The Royal Serbian Government binds itself, in addition, as
follows:
"'1. To suppress any publication which fosters hatred of, and
contempt for, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and whose general
tendency is directed against the latter's territorial integrity.
"'2. To proceed at once with the dissolution of the society
Narodna Odbrana, to confiscate their entire means of propaganda,
and to proceed in the same manner against the other societies and
associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with the
propaganda against Austria-Hungary. The Royal Government will
take the necessary measures, so that the dissolved societies may
not continue their activities under another name or in another
form.
"'Without delay to eliminate from the public instruction in
Serbia, so far as the corps of instructors as well as the means
of instruction are concerned, that which serves, or may serve, to
foster the propaganda against Austria-Hungary.
"'4. To remove from military service and the administration in
general all officers and officials who are guilty of propaganda
against Austria-Hungary, and whose names, with a communication of
the material which the Imperial and Royal Government possesses
against them, the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the
right to communicate to the Royal Government.
"'5. To consent that in Serbia officials of the Imperial and
Royal Government cooperate in the suppression of a movement
directed against the territorial integrity of the monarchy.
"'6. To commence a judicial investigation against the
participants of the conspiracy of June 28, who are on Serbian
territory. Officials, delegated by the Imperial and Royal
Government, will participate in the examinations.
"'7. To proceed at once with all severity to arrest Major Voja
Tankosic and a certain Milan Ciganowic, Serbian state officials,
who have been compromised through the result of the
investigation.
"'8. To prevent through effective measures the participation of
the Serbian authorities in the smuggling of arms and explosives
across the frontier, and to dismiss those officials of Shabatz
and Loznica who assisted the originators of the crime of Sarajevo
in crossing the frontier.
"'9. To give to the Imperial and Royal Government explanations in
regard to the unjustifiable remarks of high Serbian functionaries
in Serbia and abroad who have not hesitated, in spite of their
official position, to express themselves in interviews in a
hostile manner against Austria-Hungary after the outrage of June
28.
"'10. The Imperial and Royal Government expects a reply from the
Royal Government, at the latest by Saturday, 25th inst., at 6 p.
m. A memoir concerning the results of the investigations at
Sarajevo, so far as they concern points 7 and 8, is inclosed with
this note.'"
INCLOSURE
"The investigation carried on against Gabrilo Princip and
accomplices in the court of Sarajevo, on account of the
assassination on June 28, has so far yielded the following
results:
"'1. The plan to murder Archduke Franz Ferdinand during his stay
in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip,
Nedeljko, Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko
Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic.
"'2. The six bombs and four Browning pistols which were used by
the criminals were obtained by Milan Ciganowic and Major
Tankosic, and presented to Princip Gabrinowic in Belgrade.
"'3. The bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of
the Serbian army in Kragujevac.
"'4. To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic
instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of the grenades and gave
instructions in shooting with Browning pistols to Princip Grabez
in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider (outside
Belgrade).
"'5. In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia
and Herzegovina by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the
smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was
organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their
arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier
captains of Shabatz (Rade Popowic) and of Loznica, as well as by
the custom-house official Rudivoy Grbic of Loznica with the aid
of several other persons.'"
On the same day that the note was presented to Serbia, July 23,
1914, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg, the German Chancellor, wrote a
circular letter to the German Ambassadors at Paris, London, and St.
Petersburg, embodying and enforcing the Austro-Hungarian arguments
justifying the note. These the ambassadors were instructed to
present to the Foreign Offices of the countries to which they were
accredited. The chancellor commended the self-restraint of
Austria-Hungary in thus far avoiding war with Serbia. Now, however,
he feared that Serbia would not comply with the just demands of the
country she had injured, but would adopt "a provocative attitude
toward Austria-Hungary."
"Nothing would remain for the Austro-Hungarian Government, unless
it renounced definitely its position as a great power, but to
press its demands with the Serbian Government, and, if need be,
enforce the same by appeal to military measures, in regard to
which the choice of means must be left with it."
The ambassadors were charged to give special emphasis to the view
"that in this question there is concerned an affair which should
be settled solely between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the
limitation to which it must be the earnest endeavor of the powers
to insure. We anxiously desire the localization of the conflict
because every intercession of another power on account of the
various treaty alliances would precipitate inconceivable
consequences."
The ambassadors were instructed by the chancellor to send him
telegraphic reports of their interviews.
CONTROVERSY OVER THE TIME LIMIT
The diplomatic correspondence of the two following days is occupied
chiefly with the attempt of Serbia and the powers not party to the
dispute to have the time limit of the Austro-Hungarian note
extended. In order to save repetition the correspondence hereafter
will be given under the heads of the dates when letters, telegrams,
etc., were sent, and the subheads of the countries in whose official
reports they are found.
CHRONOLOGICAL ARRANGEMENT OF DATES
FRIDAY, JULY 24, 1914
_Serbia._ M. Strandtman, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at
Petrograd, that Pashitch, Prime Minister of Serbia, had returned to
the capital, and would give an answer to Austria within the
prescribed time, showing the points which are acceptable or
unacceptable.
"To-day an appeal will be addressed to the powers to defend the
independence of Serbia. Then, added Pashitch, if war is
inevitable, we will make war."
_Great Britain._ Mr. Crackanthorpe, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Belgrade, telegraphed Sir Edward Grey that M. Pashitch had told him
that the Austrian demands were considered unacceptable by the
Serbian Government, and that it trusted to Great Britain to induce
Austria to moderate them. M. Pashitch was dejected and anxious.
_Russia._ The Crown Prince Alexander, Prince Regent of Serbia,
telegraphed to Czar Nicholas II of Russia that the Serbian
Government had been willing from the first to open an inquiry in
Serbia as to complicity of Serbian subjects in the crime of
Sarajevo.
"The demands contained in the Austro-Hungarian note are, however,
unnecessarily humiliating for Serbia, and incompatible with her
dignity as an independent state....
"We are prepared to accept those of the Austro-Hungarian
conditions which are compatible with the position of an
independent state, as well as those to which your majesty may
advise us to agree, and all those persons whose complicity in the
crime may be proved will be severely punished by us. Certain of
the demands could not be carried out without changes in our
legislation, which would need time.... We may be attacked at the
expiration of the time limit by the Austro-Hungarian army which
is concentrating upon our frontier. We are unable to defend
ourselves, and we beg your majesty to come to our aid as soon as
possible. The much-appreciated good will which your majesty has
so often shown toward us inspires us with the firm belief that
once again our appeal to your noble Slav heart will not pass
unheeded...."
_Russia._ M. Broniewsky, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin,
telegraphed to M. Sazonof, Minister for Foreign Affairs at St.
Petersburg, that the Berlin press in the main warmly welcomed the
uncompromising attitude of Austria-Hungary.
"The semiofficial 'Lokal-Anzeiger' is particularly violent; it
describes as fruitless any possible appeals that Serbia may make
to St. Petersburg, Paris, Athens, or Bucharest, and concludes by
saying that the German people will breathe freely when they learn
that the situation in the Balkan Peninsula is to be cleared up at
last."
_Serbia._ Dr. Spalaikovitch, Serbian Minister at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to M. Pashitch a report of a chance interview with Count
Pourtalès, the German Ambassador. The Count had said that peace with
Austria-Hungary depended on Serbia alone, since the matter lay
entirely between the two disputants.
"In reply I told Count Pourtalès that he was under a
misapprehension, and that he would see before long that this was
not a question merely between Serbia and Austria, but a European
question."
_Austria-Hungary._ Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at
London, telegraphed to Count Berchtold, Minister for Foreign Affairs
at Vienna, that he had handed a copy of the note to Serbia to Sir
Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
"At the fifth heading he asked what it meant; to introduce
officials of our Government in Serbia would be equivalent to the
end of Serbian political independence. I answered that
cooperation of, e.g., police officials, in no way affected the
sovereignty of the state.
"He regretted the time limit, as in this way we should be
deprived of the possibility of quieting the first outbreak of
excitement and bringing pressure to bear upon Belgrade to give us
a satisfactory answer. It was always possible to send an
ultimatum if answer was not satisfactory.
"I developed our point of view at length. (Necessity of defense
against continued revolutionary undertakings which threaten the
territory of the [Dual] Monarchy, protection of our most vital
interests, complete failure of the conciliatory attitude which we
had hitherto often shown to Serbia, who had had more than three
weeks to set on foot of her own accord investigations as to
accomplices in outrage, etc.)
"The Secretary of State repeated his objections to the short time
limit, but recognized that what was said as to complicity in the
crime of Sarajevo, as well as many of our other requirements, was
justified.
"He would be quite ready to look on the affair as one which only
concerned Austria-Hungary and Serbia. He is, however, very
'apprehensive' that several great powers might be involved in a
war. Speaking of Russia, Germany, and France, he observed that
the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance might be more or less to
the same effect as those of the Triple Alliance.
"I fully explained to him our point of view, and repeated with
emphasis that in this case we must stand firm so as to gain for
ourselves some sort of guaranties, as hitherto Serbian promises
have never been kept. I understood that in the first place he
considered the question only as it influences the position of
Europe. He must, however, in order to be fair to our point of
view, put himself in our situation.
"He would not go into any more detailed discussion on this
subject, said he must have time to study the note more carefully.
He was to see the German and the French Ambassadors, as he must
first of all exchange ideas with the powers who are allies of
Austria-Hungary and Russia respectively, but have themselves no
direct interest in Serbia."
Count Szécsen, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Paris, telegraphed to
Count Berchtold that, on his presentation of the copy of the note to
Serbia to M. Bienvenu-Martin, French Acting Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, point five in the note had seemed to make a special
impression on the secretary, since he had asked that it be reread.
"I took the opportunity to impress on him that the question was
one which must be brought to an issue directly between Serbia and
us, but that it was in the general interests of Europe that the
trouble which for years past had been kept up by Serbian
intrigues against us should at last make way for a clear
situation.
"All friends of peace and order, and I placed France in the first
rank of these, should therefore give serious advice to Serbia to
change completely her attitude and to satisfy our just demands.
"The minister said that it was the duty of Serbia to proceed
energetically against any accomplices of the murderers of
Sarajevo, a duty which she could not escape. While laying special
stress on the sympathy of France for Austria-Hungary, and on the
good relations which existed between our two countries, he
expressed the hope that the controversy would be brought to an
end peacefully in a manner corresponding to our wishes.
"The minister avoided every attempt to palliate or to defend in
any way the attitude of Serbia."
In a second telegram Count Szécsen reported that Baron von Schoen,
German Ambassador at Paris, had officially informed M. Bienvenu-Martin,
French Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, that, in the view of the
Berlin Cabinet, the Serbian controversy concerned only the two parties
to it, and, in case that third states should wish to intervene, Germany
would be on the side of her ally. M. Bienvenu-Martin replied that his
Government agreed that the controversy concerned Belgrade and Vienna
alone, and he hoped for a peaceful solution.
Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, on presenting the copy of the
note to Serbia to M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the minister had questioned the fact of the outrages complained of
arising in Serbia, and declared that the note was a pretext for war
on Serbia.
"I said to him that no one among us was attacking the integrity
of Serbia or the dynasty. M. Sazonof expressed himself most
vigorously against the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana, which
Serbia would never undertake. The participation of imperial and
royal officials in the suppression of the revolutionary movements
elicited further protest on the part of the minister. Serbia then
will no longer be master in her own house. 'You will always be
wanting to intervene again, and what a life you will lead
Europe!' I answered that if Serbia shows good will it will be a
quieter life than hitherto.
"The commentary added to the communication of the note was
listened to by the minister with fair composure; at the passage
that our feelings were shared by those of all civilized nations,
he observed that this was a mistake. With all the emphasis I
could command, I pointed out how regrettable it would be if we
could not come to an understanding with Russia on this question,
in which everything which is most sacred to us was at stake, and,
whatever the minister might say, everything which is sacred in
Russia. The minister attempted to minimize the monarchical side
of the question.
"With regard to the _dossier_ which was put at the disposal of
the Governments, M. Sazonof wanted to know why we had given
ourselves this trouble, as we had already delivered the
ultimatum. This was the best proof that we did not really desire
an impartial examination of the matter. I said to him that the
results which had been attained by our own investigations were
quite sufficient for our procedure in this matter, which had to
do with Austria-Hungary and Serbia, and that we were only ready
to give the powers further information if it interested them, as
we had nothing to keep secret.
"M. Sazonof said that now that the ultimatum had been issued he
was not in the least curious. He represented the matter as if we
only wanted to make war with Serbia whatever happened. I answered
that we were the most peace-loving power in the world, but what
we wanted was security for our territory from foreign
revolutionary intrigues, and the protection of our dynasty from
bombs....
"In spite of his relative calm, the attitude of the minister was
throughout unaccommodating and hostile."
The Russian "Official Gazette" announced that the Government were
closely and anxiously following the Serbian controversy, to which
Russia could not remain indifferent.
Count Szápáry telegraphed to Count Berchtold that, after a council
of ministers which had lasted five hours, M. Sazonof had received
the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalés.
M. Sazonof took the position that the Serbian question was a
European affair, the settlement of 1909 having been made under the
auspices of all the powers. He pointed out
"that Austria-Hungary had offered a _dossier_ for investigation
when an ultimatum had already been presented. Russia would
require an international investigation of the _dossier_, which
had been put at her disposal. My German colleague at once brought
to M. Sazonof's notice that Austria-Hungary would not accept
interference in her difference with Serbia, and that Germany also
on her side could not accept a suggestion which would be contrary
to the dignity of her ally as a great power.
"In the further course of the conversation the minister explained
that that which Russia could not accept with indifference was the
eventual intention of Austria-Hungary 'to devour Serbia.' Count
Pourtalès answered that he did not accept any such intention on
the part of Austria-Hungary, as this would be contrary to the
most special interest of the monarchy. The only object of
Austria-Hungary was 'to inflict on Serbia justly deserved
chastisement.' M. Sazonof on this expressed his doubts whether
Austria-Hungary would allow herself to be contented with this
even if explanations on this point had been made.
"The interview concluded with an appeal by M. Sazonof that
Germany should work with Russia for the maintenance of peace. The
German Ambassador assured the Russian Minister that Germany
certainly had no wish to bring about a war, but that she
naturally fully represented the interests of her ally."
Count Pourtalès telegraphed his Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg
that M. Sazonof was very much agitated.
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at London, to explain to Sir Edward Grey, British
Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the action taken toward Serbia
was not a formal ultimatum but "merely a _démarche_ with a time
limit," which, if not acceded to, would be followed only by
Austria's breaking off diplomatic relations and beginning military
preparations.
"If Serbia were to give way only under the pressure of our
military preparations, we should indeed have to demand that she
should make good the expenses which we had incurred; as is well
known, we have already had twice (1908 and 1912) to mobilize
because of Serbia."
Count Berchtold telegraphed to Count Szápáry, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at St. Petersburg, a report of his interview with Prince
Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at Vienna. The prince had
stated that St. Petersburg was apprehensive that the _démarche_
might take the form of humiliating Serbia, and this would have an
echo in Russia.
"I explained ... the danger, not only to the integrity of the
[Dual] Monarchy, but also to the balance of power and the peace
of Europe, which would be involved in giving further scope to the
great Serbian propaganda, and how all the dynasties, and not
least the Russian, would apparently be threatened if the idea
took root that a movement which made use of murder as a national
weapon could be continued with impunity.
"I pointed out that we did not aim at any increase of territory,
but only at the maintenance of what we possess, a point of view
which could not fail to be understood by the Russian Government."
_Russia._ M. Sazonof, Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs,
telegraphed to Prince Koudacheff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires at
Vienna, to ask Count Berchtold, Austro-Hungarian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, that the time limit in the note to Serbia be
extended, as it left to the powers insufficient time for
conciliation.
"Austria-Hungary, having declared her readiness to inform the
powers of the results of the inquiry upon which the Imperial and
Royal Government base their accusations, should equally allow
them sufficient time to study them.
"In this case, if the powers were convinced that certain of the
Austrian demands were well founded, they would be in a position
to offer advice to the Serbian Government.
"A refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render
nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to
the powers, and would be in contradiction to the very bases of
international relations."
M. Sazonof communicated this message to London, Rome, Paris, and
Belgrade, with the request that in the three former cases similar
instructions be given to their Ambassadors at Vienna.
_Great Britain._ Sir Edward Grey, British Secretary for Foreign
Affairs, telegraphed to Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at
Vienna, that he had said to Count Mensdorff, Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador at London, that it was a matter for great regret that a
time limit, and such a short one at that, had been insisted upon at
this stage of the proceedings.
"The murder of the archduke and some of the circumstances
respecting Serbia quoted in the note aroused sympathy with
Austria, as was but natural, but at the same time I had never
before seen one state address to another independent state a
document of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be
hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent
sovereignty if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that
Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint
officials who would have authority within the frontiers of
Serbia.
"I added that I felt great apprehension, and that I should
concern myself with the matter simply and solely from the point
of view of the peace of Europe. The merits of the dispute between
Austria and Serbia were not the concern of his majesty's
Government, and such comments as I had made above were not made
in order to discuss those merits.
"I ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an
exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their
views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of
the situation."
Sir George Buchanan, British Ambassador at St. Petersburg,
telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey that M. Sazonof, the Russian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, had sought an interview with him, as the
Austrian step clearly meant war. At the interview M. Sazonof had
said Austria's demands were provocative and immoral, some being
impossible of acceptance. She would never have taken such action
unless Germany had first been consulted. He hoped Great Britain
would proclaim her solidarity with Russia and France. France would
fulfill the treaty obligations with Russia, besides supporting
Russia in diplomatic negotiations. Sir George said, that personally
he did not expect any declaration of this kind from Great Britain.
Direct British interests were nil in Serbia, British public opinion
would not permit Great Britain to enter war on her behalf. M.
Sazonof replied that the general European question was involved, and
Great Britain could not afford to efface herself from the problems
now at issue.
Evidently Sazonof wants Great Britain to join in warning Austria
that her intervention in Serbia will not be tolerated. But suppose
Austria nevertheless wars in Serbia, will Russia forthwith declare
war on Austria?
A council of ministers is being held this afternoon on mobilization.
At a meeting to-morrow, where the czar will preside, a decision will
be come to.
Sir George said the important thing to do was to influence Austria
to extend the time limit. M. Paléologue, the French Ambassador, was
either set on war or was bluffing, and whichever it was, our only
chance for peace was to adopt a firm and united attitude. There was
no time to carry out Sir George's suggestion. The British Ambassador
then said that his Government might perhaps warn Austria that war
would probably mean Russian intervention, which would involve France
and Germany, and so make it hard for Great Britain to keep out of
the conflict. M. Sazonof answered that Great Britain would sooner or
later be dragged into war; war would be rendered more likely by
Great Britain if she did not make common cause with Russia and
France. President Poincaré and M. Viviani, President of the Council,
being in Russia, it appears as if Austria had taken advantage of
their absence from France to present their ultimatum to Serbia. Even
though we do not join them it seems that France and Russia are
determined to make a strong stand.
Sir Maurice de Bunsen, British Ambassador at Vienna, telegraphed to
Sir Edward Grey that he was assured by M. Schebeko, Russian
Ambassador at Vienna, that Russia would not be indifferent to the
humiliation of Serbia. Prince Koudacheff, the Russian Chargé
d'Affaires, had told Count Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian Minister
for Foreign Affairs, that the note to Serbia was unusual and
peremptory, and drawn up in a form rendering its acceptance
impossible. The count replied that the Austro-Hungarian Minister
would leave Belgrade at the time set if Serbia did not yield. The
Dual Monarchy felt that its very existence was at stake. The step
taken by the Government was approved by the country. He did not
think objections would be raised by the powers.
Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador at
Paris of a conversation with M. Cambon, the French Ambassador at
London, over an intended interview that afternoon of Sir Edward with
Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador.
"I would say to the ambassador that, of course, if the
presentation of this ultimatum to Serbia did not lead to trouble
between Austria and Russia, we need not concern ourselves about
it; but, if Russia took the view of the Austrian ultimatum, which
it seemed to me that any power interested in Serbia would take. I
should be quite powerless, in face of the terms of the
ultimatum, to exercise any moderating influence. I would say that
I thought the only chance of any mediating or moderating
influence being exercised was that Germany, France, Italy, and
ourselves, who had not direct interests in Serbia, should act
together for the sake of peace, simultaneously in Vienna and St.
Petersburg.
"M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the
four powers, he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to
join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in
St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken
some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march
into Serbia, for the Serbians could not possibly accept the
Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion
to take action as soon as Austria attacked Serbia, and therefore,
once the Austrians had attacked Serbia, it would be too late for
any mediation.
"I said that I had not contemplated anything being said in St.
Petersburg until after it was clear that there must be trouble
between Austria and Russia. I had thought that if Austria did
move into Serbia, and Russia then mobilized, it would be possible
for the four powers to urge Austria to stop her advance, and
Russia also to stop hers, pending mediation. But it would be
essential for any chance of success for such a step that Germany
should participate in it.
"M. Cambon said that it would be too late after Austria had once
moved against Serbia. The important thing was to gain time by
mediation in Vienna. The best chance of this being accepted would
be that Germany should propose it to the other powers.
"I said that by this he meant a mediation between Austria and
Serbia.
"He replied that it was so."
Sir Edward Grey telegraphed the results of the interview with Prince
Lichnowsky to Sir Horace Rumbold, British Chargé d'Affaires at
Berlin. Sir Edward's statements were those he had decided upon in
his interview with M. Cambon. The prince replied that Austria might
be expected to move unless Serbia accepted her demands _in toto_. He
suggested that Serbia ought in no case to give a negative reply. A
partial acceptance if sent at once might afford an excuse to Russia
against immediate action. Sir Edward asked Sir Horace to submit his
views to the German Secretary of State, Herr von Jagow.